Cimic en 170202

Civil-Military Coordination in
Peace Operations
Course Authors
Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired)
US Army Civil Affairs
Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUPI
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Peace Operations Training Institute

®
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Peace Operations
Cover Photo: UN Photo #171677 by Stuart

Price. Brigadier General Bala Keita (fifth from
left), military commander of the Western Sector
of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid
operation in Darfur (UNAMID), talks with the
Arab nomads, following a consultation meeting.
16 March 2008.
Course Authors
Christopher Holshek, Colonel (retired)
US Army Civil Affairs
Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUPI
Series Editor
Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

®
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

© 2017 Peace Operations Training Institute. All rights reserved.

1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202
Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA
www.peaceopstraining.org
First edition: 2008

Second edition: 2012
The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI),
the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. The Peace Operations Training Institute is
an international not-for-profit NGO registered as a 501(c)(3) with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of
America. The Peace Operations Training Institute is a separate legal entity from the United Nations. Although every effort
has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course Author(s)
disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated largely
from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching document,
consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine. Only officially
vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with diametrically
opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in keeping with the
norms of pure and free academic pursuit.
Versions of this course offered in other languages may differ slightly from the primary English master copy. Translators
make every effort to retain the integrity of the material.
Peace Operations
Table of Contents
Foreword ix
Method of Study xi
Lesson 1 What Is Civil-Military Coordination? 12
Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination 14
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force 18
Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination 24
Lesson 2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum

of Peace Operations 38
Section 2.1 The Evolution of Complex, Full Spectrum Peace Operations 42
Section 2.2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace

Operations 48
Section 2.3 Integrated Peace Operations: Civil and Military Partners 52
Section 2.4 Snapshot of a Peacebuilding Mission: UNMIL 63
Section 2.5 The AMISOM Mandate 66
PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE
v
Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations
Lesson 3 Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance

and Disaster Relief 76
Section 3.1 UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 78
Section 3.2 Military Support Roles 88
Section 3.3 Practical Discussion – The Haiti Earthquake of 2010 90
Lesson 4 Military Support to Peacebuilding 106
Section 4.1 The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Nexus 108
Section 4.2 Peacebuilding Frameworks 112
Section 4.3 Peacebuilding Actors 117
Section 4.4 Civilianizing and Localizing 122
Section 4.5 Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 127
Lesson 5 UN Mission Integration and Coordination 132
Section 5.1 Coordination in a Peace Operations Context 134
Section 5.2 UN Mission Coordination 138
Section 5.3 UN Mission Civil-Military Coordination Structures 143
Section 5.4 Integrated Assessment and Planning 145
Section 5.5 UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities 148
Lesson 6 Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing 156
Section 6.1 What is Civil-Military Liaison? 158
Section 6.2 Civil-Military Assessment and Intelligence 163
Section 6.3 Civil-Military Information Sharing and Information

Management 166
vi
Lesson 7 Civil Assistance 174
Section 7.1 Mission Support and Community Support 176
Section 7.2 Protection of Civilians 186
Section 7.3 Support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration (DDR) and Security and Defence Sector
Reform (SSR/DSR) 191
Section 7.4 Military Support to Development 198
Lesson 8 Civil-Military Planning and Project

Management 208
Section 8.1 UN-CIMIC Project Management 210
Section 8.2 Quick Impact Projects 217
Section 8.3 Civil-Military Monitoring and Evaluation 220
Lesson 9 Civil-Military Communication 230
Section 9.1 Civil-Military Coordination and Public Information 232
Section 9.2 Cross-Cultural Communication 237
Section 9.3 Working with Interpreters 241
Section 9.4 Negotiations and Conflict Mitigation 244
vii
Appendices
Appendix A: Glossary and list of Acronyms 256
Appendix B: Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer Terms of Reference 275
Appendix C: Sample Civil-Military Project Management Guidelines &

Project Management Outline 281
Appendix D: Sample UN Mission UN-CIMIC Training and Education Plan 286
Appendix E: Sample UN-CIMIC Directive 287
Appendix F: Sample UN-CIMIC Operations Briefing 288
Appendix G: Survey of Further Civil-Military Training & Education

Resources 289
About the Authors: Col. (retired) Christopher Holshek 291
About the Authors: Dr. Cedric de Coning 292
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination 293
viii
Foreword
This course provides an overview of the theory and practice of civil-military coordination within the full
spectrum of peace operations proffered in the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) and explained in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
Principles and Guidelines (2008) and UN Security Council Resolution 2086 on “multidimensional
peacekeeping”. As such, it reviews the dialogue and interface among the military, civilian, and police
components of a peace operation with respect to political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and
other dimensions of the same operation to attain larger, more strategic political goals. This may be in
the conduct of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and
humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or “conflict management” conditions.
Often misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military
coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that is essentially about managing interactions among
disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process. It is also about the management of
transition from conflict to peace and from military to civilian dominance of that process. Civil-military
coordination is essential to any complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination
and the achievement of a system-wide impact on the conflict.
UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) officers are military officers responsible for the military
part of interactions among civilian, police, and military components of an integrated UN field mission
in a peace operations environment. They must work effectively with UN Humanitarian Civil-Military
Coordination (UN-CMCoord), Civil Affairs, and Political Affairs officers, as well as many others working
in the civil-military coordination context. They also need to understand the roles and functions of
development and peacebuilding actors, including UN Police, in order to facilitate and coordinate support
from the peacekeeping force to others in the mission, non-mission actors, and the local community, as
appropriate.
This course is designed for multiple audiences. For UN-CIMIC officers, it serves as an introduction
to the basics of civil-military coordination within a wider UN peace operations context and as a field
reference. For UN and non-UN civilian, police, and military personnel, it provides instruction on civil-
military coordination in general. This is to facilitate greater interoperability while respecting the integrity
and equities among disparate multilateral, regional, national, and local organizations working for a
common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations. This includes in particular
primary UN mission partners such as CMCoord, Civil Affairs and Political Affairs officers, UN Police, and
Military Experts on Mission, as well as those involved in security and safety; rule of law; logistics; and
other mission, agency, and organizational leadership functions.
As both theory and practice, this course is laid out in two informal parts. The first part (Lessons 1-4)
explains the concepts and principles of civil-military coordination mainly from a wider full-spectrum
UN peace operations context, with particular attention given to military support to humanitarian
assistance and peacebuilding. The second part (Lessons 5-8) goes into the practical application of
these strategic ideas at the operational and tactical levels. These lessons pay particular attention to
ix
civil-military relations and transition management through civil assistance (including the protection
of civilians and coordination with police) and joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and
project management. The final part (Lesson 9) is a review of civil-military coordination as an exercise in
adaptive leadership and communication.
This course is a natural progression from the original 2008 POTI course, Civil-Military Coordination,
as well as the 2012 course titled UN Civil-Military Coordination. This edition is based on best practices
obtained from various UN field missions, the UN Integrated Training Service, the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and other sources. It was also developed with knowledge
of the Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum by the international Civil Society
Consortium and available through the Peace Portal.
A course of this nature can never cover all potential variations, especially in a fast-changing and
dynamic environment. This course focuses on the broad application of concepts, principles, and policies.
However, special care has been taken to provide as much practical guidance as possible for those
working in the field. The course also provides examples of civil-military structures and operations from
a number of UN missions. Ultimately, it is up to each civil-military practitioner to interpret and apply the
general knowledge in the course to his or her own mission context.
As a minimum, we strongly suggest students new to UN peace operations to first take the POTI core
courses, Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations and Introduction to the UN System
in order to better understand and utilize this course. Please also consider the POTI courses and other
training resources referenced at the end of each lesson for greater understanding of related subject
matter.
We will add updated references and additional sources to the online classroom. We also welcome
any comments, corrections, suggestions, and contributions of examples and case studies from those
who have taken and applied this course. We would like to thank those who have already contributed,
as well as our colleagues in the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), OCHA, the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and many other UN agencies. We would also
like to express our gratitude to those in UN and African peace operations and many organizations and
individual experts, among them the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, for their
assistance with evaluating and refining the original and revised UN-CIMIC courses.
Last but certainly not least, we dedicate this course to the many civilian, police, and military
professionals, past and present, who have served and sacrificed in the cause of peace, in order to “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, as stated in the preamble to the UN Charter.
-Christopher Holshek and Cedric de Coning,

December 2016
x
Method of Study
This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The
following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies
and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:
• Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course material. Notice the lesson
and section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
• The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details,
strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
• Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson,
orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum
understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
• At the end of each lesson, take the Practice Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by re-reading
the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
• After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking
time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student
classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.
»» Access your online classroom at

<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.
• Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher
on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent,
you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
• A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the
Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.
Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

• Access to all of your courses;
• A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
• Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course

supplements;
• The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed

course; and
• Forums where you can discuss relevant topics with the POTI community.
xi
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS
LESSON
What Is Civil-Military
1 Coordination?
The need for better civil-

military coordination is driven
by the complexity of the peace
operations environment, as
well as growing demand and
increasingly limited resources.
UN Photo #192474 by Logan Abassi.
In this lesson » Lesson Objectives »
Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military • Understand what civil-military coordination is

Coordination and what it is not.
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and • Explain how international laws and criteria on the
the use of force use of force apply to civil-military coordination.
Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to • Distinguish among major international civil-

Civil-Military Coordination military approaches.
12
LESSON 1 | What Is Civil-Military Coordination?
Abou Moussa (left), Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Relief, Recovery and Rehabilitation and UN
Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia, and Colonel Akinwale (second from right), Military Observer of the United Nations Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL), meet with Richard Chayee (right), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) Commander, in Tapeta. 4 January
2004. UN Photo #29991 by Astrid-Helene Meister.
Introduction
Civil-military coordination is an inherently strategic

endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach,
is essentially about managing interactions among
disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace
process and managing the transition from conflict to
peace. Civil-military coordination is often misconstrued
as “public affairs”. In reality, it is central to mission
coordination and the achievement of a system-wide
impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform.
Civil-military coordination is the dialogue and

interface among the civilian, police, and military
components of a peace operation with respect to
political, security, humanitarian, developmental, and
other dimensions of the operation. This dialogue and
interface can help attain larger, more strategic political
13
goals related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding,

as well as humanitarian assistance, or under stabilization or “conflict management” conditions. As such,
it is a subset and a synonym for the coordination of an integrated UN field mission.
Effective civil-military coordination contributes to the mission mandate and its “exit strategy”,
primarily in the eventual departure of intervening military forces by fulfilling the mandate. In other
words, it attempts to help transition the military out of the mission environment at minimal human,
financial, and physical costs.
The need for better civil-military coordination is driven by the complexity of the peace operations
environment, as well as growing demand and increasingly limited resources. These resources include
donor funding and peacekeepers from troop- and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs). In this
regard, it is an exercise in the military principle of economy of force or effort.
Many TCC/PCCs and mission staff officers with mission coordination responsibilities are not prepared
for this vital undertaking, which hampers the interoperability and integrity of different organizations
working for a common purpose as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated peace operations. This
course is intended to help fill that gap.
Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination
A Nexus of Conflict Management
Civil-military coordination is as old as peace and war. In Julius Caesar’s Gallic Wars, the political and
military spheres were intertwined in civil-military government, as in ancient Persia, India, and China.
Many aspects of the medieval European codes of chivalry and Japanese bushido were rules on how
warriors were to interact with civilians — politically and socially. Conflict, one must remember, is above
all a political undertaking.
As war became deadlier on a mass scale in the mid-19th century, organizations like the International
Committee of the Red Cross formed to deal with wounded warriors and the impact of battle on civilian
populations. The international norms for civil-military interaction, including military, government, and
humanitarian responsibilities commanders had toward populations in territories they occupied, became
codified in the Hague Conventions of 1908 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The First World War
was the last major conflict in which the majority of casualties were military. The Second World War was
the first conflict in which the majority of those who suffered were civilians. Since then, most victims of
conflicts both large and small have been civilians.
After 1945 and especially after the Cold War, the United Nations, its agencies, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) increased in number and capacity. At the same time, military concepts and
capabilities for civil-military coordination grew as military forces saw more frequent involvement in
humanitarian assistance and operations between peace and war. The lines between the activities of
civilian and military organizations began to blur, requiring greater coordination between them.
By the 21st century, “security” had taken on a new meaning. With violent conflict occurring more
within or beyond the control of States than between them, the concept of “human security” emerged.
In its 1994 Human Development Report, the UN Development Programme identified the security of
communities and resilience of civil society as the keys to peace and stability. The democratization of
14
Peter Tingwa (left), Chief

of Civil Affairs, explains the
Disarmament, Demobilization,
Rehabilitation and Reintegration
(DDRR) programme at
the Pakistani Contingent
Headquarters in Tubmanburg.
13 January 2004.
UN Photo #30144 by Astrid-
Helene Meister.
both peace and violence occurred as technology and globalization distributed power once exclusive to
States into the hands of individuals and networks, licit and illicit. Unlike conventional national security’s
fixation with threats, human security’s concern is with the drivers of conflict and instability — the
difference between treating symptoms and curing the disease, or preventing its outbreak in the first
place. Peacebuilding and conflict prevention have grown as civil-military enterprises in response to this
paradigm shift. The UN’s approach to human security, being people-centred, comprehensive, context-
specific, and prevention-oriented, is articulated in its Human Security Handbook.
All this time, the impetus and demand for more comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated
approaches in international interventions have likewise grown. As the capacities for humanitarian
response and the promotion of peace and civil society lay increasingly with civilian entities, including
rule-of-law instruments such as police, civil-military coordination has equally developed as a nexus
of conflict management. Many civilian and military actors are realizing it is more than incidental to
operations that are increasingly integrated. In reality, this has always been the case.
Viewed strategically, two imperatives drive the need for better mission coordination and civil-military
coordination in peace operations. First, the complexity of the peace operations environment requires
greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities, because of their cross-cutting impacts
and interdependency. Second, increasingly limited resources in the face of growing demand means that
we must do more with less. We must use our available resources (including funding and peacekeepers)
more judiciously, efficiently, and effectively. In other words, we must not only better manage conflict
itself, but also the ways and means by which we manage peace.
What Civil-Military Coordination Is and Is Not
Widely misconstrued as a tactical activity in the pursuit of public relations agendas, civil-military
coordination is an inherently strategic endeavour that, regardless of doctrinal approach, is essentially
about the management of the interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the
peace process, as well as the management of transition from conflict to peace and from military to
15
civilian dominance of that process. In a peace operations context, it is the dialogue and interface among
the military and civilian and police components of a peace operation. As such, it is the nexus of any
complex peace operation because it is central to mission coordination and the achievement of a system-
wide impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform — and thus a subset and a synonym for the
coordination of a complex, integrated UN field mission.
Civil-military coordination is an exercise in strategic management, regardless of level, whose

operators must be able to “think globally and act locally” (or think strategically while acting tactically)
and leverage the comparative advantages of each component or partner in order to maximize
stakeholders in and minimize spoilers to the peace process in the right manner and time. Focusing on
drivers of conflict and instability rather than threats is more effective. Many of these drivers are in the
security sector and the civil-military relationship in societies. In this regard, as the 2015 Report of the
High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO Report) noted, rather than military and
technical engagements, “political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of UN peace
operations.” This invokes both the democratic principle of the primacy of civil authority, as well as what
some military philosophers have said about war as an extension of policy. In essence, civil-military
coordination is the applied civil-military relationship in civil society — a continuous dialogue in problem-
solving, innovation, and expectations management, regardless of “phase”.
One way to visualize this management process is its application in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
depicted in Figure 1. The idea is to move the military (in red) to the rear of the overall peace process,
assuming an increasingly minor, less visible, and more indirect role. This is achieved by working by,
with, and through external civilian (in yellow) and local (in green) partners in an enabling process of
helping to build the capacity and confidence essential to self-sustainable peace.
Figure 1
The process of enabling external civilian and local (or internal) partners, respectively, is also known
as “civilianizing” and “localizing”.1 Civilianizing and localizing may be done simultaneously, but the
most important relationship is to work by, with, and through civilian partners to improve local capacity
and confidence and enable the withdrawal of the military peacekeeping force. While this general civil-
military approach is ideal for transitioning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is also appropriate for
supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as conflict prevention.
1) This is explored in greater detail in Lesson 4.
16
More than managing the links between peace and security, drivers and threats, and strategy and
tactics, this process is also a form of adaptive leadership. It is about persuasion, collaboration, and
partnership as much as coercion and command-and-control. Civil-military coordination is a people-
centred learning endeavour. Moreover, civil-military leadership is done mostly by example. Evoking the
adage “actions speak louder than words”, the personal behaviour of peacekeepers — guided by the UN
Code of Conduct — counts more than anything else. One cannot simply talk about human rights, sexual
and gender-based violence, respect for others, and other such issues. One must also demonstrate
commitment to these principles and values. This gives every peacekeeper from every component an
inherent role in the civil-military mission, hence the learning approach to civil-military leadership and
its power of example.
Given the importance and complexity of their general mandate, civil-military coordination specialists
must be among the best of their kind with superior assessment, planning, and project management
capabilities. Beyond thinking and acting strategically and adaptively, they must contend with numerous
policy and operational frameworks and communicate and work effectively in both civilian and military
worlds. They must be effective speakers and writers, and they must have a minimum set of skills in
negotiation and mediation. Civil-military coordination is, ultimately, more a mindset than a skill set.
As an exercise in adaptive leadership, civil-military coordination is also fundamentally about

partnership. What binds all three components — civilian, police, and military — is a sense of public
service to three constituents: the international community the UN mission represents, the contributing
countries, and the host nation and local community. This way of viewing the mission is important to
building the capacity and confidence of local partners and instilling the same sense of unity of purpose
to their three components. Put another way, it is leadership by example.
The HIPPO Report calls for a “more inclusive peace and security partnership” that “leverages
comparative advantages” of all those involved. Although it focuses on the partnership between the UN
and regional organizations, the principles of cooperation identified in the report could just as well be
applied to civil-military coordination on a more operational level:
• Consultative decision making and common strategy;
• Division of labour based on respective comparative advantage;
• Joint analysis, planning, monitoring, and evaluation; and
• An integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention and transparency, accountability,
and respect for international standards.
Because civil-military coordination is a tool for managing partnerships and transition in peace
operations, “winning hearts and minds” is discouraged. In fact, a public relations approach is often
counterproductive because it is short-term and limited in effect — it is more tactical than strategic, and
more about external than internal actors. In addition to the significant dangers and risks it presents,
especially to humanitarian partners, “winning hearts and minds” reinforces rather than reduces local
dependency for services for which the military is inappropriate and cannot sustain, thus encumbering
the “exit strategy”. It also risks the perception that the force is taking sides in the conflict, compromising
the peacekeeping principle of impartiality, along with the mission’s credibility.
17
Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force

In order to understand civil-military coordination in peace operations as the applied civil-military
relationship in civil society, one must understand the international legal frameworks and criteria for the
use of force established through civilian political decisions.
The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations
The legal authority of the UN as the international body responsible for global peace and security
derives from Article 1 of the UN Charter, which states that the purpose of the UN is:
“…to maintain international peace and security, and to that

end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.”
Chapter VI of the UN Charter “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Article 33 states:
“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to

endanger the maintenance of international peace and security
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.”
Although Chapter VI does not specifically refer to the deployment of troops to monitor or supervise
ceasefires or peace agreements, most traditional peace operations missions were authorized under the
provisions of Chapter VI and are referred to as Chapter VI missions. These missions are only authorized
to use minimum force — in other words, to only use force in self-defence or defence of the mandate.
Chapter VII of the Charter, however, provides for enforcement powers, entitled “Action with Respect
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Article 39 empowers the Security
Council to determine threats to the peace, make recommendations, or decide what measures need to
be taken to restore international peace and security. Article 41 deals with enforcement measures not
involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to take any action necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Most Security Council resolutions do not refer to a specific chapter in the UN Charter when authorizing
a mission, but most analysts agree that any mandate beyond self-defence (under Article 51) derives
its authority from the powers included in Chapter VII. If a peace operation mission is authorized to use
“all necessary means to protect civilians” (or similar wording to that effect), it is generally regarded as
having some Chapter VII powers. Most recent peace operations have Chapter VII mandates. This has,
18
Three civil affairs officers of the joint

African Union/United Nations Hybrid
operation in Darfur (UNAMID) meet with
a group of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) at a Women Community Centre
in the Abu-Shouk Camp, to hear about
their security and health situation in
the camp. 3 February 2009. UN Photo
#397932 by Olivier Chassot.
to a large degree, added to the confusion in terminology between what constitutes “peace operations”
as opposed to “peace enforcement”, “stabilization”, or “conflict management”.
The UN Charter remains relevant to any discussion and analysis of peace operations and civil-
military coordination in peace operations. No matter how peace operations adapt, they have to remain
true to the spirit, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII, as well as
to the laws of war in the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law.
International Criteria on the Use of Force
Another trend is the new, more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining
characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary complex UN
peace operations are still grounded in and characterized by the core principles of consent, impartiality,
and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice have
developed considerably.
In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations: Principles and Guidelines, a policy document also known as the “Capstone Doctrine”.2 The
document reaffirms and provides a contemporary understanding of the three basic principles of UN
peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and non-use of force.
Consent by the parties to the peace or ceasefire agreement is a dynamic and multilayered concept.
It is essential for mission success and must be constantly managed, but it is understood that it may
often be lacking at the tactical level.
Impartiality means that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice to the parties to
the peace agreement. It should not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality, in the peacekeeping context,
refers to non-interference. If the UN mission is mandated to take action — for instance, to protect
civilians — it will interfere according to its mandate. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping missions are often
said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the mission will not take sides, but it will act against any party
that is in breach of its mandate.
2) As part of organizational restructuring beginning 1 January 2019, DPKO became the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and the Department of
Political Affairs (DPA) became the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).
19
The non-use of force implies that a UN peace operation will use the minimum force necessary to
protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is also now understood that UN peace operations
should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including threats against
those it has been mandated to protect.
The Capstone Doctrine uses the concept of “robust peacekeeping” to recognize that the use of force
at the tactical level may be necessary, when authorized to do so by the Security Council, to defend the
mission and its mandate from spoilers, and to protect civilians.
In addition to the peacekeeping principles, the 2004 Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identifies five basic criteria that the Security Council should
always address when authorizing the use of force:
• Seriousness of threat: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and
sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of force?
• Proper purpose: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt
or avert the threat in question?
• Last resort: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
• Proportional means: Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the
minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
• Balance of consequences: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful
in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse than the
consequences of inaction?
These criteria emphasize clear purpose and appropriate limitations on the use of force, with careful
consideration of consequences. Just as in rules of engagement applying to the use of deadly force, these
are the kinds of considerations that practitioners of civil-military coordination should foremost take into
account.
The Capstone Doctrine also stresses three other success factors: legitimacy, local ownership,
and credibility. The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping is derived from its unique position in international
law, the UN Charter, and UN Security Council authorization. This legitimacy is rightly seen as one of the
key assets — and comparative advantages — of UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations can lose
legitimacy when perceived to be serving national or regional interests, and when it fails to secure local
ownership.
A peace process cannot be consolidated if it is not locally owned and the host nation cannot assume
responsibility for its own governance. It is difficult, however, to achieve meaningful local ownership
during the period of an armed international intervention. In reality, most UN missions and other
international actors often undermine local ownership during such periods by, for example, employing
local professionals who should have been serving in government or in local civil society organizations.
The HIPPO Report argues for a more people-centred approach to peace operations and recommends
community engagement at every level, such as analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation.
Community engagement can be achieved in a variety of ways, like perception surveys and regular
forums for interaction and feedback from local residents. For example, the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) could appoint an advisory board made up of leaders from the community,
20
Two Members of the Formed

Police Unit of the Nigerian
contingent of the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) assist National
Police officers to contain
university student protesters.
12 June 2009. UN Photo
#399304 by Logan Abassi.
including prominent religious, academic, and other civil society personalities, and regularly consult
them on the peace operation’s plans or get their feedback on ongoing or past campaigns. The point is to
judge the effectiveness of the mission on the impact it is having on ordinary people — do they feel safer,
or is their trust in the justice system decreasing?
It is challenging but critical to also maintain credibility — a critical success factor — throughout
the lifetime of a peacekeeping operation. Missions have lost credibility for a variety of reasons, from
an inability to meet expectations of local communities, to sexual abuse and exploitation committed by
some peacekeepers. For this reason, civil-military coordination, at its base level, must be leadership by
example.
The Capstone Doctrine recognizes that, while UN peacekeeping operations are meant to support
the peace process, they cannot deliver peace on their own. The Capstone Doctrine thus understands
and accepts that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger peacebuilding process. In this larger
context, the core business of UN peacekeeping is threefold. First, missions should create a secure and
stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the State to provide security, with full
respect for the rule of law and for human rights. Second, UN peacekeeping operations should facilitate
the political process by promoting and enabling dialogue on peace, security, and reconciliation, and
support the establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. Third, they should provide
a framework for ensuring that the UN family as a whole, along with other international actors, pursues
its activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.
However, in the 21st century, the context for collective security and the use of force with respect
to the UN Charter has changed. With the blurring of lines between State and non-State actors and
combatants, the distribution of power, and the rise of human (versus State) security invoking the
protection of (often traumatized) civilians as well as conflict prevention, peace operations have become
more complex.
While it acknowledges that UN peace operations may find themselves, to some extent, involved in
stabilization or conflict management roles — and only with respect to deterring further escalation of
21
Members of the Nepalese contingent of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) participate
in CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) activities in an orphanage located in Kenscoff. A peacekeeper gives children
candies. 08 September 2009. UN Photo #407777 by Logan Abassi.
violence, containing the conflict, protecting civilians, and reviving the peace process, the HIPPO Report
provides clear guidance on the use of force under more robust circumstances:
“Peacekeeping operations are but one tool at the disposal of the

Security Council and they should perform a circumscribed set of
roles. In this regard, the Panel believes that UN troops should
not undertake military counter-terrorism operations. Extreme
caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks
to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such
operations should be exceptional, time-limited and undertaken
with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the
UN mission as a whole. Where a parallel force is engaged in
offensive combat operations it is important for UN peacekeeping
operations to maintain a clear division of labour and distinction
of roles.”3
With respect to the continued relevance of the peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and
the non-use of force, the HIPPO panel
“...is convinced of their importance in guiding successful

UN peacekeeping operations. Yet, these principles must be
interpreted progressively and with flexibility in the face of new
challenges, and they should never be an excuse for failure to
protect civilians or to defend the mission proactively.”
3) Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership, and People, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June
2015, p. x (Introduction).
22
All of this has critical implications for civil-military coordination. The legitimacy and credibility of
the presence and activities of peacekeeping forces are critically important to conflict transformation,
particularly in the engagement of local civilian partners and populations. This is why the principles offered
below — especially the primacy of civilian authority — reflect the civil-military relationship legitimized in
democratic societies. This not only ensures the appropriate application of military power operationally,
but also substantiates the moral and legal standing of the peace operation, and encourages partner and
host nation security forces to emulate this important relationship.
Some Operative Principles of Civil-Military Coordination
Below are some suggested operative principles that practitioners of civil-military coordination in
peace operations may consider applying, regardless of mission or circumstances. They are mindful of
the integrated UN peace operations mission model and are drawn in good part from the international
legal framework for peace operations and criteria for the use of force, as well as the principles of
peacekeeping and the Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)
Policy of November 2010.
• The Primacy of Civilian Authority: Civilian authority is paramount in UN missions. The SRSG
is responsible for overseeing the operations of the entire mission in support of the peace process.
The Head of Military Component (HOMC), also known as the Force Commander, is responsible
for the planning, coordination, and execution of military operations. In an integrated mission,
the Force Commander functions under the authority of the SRSG.
• The Military is Supporting and Not Supported: The division of labour, as explained in
the UN-CIMIC Policy, is as follows: Delivery of a secure environment is primarily a military
function, while support to the political process and long-term social stability (including through
delivery of rule of law, governance, humanitarian assistance, and development) are primarily
civilian functions. The force takes the lead role in security, but plays a supporting — and never
a supported — role to civilian-led or police mandated tasks. As such, it must have a solid
understanding of the civilian effort, of the political and social context within which it takes place,
and of ways in which the military can make a constructive contribution.
• The Military as Enabler: The essential aim of civil-military coordination is to maximize and
exploit opportunities for the military to create enabling conditions for civilian organizations and
partners — especially the host nation government and local communities — to accelerate the
peace process and bring about the mission end state. Beyond the primary role of delivering
a secure environment, this is largely done by helping to build the capacity of and confidence
in both international (or external) and local (or internal) civilian partners with respect to their
organizational comparative advantages. These include planning, coordination, intelligence,
logistics, training, etc. This also facilitates the eventual departure of military forces, commonly
known as the “end state”. In other words, the ultimate purpose of civil-military coordination is
to help work the military force out of its job.
• Indirect versus Direct Support: To minimize dependency on the force, and to promote
locally-led and locally-owned solutions, UN-CIMIC activities should be indirect. That is, civil-
military coordination should be conducted in support of and through UN and other international
23
or external civilian partners, serving as a “multiplier” or catalyst to civilian-led efforts to improve

local capacity and confidence. Direct civil assistance should only be used in cases of dire need
and as an option of last resort, i.e. when there is no police or civilian alternative available,
or when the need is so urgent that immediate action is required. Military support to peace
operations should focus on building local capacities and confidence, with the aim of transitioning
its support to civilian partner management and local self-sustainability — otherwise known as
civilianizing and localizing.
• Managing Civil-Military Interaction and Transition: Civil-military coordination is done

along two lines. The first is to manage the operational and tactical interaction (or relationship)
between military and civilian actors in all phases of peacekeeping operations. The second is
to maximize the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area in order to
facilitate transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Civil-military coordination is, thus, a
strategic leadership and management function within the context of the peace operation.
Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination
The United Nations: Two Complementary Concepts for Civil-Military Coordination
Peace operations do not take place in isolation and will always require some form of coordination
between the peace operation itself and other actors in the country in which the peace operation is
deployed. In the past, civil-military coordination was primarily a liaison task. It has now developed
into a dedicated and specialized function considered a critical factor in the success of contemporary
humanitarian assistance and complex peace operations. This is the main reason why the UN has
developed two recognized, complementary frameworks for civil-military coordination — Humanitarian
Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) and UN-CIMIC.
UN-CMCoord is the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) concept that refers to humanitarian
civil-military coordination. According to the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, UN-CMCoord is “the essential
dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is
necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency
and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.”4
The key coordination elements in natural disasters and complex emergencies are information
sharing, task division, and planning. The scope and modus operandi of these key elements will change
with the context and with the focus of the five CMCoord tasks:
1. Establish and sustain dialogue with military forces;
2. Establish a mechanism for information exchange and

humanitarian action with military forces and other armed
groups;
3. Assist in negotiations in critical areas of humanitarian-military

interaction;
4) CMCoord is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 3.
24
Military contingents from the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) joined
forces to hold a Civil-Military Co-operation, or
CIMIC day, for local residents and students
in Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince’s Bel Air
neighbourhood. Doctors, dentists and engineers
were in attendance at an all-girls school, providing
medical and dental attention and clearing the
surrounding streets of garbage and debris. 27
October 2011. UN Photo #493053 by Logan
Abassi.
4. Support development and dissemination of context-specific

guidance for the interaction of the humanitarian community
with the military; and
5. Monitor activity of military forces and ensure positive impact on

humanitarian communities.
UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that facilitates the interface between the military, police,
and civilian components of a UN mission, as well as between the military force and all other civilians
in the mission area. According to the UN-CIMIC Policy, the primary role of the military component of a
UN peace operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external
and internal actors can operate. A secondary role of the military component is to make its resources
available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives.
The UN-CIMIC Policy also points out that UN military forces undertake UN-CIMIC for two reasons:
• To manage the operational and tactical interaction between military and civilian actors in all
phases of peacekeeping operation; and
• To support creating an enabling environment for the implementation of the mission mandate by
maximizing the comparative advantage of all actors operating in the mission area.
25
Uruguayan UN peacekeepers
maintain order during a food
distribution in downtown Port-au-
Prince, Haiti. 25 January 2010.
UN Photo #426408 by Marco
Dormino.
The two core tasks of UN-CIMIC are civil-military liaison and information-sharing and civil assistance.
Civil-military liaison and information-sharing relates to the first management function of UN-CIMIC
(civil-military interaction).5 Civil assistance relates to the second management function of UN-CIMIC
(transition management), including mission and community support.6 It is important to note that the
work of UN-CIMIC officers will focus primarily on liaison and information sharing.
UN-CIMIC is conducted by military staff and contingents in peace operations at operational

(mission HQ or national) and tactical (sector HQ and units, or provincial and local) levels. Coordination
encompasses activities undertaken and/or facilitated by military components of UN integrated missions
across the full spectrum of UN peace operations, particularly as part of integrated assessments, analysis,
planning, execution, and monitoring and evaluation.
National civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted by TCC/PCC contingents as long as
they conform with or do not contravene the principles of peacekeeping, the laws and principles on
the use of force, and UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC policies and guidelines as they apply to the mission
mandate and situation at hand.7
African Union Peace Operations and Civil-Military Coordination
Although the UN is ultimately responsible for international peace and security, cooperation with
regional organizations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America help the UN carry out
its responsibility more efficiently and effectively than it could on its own. Such cooperation also builds
local capacity and ownership, helping to prevent future conflicts.
Three considerations explain the importance of regional approaches to peacemaking, peacekeeping,

and peacebuilding:
• Conflicts are rarely isolated within State borders;
5) This discussed is in greater detail in Lesson 6.

6) This is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 7.
7) The role and responsibilities of UN-CIMIC are articulated in the DPKO/Department of Field Support (DFS) policy Civil-Military Coordination in UN
Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC) of November 2010, which is available in full through the student classroom. As part of organizational
restructuring beginning 1 January 2019, the Department of Field Support (DFS) became the Department of Operational Support (DOS).
26
• Those who are closer to the problem are often in a better position to understand and influence
it; and
• Their proximity ensures that they have a long-term interest in its outcomes.
The most important regional relationship for the UN is its relationship with the African Union (AU).
African capacities are an important resource for UN peacekeeping. In 2015, African countries contributed
approximately 50 per cent of all uniformed UN peacekeepers, 60 per cent of its international civilian
peacekeepers, and 80 per cent of its national peacekeeping staff. UN support is also a critical enabler
for AU operations, as the UN has provided some form of support to all AU peace operations to date. The
UN is also an important exit strategy partner for the AU, as all AU peace operations to date have been
handed over to the UN once sufficient stability has been achieved. The effectiveness of UN and AU peace
operations is interdependent on several levels.
The African Standby Force (ASF) »
Launched in 2003, the ASF plans to provide for five sub-regional standby arrangements, each
up to brigade size, which will supply the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15-20,000 troops.
Each regional arrangement will include between 300 and 500 military observers who are trained
and ready to deploy on 14 days’ notice, a police standby capacity of at least 240 individual officers
and two company-strength police units (gendarmerie), and approximately 60 civilian experts. The
ASF should enable the AU to deploy two complex peace operations simultaneously.
There will also be a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration,
human rights, humanitarian operations, governance, and disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR).
The AU has the right to intervene in a Member State under certain grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and threats to legitimate order — in order
to restore peace and stability.
It is highly likely one will find an AU Special Political Mission alongside any UN peacekeeping operation
in Africa. Likewise, alongside any AU peace operation, one is likely to find a UN Special Political Mission.
UN and AU CIMIC officers and others responsible for coordination and liaison tasks need to be familiar
with each other’s organizations, as the UN and AU are likely to be in some form of strategic partnership
in any operation in Africa.
As of the end of 2016, the AU had deployed five major peace operations. The first was to Burundi
in 2003, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), which was replaced in 2004 with a United Nations
Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The second was the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, which
became the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007.
A third operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was deployed in the beginning of
2007 and is still ongoing. It is now the largest peace operation in Africa. A fourth operation, the African-
led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was deployed in January 2013, and transferred to
the UN in mid-2013 to become the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA). The fifth operation, the African-led International Support Mission to the Central Africa
27
Republic (MISCA), was established in December 2013. It was handed over to the UN in September 2014
and is now the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA).
AU Coordination Structures and Processes
The AU Commission acts as the secretariat for the political structures of the African Union. The
Commission is led by the Chairperson of the AU Commission (the AU counterpart of the UN Secretary-
General).
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the

highest decision-making body in the AU and
African Standby Force Mission
Scenarios »
is responsible for prevention, management,
and resolution of conflicts. The PSC has the 1. AU/regional military advice to a political
sole authority for mandating and terminating mission;
AU peace operations. The Chairperson of the
2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with
AU Commission is responsible for the overall
UN mission;
planning and management of AU peace
operations. The Peace Support Operations 3. AU/regional stand-alone observer mission;
Division, situated within the Peace and Security
Department, is responsible for the day-to-day 4. AU/regional traditional peacekeeping force for
management of AU peace operations. Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions;
The mission-level or operational

5. AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping
management structure will be informed by the
mission with low-level spoilers, an enduring feature
mandate of the mission. It typically consists
of many current conflicts; or
of a Special Representative of the Chairperson
of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or 6. AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where
more Deputy SRCC, a Force Commander, the international community does not act promptly
a Commissioner of Police, various heads of (peace enforcement).
substantive civilian components, and a Head
of Mission Support. The exact number of civilian personnel, their seniority, and the structure of the
various civilian components necessary will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission.
The Office of the SRCC has the overall responsibility for the multidimensional coherence and
coordination of the mission. It has the capacity to coordinate all elements of the mission’s mandate and
is supported by a senior mission management team.
When the size of a mission’s area of responsibility (AOR) is so large that it cannot be managed
efficiently with one headquarters, the mission will divide the AOR into multiple sectors and create an
integrated Sector Headquarters for each. The Sector HQ will be headed by a civilian Head of Sector
(HOS) who reports directly to the SRCC. The HOS facilitates coordination among the sector level
components. The HOSs report to their respective chains of command for operational purposes, with due
consideration to sector-level coordination.
AU peace operations, like AMISOM, have a CIMIC cell in the Force Headquarters, as well as Sector
Headquarters of similar size and function at UN peace operations. The AU generally uses the same
28
CIMIC policy and approach followed by the UN (UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC). Again, as with all UN-
mandated missions, national civil-military approaches and styles may be adapted as long as they fall
within the laws, principles, and guidelines set by the UN on peace operations and the use of force, and
UN-CMCoord/UN-CIMIC in particular.
NATO and European Union Civil-Military Concepts
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and coalition-type operations are typically deployed in
a contested environment as peace enforcement operations. They are often deployed where there is still
considerable hostility by factions against a peace agreement, for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan.
They are also generally deployed as a military force with a separate mandate and identity from the UN
or other international or regional groups that may be active in conflict-prevention, peacemaking, or
peacebuilding in the same country.
Civil-military approaches in NATO and European

Union (EU) doctrine are motivated by the need to
establish cooperation between the military force as a
separate legally mandated entity and the civilian actors in
their area of operations. Civil-military coordination in the
context of UN peace operations is motivated by the need
to maximize coordination between the military component
and the civilian components of the same integrated
mission, between the military component and the rest of
the UN system, and between the military component of
the UN mission and other non-UN external and internal
civilian actors in the same mission area.
For NATO, a “comprehensive approach” is required to

address a complex strategic environment that involves
multiple ethnic, religious, ideological, and capability
drivers. These drivers require sustainable solutions in
Peacekeepers from the United Nations Peacekeeping
societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters, or humanitarian
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) help volunteers in
catastrophes. These solutions are impossible to achieve the Engomi district of Nicosia, Cyprus, to load a
by military means alone. The military must enhance the container with humanitarian relief supplies bound
for tsunami victims in Sri Lanka. 19 January 2005.
abilities of civilian agencies to fill the humanitarian gap
UN Photo #63486 by UN.
through Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). CMI is a general
term for the overarching process of military and civilian actors engaging at various levels (strategic,
operational, tactical), and covering the whole spectrum of interactions in today’s challenges, complex
emergencies, and operations. These are a combination of short-term crisis response and stabilization
with long-term assistance and reconstruction activities under a CMI framework.
CIMIC (meaning civil-military cooperation) is the military function integral to multidimensional

operations, linking all cooperating parties and facilitating mutual civil-military support in order to reach
the mission end state for the best of the local population, the civil actors, and the Alliance. It enables
the military end state by coordinating and synchronizing military activities with civil actors, bringing
29
together military operations with political objectives. In NATO terms, this enables the transition from
offensive or defensive operations to security and stability operations, creating an environment where
Alliance forces can leave the area much sooner.
The NATO definition of CIMIC is:
“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the

mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors,
including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental organizations and
agencies.”
For NATO, the core CIMIC functions are grouped into three broad areas that together comprise the
total CIMIC contribution in support of the commander:
• Civil-military liaison, which includes establishing and maintaining liaison with civil actors at
appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonization, information sharing, concerted or
integrated planning, and conduct of operations;
• Support to the force, which includes: provision of information on the civil situation, including
assessment and evaluation of civil situation; the conduct of CIMIC activities, including CIMIC
projects and quick and long-term impact projects with or without civilian partners; promoting
force acceptance; influencing the civil society in the mission area; and facilitating access to
civilian resources when needed; and
• Support to civil actors and their environment, encompassing all support provided by a
military force to civilian authorities, organizations, and populations.
In addition to CIMIC staff officers in command groups at the joint task force, operational, and
tactical levels (J9 or G9), NATO forces deploy CIMIC groups, CIMIC units, and CIMIC elements. These
provide a structured organization for NATO forces to conduct CIMIC activities in support of the mission.
Their size and deployment duration are determined by task and how quickly the appropriate civil actors
and structures can be established. In addition to CIMIC staff performing a general CIMIC mission, NATO
may also deploy CIMIC functional specialists to meet a specific requirement for expertise in a certain
field to assist in the planning process or to conduct CIMIC projects. They may not necessarily be military
personnel. Specific areas could include public infrastructure and facilities, rule of law, etc.
NATO also has a CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in the Netherlands that serves as the training
centre for NATO CIMIC to help develop and deliver doctrine and operational guidance on, CIMIC planning,
CIMIC centres, and CIMIC techniques, as well as training for NATO CIMIC officers, specialists, and units.
The EU calls the concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CMCO), and defines it as:
“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission,

between military components of EU-led Crisis Management
Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU),
including national population and local authorities, as well as
international, national and non-governmental [organizations]
and agencies.”
30
The major difference between the NATO and EU concepts is that the NATO concept is more operational,
whereas the EU concept is more political-military guidance for the coordination of EU activities.
United States: Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs
United States forces define civil-military operations as:
“…the activities of a commander performed by designated CA

or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or
exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous
populations and institutions, by directly supporting the
attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or
maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. At
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and
during all military operations, CMO are essential to the
military instrument to coordinate the integration of military
and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in
support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations
dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.”
US Civil Affairs forces and operations fall within civil-military operations.
Civil Affairs, which comprises largely US Army Reserve forces, traces its historical roots to military
government operations in the North American frontier and newly obtained territories of the United
States in the nineteenth century through the occupation of Germany and Japan after the Second World
War. It is made up of designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained,
and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations, which are defined as: “the actions planned,
executed, and assessed by CA forces that enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the
civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability
within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of
civil government.” The core competencies and functions that Civil Affairs forces have to conduct civil
affairs operations include:
»» Civil Affairs activities (CAA)
• Civil information management (CIM).
• Civil-military operations centre (CMOC).
• Civil engagement (CE).
• CAO staff support.
»» Military government operations (MGO)
• Transitional military authority (TMA).
• Support to civil administration (SCA).
31
»» Civil Affairs supported activities (CASA)
• Nation assistance (NA).
• Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).
• Populace and resources control (PRC).
• Civil-military engagement (CME).
These lines of operation are conducted in coordination with US government agencies, intergovernmental
organizations such as the UN, NGOs and civil society organizations, and the host nation.
There are nearly 10,000 Civil Affairs personnel in the US military. About 90 per cent of them are
in the Army, and about 85 per cent are in the Reserves. They are particularly suited for this mission as
they live in both civilian and military worlds and may draw upon expertise in civilian occupations such
as law enforcement, engineering, medicine, law, banking, public administration, etc. As part of their
changing mission template, Civil Affairs forces are increasingly seen in conflict prevention engagement
missions to “build partnership capacity” in civil-military operations among troop-contributing countries,
particularly in Africa. A handful have been posted to UN field missions.
Relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination
What the NATO, EU, and US approaches to civil-military cooperation have in common is that they
see civil-military cooperation as a tool for command and control. It is something done in the service of
the commander and the military mission. It is there to assist and serve the military commander in the
execution of his or her military task and the achievement of the military objective.
The essential difference between these approaches and similar activities undertaken in the UN
context is that UN peace operations have an integrated military, civilian, and police mandate and mission
structure. The civil-military relationships between components of the peace operation and between
the peace operation and the rest of the UN System are largely predetermined by the organizational
structure of the specific UN peace operation. In the case of both UN-CIMIC and UN-CMCoord, the focus
is thus on how best to manage the coordination of an established UN system.
CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the
military force as a separate legal entity, and external (external to NATO or EU) civilian role players in the
same area of operations. To date, each NATO/EU operation has been unique, necessitating civil-military
coordination mechanisms for each specific set of actors in each specific mission environment. UN peace
operations are motivated by the need to maximize coordination among their own multidimensional
components, and to establish cooperation between the UN peace operation and other actors in the
peacekeeping mission area. As the same UN system actors deploy together into most missions, there
has been more room to establish system-wide policies and mechanisms that can be used in a range of
actual missions.
One of the most obvious differences between civil-military cooperation (as it is used in NATO
CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (as it is used in the UN context) is the use of two different words,
“cooperation” and “coordination”.
32
Coordination
Cooperation Coexistence
In the UN context, cooperation is viewed as the strongest relationship that can exist between
civilian, military, and police components. It is seen as a relationship where the component partners
agree to synchronize their policies and activities to undertake joint action. Most often, however, the
institutional effort necessary to achieve full cooperation can only be achieved and maintained under
special conditions, for a limited time, and for a specific purpose, for example, during an election. Under
normal circumstances, a less intense relationship is preferred. This state is referred to in its minimal
form as coexistence, especially in the humanitarian context. This normally implies that the parties to this
relationship exchange information, come together for coordination meetings, and occasionally undertake
some form of joint activity, for instance, a humanitarian convoy with a military escort. Regardless of
whether there is open cooperation or only limited coexistence, some amount of coordination is required.
Coordination in the UN context can therefore range on a scale from cooperation in its maximum state to
coexistence in its minimum state.
Nevertheless, there are some complementarities, if not compatibilities, among these civil-military
approaches. These major international players are realizing the complex landscape that impacts
their approaches to civil-military coordination; the simultaneous nature of everything from conflict
prevention to conflict management to peacebuilding; and the need for comprehensive, collaborative,
and coordinated approaches. The key for any civil-military practitioner in international peace operations
is to become familiar enough with these various approaches to facilitate greater interoperability in
general while protecting the integrity of numerous multilateral, regional, and national organizations
working for a common purpose — as part of or in partnership with UN-mandated operations.
In many ways, civil-military coordination is more a mindset than a skill set, and is the application of
common-sense wisdom.
Conclusion
In this lesson, we covered:
• The nature of civil-military coordination in international peace operations — what it is and what
it is not — and an understanding of how it applies in today’s peace and security landscape;
• How the nature and base principles of civil-military coordination are drawn from international
laws and criteria on the use of force; and
• Comparative civil-military approaches and their relationship to UN Civil-Military Coordination,

including UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC.
33
Some Civil-Military Coordination Rules of Thumb »

• Civil-military coordination is more a mindset than a skill-set.
• Build relationships and promote dialogue among unlikely partners.
• It’s not about us; it’s about them.
• Civilianize – work by, with, and through external civil partners.
• Support the establishment and expansion of “humanitarian space”, try to “do no harm”,
and consider military assets as a “last resort”.
• Fill gaps and reduce redundancies.
• “Their game plan is our game plan.”
• Localize – promote local (or internal) ownership.
• Provide assistance more indirectly than directly.
• Manage your expectations, the expectations of those you work for and with, and the
expectations of those you are helping.
• Perception is often reality.
• Actions (or inactions) speak louder and longer than words.
• When performing assessments, ask: “Who is doing What, When, Where, How, and Why?”
• Your measurements are part of a bigger picture.
For additional education and training
• Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM), First
Edition (2014), Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support Integrated
Training Services (DPKO/DFS ITS), available at: <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89582>.
• The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) provides e-learning courses,
some of which are no-fee, which may be of use to civil-military actors. Examples of relevance to
this Lesson include: Conflict Series 1 – What Is Conflict?; Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis.
For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.
• Civil Society-Military-Police Handbook and Curriculum on Human Security (March 2016), a

modular training handbook done by the Civil Society Consortium available through the student
classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1-3 and 5 of the Handbook. See also Local
Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches (March 2016), in particular
Chapters 2, 6, and 7, as well as the Policy Brief – Local Ownership, Coordination, and Human
Security (December 2015).
• NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence courses are available at: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>.

Although most of the courses are in-residence requiring funding, the CCOE offers one free
online course, the NATO CMI/CIMIC Awareness Course. It also maintains links to the latest
developments in CIMIC, directly or indirectly related to NATO, as well as CIMIC lessons-learned,
etc.
34
Further References
• Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnership, and People, Report of the High-Level
Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, 16 June 2015.
• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, DPKO, United Nations (18
January 2008).
• United Nations Security Council resolution 2199 (2015), Threats to International Peace Caused
by Terrorist Acts, S/RES/2199 (2015), UN Security Council, 12 February 2015, available at:
<https://undocs.org/s/res/2199(2015)>.
• United Nations Peace Operations: Aligning Principles and Practices, NUPI Report No. 2, 2015,
available at: <www.academia.edu/11882517/United_Nations_peace_operations_Aligning_
principles_and_practice>.
• The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions, International Peace Institute (31 July
2012), available at: <http://www.ipinst.org/2012/07/the-management-handbook-for-un-field-
missions>.
• Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, DPKO/DFS (4

February 2013), available at: <http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/89550>.
• UN Transitions: Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, International Peace Institute (August

2012), available at: <http://www.ipinst.org/2012/08/un-transitions-mission-drawdown-or-
withdrawal>.
• Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC), DPKO/DFS (1

November 2010). Available for download through the student classroom.
• UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, v. 1, and UN-CMCoord Guide for the Military, v. 1, UN OCHA CMCS
(2015), both available at: <www.unocha.org/publication/un-cmcoord-field-handbook>.
• Civil-Military Coordination in UN and African Peace Operations, African Centre for the
Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), second edition, (November 2010), available
through the Peace Portal at: <www.accord.org.za/publication/civil-military-coordination-in-un-
a-africa-peace-operations/>.
• AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, Edition A Version 1 (February
2013), available at: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>.
• CIMIC Field Handbook, third edition, NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence, 2012, available at:
<http://www.cimic-coe.org/>.
• US Joint Publication JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, (11 September 2013), available at:
<https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=748621>.
• US Army Field Manual FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, (28 January 2014), available at:
<https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-57.pdf>.
35
End-of-Lesson Quiz »
1. Civil-military coordination is inherently 4. The operative principles of civil-military

strategic because: coordination in peace operations include:
A. It is widely misconstrued at “public affairs” A. The primacy of civilian authority, the military
B. It covers the full spectrum of peace as supported and not supporting, indirect
operations versus direct support, and civil-military
C. It is about managing the interaction among liaison and information-sharing
disparate players involved in or peripheral B. The primacy of military authority, the

to the peace process and managing the military as supporting and not supported,
transition from conflict to peace indirect versus direct support, management
D. That is how the United Nations defines it of civil-military interaction and transition,
and civil assistance
2. Which of the following is NOT a major C. The primacy of civilian authority, the military
difference between UN-CIMIC and UN-
as supporting and not supported, the
CMCoord?
military as enabler, indirect versus direct
A. UN-CIMIC is a military concept under the UN support, and management of civil-military
system while UN-CMCoord is a humanitarian interaction and transition
concept
D. The primacy of military authority, the
B. UN-CIMIC covers the full spectrum of military as supporting and not supported,
UN peace operations while UN-CMCoord the military as enabler, indirect versus
concerns itself only with humanitarian direct support, management of civil-military
coordination interaction and transition, and civilianizing
C. UN-CMCoord is managed by OCHA while and localizing
UN-CIMIC is undertaken by the military
component of a UN peacekeeping operation 5. What are the two core UN-CIMIC tasks?
D. UN-CIMIC is inherently strategic, while UN- A. Civil-military liaison and civil assistance
CMCoord is primarily about public relations B. Humanitarian assistance and disaster
response
3. The operative principles of civil-military
C. A safe and secure environment and
coordination in peace operations
protection of civilians
are rooted in each of the following
documents or ideas EXCEPT: D. Civil-military interaction and transition
management
A. The UN Charter
B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
C. The international criteria on the use of force
D. The principles of peacekeeping
Answer Key provided on the next page.
36
6. The primary mandate of the military 9. Why do we need civil-military

component of a UN peace operation is coordination? (Choose the best two.)
_____.
A. Because the military is increasingly
A. to provide armed escorts dependent on civilian capacities for its “exit
B. to provide humanitarian support strategy”
C. to provide a safe and secure environment B. Because civilians are less dependent on
conducive to the sustainable implementation military assets
of the peace agreement C. Because the complexity of the peace
D. to undertake community support projects operations environment requires greater
coordination among actors, programmes,
7. The international criteria on the use of
and activities that have cross-cutting impacts
force are _____.
and are interdependent
A. legitimacy, credibility, and local ownership
D. Because increasingly limited resources —
B. consent, impartiality, and non-use of force including donor funding and peacekeepers
C. seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, from troop-contributing countries — in
last resort, proportional means, and balance the face of greater demand must be more
of consequences judiciously, efficiently, and effectively used
D. the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and E. Because the military and civilians have the
Action with Respect to Threats to the
same mandate
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of
Aggression 10. True or false? UN-CIMIC is a command-
and-control function to achieve the UN
8. True or false? For the foreseeable military mission, whereas NATO, EU,
future, the AU has adopted NATO CIMIC and US approaches focus entirely on
in the absence of its own civil-military coordination as a tool to achieve NATO,
doctrine. EU, and US mission objectives.
Answer Key »
1. C
2. D
3. B
4. C
5. A
6. C
7. C
8. False
9. C and D
10. False
37
LESSON
2 the Full Spectrum of Peace

Operations
The aim of this lesson

is to place civil-military
coordination in peace
operations within the
context of the full spectrum
of peace operations.
UN Photo #142966 by Robert Sullivan.
Section 2.1 The Evolution of Complex, Full • Understand the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping,
Spectrum Peace Operations its evolution, and implications for civil-military
coordination.
Section 2.2 Civil-Military Coordination in
the Full Spectrum of Peace • Explain how civil-military coordination facilitates

Operations interaction and transition in complex integrated
UN missions.
Section 2.3 Integrated Peace Operations:
Civil and Military Partners • Recognize the roles of key civil-military partners
in a UN peace operations mission environment.
Section 2.4 Snapshot of a Peacebuilding
Mission: UNMIL
Section 2.5 The AMISOM Mandate
38
LESSON 2 | Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace Operations
Members of the Nigerian battalion of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) on patrol during a
community meeting between UNAMID officials and Arab nomads. 16 March 2008. UN Photo #171673 by Stuart Price.
Introduction
United Nations peace operations are the most

prevalent form of peace operations in the world. UN
peacekeepers are among the largest deployed military
forces in the world. In 2016, more than 120,000
military, police, and civilian personnel from at least
123 troop- and police-contributing countries were
deployed in 16 missions worldwide. Nearly three-
fourths of UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, and
about half of them come from African countries. This
lesson examines two examples of complex integrated
UN missions in Africa, one emphasizing peacebuilding
and the other stressing protection.
39
The aim of this lesson is to place civil-military coordination in peace operations within the context of
the full spectrum of peace operations. To do so, one must first understand how peace operations have
evolved since the creation of the UN to their complex, integrated, and multidimensional state today. It
is also important to recognize how civil-military coordination helps manage interaction and transition
processes in such mission environments and oversee key civil-military actors.
Peace Operations »
Peace operations occur when the United Nations or regional organizations authorize the
deployment of civilian, police, and military personnel to monitor and facilitate the implementation
of a peace agreement or ceasefire, or protect civilians even if there is no ceasefire or peace
agreement in place. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force.
Peace operations of this kind are normally associated with UN Security Council authorization under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. However, most missions over the last decade have been deployed
with a clause that gives the mission the authority to use force in order to protect civilians
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN report An Agenda for Peace defines peacekeeping
operations as a “field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed
with the consent of the belligerent parties to monitor and facilitate the implementation of
ceasefires, separation of forces or other peace agreement.”
In the UN context, the term “peace operations” is used broadly for any UN operational deployment
that is aimed at supporting a peace process, including both peacekeeping operations and Special
Political Missions.
In the UN context, the term “peace operations” is used broadly for any UN operational deployment
that is aimed at supporting a peace process, including both peacekeeping operations and Special Political
Missions.
UN peacekeeping operations typically include civilian, police, and military components and are led by
a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) under an integrated mission structure.
Depending on the mission, the civilian component typically includes units that specialize in political affairs,
legal affairs, civil affairs, and human rights. In recent operations, units specializing in gender and child
protection; electoral affairs; demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR); security sector
reform (SSR); public information; and mission support (finance, personnel, administrative, and logistics)
are often included. Police officers, prison experts, and legal advisers deal with the rule of law aspects of
the peace process, including justice sector reform. Security and safety personnel are found in all missions.
Special Political Missions are civilian missions, but they may include unarmed military and police
advisers. These missions typically focus on supporting negotiation or mediation processes, supporting
countries in transition, and supporting peacebuilding efforts such as SSR and transitional justice initiatives.
Special Political Missions can precede or follow a UN peacekeeping mission. They are usually deployed
40
Key Terms in Peace Operations »

• Complex Emergency: A humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total
or major breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires
an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency.
• Conflict Prevention: Diplomatic, military, and development actions intended to prevent disputes
from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to
limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
• Development: Long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving

socioeconomic goals or reducing poverty.
• Emergency Relief: Action to provide immediate survival assistance and protection to the victims
of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term assistance
in the form of water, sanitation, food, medicine, and shelter.
• Integrated Peacekeeping Mission: A type of mission characterized by a system-wide approach

among all UN actors. It implies having certain processes, mechanisms, and structures in place
that generate and sustain a common strategic objective of the UN presence at country level, as
well as a comprehensive operations approach.
• Peacebuilding: Action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and
solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.
• Peace Enforcement: Action, mandated by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, authorizing the use of force to enforce international peace and security.
• Peacekeeping: A field mission, usually involving military, police, and civilian personnel, deployed
with the consent of the belligerent parties, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of
ceasefires, separation of forces, or other peace agreements.
• Peacemaking: The use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and
negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.
• Peace Support Operations (PSOs): Organized international assistance initiatives to support the
maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and preventing the return of violent conflict.
• Reconstruction: The long-term process of rebuilding the political, security, social, and economic
dimensions of a society emerging from the conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict.
• Recovery: Action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover
from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development,
ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter.
• Rehabilitation: Action aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods.
This overlaps with emergency relief and is typically targeted for achievement within the first two
years after the conflict has ended.
• Transition: The period following the signing of a peace agreement and the transition from an
appointed interim government and before democratic elections take place.
Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (18 January
2008).
41
The first unit of French troops from the United Nations-authorized multinational force, the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), arrive in northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on June 6 in a bid to help restore stability to the war-torn town of
Bunia. 6 June 2003. UN Photo #28139 by A. Burridge.
alongside a peace operation undertaken by a non-UN entity such as the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which deployed with the NATO International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF), or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) deployed alongside the African
Union AMISOM mission.
Section 2.1 The Evolution of Complex, Full Spectrum Peace

Operations
The UN Charter does not provide a definition for peace operations, nor does it provide guidelines
for when a peace operation should be established. Peace operations were created as a result of the
foresight and creative interpretation of the UN Charter by Lester B. Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld.
Pearson was Canada’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Hammarskjöld was the
second UN Secretary-General. The first UN observer mission, the UN Truce Supervision Organization
(UNTSO), was deployed in Palestine after the first Arab-Israeli War beginning in June 1948.
UN peace operations have since evolved dramatically and matured to become one of the world’s
largest and most reliable conflict management tools. Over the years there have been many lessons,
and the way in which missions are deployed and managed has improved considerably. Early missions
were little more than a symbolic presence, consisting of lightly armed or unarmed military personnel
to “internationalize” an inter-State conflict and raise the political costs of resuming violence after a
ceasefire. Since 1948, the United Nations has conducted nearly 70 peacekeeping missions, with over
3,500 total peacekeeper fatalities.
42
In 1960, the UN established a mission in the Republic of the Congo. The United Nations Organization
in the Congo (ONUC) had an unprecedented scope and mandate in an era of small-scale and limited
peace operations. At its peak, ONUC had more than 20,000 troops and 2,000 civilian experts. The
conflict resulted in the deaths of 250 UN personnel, including Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, who
was killed in a plane crash while traveling to peace talks. Due to the extreme difficulty faced by ONUC,
many believed the UN would never again deploy a peace operation in an intra-State conflict. This proved
largely true throughout the Cold War. Peace operations during this period were “traditional” inter-State
ceasefire monitoring missions — such as in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Kashmir, Lebanon, and the Sinai
Peninsula.
The end of the Cold War saw an expansion of UN peace operations in both quantity and quality, with
new peace operations in the early 1990s in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, and Somalia.
These operations went much further than observer-type missions by assisting parties to the conflict to
implement comprehensive ceasefire and peace agreements. In Cambodia and Namibia, the operations
temporarily oversaw these transitional arrangements. In Somalia and South Sudan, the UN intervened
when there was hardly a peace to keep.
The experiences of the UN in the mid-1990s — especially the failures to protect civilians in Rwanda
in 1994 and Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 — resulted in serious doubts about the ability
of the UN to undertake peace operations requiring robust military action. Many European countries,
while contributing police officers, military observers, and staff officers to UN peace operations, opted
to contribute line units in the Balkans through NATO. This trend reversed in the late 1990s, when new
missions deployed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Kosovo, and
Sierra Leone. As conflicts outside of Europe multiplied and become more complex, the limitations of the
traditional model for UN peace operations became clear.
Under mounting pressure for reform at the beginning of the 21st century, the Secretariat directed a
thorough review of UN peace and security activities and recommendations for improvements needed “to
make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace”. The result was the Report of the Panel on
United Nations Peace Operations (2000), commonly called the Brahimi Report. In the following decade,
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations looked to implement its watershed recommendations by:
• Enhancing rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations;
• Strengthening the UN relationship with Member States and legislative bodies;
• Reforming the management culture of peacekeeping operations;
• Reforming the peacekeeping operations’ relationships with field missions; and
• Strengthening the Secretariat’s relationships with other UN bodies.
By the end of 2004, the UN had established new complex peace operations in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire,
Haiti, and Liberia. By early 2007, the number of UN missions had increased to 18. Compared to the
small missions of the mid- to late-1990s, these new “integrated” peace operations, with established
lines of civil-military command and control under the civilian Chief of Mission, represented a significant
shift in the political will of the international community. Countries would invest in peace operations and
use the UN as the vehicle of choice for these types of operations.
43
With the growth of terrorism and intra-State conflict in the 21st century, security in UN peacekeeping
environments is no longer defined purely in terms of physical protection. Accordingly, UN peace
operations have been shifting more from peacekeeping, which is about preventing further violence,
to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions in the implementation of comprehensive
peace processes. This change in emphasis has required that civilian dimensions be added to traditional
military peacekeeping mandates. These new civilian dimensions are aimed at assisting the host
country in sustaining the momentum of the peace process. The array of tasks in this process — each
of which has multiple contributors, stakeholders, and beneficiaries — illustrates the complexity and
interconnectedness of complex peace operations, of which peacekeeping is one part.
Meanwhile, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peace enforcement, peacemaking,

peacekeeping, and peacebuilding have blurred — as have the roles of military, police, and civilian
actors. Rarely are peace operations limited to one type of activity, whether UN-led or conducted by non-
UN actors. The idea of “phases” often does not convey the complexity of these different and interlinked
activities. They do not necessarily proceed in a linear or chronological fashion, but they often overlap,
retreat, or proceed simultaneously — even in the same country or location. In eastern Congo, for
example, MONUSCO engaged simultaneously in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
peacebuilding.
In response to this, DPKO released its United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and
Guidelines policy document, also known as the “Capstone Doctrine” in 2008. In addition to the idea
of “full spectrum” peace operations, the Capstone Doctrine laid out the general mission context for
complex integrated missions:
“Over the past sixty years, United Nations peacekeeping has

evolved into one of the main tools used by the international
community to manage complex crises that pose a threat
to international peace and security. Since the beginning
of the new millennium, the number of military, police, and
civilian personnel deployed in United Nations peacekeeping
operations around the world has reached unprecedented
levels. Not only has United Nations peacekeeping grown in
size but it has become increasingly complex. Beyond simply
monitoring ceasefires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping
operations are called upon to facilitate the political process
through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation,
protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of
elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in
restoring the rule of law.”
In January 2013, Security Council Resolution 2086 reinforced the concept of mission integration
outlined in the Capstone Doctrine and “multidimensional peacekeeping”, and provided more specific
guidance on the conduct of UN missions in a more integrated manner. The most important points
included:
44
• An expansion of the range of peacekeeping “from traditional peacekeeping missions, which

primarily monitor ceasefires to complex multidimensional operations, which seek to undertake
peacebuilding tasks and address root causes of conflict”;
• A more “comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to the maintenance of international

peace and security by preventing conflicts, preventing relapse and building sustainable peace
through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding
strategies”;
• The conduct of UN peacekeeping activities

“in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict
peacebuilding, prevention of relapse of armed
conflict and progress towards sustainable
peace and development”;
• As a matter of UN policy, “the necessity for

the Secretariat to plan early peacebuilding
tasks in phases with clear objectives, taking
into account local conditions and lessons
learned, which should contribute to long-
term peacebuilding objectives, in order to
allow successful transition and withdrawal of
peacekeeping operations”;
• The growing role of multidimensional

peacekeeping missions “to create an enabling
environment for relevant national and
international actors to perform peacebuilding
tasks and implement early peacebuilding
tasks themselves”; and
• Increased emphasis on “integrated action

The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and
on the ground by security and development
reintegration (DDRR) of over 40,000 combatants
actors requires coordination with national began in December 2003 with the opening of the first
authorities in order to stabilize and improve cantonment site at Camp Schieffelin, 35 miles east
of Monrovia. 7 December 2003. UN Photo #29937 by
the security situation and help in economic
Shima Roy.
recovery, and underlines the importance of
integrated efforts among all United Nations entities in the field to promote coherence in the
United Nations’ work in conflict and post-conflict situations.”
All of these points signified a reinforcement of UN peacekeeping policy in a way that elevated the
importance of strong civil-military coordination. The 2010 UN-CIMIC Policy provided a framework to
operationalize this more robust view of peacekeeping and “early peacebuilding” with its emphasis on
the management of civil-military interaction and transition management under the larger concept of
mission coordination.
45
Still, the burgeoning complexity, volatility, and ambiguity of peace operations and humanitarian
assistance environments have driven a heightened sense of urgency for even further reform of peace
operations. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon outlined several of these changes during a review of UN
peacekeeping at the Security Council in June 2014:
• Operations that increasingly take place under conditions of violence where “there is no peace to
keep” – in Darfur, South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, and eastern Congo, where
two-thirds of UN civilian, police, and military personnel are operating.
• The increasing absence of clearly identifiable parties to the conflict — both within and across
the borders of affected fragile States — increased ambiguity between combatants and non-
combatants, and no viable political process for a pathway to peace.
• The increasing appearance of asymmetric and unconventional threats that have forced more
robust peacekeeping and “stabilization” operations by designated combat forces, such as
in eastern Congo under Security Council Resolution 2098. These missions act as de facto
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, as conducted in AMISOM or the “hybrid”
operation of the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
AMISOM and UNAMID illustrate how some peace operations are increasingly conducted under the
aegis of regional organizations operating under UN mandates, adding to the need for the UN to work
with an array of regional and local partners through the idea of “partnership peacekeeping”.
All of this led to the 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations
(HIPPO Report), which identified four major shifts in the approach to peace operations:
1. First is the primacy of political rather than military solutions:

“Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical
engagements, but through political solutions” which should “always
guide the design and deployment of UN peace operations.”
2. Second is how full-spectrum peace operations must be applied

in a flexible manner in response to changing ground conditions:
“The sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and
Special Political Missions should give way to a continuum of
response and smoother transitions between different phases of
missions.” This is why the HIPPO Report recommended broad
use of the term “peace operations” versus “peacekeeping” to
denote a flexible spectrum of responses. Still, “sequenced and
prioritized mandates will allow missions to develop over time
rather than trying to do everything at once, and failing.”
3. Third is that a stronger, more inclusive peace and security

partnership is needed, which is at the core of civil-military
coordination: Common purpose “must be established from the
outset of a new operation” and maintained throughout through
enhanced collaboration and consultation in a more integrated
manner, particularly with regard to conflict prevention.
46
4. Fourth is the need for the UN in general to become more field-

focused, and for peace operations in particular to be more
people-centred, in recognition of the human security context of
the full spectrum of peace and security: UN peace operations
should “engage with, serve, and protect the people they have
been mandated to assist.”
The HIPPO Report also acknowledges the increased emphasis on the drivers of conflict and instability
rather than simply threats or “spoilers” to the peace process — a clear indication of considering peace
operations in terms of peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. While it acknowledges “stabilization”
or “conflict management” roles in many cotemporary peace operations, the HIPPO Report provides a
framework to balance and limit such roles in these operations.
Contemporary UN Complex Peace Operations
There are two main types of contemporary UN peace operations: protection missions and
peacebuilding operations.
Protection missions like UNAMID are not deployed to monitor or implement a ceasefire or
peace agreement, but rather to protect civilians and to create a relatively stable space within which
negotiations for a peace agreement can take place. Although UN peace operations normally deploy to
implement a peace agreement after the violent conflict has come to an end, there have been situations
when a UN peace operation deployed to protect civilians without a peace agreement in place and
without the consent of all the parties engaged in the conflict. Examples of this are UN operations in
Chad, the Central African Republic, and Darfur. More often the case in the last few years, violence may
erupt or worsen following the deployment of the established peacekeeping mission. There are also
situations where the peace was tenuous to begin with, such as MONUSCO or AMISOM. In these cases,
civil-military coordination may be performed more in a “conflict management” environment.
It is important to remember that although the lead and content of civil-military coordination in such
contexts may be more stabilization than peacebuilding focused, and may thus be more overwhelmingly
military in character, the legal and ethical principles on the use of force that provide context for civil-
military coordination apply nonetheless. Although civil assistance may be framed in terms of “winning
hearts and minds” to create a friendlier environment for military operations, this more public relations
application of civil-military coordination is short-term and limited in effect — in other words, it is more
tactical than strategic.
This more tactical approach presents two dangers:
• It can reinforce rather than reduce local dependency on the force for services for which the
military is inappropriate and cannot sustain (setting the population up for disappointment in the
force as well as the mission); and
• It could lead the force to take sides in the conflict inadvertently.
For the UN, “winning hearts and minds” means winning support for the mission — i.e. the peace
operations mission and those external and internal actors that are working together in support of the
mandate. In other words, it should win support for a peaceful negotiated settlement, for the protection
47
of civilians, and for the other objectives of the mission. Support for the mission mandate means support
from the peacekeeping force — not the other way around.
Even in less than permissive environments, the military may find humanitarian civilian agencies and
partners working there. For that reason, the principles offered in Lesson 1 are even more important,
because the margins of error in coordination are rather small and the costs for those errors potentially
very high. Accordingly, the information and guidelines on coordination with humanitarian assistance
organizations, as discussed in Lesson 3, likewise apply to situations and environments of this kind.
Peacebuilding operations are deployed after parties have entered into a peace agreement.
They are mandated to assist the parties to the peace agreement with consolidating the peace process.
The peace operation needs to employ a broad range of capacities to assist the local government and
community to address both the immediate consequences and the root causes of the conflict to avoid a
relapse into violent conflict. In this sense, peacebuilding and conflict prevention are conversely related.
The most prominent example is the UN Mission in Liberia, discussed later in this lesson. The important
thing here is that all activities in the full spectrum of peacekeeping are conducted within the context of
peacebuilding.1
An increasing number of missions, however, combine both protection and peacebuilding requirements.
For instance, MONUSCO and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA) have been tasked to protect civilians and assist the government and other parties with
implementing peace agreements — and thus with peace consolidation. The United Nations Mission
in South Sudan (UNMISS) was similarly tasked with assisting the new government and communities
to establish the new State, as well as with helping them to manage conflicts and to protect civilians
affected by inter-community conflict.
Section 2.2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace

Operations
Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be
a daunting task and will only become more difficult in the future. As such, civil-military coordination is
growing in importance as a function of mission coordination.
UN-CIMIC in particular is the international military framework for civil-military coordination for the
full spectrum of peace and security activities — conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement,
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Based primarily on the Capstone Doctrine and the UN-CIMIC Policy,
UN-CIMIC should be understood within the context of the supporting roles of the military component in
the overall implementation of the mandate and mission coordination.
Remembering especially the transition management aspect of civil-military coordination, regardless

of where the mission may be along the spectrum of peace and security, the ultimate aim of civil-military
coordination is to create conditions that enable peacebuilding and the prevention of further conflict.
This is why civil-military coordination in general is more interested in actively addressing the drivers of
conflict and instability rather than countering threats. This is also why the core nexus for civil-military
coordination is between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.2 It is also why civil-military coordination calls

2) This is discussed in detail in Lesson 4.
48
for adaptive leadership in which the full spectrum of UN peace operations are used more flexibly and
with a greater emphasis on transition, as the HIPPO Report encourages.
Civil-military coordination must draw upon key international principles regardless of the mission
environment. This includes the UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force
(especially with regard to the latter). The criteria on the use of force includes the seriousness of threat,
proper purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences. To deal adaptively with
a complex, dynamic, and dangerous mission environment involving simultaneous activities, a principled
approach to civil-military coordination is essential. This includes:
• The primacy of civilian authority;
• The military as supporting and not supported;
• The military as an enabler;
• Indirect versus direct support; and
• Managing civil-military interaction and transition.
The first and last of these are the most important. The first point is best understood in the integrated
mission context, while the latter recognizes the main nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Two Core Tasks: Civil-Military Liaison and Civil Assistance
The two core tasks of UN-CIMIC are: civil-military liaison (and information-sharing) and civil assistance.
Civil-military liaison (and information-sharing) relates to the management function of civil-military
interaction. It goes beyond standard liaison to a more purposeful management of interactions among
civilian, police, and military components and
actors. The ultimate aim is to enhance the ability
of civilian and police partners to more rapidly
and effectively transition the peace process. This
is the qualitative difference between UN-CIMIC
and the liaison functions of Military Experts on
Mission (MEOM) — UN Military Observers, UN
Military Liaison Officers, or UN Military Advisers.3
Civil assistance relates to the civil-

military management function of transition
management. In UN-CIMIC, this includes
mission and community support. It can come
through support of the protection of civilians,
DDR, and security and defence sector reform Nigerian peacekeepers with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
provide security during Liberia’s presidential run-off election,
(SSR/DSR), as well as community support
in Monrovia. Incumbent Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Congress
projects and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in for Democratic Change (CDC) candidate Winston Tubman
critical peacebuilding and development areas competed in the one-day run-off. 8 November 2011. UN Photo
#493690 by Staton Winter.
like mine action, rule of law, youth, gender, etc.4
3) Civil-military liaison is discussed in greater detail in Lesson 6.

49
Mission support is the use of military assets to enhance the UN Country Team (UNCT), UN police,
or other civilian external actors. An example of this would be armed security escorts or intelligence
and logistical support. Community support is using military assets — by, with, and through external
actors — to help local communities take greater control over their own futures by helping to build local
capacity and confidence in the peace process. Mission and community support often work in tandem.
Although community support projects are often for physical infrastructure repair requested by a civilian
organization or entity or proposed by the military or police component, they can also help build the
capacity of the security sector by, for example:
• Supporting on-the-job capacity and confidence-building assistance to local security forces that
gradually expands their involvement in UN security missions done for the host government
(e.g., joint patrols, cash transport, VIP escort, border security, etc.) and eventually transitions
these tasks to them.
• Assisting these forces in the development and implementation of their own civil-military
capability in order to promote the civil-military relationship and community policing, using the
UN-CIMIC model. UNMIL in Liberia and UNMISS in South Sudan have done this to some effect.
• Assisting with security sector infrastructure and capacity development, including QIPs, to
improve police stations, training-the-trainer of local police to enhance their public service and
outreach capabilities, thus promoting community policing, etc.
• Assisting local security force gender mainstreaming through uniformed women personnel
involvement in leadership mentoring and development, public education, and recruiting.
The process of transitioning to and enabling external civilian and internal local partners,
respectively, can also be called civilianizing and localizing. Civilianizing and localizing may be done
simultaneously. The most appropriate relationship is to work by, with, and through civilian partners to
improve local capacity and confidence. Although this two-pronged approach is ideal for the transition
UN Peace Operations »
In the UN context, the term “peace operations” is used broadly for any UN (blue-hat)
operational deployment that is aimed at supporting a peace process. For instance, the name of
the department responsible for such operations is the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).
UN peace operations typically include civilian, police, and military components and are led by
a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Depending on the mission,
the civilian component typically includes units that specialize in political affairs, legal affairs,
civil affairs, and human rights; and, in recent operations, often separate gender and child
protection units, and units that specialize in electoral affairs, DDR, SSR, public information,
and mission support (finance, personnel, administrative, and logistics). Police officers, together
with prison experts and legal advisers, deal with the rule of law aspects of the peace process,
including justice sector reform.
50
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it is also appropriate for supporting humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, as well as conflict prevention and conflict management.
The following definitions are drawn from the UN Capstone Doctrine:
Conflict Prevention
Involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-State or inter-State

tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early
warning, information gathering, and careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention
activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, preventive deployment, or
confidence-building measures. Most of the capacity for conflict prevention exists in civil society.
Peacemaking
Generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action
to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Upon the request of the Security Council or the
General Assembly or at his/her own initiative, the Secretary-General may exercise his or her “good
offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments,
groups of States, regional organizations, or the United Nations. Unofficial and non-governmental groups
or a prominent personality working independently may also undertake peacemaking efforts.
Peace enforcement
Involves the application, with authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures,
including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and
security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional
organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
Peacekeeping
A technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and
to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has
evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-
State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements — military, police, and civilian — working
together to help lay the foundation for sustainable peace.
Peacebuilding
Involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by
strengthening national capacities at all levels. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating
the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural
causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues
that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to
effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.
51
Section 2.3 Integrated Peace Operations: Civil and Military Partners
Integrated Missions and the Integrated Approach
In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the Integrated Mission
model. It aims to enhance coherence between the UNCT, which is humanitarian and developmental in
focus, and the UN peace operation, which is peace and security focused.
The integrated approach refers to a specific type of operational process and design. In it, the
planning and coordination processes of the different UN elements are integrated into a single country-
level UN system during complex peacekeeping operations.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described the concept as follows:
“An Integrated Mission is based on a common strategic plan and

a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme
interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of
the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN
system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries
emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a
coherent and mutually supportive manner.”5
The Note of the Secretary-General on Integrated Missions (2006) established the integrated
approach as the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN peace operations in
post-conflict situations. It also linked the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development,
humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social, and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy.
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed the integrated approach as the guiding principle for
all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensional
peacekeeping operation, or a political or peacebuilding office, regardless of whether these missions
are structurally integrated or not. The 2008 Secretary-General’s Decision on Integration introduces
the notion of the integrated approach. It differs from the integrated mission concept in that it does not
require structural integration, although it provides for it, where appropriate. Instead, the integrated
approach refers to a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT that
ensures all components of the UN system operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner and in
close collaboration with other partners. An integrated approach requires:
• A shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives;
• Closely aligned or integrated planning;
• A set of agreed results, timelines, and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to
consolidating peace; and
• Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.
5) Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 9 February 2006, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/secretary-generals-note-guidance-

integrated-missions>.
52
UN INTEGRATED MISSIONS
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL (SRSG)
JOINT MISSION INTEGRATED MISSION

ANALYSIS CELL (JMAC) PLANNING TEAM (IMPT)
JOINT OPERATION
CENTER (JOC)
PRINCIPAL DUTY SPECIAL DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF FORCE DIRECTOR OF

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RESIDENT POLICE
COMMANDER COMMISSIONER MISSION
SECRETARY-GENERAL COORDINATOR/HUMANITARIAN (FC) SUPPORT (DMS)
(P/DSRSG) COORDINATOR (DSRSG RC/HC)
An integrated approach requires: basic peacekeeping principles, namely: consent,

impartiality, and non-use of force.
Civil-Military
• A sharedPartners
vision of the uN’s strategic objectives;
It •isClosely alignedimportant
particularly or integratedfor
planning; Consent,
civil-military specialists in by the parties
military andtopolice
the peace or ceasefire
commands and units
agreement, is a dynamic and multilayered concept.
• A set of the
to understand agreedarrayresults, timelines,
of civilian and actors with civil-military coordination responsibilities, within
internal it is essential for mission success and must be
responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to
or tangential to an integrated UN peace operations constantly managed, but
mission. Likewise, theit civilian
is understood
actors thatmust
it mayhave a
consolidating peace; and
often be lacking at the tactical level.
better understanding of the role of their military partner. Here, then, are the primary players in civil-
• Agreed mechanisms for monitoring and
military evaluation.
coordination found below the mission executive level, but
Impartiality still that
means in support of it.must be
the mandate
applied without favour or prejudice to the parties to
UN-CIMICuse of Force the peace agreement, and should not be confused
with “neutrality.” Neutrality, in the peacekeeping
Another trend is the new, more robust approach
According to the UN-CIMIC Policy, UN-CIMIC personnel context, refers to non-interference,
perform “the staff and if the uN
function within the
to the use of force that has become a defining mission is mandated to take action, for instance
military component
characteristic that deals with
of contemporary complextheuNinteraction
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protect civilians, and the
it will interfere police toand
according its civilian
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includingAlthough
local populations.”
contemporary It uNfurther
complexstatesmandate.
that they are uN
hence, “the primary portal
peacekeeping missionsto the
are military
peace operations are still grounded in, and often said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the
component for humanitarian and development actors, as well as the local civilian population”, as well as
characterized by, the core principles of consent, mission will not take sides, but it will act against any
“provide a key link
impartiality, andto thethe civilian
minimum usecomponents
of force, the of a mission and
party that other
is in breach civilian partners for other military
of its mandate.
staff.”interpretation and application
As such, UN-CIMIC of these
personnel principlesbut
augment, in do not replace, appropriate established civil-military
practice have undergone significant development. the Non-use of Force still implies that uN peace
interaction structure such as intelligence, plans, current operations,
operations will useand logistics use
the minimum functions.
of force
in 2008, dPKo released its United Nations necessary to protect itself and others covered by
UN-CIMIC personnel obviously serve the commanders and staff of military forces engaged in UN
Peacekeeping Operations Principles and its mandate, but it is also now understood that uN
peaceGuidelines
operations. Although
policy document,thealso
UN-CIMIC
known asfunction
the ultimately reportsshould
peace operations to the military
have Force and
the capacity Commander,
“Capstone doctrine”, that re-confirms and provides mandate to prevent or counter serious
it is important that the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) — especially the Special Representative of the threats,
a contemporary understanding of the uN’s three including those it has been mandated to protect.
Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSGs (DSRSGs), the UN Police (UNPOL) Commissioner,
and the Director of Mission Support — understand the UN-CIMIC function. It is also important that the
civilian components, mission planners,
L e s s O n 2 : and
COmPcivilians
L e x P e a responsible ns |
C e O P e r a t i Ofor 43
mission support and security and
safety recognize the crucial role that UN-CIMIC plays in facilitating mission-wide coordination. It cannot
be assumed that all who interact with UN-CIMIC officers understand the vital role of UN-CIMIC. An
53
important implied task for UN-CIMIC officers may be to inform these persons on UN-CIMIC. Although
UN-CIMIC was not designed to facilitate military-to-military liaison, it may be useful to ensure that
other UN military elements — in particular Military Experts on Mission (MEOMs) and military elements
that operate outside UN command and control — and those operating under the mandates of regional
organizations like the African Union, are aware of what arrangements the UN peacekeeping mission has
in place to manage civil-military coordination.
UN-CMCoord
UN-CMCoord officers are the primary actors for humanitarian civil-military coordination, which is
defined in the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian
and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian
principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals.”
UN-CMCoord officers are civilians deployed to emergencies that have a substantial foreign, international,
or multinational military presence, especially if the forces are engaged in relief activities or if their
military activities are likely to have humanitarian consequences. When such actors are present, there
are significant coordination challenges, e.g. ensuring that humanitarian actors have the access they
need but do not become a target.
Complementary to UN-CIMIC officers, these civilian staff members may be budgeted as part of
the integrated mission but placed in the humanitarian staff structure under the DSRSG/RC/HC in UN
integrated missions. Like UN-CIMIC officers, they are advisers and facilitators. However, they may
not have the same responsibilities or authority as their military counterparts, who work primarily
under a command and control environment, rather than a coordination environment. UN-CMCoord
officers advise the leadership of the humanitarian community on civil-military issues and facilitate
the establishment, maintenance, and review of appropriate relations between the humanitarian and
military forces present. This includes the possible use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)
in humanitarian operations. Depending on the situation, UN-CMCoord officers may also serve as the
liaison between the humanitarian community and the military forces, facilitating the interface between
the humanitarian and military communities as a cross-cutting service for the Cluster System and the
broader humanitarian community.
One of the primary responsibilities of the UN-CMCoord officer during the initial phase of an operation
is to assist the RC/HC and the UNCT in developing guidelines on humanitarian civil-military relations.
These operation guidelines should be based on internationally agreed guidelines on UN-CMCoord in
natural disasters and complex emergencies. The UN-CMCoord officer will also recommend to the RC/HC
an appropriate humanitarian civil-military coordination strategy and structure that could be applied in
an emergency. This assessment will help determine if and how many UN-CMCoord officers are needed
in the near and mid-term.
UN-CMCoord officers are deployed either at the request of the Resident or Humanitarian Coordinator
(RC/HC) or by the Emergency Relief Coordinator after appropriate consultation with the UNCT to perform
the five CMCoord tasks as described in the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook:
1. Establish and sustain dialogue with military forces;
54
2. Establish a mechanism for information exchange and

humanitarian action with military forces and other armed
groups;
3. Assist in negotiations in critical areas of humanitarian-military

interaction;
4. Support development and dissemination of context-specific

guidance for the interaction of the humanitarian community
with the military; and
5. Monitor the activity of military forces and ensure a positive

impact on humanitarian communities.
Where appropriate, feasible, and agreeable for the humanitarian and military actors, UN-CMCoord
and UN-CIMIC officers may be physically co-located as part of a mission “joint staff” approach in order
to enhance mission coordination and its interface with the humanitarian community.
If this is not deemed appropriate or possible (e.g. as a result of concerns in the humanitarian
community on neutrality and independence of humanitarian action), UN-CIMIC liaison officers may be
tasked as civil-military liaisons in the DSRSG/RC/HC office. This is the preferred option in cases where
no UN-CMCoord officers are deployed. Co-location options either in the office of the DSRSG/RC/HC,
Force Commander, or joint staff are utilized depending on the needs and mission sensitivities, and do
not change respective reporting channels.
In addition to UN-CMCoord officers, UN-CIMIC officers may encounter liaison officers deployed to a
peacekeeping area of operations by other humanitarian entities.
UN humanitarian agencies like the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN World
Food Programme (WFP) may deploy Military Liaison
Officers (MLOs) to support their own interactions
with the military. These officers are complementary
to UN-CIMIC officers. The UN Joint Logistics Centre
(UNJLC), a component of the Logistics Cluster, may
also deploy Civil-Military Logistics (CMLog) officers
that would focus on dealing with military counterparts
in the area of logistics, similar to the Joint Logistics Helicopter landing at an UNTSO observation post in
Khiam, Lebanon. March 2003. Photo by UNTSO.
Operations Centre (JLOC) in a UN integrated mission.
UN Civil Affairs
According to the April 2008 DPKO/DFS policy directive on Civil Affairs, UN Civil Affairs components
are civilian units of a UN peace operation that work at the social, administrative, and sub-national political
levels to facilitate the countrywide implementation of peacekeeping mandates. They also support the
55
population and government in strengthening conditions and structures conducive to sustainable peace.
While they do not have their own civil-military concept, the role of Civil Affairs is essential for UN-
CIMIC officers to understand, due to the centrality of Civil Affairs to the peacekeeping mission and their
overarching coordination function.
As laid out in the UN Civil Affairs Handbook, the three roles of Civil Affairs in support of the mission
mandate are:
Cross-mission representation, monitoring, and facilitation at the local level. Civil Affairs staff
represent the mission and liaise with local actors on overall operations and on the full range of mission
activities (except where a mission component covering a particular activity is also represented locally).
Civil Affairs provides a channel for communicating the priorities and perceptions of different sectors of
the population to the mission, concerning both the mission itself and the peace process. Any military
communications activities with the local population must be synchronized with Civil Affairs. Conditions
and developments at the local level are monitored to support the political and operational work done by
the mission at the national level. Conflict analysis and early warning are provided, and progress with
mandate implementation is monitored (where relevant in accordance with established benchmarks or
indicators that Civil Affairs may also assist in developing). Possible unintended consequences of mission
activities are also monitored. Data collection is carried out to support mission-wide strategies and
planning for mission activities or those of key partners, where relevant. Any information or intelligence
with respect to the civil situation must be shared and coordinated with Civil Affairs. As part of the overall
United Nations effort, Civil Affairs takes account of existing United Nations resources at the local level
and may also facilitate the work of United Nations partners not represented at the local level, where
appropriate. Civil Affairs can play an important role in supporting coordination, cohesion, and political
consistency among local mission actors (including United Nations military and police components) by
advising on the broader context of mandate implementation or on specific aspects of relations with
civilians.
Confidence-building, conflict management, and support to reconciliation. Civil Affairs actively supports
the development of social conditions conducive to sustainable peace by supporting reconciliation and
conflict-resolution activities at the local and/or national levels, and through efforts to support popular
engagement and confidence in the peace process. These efforts are undertaken in a number of ways,
including:
• Convening or facilitating dialogue between interest groups;
• Direct outreach to the population (working with other mission actors to design and deliver
appropriate and consistent messages);
• Support to the efforts of civil society groups seeking peace and reconciliation;
• The identification, implementation, and monitoring of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs); and
• Promotion or protection of the interests of excluded, threatened, marginalized, or minority

groups.
Thus, for UN-CIMIC officers, Civil Affairs is the main civilian interlocutor for military support to
transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.
56
Support to the restoration and extension of State authority. Civil Affairs is the lead mission contributor
to the restoration and extension of State authority in a number of ways, as identified in Section 2.4 of
the Principles and Guidelines. Civil Affairs components support the development of political space at
the local level that will contribute to legitimate and representative governance, and provide operational
support to the activities of State institutions, where appropriate. Support to the development of political
space at the local level may involve activities such as civic education, the organization of pre-election
political forums, and assistance with structuring or supporting dialogue between different sectors of
the population (including civil society actors) and the government. Civil Affairs work is often focused
on supporting participation while representative democracy is being established. Providing operational
support to the activities of State institutions may take a variety of forms, as deemed necessary for
mandate implementation and taking account of ongoing United Nations system-wide capacity for
responding to institution-building and governance support needs in post-conflict situations. Thus, for
UN-CIMIC officers, Civil Affairs has the lead in the localizing effort described earlier in this lesson; UN-
CIMIC support of localization is therefore by, with, and through Civil Affairs.
Civil Affairs staff frequently head local or regional offices and are the main partner of UN-CIMIC
officers at the tactical level. At the operational level, the Head of Civil Affairs is a major civilian partner
for the Chief of UN-CIMIC, or U9 on the Force HQ staff. Because of the central role of Civil Affairs in
mission coordination and numerous mission initiatives, their representation of the SRSG and/or the HC/
RC, and the potential co-multiplier effects of UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs cooperation and coordination,
UN-CIMIC and Civil Affairs should establish an ongoing liaison along functional or operational lines,
as appropriate, and become familiar with their respective mandates and roles in order to identify and
exploit opportunities for civil-military synergies.
United Nations Police
The roles of the military and the police in any country or mission are similar, but distinct. Together,
they are the primary uniformed instruments of the security sector. However, the military’s purpose
is the security of the State and its territorial integrity — mainly from external threats. On the other
hand, the police exist to protect communities and individuals from threats to their security and safety
internal to the country. While the primacy of civil authority pertains to both, it does so in different ways
and under different authorities. Given that understanding, the foremost security instrument in any
country — especially considering the internal nature of most threats and spoilers — is the police rather
than military forces. With respect to the use of force, UN integrated missions in general — and civil-
military coordination in particular — should observe this critical division of labour and authority.
One must also understand the significant differences between policing in peace operations and
domestic policing. In peace operations, policing takes place in a conflict or post-conflict situation where
governance and rule of law is often minimal or non-existent, where UN Police (UNPOL) has no law
enforcement mandate or powers where the communities and people they are there to help protect are
unfamiliar to them, along with the culture, norms, and laws. In recent years, the lines between policing
and military conflict management have blurred.
When the United Nations first deployed civilian police officers in 1960, the role of police in UN
peacekeeping missions was largely liaison and monitoring. That has since evolved to a much more
57
comprehensive and complex role. According to the December 2011 Report of the Secretary General on
United Nations Police to the General Assembly:
“Police-related aspects of Security Council mandates fall broadly

into the following three categories: (a) support for the reform,
restructuring and rebuilding of national police and other law
enforcement agencies; (b) operational support to host State
police and other law enforcement agencies, including through
the deployment of formed police units; and (c) interim policing
and other law enforcement. In addition, many recent mandates
include specific references to the promotion and protection of
human rights and the protection of civilians, which highlight the
integral part that United Nations police play in implementing
mission-wide tasks.”
After the host nation, UNPOL6 is the lead UN field mission instrument in the protection of civilians and
criminal intelligence, according to the DPKO guidelines found in United Nations Police in Peacekeeping
Operations and Special Political Missions. The UNPOL guiding principles include:
• Respect and protection of human rights;
• Conduct of operations as a component of a multidimensional integrated mission;
• Legal mandate and basis;
• Cooperation with the military component within established limits;
• Recognition of the political context of their work;
• Seeing themselves as both a community-oriented, yet criminal intelligence-led service;
• Priority to preventative deployments and proactive investigations over reactive law enforcement;
and
• Targeting spoilers through special operations.
The overarching approaches of community-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing guide

all UNPOL operations. Community-oriented policing is a strategy for encouraging the public to act as
partners with the police in preventing and managing crime, as well as other aspects of security based on
the needs of the community. The four cornerstones of community-oriented policing are:
»» Consulting with communities (regular solicitation of input from

communities about crime, disorder, and activities that generate
fear);
»» Responding to communities (willingness and ability to respond

to the security needs of individuals and groups in communities
and to give priority to these needs);
6) In the context of peace operations, UNPOL consists of Individual Police Officers (IPOs) and Formed Police Units (FPU).
58
»» Mobilizing communities (helping the community organize itself

in controlling crime); and
»» Solving recurring problems (police and communities working

preventively to change conditions that lead to crime rather than
responding to individual incidents).
Intelligence-led policing uses data analysis and criminal intelligence as the basis for an objective
decision-making framework to reduce and prevent crime. This framework uses both strategic
management and effective enforcement strategies targeting serious crimes and/or prolific offenders.
Criminal intelligence helps UNPOL effectively decide on priorities, strategies, and resource allocation
to reduce crime. It is also vital to protect civilians, prevent crime, and address other security-related
issues. At the strategic level, UNPOL provides information on existing patterns or emerging trends
of criminal activity to assist in criminal apprehension and crime and facilitate other mandated tasks,
including the protection of civilians. At the operational and tactical levels, UNPOL collects information on
specific crimes for use by operational units in criminal investigations, for planning and deploying tactical
operations, and for the safety and security for UN personnel and property. For its own operations,
UNPOL maintains the Police Operations Centre and Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU).
In addition to its broadened and more complex mandate, UNPOL — as a critical component of a
multidimensional mission — participates fully in the mission’s integrated assessment and planning (IAP)
processes, and works with human rights, gender, and other specialized units. Moreover, UNPOL, under
the direction of the Police Commissioner, works closely with the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) to ensure support for capacity development to line ministries, police reform processes, and
governance and accountability structures of the police.
While UNPOL’s more complex roles require greater coordination in general with other mission
components, including active participation in the integrated coordination mechanisms of missions, its
central area of focus is with respect to host country police force capacity building as part of rule of
law development. This has important implications for UN-CIMIC officers, who cannot expect UNPOL
to provide the same broad-based support to other mission components as can be expected from the
military. With respect to police-military coordination, the DPKO guidelines state:
“Particularly during the stabilization phase of a peacekeeping

operation, the complementary actions of both military and
police facilitate outreach and engagement and restoration
of safety and security. Examples of such cooperation include
checkpoints, joint patrols and protection of civilians activities.
Mission-specific guidance shall be developed that outlines
modalities of cooperation and clear circumstances that
indicate when transitions of responsibility take place. These
shall be developed in the planning phases for each mission
and approved jointly by the Heads of the Police and Military
Components. Joint training and exercises shall take place on a
regular basis.”
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Another important development with respect to UN Police is the increased deployment of Formed
Police Units (FPUs). FPUs have three core tasks: public order management, protection of United Nations
personnel and facilities, and support for police operations that may involve a higher risk above the
general capability of an Individual Police Officer (IPO). According to the DPKO Policy on Formed Police
Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
“FPUs are defined as cohesive mobile police units, providing

support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety
and security of United Nations personnel and missions,
primarily in public order management. As a coherent part of the
United Nations police component, FPUs work in support of the
establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human
rights abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive
and more robust policing in accordance with the mandate.”
FPUs have become particularly desirable not only because they address internal security sector
issues more appropriate for police than military forces, but also because they do not come under the
same policies and rules for TCC military personnel. As such, they represent a more politically flexible
force option for the UN. Their role, however, is more specific than that of UNPOL, which has implications
for UN-CIMIC:
“Capacity-building is not one of the FPU’s core tasks, due to

frequent rotations and the absence of a standardised approach.
As a rule, if training experts on public order management
are required, they should be recruited separately and serve
with UNPOL capacity-building programmes in order to provide
relevant long-term expertise to build sustainable host state
capacity. However, FPUs under guidance and coordination of
the FPU training officer may be made available for exercises
and joint training with host state police. If the mandate and
the security situation allow for a diversion from the core tasks
into capacity building and if an FPU has dedicated training
capabilities, an FPU may support the United Nations police
capacity-building programmes in the development of the host
state police, mainly in the area of public order management, on
a case by case basis.”
While UNPOL or FPUs may not require the same robust UN-CIMIC capability as the military force,
UN police forces must still coordinate with military forces, among other mission components. Although
not a requirement, UNPOL and FPUs would be wise to designate an officer on staff to perform UN-CIMIC
functions, as appropriate. That person should therefore have some kind of UN-CIMIC background, such
as the information provided in this course.
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Furthermore, the activities of UNPOL and FPUs — particularly those involving the protection of
civilians or capacity-building — can incorporate UN-CIMIC principles for interaction between police and
civilian actors. The military should likewise work with police forces using the same principles, with an
understanding of the special status and function of UNPOL and FPUs.7
Military Experts on Mission (MEOMs)
According to the DPKO/DFS guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Experts on
Mission:
A UN Military Expert on Mission includes all military personnel

engaged for UN peacekeeping service as a ‘Military Expert on
Mission’ to undertake ‘observer’, ‘liaison’, or ‘advisory’ tasks in
support of mission mandate implementation. These personnel
may be categorized as UN Military Observers (UNMOs),
UN Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) or UN Military Advisers
(MILADs).
The guidelines also explain the core roles of MEOMs:
• Observation: MEOMs are traditionally considered “the eyes and ears” of the mission, and their
core roles are gathering and verifying specific and general information in the mission area.
These duties include: observation in violent or post-conflict areas; observation and reporting on
alleged human rights abuses and/or developments that may lead to human rights violations;
observation of armed or military parties to a peace process; interaction with country authorities,
non-State actors, and the local population; recognition of State and non-State combatant
formations and activities; and other observation duties assigned by the Force Commander. In
conducting these observation tasks, MEOMs may be required to conduct patrols by foot, land
vehicles, waterborne crafts, and/or aircrafts. In some cases, MEOMs may be required to conduct
joint visits with other components, including police and human rights.
• Monitoring: The monitoring duties of MEOMs normally include monitoring parties to a

ceasefire, including “separation”, “control”, or “security” zones; monitoring and assisting in the
identification of minefields/explosive ordnance; monitoring separation lines; and supporting
and contributing to human rights monitoring activities. Monitoring duties can also include, if
requested by parties to a peace process, the supervision of a disarmament and demobilization
process, or the supervision of a security sector reform process.
• Investigation/Verification: MEOMs conduct comprehensive investigations to verify information

concerning armed individuals or groups in the mission area. They are also required to investigate
and verify the presence of landmines or explosive remnants of war (ERWs), alleged violations
of a ceasefire or post-conflict agreement, or any other matter directed by the mission. They are
frequently required to work alongside or in conjunction with other UN components in the field
when conducting investigative and verification tasks. As appropriate, this work could include
verification of alleged human rights abuses conducted by the human rights component.
7) For more specifics on UNPOL techniques and procedures, as well as other information, consult the cited Guidelines cited on UNPOL and FPUs or visit
<https://police.un.org/en>.
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• Negotiation and Mediation: MEOMs may be required to facilitate or conduct formal and informal
negotiations between persons and groups in the field, and/or represent the UN peacekeeping
mission in such discussions, as required by the Head of Mission. Negotiation and mediation
may be required to address a range of disputes, such as assisting parties to resolve ownership
of land and property, de-escalate violence and assist opposing parties to agree to a peaceful
resolution, facilitate prisoner exchanges or returns, facilitate the repatriation of bodies to parent
communities, assist parties in defining ceasefire zones, facilitate the freedom of movement
for UN peacekeeping operations, assist with the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons, and any negotiation or mediation task assigned by the mission.
• Liaison: MEOMs may establish military liaison between the UN peacekeeping mission and
other entities in the field, such as local and national governments; national military forces and
other security institutions; opposing armed groups; international agencies and forces; other
UN partners; international and national non-governmental organizations, including human
rights organizations; the humanitarian assistance community; local civil society groups; and
other persons or organizations identified by the mission. Military liaison can be informal (e.g.,
interaction with local community groups, interaction with the population during patrols) or
formal (e.g., periodic or ad hoc meetings with groups or senior officials, relations with the media,
and attendance at ceremonial occasions). MEOMs should make sure their liaison activities are
closely coordinated with those of UN-CIMIC officers, and vice versa.8
• Advice: MEOMs provide advice through briefings and presentations to other UN military personnel
and to civilian and police colleagues in the peacekeeping mission. They can also be required to
provide advice to government officials and parties to a peace process on issues related to their
mission-specific roles and tasks.
• Facilitating Coordination among Partners: Closely linked to other core skills is the coordination of
actions and procedures of several actors in the field, such as arranging the venue and administrative
support for meetings and facilitating the interaction between UN peacekeeping mission staff and
other key actors in the mission area. This coordination may also be in direct support of the high
level interactions conducted by the mission with government or other counterparts.
• Reporting: This is a critical role which runs through all other core skills. The final outcome
of any task performed by a MEOM is writing a report. The report may be supplemented by
a verbal brief to a senior UN peacekeeping mission official or directly to the FC or DFC. This
report must be structured in a logical manner to accurately describe the facts discovered,
the assumptions or assessments made, the actions of the writer, the conclusion reached, and
pertinent recommendations made. MEOM and UN-CIMIC reports should be coordinated and
shared in order to maximize the “common operational picture”.9
The roles and terms of reference of MEOMs and UN-CIMIC officers overlap considerably. As such,
it is imperative for MEOMs and UN-CIMIC officers to cooperate and reinforce each other’s roles. For
example, among MEOMs, UNMOs present the greatest opportunity for collaboration, especially at the
tactical level. In areas of observation, monitoring, and reporting, each represent augmenting “eyes
8) This is discussed in detail in Lesson 6.

9) This is discussed in greater detail in Lessons 5 and 6.
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and ears” and information sources. UNMOs in particular are an excellent on-the-ground source for
situational understanding of the civil and security situation. Like UN-CIMIC officers at the Force and
Sector HQs, military observers will normally be in the mission for a year. In most missions, they often
move around the mission area. Collaboration between the two groups can go far to substantiate a
common operational picture for the UN team on the ground.
The various liaison networks that MEOMs and UN-CIMIC officers are privy to can also be leveraged in
order to build relationships not only with each other, but more importantly with the military component
at large and other external and internal actors. UN-CIMIC could reinforce the public communication
aspect of the MEOM liaison and coordination role in order to make sure the military’s mission and other
information points such as rules of engagement are well communicated to mission partners, especially
internal actors.10
In the area of coordination, the databases developed by UNMOs can be used as a source by UN-
CIMIC and its partners, even in capacity development assistance.11 For example, local government
offices are often unable to collect data and knowledge about their constituent areas. Sharing such
information — carefully vetted through Civil Affairs — could go a long way to making sure local government
peacebuilding initiatives rest on an accurate understanding of the situation and will contribute to greater
cooperation between the UN and local government leaders.
Finally, the roles of MEOMs in particular demonstrate that civil-military coordination is not just a
mission for UN-CIMIC officers, but inherent to the mission of all military personnel.
Section 2.4 Snapshot of a Peacebuilding Mission: UNMIL

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) provides an example of a complex peace operation in
a context where the peace process is still fragile, where humanitarian relief, security, and development
issues were intertwined, and where a deliberate and well-coordinated transition management process
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding has taken place. It is a good example of UN-CIMIC in action, as set
out in the UN-CIMIC Policy. In a sense, UNMIL was also a laboratory in that the UN peace operation’s
mandate and structure clearly reflected a post-conflict reconstruction, as well as conflict prevention
posture. Many of the mission’s offices, units, and programmes were new to UN peace operations or
reflected a new expanded vision that has not yet been applied elsewhere. For instance, the humanitarian
coordination function was fully integrated with the peace operations mission when OCHA agreed to
formally merge with the UNMIL Humanitarian Coordination and NGO Liaison Unit in 2004.
Structure of UNMIL
At its height, UNMIL had a senior management structure, or Mission Leadership Team, consisting of
the:
• SRSG;
• DSRSG for Recovery and Governance (formerly Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation,

Recovery, and Reconstruction);
• DSRSG for Rule of Law;

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• Force Commander;
• UN Police Commissioner; and
• Director of Mission Support.
Reporting directly to the SRSG were the:
• Legal Affairs Section;
• Communications and Public Information Office;
• Resident Auditor;
• Security Sector Adviser; and
• Conduct and Discipline Unit.
Reporting to the DSRSG for Recovery and Governance were the:
• Civil Affairs Section;
• Political Policy Planning Section;
• Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Section [now disbanded];
• Gender Adviser Unit; and
• Electoral Advisory Unit [also disbanded].
Reporting to the DSRSG for Rule of Law were the:
• Corrections and Prison Advisory Service;
• Human Rights and Protection Section;
• Legal and Judicial System Support

Division; and
• UN Police Commissioner and UN Police

component, including Formed Police Units.
The UNMIL DSRSG for Recovery and

Governance also serves as the Resident
Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC),
with a Relief, Recovery, and Rehabilitation Section
The Liberian project manager of a youth agricultural training
including these offices: a Resource Mobilization farm explains the pilot project to course author Christopher
and Trust Fund Programme; Quick Impact Projects Holshek (right) and staff officers of the resident Bangladesh
peacekeeping battalion. Photo courtesy of Christopher
Unit; and an Integrated Humanitarian Coordination
Holshek.
and NGO Liaison Unit.
The UNCT in Liberia was made up of:
• UN Development Programme (UNDP);
• United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF);
• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA);
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
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• World Health Organization (WHO);
• World Food Programme (WFP);
• Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO);
• Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
• International Organization for Migration (IOM);
• World Bank; and
• UN Field Security Coordinator (UNFSCO).
Early on, UNMIL developed an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP). The IMIP was a
consolidated mission-wide strategic and operational framework for the implementation of the UNMIL
mandate. On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), the IMIP identified eight core
goals and broke these down into 86 projects. The core goals were:
• Consolidation and strengthening of peace and security;
• Establishment of mechanisms and programmes for disarmament and demobilization;
• Rehabilitation and reintegration of all ex-combatants into civil-society;
• Establishment of the rule of law;
• Establishment of safeguards for human rights;
• Facilitation of and the functioning and restoration of state authority;
• Provision of factual information to the public through public media campaigns; and
• Coordination of UN agencies.
The UNCT in Liberia initially worked on the basis of at least two key strategy and planning document
sets: the Government of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and County Development Agendas
(CDAs); and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which was fully aligned with the
Government’s PRS at the national or operational level and the CDAs at the tactical level. In January
2008, UNMIL commenced its drawdown of forces parallel to implementation of the PRS, all with the
support of the UNDAF and other plans designed to help build the capacity of the Government to deliver
essential public services, among them security, governance, the rule of law, and economic and social
development. The intent was to reach these conditions, articulated in a series of benchmarks, by the
time of the next general elections held in November 2011, thus marking the end of drawdown and
beginning the third and final phase of withdrawal, characterized by civilian-led peacebuilding focused
on development to supplant security-intensive, military-based peacekeeping operations. With the full
transfer of national security responsibilities to the Government of Liberia in mid-2016, the UNMIL force
was reduced to less than 1,200 troops and 600 police — mainly for mission protection purposes.
UN-CIMIC has been an integral part of the integrated mission approach of UNMIL. The CIMIC
concept was clearly articulated in the UNMIL Force CIMIC Directive (provided at Appendix F). The
UNMIL CIMIC Directive is a good example of how UN-CIMIC can be integrated into the peacekeeping
force and larger UN mission structures. The CIMIC intent in Liberia was to use the capabilities of the
Force to “enable and multiply civilian initiatives” and to conduct CIMIC activities “in coordination with
the UNMIL civil component (jointly) and UN agencies as well as NGOs and the [Government of Liberia]
65
(collaboratively).” This has entailed a more indirect role for the use of military assets — more clearly in
support of civilian agencies. In a country emerging from conflict, and where it is important to emphasize
civilian government, UNMIL CIMIC aimed to lead less from the front, i.e. to downplay the role of the
military, and instead it aimed to support the UNMIL civil component, UN agencies, and the Government
of Liberia. It did so by aligning the CIMIC plans and priorities with their frameworks and benchmarks
in order to promote local ownership of civil administration and essential public services responsibilities,
and to help build civil authority and public confidence.
To de-emphasize the traditional military approach

to CIMIC, UNMIL CIMIC emphasized that it is not about
“winning hearts and minds”. Instead, the motto for UNMIL
CIMIC became, “it’s not about us; it’s about them.”
Additionally, UNMIL CIMIC adopted the PRS and UNDAF
frameworks for the planning and execution of its own
projects, which is has been continuously civilianizing and
localizing. Thus, in order to facilitate the mission end state,
UNMIL CIMIC adopted the rule sets, ways, measures, and
means of the civilian partners it had been supporting. To
First all-female UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) arrives
socialize this concept among the military staff in particular,
at Roberts International Airport in Liberia. 30
another UNMIL CIMIC aphorism emerged: “Their game January 2007. Photo by UNMIL/Eric Kanalstein.
plan is our game plan.”
Section 2.5 The AMISOM Mandate

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peace support operation deployed by the
African Union with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Its aim is to provide support
for the Federal Government of Somalia in its efforts to stabilize the country and foster political dialogue
and reconciliation. AMISOM is also mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and create
necessary conditions for the reconstruction and sustainable development of Somalia.
AMISOM’s Mandate
AMISOM was established by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007. On
20 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy AMISOM
with Resolution 1744 (2007). Since then, the mission’s mandate has been renewed and updated several
times. Currently, the mandate of the mission can be summarized as follows:
1. Take all necessary measures, in coordination with the Somalia

National Defence and Public Safety Institutions, to reduce
the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition
groups;
2. Assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the Federal

Government of Somalia (GFS) over its national territory;
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3. Assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and

legitimate governance across Somalia, including by protecting
Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of
law and delivery of basic services;
4. Provide technical and other support to Somalia State

institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety,
and Public Service Institutions;
5. Support the FGS in establishing institutions and conducive

conditions for the conduct of free, fair, and transparent
elections;
6. Liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate humanitarian

assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally
displaced persons and the return of refugees;
7. Facilitate coordinated support towards the stabilization and

reconstruction of Somalia; and
8. Provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and

equipment, including the right of self-defence.
Structure of AMISOM
AMISOM is headed by a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
for Somalia (SRCC). The SRCC is supported by a Deputy SRCC (DSRCC), a mission (civilian) Chief of
Staff, the Head of Administration, the Force Commander, and the Police Commissioner. The mission has
three components: military, police and civilian.
AMISOM’s civilian component includes humanitarian, political, gender, civil affairs, and mission
support officers. The mission civilian component is responsible for assisting the Federal Government of
Somalia in re-establishing functioning State institutions and delivering services to the Somali people.
The Police component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor, and advise the Somali Police
Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organisation adhering to strict
international standards. AMISOM Police has deployed two Formed Police Units (FPU) with a combined
strength of 280 police officers in Mogadishu. In addition there are 106 Individual Police Officers (IPO)
from Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda. The individual police officers provide
mentoring and advisory support to the Somalia Police Force on basic police duties, such as human rights
observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing, search procedures, and investigations.
The military component is authorized to have a maximum level of 22,126 troops. Currently the
Force Headquarters of the military component is staffed by officers from Burundi, Cameroon, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. The bulk
of its troops come from six countries: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.
They are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia.
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The military component has been instrumental in helping the Somali National Security Forces push
the East African militant group Al-Shabaab out of most major towns and cities in southern Somalia.
It has created a relatively secure environment that allows the local population to re-establish local
governance institutions that can begin to deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and
create linkages to the national economy and government.
Overall mission coordination is pursued through a number of coordination mechanisms, such as a

Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) and an Integrated Support Services cell. The JMAC collects, analyses
and shares information from and to all the components of the mission. The Integrated Support Services
cell is staffed from officers that are seconded from the military and police components and recruited for
the civilian component. This cell serves as the central coordination point for all mission support services.
The CIMIC cell works closely in support of the JMAC and CISS.
AMISOM is unique in that it has a UN mission — the United Nations Support Office in Somalia
(UNSOS) — dedicated to providing logistical support to it. In addition to UNSOS, the mission also
benefits from bilateral donations and voluntary contributions to a UN managed Trust Fund in Support
of AMISOM. The EU also contributes to the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses,
within the framework of the African Peace Facility (APF).
The Role of CIMIC in AMISOM
AMISOM has a CIMIC cell in the Force headquarters, and in each of the six sectors. Each battalion or
unit also has a CIMIC officer or a CIMIC focal point. Because the African Union does not have a separate
CIMIC doctrine, AU CIMIC is modelled along the UN-CIMIC policy at the mission headquarters level. At
the sector headquarters and unit level, the CIMIC approach is influenced by the national doctrines of the
countries that are responsible for those sectors. However, these approaches do not differ greatly from
each other.
The CIMIC officers support their commanders with advice on supporting civilian authorities and the
local population, they act as liaison officers to the civilian population, local leaders, local authorities,
and NGOs. They coordinate armed escorts and other forms of support to humanitarian actors. They also
coordinate the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that the mission is responsible for.
AMISOM is engaged in containing and degrading Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. This means
that the role of CIMIC in AMISOM is slightly different from CIMIC in most UN peacekeeping missions
where the conflict has come to an end and the mission is helping to implement a peace agreement. A
CIMIC officer in AMISOM supports both active combat operations and deals with those areas that have
been regained or liberated from Al-Shabaab. In combat operations, CIMIC officers help plan operations
so that they have minimum negative impact on the civilian population. CIMIC officers liaise with
community leaders to inform them of the mandate and role of AMISOM and they coordinate requests
from the communities for security and support.
In those cities, towns, and rural areas where the Federal Government of Somalia has regained
control, AMISOM is supporting the Federal Government and local authorities to re-establish basic
services and administration, including policing and local judicial services. This requires a lot of facilitated
discussion (i.e., negotiation and mediation) with local leaders to agree on how they want to re-establish
their own local government structures.
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Because of the security situation and lack of facilities, there are very few civilian experts from
AMISOM or the UN or other international actors on the ground. The CIMIC officers thus have to take the
lead in dealing with community leaders and local authorities on behalf of AMISOM, and they typically
serve as the main coordinators between the local leaders and AMISOM’s civilian component, the UN and
other international experts, or international NGOs.
Medical outreach
AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel provide medical services to the civilian population
although the facilities were designed to provide medical attention to the deployed troops. Given the
depth of problems in Somalia, AMISOM medical facilities have, as a last resort, become an important
supplementary medical resource for many people in Somalia. For instance, in Mogadishu, the three
hospital departments treat over 12,000 patients per month on average. Their treatments vary from
chronic medical diseases to surgical cases, both acute and chronic. Over 90 per cent of these patients
are from the local population, including Somalia government troops and officials.
The medical support provided by AMISOM is, in CIMIC terms, support provided to the local
communities. In those cases where there are no local or international civilian medical facilities, the
mission also provides humanitarian support as an option of last resort. In addition to the direct benefit
to those that get medical assistance, these medical outreach activities also build relationships with the
local community. They provide CIMIC and other officers an opportunity to interact with local leaders and
to discuss the mission’s mandate and objectives.
Facilitating humanitarian assistance
The humanitarian mandate of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. The mandate provides that
AMISOM shall “Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including
the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).”
AMISOM facilitates humanitarian assistance by providing security on request, engaging in

coordination, and as a last resort, offering medical and other services where humanitarian actors cannot
reach people in need.
AMISOM also provides armed escorts to humanitarian convoys headed for distribution points in and
around Mogadishu and elsewhere in southern Somalia.
The AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit and its CIMIC officers works closely with the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), UNICEF-Somalia, UNHCR-Somalia, WFP and other
UN agencies and NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. AMISOM
CIMIC and the UN-CMCoord officer of OCHA in Somalia have developed mission specific guidelines for
humanitarian-military coordination in Somalia, including for armed escorts and other situations where
AMISOM provides support to humanitarian actors in Somalia.
AMISOM also collaborates with the Somali Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement,
Ministry of Health and other relevant authorities.
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Quick Impact Projects
AMISOM QIPs are typically small-scale projects that help address the basic needs of local populations
in Somalia. These projects are supported and funded by partners such as the EU and the British
Government.
The QIPs are also used to help strengthen the institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and
local authorities. For instance, QIPs have been used to refurbish police stations, police clinics, courts,
and local administration buildings.
QIPs are overseen by the Civilian Chief of Staff and approved by the SRCC, but AMISOM’s CIMIC
officers play a key role in coordinating the mission’s QIPs project in those areas where, for security and
logistical reasons, AMISOM does not have a civilian presence.
Civil-Military Coordination Challenges
AMISOM differs from UN missions in a number of important ways, and this also impacts on the
way CIMIC is undertaken. UN missions have a strong top-down command and control system, where
the force design, force placement, and the actions of the force are strongly influenced by the UN
headquarters in New York that does the initial planning. Subsequently, the Force Commander and the
Force headquarters provide the sector headquarters and units with direction and specific instructions.
This type of multinational force design works well in UN peacekeeping missions where the conflict
has come to an end and the focus is on peace consolidation. In UN peacekeeping missions, CIMIC
officers at the Force and Sector headquarters come from the various troop-contributing contingents and
operate generally in accordance with the UN-CIMIC policy and mission-specific plans and orders that are
generated at the Force Headquarters.
AMISOM, on the other hand, has more of a bottom-up command and control system where each of
the major TCCs have some degree of autonomy in the sectors they are responsible for — again, based
on the situation at hand. They have some influence on their own force structures according to their
objectives and the situations they face in the sectors they are responsible for. AMISOM’s command
and control are thus more similar to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan or its Kosovo Force (KFOR)
mission where different countries had responsibility for their own sectors. This type of multinational
design works better for combat operations where the type of combat may differ from sector to sector.
This means that that at the sector and unit level CIMIC is influenced by national doctrine, and are
accountable to their sector Commanders. The only multinational or mission-wide CIMIC cell is the one
at Mission Headquarters level and it thus has more of a coordination, tracking, and reporting role than
a command role.
However, AMISOM CIMIC compensates for the fact that the sector CIMIC cells are fairly autonomous
by having regular CIMIC conferences so that all the CIMIC cells have a common understanding of what
the mission would like to accomplish when it comes to the overall CIMIC directive and plans. This also
helps to ensure that the sector CIMIC cells report the kind of activities to the force headquarters that
can be used to track and reflect a mission-wide CIMIC profile.
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The security situation also means that in AMISOM, CIMIC officers have to take on more of the
tasks that civilian specialists will be responsible for in UN peacekeeping missions. This is in good part
because CIMIC officers have a less robust international civilian presence to transition tasks than in
a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping operation, due to a good extent to the higher conflict
management content of the mission mandate. CIMIC officers in AMISOM thus have to meet regularly
with local leaders and liaise with then in terms of the basic governance services they are responsible for,
and they have to liaise more extensively with local and international NGOs and civil society than is likely
to be the case in UN missions — in other words, CIMIC in AMISOM is at least as focused on localizing
as on civilianizing.
Conclusion
In this section we covered:
• The full spectrum of UN peace operations, its evolution, and implications for civil-military
coordination, including two examples of peacebuilding and protection-intensive missions,
respectively;
• How civil-military coordination facilitates interaction and transition in complex integrated UN

missions; and
• The roles of key civil-military partners in a UN peace operation environment.
71
• Methods and Techniques for Serving on a Peacekeeping Mission as a UN Military Observer,

Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Schirch, Lisa (editor). Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum. The

Hague, The Netherlands: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute, March 2016.
• United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities, Peace Operations Training
Institute.
• Security for Peace Operations Personnel, Peace Operations Training Institute.
Edition (2014), Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support Integrated
Training Services (DPKO/DFS ITS), available at: <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89582>.
• United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Conflict Series 1 – What Is
Conflict?; Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/
elearning>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 2, 3, and 5 of the Handbook. See also Local
Chapters 1-3, as well as the Policy Brief – Local Ownership, Coordination, and Human Security
(December 2015).
Further References
• Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945).
Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (16 June 2015).
• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, DPKO, United Nations (18
January 2008).
missions>.


withdrawal>.
72

(2015), both available at: <www.unocha.org/uncmcoord/>.
• Policy Directive, Civil Affairs, United Nations, DPKO/DFS (April 2008).
• Civil Affairs Handbook, United Nations, DPKO/DFS (March 2012), available at: <https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/civil_affairs_handbook.pdf>.
• DPKO/DFS Ref. 2015.15 Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations and Special Political Missions (1 January 2016).
• Guidelines on the Roles and Training Standards for UN Military Experts on Mission, DPKO/DFS
(1 March 2009), available at: <http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/89584>.
• “Particularized protection UNSC mandates and the protection of civilians

in armed conflict”, available at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/13533312.2015.1123628?journalCode=finp2>.
• External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division (31 May
2016), available at: <https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/external-review-2016_0.pdf>.
73
1. True or false? UN Security Council 3. Which of the following is NOT true of

Resolution 2086 reinforced the concept protection missions?
of mission integration in the Capstone
A. They are not deployed to monitor or
Doctrine and “multidimensional
implement a ceasefire or peace agreement,
peacekeeping” from a full-spectrum
perspective mainly by providing a but to protect civilians and to create a stable
framework to operationalize a more space for a peace agreement
robust view of peacekeeping and “early B. Violence may erupt or worsen following the
peacebuilding” with emphasis on deployment of the established peacekeeping
transition management.
mission
C. Civil-military coordination may be performed
2. The main recommendations of the
HIPPO Report with impact on civil- in a “conflict management” environment
military coordination are _____. D. Protection missions do not have to be
A. operations under conditions of violence that approved by the Security Council

“there is no peace to keep”, the increasing
4. Which of the following is NOT true about
absence of clearly identifiable parties to the
Military Experts on Mission?
conflict, and the increasing appearance of
A. MEOMs include all military personnel
asymmetric and unconventional threats
engaged for UN peacekeeping service to
B. expansion of traditional peacekeeping;
undertake “observer”, “liaison”, or “advisory”
a more comprehensive, coherent, and
tasks in support of mission mandate
integrated approach to peacekeeping and
implementation
conflict prevention; early peacebuilding; and
B. UN-CIMIC officers and MEOMs are the same
integrated action on the ground by security
position
and development actors
C. MEOM roles include observation, monitoring,
C. the primacy of political rather than military
investigation/verification, negotiation
solutions; full spectrum peace operations
and mediation, liaison, advice, facilitating
that are flexible and adaptive; a stronger,
coordination among partners, and reporting
more inclusive peace and security
partnership; and the need for the UN to D. There is a great deal of overlap between
become more field-focused and peace their roles and terms of reference and that of
operations to be more people-centred UN-CIMIC officers
D. rapid deployment of peacekeeping

5. The Head of Mission of a
operations, strengthening UN-Member States multidimensional UN peace operation is
relations, reforming the management culture the _____.
of peacekeeping operations, reforming the
A. Force Commander
UN relationship with field missions, and
B. Police Commissioner
strengthening Secretariat relationships with
C. Special Representative of the Secretary-
UN agencies
General (SRSG)
D. Director of Administration
74
6. Which of the following is not a civilian 9. Multidimensional peace operations mean

component in a UN peace operation? that these missions consist of _____.
A. Human Rights Unit A. army, navy, and air force contingents
B. Gender Unit B. military, police, civilian components
C. Political Affairs Unit C. humanitarian, development, and human
D. UN Police rights actors
D. international and local actors
7. The UN defines peacebuilding as _____.
A. measures that will consolidate the peace and 10. True or false? The UN Integrated
Approach refers to a strategic
prevent a relapse into conflict
partnership between the UN
B. mechanisms to monitor a ceasefire peacekeeping operation and the UNCT
C. measures to provide humanitarian relief that ensures that all components of the
D. measures and structures that will alleviate UN system operate in a coherent and
poverty and ensure sustainable long-term
mutually supportive manner, and in
close collaboration with other partners.
development
8. The UN understands conflict prevention

as _____.
A. preventing the reoccurrence of national
disasters, and limiting their damage
B. preventing disputes from arising or
escalating, and limiting their spread when
they do occur
C. preventing the spread of disease, by
ensuring international hygiene standards
D. preventing humanitarian crises
Answer Key »
1. True
2. C
3. D
4. B
5. C
6. D
7. A
8. B
9. B
10. True
75
LESSON
Military Support to
3 Humanitarian Assistance and

Disaster Relief
Humanitarian civil-military
coordination provides a
unique set of challenges
for both civilian and
military organizations.
UN Photo #148110 by Martine Perret.
Section 3.1 UN Humanitarian Civil-Military • Understand the role of the UN Office for the
Coordination Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and
humanitarian UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN-
Section 3.2 Military Support Roles
CMCoord).
Section 3.3 Practical Discussion – The Haiti
• Understand the military role in support to
Earthquake of 2010
humanitarian and disaster response within the
context of a UN integrated mission.
76
LESSON 3 | Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) surveys the remains of the United Nations headquarters in Haiti, the former Hotel Christopher,
in the devastated capital Port-au-Prince. 17 January 2010. UN Photo #425173 by Sophia Paris.
Introduction
Humanitarian civil-military coordination provides a

unique set of challenges for both civilian and military
organizations. Humanitarian actors work according to
principles and guidelines that the military must respect.
UN-CMCoord officers are specialists in humanitarian
civil-military coordination, including humanitarian-
military assessment, planning, and coordination. They
need to be in a position to advise military commanders
on the most appropriate ways the military can support
humanitarian assistance, when requested.
In order to work effectively with humanitarian

organizations, ensure a smooth interface between
security and humanitarian concerns, and facilitate an
end to the crisis while enabling the withdrawal of forces
sent specifically to meet this situation, it is imperative
for military civil-military coordinators such as UN-CIMIC
77
officers to understand humanitarian principles and guidelines. The lead agency for humanitarian response
and humanitarian civil-military coordination is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA). It is imperative for all civil-military actors to understand how the military should support
humanitarian action and assistance, in accordance with International Humanitarian Law, principles, and
guidelines.
It is also important to understand the practical implications of these policies and mechanisms. The
last part of this lesson provides a practical discussion of a major humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief event, as well as some civil-military observations and lessons regarding the international response
to the 2010 Haiti earthquake crisis.
Section 3.1 UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

As discussed in Lessons 1 and 2, one of the activities likely to be taking place parallel to a UN
peace operation is humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian action and assistance are undertaken by
UN humanitarian organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-UN
humanitarian organizations such as the non-governmental organization (NGO) Doctors Without Borders
or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The relationship between peace operations
and the humanitarian community has not always gone smoothly. It is the task of civilian and military
coordinators to manage this relationship in such a way that both communities are able to work in a
complementary fashion or, where that is not possible, to at least ensure they are not in direct conflict
with each other.
In the UN system, OCHA is the part of the Secretariat responsible for coordinating the UN humanitarian
response to emergencies. OCHA coordinates a wider framework in which non-UN humanitarian actors
can contribute to the overall international response effort. Its mandate includes:
• Mobilizing and coordinating effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with
national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering;
• Advocating for the rights of people in need;
• Promoting preparedness and prevention; and
• Facilitating sustainable solutions.
OCHA’s activities include coordination, policymaking, advocacy, information management, and

financing for humanitarian action or assistance, including natural disasters and complex emergencies.
Coordination
Under the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), OCHA brings
together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies in order to assist people
who most need relief or protection. A key pillar of its mandate is to partner with national and international
actors to coordinate effective humanitarian action. Humanitarian coordination seeks to improve the
humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability, and partnership. This includes:
• Assessing situations and needs;
• Agreeing on common priorities;
• Developing common strategies to address issues, such as negotiating access;
78
• Mobilizing funding and other resources;
• Clarifying consistent public messaging; and
• Monitoring progress.
Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms
OCHA is the secretariat for inter-agency coordination mechanisms, such as the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC), and rapid-response tools like the United Nations Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC) system and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG).
It also promotes preparedness by working with national governments, regional bodies, and other
agencies on contingency planning, hazard mapping, and early warning reports, as well as mapping
global emergency relief stockpiles.
OCHA staff can deploy on short notice to support several surge-capacity mechanisms and networks
that enable the broader humanitarian community to respond rapidly to disasters and conflicts. Among
these is the Cluster Coordination System, including meetings, data and information management, and
reporting. The Cluster System is the result of a 2005 UN review of the global humanitarian system.
The review also led to the creation of a Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to provide timely,
adequate, and flexible funding, a “lead organization concept” to cover critical gaps in protection and
assistance.
The Cluster System consists of groupings of UN agencies, NGOs, and other international organizations
organized around a sector or service that is regularly provided during a humanitarian crisis. Each cluster
is led by a designated agency, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1. The Cluster Coordination System, from the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook (referenced at the end of this Lesson), 40.
79
Following the 2010 earthquake crisis in Haiti, the IASC produced operational guidance on
designated cluster/sector leads, informing OCHA’s web-based coordination tool for cluster management,
OneResponse. A more recent innovation has been Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centres
(HuMOCCs), which were fielded and tested during responses to Cyclone Pam and the Nepal earthquake,
both in 2015.
UN-CMCoord
OCHA deploys UN-CMCoord officers responsible for humanitarian-military coordination on behalf of

the humanitarian community in a given crisis. UN-CMCoord leads the interaction between humanitarian
and military actors in an often rapidly changing environment, based on these aims:
• Improve civil-military dialogue, communication, and interaction;
• Preserve humanitarian space and freedom by maintaining clear distinction among the identities,
functions, and roles of humanitarian and military actors;
• Ensure that the relationship

between humanitarian and
military/armed actors is UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Key Terms »
appropriate to the operational Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection,
context; and advocacy activities done on an impartial basis in
• Facilitate a coherent and response to humanitarian needs resulting from complex
consistent humanitarian emergencies and/or natural disasters, or to prevent/
approach across UN agencies mitigate risks and prepare for future events.
and the wider humanitarian
A humanitarian crisis occurs when the lives, health, or
community;
well-being of people are in danger as a result of natural
• Ensure appropriate and
disasters, technological or man-made disasters, and
timely use of foreign military
violence and conflict.
assets as a last resort when
civilian capacities are not Humanitarian actors are designated civilians, whether
readily available to meet a national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or
critical humanitarian need; non-governmental, engaged in humanitarian activities.
and
Natural disasters are events caused by natural hazards that
• Ensure coherence of relief to
seriously affect society, the economy, and/or infrastructure.
avoid duplication of military
and humanitarian activities. A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis where
UN-CMCoord officers support the there is total or considerable breakdown of authority
work of the Resident Coordinator/ resulting from internal or external conflict and requiring an
Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) international response beyond the mandate or capacity of
in UN integrated missions, where the any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.
RC/HC is one of the Deputy SRSGs.

From the UN-CMCoord Field Handbook, pp. 10-11.
UN-CMCoord officers are part of the
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT),
under the HC’s leadership.
80
The HCT is the centrepiece of humanitarian coordination in a country. It comprises organizations

undertaking humanitarian action in-country that commit to humanitarian principles and participate
in coordination arrangements. These may include UN agencies, the International Organization for
Migration, NGOs, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It rarely includes military
representatives. The HCT consultatively determines and supports:
• Common strategic issues, common objectives

and priorities, and strategic plans;
• A cluster system and cluster lead agencies;
• Guidance to cluster lead agencies, activation

of resource mobilization mechanisms, and
advice to the HC on the allocation of resources
from in-country humanitarian pooled funds;
• Common policies (including country-specific

guidance for the use of armed escorts and The Security Council held a briefing attended by interior
engagement with armed actors); and ministers and their equivalents on countering the flow
of foreign terrorist fighters into conflict zones. 29 May
• Adherence to humanitarian principles and 2015. UN Photo #632737 by Devra Berkowitz.
adopting joint policies and strategies.
Regardless of where UN-CMCoord and UN-CIMIC officers are physically located, they should establish
a close working relationship with each other. This ensures two things:
• It enhances mission coordination and a coherent interface with the humanitarian community;
and
• It ensures that civil-military guidelines, coordination strategy, and coordination structures

recommended to the RC/HC and Force Commander reflect both humanitarian and military
inputs and concerns.
In rare occasions, individual UN humanitarian agencies (like UNHCR and WFP) may deploy MLOs to
support their own interaction with the military. The UNJLC, a component of the Logistics Cluster, may
also deploy CMLog Officers to deal with their military counterparts on logistics matters, similar to the
JLOC.1 Regardless, UN-CMCoord officers remain the main conduit to the UN humanitarian leadership in
humanitarian and disaster response situations.
Policy
OCHA sets the humanitarian coordination policy agenda to identify emerging trends and develop
common or harmonized policy and advocacy positions among relief organizations. This is based on
humanitarian principles, human rights, and public international law. The most important of these for
humanitarian-military coordination are the guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence
Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief (revised 2007), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”, the Guidelines
on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex
Emergencies (2003), and the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Conveys – Discussion
Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (2001).
81
These guidelines were developed to address the use of MCDA to support humanitarian assistance
in a broad range of contexts, ranging from natural disasters to complex emergencies, including UN
peace operations. The guidelines are a crucial reference point for all involved in humanitarian-military
coordination. They are relevant for humanitarian-military coordination across the full spectrum of peace
and security activities. This includes humanitarian agencies working in the same area as NATO and
US-led coalitions, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo, as well as humanitarian agencies working
alongside UN peace operations.
MCDA should only be deployed at the request or consent of the affected State and provided free of
charge. Requests for MCDA come from the HCT through the HC. MCDA should complement existing relief
mechanisms for specific support to fill a gap between humanitarian needs and the resources available.
It should be requested only to satisfy a critical humanitarian need where there is no comparable civilian
alternative, i.e. they are unique in capability and availability. While military assets will remain under
military control, the operation as a whole must maintain a civilian character under the overall authority
of the responsible humanitarian organization.
From a UN peace operations perspective, it should also be noted that these humanitarian-military
guidelines are limited to the humanitarian dimension of civil-military coordination. Humanitarian
coordination is one of the most important aspects of civil-military coordination in UN peace operations
at any operational phase, but it is not the only area of civil-military coordination. Coordination should
take place among all components at all levels throughout the entire life cycle of the peace operation —
from the assessments and planning stages, to deployment and stabilization, and through peacebuilding
and withdrawal.
There are some key terms that should be noted in the humanitarian-military guidelines. Among them
is the definition of humanitarian assistance and the three degrees of military support to humanitarian
assistance:
Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose,
to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be
provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.
MCDA assistance falls in three categories that help define the appropriateness of support under different
conditions, given ample consultation among all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity
of the assistance.
• Infrastructure Support: General services that facilitate humanitarian activities but are not
necessarily visible to, or exclusively intended for the benefit of, the affected people, such as re-
establishing infrastructure, providing communications networks, operating airfields, or providing
operationally relevant information.
• Indirect Assistance: Actions in which military personnel are at least one step removed from
the relief activity. Only civilian personnel have direct interface with the affected population,
while the military assists with logistics, engineering, telecommunications, information exchange
(including security-related information), and medical services support.
• Direct Assistance: Face-to-face distribution of goods and services from the military to the
affected population.
82
Regardless of whether for humanitarian or peace operations reasons, the principles of civil-military
coordination and the use of force outlined in Lesson 1 apply. That is, the military should only provide
direct assistance in situations of exceptional need, as a last resort, for a limited time, and with a view to
transition those tasks to civilian partners.
Direct military assistance for the purposes of “winning hearts and minds” is strongly discouraged.
The military is best suited to providing indirect support, or infrastructure support, so long as doing so
will not endanger aid workers or beneficiaries, and will not affect the independence of the humanitarians
concerned.
The matrix at the end of this lesson provides a helpful guide on the types of support the military can
provide to humanitarian and peacebuilding actors. This and other points of guidance on civil-military
coordination are found in OCHA’s UN-CMCoord Guide for the Military as well as the UN-CMCoord Field
Handbook. Every person involved in humanitarian-military coordination should be familiar with these
references and have them in the field.
These guidelines also spell out the core principles of humanitarian assistance endorsed by
international law, both in the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements comprising
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These principles are:
• Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention
paid to the most vulnerable, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of
all victims must be respected and protected.
• Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking

sides in political, religious, or ideological controversies.
• Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination toward ethnic

origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of suffering must be guided
solely by needs, and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
The most important area of military support to humanitarian assistance is in the protection of civilians
(POC). It is fundamental to humanitarian action and rooted in International Humanitarian Law for both
civilian and military actors. Although humanitarians have a broader interpretation of this mandate, it is
important for military organizations to be brought in for joint planning under the Protection Cluster to
ensure that military and humanitarian protection activities complement each other.
Especially with respect to the protection of civilians, military commanders must remain aware that
military support to humanitarian assistance is not entirely optional. The Fourth Geneva Convention
of 1949 imposed strong legal obligations on intervening military forces to protect civilians in armed
conflict and (when necessary) to provide them humanitarian assistance. In disaster relief, the guidelines
with respect to International Disaster Relief Assistance (IDRA) apply. IDRA means material, personnel,
and services provided by the international community to an affected State to meet the needs of those
affected by a disaster. It includes all actions to grant and facilitate movement over territory, including in
a transit State. IDRA is delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles and MCDA Guidelines.
83
The key consideration on whether and how to use MCDA for humanitarian purposes are thus:
• Last resort – where there is no comparable civilian alternative;
• Complementarity – complementary to extant relief mechanisms to address a resource gap;
• At no cost – no compensation to the military;
• Distinction – MCDA is clearly distinguished from those engaged in other military missions;
• Avoiding dependence on MCDA; and
• Time-limited – MCDA is clearly limited in time and scale and with an exit strategy.
Advocacy
OCHA has a unique mandate to speak out on behalf of the people affected worst by humanitarian
situations in order to save more lives and reduce the impact of conflicts and natural disasters. Advocacy
means communicating with other humanitarian agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations,
national governments, local and international media, parties to the conflict, companies, donors, regional
bodies, communities affected by emergencies, and the general public in both donor and beneficiary
countries.
Information Management
OCHA runs a well-developed information management network that supports emergency coordination
processes to collect, analyse, and share information about the situation among the various organizations
involved, and to ensure the coordination system runs efficiently. The network includes people affected
by the emergency, as well as relief organizations, governments, and media. The information often is
presented in easy-to-use formats, such as maps or tables, to support swift decision-making at all levels.
A clear information management structure also ensures that all the organizations involved work
with the same or complementary information that is as relevant, accurate, and timely as possible. It
is a foundation for situation reporting and public information. Additionally, managing information well
during the emergency phase can benefit early recovery. Equally important are the preparedness and
lessons-learned implications for key partners, especially through the IASC Task Force on Information
Management.
Closer to the ground, UN-CMCoord officers play a key role in humanitarian information management
within the HCT and clusters — in, for example, the Logistics Cluster on consolidated mapping or GIS
services, and common logistics services (air/marine/ground transport, warehousing, fuel provision,
etc.). In complex emergencies, information sharing is limited to aspects relevant to the safety and
security of humanitarian workers and the protection of civilians.
Among OCHA-sponsored web-based information management tools is ReliefWeb,2 an extensive,

web-based source for news, updates, and analysis of topical or geographical issues of importance to
peace operations and humanitarian activities. Another tool is the Who What Where (3W) database. The
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System was developed jointly by the UN, European Commission,
2) Available at: <http://reliefweb.int/>.
84
and others to provide a virtual platform for disaster alerts and information exchange and networking,
especially for the opening phases of disaster response. Both civil and military personnel can request an
account on the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre.3
Humanitarian Financing
Following a humanitarian crisis, humanitarian actors in the field can immediately provide life-saving
assistance using pooled funds managed by OCHA. There are three types of pooled funds: the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs), and Emergency Response
Funds (ERFs). These funds provide immediate assistance for food, water, and shelter; life-saving
nutrition and medical care; and basic life necessities.
Immediately following a disaster, the RC/HC can make a CERF application for humanitarian funding
for life-saving activities. In countries where there is an ERF or CHF, the RC/HC can immediately release
available funds for agreed priorities at the country level. NGOs cannot access CERF funds, but CHFs and
ERFs can be allocated to NGOs. The majority of ERF recipients are NGO partners.
Additional Agencies and Organizations
In addition to OCHA, there are multiple UN agencies that are often involved in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. Among them:
The Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR
emerged in the wake of the Second World War to help
Europeans displaced by that conflict. Optimistically,
UNHCR was established 14 December 1950 by the
United Nations General Assembly with a three-year
mandate to complete its work and then disband.
The organization continues to work into the twenty-
first century.
Haitians walk through the earthquake-ravaged streets
UNHCR is the major UN agency UN-CIMIC
of downtown Port-au-Prince. 29 January 2010. UN Photo
officers may work with regarding refugees and other #426739 by Marco Dormino.
displaced persons. Its major activities include:
• Direct and indirect assistance;
• Advocacy;
• Protection;
• Asylum and migration;
• Capacity building;
• Durable solutions for displaced persons;
• Emergency response;
• Related environmental issues; and
• Fundraising and preparation of the Global Needs Assessment.

3) Virtual OSOCC link is: <https://vosocc.unocha.org/>.
85
Prices at Niger’s food markets spiked in the aftermath of a patchy harvest in 2011, causing concern
among food security experts that many could soon go hungry. The failed harvest, brought on
by drought, drove prices up. According to the Government of Niger, some 750,000 people were
severely food insecure, a number expected to reach one million by early 2012 as the country moved
towards its traditional lean season in March and April. In response to the looming food crisis, WFP
aimed to support some 3.3 million people with life-saving food assistance. 17 November 2011. UN
Photo #505620 by Phil Behan.
UNHCR sets the administrative, health, and logistical standards with regard to camp management
for refugees and displaced persons.4
United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Created in 1946 from residual resources
from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to secure the fate of Europe’s children,
UNICEF focuses on issues, both in emergency response and peacebuilding, on children and youth, who
are often disproportionally victimized and affected, in the areas of protection, health, nutrition, and
education. One of UNICEF’s most outstanding innovations is the global, 24-hour operations centre at its
HQ in New York. The centre uses state-of-the-art technologies for early warning of atrocities and other
emergencies, information management, and global coordination and communication. UNICEF is also
considered a leader among UN agencies in partnerships with private organizations, including corporate
entities.5
The World Food Programme (WFP). Since 1961, WFP has been the food aid arm of the United
Nations system. WFP’s main aim is to promote food security, ensuring access at all times to the food
needed for an active and healthy life for all people. The policies governing the use of WFP food aid must
be oriented towards the objective of eradicating hunger and poverty. The ultimate objective should be
the elimination of the need for food aid.
4) More information on UNHCR can be found at <http://www.unhcr.org>. Additionally, UNHCR has a useful field reference for UN-CIMIC officers in
support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations: UNHCR and the Military – A Field Guide, last updated in 2006 and available at:
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465702372.pdf>.
5) More information on UNICEF can be found at <http://www.unicef.org/>.
86
Personnel of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) attend to an injured person during an
exercise on large-scale disaster response. A two-day disaster response programme dubbed “United
Beacon” was jointly conducted by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, in cooperation with a
number of government and non-government organizations in the city of Tyre, Lebanon. 27 February
2011. UN Photo #465615 by Pasqual Gorriz.
Consistent with its mandate, WFP looks to:
• Use food aid to support economic and social development;
• Meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and
• Promote world food security in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and
its Food and Agricultural Organization.
WFP activities include:
• Assistance to refugees and other displaced person emergency situations;
• Improvement of nutrition and quality of life of the most vulnerable people at critical times; and
• Building assets and promoting the self-reliance of poor people and communities, particularly
through labour-intensive work programmes.
WFP excels at emergency food aid logistics and complex distribution on a massive scale, and the UN
often calls upon it as the lead agency in this role.6
The World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO is the directing and coordinating authority
for health within the United Nations system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health
matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based
policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and assessing health trends.7
The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC). While not a UN
agency, the ICRC predates the UN by almost a century and was the lead promoter of what became the
Geneva Conventions. ICRC will likely be the major non-UN organization UN-CIMIC officers encounter
6) More information on WFP can be found at <http://www.wfp.org/>.

7) More information on WHO can be found at <http://www.who.int/en/>.
87
A Japanese military engineer with the

United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) helps level terrain in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to make way for a
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
cluster. 17 February 2010. UN Photo
#428583 by Pasqual Gorriz.
in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief support operations. In addition to the four Geneva
Conventions, the ICRC headed up the creation of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.8
The Sphere Project and the Humanitarian Charter. OCHA is not the only organization that has
led the way in establishing norms and standards by which humanitarian organizations provide assistance.
The Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of international humanitarian
agencies and organizations together around a common aim — to improve the quality of humanitarian
assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors, and affected
populations. Established in 1997, the Sphere Project is not a membership organization. It is governed
by a board composed of representatives of global networks of humanitarian agencies. The Sphere
Project is a community of humanitarian response practitioners, among them OCHA, UN agencies, and
the ICRC, along with hundreds of NGOs and civil society organizations.
The Sphere Handbook, otherwise known as the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Humanitarian Response, is one of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of common
principles and universal minimum standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response.9
Section 3.2 Military Support Roles

By this time, it should be clear that the civil-military coordination principles discussed in Lesson 1 —
the primacy of civilian authority, the military as supporting and not supported, the military as
enabler, indirect versus direct support, and managing civil-military interaction and transition — are
complementary to the principles of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as described in the
OCHA UN-CMCoord references. Military officers, following these principles and mindful of those of their
humanitarian partners, will go far to “do no harm” — that is, to maintain the “balance of consequences”
8) More information on ICRC can be found at <http://www.icrc.org/>.

9) More information on the Sphere Project can be found at <http://www.sphereproject.org>.
88
criterion with respect to the use of force discussed in Lesson 1. In the humanitarian context, “do no
harm” means to ensure that nothing that the UN peace operations mission does will contribute to further
the conflict, or harm or endanger the people that the mission has been deployed to protect and serve.
Additionally, faithful application of the civil-military principles will minimize often inevitable frictions
between the military — whose main concern is security — and humanitarian organizations — whose
main concern is alleviating the suffering of people affected by conflict or natural disasters. One way
to understand how humanitarian assistance is complementary to peace operations, even in complex
emergencies, is to recognize that stabilizing the humanitarian situation contributes to the security of
the population transitioning out of conflict, especially when the idea of “human security” is applied.
Conversely, the protection of civilians is a humanitarian as well as security imperative. The important
thing here is to recognize that both the peace operation and humanitarian community, while acting
independently of each other, are also interdependent, in that their respective mandates and missions,
when appropriately executed, improve the environment for the achievement of the others’ missions.
The more successful the humanitarian actors are in executing their task, especially of early recovery,
the more the situation normalizes and the sooner peacebuilding can take hold.
With respect to the civil-military principles in general and the criterion of “last resort” on the use of
force in particular, the MCDA Guidelines also provide guidance in regard to the humanitarian application
of this important criterion:
• Last Resort: MCDA should be seen as a tool to complement existing relief mechanisms in order
to fulfil unique and specific requirements in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap”
between the disaster needs that the relief community
is being asked to satisfy and the resources available Do No Harm »
to meet them. Therefore, foreign MCDA should be According to the IASC Civil-
requested only where there is no comparable civilian Military Guidelines and Reference
alternative and only the use of MCDA can meet a for Complex Emergencies:
critical humanitarian need. The MCDA must therefore “Considerations on civil-military
be unique in capability and availability. However, coordination must be guided
foreign civil protection assets, when civilian in nature by a commitment to ‘Do No
and respecting humanitarian principles, can provide Harm’. Humanitarian agencies
an important direct and indirect contribution to must ensure at the policy and
humanitarian actions based on humanitarian needs operational levels that any
assessments and their possible advantages in terms potential civil-military coordination
of speed, specialization, efficiency, and effectiveness, will not contribute to further the
especially in the early phase of relief response. conflict, nor harm or endanger
The use of civil protection assets should be needs- the beneficiaries of humanitarian
driven, and should complement and be coherent with assistance.”
humanitarian aid operations, respecting the overall
coordinating role of the UN.
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The UN humanitarian-military guidelines for the use of military assets can be summarized in the
following six operating principles for the use of military assets in support of humanitarian assistance:
• Requests for MCDA to support UN agencies must be made by the HC/RC, through the HCT, and
in consultation with the affected State, based solely on humanitarian criteria;
• MCDA should be leveraged by UN humanitarian agencies as a last resort (only in the absence
of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time
required);
• A UN humanitarian agency using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character.
While MCDA may remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under
the authority and control of the HC/HCT. This does not infer any civilian command and control
status over military assets;
• Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. The peace operation

should only provide direct assistance in life-saving emergency situations and as an option of last
resort. The peace operation can provide indirect support and infrastructure support, on request,
and according to the operative civil-military principles and the humanitarian-military guidance.
The aim of these principles and guidance is to ensure a clear distinction between the normal
functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders;
• Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit
strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could be undertaken by
civilian personnel in the future; and
• Countries providing MCDA to support UN humanitarian action should ensure that they respect
the UN Codes of Conduct and the humanitarian principles.
As the humanitarian crisis ensues, the international assistance effort may take on a transition
management aspect — in other words, in some instances, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief may begin to blend with peacebuilding or development assistance. A good example of this is
training local medical personnel through “on-the-job” training (an aspect of capacity development) or
improving local facilities under a Quick Impact Project (QIP), all while providing medical assistance to
local civilians. Some have called this “humanitarian development”. While the humanitarian principles in
the MCDA Guidelines do not apply to peacebuilding and development per se, they remain appropriate.
Again, the key is to apply the civil-military principles, especially to facilitate this transition process. This
is discussed in Lesson 4.
To help understand the application of direct, indirect, and infrastructure support from humanitarian
emergencies to peacebuilding, review the following response matrix.
Section 3.3 Practical Discussion – The Haiti Earthquake of 2010
Description of the Event and Early Responses
Note: The following description comes primarily from the first Report of the Secretary General on
the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti following the earthquake,10 and presents the situation
as it was in February 2010.
10) Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2010/200, 22 February 2010.
90
Carte #4224 Rev 32. Nations Unies, mars 2012. Département de l’appui aux missions, section
cartographique.
“On 12 January 2010, Haiti was hit by a 7.0 magnitude

earthquake, particularly affecting the capital, Port-au-Prince. …
According to the Government of Haiti, as a result of the quake,
222,570 people were killed, many thousands were injured or
permanently disabled, and 1.5 million were left homeless. …
The capacity of the Haitian State was seriously affected.
Two senators were killed and many senior political leaders
injured. The elections originally scheduled for February 2010
were postponed, creating a climate of political uncertainty.
According to the Government of Haiti, up to one third of the
country’s 60,000 civil servants perished. Many government
buildings were destroyed or badly damaged, including the
National Palace, the Supreme Court, the Palais de Justice, the
Parliament, the major courts and police facilities, and all but
one Ministry. The Haitian National Police was hit hard, with 77
officers killed and hundreds injured or unaccounted for. Half
of the total 8,535 prisoners in Haiti escaped, including several
hundred who were being held on charges related to gang
activities. …
The Hotel Christopher, the headquarters of the United Nations

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) collapsed, and
nearby United Nations offices and other facilities were severely
affected. A total of 101 UN staff lost their lives, including the
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SRSG, DSRSG, Acting Police Commissioner, the Director of

Political Affairs, Head of the Elections Unit, and military, police,
and civilian staff. Many more were injured, some of whom were
unable to return to work. …
Within hours of the earthquake, the UN and certain Member

States launched emergency relief operations, providing, for
example, specialized military and civilian units for search-and-
rescue operations, field hospitals, and immediate support to
life-saving assistance efforts and restoring key infrastructure.
MINUSTAH acted as a crucial first responder, opening the
major arterial road from the Port-au-Prince airport to the town
centre, re-establishing communications and opening its medical
facilities to victims. The United States of America and Canada
deployed disaster assistance troops to the most affected areas
within 72 hours of the earthquake and built up to a presence of
18,500 and 2,000 troops, respectively, by the end of January.
On 13 January, OCHA deployed a disaster assessment and

coordination team to identify priority needs. The team
established an on-site operations coordination centre to assist
the Government of Haiti and to help coordinate logistical
support for the international search-and-rescue effort.
Simultaneously, OCHA and the IASC expanded the existing
humanitarian cluster system and identified lead agencies for
thematic areas.
On 14 January, [the UN] sent the Assistant Secretary-General

for the Office of Operations in the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, Edmond Mulet, to Haiti as [the Secretary-General’s]
Acting Special Representative. … A small team from UNHQ
also deployed to support emergency functions and [surviving
staff]. … On 24 January, MINUSTAH and [OCHA] established
a joint operations and tasking centre, with military liaison
officers from the United States Joint Task Force-Haiti, the
Canadian Task Force, the European Union Situation Centre,
and the Caribbean Community, to facilitate coordination with
international forces and to provide a central hub for tactical
planning.
In the days after the earthquake, hundreds of bilateral aid

agencies, NGOs, and individuals sent emergency assistance to
Haiti. Calls for financial assistance received an overwhelming
response. The Central Emergency Response Fund initially
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Troops from the Canadian contingent of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
work on a water purification plant in Jacmel, Haiti. 21 February 2010. UN Photo #429034 by Pasqual
Gorriz.
allocated [USD] $36 million towards Haiti response, as well

as another USD $2 million for humanitarian operations in the
Dominican Republic. The Emergency Relief Response Fund for
Haiti, supported by [OCHA], received [USD] $83 million. Within
a month, a revised Flash Appeal for 2010 received USD $747
million out of a total of [USD] $1.4 billion being requested.
In the light of the vast needs in Haiti and the many actors
involved, [the Secretary-General] asked the United Nations
Special Envoy for Haiti, former President of the United States of
America, William J. Clinton, to take on an expanded role in the
relief and reconstruction effort in order to help coordinate at
the international level the work of, among others, UN agencies,
donors and private investors.
The scale of destruction caused by the earthquake created

tremendous difficulties for the initial relief effort. Electrical and
communication systems were destroyed, the main port was
closed, and roads in Port-au-Prince were blocked by rubble.
With the assistance of the United States Joint Task Force-Haiti,
Port-au-Prince airport was reopened on 13 January. Initially, air
traffic congestion and prioritization of flights posed challenges,
and many emergency supplies came by land through the
Dominican Republic, which had put in place special measures to
facilitate the transit of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian
access improved quickly, with the assistance of the U.S. Navy,
to enable the reopening of the seaport on 22 January …
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The World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners provided 3.5
million people throughout the country with food assistance. …
[By 6 April, OCHA reported that] approximately 90 per
cent of those in need had received emergency materials —
376,000 tarpaulins and over 45,000 family-size tents [were]
distributed along with basic kitchen and hygiene equipment,
ropes, blankets, and mosquito nets. With the rainy season
approaching, a key priority for the Government of Haiti and
the humanitarian community was supporting the relocation of
internally displaced persons away from flood-prone areas. …
With the aim of injecting cash into the economy and providing
income to the unemployed, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and its implementing partners launched
an extensive cash-for-work programme shortly after the
earthquake. As of 1 April, 100,000 people were employed
in short-term projects, including the cleaning of canals and
removal of debris. The MINUSTAH community labour-intensive
watershed and canal rehabilitation projects were also scaled up
as part of its approach to reduce community violence. …
In the health sector, over 396 national and international

organizations were working to provide services to the public. …
The security environment in Haiti remained generally calm. …

Initial fears of large-scale looting and violence in the aftermath
of the earthquake did not materialize. [A handful of kidnappings
had minimal impact on the humanitarian effort.] There were
also indications of some increases in crime, including sexual
and gender-based violence in camps for internally displaced
persons [activities of] former gang leaders who escaped from
prisons, in some cases with uniforms and weapons stolen
from the Haitian National Police[, and a small increase in drug
trafficking]. With MINUSTAH assistance, the Haitian National
Police recaptured some 283 escapees by early April. … Physical
damage to rule-of-law institutions [compounded the public
security] problem. There are also many broader challenges to
the protection of the displaced population, who are dispersed
across more than 1,300 sites, including obstacles to delivery
of aid and the health risks associated with overcrowding,
inadequate water supplies, and poor sanitation. Higher levels
of unemployment, loss of property and savings, and trauma
arising from the events of 12 January also contributed to an
environment of heightened vulnerability in Haiti. …
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Beginning in February, MINUSTAH was gradually reinforced

with additional troops in line with Security Council resolution
1908 (2010). A second infantry battalion from Brazil, as well as
engineering companies from Japan and the Republic of Korea,
began arriving in February, and military police from Guatemala
began arriving in April. As of 13 April 2010, the strength of
the military component stood at 120 staff officers and 8,186
contingent members, comprising 13 infantry and nine enabling
units, including four engineering companies. Additional infantry
troops from Argentina and Peru were scheduled to arrive
through mid-May, further augmenting the Mission’s capacity to
provide security and support humanitarian assistance.
With this increased deployment, and with non-United Nations

military partners reducing their presence in Haiti since early
March, the MINUSTAH military component assumed an even
greater role in supporting the humanitarian effort, including
providing security escorts to mobile and static distribution sites
for food and other items, and by intensifying security patrols to
ensure a secure and stable environment. Engineering support
has been extended to support the humanitarian effort, including
the preparation of two camps for internally displaced persons.
The integrated Joint Operations and Tasking Centre provided
a centralized entry point for humanitarian partners to request
assistance from MINUSTAH and international military actors,
and also to coordinate civil-military planning.”
Civil-Military Coordination
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, a UN-CMCoord officer was dispatched to the
headquarters of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami — the operational HQ
for the US military. A four-person team also deployed to the field, comprising two officers from OCHA’s
Emergency Response Roster (ERR), one from the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
Team, and one through OCHA’s Stand-by Partnership Programme. In addition to the liaison officer
at SOUTHCOM, a second UN-CMCoord officer was stationed in Washington, D.C. working with the
Pentagon, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA). Liaison also took place at the strategic level in New York with DPKO, as well as
in Washington and Miami. This proved beneficial to the overall humanitarian effort, particularly for
information exchange and facilitating access to decision-makers on the ground.
At the field level, however, the UN-CMCoord team in Port-au-Prince — which evolved into a Civil-
Military Coordination Cell (CMCC) within the OCHA structure — struggled to keep pace with the various
military units and humanitarian agencies on the ground. Mobility was a significant challenge, and
regular visits to key offices were not possible. As is standard practice in UN-CMCoord deployments, the
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team organized a weekly Civil-Military Coordination Network Meeting to create a forum and dedicated
location for discussing humanitarian civil-military issues and for resolving operational and coordination
problems.
The team also worked with other civil-military platforms, including the Joint Operations and
Tasking Centre (JOTC), established by MINUSTAH, OCHA, and other key partners. Through the JOTC,
humanitarian organizations in Haiti could place requests for military or police assistance in support
of their relief activities. In effect, the JOTC acted as MINUSTAH’s “clearing house” for requests for
military assistance. OCHA and the UN-CMCoord team also issued guidance to ensure that military actors
participated constructively in cluster meetings. This guidance served a dual purpose. For the humanitarian
community, it outlined why and how military actors should be involved in cluster meetings, to ease
suspicions about the military’s role among some humanitarian organizations. For military personnel, it
outlined how they could contribute to cluster arrangements, while not overwhelming the meetings.
Observations and Lessons
There were multiple lessons to learn from the 2010 Haiti earthquake. By and large, with respect to
civil-military coordination, most of the observations and lessons were positive. A number, however, had
suggestions for improvement. One report, Health response to the earthquake in Haiti - Lessons to be
learned for the next massive sudden-onset disaster – January 2010, produced by WHO two years after
the event, made the following general observation:
“If the impact was unprecedented, the organization of the

response was not. It followed the same chaotic pattern as past
disasters. Information was scarce, decisions were not evidence-
based, and overall sectoral coordination presented serious
shortcomings. Management gaps noted in past crises were
repeated and amplified in Haiti. The humanitarian community
failed to put into practice the lessons learned.
Information and coordination management was a challenge

that was not met adequately. One of the key lessons to be re-
learned from the Haiti earthquake is that coordination can only
be effective if the national authorities (civil protection, health
and other line ministries) are equipped and truly assume the
leadership and authority for coordination.
External coordination mechanisms are most valuable when they

can offer a modicum of order in the first days or weeks until the
authorities recover from the impact. But only the government
of an affected country has the legitimacy to establish and
implement relief and recovery priorities.”11
11) Health response to the earthquake in Haiti - Lessons to be learned for the next massive sudden-onset disaster – January 2010, World Health
Organization, January 2012, available at: <http://new. paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_content&task =view&id=1626&Itemid=1>.
96
On a positive note, the report did identify some Linking Relief, Recovery, and Development (LRRD)
successes. In particular, it found that “awareness and commitment to disaster risk reduction increased
considerably”.
A major issue was the overwhelming need for collaboration and coordination, especially in logistics.
Standing between the sheer scale and horrific impact of the disaster and the enormous outpouring
of aid and assistance were extremely limited air and sea points of entry and damaged and blocked
roads for local distribution and movements. One US officer described it as “trying to pump water from
a fire hose through a drinking straw to thousands of thirsty people.” A major workshop report, Haiti:
Assessment and Lessons Learned, noted:
“Because the seaport and airports were closed, getting supplies

into Haiti was very challenging. Although WHO did have a
warehouse in Haiti, there was very little transportation. These
needs highlighted the importance of civil-military collaboration,
as the military was able to provide useful assets.
Finally, the coordination of dozens of well-intentioned

organizations that had moved into Port au Prince in the
immediate aftermath of the earthquake was a logistical
problem. Some organizations were expecting assistance from
the government, and were not prepared for the chaos on the
ground or to partner with other organizations.”12
Additional observations from the report included:
• Any organization must be self-sufficient or partner with a larger organization;
• Guidelines need to be adapted to situations on the ground;
• Medical organizations should think beyond immediate surgical/emergency needs; and
• Coordinating civil-military-private partnerships is important.
In numerous public appearances, Special Envoy Clinton also identified logistics and logistics
coordination as among the most important and urgent problems in relief coordination, especially between
civilian and military organizations. General Douglas Fraser, commander of SOUTHCOM identified the most
salient lesson was the need for improved coordination and the pivotal role of logistics in disaster response.
He also stressed the need for “unity of response” in complex emergencies, such as the earthquake in
Haiti, and that overall planning and cooperation was the key to the success of the response.
A series of articles in an online lessons-learned journal published by the Humanitarian Practice

Network13 discussed specifically the success of UN-CMCoord, but echoed the observation of many
about the need for doctrinal flexibility by humanitarians. The crisis was well beyond the scope of any
civilian humanitarian actors, and, at least in the early stages, massive and direct application of military
capabilities was required — beyond security and policing functions, in logistics; medical services;
engineering; air, sea, and ground traffic control; operational planning and coordination; intelligence;
and others. One article, “The United Nations Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination”, elaborated:
12) Haiti: Assessment and Lessons Learned, AidForum, 6 August 2010.

13) “Lessons-Learned from the Haiti Earthquake Response”, Issue 48, Humanitarian Practice Network, October 2010; available at: <https://reliefweb.int/
report/world/humanitarian-exchange-magazine-no-48-feature-lessons-learned-haiti-earthquake-response>.
97
“Humanitarian actors have an opportunity to utilize military

capacities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, when
civilian capacities are typically not readily available. The
resumption of operations at the airport in Port-au-Prince – a
vital aid artery – is a clear example of what the military can
achieve in the early phase of an emergency response.
In today’s emergencies interaction among responders extends

beyond the humanitarian community to include a range of other
actors, including the military. Indeed, focused, humanitarian-
led direction needs to be provided to the military to ensure that
they are appropriately informed as to what is required, when it
is needed and how it should be utilised.
One of the primary reasons why the UN-CMCoord structure

worked well, when it reached full capacity, was that key liaison
staff from many military and humanitarian organisations were
graduates of UN-CMCoord courses run by OCHA’s Civil–Military
Coordination Section (CMCS), based in Geneva.
Although the wider humanitarian community may still have

reservations about military involvement in humanitarian work,
the reality is that national or foreign militaries — or in some
cases both — are increasingly likely to be asked by their
governments to respond to emergencies. In the interest of
making the humanitarian emergency response more effective
and predictable, the involvement of military forces needs to be
taken into account and appropriately planned for by all parties
in such situations. One of the most obvious conclusions that
can be drawn from the operation in Haiti — and one which
reinforces current practice — is the need to engage with the
military before a disaster strikes, so that humanitarian agencies
have the opportunity to shape military planning, rather than
simply react to it.”
This last point — the need for civilian and military players to establish common lines of understanding
prior to and not during an emergency — otherwise known as establishing “steady state relationships”,
has gained relevance since the crisis in Haiti.
The Humanitarian Practice Network also noted that the Haiti earthquake crisis validated and improved
various information management-based coordination systems, such as the UN Cluster System and the
Who What Where (3W) database, and also led to the creation of OCHA’s OneResponse system. One
article, titled “The Haiti earthquake: breaking new ground in the humanitarian information landscape”,
98
identified numerous innovations:
“The UN also activated the Cluster System, and a new OCHA

portal, OneResponse, was launched and used to store and
share data, information and analysis related to each of the
cluster activities. Several clusters set up GoogleGroups to
facilitate information-sharing, collaboration and coordination.
Information management tools such as the Joint Operations
Tasking Center (JOTC) logistics form, a Who is Doing What
Where (3W) database, the Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment
methodology, the Displacement Tracking Matrix, the Post
Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework and the
Cluster meeting calendar and directories were established to
facilitate coordination and information management.
The creation of new information systems and tools, however,

does not necessarily ensure effective inter-organisational
coordination and decision-making. In order to be effective,
these systems and knowledge management tools must become
integrated into the work and decision-making processes of the
international humanitarian response, including donors.”
Finally, it seemed that most military organizations responding to Haiti, at least at the command
level, understood a basic tenet of UN-CIMIC — namely, the primacy of civilian authority and the military
as supporting and not supported. With respect to JTF-Haiti:
“Early on, the U.S. decided not to create a Combined Joint

Task Force. With the UN already on the ground, a robust
multinational force was in place. In addition, MINUSTAH
countries contributing additional resources and personnel
already had links to their local UN representatives. Creating
a combined Joint Task Force would have conflicted with those
efforts. Instead, JTF-Haiti deployed to conduct humanitarian
assistance and disaster response operations. The purpose of
JTF-Haiti was to support U.S. efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-
term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate
transition to the Government of Haiti, the UN, and USAID. The
military possesses significant capabilities that are useful in
emergencies, but long-term plans for relief and reconstruction
are best left to non-military government agencies.14
14) Lt. Gen. P.K. Keen, et al., “Relationships Matter - Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti”, Military Review (May–June 2010), available at:
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/ Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_ art004.pdf>.
99
Initially, the JTF commanders and staff did not fully appreciate
the number of humanitarian organizations that were in Haiti
before the earthquake. It became apparent the JTF would have
to reach out and integrate them into their systems and processes
to be successful, so the JTF worked with the UN to develop
UN-approved coordination processes to include government of
Haiti-led ‘coordinating support committees’ and a UN-led ‘joint
operations tasking center’ where requirements were validated
and tasked to the appropriate organizations. When working with
the UN, the JTF also had to understand and coordinate within the
UN ‘cluster system’ to achieve unity of effort.”15
Not all in the military understood the appropriate relationship between civil and military components,
however, whether in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or peacekeeping — which underscores
the need for this UN-CIMIC Course and extensive training and education in civil-military coordination
for both military and civilian professionals. The UN Evaluations Group observed such tensions regarding
the management of the airfield:
“Following the dispatch of 20,000 troops to Haiti in support of

the relief effort, the US led the restoration of operations at the
Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince.
The US troops facilitated the arrival and departure of more
than 150 humanitarian flights daily and were widely recognized
as a valuable contribution to the massive humanitarian
response. The Canadian military provided similar support to
Jacmel airport. However, the US Air Force’s approach to airport
operations during the response prioritized security over aid,
which raised questions following the diversion of an MSF cargo
plane carrying medical supplies to Santo Domingo.”16
This observation illustrates how humanitarian and military organizations still act within their
respective organizational cultures and missions.17
“Military support (from MINUSTAH, the U.S. and others) came

in the form of escorts for aid distributions, following various
incidents of rioting. However, humanitarian organisations have
differing policies regarding the use of military assets (including
escorts), which at times proved problematic.”
15) Lt. Gen P.K. (Ken) Keen, et al., “Foreign Disaster Response – Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations”, Military Review (November– December 2010),
available at: <http://usacac. army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/ MilitaryReview_20101231_art015.pdf>.
16) Haiti Earthquake Response – Context Analysis, UN Evaluations Group (July 2010), available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-earthquake-
response-context-analysis-july-2010>.
17) Additional discussions on lessons and the current situation in Haiti are available at the UN OCHA webpage on Haiti: <https://www.unocha.org/latin-
america-and-caribbean-rolac/haiti>.
100
US Army Spc. Brent Nailor passes

out humanitarian aid meals to
women and children in Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, Jan. 16, 2010. Nailor
was assigned to the 82nd Airborne
Division’s 1st Squadron, 73rd
Cavalry Regiment. The squadron
established a forward operating
base at an abandoned, damaged
country club. US Department of
Defense photo by Fred W. Baker III.
Questions to Consider
This practical discussion identified some of the major civil-military issues from the Haiti earthquake
crisis of 2010, but not all. By yourself, or with colleagues who also read this practical discussion,
consider the following questions with regard to the Haiti earthquake crisis, or compare it to a situation
in which you may have been involved. Keep in mind the UN-CIMIC principles (Lesson 1), the criteria for
the use of force (Lesson 2), and the humanitarian principles (Lesson 3).
• When is it appropriate for military assets to be used in support of humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief? How and in what way?
• How should the military transition out of its humanitarian assistance role? When?
• Were security restrictions appropriate or too restrictive, hampering key humanitarian

engagement with affected populations?
• Was sufficient support provided to the police for security and protection-related activities?
• How effective were coordination mechanisms between the Haitian government, the humanitarian
community, and military actors?
• Within these structures, how effectively did humanitarian actors articulate their requirements
for support from military actors?
• Were civil-military interactions (MINUSTAH, US troops, Haitian police) undertaken only as

necessary for aid delivery, and managed in a way that safeguarded independent and apolitical
humanitarian action?
• How should civil and military information management systems be aligned during a humanitarian
crisis?
• What other civil-military lessons do you think are appropriate to explore?
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Conclusion
• The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), its mission and its key
activities, including coordination, policy, advocacy, information management, and humanitarian
financing.
• The humanitarian principles and the MCDA Guidelines.
• The leading role of UN-CMCoord and UN-CMCoord officers.
• The military role in support to humanitarian and disaster assistance.
• A practical discussion of a major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief event, as well as
some civil-military observations and lessons, with regard to the international response to the
Haiti earthquake crisis.
• The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute
• UN OCHA UN-CMCoord Courses; for more, go to: <www.unocha.org/>.
Edition (2014), DPKO/DFS ITS, available at: <http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89582>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Module 3 of the Handbook.
Further References
• Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo
Guidelines”, OCHA (November 2006, Revision November 2007), available at: <https://
interagencystandingcommittee.org/other/documents-public/guielines-use-foreign-military-
and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief-oslo>.
• Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies – An IASC Reference Paper, IASC (28 June
2004), available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/focal-points/documents-
public/civil-military-relationship-complex-emergencies-iasc-reference-paper>.
(2015), both available at: <www.unocha.org/publication/un-cmcoord-field-handbook>.
• Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion Paper and Non-binding
Guidelines, IASC (14 September 2001), available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.
org/focal-points/documents-public/use-military-or-armed-escorts-humanitarian-convoys-
discussion-paper>.
• Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups – A Manual for Practitioners, OCHA (January
2006), available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-negotiations-armed-
groups-manual-practitioners>.
102
• Guidelines on Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups, OCHA (January 2006) available
at: <www.refworld.org/docid/46924d492.html>.
• UNHCR and the Military – A Field Guide, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (March 2006), available at: <www.refworld.org/pdfid/465702372.pdf>.
• Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (1994), available at: <www.icrc.org/en/
doc/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm>.
• The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response,
The Sphere Project (2011), available at: <www.sphereproject.org/handbook/>.
Websites and Web-based Tools:
• OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit: <www.unocha.org/es/themes/preparedness-

and-risk-management>.
• OCHA webpage on Haiti: <www.unocha.org/latin-america-and-caribbean-rolac/haiti>.
• Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System: <www.gdacs.org/default.aspx>.
• Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre: <https://vosocc.unocha.org/>.
• The Sphere Project: <www.sphereproject.org/>.
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1. Which of the following is NOT a 7. True or false? UN-CIMIC support to

responsibility of OCHA? humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief can come through direct
A. Mobilize and coordinate effective and
assistance, indirect assistance, and
principled humanitarian action in partnership
infrastructure support.
with national and international actors
in order to alleviate human suffering in 8. Which of the following is NOT an OCHA-
disasters and emergencies sponsored information management
B. Advocate for the rights of people in need tool?
C. Promote preparedness and prevention A. ReliefWeb
D. Organize the military response to disasters B. Google Groups
and emergencies C. OneResponse

D. Who is Doing What Where (3W)
2. True or false? OCHA’s key activities
include: Coordination, policy, advocacy, 9. Which of the following was NOT a major
information management, and area of learning for humanitarian civil-
humanitarian financing. military coordination after the 2010 Haiti
earthquake crisis?
3. The UN Cluster System consists of the
A. Logistics and logistics coordination
following clusters EXCEPT:
B. The need for more intense civil-military
A. Camp Coordination and Camp Management
collaboration and coordination in such major
B. Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene crisis
C. Health C. US-UN coordination
D. Protection of Civilians D. Information management and information-
sharing
4. True or false? Humanitarian principles
and operative civil-military principles are
10. Which of the following was NOT a
incompatible.
question in humanitarian civil-military
coordination to be learned from the Haiti
5. The humanitarian principles are: earthquake crisis of 2010?
A. Humanity, Impartiality, Infrastructure A. How and when should the military transition
Support out of its humanitarian assistance role?
B. Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality B. How effective were coordination mechanisms
C. Humanity, Neutrality, Independence between the Haitian government, the
D. Humanity, Indirect Assistance, Neutrality humanitarian community, and military
actors?
6. True or false? “Last resort” is both an
C. Do military organizations have a role in
MCDA guideline and a criterion on the
use of force, as discussed in Lesson 2. humanitarian assistance?
D. How should civil and military information
management systems be aligned during a
humanitarian crisis?
104
Answer Key »
1. D
2. True
3. D
4. False
5. B
6. False
7. True
8. B
9. C
10. C
105
LESSON
Military Support to
4 Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding consists of a
wide range of dimensions
and tools to support
the emergence of local
capacity and civil society
and prevent a relapse into
violent conflict.
UN Photo #139439 by Eric Kanalstein.
Section 4.1 The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding • Understand the peacekeeping/peacebuilding

Nexus nexus and key implications for civil-military
transition management.
Section 4.2 Peacebuilding Frameworks
• Understand peacebuilding in terms of strategic
Section 4.3 Peacebuilding Actors
frameworks such as the New Deal and Sustainable
Section 4.4 Civilianizing and Localizing Development Goals.
Section 4.5 Peacebuilding and Conflict • Explain civilianizing and localizing as the methods
Management by which to conduct civil-military transition
management of the broader peace operations
effort.
• Understand how civil-military coordination helps

transition from stabilization to peacebuilding.
106
LESSON 4 | Military Support to Peacebuilding
Druze pilgrims walk past a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) military police checkpoint in Syria. 12 September
2010. UN Photo #454364 by Arnold Felfer.
Introduction
In contemporary UN peace operations, the mission

is no longer defined purely in terms of monitoring a
ceasefire or peace agreement, i.e. “keeping” the peace.
UN peace operations have evolved from traditional
peacekeeping to complex peace operations, which
are tasked to support the transition and facilitate the
implementation of comprehensive peace processes,
i.e. to help “build” the peace. This shift of emphasis
has emerged as the civilian dimension was added to
traditional military peacekeeping.
Peacebuilding employs a wide range of dimensions

and tools to support the emergence of local capacity
and civil society and prevent a relapse into violent
conflict. In this respect, peacebuilding and conflict
107
prevention are synonymous, occur across the full spectrum of peace operations, and provide the context
for civil-military coordination as such. This lesson aims at helping civil-military operators understand what
peacebuilding means and how “early peacebuilding” is critical to civil-military transition management,
including during stabilization or conflict management.
Civil-military transition management is largely done through a continuous process to civilianize and
localize the peace process, even though UN peace operations are not always deployed in post-conflict
contexts. As discussed in Lesson 2, while some contemporary operations have a peacebuilding mission,
others are deployed with no peace agreement in place in order to protect civilians and create the space
for political negotiations, and many missions conduct both peacebuilding and protection activities.
Given especially these hybrid or protection mission situations such as AMISOM, MONUSCO, UNAMID,
and UNMISS, it is important for civil-military operators to understand that it is essential to conduct civil-
military coordination with the ultimate goal of peacebuilding in mind and to begin to civilianize and
localize their activities from the very start.
Section 4.1 The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Nexus

The international response to violent conflict, as developed in the context of the United Nations, and
as articulated in the 1992 Agenda for Peace, is to try first to prevent conflict (conflict prevention). If that
fails, the next step is to make peace by facilitating negotiation among the parties (peacemaking). If a
ceasefire or peace agreement is reached that includes a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN or
a regional organization authorized by the Security Council deploys a peacekeeping mission to monitor
the ceasefire and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has
been stabilized and a peace process has been agreed upon, the international community would shift
its focus from emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction. This transition process is focused
on rebuilding and reconciliation, with the aim of addressing the root causes of violent conflict — known
also as the drivers of conflict and instability — so as to prevent it from occurring again (peacebuilding).
In the twenty-first century, the centre of gravity of UN peace operations has been shifting
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Moreover, the transition from conflict to comprehensive and
sustainable peace is no longer linear but simultaneous — in many peace missions, humanitarian action,
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention may be occurring at the same time, if not in the
same place. These shifts have also emerged as mostly civilian and police dimensions were added to
(and to some extent, have taken over many) traditional military peacekeeping mandates. Some of
these new tasks included assistance with political participation, national dialogue, constitution writing,
democratization, judicial reform and rule of law, security sector reform, civil administration, fiscal and
revenue managements, etc. As a result of this evolution, the nexus between security and development
has become a central focus of how peace operations are coordinated and managed, giving impetus to
the development of integrated missions and integrated approach models.
With the nature of conflict becoming more intra-State than inter-State, and with it, the reality of
“human security”, the understanding of “security” has likewise broadened and become more inclusive.
As the UN Handbook on Human Security points out, in a peacebuilding context, “security” takes on forms
such as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security,
community security, and political security.
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Members of the Bangladesh De-mining

Company of the United Nations Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) prepare to destroy
the anti-personnel landmines, previously
decommissioned by the Sudanese Peoples
Liberation Army, in accordance with the
provisions of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty. 31
March 2008. UN Photo #172512 by Tim
McKulka.
As explained in Lesson 2, it is important to understand the difference between peacekeeping and

peacebuilding, as defined in the UN Capstone Doctrine of 2008:
• Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting
has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over
the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing [ceasefires]
and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many
elements — military, police, and civilian — working together to help lay the foundations for
sustainable peace.
• Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing
into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to
lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. [It] is a complex, long-term process
of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-
rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures
address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the
capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.
In the short term, peacebuilding is designed to assist the peace process and prevent a relapse into
violent conflict by addressing the drivers of conflict and instability and lay the foundation for social
justice and sustainable peace. However, it is clear that despite a growing awareness that the security,
socioeconomic, political, and reconciliation dimensions of peacebuilding are interlinked, the agencies that
undertake these operations have found it difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions
into coherent country strategies. Coherence can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace,
security, humanitarian, and development dimensions of a peacebuilding intervention in a particular
crisis work towards a common political objective.
109
Civil-military coordination is, therefore, at the locus of one of the central problems of complex peace
operations because it contributes to the dialogue and interface between peace and security actors and
objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian and peacebuilding actors and objectives on the other.
The civil-military nexus is critical to achieving a holistic impact on the conflict the peace operation
is attempting to transform. Civil-military coordination is thus a critical element in any peacebuilding
process, without which it would be impossible to achieve an appropriate level of coherence among the
different policies and actions of the various agencies engaged in a given peacebuilding operation. Thus,
civil-military coordination, as understood in this course, is an exercise in full-spectrum peacebuilding.
The Capstone Doctrine points out that UN peacekeeping operations are part of a larger peacebuilding
process. Within this larger context, it argues that the core business of UN peacekeeping is first, to create
a secure and stable environment, including strengthening the capacity of the state to provide security,
with full respect for the rule of law and for human rights. Second, UN peacekeeping operations should
facilitate the political process by promoting and facilitating dialogue and reconciliation and support the
establishment of legitimate and efficient governance institutions. Third, UN peacekeeping operations
should provide a framework for ensuring that the UN family and other international actors pursue
their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner. This has been referred to
as “delivering as one”, which applies to the full spectrum of peace and security activities — including
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as well as security sector reform (SSR).
The Concept of Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short-, medium-, and long-
term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid relapse into violent conflict, and to
build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent, coordinated, and complementary or
multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players including government, civil society, the
private sector and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of interrelated
programmes that span the security, political, socioeconomic, and reconciliation dimensions of society,
as the chart depicts. These actors work independently, but also collectively and cumulatively within
the integrated peace operations mission. Their actions address both the causes and consequences of
the conflict and establish the foundations for self-sustainable peace and development in the long-term.
Coordination thus plays a critical role in peacebuilding because the more coherent these lines of effort
are, the more effective the transition and the more self-sustainable the outcome is likely to be.
Peacebuilding — and thus civil-military coordination — needs to be understood as a support of the

people and societies undergoing transition. This is often more psychological than physical, remembering
that most populations in conflict and post-conflict situations are traumatized by the violence and upheaval
to their lives. Peace cannot be built from the outside. The most important drivers and influences in
any peace process is the degree to which the parties to the conflict, and the people affected by the
conflict, are ready for and committed to the peace process. The transition from conflict to peace can
be supported from the outside, and such support can be crucial to the success of the peace process.
However, it is extremely important for external actors to manage expectations and remember that
the local (or internal) actors are responsible for their own future and thus the management of their
110
own peace process. The role of peacekeepers and peacebuilders is thus to facilitate that process as
an exercise in partnership and collaborative leadership, similar to a management consultant helping a
business, hence the civil-military principles discussed in Lesson 1.
Another critical shared principle is that of local ownership through the entire peacebuilding process.
If the international peacebuilders impose models on the locals or otherwise make decisions for them,
or press them to choose future directions they would not have chosen themselves, then the peace
process is likely to fail. The more the peace process is locally owned and informed by local context, the
more it can be sustained without external assistance. In peacebuilding “less is more”, i.e. international
peacebuilders must have strict self-discipline not to do as much as they can, but only as much as is
appropriate, that is, what can be absorbed, managed, and sustained locally without further international
assistance. Such discipline is likewise required in civil-military coordination.
Early Peacebuilding
Another key component of the peacebuilding concept is the idea of how peacekeeping is early
peacebuilding, as detailed in UN Security Council Resolution 2086 (2013). The Resolution identifies
several early peacebuilding tasks for peacekeepers to undertake, including:
• Protect civilians, particularly those under imminent

threat of physical violence, and support the efforts
of host authorities in the protection of civilians from
violence, including all forms of sexual and gender-
based violence;
• Provide for rapid response in mine action as well as

training tailored to local needs;
• Help establish the necessary security conditions to

facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, taking
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (at head
into account the needs of refugees, IDPs, women, of table) meets with the United Nations
children, the elderly, and disabled people, and to Country Team in Damascus, Syria. 24
April 2007. UN Photo #143463 by Eskinder
create conditions necessary for voluntary, safe,
Debebe.
dignified, and sustainable return;
• Enable national governments in conceiving and developing DDR programmes;
• Provide support to basic safety and security by assisting SSR, including capacity building of
military, police, and other law enforcement institutions in key areas, with a view to building
a legitimate, accountable, and sustainable security sector, responsive to the needs of the
population;
• Support the strengthening of rule of law institutions of the host country in a coordinated manner
with other UN entities, including strategies to address the needs of police, judicial institutions,
and the corrections system and their critical interlinkages;
• Contribute towards agreed international efforts to protect human rights, including through
monitoring and prevention;
111
Pakistanis affected by widespread,

torrential floods receive wheat flour
and other provisions from the UN World
Food Programme (WFP) in Alipur, in
the Muzaffargarh district of Punjab
Province. 18 August 2010. UN Photo
#443930 by Amjad Jamal.
• Support peace consolidation and inclusive political processes, offer advice and support, as well
as deter threats to the ongoing peace process through their good offices, facilitate a consultation
process among the local population and civil society, and provide security, technical, logistical,
and administrative support to representative electoral processes upon request;
• Cooperate and coordinate with UN agencies, funds, and programmes, as well as all relevant
partners including international financial institutions and donors, to support the host government
and relevant government institutions in poverty reduction and economic development; and
• Support the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding,
and also support the efforts of the host government towards inclusion of women in decision-
making roles in post-conflict governance institutions.
Section 4.2 Peacebuilding Frameworks

Broadly speaking, one can identify three distinct (but not necessarily sequential) phases through
which most sustainable peace processes develop: stabilization, transition, and consolidation. A
peacekeeping operation has its own life cycle that may loosely match the peace process phases, namely:
mission planning, deployment, start-up, implementation, drawdown, handover, and withdrawal. Note,
however, that the UN Capstone Doctrine downplays the concept of phases, because it wisely cautions
against planning and managing peace operations with an “ideal” linear model in mind. If we try to fit
reality into a preconceived model, we fail to recognize what is really happening on the ground, and as
a result, we struggle to adapt and manage to the actual situation. The complexity and simultaneity of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding is well illustrated in a humorous video depiction of building an aircraft
while flying it, which can be found in your student portal online.
According to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, the achievement
of sustainable peace requires progress in at least four critical areas:
112
• Restoring the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order;
• Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
• Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; and
• Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or
resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict.
UN-CIMIC officers in particular facilitate the role that the military component can play in support
of each of these four critical areas. The primary role of the military component is to ensure a safe and
secure enabling environment in which all of this work can take place. Without safety and security, none
of this would be possible. However, without a certain degree of sustainable progress in the humanitarian
situation and development, there can be only limited progress in safety and security. Hence the
interdependent relationship between these two states and the heightened need to manage the nexus
between them.
Within the architecture of a complex, integrated, multidimensional peace operation, the civil-military
peace and security relationship is managed operationally, as discussed in Lesson 2, by numerous civil-
military actors. In addition to MEOMs and UN Police, UN-CIMIC often works closely with UN Civil Affairs
at the local level to support a broad range of State-building, State formation, conflict management,
and capacity-building initiatives. UN-CIMIC is also likely to work closely with those directly responsible
for security sector reform and rule of law. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in Lessons 6
and 7, which deal with the two core tasks of UN-CIMIC: liaison and information management and civil
assistance. The UN Human Security Handbook is a useful tool for UN-CIMIC officers to understand the
peacebuilding approach to analysis, mapping, planning, and implementation.
Development Goals, Initiatives, and Frameworks
Whether at the international, national, or operational level, peacebuilding and thus peace operations
are ultimately driven by peacebuilding frameworks. First were the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).
One hundred eighty-nine countries originally endorsed the eight overarching goals, which pledged to
free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations by 2015. The MDGs saw considerable
progress made, especially on poverty, improved sources of water, primary school enrolment, and child
mortality. World leaders gathered again in September 2015 in New York to adopt the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development. This time, 193 countries agreed on an ambitious agenda comprising 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) — also known as Global Goals — to guide policy and funding for
the next 15 years. These goals, comprehensive of civil society, look to:
1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and

promote sustainable agriculture.
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote

lifelong learning opportunities for all.
113
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and

sanitation for all.
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern

energy for all.
8. Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth;

full and productive employment; and decent work for all.
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable

industrialization, and foster innovation.
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries.
11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient,

and sustainable.
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine
resources for sustainable development.
15. Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial

ecosystems; sustainably manage forests; combat
desertification; and halt and reverse land degradation and halt
biodiversity loss.
POTI supports the Sustainable Development Goals.
114
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable

development; provide access to justice for all; and build
effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the

global partnership for sustainable development.
The most significant among these for civil-military operators is Goal 16, which aims to “significantly
reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to
conflict and insecurity. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights are key to this process,
as is reducing the flow of illicit arms and strengthening the participation of developing countries in the
institutions of global governance.”1 This is one reason why the role of UN Police in peace operations
missions and civil-military coordination is gaining importance.
Another important development strategic frame of reference is the New Deal for Engagement in
Fragile States (New Deal), a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected States, international
development partners, and civil society to improve current development policy and practice in fragile
States through greater local ownership. Signed by more than 40 countries and organizations in Busan,
Republic of Korea in November 2011, the New Deal commits countries to pursue more political ways of
working to address the root causes of conflict and fragility, and to channel investments in fragile States
in line with basic but adapted aid effectiveness principles. While the New Deal may not be integral to
a UN-mandated peace operation’s mission in a given country, it may be operative for that country and
organizations working there that may also be working with the mission, as well as for countries working
bilaterally with the host nation. In any case, the New Deal framework helps to promote and enable the
all-important relational spaces for civil and political dialogue — the very same kind of spaces that civil-
military coordination looks to enable and expand.
The United Nations Development Action Framework (UNDAF) is at the operational level for each
mission. The UNDAF is a programme document between a host nation government and the UNCT that
describes the collective actions and strategies of the UN, through the mission, to the achievement
of national development. The UNDAF includes outcomes, activities, and UN agency responsibilities
agreed to by the host government. The UNDAF shows where the UN can contribute most effectively to
the achievement of national development priorities. UNDAFs typically run for three years and include
periodic reviews and updates.
UNDAFs are designed, in part, to operationalize the SDGs and related national development
strategies at the mission level. Together, these constitute the strategic framework that guides both the
host government and its international partners. As such, UNDAFs often form a bridge between the SDGs
and these national plans, often called Poverty Reduction Strategies, which adapt the measures and
benchmarks in the SDGs to local/national conditions and considerations.
1) United Nations Development Programme, “Goal 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions”, available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-16.html>.
115
Especially with respect to civil assistance activities, while civil-military operators such as UN-CIMIC
officers at the operational level should be cognizant of strategic development frameworks such as
the SDGs, they should consult more closely with the UNDAF for their mission whenever planning civil
assistance activities, in order to ensure they are in support of specific UNDAF goals and objectives. The
lines of effort outlined in the UNDAF, as well as their goals and benchmarks, should form the lines of
effort of civil assistance. Moreover, civil assistance activities should be clearly in support of civil-military
transition management. The main civilian partners within the mission are UN Civil Affairs officers, who
can be found at local and regional levels as well as at mission HQ, and representatives of international
agencies, discussed below that comprise key peacebuilding actors.
Nuances between Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Action
Another important aspect of peacebuilding that civil-military officers need to keep in mind is that,
as peacekeepers, they always have to ensure that they act impartially — the peace operation does not
take sides among the (former) parties to the conflict when supporting the implementation of a peace
agreement. As the peace process develops, however, this impartiality shifts away from a focus on the
parties to a guardianship of the peace process. In Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, for example,
the parties to the conflict that signed the original peace agreement no longer existed as identifiable
organizations after a few years. Some transformed into political parties that took on new identities,
while others may have simply disbanded.
However, many of the root causes of a conflict take much longer to transform. Peacebuilding is
aimed at taking a broad range of political and security measures to avoid a relapse into violent conflict,
and the impartiality of the peace operation shifts to protecting the integrity of the peace process itself,
as well as the various institutions that would have been established to support its implementation. In
some circumstances, this may mean acting against spoilers or insurgents to safeguard the provisions
of the peace agreement. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, some
armed groups have tried to undermine the government that has been elected as a result of the peace
process. As such, part of the mandate of the peace operation is to help the government deter or disarm
these groups and protect civilians at risk from their activities.
UN peace operations that support peacebuilding processes are neither neutral nor impartial in the
same way that these concepts are used in the humanitarian context. In order for humanitarian agencies
to do their work, they need to have access to the people affected by the conflict, regardless of where
they are. For instance, they may be in rebel-controlled areas. By maintaining strict discipline when it
comes to neutrality and impartiality, humanitarian actors are able to stay above the conflict and move
freely throughout the conflict area.
Peacekeepers and peacebuilders, on the other hand, are deployed with the specific mandate to
stop or mitigate the conflict. They intervene with it in such a way that it does not lapse back into
violent conflict. Therefore, peacekeepers and peacebuilders are not politically neutral. If they have a
mandate to protect civilians, as most peace operations now do, they have the responsibility to protect
civilians wherever they may be and from whomever poses a threat. However, one of the key principles
that enables a UN peace operation to stop the conflict and to prevent it from relapsing into violence is
impartiality — not choosing sides, or treating all parties equally. UN peace operations are impartial, but
are not neutral, as humanitarians are.
116
A peacekeeper with the African Union/

United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
(UNAMID) provides security at a camp
of nearly 2,000 displaced Sudanese in
Khor Abeche, South Darfur. The refugees
lived in the area, close to an UNAMID
team site, after fleeing violence in their
native Darfur villages in December 2010.
10 January 2011. UN Photo #460892 by
Albert González Farran.
This is the critical distinction between peacekeepers, peacebuilders, and humanitarians. Civil-
military officers in particular must understand this difference, explain it to their military, police, and
humanitarian colleagues, especially commanders, and advise action that recognizes and respects
these differences. It is in a civil-military officer’s interest to respect and protect the independence of
humanitarian actors. As with civil-military coordination, peacebuilding is essentially a management
enterprise, both in terms of relationships and transitions — orchestrating a complex array of activities
by an equally varied community of actors, as well as timing these activities to take effect in order
to transform the conflict and transition to self-sustained peace. Since civil-military coordination is at
the locus of both processes, it plays an important role in supporting the coordination and transition
management process. This is particularly true in complex integrated UN missions, where mission
coordination is the essential management challenge.
Section 4.3 Peacebuilding Actors

To understand peacebuilding actors as they relate
Internal and External Actors »
to civil-military coordination in peace operations, it
is useful to make a distinction between internal and The internal actors are comprised of the
external actors. government of the day, the parties to the

conflict, the private sector, and civil society
External Actors in all its different varieties. The external
actors are the peace operation, the UNCT,
There are a number of external actors to be
international NGOs, regional and sub-
considered in the peacebuilding context. Key among
regional organizations (such as the EU, AU,
these is the UN peace operation,2 the UNCT, civil society
or ECOWAS), and donor agencies.
organizations (CSOs),3 NGOs, and donor agencies.
2) In some cases it could be another organization that has responsibility for the peace operations, e.g. the European Union in Chad or the African Union
in Somalia.
3) CSOs are non-State organizations composed of uncoerced participants with shared interests, values, and purposes, such as ethnic, cultural, political,
or religious beliefs. CSOs may include NGOs, faith groups, and think tanks found in the civil society of the host nation.
117
Aid provisions are unloaded at Fanga Suk in East Jebel Marra, South Darfur. An inter-agency mission led
by the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), brought approximately
half a tonne of food and medical supplies to this area, notoriously difficult to access due to heavy fighting
between Government and rebel forces. 23 March 2011. UN Photo #467672 by Olivier Chassot.
In many post-conflict situations, the UN or another organization will deploy a peace operation to
stabilize the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operation’s
effort and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the peacebuilding
work can be carried out without fear of disruption.
The different members of the UN system in a given country are referred to as the UNCT. The
UNCT is headed by a Resident Coordinator (RC), who is typically also the head of the UN Development
Programme (UNDP). The RC is responsible for coordinating the UN system in the country and is often
also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). When there is a peacekeeping mission deployed at the same
time, and if it is an integrated mission, then the same person will also be one of the Deputy SRSGs, and
thus known as the DSRSG RC/HC.
The members of the UNCT typically include the UNDP, the World Bank Group (WBG), UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children’s Emergency Fund
(UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and others. All of these agencies, funds, and offices have
their own mandates, budgets, and programmes.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UNDP is the lead agency for peacebuilding and development in the UN system. Oftentimes, when a
mission transitions from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, it also transitions to a UNDP-led UN presence
for many years to follow. The DSRSG RC/HC often comes from UNDP. Because of the heavy transition
management implications, civil-military actors would do well to establish good working relations with
the UNDP offices at both the operational and tactical levels.
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UNDP heads up the implementation programmes, initiatives, and frameworks (e.g., UNDAF) in
coordination with other UN agencies and offices, as well as donor development agencies, and under the
general provisions of the SDG.
One of the more interesting initiatives for UN-CIMIC is the UNDP programme to develop and
coordinate civilian capabilities for development and capacity building, also called CivCap. This applies to
internal as well as external actors and thus has implications for localizing as well as civilianizing.4
The World Bank Group (WBG)
The World Bank Group (WBG) finances many of the developmental and capacity-building initiatives
in-country along thematic, economic sector, country, or regional lines. It consists of five financial
development agencies:
• The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development lends to governments of middle-
income and credit-worthy, low-income countries;
• The International Development Association provides interest-free loans — called credits — and
grants to governments of the poorest countries;
• The International Finance Corporation provides loans, equity, and technical assistance to
stimulate private sector investment in developing countries;
• The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency provides guarantees against losses caused by
non-commercial risks to investors in developing countries; and
• The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes provides international facilities
for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes.5
The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) looks to expand the capacity of the UN
system and its partners to implement peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development operations.
UNOPS offers implementation support services to partners who have political, policy, or substantive
mandates. UNOPS focus areas are demand-driven: census and elections, environment, health, physical
infrastructure, and justice and security sector reform.6
UN Women
The UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) merges and builds
on the important work of four previously distinct parts of the UN system, which focused exclusively on
gender equality and women’s empowerment: the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), the
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), the Office of
the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), and the United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The mission of UN Women is also embodied in one of the
SDGs. The main roles of UN Women are:
• To support intergovernmental bodies (such as the Commission on the Status of Women) in their
formulation of policies, global standards, and norms;
4) For more on UNDP, go to: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html>.

5) For more on the World Bank Group, go to: <http://www.worldbank.org/>.
6) For more on UNOPS, go to: <http://www.unops. org/>.
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• To help Member States implement these standards, standing ready to provide suitable technical
and financial support to those countries that request it;
• To forge effective partnerships with civil society; and
• To hold the UN system accountable for its own commitments on gender equality, including
regular monitoring of system-wide progress.7
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
The Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO) mandate is to raise levels of nutrition, improve
agricultural productivity, better the lives of rural populations, and contribute to the growth of the world
economy. Current focus areas include:
• Early warning of food crises;
• Detection and prevention of transboundary threats to food production, health, and the
environment;
• Sustainable forest management;
• Control of biosecurity risks to fisheries and aquaculture establishing global entities to cope with
land and water scarcity;
• Boosting national capacity for generating and analysing agricultural statistics; and
• Implementing global standards through national policies and legislation.8
The RC/HC’s function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the
needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use
various coordination mechanisms to harmonize their policies and programmes.
International CSOs and NGOs include a broad range of independent non-profit organizations that
work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most NGOs have developed a field of
specialization. Some, like Doctors Without Borders, focus on the health sector. Oxfam is known for its
work in the water and sanitation and preventive health sectors. Others, like CARE International and
World Vision, have a more cross-cutting approach and may be involved in food distribution, agriculture
projects, and support of refugees or internally displaced persons.
In some cases, CSOs and NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own
funding, while in others they may act as implementing partners for UN agencies like UNHCR (refugees) or
WFP (food distribution). In other cases, they may act as implementing partners for aid agencies like the
European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), or bilateral donor agencies like the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the German Corporation for International
Cooperation (GIZ), the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), and GOAL (Ireland). Most of these donor agencies are represented at the country level,
usually through their embassies or diplomatic missions.
7) For more on UN Women, go to: <http://www.unwomen.org/>.

8) For more on the FAO, go to: <http://www.fao.org/>.
120
Peacekeepers in armoured vehicles

from the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), MONUSCO,
were deployed to the town of Bunagana
where heavy gun fights between
Government FARDC forces and insurgent
groups pushed residents to flee toward
the Ugandan border. 16 May 2012. UN
Photo #514194 by Sylvain Liechti.
In turn, CSOs and NGOs often engage indigenous or local partners as those partners proliferate and
improve in capability. In this sense, this process helps to “localize” efforts at filling gaps in civil society
that public institutions might otherwise fill, which is the purpose of CSOs and NGOs writ large.
Internal Actors
Internal actors are comprised of the government, the parties to the conflict, the private sector,
and civil society in all its varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should
play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance.
Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the
conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role in the early stages of peacebuilding operations. As a result,
the international aid community often plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired.
The Private Sector
No other activity can have a more stabilizing and transformative impact on the peace process than
the growth of commercial and market activity, especially at the community level. This relates to SDGs 8
(promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth; full and productive employment; and
decent work) and 9 (build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization,
and foster innovation). This can occur in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief situations to promote
early recovery, as well during peacebuilding — as the Minimum Requirements for Market Analysis in
Emergencies, referenced at the end of this Lesson, demonstrates.
With this in mind, civil assistance projects should account for their potential impact on the growth
of local business and commerce to help people obtain livelihoods and be less vulnerable to coercion or
manipulation. Such capacity-building projects include improving and securing farm-to-market roads,
marketplaces, and banking facilities, as well as vocational skills training for local civilians in areas such
as building and construction work, vehicle and machine repair, and so on. In any case, such civil-military
projects should be carefully coordinated and vetted through external civilian and local partners.
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Section 4.4 Civilianizing and Localizing
Civilianizing and Localizing Explained
In Lesson 1, we identified general civil-military coordination principles, such as the primacy of

civilian authority, the military as supporting and not supported, the military as enabler, indirect versus
direct support, and management of civil-military interaction and transition. While the general civil-
military approach is appropriate for support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — or even
conflict prevention — it is most ideal for transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.
The primary role of the military component of a peacebuilding operation is to ensure a safe and
secure environment where the other external and internal actors can operate. The secondary role of the
military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the
overall mission objectives.
It should be clear by now that civil-military coordination should be integrated into the larger mission
coordination effort with all partners and stakeholders. For example, in the case of a military unit
rehabilitating a school, such services should be coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities:
internal actors like local education authorities and local community leaders, external actors like UN
agencies, CSOs, and NGOs working in the education field, as well as other external actors who may be
active in the area. The twin processes of facilitating civil-military transition management by supporting
and enabling civilian and local partners, respectively, can also be called civilianizing or localizing.
Civilianizing, quite simply, is working by, with, and through external civilian leadership. This means
shifting from direct military support (activities undertaken by the military in support of the community
earlier in the mission) to indirect military support (activities to support UN agencies, CSOs, NGOs,
or other civilian agencies in their support to the community). For example, medical outreaches that
may have been started by the military during a more unstable phase when demand for humanitarian
assistance outstripped the capabilities of civilian external actors to perform those services. As more
civilian agencies become available, however, the military should stop directly providing such services,
and instead shift support to civilian agencies. This is likely to take place over several months, with the
military gradually decreasing direct services as the civilian capacity increases.
The idea would be to bring any direct military assistance being provided under the programme
management of the appropriate UN agency partner, as well as gradually reducing the military portion of
that assistance. At the same time, the military would enhance or enable those partner efforts through
more indirect means, to include security, logistics, information, etc. This evokes the category of indirect
humanitarian assistance in the MCDA Guidelines as discussed in Lesson 3 — the more indirect vis-à-vis
the population, the better.
The reason why external civilian-managed and civilian-led activities are more appropriate than
military-led activities is because it reflects the appropriate division of roles and labour in civil society in
peacetime. During the conflict period, the armed forces of the government and the armed movements
of the opposition were likely to have been both the most resourced and most powerful actors in the
community. In many cases, this also meant that the armed forces and armed movements assumed
de facto responsibility for civilian administration in the areas they controlled. During the transition to
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peace, a re-ordering of these roles — de jure — is necessary. The intervening military must always
demonstrate its support to civilian authority and the rule of law (the first civil-military principle), and
thus assume their appropriate external defence role. The police should take on more and more of the
internal security role. As such, UN-CIMIC has key relationships with UNPOL and FPUs. UNPOL has the
primary role in introducing and building the capacity of indigenous police forces.
Civilian administration duties, in turn, must be

the responsibility of appropriate civilian authorities.
During the transition period, some of these services
may be provided by UN agencies or other external
actors while local policies, structures, and capacities
are being put in place or being revitalized. When these
services are performed by the military component of
the UN peace operation (itself an external actor), the
message sent to the local community and local armed
forces is that it is normal and appropriate for these
civil services to be performed by the military. Using
peacekeepers to provide civil assistance can reinforce
Using stones and metal rods, angry crowds in El-Haffeh,
the message that the military is an appropriate tool for
Syria, damaged UN vehicles on 12 June 2013 and fired
civilian administration. This is not only contradictory on the convoy as officers of the UNSMIS observer
to promoting a healthy, democratic civil-military mission tried to access the area. 13 June 2012. UN
Photo #516843 by David Manyua.
relationship, but is also potentially destabilizing. It is
thus important to reinforce the message as soon as possible that the appropriate institutions for civilian
administration are the local civilian authorities and civil society. This message can best be reinforced
when, in the interim period, such support is provided by international civilian organizations that have
the appropriate expertise and capacity.
Localizing, in turn, is simply about promoting local (or internal) ownership of the peacebuilding
process. It reflects the principle enshrined in international law and reaffirmed in international
peacebuilding and development policies that the local society has the right and responsibility to
determine its own future, and neither the international community nor any other actor has the right
to make decisions on their behalf. The principles of “self-determination” in international law and “local
ownership” in peacebuilding and development policy mean that the internal actors must be given the
space to determine their own futures. This means that the external actors may act on behalf of the
internal actors only as a last resort, i.e. in cases in which it is important to act where there is no
local capacity to make decisions or act; for instance, in the immediate aftermath of conflict when a
transitional government is not yet functioning.
However, it is important to recognize that there is never a total vacuum of local authority, nor does
the transition management process in peacebuilding always occur smoothly or in a linear progression.
The local community will always have representatives — traditional, religious, and civil society leaders.
Even if such persons are not formally in government, they are still able to act as important voices
for their communities, and the external actors are always able — and obligated — to consult and
otherwise make as much of an effort as possible to obtain direction and guidance from local leaders
and representatives.
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For example, while civilianizing medical outreaches, UN-CIMIC officers should consult local health
authorities and provincial or municipal representatives — ideally from the very start of these projects —
in determining need (needs assessment) and in nominating projects or events. The idea is to give them
ownership of the process from the start, to build their capacity, and to enhance their local legitimacy.
Additionally, military personnel and assets could be used in providing classroom and “on-the-job”
training for local medical personnel, gradually making them the primary providers of direct medical
assistance. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) also could be designed and employed to improve local medical
facilities in order to improve the capacity of these sites in complementary fashion.
Localizing also has an important functional rationale. There can be no self-sustainable peacebuilding
without local ownership. No policy, structure, or system will work on its own after the peacekeeping
mission has withdrawn if it is not something that is really needed by the community, and is culturally and
socially acceptable and appropriate. It is wasteful and irrational to invest in institutions and capacities
that will not be sustained once the peacekeepers leave. For example, if local health services cannot
sustain a clinic in every village, then peacekeepers and other external actors should not build and
support a clinic in every village. Instead, they could work with local health services to develop a clinic
in a district capital. In other words, these kinds of decisions need to be made by local authorities on
the basis of what can be sustained without the external assistance of peacekeepers and other external
actors. The peacekeeping mission will draw down, and withdraw within a few years.
Localizing in this context is thus an investment in self-sustainable peacebuilding and a guiding

principle that will help keep the peacekeeping operation from wasting resources — including the time and
energy of the local community — on initiatives that are not self-sustainable. As previously noted, civil-
military coordination is about leading less from the front and more from behind. More importantly, its
ultimate aim is to work the military force out of its job and manage or facilitate its eventual withdrawal.
Civilianizing and localizing are twin processes that are obviously closely interlinked. They should
therefore be sequenced and synchronized. Of the two, however, the most important and more immediate
is civilianizing. The ultimate goal and guiding principle is local ownership. In the interim or transition
leading-up to full ownership, the guiding principle is civilian rather than military leadership, i.e. indirect
support from the military. For the effort to be sustainable, initial direct military support (if necessary as
a last resort), and interim external civilian support (if necessary as a last resort), need to be guided by
the goal of local ownership. The local community, even if initially unable to take the lead itself, should
have as much input as early as possible on what is needed, what the priorities should be, what would
be sustainable, etc. This should always be done by, with, and through external civilian leadership to
the fullest extent possible. Civil-military officers should employ and emphasize the category of indirect
assistance from the MCDA Guidelines as discussed in Lesson 3. The more indirect, the better, and they
should seek and follow the advice of the local community.
Building capacity and making local distribution of public services more visible and effective also
helps to build confidence — confidence of the population in their local government and the confidence of
the local government to be able to provide the services. If there are any “hearts and minds” to be won,
they should be won by those who will be there long after the UN force withdraws.
124
When civilianizing and localizing, civilian leadership and local ownership should be complementary
to the actions undertaken by the appropriate external and internal civilian authorities or actors. For
instance, a military-supported school rehabilitation project should not compete with or in any way
undermine the activities of the local education authority or international agencies, such as UNICEF
or Save the Children, that are active in the education sector. In fact, the military should only become
involved in supporting a school rehabilitation project if it is locally owned, so the rehabilitated school will
be integrated into and sustained by the local community and the appropriate local education authorities,
ensuring long-term sustainability. In any case, UN-CIMIC and other military officers must work through
the appropriate international civilian agency, such as UNICEF in the education sector, even at the request
of local communities directly to the force. The military unit at the tactical level considering such a school
project may not be aware of country-wide initiatives, policies, and plans regarding the reconstruction of
the education sector, but by directing their support via agencies like UNICEF or Save the Children, they
can ensure that they are consulting the appropriate agencies that have access to the best information
on that specialized subject. Civilianizing and localizing are the best safeguards for military officers to
avoid negative unintended consequences, causing harm to the local community or the peace process in
general, or simply to avoid wasted effort.
As many military leaders say: “Hope is not a method.” Good intentions alone are not a guarantee
that goodwill comes from military assistance actions. UN-CIMIC officers in particular have to ensure that
all civil-military activities are coordinated with, and undertaken in support of, the appropriate civilian,
police, and even military external and internal actors. Therefore, all civil-military activities essentially
come down to civilianizing and localizing.
To visualize this principle, and how to implement it in practice, recall the graphic provided in Lesson
1 depicting the appropriate relationship of working by, with, and through civilian partners to improve
local capacity and confidence. As applied in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the idea is to move the
military (in red) further to the rear of the overall peace process, and thus assume an increasingly minor,
less visible, and more indirect role. This is accomplished by working by, with, and through external
actors (yellow) and internal actors (green) in an enabling process of helping to build capacity and
confidence. The exit door for the military from the area of operations is always at the rear. Civil-military
coordination, through the dual process of civilianizing and localizing, is continuously moving the force
closer and closer to the exit.
Figure 1
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MCDA Guidelines and UN-CIMIC Support to Peacebuilding
The use of military assets in the peacebuilding context differs from the use of military assets in
the humanitarian context, as explained in the MCDA Guidelines discussed in Lesson 3, in that there is
no assumption of independence, based on the neutrality and impartiality of the civilian peacebuilding
partners. In the peacebuilding context — for example, in a DDR or elections programme — both military
and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific
outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation. Those opposed to an election, for
instance, will be opposed to all involved in the electoral process. Therefore, the close cooperation between
military and civilian partners in the peacebuilding context does not have the same implications for the
security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context.
Still, the guidance for the use of MCDA in support of humanitarian assistance is by and large
appropriate to peacebuilding activities. The military can undertake or support peacebuilding and
development action, provided doing so will not endanger civilian partners or beneficiaries, and that it is
well-coordinated with all stakeholders.9
A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all of these dimensions are interlinked
and interdependent. The programmes and agencies are interdependent in that no single programme
can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation — addressing the consequences and causes of the
conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace — on its own. The investment
made in each individual programme is only worthwhile if the combined and sustained effort proves
successful in the long term.
The project cycles of the different dimensions, clusters, and programmes must be synchronized
with each other within the overall peacebuilding strategy framework. Individual programmes should
continuously adjust their planning to the feedback received from elsewhere in the system in order to
ensure the combined effect on the society is positive, consistent, and produced at a rate that can be
absorbed by the internal actors. Peacebuilding frameworks such as the SDGs and, more specifically, the
UNDAF provide the appropriate guidelines.
It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in all of these
dimensions and sectors that slowly builds momentum toward sustainable peace. The timing,
prioritization, and sequencing between these dimensions and sectors are very important. This is why
coordination is a critical success factor in peace operations, as well as why civil-military coordination has
such an important role to play in them.
Civilianizing and localizing as applied through civil-military liaison and civil assistance is the overall
methodology by which civil-military officers help ensure a comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated
effort that facilitates the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.
Once the distinction with humanitarian action is established, it makes sense for the peacebuilding
operation to integrate the overall management of the resources at its disposal. In this context, these
kinds of military support are seen as leveraging the resources that exist within the different components
of the mission, so that ultimately the peacebuilding operation can maximize the impact it has on the
peace process by mustering and focusing all of its available resources on a specific outcome, e.g.
facilitating a successful election.
9) See the UN-CIMIC Response Matrix in Lesson 3.
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Section 4.5 Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

As noted in Lesson 2, current and emerging UN peace operations often deploy under circumstances
where there is little or no peace to keep, where parties to the conflict are less clearly identifiable, and
where asymmetric and unconventional threats have forced more robust peacekeeping and stabilization
operations under the larger rubric of “conflict management”, as the HIPPO Report explains. UN peace
operations now deploy to protect civilians, sometimes without a peace agreement in place or without
the consent of all the parties engaged in the conflict for UN presence or operations, such as in Darfur,
Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. There are also situations where the hold on
peace is tenuous to begin with, such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). In each of these cases, civil-military coordination is even more vital to transitioning from
stabilization to peacebuilding.
The important thing to remember is that, although the military support to peacebuilding may
be far more focused on stabilization and security than peacebuilding in such contexts, and may thus
be more overwhelmingly security-driven and dominated by the military, the peacekeeping and civil-
military principles, as well as the international criteria on the use of force with respect to civil-military
coordination, nonetheless apply. Civil assistance tends to be framed in terms of “winning hearts and
minds” with a view to create a friendlier environment for the military. However, the transferability and
sustainability of early peacebuilding tasks (i.e. the focus on civilianizing and localizing) needs to remain
central to the civil-military approach and effort. this is necessary in order to facilitate the military
end state and exit strategy and create an enabling environment for the introduction of civilian and
police partners. The guidelines and frameworks for the management of security challenges in the UN
Handbook on human Security are particularly helpful here.
It needs to be understood, however, that this more public relations application of military support
to peacebuilding is short-term and limited in effect — in other words, it is more tactical than strategic.
Two dangers with this more tactical approach are: one, it can reinforce, rather than reduce, local
dependency on the force for services the military is inappropriate to provide and cannot sustain, setting
the population up for disappointment in the force. It also could lead the force into taking sides in the
conflict inadvertently. For the UN, the notion of “winning hearts and minds” means winning support for
the mission itself and those external and internal actors that are working together in support of the
mandate and the peace process. This means winning support for a peaceful negotiated settlement, the
protection of civilians, and other objectives of the mission. Support for the mission mandate means
support from the peacekeeping force — not the other way around.
Keep in mind that peacebuilding is essentially focused on addressing the drivers of conflict and
instability that violent extremist organizations, illicit powers such as criminal networks, and other
asymmetric or unconventional actors (internal or external) exploit. As such, early peacebuilding applied
in civil-military coordination through the consistent and continuous process of civilianizing and localizing
is among the greatest ways to deter and defeat threats to peace.
Even in less than permissive environments, military officers may find peacebuilding-related
civilian organizations, especially humanitarian partners, working there. For that reason, civil-military
principles are even more important, as the margins for error are small and the costs for those errors are
potentially high. As such, the information and guidelines on coordination with humanitarian assistance
organizations likewise apply to situations and environments of this kind.
127
Conclusion
• The concept of peacebuilding and the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus and its implications for
civil-military transition management;
• Peacebuilding frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the New Deal, and the
UN Development Assistance Framework;
• Peacebuilding actors, both external and internal;
• Civilianizing and localizing as the methods by which to conduct civil-military transition

management of the broader peace operations effort; and
• Civil-military coordination as vital to transition from stabilization to peacebuilding.
• Human Rights and Human Rights and Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict Resolution, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Enhancing Good Governance In International

Development; Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians; and Confronting Trauma –
A Primer for Global Action. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1-3, 7 and 10 of the Handbook. See also
Local Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches (March 2016), in
particular Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7.

Although most of the courses are in-residence requiring funding, the CCOE offers one free online
course, NATO CMI/CIMIC Awareness Course. It also maintains links to the latest developments
in CIMIC, directly or indirectly related to NATO, as well as CIMIC lessons-learned, etc.
Further References
• United Nations Security Council resolution 2086 (2013), United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, S/RES/2086 (2013), UN Security Council, 21 January 2013, available at: <http://
undocs.org/s/res/2086(2013)>.
• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, DPKO (18 January 2008).
• United Nations Development Programme web page on Sustainable Development Goals: <www.
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>.
128

• The Challenge of Sustaining Peace – Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015
Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, United Nations Headquarters, 29 June
2015.
• A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding (2011), available at: <http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/udv-strat-indsats/
stabil/skroebelige-stater/~/media/502932B2CD29496390CECB833F2D30A6.ashx>.
missions>.


withdrawal>.

• Policy Directive, Civil Affairs, DPKO/DFS (April 2008).
• Civil Affairs Handbook, United Nations DPKO/DFS (March 2012), available at: <https://
• Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping, DPKO, 2003, especially Chapter

XV on the “World Bank in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and Chapter XVI on “Recovery,
Development and Sustainable Peace”; available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/
default/files/peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf>.
• Minimum Requirements for Market Analysis in Emergencies, The Cash Learning Project (16 July
2013), available through the Sphere Project or directly from the CaLP at: <www.cashlearning.
org/resources/library>.
• Soldiers for Peace: A Collection of Peacebuilding Stories in Mindanao, Balay Mindanaw Foundation,
Inc. (2010), available at: <http://www.timonera.com/misc/soldiers4peace-preview.pdf>.
129
1. Peacebuilding operations are: 7. Civilizing and localizing relate directly to

the UN-CIMIC core tasks of:
A. Local interventions only
B. International and local interventions to build A. Civil-military separation and transition
peace by building local capacity management
C. National development operations B. Civil-military liaison and information sharing

and civil assistance
D. Local post-conflict operations
C. Civil-military separation and economic
2. True or false? The most common civilian growth
coordinating partner for military and D. Military control and transition management
police component civil-military operators
for peacebuilding is UN Civil Affairs. 8. In stabilization or conflict management
situations, the conduct of “early
3. In peacebuilding operations, what are peacebuilding” tasks is even more
the two general types of actors? critical because:
A. Combatant and non-combatant A. The environment on the ground is ideal for
B. Internal and external such tasks
C. Humanitarian and development B. They are included in every Security Council
D. UN and non-UN resolution
C. They were included in the Millennium
4. Which of the following is NOT an “early
Development Goals
peacebuilding” task according to
Security Council Resolution 2086? D. Early peacebuilding is among the greatest
ways to deter and defeat threats to peace
A. Protect civilians
B. Enable DDR 9. True or false? Civilianizing and localizing
C. Support the strengthening of rule of law is the dual process by which UN-CIMIC
institutions ensures a comprehensive, coherent,
and coordinated peacebuilding effort
D. Build resilient infrastructure
from the civil-military standpoint,
helping to manage the transition
5. True or false? The difference between
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.
civilianizing and localizing is that
However, it does not apply in less than
civilianizing is working by, with, and
permissive environments.
through external civilian leadership,
while localizing is promoting local (or
internal) ownership of the peacebuilding 10. Active development initiatives and
process. frameworks include all EXCEPT:
A. Millennium Development Goals
6. True or false? Due to the extenuating B. Sustainable Development Goals
circumstances of violent conflict in
C. New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
stabilization or conflict management
situations, civil-military operations D. UN Development Assistance Framework
should focus on “winning hearts and
minds” for UN military forces and their
operations.
130
Answer Key »
1. B
2. True
3. B
4. D
5. True
6. False
7. B
8. D
9. False
10. A
131
LESSON
UN Mission Integration and
5 Coordination
Within a UN complex,
multidimensional,
and integrated peace
operations context, civil-
military coordination
is a subset of mission
coordination.
UN Photo #118310 by Mark Garten.
Section 5.1 Coordination in a Peace • Understand what coordination is in the context

Operations Context of peace operations and integrated UN missions,
how that differs from command and control, and
Section 5.2 UN Mission Coordination
how civil-military coordination supports that.
Section 5.3 UN Mission Civil-Military
• Be familiar with UN peace operations mission
Coordination Structures
assessment, planning, and coordination policies,
Section 5.4 Integrated Assessment and frameworks, and mechanisms.
Planning
• Understand operational and tactical level UN-
Section 5.5 UN-CIMIC Structures and CIMIC coordination structures.
Capabilities
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LESSON 5 | UN Mission Integration and Coordination
Refugees inside Zam Zam Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp in the Darfur region of Sudan. 1 July 2004. UN Photo #14579 by
Eskinder Debebe.
Introduction
Within a UN complex, multidimensional, and

integrated peace operations context, civil-military
coordination is a subset of mission coordination. It
is essential, therefore, for civil-military officers in
peace operations to understand of what is meant by
“coordination” in the UN integrated mission context in
order to understand this contextual relationship.
As a basic skillset, civil-military coordinators in

UN peace operations must be able to understand how
mission coordination and civil-military coordination are
related through Integrated Assessment and Planning
and the Integrated Strategic Framework, including the
Integrated Mission Planning Process, as well as mission
coordination structures, including UN-CIMIC structures
at the operational and tactical levels. In order to
133
facilitate transition management and place the military in the best position to support consolidation of
the mission, civil-military coordination structures, assessment, and reports must be supportive rather
than duplicative of overall mission information management.
Section 5.1 Coordination in a Peace Operations Context

As mentioned in Lesson 1, one of the main differences between UN-CIMIC, NATO CIMIC, or US
Civil-Military Operations is that the latter is seen primarily as a military command and control function,
while UN-CIMIC needs to be understood as an integral part of a larger integrated mission structure and
approach, ultimately under the overall direction of the civilian Head of Mission. Regardless, command
and control of UN-CIMIC exists within the UN peacekeeping military force structure.
Before looking at the command and control of UN-CIMIC within the peacekeeping force structure,
it is essential to have a grasp of what is meant by coordination in the larger UN integrated mission
coordination context in order to understand and maintain this important distinction — namely, that
coordination is a mission function supported by UN-CIMIC, while command and control is a military
management function.
As noted in Lesson 1, civil-military coordination contributes to the dialogue and interface between
peace and security objectives on the one hand, and humanitarian and peacebuilding objectives on
the other. The civil-military nexus is at the locus of any complex peace operation and its ability to
have a holistic impact on the conflict it is attempting to transform. Better civil-military coordination
is driven by two imperatives. First, the complexity of the peace operations environment requires
greater coordination among actors, programmes, and activities that have cross-cutting impacts and are
interdependent. Second, increasingly limited resources — including donor funding and peacekeepers
from troop-contributing countries — in the face of greater demand must be used judiciously, efficiently,
and effectively. In this regard, civil-military coordination is an exercise in the military principle of
economy of force or effort.
Likewise, as noted in Lesson 1, one of the most obvious differences between civil-military cooperation
(as it is used in NATO) and civil-military coordination (in the UN context) is the use of two different
terms: cooperation and coordination.
In the UN context, cooperation is viewed as the strongest relationship that can exist between
civilian, military, and police components. It is seen as a relationship where the component partners
agree to synchronize their policies and behaviour so that they can undertake joint action. Most often,
however, the institutional effort necessary to achieve full cooperation can be achieved and maintained
only under special conditions, for a limited time, and for a specific purpose — for instance, during an
election. Under normal circumstances, a less intense relationship is preferred. This state is referred to
in its minimal form as coexistence, especially in the humanitarian context. This normally implies that
the parties to this relationship exchange information, come together for coordination meetings, and that
they may, from time to time, undertake some form of joint activity, for instance a humanitarian convoy
with a military escort. Regardless of whether there is open cooperation or only tenuous coexistence, a
minimum level of coordination is always required. Coordination in the UN context can range on a scale
from cooperation in its maximum state to coexistence in its minimum state.
134
Michael Moller (centre), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus, and
Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP), meets with
Tassos Papadopoulos (left), Greek Cypriot leader, and Mehmet Ali Talat, Turkish Cypriot
leader, in Nicosia. 5 September 2007. UN Photo #151005 by UN.
“Everybody wants to coordinate, but nobody wants to be coordinated”
There is a saying in the relief community that sums up the core dilemma of coordination: “Everybody
wants to coordinate, but nobody wants to be coordinated.” Experience from the UN Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in the early 1990s foreshadowed the feedback still seen in many situations
today: that the “meaning of coordination varied depending on which of the stakeholders employed it at a
given moment and that the various stakeholders competed to place their agencies at the forefront of the
process to enhance their own legitimacy and subsequent fundraising capacities.”1 Researcher Peter Uvin
adds that “all documents on peacebuilding stress the need for improved coordination: there is no single
need more emphasized.”2 And yet, effective coordination in the field has proved difficult to achieve.
Uvin goes on to explain numerous reasons why effective coordination appears to be so elusive:
“The lack of coordination is partly due to widely recognized

factors: the multitude of actors, often numbering in the
hundreds; [...] the high cost in time and money that effective
coordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own
constituencies and serve their national interests; competition
for influence and visibility between donors; and the general
unwillingness of actors to limit their margin to manoeuvre by
the discipline of coordination. Note that multilateral agencies
and international NGOs share most of these problems, with the
1) Sam Barnes, Humanitarian Aid Coordination During War and Peace in Mozambique (Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1998).
2) Peter Uvin, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthesis and Commentary on the Lessons Learned from Case Studies on the Limit
and Scope of the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations, (Paris, DAC, Informal Task Force on
Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, OECD, 1999), p. 18.
135
additional problem that the financing structures of humanitarian

and development assistance place them in competition with
each other.”3
Coordination in a Peace Operations Context
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English explains that cooperation means
“working together for a common purpose”, while coordination means “making things, people and
parts function together efficiently and in an organized way.” The Collins English Dictionary provides an
insight into coordination that seems even more relevant for our purpose. It defines coordination as “the
organization of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently
and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing.”
As noted in Lesson 1, the HIPPO Report specifically mentions coordination among its findings with
respect to its call for a “more inclusive peace and security partnership” that “leverages comparative
advantages” of all those involved. Although they pertain to the partnership between the UN and regional
organizations, the “principles of cooperation it identifies” could be applied easily to mission coordination
and civil-military coordination on a more operational level:
• Consultative decision-making and common strategy;
• Division of labour based on respective comparative advantage;
• Joint analysis, planning, monitoring, and evaluation; and
• An integrated response to the conflict cycle — including prevention and transparency —

accountability, and respect for international standards.
The Fog and Friction of Coordination
There are many factors that frustrate coordination, but two deserve particular attention. The first
is the sheer number of international and local actors involved, and the second is the wide-ranging
scope of disparate activities undertaken by these actors. To these we can still add an infinite number of
complicating factors, including:
• The language and socio-cultural gaps between

international peacekeepers and the local
Video »
societies they are intended to assist;
A number of practitioners have likened
• Inherent conflicts between the values, principles,
the attempt to bring together disparate
and mandates of some actors involved in
actors for a common end to the task of
peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development, and
“herding cats”: <www.youtube.com/
humanitarian assistance; and
watch?v=Pk7yqlTMvp8>.
• The inconsistencies and inherent tensions of the
liberal peace doctrines that serve to compound
existing global inequalities.4
3) Uvin, 19.
4) M. Pugh and N. Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 197.
136
In addition, the information revolution has multiplied the number of actors involved in post-conflict
reconstruction operations. It has amplified the influence of the media, created a more educated and
better informed public, and increased the number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace,
security, relief, and reconstruction actions. All of these factors together have raised exponentially the
“fog” (uncertainty) and “friction” (conflict of interests or purposes) in both kinds of coordination. With
specific regard to civil-military coordination, two other factors that encumber mission coordination are:
• The relatively weak understanding of the civilian components in particular of the supportive role
of the military within the context of UN-CIMIC; and
• The weak understanding of the mission environment, mandate objectives, and mission issues
among the rotating military staff and contingents.
The first factor underscores the role UN-CIMIC officers have in educating other components on
UN-CIMIC, whereas the second factor necessitates the need for predeployment training on the mission
environment for troop-contributing country military staff and contingents.
Coordination vs. Management and Managing Expectations
There should be a clear distinction between

management and coordination in both UN peace
operations and civil-military coordination. Decision-
making takes place in the management function,
while the coordination function is used to inform
that process. If these two functions are kept distinct,
coordination should not pose a threat to any unit or
programme. This is because each individual agent
will retain full control over decision-making functions
with respect to its own mandate. For coordination to
be palatable to protective institutional cultures, it has
to be non-threatening. For it to be non-threatening,
it has to be voluntary and free of decision-making
power over participating agencies.
In a peace operation, coordination is also a natural

convergence point for various international agencies
and NGOs. However, this does not imply a management
Members of the Guard Unit of the United Nations
or control function. UN peace operations have no
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Security
direct authority over UN agencies. Increasingly, UN Training Unit participate in a mass evacuation of
missions now recognize the importance of civil-military casualties and emergency exercise. 21 February 2009.
UN Photo #326201 by Rick Bajornas.
coordination as central to mission coordination. It is
now common for a peacekeeping force to have UN-
CIMIC officers — and even units — dedicated to this
task.
137
This leads to perhaps the most important insight any civil-military officer can gain: the importance
of managing expectations — expectations of one’s own, of those to whom one reports, of those with
whom one works, and of those whom one is trying to help. In many situations, the phrase “unity
of effort” has been widely used. This assumes widespread agreement on ends, ways, and means to
achieve overall success. It almost never happens. Those who tend to use this term (such as military
personnel) are more accustomed to a command and control environment where this could be expected.
Those who are more used to a coordination environment might rather use the term “unity of purpose”
(which assumes only common goals and objectives). Managing expectations may ultimately be the
single most important contribution a civil-military coordinator makes.
Section 5.2 UN Mission Coordination

Against this backdrop, one can gain a better understanding of the architecture of a UN peace
operation in terms of mission coordination in various ways:
• Political Coordination: At the strategic or political level, the UN Security Council is ultimately
responsible for the overall political direction of the international engagement in any given peace
process. A UN peace operation is typically headed by a civilian Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG). The SRSG will have the support of a political affairs section for
political processes at the strategic and national levels, and Political Affairs and Civil Affairs units
with a presence throughout the country to engage with other multilateral, bilateral, national,
regional, and local political structures, as well as with community and traditional leadership
structures. The SRSG and staff, other envoys, diplomats, and visiting delegations will provide
ongoing support and mediation services to the parties to the peace process. At the local level,
the UN mission may provide support to local government or traditional or civil society leaders to
mediate conflicts. Such conflict management support may include technical advice and support,
information and liaison services, coordination, and logistical support.
• Security Coordination: In many situations, the UN, the AU, or sub-regional organizations like
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deploy a peacekeeping operation to
stabilize the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peacekeeping
operation’s efforts and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment
so that the rest of the post-conflict reconstruction work can be carried out without fear of
disruption. Although the peacekeeping mission may be involved in, for example, security sector
reform (SSR), it is common for the actual training, transformation, or establishment of a new
police and/or defence force to be supported by one or more bilateral partners. The SSR role of
the UK in Sierra Leone or the defence sector reform efforts of the US in support of internationally
mandated SSR in Liberia are some examples.
• Peacebuilding Coordination: The long-term focus of most missions is on peacebuilding,

involving a wide range of players. The first of these is the UNCT, headed by a Resident Coordinator
(RC). Where there is a peacekeeping mission deployed, it is now common practice that one
of the Deputy SRSGs will be from the humanitarian or development community and has the
RC/HC function. The members of the UNCT typically include the UNDP, World Bank, UN High
138
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Women, the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and others. All of these agencies, funds, and offices have their
own mandates, budgets, and programmes.
Other members of the humanitarian relief and reconstruction community include: international and
local NGOs, international multilateral donor agencies like the EU, and bilateral donor agencies and
independent organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although these
various relief and reconstruction agencies are often viewed as highly independent because they lack
a formal organizational hierarchy, they actually form a closely connected network linked by various
value chains. For instance, many NGOs operate as implementing agents for UN agencies, while the
donors may fund both the UN agencies and the NGOs at various levels in the value chain. An improved
understanding of these relationships may reveal opportunities for enhanced coordination.
Despite the small number of donor countries, their important roles in the political and security
sectors, and the potential for positive impact through coordination, there is a well-documented
discrepancy between their willingness to coordinate and their actual practices.
• Coordination with the Internal Actors: Internal actors include the host nation or local
government, recognized parties to the conflict, and the private sector and civil society in all its
shapes and sizes. In principle, the host government and community must play the lead role in
the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately,
in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict
that they are unable to fulfil this role. As a result, international aid groups by default play more
of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. However, the principle must be upheld and
efforts must be made to ensure that the internal actors lead, guide, and inform all actions that
will affect them and their future. At a minimum, coordination processes should ensure that
the internal actors participate in all decisions that affect them, and that a process exists to
support the further development of their capacities so they can assume a leading role as soon
as possible. This adds a capacity-building dimension to coordination, as the success of the peace
operation depends on internal actors taking ownership of the process. If they do not initially
have the capacity to set priorities and generate policies on their own recovery and development,
as well as to absorb external assistance (often called “absorptive capacity”), external actors
must help develop that capacity as a prerequisite for further success. This invokes the concept
of localizing discussed in Lesson 4.
The Integrated Strategic Framework
Among the prerequisites for a coherent peace operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy
against which individual units, offices, and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress.
The overall country strategy is produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the units,
offices, and programmes in the system, in consultation with internal actors. The peace and security
aspects of such an overall strategy are derived from UN Security Council resolutions determining the
mandate of the mission and the strategic plans developed by the SRSG to implement that mandate.
139
Chinese engineers with the United Nations

Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) build a road near
Zwedru, Liberia. Local Liberians assisted the
engineers to finish the project. 8 July 2010. UN
Photo #458099 by Staton Winter.
Humanitarian and development strategies are derived from common assessment and appeal processes
that may result in, for example, a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), a Common Country
Assessment (CCA), a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), or a Poverty Reduction Strategy
(PRS).
In 2013, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon endorsed the Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning,
which reaffirms the commitment of the UN to integration as a way of maximizing the individual and
collective impact of the United Nations in conflict and post-conflict situations. The Policy, and the resulting
Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, explains the architecture of strategic frameworks from
the UNHQ level down to the mission level. While civil-military coordinators are encouraged to become
familiar with the Handbook’s various frameworks in general, the most significant of them at the mission
level is the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).
Based on mandates, integrated assessments, the Mission Concept (based on the Security Council
Resolution authorizing and outlining the mission), and other inputs, guidance, and consultation from
the political, security, and peacebuilding aspects of mission coordination discussed above, the ISF is the
result of an inclusive analytical and planning process for the consolidation of the mission. The Mission
Concept and the ISF are the foundational documents for operational and resource planning by mission
components, as they provide a strategic outlook for the entire mission structure. Regardless of its final
form, The ISF (according to the Policy) must include:
• The main findings from integrated assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace
consolidation, the UN role, and comparative advantages;
• A clear definition and expression of peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for
national capacity development and institution-building;
• An articulation of all programmatic functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated

approach, with agreed form and depth of integration;
• Agreed results, timelines, responsibilities, and other relevant implementation arrangements,

including coordination mechanisms; and
• A common monitoring and reporting framework, including indicators or benchmarks of progress.
140
Other UN planning frameworks (such as the UNDAF) may serve as the ISF if their content meets
these standards. The decision to use such frameworks as the ISF or have a separate document is made
by the SRSG, Deputy SRSGs, RC, and HC in consultation with other senior managers and Headquarters.
It is also made on the basis of a gap analysis of existing planning processes and products, as well as
the decision to develop an Integrated Strategic Framework jointly with national authorities. The same
goes for the title of the ISF, timing for development, timeframe, structure, content, and ownership of
its process and product. The opportunity for combining planning frameworks and harmonizing planning
processes should be regularly assessed, with due consideration for respective programming and
budgetary cycles.
Once developed and endorsed, the ISF document serves as a regular reference for an ongoing
field-based process of joint analysis and review of the mission-wide strategies and arrangements for
peace consolidation. As such, its nature and content may shift over time and may combine elements of
strategic, programmatic, communication, and operational integration. It should also include measures
to mitigate risks to all UN actors and activities, including to humanitarian operations.
No matter the content of the ISF, UN-CIMIC officers — especially at the operational (Force HQ)
level — must conscientiously and closely follow this framework and its standards, as well as the
benchmarks agreed to by the host government, the UN mission, and the UNCT. This must be done in
order to facilitate civil-military transition management and civilianize and localize, as well as to provide
appropriate civil-military guidance for similar efforts at the tactical (contingent or sector command)
level. At UNMIL, for example, the motto for this adaptation process became: “Their game plan is our
game plan.”
Mobilizing Resources
The international community has developed various tools to mobilize resources. UN OCHA
coordinates the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). First and foremost, the CAP is a strategic planning
and coordination tool. The humanitarian community sees the CAP as the main strategy-setting tool in
responding to man-made and other slow onset disasters. In the development dimension, UNDP or the
World Bank will typically take the lead to coordinate fundraising for common priorities through donor
conferences. In some cases, transitional appeals are launched on the basis of a CCA, and then serve
as the foundation for a UNDAF and/or a PRS, as appropriate. Once the funds have been allocated, the
coordination shifts to implementation and operational coordination, of which UN-CIMIC is one part.
In the case of UN peace operations, the missions are funded through assessed contributions. Part of
the work of a UN-CIMIC officer will be to understand how these different funding mechanisms work, as
well as which mechanisms within and outside the mission budget can be accessed to facilitate specific
projects, e.g. Quick Impact Projects.5
Operational Harmonization
The humanitarian and development communities have developed various coordination frameworks
that they use in all situations where they are operational, regardless of whether or not they operate
alongside a peace operation. In any given situation, the UNCT and other humanitarian and development
5) See Lesson 8.
141
role players would have been engaged before and during the conflict period. It is important for those
who deploy after the signing of a peace agreement to develop an understanding of existing UNCT and
humanitarian coordination mechanisms so that they can harmonize their own coordination efforts with
those of the UNCT and RC/HC.
At the operational (or mission HQ) level, one would typically find that coordination takes place
within clusters and sectors such as health, water and sanitation, shelter, refugees and IDPs, DDR/
SSR, rule of law, and so on. There have also been initiatives to create synergy across clusters, such as
UNHCR’s “4Rs” concept — repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconstruction. The concept
aims to ensure linkages among all four processes to enable sustainable solutions for populations.
Civilian, police, and military actors have developed several coordination mechanisms over the
years. NATO forces in particular have employed Civil-Military Operation Centres (CMOCs), CIMIC
Centres, CIMIC houses, etc. The humanitarian inter-agency approach to coordination typically employs
Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centres (HuMOCCs). Normally, OCHA facilitates humanitarian
coordination arrangements. The UN Joint Logistical Centre (UNJLC), of which WFP is the custodian,
would coordinate logistical aspects of a humanitarian mission. For the development dimension, UNDP —
in support of the RC — provides a Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) or at least a
development coordination officer.
The key here for UN-CIMIC officers is to refrain from creating such structures redundantly and
instead to fall in on those established by the civilian and police components of the mission and the
UNCT, preserving military resources for more important tasks.
The various coordination mechanisms at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels all aim
to encourage the flow of information — and enhance coordination — among different components,
dimensions, sectors, and disparate actors in various networks. Coordination mechanisms also serve as
platforms for joint planning and operational synchronization. On a more practical level, coordination
facilities help pool and share precious resources and centralize key areas of common services. For
example, the UNJLC is one such common service point through which all the different aid agencies can
manage the clearance of their goods through customs.
Working Groups and the Mission Leadership Team
The mission and the UNCT may also decide to develop and/or monitor implementation of joint
strategies through thematic working groups. These may vary among missions, but the most consistently
used include the Strategic Policy Group, the Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, and the Senior
Management Group, which includes representatives from all major components — civilian, police, and
military. Most of these groups fall under the direction of the Mission Leadership Team, which generally
includes: the SRSG/Head of Mission, Deputy SRSGs, head of the police component, head of the military
component, Director/Chief of Mission Support, and the mission Chief of Staff. The MLT’s key tasks
include providing political guidance and high-level operational direction to mission components and
approving high-level policy approaches for issues with mission-wide effect.
Monitoring and Evaluation
The country strategy or ISF should be supported by a monitoring and evaluation system. Such an
inter-agency initiative should not only provide feedback on individual and overall progress, but also
encourage programmes and agencies to participate in the overall coordination process. All actors should
142
A staff member from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) discusses humanitarian
needs with workers from a Libyan non-governmental organization (NGO) in Sallum, on the Libyan-Egyptian
border, where thousands fled after unrest erupted in Libya in 2011. 12 March 2011. UN Photo #466527 by
David Ohana.
be requested to report on the steps they took to synchronize their plans and operations with the others
in the system, as well as with the overall objectives of the mission. In this way, the evaluation process
becomes normative: it encourages and rewards behaviour that enables coherence, and discourages and
sanctions behaviour that inhibits coordination.
Another important element is the ability of the system to monitor the effect on its environment.
The project cycles of different programmes and agencies need to be synchronized to ensure that their
combined and cumulative effect on the host society is positive. Projects must be consistent and delivered
at a rate that can be absorbed by the local communities. When the ultimate aim of the operation is
sustainable peace, then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation have to reflect the
optimal relationship between delivery and absorption.
As with assessments and reports on the progress of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, UN-CIMIC
officers in particular should avoid duplicity during monitoring and evaluation. Again, the idea of “their
game plan is our game plan” helps to both civilianize and localize the effort. If UN-CIMIC monitors
and evaluates anything, it should be the civil-military transition process in terms of civilianizing and
localizing efforts — the two major thrusts of civil-military coordination.
Section 5.3 UN Mission Civil-Military Coordination Structures

The UN mission integration concept is well explained in the Principles and Guidelines. Both Principles
and Guidelines and experience in the field underscore that the main challenge to the effectiveness of
any UN complex peace operation is mission coordination. Successful recovery from conflict requires the
engagement of a broad range of actors — including the national authorities and the local population —
143
in a long-term, sustainable peacebuilding effort. The main rationale for the integration of UN mission
activities is to better assist countries to transition from conflict to sustainable peace. (The other, as
explained in Lesson 1, is the scarcity of funds and troops.)
A multidimensional UN peace operation is far more effective when deployed as part of a UN system-
wide response based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities. An integrated mission has a
shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of the UN presence at the country-level.
This strategy should reflect a shared understanding of the operating environment and agreement on
how to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the overall response.
THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CHAIN
Collect
Process
Analyse
Disseminate
Includes store
and retrieve
It is the UN Security Council Resolution(s) that establishes, extends, and modifies the mission
mandate. Civil-military operators should familiarize themselves with their mission’s mandate in order to
“think globally and act locally” (or think strategically and act tactically).
Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the UN engagement
in countries emerging from conflict. The UN has the unique ability to employ a mix of civilian, police, and
military capabilities under a unified leadership to support a fragile peace process. At the same time, its
peacekeeping operations are almost always deployed alongside a variety of external actors with widely
differing mandates, agendas, and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus
further compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the UN and
the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings. UN-
CIMIC plays an important role in supporting this overall coordination effort.
In essence, an integrated mission is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional UN peace

operation and the UNCT under the leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG RC/HC. According to the 2005
Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, the SRSG is the senior UN representative in the host country
with “overall authority over all the activities of the United Nations” and is responsible for “ensuring that
all the United Nations components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach”. The
DSRSG RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of both humanitarian operations and UN development
operations, and for maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader
humanitarian and development communities for this purpose.
Ultimately, successful integration and coordination requires sensitivity to the interests and operating
cultures of three broad sets of actors: the UN mission components, UNCT members, and partners outside
144
the mission or UNCT (such as CSOs, NGOs, and local governments). Within the mission structure, the
various components — civilian, police, military, and support — come under the direct authority of the SRSG
and the Mission Leadership Team, or MLT. In large integrated missions, the MLT is normally supported by
a mission Chief of Staff, who is responsible for mission-wide planning and coordinating the work of several
mission coordination structures designed to facilitate integration between mission components:
• Joint Operations Centre (JOC): Collects situation reports and operational information from all
mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. Also acts as a crisis
coordination hub;
• Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC): Provides integrated analysis of all sources of information
to assess medium- and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MLT decision-making;
• Integrated Support Service (ISS): Harnesses all logistical resources of the mission; and
• Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC): Coordinates the provision of logistical support, in
accordance with MLT priorities.
JMACs and JOCs support the spectrum of situational awareness, understanding, and forecasting.
Whereas the JOC focuses on day-to-day situational awareness, the JMAC generates integrated analysis
and predictive assessments. The work of JMACs also supports strategic, operational, and contingency
planning, and contributes to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat
assessments and other analytical products and services.
With respect to UN Police (UNPOL), there are two coordination mechanisms tangential to these
mission coordination structures. One is the Police Operations Centre, which is the hub for all information
related to UNPOL activities. The other, is the Criminal Intelligence Unit, which is a service provider to
all parts of the police component and JMAC. The CIU gathers, analyses, prioritizes, classifies, files, and
disseminates criminal intelligence.
Although the components of a UN mission have the same mandate, share a single budget, and
depend on the same integrated support services, there are significant cultural differences, both national
and professional, within and between them. Many civilian organizations and government departments
routinely function with a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity and highly flexible management models.
At the same time, military staff tend to seek to minimize ambiguity by making informed assumptions
within a strong planning culture. Mission leaders and staff must seek to reconcile these differing
“institutional cultures” while being careful not to stifle the cultural diversity that constitutes one of the
mission’s main strengths.
Section 5.4 Integrated Assessment and Planning

Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) processes are intended to maximize the individual and
collective impact of the context-specific peace consolidation activities of the UN system. While there are
important systemic constraints to integration within the UN, it is crucial that political, peacekeeping,
humanitarian, human rights, and development entities at minimum share a common analysis and agree
on a set of common strategic objectives for peace consolidation as a starting point for planning and
implementing their responses in conflict and post-conflict settings. IAP is essential to:
• Improve the quality of the situational analysis;
145
• Design interventions that are tailored to the requirements of each situation;
• Support the effective management of integrated presences in line with mandates and the
strategic vision of senior UN leadership;
• Avoid gaps and overlaps between different UN activities;
• Identify opportunities for closer cooperation across different parts of the UN; and
• Make the UN a more coherent and consistent partner with host governments and other national,
regional, and international partners.
The other thing the IAP reflects is a shared understanding of the causes and drivers of the conflict
and instability, which is not only critical to consolidation planning and peacebuilding, but to civil-
military coordination planning as well. Developing a shared understanding of the causes, dynamics, and
consequences of a given conflict provides an important basis for determining the appropriate content
and form of UN mission support. As such, the conflict analysis constitutes the starting point and the
foundation for integrated assessment and planning. There are a number of conflict analysis methodologies
that have been developed by various actors, including UN agencies, funds and programmes, donors,
NGOs, think tanks, and academic centres. The conflict analysis toolbox may include the Power Analysis,
the Country at Risk of Instability approach, the Strategic Conflict Assessment, the Stability Assessment
Framework, the Country Analysis Framework, etc. In addition, civil-military coordinators should consider
or be familiar with the peacebuilding approach to analysis, mapping, planning, and implementation in
the UN Human Security Handbook.
It is important to note here that one of the most important services UNPOL provides any UN mission
is criminal intelligence, which gives the mission a greater understanding of internal and illicit drivers of
conflict and instability and the threats to security and the mission they may generate. In this matter,
UNPOL’s main coordinating conduit is the civilian-run JMAC and main partner mission Department of
Security and Safety (DSS) personnel. UN DSS personnel, in turn, are an important partner in civil-
military liaison with regard to identifying and mitigating threats to the safety and security of mission
and associated personnel through information-sharing. Likewise, DSS is an important liaison partner for
UN-CIMIC, Civil Affairs, and others involved in integrated assessment.6
The role that civil-military coordination plays within the context of mission assessment and analysis,
as well as the relationship between civil-military information and intelligence as a function of civil-
military liaison and information-sharing is discussed in Lesson 6.
The Integrated Mission Planning Process
In order to achieve the desired level of unity of purpose or synergy, it is now becoming common
practice to enrich planning through integrated planning mechanisms and joint assessment missions.
In the UN Secretariat, for example, planning for peace operations now starts with an Integrated
Mission Planning Process (IMPP) system that brings various UN departments and agencies together to
provide input into the planning process. This is explained in the Principles and Guidelines of 2008. Joint
assessment missions that assist in ensuring a common understanding of problems to be addressed are
also conducted with regularity.
6) For more on UN DSS, go to the UN DSS home page at: <http://www.un.org/undss/>.
146
Officers of the Haitian National Police

give a crowd control demonstration to
visiting Members of the Security Council,
including the United States’ Susan Rice
(front row, left), and Agshin Mehdiyev
(next to Ms. Rice) of Azerbaijan, in
Miragoâne. 14 February 2012. UN Photo
#504837 by Victoria Hazou.
UN-CIMIC officers must be particularly knowledgeable of plans and assessments with respect to various
aspects of the conflict management or peacekeeping and peacebuilding concerns or objectives. The purpose
of UN-CIMIC assessments and reports is not to duplicate such assessments and further crowd the information
space; rather, the purpose of such civil-military information management should be to promote civil-military
coordination in terms of the UN-CIMIC mission in particular and mission coordination in general.
At the field headquarters or mission management level, the SRSG and other senior managers
coordinate with government leaders, parties to the peace process, heads of the various agencies,
organizations, and diplomatic missions. They use various regular and ad hoc meetings to achieve
their coordination objectives. The senior managers also make use of a number of strategic planning
instruments to encourage a broadly cohesive approach within the peace, security, humanitarian, and
development communities — and to ensure that this approach supports the needs and priorities of the
host community. Apart from the common strategic assessment and planning frameworks introduced
above, missions also use various other mechanisms to exchange information among components at the
HQ level. The JMAC is one example. The JMAC is a jointly staffed unit where the information gathered
by desk officers representing the various components (military units, military observers, UNPOL,
Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Human Rights, DSS, etc.) is collected and analysed. In this way, mission
management benefits from one consolidated information and assessment picture about the mission and
the peace process that is informed by all the different perspectives within the mission.
Planning and implementation of civil-military coordination activities in every mission shall seek to
synergize and maximize the comparative strengths inherent in military, police, and civilian components
in order to minimize duplication of efforts and enable the efficient and effective use of resources. At
appropriate stages of mission planning, including assessment missions and mandate review processes,
requirements for the military component to support humanitarian and development plans must be
identified. Ideally this should occur as early as possible in the IMPP.
According to the IMPP guidelines, the military components are required to contribute to analysis (hot
spots analysis, conflict drivers/triggers, etc.) through their planning staff to overall mission and UNCT
efforts to develop an ISF for peace consolidation between the mission and the UNCT. Such plans may
require the UN-CIMIC officers to support civilian plans toward common peace consolidation aims. Based
147
on military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the UN-CIMIC plan includes planning of CIMIC activities,
such as Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs), operational plans, specific events, and projects on specific issues.7
Section 5.5 UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities

In all current peace operations, the UN-CIMIC function is normally nested within the HQ command
and control structure. In UN missions, the UN-CIMIC branch consists of staff officers at the Force HQ
and the sector/unit HQ level. According to the UN-CIMIC Policy, in addition to its normal military staff
functions of informing, assessing, advising, planning, and coordinating, the UN-CIMIC staff structure
provides the primary portal to the military component for humanitarian and development actors, as
well as the local civilian population. The UN-CIMIC structure can also provide a key link to the civilian
components of an integrated mission and other civilian partners for other military staff. It augments,
but does not replace, appropriate established civil-military interaction structures, for example as part of
the intelligence, plans, current operations, and logistics functions.
Operational Level UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities
At the Mission/Force HQ level, the Chief UN-CIMIC Officer (J9 or U9) at the Force HQ is the primary
staff officer and staff proponent for UN-CIMIC throughout the mission in general and at the operational
level in particular. The Chief UN-CIMIC Officer or J9/U9 normally reports to the military Chief of Staff,
along with his or her staff counterparts. He or she additionally represents the peacekeeping force to key
mission civilian staff under the SRSG/DSRSG structure for the planning and coordination of delivery of
humanitarian assistance, rule of law, governance, and development, to include UN-CMCoord officers,
Civil Affairs, UNPOL, and other UNCT and external actor representatives at the Mission HQ level. This
includes participation of the Chief UN-CIMIC Officer in joint planning and coordination frameworks and
processes, as well as QIP review boards. The Chief UN-CIMIC Officer or J9/U9 may also develop and
update a mission-specific Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), operational UN-CIMIC annex, or UN-
CIMIC directive,8 which should normally cover:
• Mission UN-CIMIC Structure (Organization);
• Terms of Reference of UN-CIMIC staff;
• Liaison Functions and Matrix;
• Civil-Military Information Management;
• Support to Humanitarian Operations;
• Support to the Community;
• UN-CIMIC Project Management;
• UN-CIMIC and Public Information;
• Training and Education; and
• Briefings and Assessments.
7) Good examples of the products of UN-CIMIC planning include the sample UN-CIMIC directive from UNMIL at Appendix F, as well as the sample UN-
CIMIC operations briefing at Appendix G.
8) See Appendix F.
148
Peacekeepers from the United Nations

Military Observer Group in India and
Pakistan (UNMOGIP), are pictured
here going over their plans for the
day in observing the Line of Control
that separates the two countries, near
Bhimbar UN Field Station, Pakistan. 20
October 2006. UN Photo #99346 by Evan
Schneider.
In addition to the Chief UN-CIMIC Officer or J9, the J9 UN-CIMIC section at Force HQ normally
consists of a Deputy J9/U9, UN-CIMIC Plans Officer, UN-CIMIC Operations Officer, and UN-CIMIC
Sergeant with information management and administrative duties.9
The Police Commissioner or FPU commander may designate an officer with UN-CIMIC responsibilities
or assign an existing staff officer UN-CIMIC liaison responsibilities as an additional duty. In either case,
the officer’s responsibilities may be similar to that of UN-CIMIC counterparts (i.e., the Chief of UN-
CIMIC as counterpart at the UNPOL HQ level and a sector or battalion UN-CIMIC officer at the FPU
command level). As a minimum, these officers should coordinate related activities with military UN-
CIMIC counterparts (and vice versa).
In addition to the performance of operational-level staff functions, the Force HQ UN-CIMIC or

J9/U9 section exists to structure and promote the success of UN-CIMIC at the tactical level, where
most UN-CIMIC activities of consequence are taking place and most UN-CIMC projects are executed.
This includes: the provision of operational guidance, clarification, and information; mission leadership
decisions and approval of projects, as appropriate; and the identification of operational-level resources
to support tactical UN-CIMIC, including funding and approval of proposed QIPs, for example.10
A common issue with operational-tactical coordination, in particular, is the provision of information

on the larger operational UN-CIMIC situation and activities, as well as the situation and activities of
adjacent sectors and units. This can include the failure of operational UN-CIMIC command and control
structures to disseminate assessments and other information downward, while demanding tactical level
staff to supply reports, assessments, etc., to feed operational level situational understanding. “Common
operational picture” needs to work both vertically, through the chain of command, as well as horizontally,
across the components and external and internal partners.
9) Sample terms of reference are at Appendix E.

10) Procedures for coordination and approval of UN-CIMIC projects are discussed in Lesson 8.
149
It also needs to be understood that the Chief UN-CIMIC Officer or J9/U9 has no tasking authority
over any other military staff or subordinate staff or units. This usually comes through the Chief of
Operations (J3/U3) or Command Group (Force Commander, Deputy Force Commander, or Chief of
Staff). This may be understood by most military officers of experience; however, it is less likely to be
understood by officers of less experience, civilians, and many police.
Finally, the assumption in any mission should be that officers appointed to UN-CIMIC positions will
likely have little to no civil-military background or training. Therefore, another important function of
the Chief UN-CIMIC Officer or J9/U9 staff is to train and educate both civilian and military staff at the
operational and tactical levels on UN-CIMIC.11
Tactical Level UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities
Tactical-level UN-CIMIC is at the level of execution more than overall planning and direction.
Nonetheless, the UN-CIMIC mission, responsibilities, and authorities are for the most part duplicative
of those found at the operational level — particularly with regard to the staff function and UN-CIMIC
functions of civil-military liaison and information sharing and civil assistance. The tactical-level UN-
CIMIC staff structure is tailored to the needs and preferences of the sector or unit commander, the
situation, and the availability of personnel.
Nevertheless, the UN-CIMIC function exists all the way down to the lowest level of command. Although
the UN-CIMIC plans, operations, and information management functions may not be represented by
specific staff, those requirements and functions nonetheless exist — as does UN-CIMIC in general —
and must be assigned to someone on the staff. Many battalion-level units – including infantry or other
manoeuvre formations and force support units, including engineer, transport, and medical units, air
detachments, etc. — do not deploy with a pre-identified civil-military coordination officer.
However, that does not mean that a commander’s UN-CIMIC mission does not exist. Oftentimes,
officers are delegated the UN-CIMIC mission inherent to force support units. This is where the Chief
UN-CIMIC Officer or J9/U9 has an obligation to provide training to such officers, formally or informally.
On rare occasions, and usually when the mission is large, UN-CIMIC teams may deploy to provide
focused and intensive support to a project or area of concern, operating much like UN military observer
(UNMO) teams. These teams may originate from an operational or tactical HQ element or from a UN-
CIMIC unit deployed to provide such support, and may be placed under the command and control of either
the operational or tactical command and control structure, as determined to be appropriate by the Force
Commander.
Finally, per the UN-CIMIC Policy:
“Where national contingents appoint personnel as the primary

focal point for civilian actors, these personnel will also be
considered part of the UN-CIMIC structure for coordination and
information sharing purposes.”
To gain a greater understanding of the relative terms of reference for UN-CIMIC officers, as well
as their civilian CMCoord and Civil Affairs counterparts, see the “Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer
Terms of Reference: UN-CMCoord; UN Civil Affairs; and UN-CIMIC”.
11) Sample terms of reference for operations-level UN-CIMIC officers are available at Appendix E.
150
Conclusion
• What coordination is in a peace operations and integrated UN mission context, how that differs
from command and control, and how civil-military coordination supports that;
• UN peace operations mission assessment, planning, and coordination policies, frameworks and
mechanisms and how they relate to civil-military coordination;
• The relationship between civil-military information and intelligence;
• How UN-CIMIC contributes to overall mission coordination; and
• Operational and tactical level UN-CIMIC command and control structures and capabilities, and
the relationship between the operational and tactical levels of UN-CIMIC.
151
• Introduction to the UN System, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: United Nations Protocol; Introduction to the United
Nations System; Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis; and Fundamentals of Risk Management/
Advanced Risk Management. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.

Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches, in particular Chapter 7.
• Civil Society-Military-Police Handbook and Curriculum on Human Security (December 2015), a

modular training handbook done by the Civil Society Consortium. For this Lesson, see especially
Modules 1, 3, and 4 of the Handbook. See also Local Ownership in Security – Case Studies of
Peacebuilding Approaches (December 2015), in particular Chapter 7.

Further References
• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, United Nations (18 January 2008).
missions>.

152

withdrawal>.

• Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, DPKO/DFS (December 2013), available at:
<https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2014-IAP-HandBook.pdf>.
• Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) (2006).
• IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field (2009) and
Role of Headquarters (2010).

Operations and Special Political Missions, 1 January 2016.
153
1. True or false? Although UN-CIMIC is 5. Coordination in peace operations can

chiefly an aspect of an overall integrated occur in various ways, including:
mission under the direction of civilians,
A. Political, security, peacebuilding, and with
command and control of UN-CIMIC
internal actors
exists within the UN peacekeeping
military force structure. B. Local, medical, police, and media
C. Health, shelter, water, and sanitation
2. Which of the following is NOT an D. Medical, sanitation, international, and
element of a mission Integrated internal actors
Strategic Framework, regardless of its
final form? 6. Civil-military coordinators should:
A. Integrated assessments of the conflict and A. Advise the heads of partner agencies and
challenges to peace consolidation, UN role, organizations of the support their entity
and comparative advantages can provide to the overall peace operations
B. An inclusive analytical and planning process effort, including the limitations and risk
for the consolidation of the mission implications linked to such support
C. Peace consolidation priorities for the UN, B. Participate in or support the Integrated
including for national capacity development Mission Planning Process
and institution-building C. Understand the mandate, structure, and
D. Programmatic, functions, and/or operational operating principles of their partners
areas requiring an integrated approach, with D. All of the above
agreed form and depth of integration
7. The main factor that inhibits
3. True or false? At lower command levels, coordination in a multi-agency
because of the shortage of officers to environment is:
be appointed UN-CIMIC duties, the UN-
A. Conflicting mandates and roles
CIMIC mission is not a requirement.
B. Abundant resources
4. What is one role played by civil-military C. Violent conflict

assessments and reports? D. Unclear Security Council Resolutions
A. Update the media on positive developments
8. Which of the following is NOT an
in the mission
element of coordination?
B. Enhance mission security
A. Planning
C. Help prepare UN-CIMIC officers to plan,
B. Assessment
coordinate, and implement UN-CIMIC
C. Mobilizing resources
projects that are fully supportive of common
concerns D. Public information
D. Enable the use of military assets for civil

assistance
154
9. Which of the following is NOT a 10. True or false? Next to advising the
coordination mechanism in a UN commander, helping to manage
integrated mission? expectations may ultimately be the
single most important contribution a UN-
A. Joint Operations Centre
CIMIC officer makes.
B. Humanitarian Operations Coordination
Centre
C. Joint Mission Analysis Centre
D. Joint Logistics Operations Centre
Answer Key »
1. True
2. B
3. False
4. C
5. A
6. D
7. A
8. D
9. B
10. True
155
LESSON
Civil-Military Liaison and
6 Information Sharing
Liaison and information-

sharing is at the heart of
civil-military coordination.
UN Photo #115051 by Yutaka Nagata.
Section 6.1 What is Civil-Military Liaison? • Understand the primary civil-military function
of liaison and information sharing and how to
Section 6.2 Civil-Military Assessment and
achieve effective liaison.
Intelligence
• Know how to frame civil-military assessments
Section 6.3 Civil-Military Information
and the difference between civil-military
Sharing and Information
information and intelligence.
Management
• Understand the importance of information
sharing to civil-military coordination.
156
LESSON 6 | Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing
Members of the Brazilian battalion of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), rescue stranded Haitians from their
homes, flooded by heavy rains from tropical storm ‘Noel’ that left thousands homeless in Cité Soleil, Haiti. 30 October 2007. UN Photo
#159932 by Marco Dormino.
Introduction
Liaison and information-sharing is at the heart

of civil-military coordination. It lies at the core of all
operational civil-military activities and is the primary
way to facilitate civilianizing as discussed in Lesson
4. Civil-military liaison in peace operations is rather
different than most other liaison. Although it remains
essentially a matter of information exchange, it has a
higher management-related content. That is because
the goal of civil-military liaison in peace operations
goes beyond information sharing, in an application of
civil-military principles, of empowering and enabling
external actors in particular in order to civilianize (and,
to some extent, localize) the assistance effort and help
transition mission focus to peacebuilding.
157
Liaison forms the basis to support external actors and is the main function of civil-military
coordinators. This lesson will discuss what liaison is, in general, and what civil-military liaison is, in
particular, along with the ways and means by which civil-military operators conduct liaison, including
civilian, police, and military liaison structures, information vehicles, and meetings and other forums. It
also discusses how civil-military operators frame information for assessments, but not necessarily for
intelligence.
Moreover, as part of “thinking globally and acting locally”, civil-military operators must learn how to
approach all of these ways and means comprehensively and coherently to achieve the UN-CIMIC aims,
as well as enhance overall mission coordination.
Section 6.1 What is Civil-Military Liaison?
Civil-Military Liaison Goes Beyond Information Exchange to Management Support
Liaison occurs when a channel of communication is established between two or more elements, with
the purpose of exchanging information. In the context of peace operations, the aim is to coordinate the
respective initiatives, campaigns, and programmes of various mission components, as well as those of
the mission and other agencies and organizations.
For most organizations and activities, therefore, liaison overwhelmingly serves a coordination and
information-sharing function, helping to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the operation.
UN-CIMIC is a mission coordination tool, meaning it also predominantly serves this general purpose.
It is worth recalling, however, that civil-military coordination in peace operations, according to

the UN-CIMIC Policy, is undertaken “first, to manage the operational and tactical interaction between
military and civilian actors in all phases of [a] peacekeeping operation”, along with civil assistance.
Civil-military coordination is essentially a management support activity. The aim and purpose of civil-
military liaison is to provide coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of
activities and operations of all agencies in the mission.
Liaison and information sharing in UN-CIMIC therefore goes beyond standard coordination to a
purposeful management of the interaction between civilian and military components and actors —
purposeful, because the aim of this interaction, beyond improving “common operational picture”, is to
enhance and enable the ability of civilian and police partners, especially, to more rapidly and effectively
transition the peace process.
This transition management and transformational aspect of liaison and information sharing in civil-
military coordination is the qualitative difference between civil-military and other liaison officers —
strategic more than tactical in purpose as well as application, and more active than passive in practice.
Additionally, the UN-CIMIC Policy provides guidance on how UN-CIMIC officers should perform the
civil-military liaison function:
• They should act as the first point of entry to the military component of the mission for civilian
and police partners, if no relation has been established previously;
158
• They should have knowledge and training on key principles in interacting with civilian and police
partners, especially with the humanitarian actors (for example, UN-CMCoord), and inform their
military components of benefits and sensitivities when working with these partners; and
• UN-CIMIC interaction with the civilian and police partners should be based on an agreed
appropriate framework/process that would ensure the transparent flow of information, taking
into consideration the confidentiality and care in handling sensitive information.
Civil-military interaction among civilian, police and military partners should be based on an agreed
appropriate framework or process that would ensure the transparent flow of information, taking
into consideration the confidentiality and care in handling sensitive information. In most cases, this
collaboration will take place through integrated field coordination structures and will be formalized in
the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) discussed in Lesson 5. These include, at the mission level
the JOC, JMAC, and JLOC. The IMPP Guidelines for the Field also note the field coordination structures
required for military components to be actively engaged with. At the local level, civil-military liaison
and information sharing is through various components under the leadership of the Head of the Field
Office. UN-CIMIC officers at the local level can be a very useful mission multiplier in this regard. Civil
Affairs Officers are especially mandated to ensure consistency of mission effort at the local level, and
as such, can provide advice to UN-CIMIC officers on the overall strategic, political, and social context
of mandate implementation, as well as key messages to focus on in dealing with local interlocutors and
key information gathering needs.
Although every civil-military officer is, in essence, a liaison officer, there may be occasions (depending
on the size, complexity, and intensity of need for civil-military coordination) when a designated Civil-
Military Liaison Officer is posted at a civil-military coordination centre or at a specified civilian agency
office as a military or police representative.
Liaison as a Shared Responsibility
Every programme, office, or unit is responsible for liaison. All programmes, offices, or units must
ensure that their plans and activities are coordinated with others operating in the same environment,
with the objective of enhancing the overall strategic direction of the mission. The major challenge
of integrated missions (and the reason they are integrated in the first place) is effective mission
coordination. This is why liaison and information sharing — especially along civil-military lines — is a
shared responsibility.
Civil-military officers at mission, regional, and local levels represent the mission’s dedicated effort
to ensure that there is a meaningful exchange of knowledge and information between the civilian,
police, and military components at all levels, as well as between external and internal actors. As the
dedicated capability within an integrated mission for civil-military liaison, UN-CIMIC officers are primarily
responsible for civil-military liaison and coordination — in coordination with other dedicated liaison
officers representing their respective organizations.
159
Ways and Means of Civil-Military Liaison
Knowledge is the wealth of civil-military coordination, whereas information is its currency of

exchange. Liaison occurs when knowledge and information are shared and synergized. Liaison is most
effective between components that are directly interdependent. In many cases, however, the relationship
may be more indirect, especially when dealing with persons working in development. Therefore, most
coordination takes place within sectors or clusters — for example, those working in the water and
sanitation area, or those involved in organizing or supporting an election.
UN-CIMIC Liaison Officers »

A UN-CIMIC Liaison Officer (LO) is a military officer that is located with a specific civilian agency
to establish a communication and coordination channel between the peacekeeping force and the
agency.
A UN-CIMIC LO should:
»» Understand the mandate, structure, and operating

principles of the peacekeeping force and the civilian
agency where they are placed;
»» Know the relevant policies, principles, and guidelines that

will govern the civilian-military relationship between the
force and the civilian agency or police;
»» Create and maintain a professional and transparent

relationship with the civilian agency or police;
»» Participate in the planning process of both the civilian

agency or police (as appropriate) and the peacekeeping
force;
»» Advise the head of the civilian agency or police of the

support the peacekeeping force can provide, including the
limitations and implications linked to such support; and
»» Advise the commander on the needs of the civilian agency

or police and the appropriateness (on the basis of the
relevant guideline) of the support requested by the civilian
agency.
160
Liaison can be achieved through verbal communication or the exchange of written information.
Verbal communication, the most basic form, occurs through face-to-face meetings or via telephone,
radio, or video communication. Face-to-face meetings can be informal or formal, and they can occur
on a one-to-one or group (meeting) basis. There are numerous ways and means by which UN-CIMIC
officers conduct liaison and information sharing. If they are clever, they will skilfully use them all at
various times and situations to achieve desired aims.
Communication
A key requirement for any civil-military operator is effective communication — civil-military

coordination is not a job for introverts. This implies that they should also be fluent in the languages
used in and around the mission. If civil-military operators are going to be working with the local
community, a good working knowledge of local languages is a tremendous asset. It also implies that
they should be good at cross-cultural communication, negotiation, active listening, and other civil-
military communications (as discussed in Lesson 9). There are three modes of communications to
consider here:
• Face-to-face;
• Telephonic, videoconferencing, or some other means of live interactive communication; and
• E-mail, texting, and other, more anonymous forms.
There has been a tendency to rely overwhelmingly on e-mail with the proliferation of the Internet
and the demands on a person’s time, especially in HQ settings. This should only take place after a
personal introduction and a certain degree of relationship building. E-mail should be seen as one among
a number of communications tools. Also, civil-military coordinators should be mindful to refresh more
personal communications (an occasional phone call or short visit to the office) to reinforce or clarify
an e-mail or other written communication in order to ensure accuracy, especially with regard to more
complex or urgent issues, as well as to maintain relationships.
With respect to managing expectations and perceptions in an operations environment that is largely
psychological, civil-military communications can boost mission coordination and interaction beyond the
mission by improving the common operational picture. Communication in a peace operations environment
Coordination Is a Shared Responsibility »

In the UN context, mission coordination is a shared responsibility. No single multidimensional
mission component (political, security, police, humanitarian, development, human rights, etc.)
should be the central point around which the others are coordinated.
Each component should take responsibility for coordination around its own area of responsibility.
For instance, OCHA would typically facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance. Overall
strategic coordination and planning is the responsibility of the Office of the SRSG. The SRSG
will typically make use of a Strategic Policy Group, Integrated Strategy and Planning Team, and
Senior Management Group to achieve this level of mission coordination.
161
is challenging and those involved in it should be professional and mindful in their approach. Civil-military
officers are required to communicate constantly with many different players with different interests.
Every civil-military coordinator needs greater assessment, communications, and negotiation skills than
the average liaison officer. These will finally contribute to achieving a mandate-driven common end
state and unity of effort. The key to successful communication and negotiation in the context of peace
operations is situational awareness and preparation.
Relationships
Civil-military coordination is an exercise in relationship building and leadership by learning a process

of building trust and confidence that goes far to mitigate potential frictions or misunderstandings
and accelerate coordination and joint problem solving. Trust is the most important commodity in
peacebuilding. Civil-military operators need to proactively reach out to their counterparts and develop
constructive relationships so that they can exchange information and learn from each other in an
atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. Whenever engaging in civil-military coordination in general and
civil-military liaison in particular, a good rule of thumb is to “look, listen, and learn”. This implies that
civil-military coordinators should study the mandate
and role of their counterparts so that they develop an
understanding of their place in and contribution to the
overall system. They should also look beyond formal
meetings and forums as well. Sometimes, more
can be done over a cup of coffee than in a formal
meeting. For civil-military officers, the duty switch
should always be “on”. A very effective method of
civil-military team building is to invite civilian or police
contacts to military events — such as medal parades
— and other occasions to extend hospitality and build
social capital. Military Experts on Mission (MEOMs)
as well as UN Police should be especially adept at
relationship-building, and civil-military coordinators
(particularly at the tactical level) should maintain a
good working relationship with them in order to learn
from them, as well as leverage the relationships they
have established.
The ultimate aim of civil-military liaison is not

United Nations and National Police Officers speak to the
only to foster a more comprehensive, coherent, and residents of a camp of internally displaced persons to
coordinated approach to peace operations, but also gather information about the general security issues
in the area. 9 February 2009. UN Photo #323937 by
to create a more effective learning organization —
Martine Perret.
because the winners in conflict management are
those that can learn faster and better than those who
do not.
162
Coordination Centres
Fortunately, integrated UN missions now feature a host of coordination centres, such as JOCs,
JMACs, and JLOCs, as well as humanitarian and development coordination nodes. Civil-military
coordinators should fully understand the mission and functions of these centres, know the key personnel
working there, have access to important reports and other information deliverables (and be prepared to
reciprocate), and attend meetings and other coordination events of civil-military interest.
Meetings, Working Groups, and Other Coordination Events
A great deal of knowledge and information is exchanged at meetings, working group sessions, and
other coordination events. What civil-military coordinators need to keep in mind is that decisions are
shaped at such events. This comes back to the management support aspect of civil-military liaison. As
with anything else, UN-CIMIC officers in particular should refrain from calling duplicative or redundant
meetings (it seems UN civilians are often running from one meeting to another) unless there is an
identified coordination gap that a consensus of parties have identified and which is best chaired by
UN-CIMIC. For example, in earlier stages of the mission or during times of greater danger, UN-CIMIC
officers may host coordination meetings to share security information.
Liaison, coordination, and information sharing are more art than science. Civil-military coordinators
conducting liaison and information sharing should engage persistently and quietly, but engender great
effect, rather like the famous boxer Muhammad Ali, who said: “Float like a butterfly and sting like a
bee.” This is appropriate for UN-CIMIC officers in particular because they should go about their work,
as anyone who leads from behind, by drawing greater attention to those they support rather than to
themselves. Civil-military coordination is also not a job for egoists.
Nevertheless, they can employ various methods to manage their own liaison activities, such as the
matrix that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) CIMIC used (opposite page).
Section 6.2 Civil-Military Assessment and Intelligence
Civil-Military Assessments: Who’s Doing What, Where, When, How, and Why?
In order to best understand how to plan civil-military coordination, UN-CIMIC officers in particular
should refer to the mission assessment and planning frameworks, as well as maintain knowledge of
plans and assessments on various aspects of the conflict or peacekeeping and peacebuilding concerns
or objectives. The purpose of UN-CIMIC assessments and reports, however, is not to duplicate
such assessments and thus further crowd the information space but rather to promote civil-military
coordination, the UN-CIMIC mission, in particular, and mission coordination, in general. If UN-CIMIC is
to support mission coordination and management, then civil-military assessments and reports should
as well. They should either enhance existing information tools or help fill quantity and quality gaps in
information being shared, but avoid redundancies.
Civil-military assessments and reports should perform two important roles:
• First, help promote a coherent, comprehensive, and coordinated understanding of the civil
situation and specific issues of humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and transition
management concern, as well as related threats, challenges, and opportunities — in military
terms, to promote a “common operational picture” among at least UN external actors; and
163
• Second, these assessments should also help prepare UN-CIMIC officers to plan, coordinate,
and implement UN-CIMIC projects that are fully supportive of the common concerns identified,
apply the UN-CIMIC principles, and facilitate the eventual military and mission end states.
To do this — as well as to help fill the most common gaps in mission coordination — UN-CIMIC
officers should prepare or contribute to assessments by framing the information around a central, all-
encompassing question: “Who is doing what, when, where, how, and why?” This is roughly based on
the same idea as the Who What Where (3W) database OCHA employs. Whether this information is
presented in narrative or database (spreadsheet) form is dependent on the preferred method in the
mission, general and existing formats and frameworks, and the preference of the commander.
Answering that central question is the area where UN-CIMIC can contribute the most to the mission
in general and the force in particular in gaining an understanding of what capacities or capabilities could
be brought to bear to address a driver of conflict and instability. The main intent of this capabilities and
“human terrain” mapping is to minimize the use of military forces to perform tasks more appropriate for
external or internal civilian organizations or police, as well as to identify points of entry or empowerment
where the application of military capabilities can enhance civilian or police efforts. This makes the
military the real “force multiplier”.
It is important that UN-CIMIC officers are able to communicate effectively to two types of
audiences: civil (including police) and military. Ideally, any assessments produced by UN-CIMIC should
be understandable to the appropriate level of leadership and partners in both components. Doing so
will make sure they have a common understanding and help them reach decisions that are mutually
supportive. Unless specifically required, there should not be separate reports for military and civilian
audiences. As such, avoid military jargon, terms, or acronyms (without first spelling them out and
explaining them) that civilians may not understand. Likewise, explain civilian technical terms with
which military audiences may not be familiar. Again, the main mission of UN-CIMIC is civil-military
coordination.
Sources of Information and Collection Methods
The foremost sources of civil-military information are the reports, assessments, and other
information deliverables and frameworks of the civilian partners, particularly those among the UNCT,
as well as NGOs and other external actors. Likewise, it is important to obtain information from internal
Look, Listen, and Learn »

A good rule of thumb whenever engaging in civil-military coordination in general and civil-
military liaison in particular is to “look, listen, and learn”. This is especially true for civil-military
operators who are new to the mission area. This prevents one from rushing to judgment and
doing or saying something that may be counterproductive to one’s credibility and relationship-
building. It is also a vital attitude to have in information-gathering and information-sharing,
which should occur as a critical by-product of civil-military liaison.
164
actors. This is because the way internal actors perceive the situation and progress (or the lack of
progress) in the peace process is at least equally as important, if not more so, as how everyone else
does. In the peace environments of the twenty-first century, perception often shapes reality.
Among the external actors — particularly among the UNCT — there are specific sources a UN-CIMIC
officer should seek out and maintain regular liaison. In humanitarian situations, it is the CMCoord officer.
For peacebuilding and transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, they are UN Civil Affairs officers.
Other excellent on-the-ground sources for qualifying reported information are UN Military Observers
(UNMOs) and other MEOMS, as well as UN police officers and civil, police, and military liaison officers
around the mission area. UN-CIMIC officers should see themselves as integral to the overall liaison
network in the mission area. At the operational level, valuable information centres include the JOC,
JMAC, and JLOC. At the tactical level, this could be the UN Field Office or similar centre.
Beyond sourcing information through established information management networks shared by or

available to UNCT players, the primary means by which a UN-CIMIC officer gains civil-military situational
understanding is civil-military liaison and information-sharing. This includes attending and participating
in meetings, working groups, and planning sessions of consequence to the UN-CIMIC mission. Again, as
always, the question in mind remains: “Who is doing what, where, when, how, and why?”
Civil-Military Information and Intelligence
UN-CIMIC officers must understand that, while a great deal of knowledge and information gathered
in the course of UN-CIMIC will be of great interest to mission, military, or criminal intelligence staff,
the relationship between civil-military information and military or criminal intelligence must always be
discreet and separate. Civil-military assessments, reports, knowledge, and information are shared with
intelligence staff, among them MEOMs, JMAC, UNPOL-CIU, and DSS staff. However, at no time does a UN-
CIMIC officer ever perform his or her liaison and information-sharing duties in direct support of intelligence
operations, nor do they share restricted information or intelligence with non-authorized contacts.
A UN-CIMIC officer is never an intelligence operator, and under no circumstances should they be
perceived as one. Likewise, intelligence operations must never be co-mingled or co-located with UN-
CIMIC activities or staff. This is not only to preserve the critical mission integrity of UN-CIMIC and the
trust of civilian partners. In less than permissive environments, any compromise of this relationship
could endanger lives of both military and civilian personnel.
This discretionary relationship is similarly true in the case of the use of criminal intelligence. UN-
CIMIC officers obtaining such information from their police partners in order to better understand the
civil situation must take special care to treat it as confidential.
Nevertheless, information and situational understanding of the civil-military situation may be

quite valuable to those looking to provide actionable intelligence with respect to asymmetric threats in
stabilization or conflict management environments. In this regard, UN-CIMIC officers are best sharing
what they know on potential threats to civil stability and other matters of “early warning” through the
JMAC. This includes civil information related to military or criminal intelligence.
165
Section 6.3 Civil-Military Information Sharing and Information

Management
The primary means by which a civil-military coordinator gains civil-military situational understanding
is by virtue of the primary function of civil-military liaison and information sharing. However, we also
know that civil-military liaison and information sharing go beyond information exchange alone. There is a
transition management support aspect that helps to enable civilian and police partners to take a greater
lead and share of the peace process, enabling peacebuilding and reducing the demand for peacekeeping.
Civil-Military Information Sharing – Supporting and Enabling Civilian Partners
From the civilian side, the information that civilian mission components, UN agencies, NGOs, and
appropriate local community authorities would be most interested in is information related to:
• The security situation; and
• The assistance the military can offer in support of the military effort — capabilities and limitations.
Security Information
Above all, in conflict management environments and during peacekeeping, civilian agencies will be
interested in any information that will enable them to have a better picture of threats and risks. They
will be interested in: any security-related incidents (politically motivated or criminal), mine threats and
incidents, road conditions, weather reports, and any military or conflict-related action that may result in
increased tension in a specific area. In the case of classified or restricted information, UN-CIMIC officers
will have to decide, in consultation with the relevant intelligence specialists, what information can be
shared with civilian partners. UN-CIMIC officers will have to sensitize their military colleagues to the
need to share information with civilian and police partners, and to refrain from unnecessarily classifying
information that may be of use beyond the military. UNPOL and FPU officers can offer valuable information
on the security situation, particularly with regard to criminal threats, illegal trafficking, etc., especially at
community levels. Again, the human security forms articulated in the UN Human Security Handbook help
form the analysis of civil security in a peacebuilding context that is more usable to civilian partners.
Consider the role UNPOL plays in providing criminal intelligence, as well as the role of the Department
of Security and Safety (DSS) in identifying and mitigating threats to the safety and security of UN
mission and associated personnel through information-sharing, as discussed in Lesson 5.
Military Support
In terms of the support the military can provide to their civilian counterparts, we can distinguish
between mission support — the support provided to external actors, such as mission civilian and police
components, UN agencies, and international NGOs — and community support, which is support provided
to local communities, local authorities, civil society organizations, etc. Mission support can be in the
form either of security or assets. This is explained in greater detail in Lesson 7 (Civil Assistance).
166
A view of the United

Nations On-Site
Operations Coordination
Centre (OSOCC) at
the entrance to a
transit camp near the
Tunisia-Libya border.
Thousands of refugees
have come to the camp
in the last weeks,
fleeing ongoing violence
in Libya. 5 March 2011.
UN Photo #466618 by
David Ohana.
Security Support
Beyond the protection of civilians under specific mission leadership guidance, security support
typically occurs in the form of a military escort for a civilian convoy or mission. UN-CIMIC officers need
to familiarize themselves with:
• The baseline UN mission policy in this regard — the use of military (or, preferably, police) armed
escorts for humanitarian convoys and other uses of military assets in support of humanitarian
assistance, as referenced in Lesson 3;
• Any mission-specific policies and SOPs that may exist, especially including the mission Rules of
Engagement; and
• The capability, experience, and willingness of military and police units within the area of
operations to provide such support so that this information can be shared with civilian partners.
UN-CIMIC officers also need to familiarize themselves with the scope of the need for police or
military escorts, such as:
• How many agencies may require escorts on a regular basis?
• What is the size of the civilian convoys and what kind of cargo do they transport?
• Which routes do they regularly use?
This kind of information should be shared with the military planners so they can decide how best
to meet such a need, if appropriate, with the means at their disposal. One element of the information-
management database that a UN-CIMIC officer needs to maintain is the potential provision of security
support to civilian partners in a contingency.
167
Use of Military Assets
When it comes to the potential use of military assets to support civilian or police activities, UN-
CIMIC officers need to familiarize themselves with:
• Baseline UN policies with respect to civil assistance in humanitarian and peacebuilding contexts
(available from either UN-CMCoord or Civil Affairs Officers); and
• Any mission-specific policies and SOPs that may exist with respect to the use of military assets
in support of civilian or police partners, which may or may not be outlined in the mission
UN-CIMIC SOP or directive (see Appendix F); and the resources, capability, experience, and
willingness of military units to render such support so this information can be shared with the
civilian or police partners.
THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CHAIN
Collect
Process
Analyse
Disseminate
Includes store
and retrieve
At the same time, UN-CIMIC officers need to develop an understanding of potential requests or
requirements. As an SOP item, UN-CIMIC officers need to be able to provide planning and operations
colleagues with a rough estimate of the frequency with which they can anticipate such requests, their
nature and scope (what kind of support can the military anticipate being regularly asked to provide),
and the areas/locations where such support may be required, as well as general command guidance on
what the command may be able to provide, when, where, and how. UN-CIMIC officers should develop
and maintain a database of both potential resources and potential requirements to enable effective
response to requests for assistance, especially in emergency situations.
Advice to the Commander »

One of the principal reasons a UN-CIMIC officer is gathering knowledge and information is
because he or she is responsible for advising the commander on all civil-military related
matters. UN-CIMIC officers work out of command centres — at the operational (or Mission/
Force HQ) level, as well as the tactical (or Field Office or sector/battalion command) level
— to act as an interface between the military component and their civilian counterparts,
and to advise commanders on the UN-CIMIC situation, civil-military courses of action, and
assessment of progress. (See Appendix G for a sample UN-CIMIC operations briefing.) In turn,
UN-CIMIC officers communicate command concerns to civilian leaders and partners on issues
of civil-military interest, including capabilities and limitations, with regard to how the military
force may or may not support civil/police actions.
168
Institutional Memory
More often than for civilian and police staff, institutional memory for UN-CIMIC officers is a major
challenge for the military component in any peace operation. The maintenance of or access to databases
as well as well-kept project files are thus crucial in ensuring that institutional memory is transferred in
order to maintain smooth continuity of UN-CIMIC effort. For example, QIPs often take more than six
months (the typical deployment period for a formed unit) to progress from proposal to finalization. A
project that was supported by one unit may be picked up by another, such as seasonal food security and
health issues. Well-maintained and easily transferable databases and files are critical. This is where a
good UN-CIMIC sergeant who is well-versed in information management technologies, as described in
the terms of reference in Appendix A, plays a large role.
Mission Information Management
The term “information management” in the United Nations normally refers to database management
and information technology. From an overall mission management and coordination perspective,
however, the sequence by which information is collected, processed, analysed, and disseminated looks
like this, as shown in Lesson 5. UN-CIMIC “information management” should follow the same sequence.
As with assessments and reports, UN-CIMIC information management should complement — rather
than duplicate — existing structures (“their game plan is our game plan”). For example, the UN missions
in Kosovo and Liberia (UNMIK and UNMIL) organized their efforts, reporting, and information around
“pillars” representing major lines of effort in the peace operation, with lead agencies for each pillar. At
UNMIK, the four pillars were:
• Pillar I - humanitarian assistance, led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR);
• Pillar II - civil administration, under the UN;
• Pillar III - democratization and institution-building, led by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and
• Pillar IV - reconstruction and economic development, managed by the European Union.
At an even higher level of comprehensiveness and collaboration, the programmes of UNMIL and 16
specialized agencies, funds, and the World Bank are aligned with the Government of Liberia’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy. Its four pillars are:
• Pillar I - the security sector;
• Pillar II - economy revitalization;
• Pillar III - governance and rule of law; and
• Pillar IV - infrastructure and basic social services.
At a typical integrated mission, the two coordination entities that will have the best developed
systems for managing knowledge and information obtained from myriad sources would be the JMAC and
the JOC. Together, they generate the majority of reports sent from the mission to UN Headquarters. Any
UN-CIMIC information management system should be closely aligned with and complementary to those
organized and maintained by the JMAC and JOC.
169
Below the Force HQ level, UN-CIMIC information should be organized and maintained in order to
promote the even flow of information vertically (up and down the chain of command) and horizontally
(with UNCT partners, such as CMCoord and Civil Affairs).
Finally, it should be noted that efficient and effective information management for UN-CIMIC is a “force
multiplier”. It makes information in the database more readily available to military colleagues and civilian
and police partners, thus promoting the operational value-added of UN-CIMIC. It also enhances the ability
of UN-CIMIC to be a game-changer with respect to enhancing and enabling the ability of external actors
to more rapidly and effectively transition the peace process — i.e., civilianize the UN effort. Last, it helps
the UN-CIMIC team (which is almost always understaffed considering its relatively large and important
portfolio) do more with less, enabling them to concentrate on more labour-intensive and vitally important
aspects of civil-military interaction, as well as the second major function of UN-CIMIC — civil assistance.
Conclusion
• The primary civil-military function of liaison and information sharing and how to achieve effective
civil-military liaison as a mission management multiplier;
• How civil-military coordination should frame civil-military assessments through “Who is doing
what, where, when, how, and why?”;
• The difference between civil-military information and intelligence; and
• The importance of information sharing and management to civil-military coordination.
• Introduction to the UN System, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Fundamentals of Risk Management/Advanced

Risk Management; United Nations Protocol; and, Introduction to the United Nations System. For
more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 3 and 4 of the Handbook. See also Local
Chapter 7.
170

Further References

• The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions, International Peace Institute (31 July 2012),
available at: <www.ipinst.org/2012/07/the-management-handbook-for-un-field-missions>.

• Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook, DPKO/DFS (December 2013), available at:
<https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2014-IAP-HandBook.pdf>.
• Guidelines on the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), (2006).
• IMPP Guidelines on Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences: Role of the Field, (2009) and
Role of Headquarters (2010).
• DPKO/DFS Ref. 2015.15, Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping

171
1. Which of the following is NOT a reason 7. Which of the following is NOT a reason
liaison and information sharing in UN- effective information management for
CIMIC is a useful way to manage the UN-CIMIC is a “force multiplier”?
interaction between civilian and military
A. It promotes the operational value-added of
components and actors?
the JOC and JMAC
A. It promotes the common operational picture
B. It enhances and enables the ability of
B. It enhances and enables the ability of the external actors to more rapidly and
UN mission to more rapidly and effectively effectively transition the peace process
transition the peace process
C. It helps UN-CIMIC do less with more
C. It keeps major peacebuilding decisions in the
D. It increases the resources available to the
hands of mission staff
mission
D. It helps to localize the peace process
8. True or false? Ways and means of civil-
2. Whenever conducting a liaison or military liaison include communication,
information-sharing function, what information technology, coordination
questions should a UN-CIMIC officer centres, and meetings and working
always have in mind? groups.
3. Civil-military liaison and information 9. True or false? Information that civilian

sharing are applications of what way of mission components, UN agencies,
thinking? NGOs, and appropriate local community
authorities would be most interested in
4. Who is responsible for liaison? is information relating to the security
situation and information on military
A. The Office of the SRSG alone
capabilities and limitations in support of
B. All programmes, units, and offices the civilian-led effort.
C. CIMIC officers alone
D. CMCoord officers alone 10. At a typical integrated mission, the
two coordination entities with the best
5. Liaison is achieved through: managed information for UN-CIMIC
officers would be (choose two):
A. Mission support
B. Community support A. The UN Development Assistance Centre
(UNDAC) and the UNCT
C. Exchange of knowledge and information
D. Quick Impact Projects B. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and the
Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC)
6. True or false? Although a UN-CIMIC C. The Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and
officer should never perform his or the Special Representative of the Secretary-
her liaison and information-sharing
General
duties in direct support of intelligence
operations, he or she may share properly D. The Humanitarian Operations Coordination
vetted intelligence information with Centre (HoCC) and the Force Commander
non-authorized contacts as part of their
security support mission.
172
Answer Key »
1. C
2. Who is doing what, when, where, how,

and why?
3. “Thinking strategically while acting

tactically”, True
4. B
5. C
6. False
7. D
8. True
9. True
10. B, C
173
LESSON
7 Civil Assistance
The most important

mission support service
UN Police or military
personnel provide
is a safe and secure
environment to protect
civilians in order to
facilitate peacebuilding.
Section 7.1 Mission Support and • Explain the civil-military coordination (UN-CIMIC)
Community Support function of civil assistance in terms of mission
support and community assistance.
Section 7.2 Protection of Civilians
• Discuss the principles, challenges, and
Section 7.3 Support to Disarmament,
opportunities associated with civil assistance.
Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) and • Understand the concept of protection of civilians

Security and Defence Sector in terms of civil-military coordination.
Reform (SSR/DSR)
• Explain how the military and police contribute to
Section 7.4 Military Support to security sector initiatives.
Development • Explain how civil assistance contributes to

development-related initiatives that enhance
transition of mission focus to peacebuilding.
174
LESSON 7 | Civil Assistance
In Tora village, North Darfur, water is used to make bricks for the construction of a school which will house 30 former child soldiers. The
water was delivered by the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid
operation in Darfur (UNAMID). 19 April 2010. UN Photo #434502 by Albert González Farran.
Introduction
Civil assistance is the second core function of

UN civil-military coordination (UN-CIMIC), after civil-
military liaison and information sharing. As noted earlier
in Lesson 1, and in accordance with the UN-CIMIC Policy
the delivery of a secure environment is the primary
military function. Humanitarian assistance and support
to the political process and long-term social stability
(including through delivery of rule of law, governance,
humanitarian assistance, and development) are
primarily civilian functions. The purpose of civil-
military coordination is to help transition mission focus
from peacekeeping to peacebuilding through engaging
the military in civilianizing and localizing the peace
operation, facilitating the end state of peacekeeping —
the withdrawal of the military peacekeeping force.
175
Beyond civil-military liaison and information sharing, the military engages in this process through
civil assistance, which consists of mission and community support. Mission support is the use of military
assets to enhance UNCT, UN Police, or other external actor humanitarian and development-related
initiatives, while community support is the application of military assets — by, with, and through external
actors — to help communities normalize and take greater charge of their own futures. Essentially,
mission support is more about civilianizing while community support is more about localizing.
The most important mission support service UN Police or military personnel provide is a safe and
secure environment to protect civilians in order to facilitate peacebuilding. Civil assistance can come
through the protection of civilians, UN-CIMIC support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
(DDR) and Security and Defence Sector Reform (SSR/DSR), UN-CIMIC community support projects, and
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Other civil assistance activities include support of critical peacebuilding
and development areas such as Rule of Law (ROL), youth, gender, etc., civilianizing, and localizing by
applying the “I drive, you drive” method.
Section 7.1 Mission Support and Community Support

The UN-CIMIC Policy notes that “Civil Assistance is a support function that includes two types of
related activities undertaken by the military component of a UN integrated mission.” These activities fall
into either mission or community support:
Mission support refers to cooperation extended by the police or military component of a peace
operation to any civilian component or agency, for example, when the police or military component
provides security, such as an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy. When mission support
operations are undertaken, UN-CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating, and
facilitating the actions of the military units responsible for executing the task. It is important for UN-
CIMIC officers to understand what mission support is and where it fits into the role and function of civil-
military coordination in the context of complex peace operations.
Community support refers to military and police support activities that help local communities
improve and normalize their lives. Community support operations are aimed at building capacity and
confidence in the peace process and creating a positive relationship between the host community and
especially civilian external actors and local governance. Community support projects are often related to
physical infrastructure repair/rehabilitation projects that could be requested by any civilian organization
or entity through appropriate mission coordination structures, or proposed by the military or police
component through the appropriate civil-military process.
Mission Support
Simply put, mission support is when the police or military provides support to civilian external
actors in a peace operations context, for instance:
• When the military component provides security to external actors, such as an armed escort for
a humanitarian relief convoy;
• When the military provides logistical, engineering, or other service support to initiatives by
external actors; or
176
A member of the
UN Mission for the
Referendum in Western
Sahara (MINURSO)’s
Military Liaison Office
chats with a group of
local Western Saharans.
17 June 2010. UN Photo
#440059 by Martine
Perret.
• When the police or military component supports the UN mission and agencies responsible for
organizing or supporting an election with security, information, logistical, and communication
support.
The SRSG’s guidelines on the subject of “effective approval and coordination mechanisms” as directed
in the Secretary-General’s Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions frame civil assistance in a specific
peace operations mission. Relevant mission actors, including the DSRSG/RC/HC, UNPOL, the Head of
Military Component, Civil Affairs, Gender Advisers, Human Rights, Quick Impact Project Managers,
Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS), Human Rights, etc. implement these
guidelines. In addition to relevant mission actors, UN-CIMIC officers, UN-CMCoord officers, MEOMs, and
other liaison officers representing relevant entities should participate in civil assistance coordination. Civil
assistance tasks proposed by national military contingents should first be submitted to the UN-CIMIC
structure to review and forward for processing in accordance with established mission guidelines. This
helps ensure UN resources are most effectively used.
The Four Steps of Mission Support
1. Identifying the Common Objective
It is important that all the components and agencies that may participate in a joint action have a
common understanding of the objectives they want to achieve. This often means that there should be
agreement on identifying the problem (i.e., conflict analysis), as well as what must be done to address
it. Each component or agency is likely to have different interests, priorities, and entry points because
of their different mandates and responsibilities. If they have a clearly identified common objective,
however, it will be easier to establish a collaborative relationship. It is in determining the need for
mission support that the concept of “last resort” is used appropriately. Mission support, if applied directly
rather than indirectly, may engender issues of perception that may complicate the peace operations
environment and reinforce (rather than reduce) dependence on UN military assets. Its use, including its
potential unintended consequences, must be carefully considered.
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2. Collaborative Planning
The second step is to plan the intended action together. It is important to do the planning together
because the planning process will assist in developing greater understanding among the participating
partners for their respective mandates, roles, strengths, and weaknesses. This is where the Integrated
Mission Planning Process (IMPP) comes into play, at least at the operational or mission leadership level.
It is important to plan for contingencies

Coordination Principles »
before they happen. For instance, in the case
of an armed escort for a convoy, it is important One of the key aspects of any coordination
to determine beforehand how the convoy will initiative is educating each other about
respond to different scenarios, such as attack, respective capabilities and limitations —
vehicle breakdown, or roadblocks. There is often beyond your physical capacities, your
no time to discuss the principles at stake in the mandates, role, and operating procedures,
midst of an incident. In joint actions of this nature, as well as the principles that determine your
it is important to discuss the various principles, operational space.
SOPs, and other issues beforehand.
For the same reason, it is necessary to clarify the respective roles of the partners beforehand.
For example, in the case of a convoy, it is generally agreed that the commander of the police or
military escort is responsible for security-related decisions, while the senior humanitarian agency
representative is responsible for all decisions relating to goods, vehicles, and personnel. However, there
are circumstances where these two actors may have opposing views on what action to take, and it
becomes necessary to discuss such contingencies as extensively as possible in the planning phase.
3. Operational Coordination
During the execution of the collaborative action, there will be a need for ongoing operational
coordination. Key mission coordination mechanisms, in particular the JOC and JLOC, are key to ensuring
appropriate operational oversight and visibility. It should be clear from the outset who is responsible for
coordination and what communication channels will be used. At regional and local levels, UN-CMCoord,
UN-CIMIC, and Civil Affairs Officers play an important role in operational coordination. As explained in
Lesson 5, this is situation-dependent. For example, the intensity of the coordination likely will be higher
when a comprehensive action is being planned and executed, such as the run-up to an election.
4. Collaborative Evaluation
It is important that collaborative actions be concluded with some form of joint evaluation or After
Action Review (AAR). The evaluation should make an assessment of whether the common objective was
achieved, identify problem areas that need to be improved in future, and identify best practices and
lessons learned to share with others that may undertake similar joint actions in future. In addition to the
military plans and operations chain (J5/U5 and J3/U3), any civil-military coordination lessons should be
shared through the UN-CIMIC chain to the J9/U9, and through similar UNPOL channels, with the mission
Best Practices Unit, normally found in the Office of the SRSG.
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Principles and guidelines
As with all civil-military coordination, mission support operations should apply the core civil-military
principles — the primacy of civilian authority, the military as enabler, the military as supporting and
not supported, indirect versus direct support, and management of civil-military transition. The specific
circumstances or context of each operation need to be taken into consideration.
The key to successful mission support

operations is in the relationship-building aspect
Tactical Units »
of civil-military liaison. In some cases, the While sector-level and battalion-level UN-CIMIC
partners have worked together for a while. In officers will coordinate events leading up to the
most cases, however, the partners need to make execution of mission support operations, these
a special effort to educate each other. One of the activities are typically carried out at the tactical
most common mistakes in the field occurs when level by soldiers who have not been specially
a civil-military coordinator assumes that their trained in UN-CIMIC.
counterparts understand the roles, constraints,
UN-CIMIC officers will thus have to make a
and principles of their components, and that
special effort to ensure that such tactical units
they know enough about the roles, constraints,
are briefed on the principles and guidelines
and principles of their counterparts in advance.
they need to uphold during mission support
In reality, there is at best a vague understanding
operations.
on both sides of the work of other components
and actors in peace operations.
Another complication is the reality of constant personnel turnover, mostly among the military. Most
military units rotate every six months, and some companies and platoons are likely to move around
within their area of operations during this period. Military observers, staff officers (like UN-CIMIC
officers at the Force and Sector HQs), and many UNPOL will normally be in the mission for a year and
move around the mission area. Many civilians stay longer in a specific area, but some also experience
frequent personnel changes. For any specific mission support operation, it is unlikely that the same
players will go through the entire assessment, planning, execution, and evaluation process together.
The implication of this is that the process of building relationships, trust, and respect among the players
on the basis of understanding each other’s mandate and role in the peace operation is not a one-time
activity, but an ongoing process. It is also key to mitigating a key weakness of the military component
by leveraging the depth of knowledge and understanding the police and civilian components have of the
mission environment, the country/cultural context, and key political issues.
Challenges and Opportunities
It is easier to exchange information than to undertake mission support operations. Liaison typically
involves people who have frequent interaction with each other; they are likely to develop an empathy
towards each other and the organizations they represent. The people who will execute mission
support operations at the tactical level will not necessarily have had the same level of exposure to
their counterparts, and their level of understanding for each other’s mandates, roles, and operating
procedures is likely to be limited. A critical implied task for civil-military coordinators is to brief units
179
and groups more at the execution level on the role and mandates of the various partners, as well as on
the civil-military principles they need to observe during any given mission support operation, preferably
prior to deployment.
The overall command, management, and decision-making structure of a mission support operation
is a potential problem area that needs to be clearly defined. In some cases, it may be useful to have
a lead agency approach where one agency clearly has an overarching responsibility and role — for
example, UNHCR in a refugee-related crisis, based on the Cluster System. In most cases, however,
it would be advisable to keep coordination distinct from command. Coordination should be achieved
through the four steps of mission support operations set out above. If there is a clear common objective
and plan, each partner will carry out its actions accordingly. Through operational coordination, the
partners will share information about progress and setbacks and synchronize and adjust their actions
appropriately.
Rwandan peacekeepers of the African

Union/United Nations Hybrid operation
in Darfur (UNAMID) escort Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) on their
return from the IDP camp in Aramba to
their original village in Sehjanna, near
Kutum, North Darfur. The voluntary
repatriation program was organized by
the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid
Commission. 14 July 2011. UN Photo
#480079 by Albert González Farran.
Types of Mission Support
There are two types of mission support: security and logistical support.
»» Security
With respect to security, there should be a clear understanding of the division of labour between
police and military forces. The military is an external security force, trained and equipped to provide
security beyond the borders of the State. On the other hand, police forces are a domestic security force,
trained and equipped to guarantee peace, order, and security to the civilian population. Because civilian
police are not expected to use overwhelming force against the people they are expected to serve, they
require the consent of the population to be the guardians of order. In free and stable societies, the
military does not play a role in policing civilians, and civilian police maintain order because it is their
accepted role, not because of the threat of force.
Nevertheless, providing general security is one of the most common forms of support that the
military component will render to its civilian counterparts. Typically, the mandate of the mission and
the Rules of Engagement (ROE) will discuss it. This occurs most frequently in the form of area security
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or armed escorts. Keeping in mind civilianizing and localizing, it is more appropriate to have UN police
conduct these missions, rather than UN military forces, as it enables a more natural transition to local
police or other internal security organizations. Military forces should always be a last resort in internal
security.
With practically every mission having some sort of protection of civilians component of the mandate,
UNPOL is the primary instrument for a UN field mission to provide physical protection of civilians against
imminent threats of physical violence, including through force projection or high-visibility patrolling,
usually along with local police forces. More appropriately, UNPOL provides operational support to local
police forces to protect civilians through:
• On-site advice on planning and conducting operations;
• Supporting investigations into incidents or augmenting security for internally displaced persons;
and
• Helping to build and reform host national law enforcement institutions so they can sustainably
and consistently protect their own citizens.
In many respects, Formed Police Units (FPUs) are especially well-suited for security missions:
“Protection of armed and unarmed United Nations Police

and other civilian mission personnel, as well as facilities and
equipment, can include protection of convoys, relocation or
evacuation of staff, and intervention where necessary for the
protection of staff and in accordance with FPU capabilities. FPUs
may be involved in providing protection to military personnel
(Military Observer team sites) or military units, particularly
enabling units, which may have a limited capability to deal with
the types of incidents to which FPUs might typically respond.”1
Here again, the military plays a backing or back-up role. Only in exceptional cases will the military
component provide static security (guarding) for facilities (such as a warehouse or office complex).
Regardless, the transition of security-related tasks to competent and legitimate local internal security
forces — especially police — is of utmost importance, using the “I drive, you drive” method discussed
later in this lesson. The concept of the protection of civilians, which is astride both mission and
community support, is also discussed later on.
The most common form of security provision is the armed escort, for example when a police or
military unit provides an armed escort for a humanitarian convoy. The UN has developed specific
guidelines for this type of mission support operation.2 In some complex emergencies, the Humanitarian
Coordinator (HC) will develop specific policies and procedures for military or armed escorts. Civil-military
coordinators need to familiarize themselves with the generic and mission-specific policies and principles
that apply in their specific case, in addition to the ROE.
1) DKPO/DFS Policy Ref. 2009.32, Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 1 March 2010, 4.
2) Refer to the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys and other guidelines referenced in Lesson 3.
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The role that the military plays in providing information and supporting mission intelligence is
integral to security support. It not only improves the “common operational picture” among the mission
components, but also supports the role UNPOL plays in providing criminal intelligence, as well as the
role of DSS in identifying and mitigating threats to the safety and security of UN mission and associated
personnel through information-sharing. UNPOL, in turn, helps improve mission situational awareness
through the provision of criminal intelligence.
The long-term success of mission security support, however, comes through building the capacity
of the host nation security sector, especially law enforcement, which is best served by emphasizing
community-oriented policing as early as possible.
»» Logistical Support
Logistical support typically occurs in the form of providing transportation (road, air, or water);
making recovery or other specialized equipment available to civilian agencies; or cooperating with the
coordination of logistical services. The concept of “last resort” comes into play here for the application
of contingent-owned equipment (COE) versus equipment under the control of the mission (normally at
operational level). Decisions on whether to use mission-controlled assets or COE are made through the
JLOC at the operational level or through the administrative officer found with the Head of Field Office at
the tactical level.
The military component usually also has an engineering capability for use under certain conditions
to assist with the emergency provision or maintenance of roads, water, and electricity, or construction
services for security, humanitarian, or freedom of movement purposes. In some cases, a military unit
may accompany a humanitarian convoy to assist it with recovery services through bad patches in the
road. Although the military personnel involved are likely to be armed, this kind of support should not
be confused with an armed escort. The purpose of this escort is not to counter any perceived threat,
but rather to assist with mobility and the recovery of vehicles. However, the military personnel involved
must be aware of the perspective of the humanitarian actors. When carried out according to civil-
military principles and other guidelines, community support operations are likely to build a positive
relationship between the local community and the peacekeepers — indirectly, rather than through direct
attempts to “win hearts and minds”. In fact, the entities that most need to win hearts and minds are the
internal actors, while it is least important for the military. In general, UN-CIMIC civil assistance — and
community support in particular — think globally (bigger picture and long-term) and act locally. That is
what makes civil-military coordination inherently strategic.
Under certain circumstances, the military may have to perform more direct civil assistance actions,
for example, when the situation is less stable and permissive for external or internal civilian partners
to provide urgently needed services to the population, or in the early stages of peacekeeping. While
it may be done to gain credibility with the local population and internal actors, this kind of “winning
hearts and minds” should be applied sparingly and as a means to an end, not an end in itself. Civil-
military principles apply from the first to the last day of involvement, but their application changes over
time and in various places. The goals themselves are always the same, however — departure of the
peacekeeping force with peacebuilding under civilian lead and a sufficient degree of self-sustainment.
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Other than its security mission, community support is the main way a peacekeeping force works
itself out of a job. Because security and stability are associated with development-related outcomes —
based on the concept of “human security” — many other factors impact the security and stability
of a community and country other than those associated with military and police. Here again, the
human security forms articulated in the UN Human Security Handbook are most useful in understanding
security in a peacebuilding context. It is in the ultimate interest of the military to commit resources to
promote peacebuilding in order to promote such outcomes. In UNMIL, the military took this view in its
support to building capacity and confidence through joint and collaborative processes (to civilianize and
localize respectively), creating a virtuous cycle leading to less dependence on the force, as depicted in
the chart below:
Joint, Collaborative
Approaches
Reduce
Dependency
Build Capacity
and Confidence
A Principled Approach to Community Support
Community support is where the core civil-military principles most apply — the primacy of civilian
authority, the military as enabler, the military as supporting and not supported, indirect versus direct
support, and management of civil-military transition. It may be difficult to imagine how military community
support activities could have negative outcomes, but many do have unintended consequences. The
main reason is usually because they fail to apply these principles. Two mottos should be kept in mind,
as they apply to community support more than anywhere else in civil-military coordination:
»» “It’s not about us; it’s about them”; and
»» “Their game plan is our game plan.”
Community support in application takes a civil-military project management approach. There are
some important considerations to make or rules to observe regardless of the project.3 Perhaps the most
important technique in the transition management aspect of civil assistance is the use of the “I drive,
you drive” method.4
3) These are discussed in Lesson 8.
4) A good example in general of how community support is applied as a way to facilitate the management of transition of UN mission focus from
peacekeeping to peacebuilding is the UNMIL CIMIC Directive, provided in its entirety at Appendix F.
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Examples of Community Support Initiatives
Community support activities and emphasis on what projects to support vary from mission to
mission, time to time, and locality to locality. That is why the military should conduct community
assistance projects through and with external and internal actors, based foremost on the needs and
priorities of local communities. Nevertheless, there are typical projects that many military forces find
themselves involved in. The list below is by no means exhaustive.5
“I Drive, You Drive” »

Perhaps the most important technique in community support — and in localizing — is the same
method used to teach a person how to drive a motor vehicle. The teacher demonstrates to the
student how to operate the vehicle by having them sit in the passenger seat while the vehicle is
in operation. After a while, they switch seats, and the student, coached, advised, and mentored
by the teacher, takes the wheel and drives, gaining confidence and competence, until the
student can operate the vehicle alone.
This same method can be employed in civil-military transition management, especially in

localizing community assistance projects, particularly the transition of security-related tasks
under security sector reform (SSR). Whether police or military, the UN force can have local
security forces participate jointly on missions that will ultimately go to local actors, first as
observers and then as participants, gradually taking the lead in these missions over a period
of years. Such tasks could include joint patrols, escorts of civil service payments, humanitarian
convoy escorts, personal security escorts, border security, and area and static security missions.
This not only helps build the capacity of these forces — it likewise transfers public confidence
from the UN forces to local forces. This transition process should begin as early in the mission as
possible. Four other important points are:
• First, it is important for local actors to be present throughout the whole process, starting
with assessment and planning, using the project management model discussed later in
Lesson 8;
• Second, concentrate on having them show up — worry less about whether local partners
have all the people or capabilities they are supposed to have for this task right now;
• Third, such efforts should be well-publicized as they gain traction and success, in close
coordination with public information (see Lesson 8); and
• Fourth, a certain degree of failure must be allowed in this process. It is better they make
mistakes now while you are still there to help them make corrections, ultimately lowering
the risks of such transitions.
5) Other examples can be found in the UNMIL CIMIC Directive available through the student portal, the respective websites of current UN peacekeeping
missions, and the UN Best Practices website.
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When thinking about community support, the concept of comparative advantages as discussed in
the HIPPO Report should be employed with respect to any component, but especially the military —
particularly its planning, problem-solving, and training culture. Civil-military coordinators should see
how these equities can best help build the capacity and confidence of community partners through the
community support project in question.
Some typical community support initiatives include:
»» Infrastructure projects:
• Rehabilitation of key buildings, including schools, clinics, police stations, and courthouses;
• Reconstruction or critical maintenance of roads and bridges;
• Reconstruction of water and sanitation services; and
• Rehabilitation of electricity supply.
»» Support to civil administration and social services:
• Provision of information and data on the civil

situation, including as obtained by UNMOs, Police and Troop
through Civil Affairs, in order to improve the local Participation »
government’s ability to understand community
Police and troop participation in UN-
needs and provide service;
CIMIC community projects also has
• On-the-job training of medical, engineering, or the effect of boosting morale because
other local personnel; and it gives them an opportunity to get out
• Training of teachers and vocational trainers. of the compound and interact with the
local population in a meaningful way.
»» Support to economic activity:
It will make them feel good about the
• Rehabilitation of a market; or contribution they are making to rebuild

the country where they are deployed.
• Vocational training, or other support, in certain
sectors, including construction and engineering,
agriculture, etc.
»» Socio-cultural, youth, and sport activities:
• Support for cultural activities, like traditional ceremonies;
• Rehabilitation of sports facilities and venues;
• Training of coaches and managers; and
• Support for gender, youth, and environmental initiatives.
Within the scope of the mandate and their mission, UNPOL and FPUs can play a particularly effective
role with respect to localizing and building the capacity of and confidence in local police forces. They
can also improve community policing, especially if their civil assistance activities employ the UN-CIMIC
principles and emphasize a community service ethic for local police. Some examples may include:
• Teaming with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local Red Cross/Red Crescent
to train local police in first aid and medical first response.
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• Training local police on public safety (for example, traffic safety), HIV/AIDS, sexual exploitation
and rape mitigation, etc.; then have them provide public instruction at schools, youth centres,
and community centres as a public service.
• Promoting police-youth organization partnering for sports, public education, and community
policing activities.
Section 7.2 Protection of Civilians

As the UN-CIMIC Policy states: “Delivery of a secure environment is primarily a military function,
while support to the political process and long-term social stability (including through delivery of rule
of law, governance, humanitarian assistance and development) are primarily civilian functions.” The
protection of civilians (POC) is the fundamental civil assistance activity of any UN peacekeeping force,
including civilian, police, and military components. It is the primary reason why civil-military coordination
is integral to all UN military and most police operations, and not merely a supplemental mission.
Since 1999, most new UN peacekeeping operations have featured increasingly robust protection of
civilians mandates, and the UN has focused increasing levels of attention on refining the POC concept
across the full spectrum of peace and security activities undertaken by the UN in support of conflict
management, resolution, and transformation efforts. Although the wording of the POC mandates in UN
Security Council resolutions has been similar to date, the ways in which UN missions have implemented
these mandates have varied. Because missions operate within differing contexts, each develops a
unique strategy to achieve the common principles and aims of protecting civilians in conflict situations
according to the unique settings in which it operates.
Most mission POC strategies to date have conceptualized protection around three dimensions:
• Security-focused, or direct protection;
• Securing humanitarian access; and
• Building an environment conducive to longer-term protection.
All of these mission strategies recognize that protection can be achieved only through cooperation
with local and national authorities, as well as through concerted action across the political, security, rule
of law, humanitarian, development, and social reconciliation dimensions. Additionally, any POC planning
and operations should entail consideration of the criteria on the use of force detailed in Lesson 2.
POC as a Core Peacekeeping Business
The Capstone Doctrine lists as a part of the “Core Business’” of UN peacekeeping operations the
creation of “a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security,
with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.” It explains that:
“Most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping

operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The
protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action
among the military, police and civilian components of a United
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Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed

into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United
Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental
organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range
of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close
coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential.”
Building on the Capstone Doctrine and based on Security Council Resolution 1674, the UN Concept
Note on POC adopts a three-tiered approach:
»» Tier 1 — “Protection through political process”, encompassing

political engagement, advocacy, and assistance by the UN
mission to the effective implementation of a peace agreement
or other political process to resolve the conflict.
»» Tier 2 — “Providing protection from physical violence”, involving

actions to prevent, deter, and respond to situations in which
civilians are under the threat of physical violence.
»» Tier 3 — “Establishing a protective environment” that enhances

safety and supports the rights of civilians through promoting legal
protections, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and supporting
national institutions. It is in this tier particularly where UN-CIMIC
civil assistance activities can have significant impact.
These tiers are neither hierarchical nor sequential — all three are to be pursued simultaneously
in a coordinated manner to produce synergistic effects. The overarching objective is the creation of
a durable peace in which civilians are not under threat from physical violence or other human rights
abuses. As the Concept Note explains:
“Although there is no inherent hierarchy between the tiers, the

mission must ensure that it has taken all possible measures
within its capacity to help the host authorities to protect
civilians from physical violence when mandated to do so.
Peacekeeping operations are generally the only international
entity responsible for playing a direct role in the provision of
protection from physical violence; in that regard, they have a
unique responsibility among protection actors.”
No matter the circumstances, police forces should be considered as having the lead in the protection
of civilians by use of force, unless otherwise directed by civil authority, and then only to fill gaps police
forces are unable to fill for the time being. Although expediency may call for direct support of host
nation police and military operations, the most appropriate support that mission military or police forces
can render is indirect, through institutional and operational capacity building.
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Peacekeepers from the UN Mission in

South Sudan (UNMISS) inspect bomb
fragments as they assess damage to
the Mission’s County Support Base,
which was hit during a series of air
strikes in Mayom, Unity State. The
UNMISS team also evacuated wounded
civilians to a health facility in the State
capital, Bentiu. 16 April 2012. UN
Photo #510326 by Isaac Billy.
Phases of POC
The UN’s strategic framework for POC talks about “phases of protection”. These phases are
not sequential, but rather should be understood as four organizing concepts that might operate
simultaneously depending on the range and nature of the threats.
Assurance/Prevention: Ongoing throughout the course of the mission deployment. Activities

designed to demonstrate to the population that the mission is present, aware of the prevailing treats
and circumstances, and prepared to take action to protect them.
• Military and police presence, patrols (and use of force if necessary to protect during the course
of routine patrols6);
• Human rights monitoring;
• Conflict prevention and mediation; and
• Advocacy with armed actors, government forces, and other potential parties to the conflict in
order to affirm their responsibilities under international human rights and humanitarian law,
and show them that the mission is going to witness and report violations.
Pre-emption: When the level of threat escalates or where preventive activities are no longer enough,
actions to pre-empt violence against civilians include:
• Intensified political pressure and advocacy with parties to the conflict in order to diffuse tension
and prevent violence;
• Increased strength and visibility of military or police presence; and
• In some instances, limited punitive strikes/offensive operations (against negative forces with
a known history of attacks against civilians, and that have given the mission reasonable belief
that they are preparing to strike again). This both weakens the threat, and fortifies the credible
threat that is necessary to make deterrence effective.
Response: When a threat of physical violence becomes apparent and efforts to pre-empt that threat
have failed or are insufficient, more active measures are needed. At this stage, the violent behaviour is
already underway and steps must be taken to compel the aggressor to comply. This may require both
6) Failure in this regard undermines the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence.
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physical protection efforts and heightened political engagement at the local, national, and potentially the
international level. This is the stabilization of a post-crisis situation when the peacekeepers need to assist
the local population and the host authorities to return to a state of normalcy. Activities in this phase include:
• Liaison activities where UN-CIMIC can play an important supportive role;
• Documenting and investigating human rights abuses, etc.;
• Facilitating humanitarian access and/or creating conditions conducive to the return of refugees
and IDPs; and
• Re-establishment of ties between the community and governance institutions (including security
institutions) where necessary and possible.
Consolidation: This is the phase where UN-CIMIC can be of greatest assistance through its two
core tasks of civil-military liaison and information-sharing and civil administration to transition to
peacebuilding.
Hostile Intent
Hostile intent is one of the key concepts in the interpretation of POC mandates for UN peace
operations. Where armed actors have demonstrated a determination to attack civilians, the threat they
represent to the population does not dissipate between specific incidents. Rather, such armed actors
continue to represent an imminent threat until they lack either the intent or the capacity to inflict
violence against the civilian population. When faced with such adversaries, UN peace operations may
use force proactively to confront such threats, including through offensive operations. Such operations
must be conducted in accordance with the ROE that are drawn from the UN master list and adapted as
necessary for particular missions. In POC-mandated missions like UNAMID, these typically authorize the
use of force to protect civilians from hostile acts or hostile intent. Hostile intent is defined as:
“The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is

demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to
be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the
hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized.”
Whether or not hostile intent is demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the
basis of one or a combination of the following three factors:
1. The capability and preparedness of the threat;
2. The available evidence that indicates an intention to attack; and
3. Historical precedent within the Mission’s Area of Responsibility

(AOR).
These three factors, particularly historical precedent in the AOR, provide a basis for assessing whether
armed actors possess an ongoing hostile intent against civilians. Where ongoing hostile intent is assessed,
UN Rules of Engagement permit a wide range of defensive, stability, and offensive operations, including
opening fire without warning under some circumstances. While the degree to which offensive operations
are appropriate will vary according to the context, existing UN guidance and recent practice establish
189
broad latitude to develop and employ operational approaches that incorporate the proactive use of force
to seize the initiative and protect civilians. It is important to note that, while often critical, such operations
can only ever constitute one aspect of a comprehensive approach to address threats to civilians.
When thinking about ROE and the employment of military forces in POC, it is worth recalling the
three basic UN peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force apply in equal
importance. Additionally, the criteria on the use of force as identified in the Report of the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of 2004, discussed in Lesson 1:
• Seriousness of threat — Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and
• Proper purpose — Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt
or avert the threat in question?
• Last resort — Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
• Proportional means — Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action
the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
• Balance of consequences — Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being

successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse
than the consequences of inaction?
The Role of Formed Police Units (FPUs)
With respect to internal security and related rule of law challenges, FPUs play a vital role, as laid out
in Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:
“Public order management in most cases will be in support

of host State police, but FPUs can also be called upon to act
independently in accordance with the mission mandate and
authority allocated therein. The primary focus of public order
management is to facilitate the population’s exercise of their
fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified
hindrance and to prevent assemblies from threatening or
actually harming public safety. This is the most central
competence of FPUs and should be applied within a strict
legal framework and with the minimum appropriate use of
force, keeping in mind the principle of proportionality and the
necessity of continued negotiation... The effective execution of
this task depends on a sound threat assessment, as well as on
information gathering and knowledge of local conditions, which
should be sought through the information and analysis capacity
of the mission and the FPU itself, and in cooperation with the
host State police and other partners.”
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The protection of civilians is not a direct civil-military coordination mission. However, it is a mission that
it clearly supports, with both mission support and community support implications. In fact, civil-military
officers should be part of the planning team for POC operations, advising on civil-military opportunities
and risks, as well as implications for civilian and local partners and entities. In both planning and execution
of POC, they can liaise with key community leaders in conjunction with public information and education
efforts. They also support the protection of civilians through support of DDR and SSR. In any case, civil-
military officers should understand how POC applies in their area of responsibility, as this is a highly
sensitive political issue. In addition to UNPOL, the J9/U9 UN-CIMIC officer in particular should consult with
Political Affairs and Civil Affairs, as well as the J3/U3 and Legal Affairs officer on the force staff.
Section 7.3 Support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration (DDR) and Security and Defence Sector
Reform (SSR/DSR)
DDR
DDR is generally the process during which combatants are disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated
back into the community. It can have many adaptations. In the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the DDR process was referred to as Disarmament,
Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR) to accommodate the fact that
some of the combatants had to be repatriated to their country of origin, while others wished to be
resettled instead of being reintegrated back into their original communities. In Liberia, it was known
as DDRR, for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration. Each country may use a
slightly different version to address its specific needs.
Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian population. Disarmament
also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
Demobilization refers to the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces
or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual
combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designed for this purpose (cantonment
sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the
support package provided to the demobilized — or reinsertion, which is short-term assistance offered to
ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is
also a form of transition assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and
can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, etc. for up to one year. In a peace operation,
one of the critical characteristics of reinsertion is that the project falling under it can be funded from the
support account. Longer-term reintegration projects cannot be funded for that source and the partners
implementing the reintegration processes will have to raise funds in order to cover those costs.
Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable
employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open
timeframe, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development
of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. In
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The United Nations Organization

Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) DDR (disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration)
officer explains the process to
Rwandan ex-combatants ready
to voluntarily demobilize and
return back home, Kamina, DRC.
1 September 2002. UN Photo
#66074 by Yasmina Bouziane.
most UN field missions, DDR previous to reintegration is implemented by the DDR office of the mission.
While planning and implementation for disarmament and demobilization must be closely linked to
reintegration planning, the implementation of reintegration is often done through a partner such as
UNDP, but possibly the World Bank or the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
SSR
The Report of the Secretary-General on SSR (A/62/659) of 2008 defines “security sector” as:
“A broad term often used to describe the structures,

institutions, and personnel responsible for the management,
provision, and oversight of security in a country. It is generally
accepted that the security sector includes [defence], law
enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions
responsible for border management, customs, and civil
emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the
adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse
of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore,
the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing
and overseeing the design and implementation of security,
such as ministries, legislative bodies, and civil society groups.
Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the
security sector include customary or informal authorities and
private security services.”
The UN refers to SSR as “a process of assessment, review, and implementation, as well as

monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective
and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for
human rights and the rule of law.”7
7) DPKO, The United Nations SSR Perspective, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Security Sector Reform Unit (New York: United Nations,
May 2012), 1-3.
192
The DDR-SSR Nexus
In civil-military coordination, it is especially important to approach DDR and SSR comprehensively

and collaboratively along the “DDR-SSR nexus”.
According to the United States Institute of Peace Special Report on The Link Between DDR and SSR
in Conflict-Affected Countries, “DDR and SSR should be conceived as one.”8 This is because both “share
the same objective: consolidation of the [State’s] monopoly of force [and legitimacy] so that it may
enforce the rule of law. DDR and SSR programs rise or fall together, and therefore should be planned,
resourced, implemented, and evaluated in a coordinated manner.” Additionally, DDR and SSR should be
planned, resourced, implemented and evaluated in parallel, not serially. This mutually reinforces both
programmes by rapidly transitioning qualified ex-combatants into the new security sector, controlling
spoilers, and containing violence. Additionally, former combatants can benefit from security sector
programmes that provide for their welfare so they do not become a chronic source of instability.
The natural point of intersection for DDR and SSR is in the reintegration phase, as many ex-
combatants find employment in the security apparatus created by SSR. DDR helps ensure the long-term
success of SSR, as it shifts ex-combatants into the new security forces, where they no longer threaten
the State’s monopoly of force. If done properly, this reinforces the peace settlement by fostering mutual
trust between former enemies, encouraging further disarmament and transition into civilian life.
SSR helps ensure the long-term success of DDR by consolidating it, as security sector governance
includes ministry programmes that provide for the welfare of former combatants. This focus discourages
ex-combatants from becoming insurgents or joining criminal gangs. At the same time, effective SSR
produces professional security forces that can control spoilers and contain violence.
DDR and SSR together promote development by preserving resources and infrastructure, freeing
and managing labour, and supporting reconciliation that encourages investment and entrepreneurship.
They also promote the interests of women, minorities, former child soldiers, youth, and others who
should be supported in a consistent manner between the two programmes.
The UN Approach to SSR
Although DDR and SSR are linked, SSR is a much more comprehensive and complex undertaking,
as the definition of the “security sector” by the 2008 Report of the Secretary General on SSR clearly
suggests.
The United Nations SSR Perspective, published by the SSR Unit at DPKO/DFS, helps explain the UN
concept of SSR. Seen strategically through the UN Inter-agency Task Force, you can get an idea of the
areas of concerns the UN has with respect to SSR. The areas of concern shown in the chart below are
reflected at the field mission level.
This next chart illustrates the sector-wide approach to SSR at the UN field mission or operational
level. Sector-wide security sector support goes beyond critical, but narrow exercises like “right-sizing”
the security services or training and equipping uniformed personnel. Additionally, sector-wide assistance
addresses the combination of effectiveness and accountability in all security structures and processes.
8) The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries, Sean McFate, US Institute of Peace Special Report 238, May 2010; available at:
<http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR238McFate_DDR_SSR_Conflict.pdf>.
193
To that end, the SSR Unit assists peacekeeping and special political missions in support of efforts by
national authorities to:
• Facilitate national SSR dialogues;
• Develop national security and defence policies, strategies, and plans;
• Strengthen oversight, management, and coordination capacities;
• Articulate security sector legislation;
• Mobilize resources for SSR-related projects;
• Harmonize international support for SSR; and
• Monitor and evaluate programmes and results.
SSR is a form of transition management — specifically, institution-building in both security and

justice. In other words:
“We need to transform and rebuild the social contract upon

which rule of law and security institutions are predicated. Such
foundations are essential for sustainably addressing the fragility
of rule of law and security institutions and thus to solidify the
gains of peacekeeping and peacebuilding more broadly.”9
9) DPKO, The United Nations SSR Perspective, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Security Sector Reform Unit (New York, NY: United
Nations, May 2012), 51.
194
Civil-Military Coordination and DDR-SSR/DSR
As with POC, DDR and SSR/DSR are not direct civil-military coordination missions. This is a mission
directed by the civilian leadership of the mission leadership team, and supported by the peacekeeping
force under the direction of the Command Group. However, civil-military coordination can contribute
most decisively through its civil assistance function, particularly with respect to fostering a healthy civil-
military relationship in the civil society of that country. In the majority of situations, it is the breakdown
in the security sector where the greatest threats to peace and civil society reside. Through mindful civil-
military actions and projects, civil assistance in DDR/SSR can support the broader intent of helping to
embed host nation and community security institutions in civil society. This is why one should see SSR
as a development challenge as much as — if not more than — a security challenge. In fact, another
more appropriate term for SSR could be “security sector development”.
Building a healthy, transparent, and trusting relationship

between the uniformed instruments of national and public Quote »
security and the constituent population is often the key to
“Give a man a fish, and you
sustainable peace and stability. Civil assistance also promotes
feed him for a day. Teach a man
the civil-military relationship through the example of how it
to fish, and you feed him for a
performs its mission and applies the civil-military principles
lifetime.”
— among them the primacy of civil authority. The primacy
of civil authority is at the heart of peace and security, -Chinese Proverb
democratization, and security sector assistance in conflict
195
areas. It best addresses the real drivers of conflict and instability emblematic of “fragile states” that
illicit organizations look to exploit in the first place. Establishing a strong, sustainable civil-military
relationship that institutionalizes the primacy of civil authority and takes more of a peacebuilding
approach to security sector development is key to conflict transformation. From the more strategic
understanding of civil-military coordination, it becomes easier to see why the primacy of civil authority
must be integral to all security assistance efforts in peace operations. Encouraging a public service ethic
among host nation military and police as integral to their professional ethic, over time, helps temper
ill behaviour toward civilians and thus improves the civil-military relationship and the protection of
civilians.
The military (or defence sector) is normally a State instrument of security to protect a nation as a
whole from external threats, while police and paramilitary forces are essentially mandated to protect
the communities within that country from internal threats. This distinction is extremely important to
build the capacity of these respective security forces for their respective security tasks. A common
mistake is to conflate the build-up of the defence sector with that of the security sector, resulting in an
inappropriate build-up of internal military forces at the expense of police forces. This could result in the
same kind of overreliance on (external) military forces to address security challenges more appropriate
for internal security forces that happens in especially stabilization interventions. This could have a de-
stabilizing effect versus upholding the rule of law and the civil-military relationship.
In building the capacity of the security sector, there should be a clear emphasis on building the
capacity of host nation police forces and the rule of law in general, rather than military forces. Along the
same lines of the civil-military relationship in any peaceful and stable society, the division of security
development responsibilities between the peacekeeping military force and UN police forces should be
balanced and aligned. This is why UNPOL in general and FPUs in particular have a leading role to play
in DDR and SSR. Although individual police officers and special sections of UNPOL may be specifically
mandated to assist in the capacity-building and development of the host nation police...
“...Capacity-building is not one of the FPU’s core tasks, due to

frequent rotations and the absence of a standardised approach.
As a rule, if training experts on public order management
are required, they should be recruited separately and serve
with UNPOL capacity-building programmes in order to provide
relevant long-term expertise to build sustainable host state
capacity. However, FPUs under guidance and coordination of
the FPU training officer may be made available for exercises
and joint training with host state police. If the mandate and
the security situation allow for a diversion from the core tasks
into capacity building and if an FPU has dedicated training
capabilities, an FPU may support United Nations police capacity-
building programmes in the development of the host state
police, mainly in the area of public order management, on a
case by case basis.”10
10) DPKO, Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 1 March 2013, paragraph 18.
196
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) doctors helping a local patient. MINUSTAH’s Brazilian
Battalion conducted a Civil Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) operation in Bel-Air, once a slum dominated by
gangs in Port-Au-Prince. The operation provided medical and dental assistance, distribution of potable water,
and a soccer game between the Brazilians and the local population. 27 August 2005. UN Photo #87055 by
Sophia Paris.
A core aspect to consider is that many local security instruments normally have little to no trust or
credibility with the population, while the UN peacekeeping force and UN Police may have gained social
capital. As part of its overall transition management support process, civil-military coordinators must
conscientiously develop ways by which this trust can be transitioned from the UN forces to local forces,
gradually and deliberately, as part of the overall security transition plan using the “I drive, you drive”
method. These activities should begin much earlier in the life of the mission than often thought, as
transition to peacebuilding is a slow and uneven process that takes time and care.
Examples of such activities include, but are not limited to:
• In support of DDR, the use of a certain percentage of ex-combatants in labour-intensive

community support projects such as infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.), as well as quotas
for ex-combatants in vocational and agricultural training projects. However, care should be
taken not to create the impression that ex-combatants are benefiting from their status more
than the ordinary population, as that may create tensions between the population and the ex-
combatants that the mission is trying to reintegrate back into the community
• Assist with on-the-job training and capacity- and confidence-building assistance to local police or
other legitimate host nation security forces, especially in planning, operations, and intelligence.
Gradually expand the involvement of local security forces in UN security missions on behalf of
the government (joint patrols, civil service cash payment transport, VIP escort, border security,
etc.) in order to facilitate the eventual transition of these tasks. This could take years, and
invokes the “I drive, you drive” method.
• Assist these forces in the development and implementation of civil-military capability in order
to promote the civil-military relationship, to include UN-CIMIC staff officer training, attendance
of UN-CIMIC courses in-country, and their gradual involvement in UN-CIMIC projects as on-the-
job training and public confidence-building opportunities, again using “I drive, you drive”.
197
• Assist with security sector infrastructure and capacity development, to include Quick Impact
Projects (QIPs) improving police stations, train-the-trainer of local police in order to enhance
their public service and outreach capability to promote community policing, etc. Examples
of such legitimacy enhancement include: Red Cross first aid training; public education and
outreach on gender mainstreaming, sexual exploitation mitigation and rape prevention, HIV/
AIDS, and other public health awareness; environmental awareness; etc.
• Assist local security force gender mainstreaming through involvement by female uniformed
personnel in leadership mentoring and development, public education, and recruiting.
• Assist in building the capacity of local civil society organizations promoting the civil-military
relationship and civil dialogue, under the direction of the J9/U9. This could include supporting
seminars and discussions, ideally at universities and other established institutions of public
learning and discussion. Such events would be aired through UN and other media to incite
discussions on the role of the security forces in society, human rights, community policing,
gender mainstreaming, reconciliation topics, youth outreach, etc.
At the operational level, the Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9/U9) should maintain an ongoing dialogue with
Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, the DDR Office, and the Security Sector Adviser at the mission HQ to
determine the parameters and timing of such UN-CIMIC support, as well as with the Force Command
Group in general and Chief Operations and Plans Officers (J3/U3 and J5/U5) in order to articulate and
update guidance on UN-CIMIC support to DDR and SSR/DSR. UN-CIMIC should also coordinate closely
with UN Police to develop opportunities to indirectly assist UNPOL/FPU efforts to build police capacity
and confidence, and promote the rule of law and the justice sector.
Section 7.4 Military Support to Development

Civil-military coordination in every peace operations mission contributes to the linkage between
security and development, as well as with humanitarian assistance. In addition to the areas of civil
assistance discussed in this lesson, there are special areas of peacebuilding and development which
deserve particular emphasis with respect to UN-CIMIC in general and civil assistance in particular.
Here again, the human security and peacebuilding context in the UN Human Security Handbook and
the peacebuilding approach to analysis, mapping, planning, and implementation it articulates is most
helpful to framing civil assistance to development.
Among the most critical areas in this respect is the rule of law (ROL), which includes police, justice,
corrections, and legal representation. Whenever feasible, civil-military coordination should look to
support or implement projects and activities that help build the capacity of those institutions, as they
are central to both security and stability. Beyond UNPOL and FPU civil assistance to local police forces
and the use of QIPs to restore justice facilities, there are many other things that can be brought to bear.
One of these, mentioned in Lesson 6, is information sharing in order to substantiate local government
knowledge and database capacity in constituent and functional areas. This includes discreet sharing of
MEOM and especially UNMO, military, police, and other security-related reports and data on the civil
situation — through Civil Affairs — in order to build civil administrative information capacity, as well as
assist with local assessment, early warning, and monitoring of development progress.
198
There is civil assistance in regard to two of the most important and vulnerable segments of society
with respect to security and development: youth and women. Idle, unemployed youths gathering in
large numbers in urban areas or strategic locations in the countryside are ideal targets for recruitment
by spoiler groups — from criminal organizations involved in trafficking and other illicit activities to
terrorist groups. Youth — and specifically youth unemployment — is as much a peacekeeping or security
challenge as it is a peacebuilding or development challenge. UN-CIMIC community support should pay
particular attention to youth-related areas such as ex-combatants (as part of DDR), vocational and
agricultural training, education, sports, and youth mentoring.
More importantly, civil assistance, as part of civil-military coordination’s support to transition

management, should look to assist the build-up of government- or community-supported youth
organizations and offer services (such as vocational and agricultural training) through them to attract
young people away from real or potential illicit actors. In addition to skills training, military and police
can support the building of youth centres and local sports infrastructure, with concurrent “on-the-
job” training of youth in construction skills, as well as leadership mentoring. They can also assist with
organization of sports activities, training of coaches and referees, etc. This is where the idea of troop
participation as a morale-builder, mentioned before, particularly comes into play.
Gender Mainstreaming
Until recently, among the most underutilized comparative advantages of UN peacekeeping forces
has been female personnel. The base policy document for gender mainstreaming is UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security.11 It recommends that a “military gender
adviser should be appointed at mission headquarters in the Office of the Force Commander to support
mission-wide efforts to implement mandates on women, peace and security. The focal point can also
support liaison with the mission gender unit and local women’s organizations on UN-CIMIC activities.”
A robust percentage of UN-CIMIC and other civil-military officers, especially at the tactical level and
those liaising with internal actors, should be women. As the guidelines point out:
“UN-CIMIC activities to promote confidence-building with

the local population can be effectively implemented through
consultations between the military and local women’s
organizations in the area of operation. QIPs provide a good
way of engaging local women. When the military identifies
potential QIPs targeted at women and girls, these initiatives
should be discussed with the mission gender unit, which can
provide technical input and guidance to assist with successful
implementation of the project.”
11) Military guidelines on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) are available in Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations
Military in Peacekeeping Operations, referenced at the end of this lesson.
199
Gender mainstreaming should be integral to all aspects of military operations, to include security,
as the guidelines note:
“Security support activities take account (with respect to

planning and implementation) of the impact on women
and women’s role in and contribution to peace and security
processes. Monitoring and verification activities undertaken by
the military component of peacekeeping operations draw on
the contributions and perspectives of both women and men in
the host country... Confidence-building between the military
and the local population can be greatly enhanced by the use of
mixed teams. It can also increase access to local women, who
may feel more comfortable confiding in female peacekeepers
than their male counterparts, particularly in situations where
they may need to share information about rape. This principle
should also inform situations where the military is undertaking
investigations, as it could help provide reassurance and ease
tensions with regard to communication with the local population.”
Going further along the lines of security, with regard to the protection of civilians:
“Military protection activities, including all measures to

ensure the protection of civilians, to support the delivery
of humanitarian assistance and to protect UN facilities and
personnel respond to the priorities of both women and men. The
presence of female military personnel can also boost protection
and response strategies as local women and children may more
readily confide in female peacekeepers—this is particularly true
for victims of sexual violence. In the absence of female military
personnel, female police officers could work alongside male
military officers to ensure effective outreach to local women.”
As far as the civil-military liaison and information-sharing function of civil-military coordination goes,
“Military liaison activities in the area of operation foster an integrated approach to implementation of
mandates on women, peace and security”, specifically with regard to liaison with women’s organizations.
This can have many positive knock-on effects on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, such as:
“Collaboration between military peacekeepers and local

women’s organizations can enhance the implementation of DDR
programmes by also ensuring more targeted outreach to female
ex-combatants and women associated with fighting forces.
Collaboration with women’s organizations can also support
information-gathering activities related to the location of arms
caches being illegally stored or transported in the community.”
200
Beyond the involvement of female police and military personnel to promote gender mainstreaming
in local security forces, public education, and recruiting, one of the largest areas for civil assistance to
gender mainstreaming is in community support. As the guidelines explain:
“The mentoring role played by military peacekeepers towards

counterparts in the host country’s armed forces provides an
opportunity to lead by example, both in terms of the profile
of the peacekeepers as well as their standards of behaviour.
The deployment of female military peacekeepers can have a
role-modelling impact by facilitating increased recruitment of
local women to the national security forces. Of equal value is
the standard-setting role of military peacekeepers in terms
of conduct and discipline. Military peacekeepers should also
uphold the highest standards of military professionalism and
strictly adhere to the policy of zero tolerance in relation to acts
of sexual exploitation and abuse of the women and girls they
are deployed to protect.”
Youth
UN Security Council Resolution 2250 points out that “youth should actively be engaged in shaping
lasting peace and contributing to justice and reconciliation,” recognizing the opportunity that “a large
youth population presents a unique demographic dividend that can contribute to lasting peace and
economic prosperity if inclusive policies are in place.” It also recognizes that “the rise of radicalization to
violence and violent extremism, especially among youth, threatens stability and development, and can
often derail peacebuilding efforts and foment conflict.”
Resolution 2250 identifies the engagement of youth in peacebuilding through:
• The protection of youth as part of POC;
• Violence prevention among youth through peacebuilding activities that offer them alternatives
to becoming involved in illicit networks and activities;
• A multitude of partnerships across civilian, police, and military lines; social and economic
sectors; and public and private institutions and organizations; and
• Disengagement and reintegration, in particular, among DDR.
Military and police forces have a particularly important role to play due to the attraction many male
youths especially have to their organizational cultures — order, discipline, respect and perception of
power, physical fitness and sport, and hands-on training. Beyond Resolution 2250, an important tool for
peacekeepers looking to help stabilize youth is the toolkit developed by the United Network of Young
Peacebuilders. It approaches youth development from the view of the youth themselves.
201
Conclusion
In this section, we covered:
• The civil-military coordination (UN-CIMIC) function of civil assistance in terms of mission support
and community assistance;
• The principles, challenges, and opportunities associated with civil assistance;
• The concept of protection of civilians in terms of civil-military coordination;
• How the military and police contribute to security sector initiatives; and
• How civil assistance contributes to development-related initiatives that enhance transition of

mission focus to peacebuilding, using the “I drive, you drive” method.
• Human Rights and Human Rights and Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict Resolution, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Protection of Civilians, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Gender Perspectives in UN Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Implementation of the UN SCRs on Women, Peace, and Security – in Africa; in Asia and the
Pacific; and in Latin America and the Caribbean (three separate courses), Peace Operations
Training Institute.
• Preventing Violence Against Women, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Enhancing Good Governance In International

Development; United Nations Protocol; Introduction to the United Nations System; Introduction
to Security Sector Reform; Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians; Confronting
Trauma – A Primer for Global Action; Conflict Series 1 – What Is Conflict?; Conflict Series 2 –
Conflict Analysis. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.
• Mandated to Protect – Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations, (DVD - 2011) UNITAR;

available for viewing on You Tube at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRmasLzbkpU>.
• Side By Side – Women, Peace, and Security, (DVD - 2012), UNITAR; available for viewing on
YouTube at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a2Br8DCRxME>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1-10 of the Handbook. See also Local
Chapters 1-7.
202

• Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A practical field and classroom guide, by Colin
Gleichmann, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken and Adrian Wilkinson issued by the Swedish
National Defence College, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Norwegian Defence International
Centre and Deutshce Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit.
• “2250: A Youth Toolkit”, United Network of Young Peacebuilders, available at: <unoy.org/2250-
toolkit>.
Further References
• United Nations Security Council resolution 2086 (2013), United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, S/RES/2086 (2013), UN Security Council, 21 January 2013, available at: <http://
undocs.org/s/res/2086(2013)>.
• United Nations Security Council resolution 2199 (2015), Threats to International Peace Caused
by Terrorist Acts, S/RES/2199 (2015), UN Security Council, 12 February 2015, available at:
<https://undocs.org/s/res/2199(2015)>.
• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, United Nations (18 January 2008).

• United Nations Development Programme web page on Sustainable Development Goals: <http://
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/mdgoverview.html>.
• A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding (2011), available at: <http://um.dk/da/danida/det-goer-vi/udv-strat-indsats/
stabil/skroebelige-stater/~/media/502932B2CD29496390CECB833F2D30A6.ashx>.
• Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping, DPKO (2003), especially Chapter

XV on the “World Bank in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and Chapter XVI on “Recovery,
Development and Sustainable Peace”; available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/
files/peacekeeping-handbook_un_dec2003_0.pdf>.
• The Management Handbook for UN Field Missions, International Peace Institute (31 July 2012),
available at: <www.ipinst.org/2012/07/the-management-handbook-for-un-field-missions>.
203

• Civil Affairs Handbook, DPKO/DFS (March 2012), available at: <www.un.org/ en/peacekeeping/
documents/>.

withdrawal>.

• Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide, US Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations
Institute (January 2013).
• UNMIL Force HQ CIMIC Directive, 15 June 2009, including Annexes A-E. See the student portal.

• Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS, 1 March 2010,
available at: <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_
policy_032010.pdf>.
• Guidelines for Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations, DPKO/ Police Division,
DPKO/PD/2006/00015, 8 May 2006.
• Fostering a Police Reform Paradigm, Karen Finkenbinder, Robert E. Lowe, and Raymond Millen,
US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (June 2013), available at: <http://
pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/Fostering_a_Police_Reform_Paradigm.pdf>.
• UN Security Council resolution 1674, Protection of Civilians, UN Security Council, 28 April 2006,
available at: <http://undocs.org/s/res/1674(2006)>.
• Military Planning to Protect Civilians – Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center (September 2011), available at: <www.stimson. org/
images/uploads/research-pdfs/3_-_Military_Planning_To_Protect_Civilians_2011.pdf>.
• United States Institute of Peace Special Report 238, The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-
Affected Countries, Sean McFate, May 2010, available at: <www.usip.org/publications/the-link-
between-ddr-and-ssr-in-conflict-affected-countries>.
• The United Nations SSR Perspective, DPKO/DFS Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions
Security Sector Reform Unit, 2012, available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/
files/ssr_perspective_2012.pdf>.
204
• SSR and Peacebuilding – Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) to Peacebuilding
and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund, UN Peacebuilding Support Office (2012).
• Reconciling Security Sector Reform and the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Contexts,
Fairlie Chappuis and Aditi Gorur, The Stimson Center and Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), (Issue Brief No. 3, January 2015), available at: <https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dpko_dfs_gender_military_perspective.pdf>.
• UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security (31 October 2000),
• DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations
Military in Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS (March 2010), available at: <www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/documents/dpko_dfs_gender_ military_perspective.pdf>.
• UN website on Women, Peace and Security: <www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-

peace-security>.
• Youth and Millennium Development Goals website: <www.un.org/millenniumgoals/youth.

shtml>.
• UN Security Council resolution 2250, S/RES 2250 (2105), 9 December 2015.
• Particularized protection UNSC mandates and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
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1. Mission support refers to: 5. Which of the following would NOT be

considered mission support?
A. CIMIC activities that help local communities
B. Support extended to civilian agencies by the A. Providing transport assets
military component of a peace operation B. Undertaking a joint evaluation
C. Operations that aim at building confidence in C. Providing a local community with potable
the peacebuilding process water
D. Support provided to the military by the D. Providing a water purification plant to an
administration component international NGO
2. Community support refers to: 6. Which of the following is NOT an

example of a community support
A. CIMIC activities that provide public
initiative?
information to local communities
A. Provision of information and data on the
B. Cooperation extended to any civilian
civil situation, e.g., as obtained by UNMOs,
component by the military component of a
through Civil Affairs in order to improve local
peace operation
government capacity
C. Actions that are aimed at building
B. Boosting troop morale through participation
confidence in the peace process among local
in community support projects
communities
C. Vocational training, or other support, in
D. Military providing humanitarian assistance to
certain sectors, e.g. construction and
local communities
engineering, agriculture
3. The four stages of mission support are: D. Rehabilitation of sports facilities and venues
A. Joint planning, coordination planning, joint

7. True or false? The protection of civilians
coordination, and common objectives is not a UN-CIMIC mission. However, it
B. Operational coordination, collaborative is a mission that UN-CIMIC supports in
planning, objective commonalities, and both mission support and community
evaluation
support.
C. Evaluation, identify common objectives, joint

8. Which of the following is NOT a
planning, and operational coordination
motivation for UN-CIMIC support to DDR
D. Identify the common objective, collaborative and SSR?
planning, operational coordination, and
A. Help build a healthy, transparent, and
collaborative evaluation
trusting relationship between particularly the
uniformed instruments of national and public
4. Which of the following is NOT typically
one of the aims of community support? security and the constituent population
B. Win hearts and minds on behalf of
A. Building the capacity and confidence of
indigenous forces
internal actors to deliver essential services,
C. Help transition trust and other social capital
including security (i.e., localizing)
from the UN forces to indigenous forces
B. Transitioning mission focus away from
D. Promote gender mainstreaming through
peacekeeping to peacebuilding
uniformed women personnel involvement
C. “Winning hearts and minds”
in leadership mentoring and development,
D. Reducing the role of the military per se (i.e.,
public education, and recruiting
civilianizing) and facilitating its eventual
withdrawal
206
9. True or false? Youth is more a

development challenge, but with
important security implications that UN-
CIMIC must take into consideration.
10. Which of the following is NOT a way to

promote gender mainstreaming through
UN-CIMIC?
A. Liaise with local women’s organizations in
the area of operation
B. Deploy female peacekeepers in the
protection of civilians
C. Support and implement QIPs targeted for
young boys
D. Set a good example through troop behaviour
Answer Key »
1. B
2. C
3. D
4. C
5. C
6. B
7. True
8. B
9. False
10. C
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LESSON
Civil-Military Planning and
8 Project Management
Beyond having the right

mindset, effective civil-
military coordination
requires many skills.
Section 8.1 UN-CIMIC Project Management • Understand the principles and methods —
or rules — by which to conduct civil-military
Section 8.2 Quick Impact Projects
project management.
Section 8.3 Civil-Military Monitoring and
• Understand how to apply Quick Impact Projects
Evaluation
(QIPs) and other projects to civil assistance and
military support to transition management.
• Understand how to monitor and evaluate civil-

military effectiveness in order to enhance
focus on transition management and generate
operational and strategic support.
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LESSON 8 | Civil-Military Planning and Project Management
Women work on a project funded by the United Nations and other partners to rebuild vital roads in Oecussi, Timor-Leste. 10 September
2007. UN Photo #152382 by Martine Perret.
Introduction
Beyond having the right mindset, effective civil-

military coordination requires many skills. Among the
most important of these is project management, which
is really leadership in action. Civil-military project
management, however, differs from other forms in this
respect: civil-military coordinators use projects as a
means to facilitate transition management. As such, it
requires a coherent, coordinated, and complementary
approach.
The rules for managing such projects most closely

resemble the approach of development specialists. In
addition to the “I drive, you drive” method, among the
most effective transition management tools used by an
integrated peace operation are Quick Impact Projects
(QIPs), which are heavily supported by civil-military
coordination.
209
Measuring civil-military progress is critical in maintaining strategic support of the UN mission.

However, civil-military monitoring and evaluation is as much a look at the civil-military transition process
as the outcomes delivered because of the intervention of the UN team. How much delivery of essential
services is transitioned from external military forces to civilian partners and then to local authorities —
i.e., civilianized and localized — is, in many ways, more important than how much or how well service
delivery there is.
Section 8.1 UN-CIMIC Project Management
A Principled Approach to Civil-Military Projects
As discussed in Lesson 7, community support in civil-military coordination is by and large through

civil-military projects. Community support projects are where the core civil-military principles most
apply:
• The primacy of civilian authority;
• The military as enabler;
• The military as supporting and not supported;
• Indirect versus direct support; and
• Management of civil-military transition.
As with community support in general, the aim of civil-military projects is not to win hearts and
minds. The approach to civil-military projects is based on the principles of community support, invoking
the well-known proverb, “Give a man fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed
him for a lifetime”, as well as two mottos of UNMIL CIMIC:
»» “It’s not about us; it’s about them”; and
»» “Their game plan is our game plan.”
Being more a mindset, there are

many skills required for civil-military Civil-Military Community Support Project
coordination: liaison, coordination, Management Rules »
communication, assessment, and 1. Work by, with, and through civilian external actors.
other people-related skills. Among
2. Front-load local ownership of both the problem and
the most important of these is project
the solution.
management. Civil-military project
management, however, differs from 3. Remember, their outcomes and benchmarks are your
most forms of project management in outcomes and benchmarks.
this respect: civil-military projects are
4. Build in transition and sustainment.
not really military projects; rather,
they are military-supported projects 5. Synchronize capacity building with service delivery.
that help external civilian actors — and
6. Manage expectations and risks.
especially internal actors — plan and
implement programme objectives. 7. Do no harm.
This is because civil-military projects
210
are a way to facilitate transition management. It is the most demonstrative application of the civil-
military principles, and is an exercise of civil-military coordination as a form of strategic leadership.
Civil-military project management requires a coherent, coordinated, and complementary approach.

Because of that, the methods or rules to manage civil-military projects differ from most project
management. They more closely resemble the approach of development specialists. This is because civil-
military projects essentially support — or ideally, are integrated with — the initiatives of peacebuilders
and development organizations, within the appropriate frameworks set down by both external and
internal actors under the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).
Civil-Military Project Management – The Rules
As with civil-military coordination in general, the paradox of civil-military project management is

to engage internal actors in project management that builds their capacity and confidence — by, with,
and through civilian external actors — in such a way that it is really not a civil-military project but
a peacebuilding or development project supported by the military, even though the project may be
suggested by the military and most of the driving energy may at least initially come from the military.
In order to achieve this while mitigating the challenges and risks to engaging in civil-military
projects, there are some important considerations to make, methods to apply, or rules to observe —
regardless of the types of community support projects discussed in Lesson 7.
»» Work By, With, and Through Civilian External Actors
• Civil-military community support

projects should first be coordinated
Community Support Projects and
with appropriate UN lead agencies and Humanitarian Action »
members of UNCT, even if the proposal
Civil-military community support projects
originates within the force structure or
are not humanitarian projects, even if they
results from consultation with an internal
address a humanitarian concern. Civil-military
actor. If the project cannot be integrated
officers should not report them as humanitarian
with a current agency project, it should
activities, in order to maintain the distinction
be complementary with the initiatives
between humanitarian assistance and civil-
of that lead agency or civilian partner.
military projects.
Never have the military assume the
project lead — it is always in support.
If an agency cannot or will not accept the lead, then an NGO associated with that agency may
agree to be the supported civilian agency. This facilitates civilianization as well as maximizes the
chance for funding of the project. If a civilian lead agency cannot be found, this raises serious
concerns about the sustainability of the project.
»» Front-Load Local Ownership of Both the Problem and the

Solution
Local ownership of the project should begin at the start of the project management cycle — with
the assessment that leads to the nomination of the project. Community support projects must be
carried out based on the needs of the community, as identified and prioritized by the community — not
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The first day of school at Fatu-Ahi, Timor-Leste. The building, which was burned by rebels following the
independence referendum in 1999, had desks and benches made by Potuguese peacekeepers with UNTAET,
who also repaired the roof. 2 March 2000. UN Photo #31571 by Eskinder Debebe.
by the civil-military officer or any other external actor. Work closely with local partners through the
entire project management cycle, especially planning and implementation, and maximize opportunities
for them to take the lead and to determine the content in a phased, deliberate manner. The aim of
community support projects is to assist communities in taking control of their own lives and futures.
Civil-military projects should empower them — hence the idea of localization and the use of the “I drive,
you drive” method discussed in Lesson 7.
»» Their Outcomes and Benchmarks Are Your Outcomes and

Benchmarks
Make sure the outcomes of the project are tied directly to the benchmarks of at least the external
actor you are supporting, and preferably both civilian external and internal actors. For civil-military
projects, especially, it is important to show how the project builds the necessary capacity and confidence
of internal actors to fill public service gaps that have contributed to instability or insecurity in that
community. In addition to applying civilianization and localization, this facilitates transition management
and an exit strategy for the military from the project.
»» Build In Transition and Sustainment
Project design should have a built-in transition and sustainment strategy — identifying specific
points of greater civilian and local engagement, and showing how the project is self-sustainable after
the withdrawal of military support. This maximizes the probability that the investment and work by the
military will not become undone, re-creating the conditions that generated the problem originally being
addressed by the project. If a project eventually cannot be sustained by the community once military
support is withdrawn, then it is not worth doing in the first place.
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»» Synchronize Capacity Building with Service Delivery
If well-thought-out, planned, and coordinated, civil-military community support projects can

address capacity and service delivery gaps simultaneously, returning the investment and facilitating
transition management. One of the great military comparative advantages is the “train-the-trainer”
principle it applies, illustrated best by the “I drive, you drive” method. When providing infrastructure or
facilities rehabilitation, military personnel should engage local personnel as much as possible in on-the-
job training so they can learn these skills and eventually provide more of these services themselves.
For example, when military personnel provide vocational training, they should also look to train some of
the better students as future trainers, themselves. Another reason to work closely with internal actors
through the entire project management cycle is to expose them to basic project management and
problem-solving skills they can learn, sharpen, and apply in their own future projects.
»» Manage Expectations and Risks
As with any police or military operation, civil-military community support projects need to be
carefully thought through and planned to succeed, both tactically and operationally. Risk management,
in assuming the worst and planning and setting objectives accordingly — never over-committing — is
paramount. Success builds on success, so it is better to conduct a few projects with high impact and
the greatest chance of success rather than many projects that risk disappointment or disillusionment
with the peace process, like a commander spreading his force too thin along the line before going into
the attack. The battle here is mostly psychological. The greatest risk is to undertake a project because
the military component, or a specific unit, wants to be seen to have done something good, i.e. public
relations projects that “win hearts and minds”. Projects need to be determined by the real needs of the
local community or the civilian partners of the military components. If the project is really needed by the
community, and this project is eventually realized with the support of the military component or unit,
then the contribution of the peacekeeping mission will be highly valued. If the project is undertaken for
the wrong reason, i.e. to make the peacekeeping mission look good, the community is likely to feel used
and the mission is likely to lose credibility.
The second greatest risk is doing too much, i.e. taking over the project and determining its content,
the pace at which it is being carried out, etc. If the aim of the project is to build capacity and to be a
catalyst for the normalization of the local community structures, then they need to be given the space
to take the lead, determine the content, set the pace, and control the process. The wisdom of T.E.
Lawrence — “Lawrence of Arabia” — is especially relevant to community support. As with civil-military
coordination in general, quality is more important than quantity in civil-military projects. As mentioned
above, it is far better to complete a few projects the right way than to initiate many more incorrectly. In
other words, less can often be more.
There are numerous challenges and risks to civil-military projects. The first is to reach consensus on
assessment of what the problem is that the project is trying to address. Consultation with stakeholders
and beneficiaries can help narrow the gaps. A UN-CIMIC officer is also wise to defer to the judgment of
internal actors in order for them to take ownership of both the problem and the solution.
A greater challenge is securing funding for the entire life cycle of the project. This risk is best
mitigated in two ways — keeping the project short-term (over a period of weeks or months), and
213
supporting existing initiatives led by civilian external actors rather than creating new military-led
projects. Another challenge is evaluating and monitoring progress. Here again, the best approach is to
defer to measures agreed upon by the civilian actors, both external and internal.
»» Do No Harm
As part of risk management, it is also critical to consider and discuss with the local community
leaders and civilian partners what can go wrong. What are the potential unintended consequences that a
particular project may generate? Any project that involves the transfer of skills, goods, money, or assets
has potential risks of misuse or manipulation. It could be used by a faction to improve their standing in
a community, or cause tension between communities or elements, (like ex-combatants or returnees and
the host population). These potential consequences must be thought through and addressed. All projects
should be guided by the principle “do no harm”. A project that causes tensions or divisions in a community
is not worth doing. Not all unintended consequences can be foreseen. Civil-military officers must accept
that there could always be unintended consequences, and they should have processes in place to carefully
monitor the implementation of the project and the effects it is having, so that they can detect any
negative side effects as early as possible and, in consultation with their civilian and local partners, decide
what to do about them. Still, as in humanitarian work, they should strive to do no harm.
Perhaps the greatest two challenges are

the interconnected issues of local ownership Civil-Military Project Challenges »
and sustainability. Applying the rules of
1. Assessment
civil-military project management does not
guarantee local ownership and sustainability, 2. Funding
but they do structure the project best for that
3. Evaluation and Monitoring
possibility. An additional strategy is coordination
with public information and Civil Affairs to
4. Local ownership
reinforce the idea that the project belongs to
the appropriate governing community, or civil 5. Sustainability
society organization (CSO), which has the
greatest stake in project success or failure. With any civil-military project, it should be this governing
body whose credibility with the local community is on the line.
Practical Example: The Rehabilitation of a School
Civil-military project management can be illustrated in a fairly common example, such as the
rehabilitation of a school. Let us assume, for instance, that some UN-CIMIC officers, through their
interaction with teachers and local community leaders, learned there is a need to rehabilitate a local
school damaged during conflict or partially destroyed by fire. Although additional interviews with local or
internal actors may take place to substantiate the possible need for such a project, the UN-CIMIC officer
should make it clear that there is no commitment at this point, and that the project will have to come
by, with, and through the appropriate UN agency. In addition to applying the above-mentioned civil-
military principles and project management rules, it mitigates the possibility that the local community
may be playing the military off of civilian external actors to get what it wants.
214
Therefore, once the potential need has been established, the UN-CIMIC officers consult with the
appropriate UN Head of Field Office — who heads the Local Project Review Committee (LPRC) — and/
or UN agency, Civil Affairs, and/or UN-CMCoord officer. They will review existing projects and initiatives
in the education and related sectors, and determine whether or not the rehabilitation of this particular
school should be supported through one of those initiatives.
If the LPRC and the civilian agencies

agree that the military could provide a useful
contribution, then the UN-CIMIC officers
can start planning the project by engaging
with their external civilian partners and the
community through a forum or meeting with
the internal actors to discuss the project.
It is important to discuss the aim of the
project, how it will be sustained, and who
will take responsibility for the management
of the school, among other topics. It is also
important to get a clear consensus from the
Members of the Brazilian Engineering Battalion of the United
community and civilian partners on the role of Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assemble a
the military in the project. Typical roles could bridge to improve access to Boucan Carre, a small village 60 km
north of Port-au-Prince. 1 October 2009. UN Photo #416809 by
be facilitating the application of QIP funds or
Marco Dormino.
(once approved) providing on-site supervision,
skilled manpower, and equipment. Funding sources for building materials and other expenses must be
identified, and could come from QIPs, or directly from an agency or NGO. Additionally, the community
must be engaged as much as possible to manage the project, to provide labour, etc.
The UN-CIMIC officers should also consult with agencies and NGOs active in the education sector,
such as UNICEF and Save the Children. Sometimes, agencies like UNICEF or UNHCR may rehabilitate
schools as part of a programme to assist with the reintegration of refugees into their communities of
origin. The consultations must be aimed at finding out:
• If there are other initiatives underway to rehabilitate schools, and if so, if this school is included
in those plans;
• If there are any existing policies or guidelines that will have an impact on the project, such as
the number of classrooms required for a school of that size;
• If there are any other initiatives that can be synchronized with the project to enhance desired
effects, especially sustainability — for instance, UNICEF often has projects to train teachers. It
is especially important to confirm that the appropriate authorities will support the operation of
the school once it has been rehabilitated — paying teachers, providing teaching materials like
books and stationary, among other things; and
• Whether there are opportunities to combine this project with other projects not directly related,
such as vocational training for carpenters, plumbers, and electricians; youth employment for
day workers; etc.
215
The UN-CIMIC officers should help the community develop its project proposal and submit it to
the appropriate potential sources of funding. These can be mission QIPs, or the projects organized by
the government, a UN agency, or NGO. Local ownership should be emphasized — it is ultimately the
community’s project, not UN-CIMIC’s. As part of the plan, outcomes and benchmarks should be clearly
outlined, as well as milestones and transition points for military withdrawal and the sustainability plan
for the project after that withdrawal occurs. The plans should also contain a risk management plan,
considering factors that may slow the project down, such as property or other disputes, seasonal issues,
or cultural events.
The UN-CIMIC officers should also be coordinating with community or CSO staff counterparts on
the feasibility of military support, while keeping the chain of command briefed on the development of
the project, with a clear identification of how the project addresses a major mission/force concern.
Ultimately, the commander must approve military support and participation.
Once all the necessary approvals are in place, the UN-CIMIC officers should facilitate the appointment
or selection of a project management or steering committee that will oversee the project. The steering
committee should include local community leaders; the UN Civil Affairs officer; relevant UN agency and
NGO representatives; the UN-CIMC officer; an engineering officer; the battalion, company, or platoon
commander responsible; UNPOL and local police; and other stakeholders.
In most cases, the military unit will supply only technical expertise, tools, and equipment not readily
available in the market place — for example, nails and roof sheeting. All materials that can be locally
procured, such as timber, should be obtained locally, and all labour should be organized locally. If such
a project is properly coordinated with others, the military unit will also be able to leverage support
from other elements in the mission. For example, the project may be able to make use of the resources
available under the QIP schemes, and it may be able to make use of a “Food for Work” scheme, under
the auspices of the World Food Programme, or one of its implementing NGOs, to reward the labourers
with food.
UNPOL, including Formed Police Units, could also play an important role in engaging and working
with local police forces. They could serve as a capacity-building measure, promote community-oriented
policing, and plan and implement police security for the school, its staff, and pupils, as deemed necessary,
using the “I drive, you drive” method an in accordance with the Guidelines on Police Operations in
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions.
The LPRC, project management, or steering committee should monitor progress, deal with
unforeseen developments, and evaluate the project upon completion. They should assess if the project
has achieved its objectives and identify best practices or areas of improvement in future projects.
The successful completion of a project of this nature is likely to achieve much more than the
rehabilitation of a school. It helped build capacity and confidence in community leadership, the credibility
of external actors, general stability and security, and a positive view of the peacekeeping force. For
sample civil-military project management guidelines and project management outline, see Appendix C.
216
Senegalese engineers with the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) test
a new water pump for the single well in Kuma Garadayat, North Darfur, as part of a Quick Impact
Project to assist the village. The Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs of UNAMID, Aïchatou
Mindaoudou Souleymane, visited Kuma Garadayat and introduced residents to other components of
the Project, including the construction of a school with fourteen classrooms, a new clinic, youth centre
and women’s centre. 2 February 2012. UN Photo #503530 by Albert González Farran
Section 8.2 Quick Impact Projects

UN mission Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are funded by the peacekeeping budget and intended to
provide a flexible disbursement facility to support local level, non-recurrent activities in the areas of
health, education, public infrastructure, and social services — all on short notice. These services are
designed to fill capability gaps in partner organizations and to support building local capacity in order
to sustain public confidence in the peace process, paving the way for peacebuilding and development.
The United Nations developed the concept of QIPs to fill the need for supporting short-term, local-
level, small-scale projects in peace operations. QIPs are not unique to UN peace operations. The idea
was introduced first by UN agencies like UNHCR. In the context of peace operations, however, supporting
these small projects could make an impact on the ability of communities to cope with the immediate
post-conflict transition, contributing greatly to the overall momentum of the peace process.
In the past, such initiatives were funded only if they were part of a larger humanitarian or
development programme. Such programmes typically take months to progress from the original
proposal to implementation. To address this, DPKO obtained approval to include funding for QIPs in
the peacekeeping budget of most new missions for the first year. In some cases, DPKO has facilitated
the creation of trust funds that are open to voluntary contributions. As a result, the SRSG now has
an amount of money at his or her disposal that can be used to support small deserving transition
management projects.
217
Funding for QIPs is not intended for

General QIP Procedures »
large infrastructure projects. Instead, they
focus on low-level, one-time improvements 1. PRC recommends, SRSG authorizes
over several months and have an easily
2. CMS/DMS acts as Certifying Officer
identifiable and immediate local impact.
On average, a UN mission may receive
3. Humanitarian Affairs (HA) or Civil Affairs
between USD $300,000-$1.5 million for
Officers, with assistance from UN-CIMIC officers
QIPs per year. However, that generally
in some cases, identify projects
diminishes as the mission transitions its
focus from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. 4. HA or Civil Affairs Officers prepare project
Most projects last about three months and proposals and submit them to the Secretary of
cost about USD $50,000. Such projects the Project Review Committee (PRC)
include, but are not limited to:
5. Secretary of PRC/QIP Unit distributes proposals
• Enhancing potable water, sanitation,
to members of the PRC
shelter, and health services in
areas that may not be covered by 6. PRC meets and makes recommendations to the
humanitarian agencies; SRSG
• Assisting with repairing medical

7. Minutes of the PRC meeting to be endorsed by
facilities and schools, and
the SRSG for authorization
provision and maintenance of
critical equipment and supplies; 8. MOUs entered into with implementing partners,
• Refurbishment of local police where applicable
stations, court houses, and
9. Finance to distribute start-up funds as per QIP
other government buildings, and
SOPs and approved project documents and MOU
provision of critical equipment
such as a generator;
10. HA or CA Officers prepare progress reports and
• Support for small-scale agriculture request additional payments when due
and animal husbandry;
11. Projects to be monitored by QIP Unit
• Urgent repairs to bridges and roads;
• Restoration of electricity to critical 12. QIP Unit to report and CMS/DMS to certify
areas; completion
• Promoting HIV/AIDS awareness;
• Emergency repairs to domestic shelters for displaced persons; and
• Publication and distribution of posters/leaflets as part of a larger mine and UXO awareness
public information campaign.
In order to help create work and restart economic activity through injecting a small sum of money
into the local community, QIPs must involve beneficiary contribution and participation. They should not
be biased to a particular community or party and should be technically feasible and appropriate in terms
of available skills. Finally, QIPs should be cost-effective.
218
Procedures for Identifying, Approving, and Implementing QIPs
Civil-military officers should consult the DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Quick Impact Projects for
procedures to identify, obtain approval of, and implement QIPs, as well as specific mission guidance. As
with all civil-military project management, UN police and military contingents are encouraged to help
identify potential projects in their areas of responsibility, in close consultation with the beneficiaries,
community leaders, and their Civil Affairs and/or CMCoord colleagues. Any mission component or
At the local level, the Head of Field Office and the LPRC is usually the first layer of approval for a QIP.
section may identify and propose QIPs. Such proposals should ideally be the result of a multi-functional
After that the proposed project is considered at the mission level by the Project Review Committee
team effort. Once
(PRC). a project
The PRC consistshas been identified,
of representation from thea civilian,
project proposal
police, should
and military be prepared
components and is and submitted
headed by the SRSG or DSRSG. After reviewing the project, the PRC may give final approval. The
for approval.
Budget Unit & Finance Section will then disburse funding and accounts for expenditure.
UNMISS
UNMISS QIP Flowchart
QIP Flowchart
Meet county stakeholder & authorities for sensitization
Preliminary Receive proposal

phase
Desk study of
proposal Accept Reject
Re-submit
Field assessment &
verification Reject
Accept
Technical assessment
Reject
Accept
Preparatory
phase Summarize proposal & organize PRC meeting
Inform Applicant
No
PRC recommendation
Yes
Sign MoU
Release 1st advance

Feedback to IP
Monitoring and supervision
IP submits progress report & request 2nd advance

Implementation
phase
Request IP to re-
Reject
submit progress
Verify progress
report
Accept
Release 2nd payment
IP submits final report & request final payment

submit final report
Request IP to re-
Reject
Verify final report
Accept
Completion phase
Final payment
Handover ceremony
219
A mother and her children smile and

make funny faces for the camera inside
their home in the small town of Clay
Ashland, Liberia. The town is where the
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) built a new
magistrates’ building, one of its Quick
Impact Projects, or QIPs, which refurbish
or construct courthouses, police stations,
and police barracks, to strengthen the
rule of law in the country. 20 July 2011.
UN Photo #482583 by Staton Winter.
At the local level, the Head of Field Office and the LPRC is usually the first layer of approval for a
QIP. After that the proposed project is considered at the mission level by the Project Review Committee
(PRC). The PRC consists of representation from the civilian, police, and military components and is
headed by the SRSG or DSRSG. After reviewing the project, the PRC may give final approval. The
Budget Unit & Finance Section will then disburse funding and accounts for expenditure.
In most UN missions, the QIPs Management Team (QMT) manages QIPs on behalf of the SRSG,
including project oversight and implementation, as well as monitoring, evaluation, and documentation.
The QMT is usually staffed by Civil Affairs, Mission Support, and other civilian officers, along with UN-
CIMIC and other military and police representatives. In some cases, UN-CIMIC officers may assist with
QIP identification, facilitation, and monitoring. The procedures for QIP submission and implementation
differ slightly from mission to mission. Regardless, the general flow of QIPs is fairly consistent.
Section 8.3 Civil-Military Monitoring and Evaluation
UN Mission Monitoring and Evaluation
Among the most nettlesome problems in peacebuilding and development is evaluating and
monitoring progress. This is especially true in civil-military coordination because of the need to measure
progress being made on the ground and gauge how well civil-military coordination itself is doing.
In general, the country strategy or ISF of a UN peace operation should be supported by a coordinated
monitoring and evaluation system. Such an inter-agency initiative should not only provide feedback on
individual and overall progress, but also encourage programmes and agencies to participate in the
overall mission coordination process. All components — civil, police, and military — should report on the
steps they took to synchronize their plans and operations with the others in the system and with the
overall objectives of the mission. In this way, the evaluation process encourages and rewards behaviour
that enables coherence, and discourages and sanctions behaviour that prevents coordination. Civil-
military monitoring and evaluation also falls under this rubric.
220
Another important element is the ability of the system to monitor its effect on the environment.
The project cycles of different programmes and agencies need to be synchronized to ensure that their
combined and cumulative effect on the host society is positive. Projects must be consistent and delivered
at a rate that can be absorbed by the local communities. When the ultimate aim of the operation is
sustainable peace, then the overall strategy and pace of its implementation must reflect the optimal
relationship between delivery and absorption.
As with assessments and reports, civil-military officers in particular should avoid unnecessary
overlap when monitoring and evaluating. For example, if UN-CIMIC monitors and evaluates anything, it
should monitor and evaluate the civil-military transition process in terms of civilianizing and localizing.
Measuring Progress on the Ground
With respect to the first challenge of measuring technical or project progress, the best approach
for civil-military officers is to defer to measures agreed upon by the civilian actors, both external and
internal. This promotes civilianization and localization; ownership of both the problem and the solution
by internal actors; and the military’s work by, with, and through civilian partners. Again, as with project
management in general, the motto of “their game plan is our game plan” comes into play.
Civil-military peacekeepers should use

these measures to keep their chain of command
informed of the progress being made by both
external and internal actors. However, they need
to be mindful of the difference between inputs,
outputs, and outcomes. An input refers to the
resources invested to achieve an output, such
as a certain number of persons and equipment.
An output refers to what was generated as a
result, like how many water wells were dug in
a province over the last month. The outcome
refers to the effect, such as how many persons
A group of 25 observers with the UN Supervision in Syria
or families now have access to potable water (UNSMIS) conduct a fact-finding mission in the Syrian village
(both in total numbers and as a percentage of Mazraat al-Qubeir, where a massacre of civilians reportedly
took place on Wednesday. 8 June 2012. UN Photo #516499 by
of the population). Ultimately, the outcome is
David Manyua.
what is most important.
Additionally, an important qualifier is to determine how many of those wells can be maintained
by the local community as opposed to being dependent on an external actor to come around every
so often to maintain or repair it. Yet another qualifier may be independent wells created in areas
of strategic importance or sensitivity. To use another example from the school rehabilitation project
discussed earlier:
• Inputs would refer to the efforts the community, agencies, and the military contributed to
rehabilitating the school, including the funding that was obtained;
• Outputs would refer to the school that was rehabilitated, or even specific parts of the school,
like classrooms or store rooms, one ablution block, etc.; and
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A member of the Portuguese Formed Police Unit (FPU), at left, with the UN Integrated
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), leads the Timorese Police’s special company officers in a
public order training exercise, in Dili, Timor-Leste. 11 January 2012. UN Photo #501804 by
Martine Perret.
• Outcomes would refer to what was achieved with the project, e.g., 100 children who were not
going to school are now going to school again; three teachers are now employed; the community
has now established a standing project steering committee and is already looking into the
new project; for the first time women were included in a project steering committee of this
nature; the project provided labour for 20 men and women from the local community, including
five ex-combatants and three recent returnees, and has contributed to the ex-combatants and
returnees being reintegrated into the local community, etc.
The point is to the effect of specific projects and initiatives not only on the outputs achieved, but
especially by the effects or outcomes generated as a result. Likewise, when evaluating a project in the
first place, the major consideration should be the outcomes.
This kind of information is important to UN-CIMIC officers in order for them to fulfil their
responsibilities of assessing the civil and civil-military situation and identifying threats, challenges, and
opportunities for continuing and future UN-CIMIC action. As the chapter on measures of effectiveness in
the NATO CIMIC Field Handbook emphasizes:
»» “Your measurements are part of a bigger picture!”
Measuring UN-CIMIC Effectiveness
While the progress of the UN integrated mission and its peacebuilding and development efforts are
valuable in helping the commander understand the civil-military situation, it is only half the story. The
commander also needs to know what kind of progress is being made in UN-CIMIC’s mission to enable
the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This includes building the capacity and confidence of
internal actors, reducing dependency on the peacekeeping force, and facilitating the military end state
of withdrawal under the right conditions. As the NATO CIMIC Field Handbook notes: “If the effects and
actions are not linked to the commander’s objectives, or are not clearly set out in writing, measuring
your effectiveness is nearly impossible.” In short, the commander needs to know what progress is being
made on actions, activities, or projects the military is supporting and are being civilianized and localized.
222
One way of evaluating this is to take a look at each of these actions, organized by geographic area
and functional line of effort or “pillar” (reflecting the same organization of peacebuilding activities used
by external and internal actors). This is done by asking two basic questions and then assigning a colour-
code, typically: the “traffic light” colours, which are often preferred in the military — “green” indicating
optimal conditions, “yellow” indicating fair conditions, and “red” indicating unfavourable conditions. The
two questions are:
»» Who has the management lead in the project? If it is the UN

military force, then the situation is “red”; if it is an external
actor, then it is “yellow”; if it is an internal actor, then it is
“green”.
»» Who is providing at least 50 per cent of the project effort (in

terms of money, material, and manpower)? Or, put another
way: Who is actually delivering the service in question? Again,
if it is the UN military force, then the situation is “red”; if it is
an external actor, then it is “yellow”; if it is an internal actor,
then it is “green”.
Combining these two answers can give you a sense of whether the activity or project is transitioning
toward the desired end state, which lines of effort are transitioning in certain sectors, and so on, as the
presentation of information is desired. Note that this does not cover outcomes or the capacity that is
being developed. What is being measured here is progress in civil-military transition rather than effects.
Additionally, capacity building is implied by how much local content is in the project or who is delivering
the service.
Naturally, there are many qualifiers to these information points, such as multiple capacity-building
effects. In the example, these could include how many local carpenters, masons, and electricians
received on-the-job training due to refurbishing the police station, how many persons received temporary
employments, and so on. The local sustainability of the project must also be considered.
Another factor is confidence: how much or how well did the project improve the confidence of local
governing bodies to deliver additional services in the future? How well is the activity being perceived by
the community and how has it changed their perception of local governing bodies? In addition to Civil
Affairs, one good source of estimating this effect is the local media and UN public information. As noted
earlier in this course, perception can be reality.
Qualifying information such as this is largely anecdotal, as the NATO CIMIC Field Handbook observes:
“Anyone can observe actions and effects; it could be a CIMIC

team, a project manager [e.g., Civil Affairs, CMCoord, MEOMs,
etc.]. Observation is as individual as each event... Deliberate
assessment through interviews, polling, and surveys of those
who participated in the events is as important as with those
who observed the event (a CIMIC team or project manager, for
example). It is now your challenge to evaluate and validate the
observations.”
223
Reporting and Presenting the Information
The above dissection could help determine the information sets to be provided in civil-military
reports, discussed more generally in Lesson 6, which could include, in addition to a general assessment
of the civil situation:
• External activities and outcomes;
• Assessment of civil assistance activities and projects; and
• Public attitudes towards internal and external actors.
In presenting the information in a report or civil-military operations briefing, the assessment of both
progress on the ground (outcomes) and progress in civil-military transition could cover specific projects
in each line of effort or pillar or an aggregate assessment of activities and projects for each pillar within
a given sector.1
The key is to make the information supportive rather than duplicative of civilian-led assessments,
report more specifically on the civil-military situation, and be as understandable as possible — without
either oversimplifying or overcomplicating it. As there is no exact science to civil-military reporting,
there is no exact science to measuring progress or effectiveness in civil-military coordination. It is
driven by the mission mandate and the situation at hand more than anything. In general, the purpose
of presenting such information is to enhance civil-military mission focus on transition management,
and generate operational (command and civilian partner) and strategic (UN Security Council and donor
country) support for the UN peace operation.
CIV-MIL
PILLAR OUTCOMES OVERALL
TRANSITION
Security Sector
Economic Development
Rule of Law
Infrastructure
Youth
1) See the chart at the bottom of the page for an example of this.
224
»» Again: “Your measurements are part of a bigger picture!”
For further example of how to present such information in a UN-CIMIC operations briefing, consult
Appendix G.
Conclusion
• The principles and methods — or rules — by which to conduct civil-military project management;
• How to apply Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and other projects to civil assistance and military
support to transition management; and
• How to monitor and evaluate civil-military effectiveness in order to enhance focus on transition
management and generate operational and strategic support.
225
• Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission, Peace Operations
Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Fundamentals of Risk Management/Advanced Risk

Management; Introduction to the United Nations System; Conflict Series 1 – What Is Conflict?;
Conflict Series 2 – Conflict Analysis. For more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.

Ownership in Security – Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches, in particular Chapter 7.

Further References

• United Nations Development Programme web page on Sustainable Development Goals: <www.
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>.
missions>.

• Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), DPKO/DFS Guidelines, Ref. 2012.21 (21 January 2013), available
at: <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO_DFS_revised_QIPs_2013.pdf>.
• Civil Affairs Handbook, United Nations DPKO/DFS (March 2012), available at: <https://
226

withdrawal>.


Operations and Special Political Missions, 1 January 2016
• Military Planning to Protect Civilians – Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, The Henry L. Stimson Center (September 2011), available at: <www.stimson. org/
images/uploads/research-pdfs/3_-_ Military_Planning_To_Protect_Civilians_2011. pdf>.
• CIMIC Field Handbook, 3rd Edition, NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence
(2012), available at: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CIMIC-
Handbook.pdf>.
227
1. Civil-military project management 6. Which of the following is NOT a strategy

differs from most other forms of project for limiting risks to UN-CIMIC projects?
management because _____.
A. Consult with stakeholders and beneficiaries
A. it promotes the common operational picture and defer to the judgment of the internal
B. UN-CIMIC projects are nominated and actor
managed by UN-CIMIC officers, even B. Keep the project relatively short-term
though they are under the name of a civilian C. Support existing initiatives led by civilian
organization external actors rather than creating military-
C. UN-CIMIC projects are projects that UN- led projects
CIMIC helps both external and especially D. Let the military take the lead on the project
internal actors to plan and implement
D. it helps to externalize the peace process 7. Which of the following should NOT be a
goal of the successful completion of a
2. What is the main reason UN-CIMIC project?
officers conduct civil-military projects? A. Building capacity and confidence
B. Dependency and victory
3. Should UN-CIMIC officers report
C. General stability and security
UN-CIMIC projects as humanitarian
activities? D. The credibility of external actors
4. Which of the following is NOT a rule for 8. QIPs are aimed at supporting _____.
civil-military project management? A. small, random projects
A. Work by, with, and through civilian external B. small, selected projects
actors C. large, random projects
B. Front-load local ownership of both the D. large, selected projects
problem and the solution
9. Which of the following is NOT one of the
C. Identify the “winning hearts and minds”
generic steps for implementing QIPs?
benefits for the force
A. The CIMIC officer helps identify the projects
D. Their outcomes and benchmarks are your
B. The project proposal is submitted for
outcomes and benchmarks
approval
5. What is the average length and cost of a C. The Secretary-General approves the proposal
typical QIP? D. The QIP unit monitors the implementation
A. Three months, USD $50,000
B. Six months, USD $75,000
C. One month, USD $50,000
D. Six months, USD $50,000
228
10. Which of the following is NOT a key

question to ask when evaluating civil-
military transition?
A. Who is managing the project?
B. Who is providing most of the effort?
C. Who is really delivering the service in
question?
D. What outcome(s) should the project
generate?
Answer Key »
1. C
2. They are a way to facilitate transition

management.
3. Civil-military community support projects

are not humanitarian projects, even if
they address a humanitarian concern.
Civil-military officers should not report
them as humanitarian activities, in order
to maintain the distinction between
humanitarian assistance and civil-military
projects.
4. C
5. A
6. D
7. B
8. B
9. C
10. D
229
LESSON
9 Civil-Military Communication
Civil-military coordination
is inherently information-
and communication-
intensive.
Section 9.1 Civil-Military Coordination and • Understand the applied relationship between
Public Information civil-military coordination and public
information.
Section 9.2 Cross-Cultural Communication
• Discuss the importance of cultural awareness
Section 9.3 Working with Interpreters
and the role of a cultural framework in a UN
Section 9.4 Negotiations and Conflict peace operation.
Mitigation
• Understand how to communicate in another
language through an interpreter.
• Understand basic principles and techniques

of effective communication, negotiation, and
mediation.
230
LESSON 9 | Civil-Military Communication
A display of campaign material distributed by members of the Brazilian battalion of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), as part of the activities of the joint campaign with the National Police in Haiti, warning children of the dangers of playing
with life-like toy guns. 5 December 2007. UN Photo #163545 by Logan Abassi.
Introduction
Civil-military coordination is inherently information-

and communication-intensive. Beyond that, the
operations environment, being largely psychological,
requires a close synchronization of civil-military and
information activities. The kind of work that civil-
military coordination engages in has many opportunities
for media exposure. Civil-military officers should work
closely with military and civilian public information to
maximize the effect of their activities at international
and local levels.
Communication in a peace operations environment

is much more challenging than communication under
normal circumstances. The end result can be far more
important than one would imagine at first glance. Civil-
military coordinators communicate on a daily basis with
people from other cultures — among external as well
231
as internal actors — at times without a common first language, and at times under threatening, stressful,
or tense situations. In this environment, every civil-military operator needs more communication and
negotiation skills than the average military officer. The key to successful communication and negotiation
in the context of peace operations is awareness and preparation. How to work with and make use of
interpreters in a negotiation is another essential skill.
Section 9.1 Civil-Military Coordination and Public Information
The Role of the Media in Peace Operations
We have all heard of the so-called “CNN factor” — that is, how the political will to intervene in a
conflict is stimulated by international media attention, or how media coverage of a tragedy is able
to increase the attention such a crisis receives from donors, UN Agencies, NGOs, and internal and
regional bodies. The media can play a significant role in conflict situations. Their reporting can generate
international attention that may result in increased political will to support the peace process or increase
the flow of humanitarian and development assistance. Within a country recovering from conflict, the
media and public opinion leaders can also play an important role in keeping the public informed of
progress and setbacks in the peace process. As such, they are a critical factor in building positive
momentum for the peace process. Unfortunately, the media can also be a tool for violent extremists in
stabilization settings.
Civil-military operators must understand that contemporary media organizations are businesses.
They tell stories to sell advertisements and gain market share. Given this understanding, civil-military
officers — like public information officers — should not be afraid to engage the media, nor should they
assume that the media is hostile or friendly. The media is an opportunity. They want stories: either
provide them, or they will find their own. Obviously, the former is better than the latter.
Another growing dimension of the contemporary media is social media, which civil-military officers
must likewise learn to understand and engage effectively.
The Public Information Component in UN Peace Operations
Each multidimensional UN peace operation has a Public Information Office (PIO) responsible for
handling interactions with foreign, local, and social media. The PIO develops and manages the mission’s
communications strategy, assists the foreign and local media, engages through social media, and
ensures that the local population is informed about the mandate and the peace process. The PIO may
operate its own radio station or broadcast on local stations, produce video material for television and
social media, and publish information through brochures, posters, pamphlets, websites, and social
media pages — all in a number of local languages. In most mission areas, non-media methods of
public communication, especially in rural areas, are equally or more important than mass, electronic,
or social media. When possible, civil-military coordinators and PIO should jointly engage local means
to deliver messages. It is always better to have someone else tell the mission’s story. This is one
reason why the PIO employs local staff (usually journalists) with good knowledge and understanding
of local customs and traditions.
232
In most cases, the peacekeeping force also has a military public information unit, with military
public information officers attached to sectors and contingents. If they are present, there should be a
close working relationship between UN-CIMIC and the civilian and military public information units to
ensure that the operations have a coherent communications strategy.
The Relationship between Civil-Military Coordination and Public Information
Civil-military coordination and public information are closely linked in the information-intensive,
24/7 media-sensitive, and culturally sensitive peace operations environments, with related opportunities
and risks. The combination of civil-military coordination and public information creates integrated and
synergistic effects — both positive and negative. The most important effects regard host country public
confidence in the peace process and the local capacity development process. Perception is key.
In an operational environment that is largely psychological, the relationship between civil-military

and public information operations is critical to achieving desired outcomes and transitions. Public
information efforts multiply the information effects of civil-military operations. Civil-military operations,
in turn, are an important multiplier to public information. Civil-military activities are often a source
of positive news stories on mission progress, which could have an effect on public perceptions at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
“It’s not about us; it’s about them.”
It is important to recall, however, that civil-military coordination is less about “winning hearts
and minds” and more about building local confidence in their own government. In other words,
one should not conduct civil-military operations simply to get good publicity (such activities usually
have the opposite effect). When they are done for the right reasons — to civilianize and localize the
peace process — then that effect can be multiplied with good public information and media coverage.
Furthermore, civil-military operations can support public information activities through civil-military
liaison and information sharing with external and internal actors at the tactical and operational levels,
and through its assessment of the civil-military situation, including target audiences, messaging, and
assessing message effects.
Objectives of Public Information »

• Ensure the peace operation’s mandate and responsibilities are fully and widely understood;
• Promote all aspects of the work of the peace operation to the national and international
community;
• Implement a communications strategy that actively supports the peace operation’s

objective;
• Advance the peace process through the creation of timely and relevant information
products;
• Defend and protect the peace operation from unjustified criticism and misinformation; and
• Counter propaganda, false information, and hate messages that are harmful to the
objectives of the peace operation and peace process.
233
CIMIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION:

INTEGRATED EFFECTS
Effects on the
Information Domain
CIMIC Public Information
UN MISSION
Moreover, the behaviour of all peacekeepers can have the greatest impact on local perception of the
peace process. Positive behaviour reinforces the ability of the peace operation to help move the peace
process forward and fosters trust with the local population. Negative behaviour undermines the reputation
of the peace operation and its parent body, thus weakening the peace process. Parties to the conflict can
exploit negative behaviour and use it to delay the peace process. In addition to the usual guidance on,
for example, HIV/AIDS or sexual exploitation, UN-CIMIC officers should be prepared to help commanders
communicate cultural “dos and don’ts”, as well as main information themes to the troops.
While there are benefits to greater integration or coordination between civil-military and public
information operations, there are also risks. Gaps and distortions in the information and cultural domains
of the multidimensional mission environments of today can not only create counterproductive effects,
they may even translate into physical dangers for both military and civilian personnel where violent
groups working against the mission are present.
For example, the media or the PIO may wish to report on a civil-military project in a way that
demonstrates the good deeds that the UN mission has done. This may undermine the specific project
or the overall objective of the mission, or harm the standing of the force or unit with the community.
Civil-military officers should try to guide the media and PIOs to civilianize and localize their message,
for example, by pointing out to the media and PIO that the community itself contributes the bulk of the
effort to achieve a particular outcome, and that the peacekeeping mission has merely played a catalytic
role. Essentially, there is a risk that the media and PIO may undermine the civil-military principles
because they misunderstand the indirect role the force, and civil-military coordination in particular,
plays in the peace process.
234
Moses Obi (front), Interim Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan (UNMISS), speaks with the press after his tour of Pibor to assess the security situation, mainly
pertaining to child abduction and cattle raiding. 9 August 2011. UN Photo #482296 by Isaac Billy.
For this reason every civil-military plan, activity, or project should have a public information element.
Although public information is integral, civil-military operations should not be undertaken solely for the
purpose of generating media coverage.
Direct Civil-Military Engagement of the Media: Interview Guidelines
In keeping with civil-military principles, civil-military operators should work by, with, and through
PIO officers as much as possible. However, there are times when the PIO may wish to use UN-CIMIC
officers as spokespersons, or media may appear at an event unexpectedly and request an interview. In
UN operations, take note that the Secretary-General encourages transparency and openness with the
media. This means that civil-military coordinators — and all peacekeepers for that matter — may talk to
the media about their own work or area of responsibility in a factual manner.
Nobody is required to speak to reporters if they do not want to. Peacekeepers may decline politely
if they wish. However, past experience shows that troops who talk to the media about their work can
be effective in conveying positive messages. When talking about their work, mission personnel should
know the mission’s main information themes and relate them to their own jobs. They should always
be professional, factual, and impartial in their demeanour. They should display a positive attitude and
speak respectfully about the local population.
UN peacekeepers should remember they are international public servants, as discussed in Lesson
1. They represent the UN and their country 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Their behaviour and
anything they say may be perceived as the opinion of the UN or their country. Accordingly, they should
take care to provide information as authorized, and not give opinions on matters for which they are not
directly responsible. Because of media and social networking technology, an interview or news coverage
of an event may be broadcasted to millions of viewers on the Internet across the world.
235
Media
DOs DON’Ts
Speak to the media about your work. Don’t try Don’t offer your personal opinion about the
to give information about something you are peace process or about the peace operation.
not directly responsible for;
Don’t answer questions that are speculative,
Plan beforehand what you will say to the such as “What will happen if…?” Speculations
media. Focus on three or fewer key messages are just that;
that you want to convey;
Don’t give any information about the
Always use the facts. They cannot be refuted; operation’s security plans or procedures, and
don’t give any information on incidents that
Refer reporters to the public information unit are under investigation or that will require an
if they ask you any questions that you are investigation, such as a car accident;
unable or unauthorized to answer;
Don’t give names of persons who have been
Always be polite with the media, even if they injured or have died until their next of kin has
appear rude or unfriendly. They may be under been informed; and
pressure to get the news. You should always
keep your professionalism and maintain a calm Don’t appear to support or favour one side
and polite attitude; and over the other; remember at all times that you
are impartial.
Be brief and precise. If your answers are too
long or unclear, the message you want to
convey will be lost.
Interview Techniques
The basic rules for handling an interview are few and simple:
• Do not be intimidated by the camera or the reporter. When speaking to a reporter, look directly
at the person interviewing you, not the camera;
• To avoid making mistakes or losing face with a wrong answer, listen carefully to each question. If
necessary, ask the reporter to repeat themselves, and take the time to compose your response;
• Speak naturally and focus on the facts, avoiding exaggerated movements;
• Decline to answer questions you are not authorized to, or which you may not be sure of;
• Saying “No comment” may give the reporter and the public the impression that you are trying
to hide something. It is much better to answer “I don’t know”, or to refer the question to
someone who may know more about the issue;
• Answering with only “yes” or “no” can give the same impression. Use short sentences. For
example, answer the question “Do you like your work?” with “Yes, I enjoy my work with the
UN”, or a similar short and clear answer;
236
• The expression “off the record” may suggest that what you say is only for the reporter’s own
background information and may not be directly quoted or attributed. However, there is no
guarantee that it will not be used in some form. If you do not want something reported, do not
share it in any form; and
• If you are unsure whether you can say something or how to say it, simply ask yourself: “Do I
want this to be on the front page of my hometown newspaper?”
Section 9.2 Cross-Cultural Communication
Traumatized Populations
Keeping in mind that the peace and security environment is ultimately more psychological than
physical, the context of interaction — at both organizational and personal levels —is often as important
as content. Hence the significance of culture and cross-cultural communication, as well as the idea that
“it’s not about us; it’s about them” in that process. War and conflict can bring out both the best and
the worst in people. Most populations in conflict and post-conflict situations are traumatized by violence
and upheaval. Although peacekeepers need not have the same level of expertise as peacebuilders who
specialize in dealing with traumatized populations, this fact is worth remembering. For example, the US
Department of Health and Human Services’ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) offers a useful framework for a “trauma-informed approach” based on six key principles
rather than a prescribed set of practices or procedures. These principles may be generalized across
multiple settings and include: safety; trustworthiness and transparency; peer support; collaboration
and mutuality; empowerment, voice, and choice; and cultural, historical, and gender issues.1
Cultural Awareness
Culture is acquired through the process of

socialization. We learn relative values and appropriate Cultural Framework »
behaviours from our community members. One level Everyone involved in a peace
of culture deals with obvious or observable aspects — operation — from those planning the
clothing, language, food, etc. mission, to the military and civilian
There is another level that we cannot always see, peacekeepers deployed to carry it out,
which includes our shared ideas, beliefs, and values. to the local population in whose territory
These usually become apparent when people from it is carried out — is part of a cultural
different social systems interact. framework. This framework provides the

context within which the actors’ belief
Civil-military operations work in the spaces between
and actions are constructed, expressed,
cultures — between the international or UN culture and
interpreted, and understood.
the host nation or local culture, as well as between the
peacekeeper’s own culture and the local culture.
In order to be sensitive to other cultures, we first need to recognize our own prejudices and be
aware of the limitations, lenses, and interpretations our cultural context places on us. After that, we can
begin to understand the difficulty people from different cultures have communicating with each other.
1) See the SAMSHA website at <https://www.samhsa.gov/programs>, as well as Modules 1 and 6 of the Civil-Military Police Handbook cited at the end
of this Lesson.
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Peacekeepers and international public servants need to be sensitive to the perception of our actions by
the local culture. We are guests in their country, and it is our responsibility to understand and respect
their cultural context. For the peacekeeping mission to be respected and have a positive impact on the
host population, we need to first earn their respect and appreciation.
Our world is increasingly multicultural. Individuals do not embody a single culture. Rather, they
are influenced and formed by multiple cultures. Underlying group identity also has a strong impact
on the way we experience culture — age, gender, class, profession, and religion all affect who we are
as human beings. Culture colours everything we see or do. Our perspective and experience are filters
through which we interpret events, and it is impossible to leave our cultural lenses behind during our
interactions.
Failing to understand the host country and its culture makes it difficult to understand the problems
facing the mission. If you do not understand the problems, you will not be able to help resolve them,
transition them to local ownership in a sustainable way, and thus facilitate the end state of the mission.
That is why civil-military coordination concentrates, as its approach to transition management, on
civilianizing and localizing efforts to keep and build peace. It is why civil-military assessments and
project management begin with an understanding of the problem — and thus of the solution — first and
foremost from the perspective of the beneficiary.
SENDER RECEIVER
Idea Transmit CHANNEL Receive Own Idea

Message Message
Possible “Noise”
It is also worth remembering the importance of understanding the country and cultural context in
terms of the three success factors to peace operations discussed in the Capstone Doctrine — legitimacy,
local ownership, and credibility. Given these factors, it is clear that understanding the country and cultural
context for peace operations — and especially the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding — is
likewise paramount.
A major service the J9/U9 in particular can provide is producing a country and cultural “dos and
don’ts” reference, in coordination with Civil Affairs, Political Affairs, MEOMs, NGOs, and other partners
with greater knowledge of the mission environment.
Making Judgements
Human beings frequently make generalizations about, and attribute characteristics to, people. We
create stereotypes. When we do this with cultural groups, there is a danger of developing negative
stereotypes, which leads to prejudice.
238
Ryszard Wroblewski (Poland, left)

and Ma Roedy (Indonesia, right),
patrol officers for United Nations
Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG), stop by various
houses to interview locals in the
Gagida village in Abkhazia region.
1 March 2004. UN Photo #49198
by Justyna Melnikiewicz.
A cycle of prejudice begins when we judge other cultures by our own set of standards to define
the world around us. Lack of knowledge or an unwillingness to learn can create misunderstanding or
even conflict. Prejudices are often based on imperfect information and are normally filtered through
an individual’s background and experience. The only way to break this cycle is to be aware of cultural
differences and try to understand their origins. When working in an environment as culturally diverse as
peacekeeping, we must question our own cultural expectations to avoid forming prejudices.
Communication
Language is culturally specific. Any language contains cultural undertones. You may not be aware of
a specific meaning or always understand an example or idiom that another person uses. In such cases,
it is always advisable to ask the person to repeat himself or herself, or express himself or herself in a
different way. Idiomatic language should be avoided as much as possible when communicating with
someone from another culture.
Peacekeepers should also be aware that humour does not easily cross cultural boundaries. What is
considered humorous in one culture can cause offence in another.
Body language, or non-verbal communication, is highly important — it conveys things words do not.
Certain gestures have different meanings in various cultures. Some gestures are safer — a smile is unlikely
to be misunderstood, while a polite handshake between people of the same sex is accepted in most cultures.
Cross-Cultural Communication
Culture is the collective worldview a group of people have developed over many years to make sense
of the world around them and to order their society accordingly. Your own culture may be different from
that of the community in which you serve as a peacekeeper, but you should understand it in the context
of that community’s history and environment. Guard against judging another culture as right or wrong,
or as good or bad, using your own as a yardstick. Again, as pointed out in Lesson 6: Look, listen, and
learn.
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The foundation for effective cross-cultural communication is respect built on trust. The golden rule
is to do nothing that will offend the other culture, as you would want them to respect your own.
Professional, humble, friendly, and respectful conduct is unlikely to cause offence in the local community.
Take note that every culture has developed customs and traditions to regulate formal communications,
like negotiation and mediation. Civil-military operators should find out what these cultural expectations
are, and try to shape the way in which they conduct negotiations to reflect local customs and traditions.
Translators and interpreters are good sources of cultural information.
Communicating in Another Language
Our languages are extensions of our

cultures. It requires great cultural sensitivity
Brief the Interpreter on How You
and knowledge of culture and language to
Want to Have Things Done »
correctly translate not only words, but also
the context, content, emotion, and meaning
• Use short sentences;
of the words when interpreting a conversation • Consider beforehand the physical position
between two people with different languages of the interpreter;
and cultures. Interpreting (thinking in two • Look at the other party when you speak
languages simultaneously) is far more difficult to them, not at the interpreter;
than translating.
• Interpret word-for-word what is said;
Most translators and interpreters in peace
• Do not analyse — the interpreter
operations are not professionally trained. They
may explain the culture or context
are people with some knowledge of the mission
where necessary to you, in addition to
language (in most cases English) and local
interpretation; and
languages, and have been hired by the UN as
• Discuss confidentiality issues.
language assistants. This does not mean that
they are not dedicated to their role — just that
they are not professionally trained interpreters.
It is thus quite possible that much of what you are saying to the other party is not being conveyed
and understood in the same way that you said it or meant it. Much of what you understand about what
is being said by the other party may also not be very accurate.
Consequently, one should assume there may be a “fog” of misunderstanding and misinterpretation.
If something sounds out of context or does not make sense, check it for accuracy by paraphrasing or
repeating it. Remember to allocate twice the expected amount of time when conducting a meeting,
negotiation, or mediation involving interpretation.
While it is good for civil-military coordinators to learn the local language, it could be more useful to
learn a few key phrases to demonstrate interest in the language and culture, rather than to pretend that
your knowledge of the community is expert. Knowing how to say “please” and “thank you” opens more
doors than most other expressions.
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Gender and Youth
In any form of communication, it is extremely important to be aware of one’s audience at all

times. With respect to gender and minorities, make sure both verbal and non-verbal communication is
inclusive, respectful, empowering, and mainstreaming rather than unintentionally divisive. Remember
that marginalizing certain groups can be a driver of conflict and instability.
It is also worth remembering the criticality of youth as a major source of both conflict and peace.
It is important to understand how young people view the situation and the process and how they can
see themselves as part of it. When communicating with young people, keep in mind how Security
Council Resolution 2250 frames the engagement of youth. The toolkit the United Network of Young
Peacebuilders has developed is especially helpful because it approaches youth development from the
view of young people themselves.
The Importance of Personal Behaviour
When communicating in a UN-CIMIC capacity, civil-military

operators should always be mindful of their own behaviour. Issues to Consider »
One cannot simply “talk the talk” about human rights, sexual • Language reflects culture;
and gender-based violence, respect for others, and other
• Expected misunderstandings;
issues. Civil-military operators must demonstrate their own
commitment to these values, as spelled out in the UN Code of
• Position of the interpreter in
society (at home); and
Conduct. As mentioned in Lesson 1, civil-military coordination
is an exercise in leadership, and its most powerful form is by • Dangers for the interpreter.
example. This more than anything is what makes civil-military
coordination integral and central to peace operations.
When coaching civilian staff, police, or soldiers on what is appropriate behaviour in a foreign country,
simply pose two questions those individuals should ask themselves:
• Would I do this if I were performing my mission in my own neighbourhood back at home?
• Would I want to see what I’m doing on the front page of my hometown newspaper?
Unless the answer to both questions is “yes”, the behaviour should probably be avoided. These two
questions should frame the civil-military cultural “rules of engagement” for most soldiers.
Section 9.3 Working with Interpreters

To avoid miscommunication, you should make the work of the interpreter as easy as possible by
avoiding the use of:
• Long sentences;
• Technical terms and abbreviations (where this is unavoidable, discuss the terms with the
interpreter beforehand so that they can look them up in a dictionary and prepare an appropriate
word or phrase in the local language);
• Culturally specific idioms; and
• Jokes and humour. (Humour does not often translate well.)
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Mrs. Nane Annan (left) talks with one of the mothers, through an interpreter, at a child feeding centre
run by Médecins Sans Frontières, when she toured the facility in Zinder, Niger. 23 August 2005. UN Photo
#85803 by Evan Schneider.
Communicating Through an Interpreter
Given their usual lack of formal training, it could be helpful to tell an interpreter what they should
say and how they should act. Civil-military operators should not show disrespect towards the host
country, religion, people, leaders, culture, or food in front of interpreters. They also should not show
disrespect to any of the parties in the conflict situation in front of interpreters. Think of the interpreters
and other local staff as ambassadors to the local community. Interpreters are normally influential in
their communities because they are often better educated than their peers. Interpreters and other
local staff stay within their own communities, and family and friends are likely to ask them about their
experience working with the peace operation. The personal safety of interpreters should also be taken
into account, and they should not be exposed to situations that may result in reprisals.
Practical Steps
Interpreters should be briefed on where to stand and sit during communication, taking into account the
local culture and religion, which may have special requirements. For instance, the position of the hands and
feet often have a meaning of their own. The seating and standing plans should be worked out in advance.
To reduce confusion, it is a good standard practice for civil-military operators to always sit or stand with the
interpreter immediately behind them, and slightly to their right. There are several reasons for this positioning:
• If you have worked out hand signals with your interpreter in advance, you will not be seen
touching your interpreter with an inappropriate hand during the negotiation; and
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• By having your interpreter slightly off your right shoulder, it will force your negotiating partner
to maintain eye contact with you. Your interpreter is a colleague and should not be given more
importance than that. Allowing your negotiating partner to maintain eye contact solely with the
interpreter de-emphasizes your importance as the lead negotiator.
Eye contact is important for civil-military operators as well. Look at the person you are speaking to,
not the interpreter, and keep eye contact or show that you are focused on the other person in whatever
way may be culturally appropriate when they are talking, even if you do not understand the actual words.
The interpreter should repeat verbatim what is being said, not just provide a summary or evaluation.
Neither should they analyse, edit, or judge what is being said. It may be helpful for interpreters to
explain the culture or context, where necessary, but they should make a clear distinction between the
interpretation and the contextualization.
Additionally, it is most beneficial to the outcome of the meeting or negotiation to bring a note
taker. The note taker would usually be someone from your unit that you work with on a daily basis and
who is subordinate to you in rank. The note taker records the points of agreement and disagreement
during the meeting or negotiation. However, the note taker has other functions as well, such as being a
timekeeper. At the conclusion of the meeting or negotiation, you can use the note taker to read back the
points of agreement only. Do not get bogged down rehashing points of disagreement. If possible and
appropriate, get your negotiating partner to initial the points of agreement as a record.
What You Should Expect of Interpreters
Interpreters are expected to:
• Translate messages as literally as possible to make the same sense in the other language;
• Use the same tone and inflection as the speaker;
• Speak in the first person;
• Present a professional appearance;
• Speak for approximately the same length of time as the speaker;
• Understand and translate military jargon; and
• Be prepared and know the general subjects and topics.
Ensure the interpreter is on time and at the right place. Rehearse with them, make them part of
your team, invest time and interest in them, and know his/her religion, background, and their own
history in the hostilities. Practice with the interpreter, group your words in short bursts, and speak
succinctly and simply. It may take extra time to get your message across. Plan for it.
Be aware that interpreters get tired, so plan periodic breaks. Also, remember to maintain eye-to-eye
contact. Look at your counterpart, not at the interpreter. Act normally and speak as if the interpreter is not
there. Your interpreter should work with you to establish leader/interpreter signals (e.g., a tap on arm to
stop talking). Make sure your commander and fellow officers are familiar with how to work with interpreters.
Choose your interpreter for the specific occasion and try to be culturally aware at all times. Make sure the
interpreter’s sex matches the cultural context. Do not use a much younger person when your counterpart is
older and holds a respected rank in a community, tribe, or sect where age is an important factor, especially if
243
Peacekeepers from the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) speak with the
local population near Bhimbar UN Field Station, Pakistan, as visible representatives of the UN. Their mandate was
to be a neutral party in the India and Pakistan situation. 20 October 2005. UN Photo #99349 by Evan Schneider.
your interpreter is from the same community. Try not to use an interpreter from a community, tribe, or sect
that your partner may find offensive. Uniformed personnel should never ask interpreters to wear a uniform,
but protective gear under hazardous circumstances may be appropriate.
Section 9.4 Negotiations and Conflict Mitigation
Why Are Communication and Negotiation Skills Necessary?
Soldiers are primarily trained for war, but peace operations are different in a number of critical
ways:
• In peace operations, you are impartial. You are not part of the conflict; you are there to help
end it on equitable terms of consent;
• In war, the aim is victory (which is zero-sum, or someone wins and someone loses). In peace
operations, the conflict itself is the enemy, not the parties involved, and your aim is to assist
them in achieving peace. You have no enemies or opponents in peace operations. You work with
the warring parties to build trust and achieve peace in a win-win fashion, as a diplomat might;
• In war, one wants to surprise the enemy,

and wears camouflage and attempts to Conflict Management Cycle »
conceal presence, strength, and movements • Identify potential violent disputes;
from the enemy. In peace operations, your
• Make an appraisal of the situation;
visible presence — blue helmets and white
vehicles — and transparency emphasize your
• Design a response;
role as a neutral third party and helps to • Undertake the intervention; and
instil confidence in the peace process among • Evaluate the outcome/feedback.
the parties and local people. Typically, you want
the parties to know your strength, and you will
inform them of your movements; and
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• In war, one achieves victory by destroying or defeating the opponent through combat operations,
while in peace operations, you achieve peace by containing the conflict at manageable levels
and preventing it from becoming violent again. The primary tools you will use to manage the
conflict are communication and negotiation.
This is especially true in the case of the civil-military operator. Civil-military operators are the
designated focal point for communication between their agency, unit, or headquarters, with the
host community, civil society, government representatives, and fellow external actors — such as
UN humanitarian and development agencies and NGOs. Communication with these individuals and
organizations involves both formal and informal conversations on a daily basis, as well as formal
negotiations, often in the form of meetings. As a matter of last resort, civil-military operators may have
to chair or facilitate these meetings. It may be wise for UN-CIMIC officers to bring along a Civil Affairs,
CMCoord, or UNPOL officer who could assist with negotiation and mediation.
Negotiation and Mediation
Negotiation is not capitulation. Some people, especially soldiers, associate negotiation with giving in
to the demands of the party they are negotiating with. For instance, we will often hear people say: “We
will not negotiate with terrorists.” What they mean is that they will not give in to their demands, but in
most cases the authorities do negotiate with the terrorists to secure the release of hostages, and so on.
Negotiation describes a process, not an outcome. Negotiation is communication with the aim of
reaching an agreement. Any communication with the aim of reaching an agreement is a negotiation.
Every time you are communicating with one or more persons with the aim of reaching an agreement,
you are negotiating.
Mediation is the intervention into a dispute by an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who
has no authoritative decision-making power — in many respects, a facilitated negotiation. Mediators
assist parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable agreement. If you are called upon to assist two
parties to reach an agreement, you are mediating between the two parties. In other words, mediation
is a negotiation that you are facilitating. The more the negotiation is going on directly between the two
parties rather than through the mediator, the better. As in most applications of civil-military coordination,
both negotiation and mediation are a form of adaptive leadership.
Basic Communication Techniques
The following basic communication techniques are useful in most communication and negotiation
situations.
• Emphatic Listening – Listen actively and with understanding, even if you do not agree with what
is being said. Be alert and focused on the person speaking. Do not speak to your colleagues
when the other person is speaking, even if you are waiting for interpretation.
• Paraphrasing – Listen and restate in your own words what another person is saying. For instance:
“So, what you are saying is...?”
• Communicating Openness – Be open to hearing the perceptions and needs of others, even if
you disagree with what they are saying. For instance, by exploring their ideas: “How would that
work if...?”
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• Reframing – Shift the focus from positions to interests, encouraging flexibility, and expressing
something in a different way. For instance: “In other words, what you want is...?, or “Let me
make sure I understand what you mean... Is that correct?”
• Non-Verbal Communication – Acknowledge non-verbally that you are willing to listen (eye
contact when culturally appropriate, body focused on the person); pay attention (do not look
away); hear what is being said (nod); smile when appropriate; and show genuine interest in
solving the problem at hand. It is important to remember that non-verbal communication is
culture-specific. Make sure you know what your non-verbal communication means in the local
context, and avoid taboos. Interpreters can provide guidance in this area.
Negotiation in the Peace Operations Context
Whenever civil-military operators negotiate with other parties in the context of peace operations,
the subject of the negotiation is likely to fall into one of the following categories:
• Negotiating the freedom of movement

of peacekeepers, NGOs, or local Negotiation »
population through an area controlled Negotiation is communication with the aim of
by one of the parties — such as at a reaching an agreement.
roadblock — or the direct protection of
civilians;
Mediation »
• Discussing relationships or roles between
the peace operation and the parties or Mediation is the intervention into a dispute
local authorities — for example, a patrol by an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third
moving through a village; party that has no authoritative decision-

making power. It is a facilitated negotiation
• Resolving disputes with or between parties
and a form of leadership.
and local people, villages, or communities
(depending on the mandate); and
• Civil-military partners meeting among themselves or with parties, the local authorities, or community
leaders to coordinate a specific event — for example: a marriage or other traditional ceremony in a
sensitive area, making arrangements for a vaccination campaign, coordinating the return of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees, or coordinating humanitarian relief distribution.
Factors that influence the outcome of a negotiation
Successful negotiation depends on your understanding of the following three factors:
• Understanding the Commander’s Intent and Interests - Civil-military operators need to have a
clear understanding of their Commander’s intent and interests — essentially what they want to
achieve out of the negotiations. In the context of peace operations, those interests will derive
from the mission’s mandate, the unit’s policies, and the instructions provided;
• Understand the Interests of Other Parties - Civil-military operators need to anticipate and understand
what the other parties’ interests are and what they want to achieve out of negotiations. This can be
done to a large degree by studying previous statements and actions to detect any changes in policy.
The focus should be on identifying their real underlying interests, not their stated positions, and
advising the Commander on what the other parties might actually want; and
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• Understand the Cultural and Historical Context within which You Operate - Being sensitive to
the cultural and historical context in which they operate can help civil-military operators avoid
critical cultural mistakes, improving credibility and acceptability, and building trust.
Guidelines for the Facilitator
»» Fair Process
The facilitator should be an advocate for the principles that underlie collaborative decision-making
processes, including structuring and managing the process to ensure maximum representation and
effective participation by all key stakeholders. They should not dominate. An effective facilitator is like
a good referee: they only step in when necessary. A poor referee breaks the momentum of the game.
»» Neutrality and Impartiality

Military-Specific Meeting Considerations
The facilitation process should be for the Facilitator »
impartial, if not neutral. In this context, • Sanitize your meeting space, as well as routes
neutrality means not intervening in the in and out;
process to achieve a particular aim,
• Ensure that there are no maps, troop
other than to facilitate the process, and
identification materials, or stray documents
impartiality means not taking sides.
lying about;
The facilitator should not become an
advocate for any particular point of view • Provide security for visitor’s weaponry;
or position. If it is necessary to advance a • Provide security for your own weaponry;

UN policy, let a colleague make the point. • Need to search visitors (at what level?);
You cannot be a credible facilitator and a
• Decide on the use of recording devices; and
party to the process.
• Identify cultural differences of a military nature.
»» Informed Consent
The facilitator has an obligation to ensure that all the parties understand the nature of the process,
the procedures, and the role of the facilitator.
»» Confidentiality
In some cases, one or more of the parties may confide in the facilitator. Maintaining confidentiality
in these situations is critical for the credibility of the facilitator, especially in a dispute resolution process.
Dealing with Problem Situations
Even under the best circumstances, problems can occur. There are a number of things to do when
a problem may be emerging. One option is to do nothing. It is not always necessary to intervene, and a
premature intervention may actually worsen the situation. However, if it is a potentially serious problem,
it should be dealt with as early as possible. You will have to make a risk assessment and judgement call
yourself, and act accordingly.
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Peacekeepers of MONUC escort the members of the Ituri-based Patriotic Force of Resistance (FRPI) militia, to
the negotiation meeting with the representatives of the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to
pave the way for the disarmament and integration of FRPI combatants into the national army. 18 November
2006. UN Photo #133052 by Martine Perret.
The key to dealing with problem situations in a meeting is to change the dynamics. One way to
do that is for the facilitator to address the problem. Take aside the individuals involved for a private
discussion, change the facilitation style, or call for a break. Another option is to involve the whole group
in seeking a solution. Make the group aware of the problem and ask their advice on how to deal with it.
One of the most difficult situations to handle is when an argument breaks out in the group. Discourage
a back-and-forth exchange between two people by moving the discussion away from personalities and
reminding them of the problem they need to solve collectively.
Preparing for Negotiation
Preparation is crucial to successful negotiations. The more prepared you are, the better your chances
of successfully calming and managing a potential violent conflict situation. Take time to make sure you
have a clear understanding of the mission’s interests, the interests of the other parties, and the context
within which the negotiation is taking place.
Not all negotiations are conducted at the highest levels, or by senior diplomats or general officers.
Negotiations can be conducted by the “Strategic Corporal” at the checkpoint or on patrol. You may find
yourself forced to respond to an impromptu situation where there is no time for preparation. However,
if you have gained enough knowledge of the history, culture, and nature of the conflict; if you are well
briefed on your own mandate and orders (e.g., convoy protocols); and if you use the beginning of the
negotiations to gather information about the specific problem you are facing, you will be armed with
enough knowledge to deal with it.
Bilateral negotiation is defined as affecting “reciprocally two nations or parties; to arrange or bring
about through conference, discussion, and compromise”. Under this definition, bilateral negotiations
occur from the squad leader to general officer level. Each leader interacts, meets, and coordinates
248
with the other nation’s partners on a regular basis. Each bilateral negotiation requires intelligence
preparation of the battlefield or “of the bilateral negotiation” in order to reach the intended outcome.
Deliberate preparation by both the leader and the staff officer, focused towards an intended outcome,
provides the pathway to success. While prior preparation is vital for reaching success, the post-bilateral
negotiation effort provides the rewards of that success by synchronizing follow-up actions to seal the
agreement or further press the effort.
The original designers simply provided a template for the science of bilateral negotiations preparation
and follow-through. Staff officers are not charged with being experts in the art of discussion, but they
must be thorough in their preparation and follow-through. Being aware of the science of preparation is
key to concluding a successful bilateral negotiation.
Some Important Guidelines
Pre-Negotiation Rehearsal Reminders:
• Rehearsals are key to negotiation success;
• Include the interpreter in the rehearsal — ensure they understand your issues, the intended
outcome, mission jargon, etc.; and
• Establish leader/interpreter signals (for example, tap on arm to stop talking).
If you host the negotiation:
• Ensure facility appearance is professional;
• Rehearse pick-up of the partner at the gate;
• Sanitize the negotiation location (no operational graphics, etc.); and
• Plan snacks and beverages — remember that eating can lighten the partner’s mood.
Actions During a Negotiation - Leader Dos and Don’ts:
• Don’t agree to the first offer at the table;
• Don’t ever lie, bluff, or make threats;
• Avoid discussion of politics, religion, or local national policy;
• Avoid excessive offline conversations;
• Don’t tell jokes — they often do not translate well;
• Don’t look at your translator — look at your counterpart when you speak to them, and maintain
eye contact;
• Don’t rush to the next meeting — make them feel this meeting is the most important event in
your day;
• Don’t promise anything beyond your ability to control;
• In Muslim communities, don’t schedule meetings between 13:00–15:00;
• Do speak clearly and slowly without acronyms;
• Do know if the partner is a decision-maker;
249
• Do stay within your terms of reference;
• Do finish on time;
• Do have a note taker or recorder; and
• Do finish with a final review or restatement of agreements made.
Post-Negotiation Follow-Up Reminders:
• A leader’s credibility is directly linked to the follow-through on agreements made;
• The leader and staff must conduct a post-negotiation review (the sooner the better);
• The recorder briefs on the review of agreements made, outstanding issues captured, and
recommended next steps;
• The leader listens and provides clarity and guidance for next steps, and at the conclusion of the
review:
-Results and recommendations are reported back up the supervisory chain; and
-Target folders for the met-with partners should be updated.
Negotiation Reminders:
• Stay within your terms of reference;
• Be prepared and alert;
• Be aware of your facial expressions;
• Appearance matters — this also applies to all with you;
• Manage your time:
-25 per cent casual, develop rapport and a professional relationship;
-50 per cent business; and
-25 per cent closure and “relationship-building” time;
• Avoid slang, humour, technical jargon, and unexplained acronyms;
• Emphasize win-win solutions;
• Only shift to “win-lose” if all else fails;
• Remember that 90 per cent of all progress occurs away from the table;
• Never make threats, unless you are prepared to follow through;
• Treat translators as pacing items;
• Rehearse repeatedly — you can never over-prepare;
• Remember that every aspect of the meeting is deliberate, even small talk;
• Do not let a confrontational person cause you to get off topic;
• Watch your body language;
250
• Always separate the person from the problem — attack the problem;
• Be a good listener;
• Be able to say “I don’t know” when you don’t have the answer; and
• Remember that informal conversation helps fill in the blanks on the biographies.
Conclusion
• The applied relationship between civil-military coordination and public information;
• The importance of cultural awareness and the role of a cultural framework in a UN peace
operation;
• How to communicate through an interpreter in another language; and
• Basic principles and techniques of effective communication, negotiation, and mediation.
• Ethics in Peacekeeping, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution, Peace Operations Training Institute.
• Examples of relevance to this Lesson include: Cross Cultural Negotiation; Negotiation for Conflict
and Dispute Resolution; and International Negotiations: Practical Skills and Techniques. For
more, go to: <http://www.unitar.org/event/elearning>.

classroom. For this Lesson, see especially Modules 1 and 6 of the Handbook. See also Local
Chapter 7.

• “Mediating Violent Conflict,” US Institute of Peace online course, available at: <www.usip.org/
academy/catalog/mediating-violent-conflict-online-self-paced-course>.
• Conflict Management in International Peace Operations: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers,
Olav Ofstad, issued by the Norwegian Defence International Centre, available at: <www.nodefic.
no>.
251
• “2250: A Youth Toolkit,” United Network of Young Peacebuilders, available at: <unoy.org/2250-
toolkit>.
Further References

missions>.
• Civil Affairs Handbook, DPKO/DFS (March 2012), available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/

sites/default/files/civil_affairs_handbook.pdf>.

withdrawal>.

• UN Security Council Resolution 2250, S/RES 2250 (2105), 9 December 2015.

• Getting to Yes: Negotiation Agreement Without Giving In, Roger Fisher and William Ury (New
York: Penguin, 1981). A summary sheet is available at: <www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/
fisher-getting>.
• Negotiation in International Conflict: Understanding Persuasion, Deborah Goodwin (ed.)

(London: Frank Cass, 2002).
• The Military and Negotiation, Deborah Goodwin (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
• “Bilateral Negotiations: The Best Offense is...”, Lt. Col. Steven Heidecker and Capt. Jon Sowards,
Army (July 2004).
• “Bye Bye BATNA & Asta La Vista ZOPA: The Muddy Boots Guide to Effective First Contact and
Negotiation Skills”, Stephen E. Henthorne, (Single authored, refereed monograph). (London:
RUSI, April 2007).
252
• “Negotiations During Peace Support Operations”, Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, vol.
8, No. 2 (October 2001).
• Conflict Management for Peacekeepers and Peacebuilders, Cedric de Coning and Ian Henderson,
ACCORD, Durban (2008), available at: <www.accord.org.za/publication/conflict-management-
for-peacekeepers-and-peacebuilders/>.
253
1. Which of the following is NOT typically 6. Negotiation is _____.

true of civil-military interactions with
A. communication with the aim of reaching an
the media?
agreement
A. The media is first and foremost a business
B. not giving in to unreasonable demands
B. The media tells stories to sell advertisements
C. talking with others in order to make
and gain market share
compromises
C. The media is generally hostile to and
D. continuing the struggle by other means
suspicious of the military
D. The media is an opportunity 7. Mediation is _____.
A. intervention by the UN into a dispute
2. Which of the following is NOT a way
UN-CIMIC synchronizes with public B. negotiation with more than three people
information? C. intervention by a neutral third party to a
dispute
A. Civil-military liaison and information-sharing
with external as well as internal actors D. leadership by a neutral force
B. Generation of positive news stories on

8. When negotiating with someone who
mission progress speaks a different language from your
C. "Winning hearts and minds" own, it is important to understand
D. Assessment of target audiences, messaging, which part of your own language is
and message effects
____________ and difficult to translate.
A. easily understandable
3. How can the behaviour of peacekeepers B. common to all cultures
affect the local perception of the peace
C. respectful in all cultures
process?
D. culturally specific
4. Which of the following would NOT be a

good media interview technique? 9. Which of the following things should
NOT be included in briefing an
A. Trying to intimidate the journalist interpreter?
B. Speaking naturally and honestly
A. Physical position you want the interpreter to
C. Focusing on facts be in
D. Behaving in a friendly and respectful manner B. The need to use short sentences
C. The need to interpret word-for-word what is
5. Culture is not right or wrong, but people
sometimes create stereotypes. Which of being said
the following is a way in which people D. Confidential information available to the UN
create stereotypes?
10. Basic communication techniques include
A. Judging other cultures by their own set of
_____.
standards
A. talking actively
B. Respecting cultural differences
B. emphatic listening
C. Recognizing that different cultures have
C. brainstorming
different values
D. caucusing
D. Making an effort to learn more about the
cultures of the host country where a peace
operation is deployed
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Answer Key »
1. C
2. C
3. Positive behaviour can reinforce the ability of the peace operation to

move the process forward, while fostering trust with the local population.
Negative behaviour can undermine the reputation of the peace operation
and its parent body, weakening the peace process. Parties to the conflict
can exploit negative behaviour and use it to divert the peace process.
UN-CIMIC officers in particular should be prepared to help commanders
communicate cultural “dos and don’ts”, as well as main information
themes to the troops.
4. A
5. A
6. A
7. C
8. D
9. D
10. B
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Appendix A: Glossary and list of Acronyms
The following are key terms used either in UN-CIMIC or which UN-CIMIC officers may encounter in
the course of their work with their partners. Most are UN definitions, whereas others are derived from
other sources cited in the course. Some are derived from non-cited sources such as the DCAF-ISSAT
manual, SSR in a Nutshell (see Appendix G). In some cases, the authors have taken the liberty to
modify the definitions to improve clarity of meaning for the purposes of this course.
Accountability is an obligation or willingness to take responsibility or to account for one’s actions

according to principles of transparency.
Capacity is the ability of an individual/organization to perform assigned duties effectively. This

includes human capacity (individual ability), physical capacity (having the right equipment), and
institutional capacity (systems and organizational structures in place).
Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF) is a key assessment tool. The CIF enables practitioners
to assess institutional reform needs and to develop realistic programming options. The CIF focuses on
the capacity and integrity of a public institution, both of which are central to the institution’s ability to
perform its mandate. It does this at three levels: the individual, the organizational, and the external.
Capacity Building includes efforts to strengthen the aptitudes, resources, relationships, and
facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively to achieve an intended purpose. Capacity building
targets individuals, institutions, and their enabling environment.
Civil assistance is a support function that includes two types of related activities undertaken by the
military component of a UN integrated mission:
• Support to civilian humanitarian and development actors, which is the preferred steady state of
UN-CIMIC; and
• Support to the local civilian population and authorities, or community support projects.
Community support projects, which are often related to physical infrastructure repair/
rehabilitation, are designed to help fill gaps in partner or local capacity that would otherwise
risk de-stabilization of the local population or government through loss of public confidence
in the peace process. UN-CIMIC ensures these supporting projects take place within joint and
collaborative frameworks and processes, e.g., Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).
Civil society is the political space between an individual and government. Civil society can help define
a country’s security needs and policies, ensure oversight of public institutions, and at times provide
security and justice services to segments of the population. It also refers to civil society organizations,
non-State, and non-statutory security and justice providers.
Civil Society Organization (CSO) is a non-State organization composed of uncoerced participants

with shared interests, values, and purposes, such as ethnic, cultural, political, or religious beliefs.
CSOs may include non-governmental organizations, faith groups, think tanks, etc. (Also see civil
society.)
Civilianizing is working by, with, and through external civilian leadership.

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Civil-military operations is a US term meaning: “The activities of a commander that establish,

maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile
operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational US
objectives.”
Community support refers to UN-CIMIC activities that help local communities to improve and
normalize their lives. Community support operations are aimed at building capacity and confidence
in the peace process and creating a positive relationship between the host community and especially
civilian external actors and local governance. Community support projects are often related to physical
infrastructure repair/rehabilitation projects that could be requested by any civilian organization or
entity through appropriate mission coordination structures, or proposed by the military component
through the appropriate civil-military process.
Complex emergencies are humanitarian crises where there is total or considerable breakdown of
authority resulting from internal or external conflict which may require an international response
beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.
Conflict prevention is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing
disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
Criminal Intelligence is processed information on crimes and criminality to plan, prioritize, and
allocate resources in undertaking crime reduction strategies (Guidelines on Police Operations in United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions).
Criteria on the Use of Force
• Seriousness of threat: Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and
• Proper purpose: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or
avert the threat in question?
• Last resort: Has every non-military option for meeting the threat been explored?
• Proportional means: Are the scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the
minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
• Balance of consequences: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful
in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely worse than the
consequences of inaction?
Defence Sector Reform (DSR) is a coordinated series of actions designed to improve the
effectiveness and accountability of a State’s armed forces.
Development is long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving socio-
economic goals or reducing poverty.
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Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is the process during which combatants
are disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated back into the community. Each country may use
a slightly different version to address their specific needs. In the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the DDR process is
referred to as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR)
to accommodate the fact that some of the combatants had to be repatriated to their country of origin,
while others wished to be resettled rather than to be reintegrated back into their original communities.
In Liberia, this process was known as DDRR, for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and
Reintegration.
Do No Harm is a humanitarian civil-military principle by which, according to the IASC Civil-Military

Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies: “Considerations on civil-military coordination
must be guided by a commitment to ‘Do No Harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy
and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the
conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance”. It has gained wider
application to civil-military coordination beyond humanitarian assistance.
Do No Harm Analysis is a key assessment tool developed by Dr. Mary B. Anderson. The Do No Harm
Analysis is designed to help understand the impact that an assistance programme could have on the
relationships between actors in a fragile State environment. If the analysis shows that assistance could
increase tensions between local actors, alternative programming options need to be considered in
order to eliminate these negative influences.
Emergency relief is action to provide immediate survival assistance and protection to the victims of
crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term assistance in the
form of water, sanitation, food, medicines, and shelter.
External actors are the peace operation; the UNCT; international NGOs; regional and sub-regional
organizations like the EU, AU, or ECOWAS; and donor agencies.
Failed State is a condition of “State collapse” which depicts a State that can no longer provide basic
services (e.g., security, safety, health, education, etc.) to its population, has no effective control over
its territory and borders, and cannot reproduce the conditions for its own existence.
Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men, boys and
girls of any planned action, in all areas and at all levels. The needs, concerns, and experiences of
these groups are an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of
policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres, so that everyone benefits
according to their needs.
Hostile intent is the threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through
an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in
hostile intent is required before the use of force is authorized.
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Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection, and advocacy activities done on an impartial
basis in response to humanitarian needs resulting from complex emergencies and/or natural disasters,
or to prevent/mitigate risks and prepare for future events.
Humanitarian actors are designated civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN,

governmental or non-governmental, engaged in humanitarian activities.
Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save
lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided
in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. For the
purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree
of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define
which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military
resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all
concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance. Direct Assistance is the face-
to-face distribution of goods and services. Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the
population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel.
Humanitarian crises occurs when the lives, health, or well-being of people are in danger as a result
of natural disasters, technological or man-made disasters, and violence and conflict.
Humanitarian principles, which define the “humanitarian space”, include:
• Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention
to the most vulnerable, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all
victims must be respected and protected.
• Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking

sides in political, religious, or ideological controversies.
• Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic

origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race, or religion. Relief of the suffering must be
guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.
• Independence is the autonomy of a particular actor or institution from the actions or policies of
a State authority or any other institution.
Human rights are those rights that belong to everyone as a member of the human race, regardless
of skin colour, nationality, political convictions, religious persuasion, social standing, gender, age, or
any other distinction.
Human security is a notion of security of individuals and communities rather than States, relating
to the freedom from fear and freedom from want. It encompasses human rights, good governance,
access to education and healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to
fulfil his or her own potential.
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Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace
management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for
the benefit of the affected population.
Independence is the autonomy of a particular actor or institution from the actions or policies of a
State authority or any other institution.
Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the UN

engagement in countries emerging from conflict. In essence, an integrated mission is a strategic
partnership between a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, under the
leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG RC/HC.
Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), along with the Mission Concept, makes up the foundational
documents for operational and resource planning by mission components, and provides the
strategic outlook for the entire mission structure. The ISF comprises: main findings from integrated
assessments of the conflict and challenges to peace consolidation, UN role, and comparative
advantages; peace consolidation priorities for the UN, including for national capacity development
and institution-building; programmatic functions and/or operational areas requiring an integrated
approach, with agreed form and depth of integration; agreed results, timelines, responsibilities, and
other relevant implementation arrangements, including coordination mechanisms; and a common
monitoring and reporting framework including indicators or benchmarks of progress.
Intelligence is processed knowledge, information, and data acquired by various covert and overt
methods, for the purpose of predicting or understanding the intentions of groups or States.
Intelligence sector reform is a reform programme concentrating on the intelligence services of a

State, seeking — among other things — to ensure a balance between secrecy and transparency, to
develop an adequate legal framework ensuring oversight, to clarify roles and responsibilities, and to
improve accountability.
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an international humanitarian coordination body

established by the UN General Assembly that has the membership of nine UN Agencies, Funds,
Programmes, and Offices, as well as nine Standing Invitees, including the Red Cross Movement and a
number of NGOs.
Internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private
sector, and civil society in all its different varieties.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are people or groups of people who have been forced or
obliged to leave their homes, in particular as a result of the effects of armed conflict, situations of
generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have
not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
260
International community is the wider global population, both State and non-State, which in some
cases may denote particular groups of international actors linked by a common mission or project.
International criminal law is a body of laws, norms, and rules governing international crimes and
their repression, as well as rules addressing conflict and cooperation between national criminal-law
systems.
Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) coordinates the provision of logistical support, in
accordance with MLT priorities.
Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) provides integrated analysis of all sources of information to
assess medium- and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MLT decision-making.
Joint Operations Centre (JOC) collates situation reports and operational information from all
mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. The JOC also acts as a crisis
coordination hub.
Joint staff means staff elements within the integrated mission structure that are outside the reporting
lines of a single (e.g. military) component. Current examples are Joint Mission Analysis Centres
(JMAC), Joint Operations Centres (JOC), and Joint Logistics Operations Centres (JLOC).
Judiciary is a system of courts that interprets and applies the law in the name of the sovereign or
State.
Justice Sector Reform (JSR) is the transformation or change of justice institutions to make them
more independent, effective, and accountable so as to better serve the justice needs of the people.
Last Resort is a humanitarian civil-military principle on the use of MCDA as a tool to complement
existing relief mechanisms in order to fulfil unique and specific requirements in response to the
acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being
asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. MCDA should be requested only where
there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of MCDA can meet a critical humanitarian
need, and is unique in capability and availability. The use of civil protection assets should be needs
driven, complementary to, and coherent with humanitarian aid operations, respecting the overall
coordinating role of the UN.
Legitimacy is the acceptance of decisions of government leaders and officials by the (local)
population based on the fact that the power is acquired and used in line with the accepted procedures
and political or moral values of the society in question.
Lessons learned are generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programmes,
or policies. Information gained through lessons learned can contribute to greater effectiveness and
efficiency in the design and implementation of future activities.
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Local ownership is an approach that recognizes that the reform of security and justice policies,
institutions, and activities in a given country must be designed, managed, and implemented by
national actors rather than external actors.
Localizing is promoting local (or internal) ownership of the peacebuilding process.
Mediation is the intervention into a dispute by an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who
has no authoritative decision-making power — in many respects, a facilitated negotiation.
Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) comprise relief personnel, equipment, supplies and
services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for International Disaster Relief
Assistance (IDRA). In the context of the MCDA Guidelines, international disaster relief assistance
means material, personnel, and services provided by the international community to an Affected
State to meet the needs of those affected by a disaster. It includes all actions necessary to grant and
facilitate movement over the territory — including the territorial waters and the airspace — of a Transit
State. IDRA delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles is humanitarian assistance.
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), originally pledged in 2000 by 189 nations to free people
from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations, were eight development goals to be achieved by
2015. The eight MDG areas were:
• Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger;
• Achieve universal primary education;
• Promote gender equality and empower women;
• Reduce child mortality;
• Improve maternal health;
• Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;
• Ensure environmental sustainability; and
• Develop a global partnership for development.
Mission support refers to cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the military
component of a peace operation, for example, when the military component provides security, such as
an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy. When mission support operations are undertaken,
UN-CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating, and facilitating the actions of
the military units responsible for executing the task. It is thus important for UN-CIMIC officers to
understand what mission support is and where it fits into the role and function of UN-CIMIC in the
context of complex peace operations.
Multi-National Force (MNF) is a reference to any grouping of countries or a coalition of the

willing that come together to undertake a joint operation. An MNF is normally associated with peace
enforcement operations authorized by the UN Security Council.
262
NATO CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) is the coordination and cooperation, in support of

the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations, local
authorities, and national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. Because it is a NATO
term, the term “CIMIC” alone is not to be used by UN missions to describe the staff function and
processes that are covered by UN-CIMIC.
Natural disasters are events caused by natural hazards that seriously affect society, the economy,
and/or infrastructure.
Negotiation is communication with the aim of reaching an agreement.
New security agenda is a term that recognizes the wide range of State and non-State actors that
can act as security providers — or in some instances, as purveyors of insecurity. It also takes a
broad view of security, understanding national security not only in military terms but also in terms of
political, social, economic, and environmental security.
Non-governmental organization (NGO) is an organization that is autonomous, voluntary, and non-

profit based, and which is not associated with national or local governments.
Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into
conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the
foundation for sustainable peace and development. It is a complex, long-term process of creating the
necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes
of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect
the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively
and legitimately carry out its core functions.
Peacebuilding operations are deployed after a peace agreement has been entered into, and are
mandated to assist the parties to the peace agreement with consolidating their peace process. They
employ a broad range of capacities to assist the local government and community to address both the
immediate consequences, and the root causes of the conflict, in order to avoid a relapse into violent
conflict. In this sense, peacebuilding and conflict prevention are conversely related.
Peace Enforcement usually occurs in a hostile environment where consent is absent, but where
the United Nations Security Council, often out of humanitarian considerations, authorizes use of
force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with
internationally sanctioned resolutions or agreements. Peace enforcement is normally associated with
Chapter VII of the UN Charter entitled, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. The most important factor in both peace operations and peace
enforcement is the impartiality of the peacekeepers.
263
Peacekeeping is designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years,
peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation
of forces after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements — military, police
and civilian — working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.
Peacekeeping Principles
• Consent by the parties to the peace or ceasefire agreement is a dynamic and multilayered
concept. It is essential for mission success and must be constantly managed, but it is understood
that it may often be lacking at the tactical level.
• Impartiality means that the mandate must be applied without favour or prejudice to the
parties to the peace agreement, and should not be confused with neutrality. Neutrality, in the
peacekeeping context, refers to non-interference, and if the UN mission is mandated to take
action, for instance, to protect civilians, it will interfere according to its mandate. Hence, UN
peacekeeping missions are often said to be impartial but not neutral, i.e. the mission will not
take sides, but it will act against any party that is in breach of its mandate.
• Non-use of Force still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum amount of force
necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is also now understood
that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious
threats, including those it has been mandated to protect.
Peacemaking is the use of diplomatic means of persuading parties in conflict to cease hostilities and
negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.
Peace Operations occur when the United Nations, or regional organizations, authorize the
deployment of civilian, police, and military personnel to monitor and facilitate the implementation of
a peace agreement or ceasefire, or in some cases to protect civilians even if there is no ceasefire or
peace agreement in place. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force.
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are organized international assistance initiatives to support the
maintenance, monitoring, and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict.
Private Military and Security Company (PMSC) is a legally established national or international
firm offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic manner and by
military or paramilitary means.
Protection of Civilians (POC) refers to all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical
integrity of civilian populations, particularly children, women, and other vulnerable groups, including
IDPs; preventing the perpetration of war crimes and other deliberated acts of violence against
civilians; securing humanitarian access; and ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual,
in accordance with relevant national and international bodies of law, i.e. human rights law and
International Humanitarian Law.
264
Protection missions are not deployed to monitor or implement a ceasefire or peace agreement,
but to protect civilians and to create a relatively stable space within which negotiations for a peace
agreement can take place. Although UN peace operations normally deploy to implement a peace
agreement, i.e. after the violent conflict has come to an end, there have been situations in which a
UN peace operation deployed to protect civilians without a peace agreement in place, and without the
consent of all the parties engaged in the conflict. More often the case in the last few years, violence
may erupt or worsen following the deployment of the established peacekeeping mission.
Programming is a general term for a set of activities designed to achieve a specific objective. In
order to ensure that a programme’s results, outputs, and overall outcome are reached, activities are
often framed by a strategy, key principles, and identified targets. Together, these indicate how the
activities will be structured and implemented.
Programme/project cycle is the course of a programme or a project’s lifetime. This commonly

includes the stages of assessment and identification, design and planning, implementation, monitoring
and review, evaluation, and learning lessons.
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, rapidly implementable projects of benefit to
the population. These projects are funded through the mission budget and are used by the UN
peacekeeping operation to establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate, and the peace
process, thereby improving the environment for effective mandate implementation. In most UN
missions, QIPs are managed by Civil Affairs on behalf of the SRSG.
Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political,

socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-
term development.
Recovery is action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover
from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development, thus
ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter.
Refugee is a person who is outside his or her country of origin and has a well-founded fear of
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Rehabilitation is action aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods;
overlaps with emergency relief and is typically targeted for achievement within the first two years
after the conflict has ended.
Results-Based Management (RBM) is a broad management strategy aimed at achieving improved

performance and demonstrable results. RBM includes elements of design, monitoring, and evaluation
and contributes to learning, risk management, and accountability.
265
Rule of law is the principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public
and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles
of supremacy of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency (Report of the Secretary-General,
S/2004/616).
Security and development nexus is an understanding that security and development are mutually
reinforcing factors and the recognition that they are intrinsically linked.
Security is the absence of real or perceived threats to acquired values or to someone’s well-being.
Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel
responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country. It is generally
accepted that the security sector includes defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services,
and institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. Elements of
the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse
of force are also included. The security sector also includes actors that play a role in managing and
overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies, and civil
society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include
customary or informal authorities and private security services.
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as
monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective
and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for
human rights and the rule of law.
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are all lethal conventional weapons and ammunition
that can be carried by an individual combatant (SA) or a light vehicle (LW) that does not require
substantial logistic and maintenance capability. Based on common practice, weapons and ammunition
up to 100 mm in calibre are usually considered as SALW.
Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of humanitarian agencies and
organizations worldwide together around a common aim — to improve the quality of humanitarian
assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors, and affected
populations.
Spoiler is an individual or party who believes that the particular policy or activity could threaten their
power and interests and who will therefore work to undermine it.
Stability is a situation where the political and security systems and the actors, rules, cultures, and
institutions associated with them achieve balance and maintain a certain degree of order and where
there is an absence of large scale violence within a country.
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Stakeholder is a broad term used to denote all local, national, and international actors, including the
State, civil societies, and business, which have an interest in the outcome of a particular activity or
process.
Stakeholder analysis is a key assessment tool, the stakeholder analysis aims to identify potential
stakeholders of security and justice reform programmes and determine their interests, influence/
power, and whether that influence is positive or negative to the programme. This information can be
visually mapped on a grid of low and high influence and interest.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or Global Goals, which succeeded the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015, are guiding development assistance policy and funding for the
next 15 years. These goals, comprehensive of civil society, look to:
1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere;
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable
agriculture;
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages;
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning
opportunities for all;
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls;
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all;
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all;
8. Promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth; full and productive
employment; and decent work for all;
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization,

and foster innovation;
10. Reduce inequality within and among countries;
11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable;
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns;
13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts;
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for
sustainable development;
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15. Protect, restore, and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems;

sustainably manage forests; combat desertification; and halt and reverse land
degradation and halt biodiversity loss;
16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development; provide
access to justice for all; and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at
all levels; and
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for
sustainable development.
SWOT Analysis is a strategic planning method used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities, and Threats involved in a policy or project.
Terms of Reference (ToR) is a document that describes the purpose and structure of a project
as well as the parties, their roles, and responsibilities in accomplishing a shared goal. Also used as
synonymous to a job or position description of responsibilities of a staff member.
Transition is the period following the signing of a peace agreement and the transition from an
appointed interim government and before democratic elections take place.
Transparency is free and open access to information which enables civil society to perform its
regulatory function, ensuring that stakeholders are accurately informed about the decision-making
process and have the ability to influence it.
Vetting is a process of examination and evaluation, generally referring to performing a background

check on someone before offering him or her employment, or conferring an award.
UN Civil Affairs is a civilian component of a UN integrated mission with a role to engage and assist
local civilian authorities and communities in efforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political,
legal, economic, and social infrastructures that support democratic governance and economic
development. In missions that have a transitional administration mandate the Civil Affairs component
can become a civil administration, responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life while
simultaneously working to devolve its responsibilities to local authorities.
UN Civil Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) is a military staff function in UN integrated missions

that facilitates the interface between the military and civilian components of the mission, as well as
with the humanitarian and development actors in the mission area, in order to support UN mission
objectives.
UN Cluster System is the result of a UN review of the global humanitarian system in 2005 that
highlighted a number of gaps in humanitarian response. Established by the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee, the cluster system consists of groupings of UN agencies, non-governmental organizations,
and other international organizations organized around a sector or service regularly provided during
a humanitarian crisis. Each cluster is led by a designated agency. The following clusters have been
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established: Protection; Camp Coordination and Management; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene; Health;
Emergency Shelter; Nutrition; Emergency Telecommunications; Logistics; Early Recovery; Education;
and Agriculture.
UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and

interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary
to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and
when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation.
Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.
Table of Acronyms
AAR After Action Review
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
APF African Peace Facility
AU African Union
CA Civil Affairs
CAP Consolidated Appeals Process
CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CCA Common Country Assessment
CDA County Development Agenda
CERF Central Emergency Response Fund
CHAP Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CHF Common Humanitarian Funds
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CIU Criminal Intelligence Unit
CMCC Civil-Military Coordination Cell
CMCO Civil-Military Cooperation [European Union term]
CMCS Civil-Military Coordination Section
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CMI Civil-Military Interaction [NATO term]
CMLog Civil-Military Logistics [humanitarian term]
CMO Civil-Military Operations
CMS/DMS Chief/Director of Mission Support
COE Contingent-Owned Equipment
CONOPs Concept of Operations
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DACO Development Assistance Coordination Office
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and

Reintegration
DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement,

and Reintegration
DFID Department of International Development
DFS Department of Field Support
DOP Department of Operational Support
DPA Department of Political Affairs
DPPA Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO Department of Peace Operations
DSR Defense Sector Reform
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS Department of Security and Safety
EC European Commission
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
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ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EOD Explosive Ordnance Removal
ERF Emergency Response Funds
ERR Emergency Response Roster
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FC Force Commander (see also HOMC)
FPU Formed Police Unit
GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations
HOMC Head of Military Component
HoS Head of Sector [African Union term]
HQ Headquarters
HuMOCC Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre
IAP Integrated Assessment and Planning
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDRA International Disaster Relief Assistance
IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process
INSARAG International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
IOM International Organization for Migration
IPO Individual Police Officer
ISF Integrated Strategic Framework

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ISS Integrated Support Service
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JLOC Joint Logistics Operations Centre
JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Centre
JOC Joint Operations Centre
JOTC Joint Operations and Tasking Centre
JTF Joint Task Force
LO Liaison Officer
LPRC Local Project Review Committee
LRRD Linking Relief, Recovery, and Development
M&E Measures and Evaluations
MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MEOM Military Expert on Mission
MILAD Military Adviser
MIP Mandate Implementation Plan
MLO Military Liaison Officer [humanitarian term]
MLT Mission Leadership Team
MNF Multinational Force
MoE Measures of Effectiveness
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organization
NORAD Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

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OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAC Project Approval Committee
PIO Public Information Office
POC Protection of Civilians/Police Operations Centre
PRC Project Review Committee
PRS Poverty Reduction Plan
PSC Peace and Security Council [African Union term]
QIP Quick Impact Project
QMT QIPs Management Team
RC Resident Coordinator
SCE Support to the Civil Environment
SCR Security Council Resolution
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
SRCC Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU

Commission [African Union term]
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR Security Sector Reform
STF Support to the Force
UNCT United Nations Country Team
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDAF United Nations Development Action Framework
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
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UNFSCO United Nations Field Security Coordinator
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Centre [humanitarian]
UNMO United Nations Military Observer
UNPOL UN Police
UN Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the

Empowerment of Women
UXO Unexploded Ordnance
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VEO Violent Extremist Organization
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
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Appendix B: Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer Terms of Reference
UN-CMCoord Officers
The following terms of reference are from the OCHA CMCoord Field Handbook of September 2015.
• Liaise with the headquarters of regional organizations (not covered by OCHA Liaison Offices)
at the strategic and policy level, to promote adherence to existing guidelines, and contribute to
building capacity for civil-military relations.
• As appropriate, participate in military exercises and pre-deployment training of national

and regional military forces.
• Ensure that civil-military coordination information is included in information products (maps,

SitReps, etc.).
• Ensure that the necessary CMCoord human resources are available to implement the above-
mentioned tasks.
• Conduct a CMCoord assessment and analysis of the civil-military environment (through

CMCoord focal point or with support from CMCS or OCHA’s Surge Capacity Section).
• Connect with senior military officers in international and national military forces, military liaison
officers, relevant government institutions, and local authorities, security forces, UN agencies,
civilian UN mission staff, and NGOs in the area of responsibility.
• Sensitize military commanders and forces on humanitarian principles and coordination

mechanisms.
• Establish and maintain dialogue with humanitarian actors and clusters in the area of
responsibility to provide information channels, and raise issues and concerns with relevant
military/paramilitary organizations.
• Connect and bring together the right military and humanitarian actors and facilitate their
dialogue.
• Establish CMCoord mechanisms and tools for information exchange as required, e.g. CMCoord
cells, internet platforms, FMA request, and tracking mechanisms.
• Lead the development of country-specific guidance and ensure that they are properly
disseminated and understood by humanitarian actors and military forces, as well as local actors.
• Identify CMCoord training needs of humanitarian actors and military forces, design a training
strategy and materials, and organize and conduct training events.
UN Civil Affairs Officers

The following terms of reference are from the UN Civil Affairs Handbook of 2012.
UN Civil Affairs officers have three core roles for civil affairs in UN peacekeeping, depending on the
context and mandate:
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Core Role 1: Cross-mission representation, monitoring, and facilitation at the local level
Cross-mission representation, monitoring, and facilitation are performed in most missions and
usually throughout the life cycle of the mission. In many situations civil affairs is the most important
interface between the UN mission and the community, not just in terms of the local/regional authorities
but also civil society in its broadest sense.
Core Role 2: Conflict management, confidence-building, and support to the development

of political space
Conflict management, confidence-building, and supporting the development of political space are
integral to UN peacekeeping and central to civil affairs work. Through this role, civil affairs actively
supports the development of social and civic conditions conducive to sustainable peace, and promotes
popular engagement and confidence in the peace process. While often the lead component in this area
of work, civil affairs usually undertakes these activities in partnership with other mission components,
as well as UN agencies and local and international partners.
Core Role 3: Support to the restoration and extension of state authority
Restoration of state authority is increasingly recognized as a key element of the stabilization of

fragile States and a critical requirement for keeping and building peace.
These three core roles play out through the life cycle of a UN field mission, as follows:
During deployment and mission start-up, the civil affairs focus is typically on rapid deployment into
the field, depending on the security environment, in order to perform the cross-mission, local-level
representation and monitoring role. During the early stages of a mission, civil affairs may be the only
civilian component, or one of a few, represented at the local level. As such, it may serve the needs of
a wide variety of mission components and other stakeholders not represented. During the early phase,
civil affairs components may focus on issues such as:
• Liaison with local communities and local authorities, development of cultural understanding;
• Conflict analysis, early warning, information-gathering, assessment of needs (on a variety of

possible issues, ranging from protection of civilians to basic socioeconomic information);
• Identification of potential partnerships, opportunities for cooperation and coordination with other
actors at the local level, such as uniformed components and the humanitarian community; and
• Early confidence-building activities, such as rapid identification of a small number of visible

QIPs.
All these tasks should draw on the UNCT and capacities of other actors at the local level, and should
build on the involvement, priorities, and capacities of local communities and authorities wherever
possible. (Engaging longer term actors and focusing on local capacities from the outset can help to
facilitate a smoother entry and exit for peacekeeping operations.)
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In a formative or transitional political environment, such as a pre-election period, there is

often a focus on:
• Activities related to supporting the development of political space at the local level; and
• In-depth activities related to confidence-building and conflict management.
During this phase, a larger variety of civilian components and other stakeholders may be present
at the local level and the civil affairs component is likely to focus more narrowly on these specific roles.
In a maturing political environment, such as a post-election period, there is likely to be a

continued focus on the activities described above. However, activities in support of the restoration of
state authority, where relevant, may expand or shift in emphasis to include, for example, more hands-
on support to local-level institutions and newly elected officials.
As the mission begins the process of drawdown and withdrawal, civil affairs may return to a
broader function of cross-mission liaison and monitoring, as other civilian components which may have
been represented at the local level begin to withdraw. As indicated, planning for this transition should,
as far as possible, guide the civil affairs approach from the outset. The aim of the peacekeeping mission
is to support the creation of minimum foundations and safeguards until national capacity or specialized
international capacity takes over. As discussed, close partnership and planning with longer term actors,
particularly UNCT actors, is crucial. Key considerations and areas of focus for civil affairs components
during drawdown and withdrawal phases include:
• Monitoring of local perceptions, attitudes, and concerns regarding issues related to transition;
• Outreach to communities to manage expectations and/or address concerns and misconceptions

at the local level (e.g., about what UNCT can realistically provide, or what the mission will leave
behind);
• Ongoing analysis of local context and early warning systems, including in relation to the security
situation as international uniformed components draw down;
• Monitoring of mission benchmarks related to withdrawal; and
• Handover of activities, including assessment of local capacities, identification of partners

(national or international), analysis of potential gaps at the local level.
Suggested UN-CIMIC Staff Terms of Reference

The following terms of reference are from Annex A of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive (see
Appendix E). These, in turn, are based largely on those found in the DPKO/DFS UN Standby Arrangements
System Mission HQ On-Call List Job Descriptions for CIMC officers. Additional ToRs may be found at
Annex 3 (Generic Terms of Reference for UN-CMCoord Officers) of the UN-CIMIC Policy (Appendix A).
Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9/U9)
(1) Under the direction of the Force Chief of Staff, serves as the UN mission principal staff proponent
for civil-military coordination; advises the Force Command Group and Mission Leadership Team on UN-
CIMIC with respect to the mission.
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(2) Principal civil-military liaison between the FHQ and the civil component of the mission, UN
agencies, host nation government, CSOs/NGOs, etc; responsible for operational- (country) level civil-
military coordination — member of the UNCT.
(3) Plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of the Force UN-CIMIC strategy. Ensures civil-
military common operational picture through synchronization with civilian strategies, programs, and
events, including public information.
(4) Assesses the civil and civil-military situations and the conduct of UN-CIMIC; provides input to
the mission analysis process through the JMAC.
(5) Provides “reach back” support for tactical UN-CIMIC — operational UN-CIMIC guidance,
information, and identification of resources.
(6) Prepares and updates UN-CIMIC plans, SOPs, and directives and the coordination of these with
other Force plans, SOPs, and directives.
(7) Educates military and civilian partners on UN-CIMIC; manages training for UN-CIMIC and
related civilian personnel.
(8) Synchronizes UN-CIMIC with information operations; principal UN-CIMIC spokesperson.
(9) Serves as a member of the QIPs Management Team (QMT) and/or Project Review Committee.
(10) Performs other duties as assigned by Force Command Group.
Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC (D-J9/U9)
(1) Responsible for the management, administration, and operational rhythm of the J9/U9 UN-
CIMIC staff and office operations as an operational level “UN-CIMIC centre”.
(2) Performs G5 CIMIC management of tasks, both external and internal to J9/U9 UN-CIMIC in
origin; oversees plans-operations transition of J9/U9 UN-CIMIC projects.
(3) Ensures preparation and distribution of weekly, monthly and special UN-CIMIC assessments in
accordance with the Force reports annex.
(4) Responsible for J9/U9 UN-CIMIC information and document management.
(5) Oversees preparation and delivery of routine Force HQ UN-CIMIC briefings.
(6) Coordinates UN-CIMIC support to appropriate security sector forces, organizations, or entities
under the guidance of the J9/U9 and to host nation police forces through UNPOL.
(7) Coordinates and organizes UN-CIMIC training, to include UN-CIMIC induction, the Mission UN-
CIMIC Course, and access to external training and education sources.
(8) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact.
(9) Coordinates UN-CIMIC-related logistics support with the UN-CMCoord or CMLog Officer for non-
UN entities.
(10) Assessment and action officer on civil development functional area (“pillar”) as specified and
directed by the J9/U9.
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(11) Assumes the duties of the Chief of UN-CIMIC (J9/U9) in absence.
Operations Officer
(1) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, responsible for project management and
coordination of all CIMIC activities under current execution as directed by the FHQ and as specified by
the J9/U9. Some projects, however, are assigned through the entire life cycle, as determined by the J9/
U9.
(2) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in the management, administration, and operational
rhythm of the J9/U9 UN-CIMIC staff and office operations as a virtual operational-level “UN-CIMIC
centre”, as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.
(3) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact with respect to current
UN-CIMIC activities and projects.
(4) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, liaises and coordinates with Force HQ and
Sector UN-CIMIC officers and Sector HQ staff on UN-CIMIC assessment and activities; advises the J9/
U9 on the UN-CIMIC situation in those commands.
(5) Provides input to UN-CIMIC assessments and briefings as appropriate; prepares assessments
and provides briefings as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.
(6) Synchronizes UN-CIMIC with information operations under the direction of the J9/U9; specifically,
preparation of UN-CIMIC inputs to public information initiatives.
(7) Assumes the duties of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC and Plans Officer in absence.
Plans Officer
(1) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, assists the J9/U9 in the preparation and
update of UN-CIMIC plans, SOPs, and directives and the coordination of these with other Force plans,
SOPs, and directives.
(2) Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC, responsible for project management and
coordination of all UN-CIMIC activities in planning phases as directed by the Force HQ and as specified by
the J9/U9. Some projects, however, are assigned through the entire life cycle, as determined by the J9/U9.
(3) Liaises and coordinates with operational-level civilian points of contact with respect to UN-
CIMIC plans functions.
(4) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in J9/U9 UN-CIMIC information and document
management.
(5) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in J9/U9 UN-CIMIC operational task management.
(6) Assists the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC in UN-CIMIC training and education management.
(7) Provides input to UN-CIMIC assessments and briefings as appropriate; prepares assessments
and provides briefings as directed by the Deputy Chief of UN-CIMIC.
(8) Assumes the duties of the Operations Officer in absence.
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Sector and Unit UN-CIMIC Officers
(1) Chief command adviser and staff proponent for Sector/Unit UN-CIMIC.
(2) Under the direction of the sector/unit commander or chief of staff, liaises and coordinates with
Heads of Field Offices and UN CMCoord, Civil Affairs, and other civilian actors, as appropriate, as well as
unit UN-CIMIC officers and staff, MEOMs, and UNPOL.
(3) Oversees conduct of civil reconnaissance in sector in coordination with MEOMs and other
information providers in order to provide the commander situational understanding of the civil and civil-
military situation in the Sector/Unit AoR and recommend UN-CIMIC and related courses of action.
(4) Provides weekly UN-CIMIC assessments in accordance with the Force reports annex.
(5) Responsible for sector or unit UN-CIMIC information and document management; promotes
information-sharing per the UN-CIMIC SOP or Base Directive.
(6) Plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of UN-CIMIC projects in-sector per the Base Directive
and project management annex; conducts sector or unit UN-CIMIC task management; serves as chief
Sector/Unit QIPs officer and is a member of the Local Projects Review Committee (LPRC).
(7) Synchronizes sector/unit UN-CIMIC and Sector/Unit AoR information operations; principal
Sector/Unit spokesperson on UN-CIMIC.
(8) Manages and provides training and education for sector or unit UN-CIMIC officers and related
civilian personnel, as appropriate; educates partners on UN-CIMIC role.
(9) Performs other duties as assigned by the sector or unit commander or chief of staff, as
appropriate.
UN-CIMIC Sergeant
(1) Under the direction of the assigned UN-CIMIC officer, executes UN-CIMIC internal administrative
management and information management functions as specified.
(2) Perform physical or virtual UN-CIMIC centre operations sergeant tasks, as appropriate.
(3) Assists UN-CIMIC information and document management, as well as distribution of UN-CIMIC
products; maintains UN-CIMIC contact lists.
(4) Provides research and other input, as directed or appropriate, for UN-CIMIC assessments.
(5) Provides administrative assistance to UN-CIMIC task management and scheduling.
(6) Provides administrative assistance to training and education management.
(7) Prepares briefings and documents as directed.
(8) Maintains accountability of personnel and property as well as equipment readiness; performs
section supply and logistics functions.
(9) Performs driver functions.
(10) Performs other duties as assigned by the appropriate UN-CIMIC officer.
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Appendix C: Sample Civil-Military Project Management Guidelines & Project Management Outline
The following SOP is from Annex C of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive 15 June 2009.
CIMIC Project Management in UNMIL – General Guidelines
1. Purpose. The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure effective and efficient management of
any CIMIC project undertaken by the UNMIL military in order to:
a. Generate desired effects of improved capacity and confidence at local level.
b. Narrow essential public service gaps that may result in civil instability.
c. Transition ownership of public service responsibilities to the Government of Liberia (GoL) in a

sustainable manner.
2. Project Assessment. Every CIMIC project should be based on an in-depth assessment (see
Annex B) in accordance with the CIMIC lines of coordination and support in the Base Directive should
be conducted. Of paramount importance is to have the project come at the request of the appropriate
GoL structure — which should have the project lead and comprise the “storefront” operation, be joint
and collaborative, and feature military assets in a supporting role. The assessment should identify a
key opportunity or challenge with respect to fulfilment of the GoL Poverty Reduction Strategy/County
Development Agendas (PRS/CDAs) and UNDAF. PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives should be specifically
referenced in the CIMIC proposal. Involving the GoL from the very start maximizes ownership of the
project and provides an opportunity to assist the beneficiary GoL office with its own project management
skills development, thus multiplying the capacity-building effect. The project should be focused on
answering the question: “What are the desired effects or outcomes and can they be made sustainable”?
Risks and opportunities of conducting and not conducting the project should be carefully evaluated against
intended effects. Additionally, assessment should also consider that the intended project does not favour
one religious, ethnic or political group of people and that does not have adverse effects on the cultural
or power balance in the area. However, in order to make a comprehensive assessment, consultation
with the local county officials, county support team, concerned UNMOs, UN agencies, NGOs, and other
beneficiaries/stakeholders should be carried out along with ground reconnaissance and survey.
3. Project Planning and Coordination. Based on the assessment, CIMIC officers should embark
on meticulous planning and designing of the intended project under following guidance:
a. At the onset, the project proposal should address the main opportunity or challenge identified
in the assessment, using the “5WH” [who, what, when, where, why, and how] method per
Annex B.
b. An appropriate project title should be selected. The title should mainly enhance GoL/
community lead and “storefront” — therefore, let them name the project. Reference should be
made to specific PRS/CDA objectives, as appropriate.
c. Projects will be joint — at Sector/unit level through the Sector/unit CIMIC-Head of Field
Office/County Support Team line of coordination.
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d. Projects will also be collaborative — i.e., include participation of UN agency and international
or local national NGOs.
e. Project planning and design should also involve county/district level officials as appropriate
(see paragraph 2 above).
f. For project funds/resources, coordinate with civil partners under joint and collaborative effort.
When military resources are used, these should never be at the expense of Force core missions
or the welfare of Force personnel.
g. Project design should identify and articulate the tasks of three distinct phases: planning
and coordination phase; implementation phase; and sustainment phase. Responsibilities of all
partners/stakeholders and lines of coordination in every phase should also be spelled out. To
ensure commitment and smooth compliance, agreement from the civil partners/stakeholders
should be solicited in the first phase.
h. Project design should include a time frame that will show when each task will start and end.
One way of doing this is to list the tasks in different phases and indicate the start and end dates
against each. A planning matrix identifying desired outcomes (per PRS/CDA and UNDAF) and
respective stakeholder responsibilities is a very effective tool to build consensus and insure
coverage of tasks.
j. Project design should involve a sustainment strategy; namely, discussing by what ways and
means the beneficiary/stakeholders will maintain the project following military withdrawal.
4. Project Implementation.
a. As required, UNMIL CIMIC concludes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other

appropriate contractual agreement between the Force and all other partners. This could also be
in the form of the planning matrix.
b. Coordinate with the partners/stakeholders according to the CIMIC lines of coordination and
support in the [UNMIL CIMIC] Base Directive and within the agreed time frame.
c. Involve at least a minimum participation of appropriate county or district-level officials and

push them out in front of the project lead.
d. Engage local and UNMIL public information assets to advertise the GoL as in the lead. This
event should be coordinated through local Civil Affairs and PIO, as appropriate.
e. Monitor progress using GoL/civilian organization measures of effectiveness or success

indicators. Ensure all information is formatted to support information-sharing and capacity-
building of GoL knowledge/data systems.
f. Use local labour or contractors in the project works when feasible. Provide on-the-job skills
training when feasible in order to build skilled labor base.
g. Periodically help conduct joint, collaborative in-progress reviews to evaluate the progress and
take corrective action when necessary.
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5. Project Sustainment.
a. Before disengagement, ensure its sustainability with respect to capacity and confidence
effects or desired outcomes identified in the planning phase.
b. Upon completion or military withdrawal, UNMIL CIMIC, though Civil Affairs, helps the
beneficiary (GoL) conduct an after-action or in-progress review involving of all partners/
stakeholders to identify best practices to sustain and areas to improve the next time, ensure
knowledge and information sharing, and identify a follow-on project.
6. Managing Challenges. Sound management of any project is key to overcoming challenges of

joint, collaborative project management. Specifically:
a. Care must be taken while making the assessment. Special attention should be paid in
understanding desired effects/outcomes, context, contacts, timeframe, etc.
b. If certain outcomes/objectives are to be reached by a specified time, plan backwards with

plenty of “cushion” time to account for problems that may be reached in mobilizing stakeholders
and/or resources, obtaining decisions, etc.
c. While planning and designing the project, likely risk factors should be calculated, and possible
mitigation strategy/alternatives identified accordingly.
d. To ensure realistic evaluation and monitoring of the progress, goals, and objectives against
each task/event should be made quantifiable/measurable as far as possible, using the
beneficiaries’ benchmark system.
e. In UNMIL CIMIC projects where various civil-military actors, stakeholders and beneficiaries
from different organizations/communities are involved, resource mobilization and coordination
is very challenging. Forging relationships and robust coordination and liaison mechanism among
partners is the most reliable safeguard.
f. Sustainability is more challenging than completing a project. Hence, “front-loading” ownership

in the project management cycle as well as know-how transfer, both technical and administrative,
to the appropriate stakeholders/local officials and long term monitoring mechanism should be
ensured before disengagement.
7. Project Management Format. Care should be taken to use the beneficiary’s or a major
partner’s project management format. The military should provide a format as a last resort. Consultation
to include important components of project planning, implementation, and sustainment as discussed
above may be appropriate. In the absence of any civilian project management formats, the format
below may be considered as a basis for consensus.
283
UNMIL CIMIC Project Management Outline
1. Assessment – opportunities or challenges identified; should relate to capacity and confidence at

local level.
2. Description of Project (“5WH”) and specific PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives/outcomes.
3. Intended Effects/Outcomes
a. First Order (beneficiary – specific primary GoL physical or organizational capacity targeted for
development; note applicable PRS/CDA and UNDAF objectives)
b. Second Order (additional capacities enhanced, e.g., other beneficiary capacities, skill
development, beneficiary project management, etc.)
c. Third Order (potential public confidence effects through capacities improved)
4. Stakeholders/Contributors
a. GoL – name of project and project leader
b. UN agency – name of project officer(s)
c. NGO – name of project officer(s)
d. UNMIL Civil Component (HoFO/CST) – name of project officer(s)
e. UNMIL Force – name of project officer(s)
5. Resources (material, financial, services, personnel, etc.)
a. GoL
b. UN Agency
c. NGO
d. UN Civil Component
e. UNMIL Force
284
6. Implementation Plan (attach planning matrix as appropriate — the planning matrix may list all
stakeholders on one side, project objectives/outcomes on the other, and a listing in each box area of
what tasks and/or resources by whom are to be used to help reach this objective/outcome; the matrix
may also be a timeline that shows who does what, when, and where in order to reach objectives).
a. Responsibilities
b. Coordination scheme (attach coordination matrix as appropriate)
c. Monitoring/measurements
d. Risk management — identify possible risks and means to mitigate them
e. Evaluation criteria/scheme
f. Public information and community sensitization plan (per Annex D)
7. Sustainability Plan
a. Explain how beneficiary will sustain the project following military withdrawal, with what
resources, by whom, etc.
b. Force capabilities not to be required in future as a result
c. Possible follow-on/related projects to exploit effects reached by this project.
285
Appendix D: Sample UN Mission UN-CIMIC Training and Education Plan
To view this entire document, visit the student classroom.
The following SOP is from Annex E of the UNMIL CIMIC Force Directive (see Appendix F).
UNMIL CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC) EDUCATION AND TRAINING
1. General. For especially the drawdown phase, a critical CIMIC vulnerability is the
relatively low understanding of CIMIC in the Mission and among the Force and the shortage of
trained CIMIC military officers. To mitigate this, the G5 CIMIC has instituted a multi-sourced
education and training strategy to improve overall understanding of CIMIC, build CIMIC
capability, and thus enhance Mission coordination.
2. CIMIC Education. UNMIL CIMIC education is intended to improve overall

understanding of UNMIL CIMIC among Mission civilian and military staff, as well as civilian
partners among agencies, NGOs, and the GoL in order to advance civil-military coordination
and further CIMIC goals. Major activities include:
a. CIMIC concept briefings delivered to civilian and military executive leadership, staff, etc.
and professional development venues, meetings, etc.
b. CIMIC induction briefing.
c. Sharing of background papers and this Directive with select offices and organizations.
d. Sharing of CIMIC assessments with select offices and organizations.
3. CIMIC Training. UNMIL CIMIC training is primarily aimed at enhancing CIMIC and
related personnel knowledge, skills and abilities with respect to the conduct of the UNMIL CIMIC
mission. Major activities include:
a. As directed by the Force Commander, the G5 organizes and executes an UNMIL CIMIC
course every two to three months. Training audiences, in order of priority, are UNMIL
CIMIC personnel, UNMOs, related military staff, UNCA, related UNMIL civilian staff, and
UN agency and NGO personnel. This course is designed to provide a general
understanding of CIMIC as applied in UNMIL, explain how CIMIC works with related
military and civilian activities, and introduce basic CIMIC skills in assessment and project
management. An example of the course program of instruction is below.
b. United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute CIMIC course. This course is among
a menu of online courses on peacekeeping and is free for most peacekeepers. For
others, it is at very low cost. The course provides a general introduction of comparative
CIMIC and a discussion of applied CIMIC from the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) perspective. It is highly recommended as enhancement training
following the UNMIL CIMIC course. The G5 CIMIC provides copies of the program of
instruction for this online course. For further information and to enroll, go to:
http://www.peaceopstraining.org
c. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA) Civil-
Military Coordination course. This course focuses on the OCHA concept of CIMIC
(“CMCoord”), which concentrates on humanitarian coordination. UNMIL leadership
286
Appendix E: Sample UN-CIMIC Directive
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA

(UNMIL)
FORCE HEADQUARTERS
(FHQ)
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION
(CIMIC)
FORCE DIRECTIVE
FOR THE CONDUCT OF CIMIC BY THE UNMIL FORCE
FOR THE DRAWDOWN PHASE
Version 2 to be effective 1502359ZJUN09
287
Appendix F: Sample UN-CIMIC Operations Briefing
CIMIC Concept of Operations

in UNMIL for Drawdown
Col. Christopher Holshek

Chief, CIMIC, UNMIL
4 June 2009
288
Appendix G: Survey of Further Civil-Military Training & Education Resources
The following constitute additional resources worldwide for UN-CIMIC officers to enhance their own
professional development, either in a deployment or home-stationed status.
1. Additional POTI Courses. The following POTI course are

recommended as enhancements to this course:
• Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations
• International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
• Ethics in Peacekeeping
• Human Rights
• Human Rights and Peacekeeping
• Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
• Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission
• Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
• United Nations Police: Restoring Civil Order Following Hostilities
• Protection of Civilians
• The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations: Principles of Intervention and Management
• Gender Perspectives in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
• Preventing Violence Against Women and Gender Inequality in Peacekeeping
• Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and

Management in Peacekeeping Operations
• Security for Peace Operations Personnel
• Methods and Techniques for Serving on a Peacekeeping Mission as a UN Military Observer
• Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Introduction
2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Activities (OCHA) Civil-Military Coordination course. This course
focuses on the OCHA concept of CIMIC (“CMCoord”), which
concentrates on humanitarian coordination. Personnel who are
unable to attend the course may nonetheless take the CMCoord
IMPACT course online. For more information, go to: <https://
www.unocha.org/es/themes/humanitarian-civil-military-
coordination>.
289
3. Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace

Operations, ACCORD, 2007, Durban. UN and African CIMIC
Officers who have not had an opportunity to attend a CIMIC
course prior to deployment will find this handbook particularly
useful as a self-study guide. It will also be of interest to those
interested in learning more about civil-military coordination in
UN and African peace operations. For more information, go to:
<http://www.accord.org.za/publication/conflict-management-
for-peacekeepers-and-peacebuilders/>.
4. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence CIMIC

Courses. The CCOE Training & Education (T&E) Branch provides
support, creates products, offers specialized education and
training in order to enhance the general knowledge about
CIMIC and to enable military and civil operators to conduct
CIMIC-related tasks in different missions and scenarios, while
simultaneously contributing to the lessons learned process. For
more information, go to: <http://www.cimic-coe.org/>.
5. The Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police

Curriculum. Edited by Lisa Schrich and published by the Alliance
for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, and the Kroc Institute in March
2016. For more information, go to: <https://gppac.net/human-
security-toolkit>.
290
About the Authors: Col. Christopher Holshek (retired)
Christopher Holshek, Colonel,

US Army Civil Affairs (retired)
is an international peace and
security consultant focused
on civil-military relations and
operations and peace and
stability operations education
Col. Christopher Holshek
and training.
Chris Holshek has over three decades of civil-military experience at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels in joint, inter-agency, and multinational settings across the full range of operations. This
includes command of the first US Army Civil Affairs battalion to deploy to Iraq in support of Army,
Marine, and British forces, as the KFOR Civil-Military Liaison Officer to the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), and in the planning and deployment of CA forces to the Balkans in the mid-1990s.
He has served with the UN in military and civilian capacities — as a civilian Logistics Officer with
the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia from 1996-98, and with UNMIK as the Political
Reporting Officer from 2000-01, then as Chief of CIMIC at the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2008-
09.
Over the years, he has also had significant input to the development of policy and doctrine for NATO
CIMIC, US Army Civil Affairs, and US Joint civil-military operations, as well as the UN-CIMIC Policy.
In addition to this course, he contributed to the development of a DPKO Integrated Training Service
program on UN-CIMIC, the Africa Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes revision of the
Civil-Military Coordination in UN and Africa Peace Operations handbook, and to the Global Partnership
for the Prevention of Armed Conflict’s Civil Society and Security Sector Engagement for Human Security
training and education project as the Senior Military Adviser.
He is currently a member of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
international advisory group for the new Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Standards to be
published in 2017. He is also a senior civil-military adviser at the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the United
Nations Association of the National Capital Area, and as a Director in the Civil Affairs Association,
including co-editor of its annual Civil Affairs Issue Papers on subjects of future force development.
He has written extensively on national security and strategic issues, civil-military relations in policy
and practice, and stability and peace operations in numerous publications worldwide.
291
About the Authors: Dr. Cedric de Coning
Dr. Cedric de Coning is a senior

researcher with the Peace
and Conflict Research Group
at the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (NUPI)
and a senior adviser on
peacekeeping and peacebuilding
for the African Centre for the
Constructive Resolution of
Dr. Cedric de Coning Disputes (ACCORD).
Dr. Cedric de Coning is an adviser to the High Representative of the African Union Peace Fund, and
previously was an adviser to the head of the Peace Support Operations Division of the African Union. He
has served on African Union panels to review the African Standby Force (ASF) and African Union Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM). He was a member of the UN Peacebuilding Fund Advisory Group, and he worked with
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York and with the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
He started his career as a South African diplomat in Washington, D.C. and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He
holds a Ph.D. in Applied Ethics from the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa. Recent edited books include
The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram, Zed Books, 2016; Insights
from Complexity Thinking for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation, Palgrave, 2016; and UN Peacebuilding
Architecture: The First Ten Years, Routledge, 2016. A recent academic journal article is: “From peacebuilding
to sustaining peace: Implications of complexity for resilience and sustainability”, Resilience, 2016.
292
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination
Format and Material
The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online
Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and
D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may
also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.
»» Access the exam from your Online Classroom

by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/
courses/> and clicking the title of this course.
Once you arrive at the course page, click the red
“Start Exam” button.
Time Limit
There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions
carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one
sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The “Save” button is
located at the bottom of the exam, next to the “Submit my answers” button. Clicking on the “Submit
my answers” button will end the exam.
Passing Grade
To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion
will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade,
and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the
exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be
awarded a Certificate of Completion.
Continue your POTI training experience »

• Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.
• If a particular category of study interests you, such as Human Rights,

Logistics, or Military Studies, consider the POST Certificate programme
available in six areas of specialization. See the requirements at
<www.peaceopstraining.org/specialized-training-certificates/>.
• Stay connected with POTI by visiting our community page and engaging
with other students through social media and sharing photos from your
mission. Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/community> for more. Once you
pass your exam, see your name featured on the Honour Roll as well.
293

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Civil-Military Coordination in

Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUPI

Peace Operations Training Institute

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Cover Photo: UN Photo #171677 by Stuart

Cedric de Coning, ACCORD/NUPI

Peace Operations Training Institute

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time

Peace Operations Training Institute

First edition: 2008

Method of Study xi

Lesson 1 What Is Civil-Military Coordination? 12

Section 1.1 The Nature of Civil-Military Coordination 14

Section 1.2 Civil-Military Coordination and the use of force 18

Section 1.3 Comparative Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination 24

Lesson 2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum

Section 2.2 Civil-Military Coordination in the Full Spectrum of Peace

Section 2.4 Snapshot of a Peacebuilding Mission: UNMIL 63

Section 2.5 The AMISOM Mandate 66

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Lesson 3 Military Support to Humanitarian Assistance

Section 3.1 UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination 78

Section 3.2 Military Support Roles 88

Section 3.3 Practical Discussion – The Haiti Earthquake of 2010 90

Lesson 4 Military Support to Peacebuilding 106

Section 4.1 The Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding Nexus 108

Section 4.2 Peacebuilding Frameworks 112

Section 4.3 Peacebuilding Actors 117

Section 4.4 Civilianizing and Localizing 122

Section 4.5 Peacebuilding and Conflict Management 127

Lesson 5 UN Mission Integration and Coordination 132

Section 5.1 Coordination in a Peace Operations Context 134

Section 5.2 UN Mission Coordination 138

Section 5.3 UN Mission Civil-Military Coordination Structures 143

Section 5.4 Integrated Assessment and Planning 145

Section 5.5 UN-CIMIC Structures and Capabilities 148

Lesson 6 Civil-Military Liaison and Information Sharing 156

Section 6.1 What is Civil-Military Liaison? 158

Section 6.2 Civil-Military Assessment and Intelligence 163

Section 6.3 Civil-Military Information Sharing and Information

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Lesson 7 Civil Assistance 174

Section 7.1 Mission Support and Community Support 176

Section 7.2 Protection of Civilians 186

Section 7.3 Support to Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Section 7.4 Military Support to Development 198

Lesson 8 Civil-Military Planning and Project

Section 8.1 UN-CIMIC Project Management 210

Section 8.2 Quick Impact Projects 217

Section 8.3 Civil-Military Monitoring and Evaluation 220

Lesson 9 Civil-Military Communication 230

Section 9.1 Civil-Military Coordination and Public Information 232

Section 9.2 Cross-Cultural Communication 237

Section 9.3 Working with Interpreters 241

Section 9.4 Negotiations and Conflict Mitigation 244

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Appendix A: Glossary and list of Acronyms 256

Appendix B: Comparative UN Civil-Military Officer Terms of Reference 275

Appendix C: Sample Civil-Military Project Management Guidelines &

Appendix D: Sample UN Mission UN-CIMIC Training and Education Plan 286

Appendix E: Sample UN-CIMIC Directive 287

Appendix F: Sample UN-CIMIC Operations Briefing 288

Appendix G: Survey of Further Civil-Military Training & Education