Illuminating What Is Thought PDF

'Illuminating What Is Thought'.
A Middle Platonist placitum on 'Voice' in Context

Author(s): Jaap Mansfeld
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 58, Fasc. 3 (2005), pp. 358-407
Published by: BRILL
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'ILLUMINATING WHAT IS THOUGHT5.
A MIDDLE PLATONIST PLACITUM ON
'VOICE' IN CONTEXT
BY
JAAP MANSFELD
Abstract
The Plato ?ef??a??? in A?tius' chapter On Voice is the result of the inter-
pretation, modernization, and systematization of brief passages dealing with
hearing, voice and speech to be found in several dialogues. This con-
struction of Plato's doctrine of 'voice' was mainly inspired by the system-
atic and innovative Stoic t?p?? On Voice. The 'physical' definition is based
on passages in Theaetetus and other works, the 'physiological' on a passage
in Tvmaeus. The distinction and relation between voiceless internal ?????
(or thought) and spoken ????? in Theaetetus and Sophist was interpreted as
being equivalent to that between internal and uttered f???^???-?????
which played an important part in the Stoic view of the relation between
thinking and speaking. Because as a rule Plato uses f??? of the human
voice, the rigorous distinction between this voice and that of animals and
lifeless things postulated by Diogenes of Seleucia and other Stoics could
be attributed to him, and his unsystematic usage justified by claiming that
he used f??? both in the proper and in a loose (or improper) sense.
Approaches such as these are characteristic of Middle Platonism. In the
present case the neutralization of Theophrastus' criticism of Plato in the
De sensibus played a significant part. Plato's statement that thought is mir-
rored in what is spoken was updated by replacing it with a (fanciful) ety-
mology of f??? which must be dated to at least the Hellenistic period (it
was known to e.g. Philo of Alexandria and used by the grammarian
Philoxenus). Surprisingly full parallels for virtually the entire contents of
the A?tian ?ef??a??? are found in the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem.
The etymology of f???, and others like it, were quoted and used by gram-
marians and lexicographers from the later first century BCE up to late
Byzantine times. The attempt to understand the doxographer's lemma on
Plato on voice thus becomes a case-study demonstrating both the open-
ness and the tenacity of philosophical interpretation in antiquity. But note
that the present inquiry is not concerned with the Aristotelian or (pardy)
Aristotelianizing tradition according to which language is conventional.
One of the side-effects of the present inquiry was the unsurprising real-
ization (again) that 'parallel passages', once quoted and interpreted out of
context, may sort of drift from one book or paper to the next, while their
? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Mnemosyne,Vol. LVIII, Fase. 3

Also available online - www.brill.nl

A MIDDLE PLATONIST PLACITUM ON 'VOICE' 359
interpretation hardens into received truth. In the present case the so-called
parallels in Plato for the later distinction between the internal and the spo-
ken voice proved to be not so parallel after all.*)
1. Doxographical Definitions
The first ?ef??a??? of A?tius, Piacila 4.19, the chapter On Voice

(pe?? f????, in both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus) runs as follows:
? 1 Plato defines Voice' (f???) as

(a) [on its physical side] breath (p?e??a), impelled from the mind
through the mouth, and
(b) [as physiological stimulus of hearing] as a shock propagated by
the air through the ears and brain and blood to the soul;
(c) in a loose sense (or: improper sense, ?ata???st????)1) 'voice' is
also said in the case of irrational animals and lifeless things, such as
whinnyings2) and mere noises,
(d) but in the proper sense (??????) it is articulate (??a?????) voice,
considered as illuminating (f?t????sa?i.e. revealing) what is being
thought (t? ?????e???).3)4)
*) A considerable part of this study was prepared and written in the hospitable
environment and thanks to the indispensable library of the Fondation Hardt,
Vandoeuvres, August 2004. Gratitude for criticisms of earlier drafts is due to
Tiziano Dorandi, Frans de Haas, Jan van Ophuijsen, David T. Runia, and Teun
Tieleman.
1) ?ata???st???? (as opposed to ??????) may imply misuse either in a rela-
tively strong sense, viz. when a term is used for something which has no name,
or indicate extended or metaphorical use in a much less severe sense; see Runia
1988, 76, 83-7, also for references. I here prefer the less strong sense, because
stricdy speaking f??? in the case of the animal example replaces something for
which a name does exist, viz. ??e?et?s???, and this will also hold for numerous
cases of ??f?? produced by ????a.
2) Qpsta ibn Luqa (ed. Daiber, 1980) has 'dem Wiehern und dem Esehgeschr?'
(my emphasis), which may or may not have been in the Greek text translated. Cf.
further e.g. Diomedes, Gr.L. I p. 420.13-4 Keil, 'confusa (se, vox) est irrationalis
vel inscriptilis [= a?????at??], simplici vocis sono animalium effecta, quae scribi
non potest, ut est equi hinnitus (= ??e?et?s???), tauri mugitus' (quoted Ax 1986,
18). Also cf. Hsch. ?. ? 693: ??e?et?s???? ? f??? t?? ?pp??, and ??e?et?st????
as epithetonornons of 'horse'.
3) Tr. Beare 1906, 107 inclusive of explanatory glosses; wording modified. Good
brief overview of the ancient debate about speech (not: a certain kind of f???)
as the distinguishing mark of humans, or as also attributable in some respect to
animals, or to certain species of animals, at Sorabji 1993, 80-2.
4) A?t. Ploc. 4.19.1 Diels, ???t?? t?? f???? ????eta? p?e??a d?a st??at??
?p? d?a???a? ???????, ?a? p????? ?p? a???? d?' ?t?? ?a? e??ef???? ?a? a??at??
?
????? ????? d?ad?d?????? ???eta? d? ?a? ?ata???st???? ?p? t?? ?????? ?f??
f??? ?a? t?? ??????, ?? ??e?et?s??? ?a? ??f??? ?????? d? f??? ? ??a?????

360 JAAP MANSFELD
The two definitions which come first, (a) plus (b), are based on
passages in the dialogues.5) Diels ad loc. (1879, 408) however stated
that the next two paragraphs, (c) plus (d), "non iam ad Platonem
pertinent". In his index verborum s.v. f?>?? he cited (c) and (d) not
among the 'placita', but separately at the beginning, so perhaps as
definitions; no further comments elsewhere in the Doxographi Graeci.
Apparendy this verdict has been influential. Litde attention has been
paid to the A?tian lemma, and what has been said about its sec-
ond half
(to judge from what I have seen)6) is far from sufficient.
In what follows I shall argue that paragraphs (c) plus (d), pace Diels,
"ad Platonem pertinent".
We should observe that definitions (a) and (b) belong to the
domain of physicalphilosophy (and the
explicidyPlacita transmit
'the physical doctrine'),7) while paragraphs (c) and (d) are episte-
mologica! so belong to another part of philosophy. Moreover, only
the definition of voice sub (d), as 'articulate voice', is a proper one
per genus et diff?rentiam; what is said at (c) helps to identify both the
genus and its species 'human voice'. The physical and physiologi-
cal definitions sub (a) and (b) are descriptive. The mix of physical
?st?? ?? f?t????sa t? ?????e???. Note that Stob. 1.57, the sorry remains of the
chapter On voice and whetherit is incorporealand <***> what is its regentpart, consists
of only this single passage. Ps.Galen's text stops after d?ad?d??????, which how-
ever need not entail that what follows was lacking in his copy of ps.Plutarch.
5) For (a) cf. Tht. 206d quoted below, n. 137, and Sph. 263e quoted below,
n. 145, and the echo at [PL] Def. 414d, quoted below n. 95; for (b) cf. ??. 67b quoted
below, n. 91 (good discussion of how to translate this passage at Taylor 1928, 476-7).
See Ax 1986, 78-9, and further below, sections 5 and 6.
6) Ingenkamp (1966, 80) merely calls it an "anschliessende Erkl?rung". Ax (1986,
78 n. 62) believes it is a "kritische Anmerkung", or scholium, emphasizing f???
as human voice in the Plato lemma "mit Hilfe der Etymologie". For Tabarroni
(1988, 107 n. 9) see below, n. 23. Lachenaud (1993, 293) refers to parallels such
as the important passage Nemes, nat.hom. pp. 4.16-5.1 Morani for a distinction
between humans and animals as to speech (it has momentarily escaped him that
"Plut., Mor. 909 A" is in fact the fourth lemma of ps.Plu. Plac. 5.20 [below, ? 13],
the tract he edits and comments upon). He has noticed a "jeu ?tymologique", but
also adduces the role of the sun in Stoic cosmology, and in cognition according
to passages in Plutarch's De facie?rather far-fetched. Baltussen (1993, 213 and
2000, 237) states that "the rest [i.e. from (c), ???eta? d? ?a?...] derives from other
Platonic writings", but see below, sections 5 and 6. On ancient etymologizing see
e.g. Sluiter 1990, 12-3, 18-21, 27-33, Schenkeveld 1999, 181-2, also for references;
and below, n. 13.
7) A?t. Plac. prooem. 1, the first words of the treatise: ??????te? t?? f?s????
pa?ad?se?? ?????.

A MIDDLE PLATONIST PIACITUM ON 'VOICE' 361
and epistemologica! approaches need cause no surprise: book four

of the Placita contains more epistemological material, e.g. chapter
4.9, 'Whether perceptions are true'. As we shall see, in the present
case the epistemological ingredient came to be included because
f??? involves the multi-faceted notion, or rather notions, of ?????.
That in the Plato lemma f??? is more Stoico said to be pneuma,
i.e. corporeal, entails that sides are taken in the well-known con-
troversy about its being either corporeal or incorporeal.8) Actually,
all the tenets
(of [Plato], Epicurus, Democritus, the Stoics and
Anaxagoras) described [Plu.] Plac. 4.19.1-5 take f??? to be corpo-
real. Curiously enough, the diaphonia corporeal vs incorporeal is only
at issue in the next (!) chapter, Plac. 4.20: long tide in ps.Plutarch
'Whether voice is incorporeal and how echo comes to be', while
the short and
presumably original tide 'Whether voice is incorpo-
real' may be abstracted from Stobaeus (where the text is no longer
extant; ps.Plutarch's is excerpted ps.Gal. Phil.Hist. 101). Here the
first lemma lists 'Pythagoras Plato Aristode' as arguing that voice
is incorporeal, while the second presents the arguments of the Stoics
in favour of its being corporeal. The postponement of an exposi-
tion of the diaphonia is a further sign that A?tius (a bit atypically)
does not give equal weight to the two
opposite sides. But I must
postpone discussion of the surprising order in which these two chap-
ters have been transmitted to another occasion.
The etymological explanation ad finem of our passage is not, of
course, an etymology in the modern sense, but an instance of the
ancient way of unfolding the original and true meaning of a word.
The function of this etymology is to demonstrate the role played
by the 'articulate human voice' in relation to the thought it so to
speak makes visible, and to do so more clearly than is the case at
the beginning of this passage, where voice is already said to come
from the mind. It is noteworthy that we are not told where in the
body this mind is situated.
8) For this 'vetus atque perpetua quaestio' (Gell. NA. 5.15.1) see Baumgarten
1962, 148-9 ?. 119 and ?? 1986, 33-4 and esp. 178-89, both with references to
the evidence; also cf. below, n. 41.

362 JAAP MANSFELD
2. Grammarians and L??cographers
The main ingredients of the A?tian lemma can be paralleled from

the rather laboured introductory paragraph of the Ars grammatica of
Diomedes (ca. 370 CE, so about four centuries later), though their
order is different (as are also the contents of the physical paragraph)
and though, more importandy, the etymological explanation is lacking:
? 2 [others begin elsewhere], but we are happy to begin with speech

(oratio = ?????). For this, (d) revealing the secrets of the heart,
(a)/(b) transfers itself to the tongue which steers it, being guided by
a certain mobile breath
(d) of the articulate voice (vox articulata = f??? ??a?????)
(a)/(b) and by the rounded steering of its helm, and since the inter-
nal air which is near (it) is struck by the adroitness of the heart, and
the palate slowly and gradually made to reverberate,
(d) it [sc, speech] is impelled, as a sort of intermediary and betrayer
of the human mind, to express the indications of the thinking mind
in a rational way through the mouth and through spoken language.
(c)/(d) By this its specific and great gift, reason expressed in spoken
language, nature alone declares and proves that we are humans, sep-
arated from the other animals.9)
Diomedes, otherwise a far from original author though his trea-

tise differs from the general trend in grammar in treating the partes
orationis or parts of speech first,10) has committed a rhetorical tour de
force in the proem of book one, jumping back and forth from the
physical to the cognitive aspect and indulging in choice expressions.11)
Even so, we can hardly fail to notice that the crucial distinction
9) Gr.L. I p. 300.6-13 Keil, cf. FDS 517 (passage already cited by Schmidt
(1839, 18 n. 31)) '[...] nos vero ab ipsa oratione auspicemur. (d) haec enim se-
creta pectoris arguens (a)/(b) ad linguam sui gubernatricem migr?t, mobili quo-
dam (d) vocis articulatae (a)/(b) spiritu rotundoque gubernaculi moderamine
temperata, et interiore vicino aere pectoris argutia verberato palatoque sensim pau-
latimque pulsato (d) velut internuntius ac proditor humanae mentis ad indicia expri-
menda cogitationis per os sermonemque rationabiliter agitatur. (c)/(d) hoc enim
suo magnoque natura beneficio, expressa ratione sermonis, nos ceteris separates
animalibus sola homines fatetur atque demonstrat'. For the expression seaeta pec-
toris cf. Sen. Ben. 6.38.5, Tac. Ger. 22.4; for the role of the physiological appara-
tus cf. also the references cited below, n. 15 adfinem. Note that Diomedes is so to
speak old-fashioned and wholly unaware of the revisions argued by Galen, for
which see Baumgarten 1962, 108-72.
10) See Ax 1986, 17-22 and HLL 5 (1989) ? 524 (Schmidt 1989, 132-6).
11) Dammer 2001, 68-9.

between humans, endowed by nature with rational thought and spo-

ken language on one side, and all other living beings on the other,
which is implicit in paragraphs (c) plus (d) of the Aetian lemma, is
here spelled out explicidy. And whereas the doxographical passage
simply states that the 'articulate voice' reveals what is thought,
Diomedes uses more forceful language,stressing that unspoken
thoughts are secret, and that when spoken they are in a way betrayed.
We shall encounter further examples of this dramatic approach in
section 3, below.
Other parallels, which as to their lay-out are closer to the Aetian
lemma?that is to say especially for the combination of the con-
tents of paragraphs (c) and (d) in the same sequence, and by the
inclusion of versions of the etymological explicatio?are to be found
in the so-called Commentarla on Dionysius Thrax, the remains of
commentaries dating from late Antiquity and Byzantine times and
separated from A?tius by seven centuries or more. I adduce three
passages containing variously phrased but as to contents very sim-
ilar or even virtually identical information. As we shall see one can-
not exclude that one of these passages depends on one of the others;
what is implied is at the very least a shared tradition.
The first to be quoted (T 3.1) is from the Scholia Vaticana. Hilgard
in his edition attributes the paragraph from which I quote to the
(otherwise unknown?) grammarian Stephanus (early seventh cen-
tury),12) but this attribution is not certain. The distinction between
?????? and ?ata???st???? in (c) is explicit, just as in the A?tian
lemma; it is exemplified here by quotations from the (authoritative)
Iliad. And in paragraph (d) two rather similar etymologies are spelled
out at some length, while the 'physical' paragraph (e), here not at
the beginning but adfinem, is somewhat different:
12) Hilgard 1901, 180; Gudeman (1929, 2399) says he is "nur als Erkl?rer der
Grammatik des Dionysios Thrax [. . .] bekannt." Wolska-Conus (1989) argues that
Stephanus of Athens and Stephanus of Alexandria are the same person, to be sit-
uated in an environment indebted to Philoponus. She fails to mention the study
of grammar, though Philoponus also taught grammar. It is anyhow unlikely that
our grammarian is to be identified with the Athenian, because in a passage in the
Schol.Vat. dealing with questions and answers attributed to him by Hilgard his
example of a p????-question is p???? St?fa???; and the answer is ? ?at???, S D.T
p. 239.21-2 Hilgard; see Gudeman 1932, 403. He accordingly distinguished at
least two different persons. But I cannot deal with the Stephanus-problem here.

364 JAAP MANSFELD
? 3.1 (c) Note that ph?-n? (Voice') in the proper sense is said of
humans, as in the poet: 'not if I had ten tongues, and ten mouths,
and a voice that cannot be broken'; in a loose (or: improper) sense
Voice' is also said of others, as Homer said of the trumpet: 'just as
when a voice is clear, when a trumpet calls'.
(dl) ph?-n? (Voice') is formed from ph?, phain? ('bring to light'), com-
ing to be through addition of the syllable -ne \_ph?\n) ph?-n?; for it
brings the thoughts (e??????ata) to light and brighdy clarifies them;
(d2) or because it is a sort of ph?to-no? ('light-thought'),14) for it brings
forth the thoughts of the no-os ('mind') into the ph?-s ('light').
(e) voice is defined as follows: voice is a sort of breath brought up
from a proper apparatus and blood as far as the tongue, being struck
by which it is articulated and transmitted as intelligible to the ears
of one's fellow-men.15)16)
13) Bracketed by Hilgard; see however below, n. 24. For the four main ways
of explaining, or implementing, a change in a word or phrase see the list at Quint.
1.5.38-41, where also alternative views are discussed; of these four three were
already known to PI. Crt. 394b. See Ax 1987. Here we have addition (adiectio);see
further below, nn. 32 (adiectio)and 40 (immutano),and text thereto.
14) The word f?t???? is only paralleled in ? 3.2 (d), see below n. 19, and in
the additamentumfrom the EtymologicumGenuinumin the EtymologicumGudianumquoted
below, n. 40.
15) S D.T pp. 181.28-182.2 Hilgard, (c) ?st??? de dt? ? f??? ?????? <???>
???eta? ep? t?? a????p??, ?? pa?? tf p???t? (? 489 f.) "??d* e? ??? d??a ???
???ssa?, d??a d? st??at' e?e?, f??? t' ?????t??'*? ?ata???st???? d? ?a? ?f'
et???? ???eta? f???, ?? ep? s??p????? e?pe? '?????? (S 219) "?? d' dt' ???????
f???, dte t' ?a?e s??p???". (dl) s???at??eta? d? ? f??? pa?? t? f?, t? fa???,
?at? p??s????? s???a??? t?? <??> ???????? [f?] f??? ? fa??e? ?a? ?a? ?a?p???
?
d???? ta e??????ata (d2) ? ?t? f?t???? t?? ?st?? a?t? ?a? ta t?? ???? e??????ata
e?? f?? e???e?.
(e) ????eta? d? ? f??? ??t??? f??? ?st? p?e??? t? ?p? s?st??at?? ?d??? ?a?
a??at?? ??afe???e??? ??? t?? ???tt??, ?f' t?? t?pt??e??? d?a?????ta? ?a? ???t??
ta?? p??s??? ???a?? pa?ad?d?ta?. This 'physical' definition (two parallels cited
below, n. 19) is not so easy to place, see Schenkeveld 1990b, 300; it is also in
some respects very old-fashioned, see above, n. 9 ad finem. The s?st??a ?d???
remains unclear; could it represent the heart? The contribution of the tongue can
of course often be paralleled, see X. Mem. 1.4.12, Ar. HA 4.9.535a27-b3, and then
e.g. Diomedes (T 2 (a)(b) + (d), above, n. 9 and text thereto) and the Philonian
texts (T 7.2 and 7.3) quoted in section 3 below, while the ears of one's fellow
men are referred to implicitly (and sometimes explicidy) in most of the texts about
f??? quoted in the present study. See also Porphyry's exegesis of PI. 77. 67b (cf.
below, text to n. 110), in Harm. p. 47.29 During, p??sse? ???? t?? a?s??s?? ?
???, 'the air strikes our sense organ'. So this definition has a bit of everything,
just as Plutarch's account at Gen.Socr.589G and even Nemesius' at nat.hom. pp.
71.16-72.2 Morani.
FDS 503A contains p. 181.18-32 Hilgard up to and including paragraph (c).
16) A very briefly phrased parallel for the etymologies is found in the Ca?ones
of the grammarian Theognostus (ninth century), ? 538.1 Cramer,
sive De orthographia
f??? pa?? t? f?? ?a? ????? ? ta ?? t? ?? f?t????sa ('ph?-n?from ph?-s and no-
us; what illuminates what is in the mind').

The secondpassage (T 3.2) is from the Scholia L?ndinens^a. This

is closelyparallel to the passage from the Scholia Vaticana just quoted,
paragraph ? 3.2 (c) being virtually identical with ? 3.1 (c), while
paragraph ? 3.2 (d), the only one I need translate, is shorter and
a shade different. Hilgard in his edition attributes the paragraph
from which I quote to the grammarian Heliodorus, who is believed
to have excerpted Ghoeroboscus so must be later than the first half
of the ninth century.17) I do not think one can exclude that
Heliodorus(?) excerpted Stephanus(?) here. Note however that the
etymological explanation of f??? through fa??? is not found in
? 3.1 (d2):
? 3.2 (dl) ph?-n? ('voice') is spoken of as in a way being phao-n?ls)

('light'-/z?) which means splendidly clarifying the thoughs (????ata);
(d2) or because it is a sort of ph?to-no? ('light-thought'), from its illu-
minating (i.e. revealing) the mind.19)
The third of these passages (T 3.3), an explanation of t???? ('pitch

accent'), is from the Scholia Vaticana too, and again from a passage
17) Hilgard 1901, 482. For the date of Choeroboscus see Montanari 1997; for
the relation of Heliodorus to Choeroboscus the best account I have seen is still
that of Hoerschelman (1874, 46-8).
18) The quasi-hapax fa??? is only paralleled in the explanation of f??? at EM
p. 803.52-6 Kallierges: f???? pa?? t? f?? ?a? t?? ????, ? ta ?? tf ?f f?t????sa?
? t? t?? ???? f??? pa?? t? f??? e??a? t?? ????? d?a ?a? t?? f???? ta t?? ?????
e??????ata ????s???e?, fa??? t?? ??sa, ?a? f???. The etymology of f??? from
(????) f?? is cited by Betz (1973, 272 n. 3) with reference to this passage; he calls
it "erbaulich"; foUowing Steinthal (see next n.) he sees the etymology of f??? as
f?? t?? ??? as Stoic (1973, 285 n. 6), but see next n., and below, section 4.
19) S D.T p. 483.5-6 Hilgard, f??? d? ???eta? ????e? fa??? t?? ??sa, t??t?st?
?a?p??? d????sa ta ????ata? ? f?t???? t?? ??sa, pa?? t? f?t??e?? t?? ????
(for fa??? see above, n. 18, for f?t???? nn. 14 and 15). This etymological account
is followed by the same 'physical* definition as in paragraph (e) of the passage
cited above, n. 15. Another passage that is entirely parallel, from (c) up to and
including 'physical' definition (e), is found in a late tract, [Theodosius] ?e?? ??a?-
?at???? p. 16.6-19 G?ttling. Here (d) is formulated as follows, p. 16.11-5: e???ta?
d? f??? d?a t? e??a? f?? ???, ????? ? ta ?? tf ?f f?t????sa? ta ?a? ??d???eta
?a? ?e???????a t?? ??? fa?e?? ???? ? f??? ??p??e?, ?a? ta ????ata ?a?p???
de????s??. The etymological part of this passage is quoted by Schmidt (1839, 18
n. 31) and Heinze (1872, 142). It is discussed by Steinthal (1891, 285), who writes:
"Die Sprache aber, ? ?????, ist die Offenbarung dieser Vernunft [????], was die
Stoiker auch in dem Namen f??? ausgedr?ckt fanden; denn nach ihnen war die
Etymologie dieses Wortes f?? ???". There is however no good evidence that the
etymology is Stoic, see below, section 4. SteinthaTs claim is presumably based on
the fact that the [Theodosian] passage is quoted by Schmidt in his book on Stoic
grammar.

366 JAAP MANSFELD
attributed to Stephanus by Hilgard in his edition (1901, 174). No

explicit reference in (c) here to the distinction between ?????? and
?ata???st????, but the distinction between the human voice issu-
ing from the mind and that of animals (i.e. here those animals
which can imitate human speech) is stated explicidy.20) The ety-
mological explicatio uses other means to arrive at the same conclusion:
? 3.3 (c) He says that pitch is a resonance of the enharmonic, or

rather of the articulate, that is to say the human voice; for only the
human voice is articulate.
(d) This is why 'man' (?????p??) is called pho-s, the voice (ph?-n?)
being in some way luminous (ph?tonoeid?),21) because it illuminates (i.e.
reveals) and makes clear what is inside the mind.
(c)(d) Accordingly the [sc, voice] sent out from the mind and going
back to the mind is also called enharmonic, i.e. articulate [...].
(c) Since there are also other living beings, which imitate the enhar-
monic voice and speak in such a way that one believes to hear a
human being, should we therefore say that their voice too is enhar-
monic? We say it is not, for it imitates the voice of man, but is not
sent out from a mind.22)
In paragraph ? 3.3 (d) I have printed f?? in the footnote with-

out accent, to highlight the etymological wordplay: f??, 'man' (syno-
nym of ?????p??, 'man'), is identified with f?? (contraction of f???),
20) For another and differendy worded parallel for the distinction between the
human voice and that of animals and lifeless things see S D.T p. 130.8-21 Hilgard;
cf. also Tabarroni 1988, 106. For Stoic views of animals capable of imitating
human speech see the passages cited below, n. 48.
21) The word f?te???e?d? is only paralleled at S E. Hipp. 740, p. 92.8 Schwartz.
The etymology of f??? from f??/f?? (= ?????p??) is paralleled Elias in Porph.
p. 37.1-4 Busse, ?????????e? d? ???????? d?a f????, ??e? rai f??? e???ta? ??
e?? f?? ????sa ta t?? ??? ?e????ata, d?? ?a? f?? ????? ? ?????p?? ???eta? ??
p??? t? f?t?st???? ???? ?a? ??a??e?t???? ? ??t?? ?a? ?a? ta ???st??? ea?t??
p??? e?a?????e? d?a t?? f???? t?? ??a????? ?t?. See also below, n. 31 and text
thereto.
22) S D.T p. 175.5-9 Hilgard, (c) ???e? d? t?? t???? e??a? ?p???s?? t?? ??a?-
?????? f????, ????? t?? ??a?????, t??t?st? t?? a????p????? ???? ??? ? t??
?????p?? f??? ??a?????? (d) d?e? ?a? f?? ? ?????p??, ?? e??a? a?t?? f?te?-
??e?d? t??a, t?? f?t????sa? ?a? saf??????sa? ta ??t?? t?? ???. (c)(d) d?e? ?a?
??a??????? ?st?, t??t?s?? ??a?????, ? ?p? d?a???a? e?pe?p??e?? ?a? e?? d?????a?
a?e??????? [...]. (c) ?pe? d? ?a? ???a ?st? ?fa t?? ??a??????? f???? ?p???????e?a,
?a? f????eta? ?? d??e?? ?????p?? ????e??, ??a ???e???? e?p???e? ??a???????
e??a? t?? f????; fa??? ??? ???e?ta? ??? t?? t?? ?????p?? f????, ??? ?p?
d?a???a? d? e?p??peta?.

'light',23) in order to provide an explanatory etymology for f?(-??)

as the exclusive property of humans. This wordplay is paralleled in
? 4.2 below. 'What is inside the mind' are, obviously, thoughts.
The derivation at ? 3.2 (dl) of ph?-n? from a monosyllabic ver-
bal rootpho, said to be equivalent to phai-no, which is then sup-
ported by an explicatio, or explanatory comment, viz. 'for it brings
the thoughts to light and brighdy clarifies them', is attributed to
the grammarian Philoxenus first century
(late BCE) by the editor
of his remains.24) The formula pa?? t? f? t? fa??? vel. sim. is also
found in a named Philoxenus fragment from the Etymobgicum of
Orion (fifth century CE), and in four anonymous others which have
been plausibly attributed.25) And the explicatio is paralleled ad senten-
tiam in two fragments where the name
Philoxenus has been pre-
served as well. In the lemma f???? we read 'we accomplish
on
the publication and demonstration of thoughts by speaking (f???e??)',
and in that on f??? (phr?n, in the sense 'mind')26) we hear that the
f??? is that 'from which deliberations come forth'. In the anony-
23) Cf. above, ?. 18. Tabarroni (1988, 107 ?. 9) is the only scholar I know of
who has noticed the parallel between this D.T. scholium and A?t. 4.19.1, but he
errs in stating that the scholium has "light (ph?s)", and has failed to notice the
parallels in ? 3.1 and 3.2. For the derivation from f?? see below, n. 31 and text
thereto.
24) Fragment abstracted from the passage quoted above, n. 15: S D.T. p. 181.33-5
Hilgard = Philox.Gramm. fr. *195 Theodoridis (1976, 179), s???at??eta? d? ?
f??? pa?? t? f?, t? fa???, ?at? p??s????? s???a??? t?? ?? ????????? f?
f???? fa??e? ?a? ?a? ?a?p??? d???? ta e??????ata. This is an "erschlossenes
Fragment" (which is why it is preceded by an asterisk); for Theodoridis' reasons
see ibid., 76-7. It will be clear that I cannot agree with his remark that this "Glosse"
has not been "andersweitig ?berliefert". Note that he reads f? f????, so keeps
f?, expunged by Hilgard (above, n. 13).
25) Philox.Gramm. fr. 26 Th. ap. Orion Et. p. 160.23-7 Sturz, F????e??? ??
tf ?e?? ????s??????? ????t??, and frs. *40, *55, *60 and *107 Th. But pa??
t? f? t? fa??? is also found in passages that are perhaps less easily attributable,
such as Et.Gud. v. f?s??, p. 560.35-7 Sturz, f?s??? t? fa???, ?? ?? ?a? ?p?f?'..
???eta? d? pa?? t? f? t? fa???, ?a? p?e??as?f t?? s??, or EM ?. e??f??,
p. 375.7-10 Kallierges, e??f??* ? ?????? a??, ? ? ????? a??. pa?? t? ?a? ?a? t?
f?, t? fa???, ????f?? ?a? e??f?? ?at? s????p??, ? ?? tf ea?? fa????e???, ?????
p??????, ? ???? ?? tf ?e????? te??e??, ???a???.
26) f??? is standardly identified with d?????a in the l?xica, e.g. Suda v. phi 709,
and elsewhere, e.g. Gal. Hipp.Qff.Med. XVIIIB p. 649.18-9 K?hn (SVF 2.135 first
text, cf. below, n. 48), t?? d?????a?, ?? te ?a? ???? ?a? f???a ?a? ????? ??????
?? ?????p?? ?a???s??.

368 JAAP MANSFELD
mous but convincingly attributed fragment concerned with f???????,

'prudent', this explicatio is stated more fully: the f??? is that 'from
which d?lib?rations and judgements come forth'.27) And the deriva-
tion of words from monosyllabic verbal roots is the shibboleth of
Philoxenus.
As is to be expected the corpus of so-called Etimologica contains
further echoes, or versions, of the etymological explanations of f???.
Critical editions are only available for parts, or sections, so often
enough one does not know what the transmission and interrelations
of the extant manuscript versions of this succession of treatises are.
Accordingly the evidence is not as good as one would like it to be,
but still, one supposes, sufficiendy reliable to be used. For one of
the sources of the Etimologica, the Epimerismi Horner?a, the situation
is good thanks to Dyck's magisterial editions. Dyck moreover quotes
or refers to parallel passages in the Etimologica in his second appa-
ratus, using ms. evidence where no critical edition is available.28)
Even I do not pretend
so, to have found all the lemmas in the
Etimologica containing parallels that may be relevant, nor shall I
quote all those I have collected.
Early instances are found in the Etymologicum of Orion (a work
cited above in connection with the Philoxenus fragment). In the first
of these brief entries we find the term ????? in the sense of 'speech',
or 'discourse' (compare the proem to book one of Diomedes' Ars
quoted above (T 2) where the equivalent used is oratio):
? 4.1 ph?-n? (Voice'): what illuminates the (contents) of the mind (nous)
through speech (?????).29)
This is immediately followed, ibid., by two etymologies of f??,

'man':
27) Fr. 27a) Th., [. . .] t?? ?a? ??????t?? e?d?s?? ?a? de???? d?a t?? f???e??
p?????e?a, ??t? F????e??? ?? tf ?e?? ????s???????; fr. 29a) Th., [...] f???,
af' ?? p???eta? ta ????e??ata, ??t? F????e???; fr. *194a) Th., [. ..] f???, ?f*
?? p???eta? ta ????e??ata ?a? a? ????a?.
28) I have consulted Reizenstein 1897 and 1907, Alpers 1969, Serrano Aybar
1977, 102-5, Dyck 1983, 5-16, 22-33, Dyck 1995, 23-48, 848-64, and Tosi 1998;
Schironi 2004, 16-25 was not yet available to me.
29) Orion Etym. p. 160.12 Sturz, f???? ? f?t????sa tf ???? ta t?? ???.

? 4.2 ph?-s: 'man' (?????p??), the only one to illuminate the (con-
tents) of the mind (d?????a) through speech (?????); alternatively from
'ph?' 'speak' (????);30) for man is a rational (???????) animal.31)
The remark in ? 4.1 that the contents of the mind are revealed
by means of ????? entails that f??? in this sense cannot be attrib-
uted to other living beings; ? 4,2, where it is said that man is the
only one to do this, states this even more clearly. We should note
the wordplay which is the same as in ? 3.3 (d) above: f??, 'man5,
is put on a par with f??, 'light'. The etymological point in ? 4.1
and ? 4.2 about the illumination of the contents of the mind is
also paralleled in ? 3.1 to ? 3.3 above. Orion's treatise is earlier
than the paragraphs of the Commentaria in Dionysium Thracem from
which I have quoted above, so one could argue that what is found
there derives from (a fuller version of ?) this Etymologicum, though
naturally one cannot be certain.
A very similar explicatio is preserved in a lemma of Orion con-
cerned with another verb meaning 'to speak':
? 5.1 To speak clearly (phtheggesthai):is produced [viz., from pheggesthai]

by the insertion of the ? ('th'). For to shine (pheggesthai) is derived
from bright light (pheggos). Note that it [viz., phtheggesthai] is said from
the bringing into light (ph?s) of the operations (?????ata) of the mind
(t?? ???).32)
30) The formula pa?? t? f? t? ???? (cf. attributed frs. *55, *159 and *191
Th.) is not implausibly attributed to Philoxenus too by Theodoridis, whose fr.
*196a)?abstracted from this very Orion passage?runs: f???... ? pa?? t? f? t?
????? ??????? ?a? ?f?? ? ?????p??. Note that the part omitted by Theodoridis
is paralleled ad sententiamat Philox.Gramm. fr. *195 Th., see above nn. 24 and
27. But pa?? t? f? t? ???? also occurs in passages which are less easily attrib-
utable (e.g. EM v. f????, p. 799.21 f. Kallierges).
31) Orion Etym. p. 160.13-5 Sturz, f??? ? ?????p??, ? ????? ta t?? d?a???a?
f?t???? t? ????, ? pa?? t? f? t? ????? ??????? ?a? ???? ? ?????p??. Cf.
Ep.Hom. f 15, ?. 724.1-2 Dyck, and the parallels cited ad he. by Dyck (1995),
among which a passage from the Et.Gen. Also cf. Apollon. L?x. p. 166.1-2 Bekker,
f?te?? oi ?????p??, ?p? t?? f?t??e?? ta ?????e?a p??ta d?a t?? ?????.
32) Orion Etym. p. 162.12-4 Sturz, f????es?a?* p?e??as?f t?? <?>. f??/es?a?
?a? ?st? pa?? t? f?????, ? ?st? t? f??. e???ta? ??? pa?? t? e?? f?? ??e?? ta
t?? ??? ?????ata. Insertion (adiectio)is a standard explanation or effectuation of
change, see above, n. 13. The expression ??? (or d?a???a?, or ?????) ?????ata
in the sense cogitata, 'thoughts', is quite common, see e.g. S.E. M. 7.221-2,8.11-3
(LS 33B), 70, 137-9, D.L. 9.70, the Nemesius passage referred to above, n. 6 and
partly quoted below, n. 48, and nat.hom.p. 71.9-10 (see below, n. 145), Cic. ND.
3.71 mentis motus, Sen. Ep. 117.13 motus animorumenuntiativicorporum,Cale. p. 234.3

370 JAAP MANSFELD
The Byzantine Etimologica too preserve this sort of information.

First, a passage from the Etymologicum Gudianum, v. ?s??a (I do not
quote the whole entry):
? 5.2 phtheggesthai from ph?, from the bringing to light (ph?s) of the
contents of the mind (ta t?? ???).33)
The compiler of this Etymologicum abstracted the entire lemma

?s??a from the Epimerismi Homerici plausibly attributed to Choero-
boscus.34) Lentz, who quoted from Cramer's edition (1835) of the
Epimerismi and from the Etymologicum Magnum, argued that it derives
from the ?e?? pa??? of Herodianus (second century CE), an attri-
bution provisionally accepted by Dyck (who ad be. refers to the par-
allel in Orion) in his edition of the Epimerismi.35)
Lentz also attributed other entries of similar content to this
work.36) The most
interesting passage is found in Hdn. Path. fr. 220
Lenz, again deriving from the Epimerismi for which now Dyck's text
is available:37)
? 5.3 About *strong' (iphthimos) Seleucus says [it is derived] by the

insertion of the W;38) just as from bright light (pheggos) comes to shine
(pheggesthai) and [from this again] to speak clearly (phtheggesthai), from
bringing the ????? into the light (ph?-s).39)
Waszink (SVF 2 p. 236.21 von Arnim, see quotation below, n. 86).?Perhaps

Plutarch alludes to this etymology, see Gen.Soa. 589 BC: humans get to know each
others' thoughts (???se??) by means of voice, which is like groping in the dark
(?p? s??t?), whereas the thoughts of the demons, which possess bright light (f?????),
shine upon (?????p??s??) those able to <see> them (cf. also below, n. 89).
33) Et.Gud. p. 211.12-3 di Stefani, t? f????es?a? pa?? t? f?, t? e?? f?? ???
ta t?? ???.
34) Text at Dyck 1995, 105-6: a 143, where several parallel passages in the
l?xica are indicated in the apparatus ad be. For the attribution to Choeroboscus
see ibid., 23-4.
35) Lentz 1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 286 ad Hdn. Path. fr. *364, attribution accepted
by Dyck (1995, 105; for the text see now Dyck 1995 quoted in the previous note).
36) See Lentz 1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 248 ad Hdn. Path. fr. 220, a cento com-
posed by him from passages in Et. Gud. and Ep. Horn.; for these texts see now
Dyck 1995, 376: ? 13 and 390-1: ? 56, who attributes the first passage to [Hdn.]
Ep. Horn, and the first part of the second to Hdn. Path, and Cath. Pr. Finally Lentz
1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 371 ad Hdn. Path. fr. *627, quoted by him from EM.
37) Lentz 1868, Hdn. Gr. III.2 p. 248; better text at Dyck 1995, 376: ? 13,
who attributes it to [Hdn.] Ep. Horn.
38) This phrase is more intelligible in Dyck 1995, 390: ? 56, p. 390.79-81, where
anonymous 'others' (i.e. other than Herodianus mentioned at the beginning of the
entry) derive ?f????? in this way via ?f?. For insertion see above, n. 32.
39) Ep.Hom. ? 13, p. 376.83-5 Dyck = Seleucus fr. 1 M?ller, <?p?> t?? ?f?????

With the grammarian Seleucus, a contemporary of Tiberius and

a (later) rival of Philoxenus, we find ourselves in the early first cen-
tury CE. Though the methods of derivation of these two men are
different, Philoxenus starting from monosyllabic verbal stems, Seleucus
adding supernumerary letters, in the present case both are agreed
that words pertaining to speech and speaking are to be explained
by having recourse to a semantic element, viz. the etymological
explanation by means of words
for 'light' and 'shine'. One cannot,
of course, exclude was inspired by Philoxenus,
that Seleucus but as
we shall see the idea itself was sufficiendy common to make a deriva-
tion from a single source most
unlikely.
We should also cite first explanation,
the in an additamentum to
the Etymologicum Gudianum deriving from the Etymologicum Genuinum
(second half of the ninth century), of a synonym of f???, viz. a?d?
('human voice', 'speech', 'sound') via a synonym of f??, viz. a???:
? 6 aud-?: voice (ph?-n?); it is said from aug-? ('bright light') through

substitution of d for g, (aud?/aug? is that) through which the (contents)
of the mind (noti) are shone upon and illuminated (phot-izetai). And
voice (pho-ne) the same, because it is a sort o?ph?to-no? ('light-thought').40)
Anetymology of a?d? is not found in texts ? 1 and ? 3-T 5,

but the link between light (in ? 6 a??? as well as f??) and the
expression of thought contents by speaking is the same in all these
passages, and the etymology of f??? through f?t???? at the end
is only paralleled in ? 3.2 (d2) and ? 3.3 (d2) above.
? S??e???? ???e? p?e??as??? e??a? t?? ?, ?spe? pa?? t? f????? f???es?a? ?a?
f????es?a?, pa?? t? e?? f?? p????e?? t?? ?????. Dyck ad loe. says that it may
come from Hdn. Path., as Lentz believed, but is very skeptical about Lentz' claim
that Herodianus said he agreed with Seleucus. We may add that the words ?a?
??e?? s???atat????e?a tf Se?e??? which Lentz apparently claims to have taken
from the text at p. 208 of Cramer's edition of the Ep.Hom. are not in fact to be
found there, and I have been unable to establish their provenance.
40) Et.Gud. add. p. 231.22-3 di Stefani, a?d?? f???? e???ta? pa?? t? a??? ??
t??p? t?? <?> e?? <d>? d?' t\? a????eta? ?a? f?t??eta? ta t?? ???? ?a? f??? t?
a?t?, f?t???? t?? ??sa (for f?t???? cf. above, nn. 14 and 15). Di Stefani ad loe.
notes that this derives from the EtymologicumGenuinum,information he received from
*
Reitzenstein, see ibid., iii. Substitution' (immutano)too is an old etymological ploy,
cf. above, n. 13.?I note in passing that Gal. Hipp.Epid., XVIIA pp. 757.6-759.8
K?hn (first part at SVF 2.144 second text = FDS 478; partly in SVF 2.144 first
text = FDS 477, from the spurious commentary on Hum. so to be discounted),
explaining the co-occurrence of ??a?d?? and ?f???? at [Hipp.] Epid. 3.17.(3), and
also Def, XIX pp. 79.16-80.3 K?hn, argues against the view (attested Erot.

372 JAAP MANSFELD
The evidence studied in this section demonstrates that the sec-

ond part of the first lemma of the Aetian
chapter be On Voice can
paralleled in various ways in what we may call a grammatical tra-
dition. In one branch of this tradition, that of the Etymologica, the
material is (unsurprisingly) limited to versions and varieties of the ety-
mological ingredient. Two virtually identical passages in the Commentaria
in Dionysium Thracem are closer to the Aetian lemma because they
not only contain etymological explanations but also a paragraph on
the distinction between f??? in the proper and in the loose, or
improper, sense, and a (different) physical description. In the third
parallel passage from the Commentaria (T 3.3) and in that in Diomedes
(T 2) quoted above the etymology is lacking.
In the sections that follow we shall see that the evidence for the
etymological explanation (and also that for the physiological account)
is not limited to grammatical or lexicographical sources, so that we
need not assume that whoever composed the Aetian lemma depended
on a grammarian's account of Voice'. We should moreover keep
in mind to what extent it ultimately derives from several dialogues
of Plato, that is to say is linked with a philosophical tradition. The
extant Commentaria presumably derive to a large extent from the
comments on Dionysius' grammar by people who (like John
Philoponus) also taught philosophy, and they also contain other
philosophical items, such as definitions of definition, of techn?, etc.41)
Accordingly, the passages from these commentaries quoted above
may ultimately be indebted to a philosophical as well as a gram-
matical tradition.
p. 44.3-6 Klein, cf. e.g. Hsch., Suid., and Phot, s.w.) that ??a?d?? and ?f????
are synonyms; ??a?d??, he posits, pertains to human speech only; see further Ax
1986, 207-9.
41) For a related passage in a philosophical commentary see the quotation from
Elias, above n. 21. I cannot enter here into a discussion of the treatment of this
question by the late Neoplatonist commentators in general; for some comments
see Tabarroni 1988, passim, Chiesa 1992, 16, 29. For definitions of definition in
the S in D.T see e.g. 'Aristotle', S in D.T p. 107.6-7, tChrysippus\ ibid. p. 107.5
(SVF 2.226), and 'Antipater the Stoic', ibid. p. 107.6-7 (SVF 3 Ant. 23); for ver-
sions of the standard Stoic definition o?techn?(c?.SVFl.lZ, 2.94) see ibid. pp. 2.24-6,
6.20-1, 26.24-6, 108.31-3, 157.18-29, 161.27-9, 445.12-3; for an instance of the
diaphoniareferred to above, n. 8, see ibid. p. 482.9-14.

3. Philo, Cicero, Heraclitus the Allegorist
Two species of human speech are mentioned in a passage of

Philo of Alexandria (early first century CE), which lacks the ety-
mology but provides an explanation which comes quite close:
? 7.1 [. . .] and beside truth he set a kindred quality which he called

'clarification* (d???s??); these [i.e. truth and clarification] represent
both (species of) speech we possess, viz. the internal and the uttered
(??d?a??t?? te ?a? p??f??????). For the uttered requires clarification,
by which the hidden thoughts in each of us (ta afa?? t?? ?a?'
e?ast?? ???? e?????a) are made known to our fellow-men [. . .].42)
There are, as a matter of fact, quite a few passages dealing with

'voice', and 'speech', in Philo's oeuvre which contain most of the
ingredients studied in the previous sections of this study, though the

majority lack the etymology. Look for instance at his account of
'articulate voice'. Philo insists on the crucial difference between men
and animals, describes the physical process of the production of
voice as sound upon which articulation and reason are imprinted,
and declares that speech is the herald and interpreter of the mind:
? 7.2 As to articulate voice (??a????? f????), moreover, an advan-

tage possessed by man alone of all living creatures, there are partic-
ulars of which we are aware; as, for example, that it is sent up from
the mind (d?a???a?), that it is in the mouth that it acquires articula-
tion, that it is the stroke of the tongue that imparts articulation (t?
e?a?????) and speech to the (pneumatic) tension of the voice; it does
not produce a mere idle sound and formless noise (????? .. . f????
????? ?a? ?d?at?p?t?? ????), as it performs for the suggesting mind
the function of its herald or interpreter (??????? ? ???????? . . .
t????).43)
42) Ph. Spec. 4.69; tr. here and in the following passages by Colson & Whittaker,
modified. For other Philonic passages where 'internal speech' and 'uttered speech'
occur (or are hinted at) see FDS 530-4 (none of these is in SVF). Add Congr.33-4,
Mut. 69; also Anim. 12 and 98, see the instructive comments of Terian (1981, 125-
6, 203-4). Good brief overview at Betz 1973, 285; Otte 1968, 131-9 is to be used
with caution. For the 'hidden' thoughts cf. below, ? 7.3 and nn. 86 and 89 and
text thereto.
43) Ph. Det. 40. Cf. Mos. 2.127 (FDS 531), Migr. 71 (FDS 530), Migr. 117, Congr.
33, Mut. 69. H?lser (1987, 564-7, i.e. FDS 515-8) has a paragraph "Der Verstand
als Quelle der Rede", a theme for which he also refers to passages elsewhere in
his collection. But FDS 515 (SVF 2.840) does not provide independent evidence;
this quasi-apophthegm is derived from Galen's note t????t??? d? ?a? t?? d?????a?
s??f???? ?f??????e??? ?????s?? a?t?? p???? e??a? ????? embedded in his excerpt

374 JAAP MANSFELD
The mind (d?????a), according to Philo, is the 'source' (p???) of

speech, a formula which is first found in a verbatim fragment of
Chrysippus preserved by Galen.44)
The best parallel passage, Deter. 125-9, demonstrates that Philo
not only knew the etymology of f??? as f?? ??? vel. nm., but appar-
endy also that of a?d? from a???.45) It is too long to translate and
quote in its entirety, so I merely present the following abstract:
? 7.3 The Creator says he knows that uttered speech (t?? . . . p??-
f?????? ?????), the brother of the mind (d?????a), does speak [...].
This speech speaks and talks and interprets the thoughts (e??????ata)
for both me and you and all humans, and goes out to meet the rea-
sonings of the mind. For when the mind bestirs itself and receives an
impulse towards some object belonging to its own sphere, either moved
from within itself or experiencing various impressions from external
objects, it becomes pregnant and is in labour as to its thoughts
(????ata). It wishes to be delivered of them, but cannot, until the
sound produced by the tongue and the other organs of speech takes
the thoughts (????ata) into its hands like a midwife, and brings them
forth into the light (f??). This [viz., articulate sound produced by
human adults] is the farthest-shining (t??a??est?t?) voice (f???) of
our thoughts. For just as things laid up in darkness are hidden, until
a light (f??) shines upon them and shows them, in the same way
thoughts (e??????ata) are stored in the mind?a hidden place?until
the voice, illuminating (??a???sasa) them like a light (??a f??), uncov-
ers them.46)
Most of the ingredients of this somewhat fulsome passage we have

met before. It is hard to miss the Platonizing colouring: the well-
known 'Socratic' simile of pregnancy and deliverance is here applied
from Chrysippus at PHP 2.5.18, or from the fragment itself (PHP 2.5.15-20; SVF
2.894, FDS 450). Tieleman (1996, 271 n. 38) suggests that Galen's source for this
interpolation is a Stoic lexicon. For the 'interpreter' cf. below, nn. 48 and 86.
44) For Stoic antecedents of the formula 'source of speech' see below, text after
n. 69.
45) See above, n. 40 and text thereto; tt??a??est?t? and ??a???sasa in Philo's
text.
46) Ph. Det. 126-8. Cf. Bas. hex. 3.2.8-16 Amand de Mendieta-Rudberg, esp.
for Basil's formula ?? tf ???pt? ????a (it has escaped the editors that this pas-
sage is quoted in part at Melet. nat.hom.p. 22.8-3.6 Cramer, without the author's
name but after a quotation from another oration of Basil which is not anony-
mous). See further Gronau 1914, 69-71, also for parallel passages. Gronau believes
that what is in Basil is Stoic, but the evidence does not support this view, see sec-
tion 4 below. For 'hidden thoughts' also cf. the Philo quotation above, ? 7.1, and
n. 42 ad finem.

to the everyday act of speaking. The etymology of f??? is not Stoic

either, but a considerable part of its further contents seems to be
of Stoic provenance. Philo himself, who is quite familiar with the
discipline of grammar, ascribes its development to the influence of
'philosophy'.47)
A similar concatenation of ideas is found in a Ciceronian
pas-
sage (the epistemological setting here, however, lacks the Platonizing
element): men are distinguished from the beasts by ratio, i.e. by what
'enables us to draw inferences, to prove and disprove, to discuss
and solve problems, and to come to conclusions5. This ratio, clearly,
is what in other texts is called 'internal speech'. The 'rudimentary
beginnings of intelligence' are imprinted via the senses. 'Speech' is
characterized as 'the mind's interpreter'.48)
We may conclude this section with passages from the Allegoriae,
or (Quaestiones Homericae, of Heraclitus (date uncertain; possibly first
century CE), who like others identifies Hermes with ?????,49) man-
ages to believe that internal and uttered speech are implied in the
Homeric descriptions of the god, and rather forcefully stresses that
internal speech is hidden:
47) For Philo's familiarity with 'grammar* cf. Congr. 148-50 (SVF 2.99), on which
see Schenkeveld 1990a, 105-6 and 1990b, 306.
48) Cic. Ug. 1.30 (for the formula cf. above, text to n. 43; below, n. 86). For
Cicero on the production of speech and the distinction between men and animals
cf. e.g. N.D. 2.149 (FDS 518), with Pease's notes. For Cicero on exclusively human
thought processes see e.g. ND. 2.147, Off. 1.11 with Dyck's notes, and the paral-
lel at Gal. Hipp.Med.Off. XVIIIB pp. 649.16-650.5 K?hn (SVF 2.135, first text =
FDS 528, cf. the first words quoted above, n. 26; Arnim omits the final words
?sa t' ???a t??a?ta, H?lser prints them), but note that Galen mentions neither
Stoics (only oi f???s?f?? in general) nor animals. Sext. M. 8.275-6 (~ SVF 2.223
and in part 2.135, second text; FDS 529, LS 53T) speaks of humans differing
from animals (such as parrots, which may imitate them) because humans have
internal speech (the translation of ????? e?d???et?? as 'disposition int?rieure' in
the French tr. of LS 53T is peculiar) and presentation arising from inference and
combination; cf. Chiesa 1991, 304-7, Labarri?re 1993, 235-6, Long 1996a, 117-8.
Chrysippus ap. Var. L. 56 (SVF 2.143; for the sequel, not in SVF, see below,
n. 66) is reported to have argued that parrots and children only have 'quasi-speech'
(ut kqui - ?sa?e? ???e??, cf. Pohlenz 1970-2, 1.40, 2.23). Nemes, nat.hom.p. 71.9-
13 Morani compromizes by saying that humans are the 'most rational' (????sta
???????) of all living beings through the presence of internal speech. Long and
Sedley (1987, 2.319) point out that Sext. M. 8.275-6 is certainly Stoic (see also
Long 1972, 87), while Sorabji (1993, 80) speaks of "unnamed philosophers".
49) Thus already PI. Cra. 407e-408b. For parallels see van der Stockt 1990, 189,
Ramelli 2003, 331-2.

376 JAAP MANSFELD
? 8.1 This is why Homer called the internal (speech) chthonic (Hermes),
for invisible it lies, darkened, in the depths of the mind; but the
uttered (speech) he located in the heavens, because it is clear from
far away.50)
Earlier in the same chapter Heraclitus explains Hermes' epitheton

ornans ???e?f??t??, insisting here as well that it is speech which lays
bare the operations of the mind:
? 8.2 Homer calls the god argei'-pho-ntes [. . .] because only the real-
ity of logos as a whole clearly reveals what is thought.51)52)
4. Stoic Views
The etymologizing explicatio of f??? from f?? is also known to

the learned Eustathius, who in a passage of his commentary on the
Odyssey explaining the Sirens' song (? 197-8) declares that
? 9 the definitions of voice as 'air that has been struck' or 'the proper
sense-object of hearing' are not to the point, for we clearly need here
(the definition) 'light of the mind'. For such is uttered speech, which
illuminates for the hearers the internal speech which is practised in
the heart.53)
50) Heraclit. All. 72.18, d?a t??t' ??? '?????? t?? ??? ??d???et?? e?pe ???????,
afa??? ?a? ?? t??? t?? d?a???a? ?????? ?pes??t?ta?, t?? d? p??f??????, epe?d?
p??????? ?st? d????, ?? ???a?? ?atf??se?. Cf. Zeller, cited below, n. 59.
51) Heraclit. All. 72.10-1, ???e?f??t?? te ?a? ??????e? t?? ?e?? [...] epe?d?
??a pa?t?? ????? f?s?? ??fa??e? ??a???? t? ?????e???.
52) This etymology is paralleled in Cornutus' Epitomeof GreekTheology,from the
middle of the first century CE, Corn. ND. p. 21.11-3 Lang: 'argei-phon-t?sis like
('white-revealing'), from showing
arge?-phan-t?s * everything whitely [i.e. clearly] and
making it clear; for the ancients called white' (leukos)argos' (???e?f??t?? d? ?st??
???? ???ef??t?? ?p? t?? ?e???? p??ta fa??e?? ?a? saf????e???t? ?a? ?e????
????? ??????? ?? pa?a???). The etymology by means of a???? = ?e???? is also
found in the Etymologica,see Et.Gud. v. ???e?f??t??, p. 186.3 de Stefani and three
of the additamentaquoted ibid. pp. 185.14-186.25. The first explanation of the epi-
theton (paralleled in the same additamenta),at p. 185.8-9, attributed to Alexion,
Archias and Aristarchus, is similar to that given by Heraclitus and Cornutus, viz.
'from making the presentations clear' (pa?? t? e?a??e?? ta? fa?tas?a? p??e??).
The inference that Heraclitus and Cornutus depend on a shared tradition is unavoid-
able, cf. Ramelli 2003, 334-5, also for further parallels.
53) Eust. in Od. 2.7.36-8 Stallbaum, t????a?ta ?a? ?? fa??? ???s??? f????
t??a?t?? t? a??a pep???????? a?t?? e??a? ? ?d??? a?s??t?? a????, ???a d??ad?
f?? ???. t????t?? ??? ? p??f?????? ?????, d?af?t???? t??? ????ata?? t?? ??d???et??,
?? ?? ?a?d?a ?e?et?ta?. The context, from p. 7.24 ff., where Eustathius discusses
various terms for voice or speech, insists on the difference between humans and

Part of this terminology is Stoic, or had become Stoic. The ety-

mological explanation of f??? is not Stoic,54) but the standard
definitions of 'voice' as 'air that has been struck, or the proper
sense-object of hearing', which Eustathius here disprefers, are found
in the abstracts from the influential handbook On Voice by Diogenes
of Seleucia in the longer account of Stoic dialectic of Diogenes
La?rtius book seven, and elsewhere.55) However our evidence for
the terminologLcal speciality 'internal speech'/'uttered speech' as early
Stoic is not good enough.56) Max
Pohlenz, who righdy pointed this
out, also argued that the doctrine behind the formula, pace the con-
sensus among earlier scholars, cannot be attributed to the early
Stoics.57) It would have been quite generally known in the Hellenistic
others, and of course demonstrates his knowledge of the Etymologicais interesting.

The poet's 'daring expression is cured in a philosophical way through etymology'
(p. 7.35, ?e?ape?eta?... f???s?f?? ? t???a d?' et???????a?). At in II. 4.237.6-7
van der Valk (SVF 1.74) he states diserts verbis that cair that has been struck' is
'Zeno's definition of voice' (t?? ?at? ?????a t?? f???? d???), but Zeno in this
late author (as so often) probably represents 'the Stoics'.
54) See below.
55) D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H). Later also found in a passage con-
taining doxographical material, S D.T, Schol.Lond.p. 482.5-7 Hilgard (FDS 481, not
in SVF; see Ax 1976, 166 n. 112). At Simp, in Ph. pp. 425.34-426.2 Diels the sec-
ond of these definitions is anonymous and the first attributed to Diogenes (cf. SVF
3 Diog. 19). Parallels from or (perhaps) attributable to Apollonius Dyscolus are
cited by Schneider (1910, 2); also see Dalimer 2001, 265 ad A.D. Conj.p. 220.3-4
Schneider. Stroh (1998, 442) also adduces [Plu.] Mus. 1131D, ??????ta? t?? f????
?? ???st?? ??a??at???? a??a pep???????? a?s??t?? a???. Cf. in a doxographical
passage Gell. 5.15.6 (SVF 2.141): 'Stoici. . . ictum aera' (see also below, n. 110).
See also Tabarroni 1988, 107, Ax 2002.
56) One may compare the technical term ??e???????, already attested in ver-
batim fragments of Chrysippus ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.70 (SVF 2.898, ?? t? ?a?d?a ???
t?? ??e??????? d?t??) and 3.7.11-2 (SVF 2.885, ?????... t? ??e???????, and pe??
d? t?? ??e??????? ?????? t?? ?????, where the presence of ????? reveals that the
use is not yet entirely technical). This formula seems to have been preceded by
the somewhat less technically sounding t? ????? t? ?????e??? a?t?? (se, t??
?????), Cleanthes on Zeno at Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels ap. Eus. PE 15.20.3 (SVF 1.141),
expression paralleled [Gal.] Def XDC p. 365.9 K?hn, t? ?????e??? t?? ?????
?????, and Dio Or. 36.51 (SVF 2.602), t? f?????? ?a? t? ?????e??? a?t?? (se,
t?? ?????). Galen knows it, see PHP 2.5.81. Chrysippus' terminology is not fixed;
to support the claim of the heart as seat of the regent part through etymology he
calls it t? ????e??? ?a? ??at??? t?? ????? ?????, ap. Gal. PHP 3.5.28 (SVF 2.896).
57) Pohlenz 1970-2, 2.21-2: "[d]ie Termini wie die ^re sind der alten Stoa
fremd" (my emphasis). For details see his "Anhang: ????? ??d???et?? und ?????
p??f??????", Pohlenz 1939, 191-8 = 1965, 79-86, followed e.g. by Waszink (1962,
55: "hanc distinctionem non necessarie ad Stoicos referendam esse recte monet
Pohlenz"), Babut (1973, 73 with nn. 9 and 10), van der Stockt (1991, 188-90),

378 JAAP MANSFELD
period and cannot be linked with a specific school. Its provenance

is stated to be the debate on animal intelligence between Stoics and
Academics. According to Pohlenz "internal" and "uttered speech"
are only explicidy attributed to "the Stoics" by as late an author-
ity as Porphyry, while Sextus Empiricus in the parallel passages only
speaks of the "Dogmatists".58)
But these arguments have failed to convince me. Pohlenz'?in
itself correct?point that a variety of this idea is already found in
Plato59) does not preclude that the Stoics subscribed to it; in fact,
he writes: "Zweiffellosentspricht die Lehre [viz., die Scheidung der
beiden Logoi] den Anschauungen der alten Stoa". But on the next
page he takes this back again: "Die Scheidung der beiden Logoi
ist fur die alte Stoa
ausgeschlossen".60) It is also odd that he fails
to exploit the fact that the (as he knows) parallel accounts of the
'internal speech' and 'uttered speech' which animals are claimed to
possess in Philo, Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry must go back to
a common source earlier than Philo.61) And though it is true that
Philo omits to mention the Stoics, Porphyry is not the only author
to refer to them, for Sextus explicidy mentions them as well. Indeed,
virtually the whole argument in Sextus (concluding his exposition
of the first trope of Aenesidemus)62) is aimed at the Stoics.63) The
and Chiesa (1991, 312-4); Pohlenz' argument is criticized unsuccessfully by M?hl

(1962, 8-16).
58) Porph. Abst. 3.2, p. 187.20-4 Nauck (FDS 529A); cf. below, n. 61 and text
thereto for the context from which it is quoted.
59) See already Zeller 1865, 61 n. 1, slightly revised Zeller 1888, 67 n. 1 and
Zeller-Wellmann 1909, 68 n. 4; for the phrase in Aristotle adduced as a parallel
by Zeller (and Pohlenz, and others) see below, n. 144. For the rather different
Platonic view (which, unlike the Stoic, places speech on a lower level than thought
and stipulates that thought is voiceless, while Chrysippus and Diogenes of Seleucia,
as we shall see, speak of an inner voice) see below, section 6.
60) Pohlenz 1939, 195 = 1965, 83 and 196 = 84.
61) Ph. Amm. 12-70, S.E. P. 62-77, Porph. Abst. 3.2.1-82; argued by Tappe
(1912), to whom Pohlenz refers. Cf. Dierauer 1977, 269-70; good survey and table
with three facing columns at Bouffartigue & Patillon 1979, 138-43, informative
account at Tabarrroni 1988, 108-11, further discussion at Chiesa 1991, 308-12.
Also see the mainly anti-Stoic arguments at Plu. SollAn. 960A-962C and 972F-
973A already adduced by Tappe; the treatise e? ????? ??e? ta ?fa (Lamprias 135)
is lost.
62) Not paralled in the versions of the first trope Ph. Ebr. 171-5 and D.L.
9.79-80.
63) Pohlenz refers to S.E. P. 1.62 (cf. 1.64) and M. 8.175 for the d???at????,

fact that an idea, or formula, came to be in common circulation

does not entail that it is not Stoic: numerous Stoic terms and ideas
were, as we know, taken over by others. What is true is that one
cannot conclude that a doctrine is Stoic and nothing but Stoic when
it is found to contain Stoic terminology?but that is another matter.
Zeller will moreover be right that the ?e?te???, to whom the for-
mula 'uttered speech5 is attributed in a passage where they are con-
trasted by Theon of Smyrna with another school of thought, viz.
the Peripatetics, can only be Stoics:64)
? 10 ????? according to the Peripatetics has many meanings, (viz.)

that accompanied by voice called 'uttered' by the younger (philoso-
phers); and the internal (logos) that lies in the mind without sound
and voice; and that of proportion, (etc.).65)
Forms of the quite common verb p??f??es?a? may be behind a

passage of Varr? which however need not apply to the Stoics only,
though Chrysippus has been mentioned a few Unes earlier:66) 'so he
who knowingly puts each word in its own place does speak; and
then, when he has expressed by speaking what he had in his mind,
he is (someone) who has uttered'. Prolocutus is of course a Latin
derivation, but it is analogous to a term one could derive from the
Greek verb. But in the formula t? . . . e?? p??fe???e?a, 'we utter
the word "G", in a verbatim fragment of Chrysippus67) the term
p??fe???e?a does not yet seem to be a technicality.
but overlooks P. 1.65 on internal speech ?at? t??? ????sta ???? ??t?d?????ta?
??? d???at?????, t??? ?p? t?? St???. For the thrust of Sextus' (or Aenesidemus')
argument see further Glidden 1994, 136-7.
64) See reference above, n. 59. It is either the context or the specific doctrine
attributed to ?e?te??? which enables one to identify them when identification is
possible. Here it is the context.
65) Theo Sm. pp. 72.24-73.2 Hiller, ????? d? ?at? ??? t??? ?e??pat?t?????
???eta? p???a???, ? te ?et? f????, p??f?????? ?p? t?? ?e?t???? ?e???e???, ?a?
? ??d???et?? [?a? unas inclusi\ ? ?? d?????a ?e??e??? ??e? f?????? ?a? f????
['without sound or voice': very Platonic!], ?a? ? t?? a?a????a? ?t?. This passage
is not in SVF or FDS; it is cavalierly treated by Pohlenz (1939, 192 = 1965, 80).
66) Var. L. 6.56 (passage included at FDS 512), 'igitur is loquitur, qui suo loco
quodque verbum sciens ponit, et is turn prolocutus, quom in animo quod habuit
extulit [p??e?????ta? or p??f??eta? ?] loquendo'; comments at Stroux 1923, 309-
15, Pohlenz 1970-2, 2.23, Sluiter 1990, 206, Barnes 1993, 57, Labarri?re 1993,
237, Sorabji 1993, 81. For the reference to Chrysippus see above, n. 48.
67) Ap. Gal. PHP 2.2.11 (SVF 2.895).

380 JAAP MANSFELD
On the other hand the distinction

between ???e?? and p??f??es?a?
in the passage in Diogenes La?rtius which presumably derives from
Diogenes' On Voice (or from that of his pupil Archedemus of Tarsus)
is certainly technical: 'to speak is different from to utter, for what
is uttered are voices [or: words, sentences], and what is spoken [or:
said] are states of affairs, which naturally turn out to be speakables
[or: sayables]'.68) Note that this statement lacks an explicit reference
to the mind. I submit that the presence of ???e??, a term which
(together with ?????) is described and clarified in a technical way
in what comes before in Diogenes La?rtius' account, is sufficient.
Furthermore, two verbatim snippets from Chrysippus' On the Soul,
the second of which followed closely upon the first, provide an
analysis of thinking-and-speaking. First we have the process of
'rehearsing statements and the like' and the 'thinking and speaking'
which take place in the mind (d?????a). Then these are firmly linked
with each other: 'speaking must be fiom the mind, and also speaking
within oneself and thinking, and going through voice in oneself, and send-
ing it out\m) ?? ?a?t??? f???? d?e????a? ?a? ??t?? ??p??pe??. The
'voice within ourselves' which is 'sent out' and thus constitutes 'speak-
ing from the mind' clearly represents what came to be called 'inter-
nal' plus 'uttered' speech. In a longer verbatim fragment from the
same work, dealing with the regent part of the soul, Chrysippus
argues that the 'source of speech [viz., the regent part] is not different
from the of mind, and the source of voice is not different
source
from the source
of speech'. 'It is plausible70) also for other reasons
that what is spoken (ta ?e???e?a) should receive its meaning from
the place to which it conveys meaning, and that spoken words (ta?
f????) should come from there in the manner described'.71)
Following in Chrysippus' footsteps but stating matters more pre-
cisely Diogenes of Seleucia defined ?????, 'speech', as a species of
68) D.L. 7.57 (SVF 3 Diog. 20), d?af??e? d? ?a? t? ???e?? t?? p??f??es?a?-
p??f????ta? ??? ?a? a'? f??a?, ???eta? d? ta p????ata, a d? ?a? ?e?ta t?????e?.
Cf. Long 1996a, 121, 122.
69) Gal. PHP 3.7.34 and 43 (SVF 2.903); translations here and in the follow-
ing passages are De Lacy's, modified; my emphasis. See also Barnes 1993, 57.
70) On the role of the p??a??? in Chrysippus' argumentation see Tieleman
1996, index s.v.
71) Gal. PHP 2.5.15-20 {SVF 2.894). See also Barnes 1993, 57-8.

articulate f???, which in its turn is a species of f??? in general.72)

He argued that 'from where voice is sent out, (from there) also the
articulate voice (is sent out), so also meaningful articulate voice,
which is speech'.73) 'Some people', he continues a bit further on,
'define speech as voice sent out from a mind.74) It is also for other
reasons plausible that speech is sent out imprinted and stamped, as
it were, by the cogitations in the mind (?p? t?? e?????? ??ses?-
?as????? t?? ?? t? d?a???a ?a? ???? ??tet?p??????),75) and that it
is temporally parallel qua completion of thought and activity of
speaking'. The presence of the word ???? shows that this imprinting-
and-stamping is meant metaphorically, not literally.
This presentation of the co-presence and co-duration of not only
analogous but also coterminous cognitive and vocal activity once
more shows in what way what came to be called internal and uttered
speech are bound up with each other.76) Speech is invariably prompted
72) Gal. PHP 2.5.9-13 (SVF 3 Diog. 29, LS 53U). See ?? 1986, 149. Against
the idea that f??? is the genus of ????? see e.g. Amm. in Int. p. 16.13-30 Busse,
who argues that one should follow Aristode's view in the De generationeanimalium
(viz., GA 5.7.786b20-5?Aristode in this passage interalia also refers to the De anima,
viz., to 2.8.419b3-421a6) that f??? is only the ??? of ?????.
73) ??e? e?p??peta? ? f???, ?a? ? ??a?????? ?????? ?a? ? s??a????sa ??a?-
???? f??? e?e??e? t??t? d? ?????. See also Barnes 1993^ 58.
74) e???? ???? ?a? ??????e??? a?t?? [se, ?????] fas?? e??a? "f???? s??a????-
sa? ?p? d?a???a? ??pe?p??????". Sluiter (2000, 379) translates d?????a as 'thought'
not 'mind', which I find unfortunate.
75) Sedley (1993, 330-1) states that Diogenes amplified Zeno's syllogism on the
origin of speech and voice (ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.8, SVF 1.148) with the help of the
Theaetetuspassage quoted below, n. 137, where ??t?p???e??? is said of the stamp-
ing of one's opinion on the vocal stream. We may add that Diogenes' ?p? t??
e?????? ??ses??as????? is paralleled at the account of memory [not: soul, or
voice] at Tht. 191c as a wax tablet (??????? ???a?e???) in the soul 'which we hold
under the perceptions or conceptions and imprint them on it as we might stamp
the impression of a signet-ring' (?p????ta? a?t? ta?? a?s??ses? ?a? ?????a??, ?p?-
t?p??s?a?, ?spe? da?t????? s??e?a ??s??a?????????). However the metaphors
of stamping or imprinting and wax are not restricted to Plato (for the possible
impact of the Theaetetuson Zeno see Ioppolo 1990, esp. 438-9, 447) but are also
found in Democritus' explanation of visual perception according to the detailed
report of Theophrastus (Sens. 50-3 = Dem. fr. 68A135 DK). For details see below,
Appendix, p. 401 f.
76) Cf. Long 1972, 82: "thinking as internal discourse goes back to Plato" [cf.
Sorabji 2004, 211-3, but see below, section 6]. "In Stoicism it seems to mean that
the processes of thought and the processes of linguistic communication are essen-
tially the same." See further Baratin 1982, whose argument is concerned with the
relation between signifier and signified in the "?nonc?" (e.g. 1982, 13: "il n'y a
pas de pens?e sans parole, parole int?rieure ou ?mise"), and Chiesa 1991, 319-21,

382 JAAP MANSFELD
and accompanied by thinking, whereas the converse is of course

not true.
Thedefinition 'meaningful articulate sound sent out from the
mind' quoted by Diogenes can easily be abstracted from Chrysippus'
arguments and may indeed be originally Chrysippean.77) Virtually
the same formula is attributed
to Diogenes himself at D.L. 7.55
(SVF 3 Diog. 17, 33H LS) in a definition of human voice, not speech,
as distinguished from that of living beings in general: 'the voice of
animal is air that has been struck by impulse, and (that) of man is
articulate and sent out from the mind, as Diogenes says'.78) This
formula, by the way, does not necessarily entail that no animals
(such as parrots) exist who may produce an articulate voice: the
opposition is between impulse, i.e. nothing but impulse, on the one
hand and mind on the other.79)
Other Stoic texts may be cited in this context, for instance the
strange argument cited by late authorities concerning the nomina-
tive case, which is called 'straight' because 'it has fallen from the
thought; for if we wish to show the thought "Socrates" which we
have in ourselves, we utter the name "Socrates"'.80) Or the sug-
gestive phrase in Diogenes La?rtius' brief account of Stoic logic: 'the
who, quoting and translating SVF 3 Diog. 19, points out ibid. 320: "Diogene fixe
le cadre th?orique dans lequel la distinction (des) deux ?logoi? [viz., the internal
and the uttered] devait s'ins?rer", but I believe one may ascribe this "cadre
th?orique" to Chrysippus already.
77) Barnes (1993, 59-60) only grants that the definition is Stoic.
78) D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H), ?f?? ??? ?st? f??? ??? ?p? ?????
pep????????, ?????p?? d' est?? ??a????? ?a? ?p? d?a???a? e?pe?p??e??, ?? ?
???????? f?s??. See also Pohlenz 1970-2, 1.40, Tabarroni 1988, 107-8, Barnes
1993, 58, and below, text to n. 124. Note the absence of s??a????sa in Diogenes'
definition of 'human voice': a portion of articulate voice sent out from the mind
need not be meaningful (standard example: ???t???, e.g. D.L. 7.57, SVF 3 Diog.
20). So I cannot accept Long's argument (1996, 123) that ?p? d?a???a? and
s??a????sa are equivalent, the former explaining the latter, though in general I
agree with his account of the relation between thought and speech in Stoic phi-
losophy in this paper (esp. 1996, 119-27).
79) Chiesa (1991, 306-7) argues that the account at D.L. 7.55-7, esp. the definition
of Diogenes which says that the human voice is articulate, is at variance with that
at S.E. M. 8.275-6 (above, n. 48). But the abstract in Diogenes La?rtius does not
say animal voices are never articulate.
80) Amm. in Int. p. 43.11-6 Busse (SVF 2.164, LS 33K) ap???????ta? oi ?p?
t?? St??? ?? ?p? t?? ????at?? t?? ?? t? ???? ?a? a?t? [se, ? e??e?a or ????
pt?s??] p?pt??e?? d ?a? ?? ?a?t??? e???e? t? S????t??? ????a d???sa? ??????e???,
t? S????t?? ????a p??fe???e?a. Cf. the parallels cited by Frede (1993, 18). Barnes

mind, prone to expression,

being utters (e?f??e?) by speech what it
experiences by the agency of the presentation'.81)
In the account of f???, ????? and ????? provided by Diogenes
La?rtius,82) where Diogenes' name is often mentioned, the division
is the same as in the verbatim Diogenes fragment about meaning-
ful speech, articulate voice, and voice in general quoted by Galen,
but expressed in a different way:83) the technical term ????? ('artic-
ulate' but not necessarily meaningful voice), here added to the for-
mula voice' paralleled
'articulate in the other passage, is a species
of f??? ('voice'); and ?????, speech ('meaningful articulate voice')
is a species of ????? so a sub-species of f???.
Consequendy the Stoics, and Diogenes of Seleucia in particular,
argue in favour of a rigorous distinction between voice and speech

as issuing from the adult human mind on the one hand, and voice
and quasi-language produced by irrational impulse, as is the case
with other living beings, including parrots and children under the
age of fourteen, on the other.84) And I have found no evidence
implying that speech is in any way inferior to thought.
The etymological explanation(s) of f??? discussed in the previ-
ous sections of this study however are not found in Stoic reliquiae.
Though a definition of 'speaking' in Sextus Empiricus comes quite
close, the point about the illumination of thought is lacking:
? 11 To speak, as the Stoics themselves say, is to utter the mean-

ingful voicing of the state of affairs that is being thought.85)
The only evidence I have

found pertaining to speech as giving
away (not yet: illuminating) the seaet thoughts of the mind accord-
ing to the Stoics is late and dubious:
(1993, 54) says "the contents of the last sentence [viz., from ? ?a? ?? ?a?t???] is
a commonplace". Yes and no ...
81) D.L. 7.49 (SVF 2.52, LS 33D), ? d?????a ???a??t??? ?p?????sa, ? p?s?e?
?p? t?? fa?tas?a?, t??t? e?f??e? ????. Sluiter (2000, 376) translates d?????a as
'thought' not 'mind', cf. above, n. 74.
82) D.L. 7.55-6 (SVF 3 Diog. 17 + 18 + 20).
83) See Ax 1986, 165, Barnes 1993, 58-9.
84) D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17, LS 33H), cf. above, n. 48. Cf. Tabarroni 1988,
107, Sorabji 1993, 81, Glidden 1994, 136.
85) S.E. M. 8.80 (SVF 2.167), ???e?? ??? ?st?, ?a??? a?t?? fas?? oi ?p? t??
St???, t? t?? t?? ????????? p????at?? s??a?t???? p??f??es?a? f????. Gf. Barnes
1993, 60.

384 JAAP MANSFELD
? 12 They [sc, the Stoics] say that the voice is sent out from the
innermost part of the breast, that is to say from the heart, the pneuma
exerting itself in the depths of the heart, where an interposed bound-
ary, covered with sinews, separates the heart from the lungs on both
sides and the other vital organs. With this (pneuma) it [sc, the inner-
most part of the heart], battering the narrow passages of the wind-
pipe, through the tongue and the other vocal organs which shape
them produces articulate sounds, the elements of uttered speech,
through which the secret operations of the mind are laid bare. This
(innermost part of the heart) he [sc, Chrysippus] calls the regent part
of the soul.86)
This is the final paragraph of a chapter in Calcidius where views

of Zeno and Chrysippus on the soul and its regent part (the spi-
der in the web) are quoted at quite some length, or at least para-
phrased. This context is in favour of the authenticity of the information
just quoted. The at first sight bizarre omission of the role of the
lungs can be paralleled in the physical definition of the f??&e? ?p?
t?? ??????? e????????, d ?a? f???<t???>? ?a???s?? ('the "vocal"
[se, part of the soul], thus expressed by Zeno, which they also call
"ph?n?tikon" ').87) The idea is that a direct stream of psychic pneuma
86) Cale. eh. 220 pp. 233.23-234.3 Waszink (SVF 2.879, p. 236.17-23 von
Arnim), Vocem quoque dicunt e penetrali pectoris, id est corde, mitti, gremio
cordis nitente spiritu, qua nervis obsitus limes interiectus cor a pulmone secernit
utroque et vitalibus ceteris, quo [i.e., spiritu] faucium angustias arietante forman-
teque lingua et ceteris vocalibus organis articulatos edit sonos, sermonis elementa,
quo quidem interpretem [for this metaphor cf. above, text to n. 43, n. 48] men-
tis arcani motus aperiantur. id porro principale animae vocat'. For the change
from Chrysippus to the Stoics in general and back see Waszink ad loc; cf. the
move from f?s? + proper name (Chrysippus twice, Posidonius once) to fas? at
Ar.Did. frs. 23, 27, and 28 Diels, and the switch from oi St????? fas?? and
?a???s?? to Zeno to ?a???s?? again at Act. 4.21 (partly quoted in the text quoted
to the next n.; the final sentence of this ch. reports a minority position, cf. t??a?
d? t?? St????? at Phld. Piet. col. 9.8-12 Gomperz, printed SVF 3 Diog. 33).
87) A?t. 4.21.4 (SVF 1.150), the translation of f???e? in this passage as 'power
of speech' in LSJ is wrong, but this is by the way. f???<t???>? senpsi, for
ps.Plutarch's f???? (kept by Diels, accepted by von Arnim, Mau, Lachenaud) does
not make much sense, while the technical term for the vocal part of the soul is
f???t????: see SVF 1.143 (Nemes, nat.hom.p. 72.7-9 Morani, cf. below for Panaetius),
2.828 (D.L. 7.110, 157), 2.830 (Porph. de An. ap. Stob. 1.49.25a = fr. 253F Smith);
Panaet. fr. 125 Alesse (Nemes, nat.hom. p. 72.9-11 Morani); add ps.Gal. PhiLHist.
24, DG p. 615.3-10 Diels, where we are also told that the early first century BCE
Stoic Mnesarchus (??conjecture of Diels for ms. ?e???a??? and ?e??pa???) t?
f???t???? <?a?> t? spe??at???? pe??e??e?, 'abolished the vocal and the seminal
part'. The corruption in ps.Plutarch is old, for Qpsta ibn Luqa translates Laut.

stretches from the regent part to the speech organs,88) which pre-
sumably is why the separation of the heart from the lungs is stressed
in the Calcidius passage. However I believe that the emphasis on
the secrecy which is broken derives from the Platonist tradition to
which Calcidius is indebted, for such 'secret operations' (arcani motus)
are paralleled several times by comparable expressions elsewhere in
the in Timaeum. We have also encountered 'hidden thoughts' in pas-
sages of Philo.89)
5. Theophrastus, Platonists; Aetius Again
Theophrastus in the De sensibus famously criticizes Plato's theory

of sense-perception in Tvmaeus. We look at his remarks on hearing
and voice. Plato, the Eresian tells us,
? 12.1 defines hearing in terms of voice (a???? d? d?a t?? f????

????eta?): for voice is a blow given by the air to the brain and blood
through the ears till it reaches the soul; the motion caused by this
blow and extending from the head to the liver is hearing.90)
Note that the excerpt of A?t. 4.21.4 at Thdt. CAG 5.20, quoted ad be. in the DG,
has preserved t? f???t????, and so has the excerpt at ps.Gal. Phil.Hist. 102, DG
pp. 638.27-39.1 Diels.
88) A?t. 4.21.4 (see previous n.), continued: p?e??a d?ate???? ?p? t?? ??e???????
????? f????/?? ?a? ???tt?? ?a? t?? ???e??? ???????. Gal. PHP 5.3.7 (SVF 2.841),
discussing the parts of the soul according to Chrysippus, mentions the p?e??a . . .
f???t????. I therefore believe that Gal. PHP 2.4.40, printed as a genuine Stoic
fragment at SVF 2.893 and accepted by Sedley (1993, 330), was thought up by
Galen to serve his polemics, for here the (psychic?) pneuma of the heart stamps the
pneuma (i.e. breath) in the lungs, which then imprints in accordance with itself the
pneuma (breath) in the windpipe.
89) Cale. p. 153.23-5 Waszink, 'sine voce et sono ratio est in intimis mentis
penetralibus residens. haec autem differ? ab oratione: est enim ratio interpres animo
conceptae rationis'?cf. also above, text to n. 43, and esp. Cale. pp. 178.21-179.1:
God speaks 'non illa sermone qui est positus in sono vocis ad declarandos motus
?ntimos propter humanae mentis involucra'. Cf. the parallels for silent communi-
cation cited by Waszink ad be. and those discussed by Theiler (1954, 434-40 =
1966, 305-12); also see van der Stockt 1990, 183-4 for Plutarch (esp. Gen.Socr.
588C-589C), and Kirwan 1994, 208-11 for Augustine on this topic.
90) Sens. 6, ????? d? d?a t?? f???? ????eta?? f???? ?a? e??a? p????? ?p'
a???? e??ef???? ?a? a??at?? d?' ?t?? ????? ?????, t?? d* ?p? ta?t?? ????s??
?p? ?efa??? ????? ?pat?? ?????. Translations of Sens, are Stratton's, modified.
Long (1996b, 352) points out that Theophrastus* "report is impeccable and almost
verbatim".

386 JAAP MANSFELD
From 'voice is a blow. . .' this is a quite accurate abridged ren-

dering of Plato's description in Timaeus.91) And Voice is a blow. . .
till it reaches the soul5 is repeated later in the treatise, where it is
made to function as a definition of voice.92) Finally, Theophrastus
criticizes Plato's definition (?????) of voice as insufficient, for it
? 12.2 is not equally applicable to all creatures (??te ?a? ??????

apas? t??? ?f???); and he fails to state the cause of the perception
though he wants to do so. Moreover he seems to be defining not
sound or voice (t?? ??f?? ?a? t?? f????) but our sensory process.93)
Theophrastus Sens. 6 and 91, when taken together, correspond in

interesting ways to the Aetian lemma quoted in the first section of
this study. The etymological explicatio of f??? is (unsurprisingly)
absent, but several other ingredients are there. I quote Plac. 4.19.1
and Sens. 6 + 91 in facing columns, underlining expressions that
are parallel either verbally or ad sententiam'.
A?tius Theophrastus
???t?? t?? ?????????eta? p?e??a ?t? ????? d? d?a t?? f???? ????eta??
st??at?? ?p? d?a???a? ???????, ?a? f???? ?a? e??a? p????? ?p' a???? ???e-
p????? ?p? a???? d?' ?t?? ?a? ???e- f???? ?a? a??at?? d?' ?t?? ae??? ?????.
f???? ?a? a??at?? ????? f???? d?a- t?? d' ?p? ta?t?? ????s?? ?p? ?efa???
d?d???????? ????? ?pat?? ?????.
???eta? d? ?a? ?ata???st???? ep? t?? ??deest???? <d?> ?a? ? t?? f????
?????? ?f?? f??? ?a? t?? ??????, ?? e???ta? ?????? ??te ??? ?????? ?pas?
??e?et?s??? ?a? ??f??? ?????? d? f??? t??? ?f??? ?st?? ??te t?? a?t?a? ???e?
? ??a????? ?st?? ?? f?t????sa t? t?? a?s??se?? ??????e???. et? d? ??
?????e???. t?? ??f?? ?a? t?? f????, ???a t??
??et??a? a?s??s?? ?'???e? ?f????e??.
Wolfram Ax argues that in the first Aetian definition '(voice is)

p?e??a, impelled from the mind through the mouth' at Plac. 4.19.1
Plato's accounts of voiceless, i.e. mental, and spoken ????? at Th.
91) PI. ??. 67b, ???? ??? ??? f???? ???e? t?? d?' ?t?? ?p' a???? e??ef????
te ?a? a??at?? ????? ????? p????? d?ad?d??????, t?? d? ?p' a?t?? ????s??, ?p?
t?? ?efa??? ??? a??????? ?, te?e?t?sa? d? pe?? t?? t?? ?pat?? ed?a?, ?????.
'In general, let us take it that voice is the percussion of air by way of the ears
upon the brain and the blood and transmitted to the soul, and that hearing is the
motion caused by the percussion that begins in the head and ends in the place
where the liver is situated' (tr. Zeyl, modified).
92) Sens. 85.
93) Sens. 91. Good analysis of Theophrastus* criticism at Ax 1986, 72-4.

206d (mental ????? also at Tht. 189e-190a) and Sph. 263e have been
transformed into one of voice.94) He strikingly calls this transfer from
????? to f??? "Umlemmatisierung des Originalbelegs".95) One should
add that the introduction of p?e??a in this context (rhyming with
and replacing ?e??a) must be dependent on Stoic usage.96) Speaking
of ????? in this context Plato uses other terms: at Tht. 206d ???,
at Sph. 263e ?e??a (echoed [PL] Def. 414d). The 'flow of ?????
streaming out' is also mentioned 71 75e, ????? ???a e?? ????.
The swap of p?e??a for ?e??a etc. may have also been stimu-
lated by the fact that in the physical definition of hearing and voice
at 77. 67b (see further below) air is said to play a major role. Aristode
knows a doctrine (ultimately based on an interpretation and sys-
tematization of remarks on the senses in various paragraphs in
Timaeus) according to which individual elements are coupled with
individual senses. In this way 'the capacity to perceive sounds belongs
to air'.97) This doctrine is famously adopted by Posidonius 'explain-
ing Timaeus'''. 'voice is grasped by airlike (?e??e?d???) hearing'. It is
also echoed in A?tius, a lemma (in Stobaeus only) with the name-
labels 'Pythagoras Plato': here it is the 'breathlike' element (t? p?e?-
?at????) which gives rise to hearing.98) Air and breath (p?e??a) are
94) ?? 1986, 78-9. See further below, section 6.

95) See already Ingenkamp 1966, 80, who argues that the definition of f???
as ?e??a d?a st??at?? ?p? d?a???a? at [PL] Def 414dl and the similar p?e??a
d?a st??at?? ?p? d?a???a? ??????? in the A?tian lemma (he speaks of the "Epitome"
of "Plutarch") suggest that "der Verfasser der Definition [viz., in Def 414d] Platons
?????-Bestimmungen aus dem Theaitet und Sophistes vor Augen gehabt und
absichtlich oder unabsichtlich die auch fur f??? sinnvolle ganze Definition des
????? zu f??? gestellt hat."
96) Baltussen 1993, 212 n. 6 and 2000, 235 n. 61. For the voice as a stream
of p?e??a from the mind to the speech organs see e.g. the verbatim fragment
from Chrysippus' On the Soul, ap. Gal. PHP 3.1.10-1 (SVF 2.885), and A?t. 4.21
(SVF 1.41, 2.835). Ti.Locr. 58, p. 200.4-6 Thesleff is different: here the p?e??a,
?? ? ???as?? ???? ?st? ('whose movement is hearing') is not that of uttered speech
but of perceived sound, which is situated in the ducts of the ears stretching to the
liver. This is another attempt at modernization, see Baltes 1972, 171-2. Note that
Baltes (1972, 25) dates the tract to the first century BCE-first century CE.
97) Ar. Sens. 2.438b20. See further Baltes 1978, 187-9 = 1999, 38-40.
98) Posid. fr. 85 E.-K. (395a Theiler) ap. S.E. M. 7.93; A?t. 4.9.10 (in the chap-
ter about the reliability of the senses), and Taurus fr. 26B Lakmann (33 Gio?) ap.
Phlp. AetMu. p. 520.15 Rabe, ?at? t?? a??a ? a???, Apul. de Pkt. 1.209, Gal.
PHP 7.5.49, Nemes, nat.hom. p. 56.9-10 Morani. See Baltes 1978, 195-6 = 1999,
49-50. Also cf. Plu. Gen.Socr.589C, ? ?a? ??? ... ?e???e??? d?' ???? ????? ?a?
f???.

388 JAAP MANSFELD
closely related;99) the Stoics held that p?e??a is composed of air and
fire. The use of p?e??a in this context moreover gives Plato's view
a more actual scientific sense.
It may also be relevant that the term ?e??a is preserved in the
next lemma, A?tius 4.19.2, name-label Epicurus:100) a contrast between
updated Plato (and his Stoic allies) and old-fashioned Epicurus may
be intended.
The second Aetian
definition at 4.19.1 is based on ??. 67b, as
we have seen.101) Because of the wording of this definition: '(voice
is) a shock propagated by the air through the ears and brain and
blood to the soul', we should, I submit, in the first place think of
the account of hearing at ??. 67b as abridged by Theophrastus'.
Plato Theophrastus A?tius

t?? d?' ?t?? ?p* a???? p????? ?p' a???? e??e- p????? ?p? a???? d?'
e??ef???? te ?a? a??a- f???? ?a? a??at?? d?* ?t?? ?a? e??ef???? ?a?
t?? ????? ????? p????? ?t?? ????? ??/??, t?? d' a???at????????????? d?a-
d?ad?d??????, t?? d? ?p' ?p? ta?t?? ????s?? ?p? d?d??????.
a?t?? ????s??, ?p? t?? ?efa??? ????? ?pat??
?efa??? ??? a??????? ?, ?????.
te?e?t?sa? d? pe?? t??
t?? ?pat?? ed?a?, ?????.
Han Baltussen has argued that this part of A?tius' text is closer
to Plato's original than to Theophrastus' excerpt, so has been
excerpted from the passage in the dialogue.102) But the tripartite
comparison above shows how close the Aetian sentence in fact is
to the first half of the
phrase in the De sensibus. There is, to be
sure, a minor difference in word order: Plato has ears, air, brain,
blood; Theophrastus air, brain, blood, ears; A?tius air, ears, brain,
99) Baltes 1978, 185 and 190 = 1999, 35 and 42. For the composition of the
Stoic p?e??a see SVF 2.310, 442, 796.
100) For this acoustic ?e??a see Epicur. Ep.Hdt. (ap. D.L. 10.52-3).
101) Ax 1986, 78-9, 105 n. 144; cf. above, nn. 5 and 93. The Platonic definition
of hearing at A?t. 4.16.4 is not an acceptable quotation or paraphrase of 77. 67b,
because this passage is "vage und mit fremder Begri?Richkeit angedeutet" (?? 1986,
80-1; cf. Whittaker 1990, 124 n. 343, and Baltussen 1993, 210, and 2000, 233).
A similar sloppy formula is found Gal. Pbt.Tim. 15.23-6, see Kraus & Walzer adbc.
102) Baltussen 1993, 210-3 and?a shade modified?2000, 234-7.

blood. So the ears, first in Plato, come last in Theophrastus and

second in A?tius.
Baltussen is of course right in pointing out that A?tius' d?a-
d?d?????? ('transmitted') is lacking in Theophrastus and must have
been imported from Timaeus.m) The question, however, is whether
this has happened direcdy or via an intermediary tradition. I pre-
fer to assume that retrograde contamination has taken place, viz.
of (a text based on) the excerpt in Theophrastus' De sensibus with
the Platonic original, or possibly even with another source based
on Timaeus, or an epitome of, or excerpt from, this dialogue. One
may point out that d?ad?d?????? is quite successful as an epitomists'
substitute for Theophrastus' phrase t?? d' ?p? ta?t?? ????s?? ?p?
?efa??? ????? ?pat?? ????? ('the motion caused by this blow and
extending from the head to the liver is hearing').
The catalogue of Aristode's writings in Diogenes La?rtius lists a
(lost) monograph containing abstracts (i.e. an epitome) from Timaeus
and from the works of Archytas, ta ?? t?? ???a??? ?a? t?? ????te???
a'.104) We do not know for how long this may have been available;
but an epitome of Timaeus may have been one of the sources of
Timaeus Locrus.105) A (to some extent Stoicized) epitome of the first
part of the cosmology of Timaeus also containing material deriving

from other dialogues is part of Diogenes La?rtius presentation of
Plato's philosophy.106)
The paragraph on hearing (77. 67b) moreover was quite well
known. It was not only one of the starting-points of the theory con-
cerned with the relation between the elements and the senses,107)
but was also cited or paraphrased in texts dealing with Plato's phys-
ical doctrine of hearing, such as that of Alcinous.108) The whole of
77. 67a-c is quoted (following upon A?t. 16.1-4) at Stobaeus 1.53,
the (remains of the) chapter On Hearing. And it has been generally
overlooked that Porphyry quotes, and comments upon, Ti. 67b (and
67c, less relevant here), ? d? ???t?? ?? t? ???a?f pe?? te f????
103) Baltussen 1993, 212 and 2000, 236-7. Teun Tieleman points out to me
that d?ad?d?s?a? became a standard technical term for the transmission of impres-
sions etc. in physiological theory, cf. e.g. Gal. PHP 2.5.35.
104) D.L. 5.25.
105) Thus Baltes 1972, 24-5.
106) D.L. 3. 67-77.
107) Above, n. 98 and text thereto.
108) Cf. below, n. 119.

390 JAAP MANSFELD
?a? a???? d?af???? te f???? d?a?e???e??? ???fe? ta?ta ?t?.109) He

refers to what he claims to be the wrong view of 'the Platonists
without exception' (?? ??at?????? p??te? ?pa?ap???) who under-
stand Plato's p???? in a passive sense, viz. as a p???? a???? instead
of (as Plato says disertis verbis) a p???? ?p' a????, and insists that we
should think of 'the effect of this blow upon the listeners' (?at? . . .
t? ??e??e?? t?? p????? e?? t??? ??????ta?). We have seen that (un-
like Porphyry's ??at??????) both Theophrastus and the Aetian
lemma preserve ?p' a????.110) It is clear that our Timaeus passage
on hearing was discussed, or used, by more Platonists then we
know of. Furthermore, the participle d?ad?d????? found in A?tius
is not only paralleled in Alcinous' paraphrase, but also in Por-
phyry's and Stobaeus' excerpts. Timaeus Locrus paraphrases it with
d?????????a.111)
Baltussen claims that A?tius'
??e?et?s??? ?a? ??f?? (which he calls
"animal-noises") derive from
a passage in Plato's Republic about imi-
tating animals, and e.g. the sea, on stage.112) But the Aetian lemma
explicidy echoes what had become a standard distinction between
sounds produced by humans, animals, and lifeless things respec-
tively, the ??e?et?s??? representing animal Voices', the ??f?? ('sounds')
those of things. What cannot be paralleled in Plato (as Baltussen
correcdy argues) is the terminological distinction between 'voice' in
the 'proper sense', according to which it pertains to humans, and
109) Porph. in Harm. pp. 46.3-47.12 During, d?af???? f???? pertains to the
sequel about pitch accent, which is not relevant here.
110) Porphyry apparendy did not know, or neglects, Plutarch's paraphrase (esp.
Plat.Qu. 1006B, est? ?a? ? f??? p???? t?? a?s?a??????? d?' ?t?? ?p* a????).
We may observe that Porphyry's criticism is to some extent captious, for the for-
mula ?p' a???? is ambiguous. Other cases in Plutarch look more vulnerable but
are in fact equivalent (Fort. 98B, p????? a???? dG ?t?? ?a? e??ef???? p??s-
fe???e???, Def Or. 436D, ????e?? d? t? p???? t?? a????). And p???? a???? is
attributed to Plato in dial?ctico/doxographical passages (cf. above, n. 8) such as S
D.T p. 482.9 Hilgard (cf. ibid. p. 181.7, without Plato's name); already Gell. NA.
4.15.7, where Plato himself is made to reject the first part of the Stoic definition
of voice (see above, n. 53), a phrase followed by a free paraphrase of 77. 67b:
'Plato autem non esse corpus putat: "non enim percussus', inquit, "aer, sed plaga
ipsa atque percussio, id vox est".
111) Ti.Locr. 58, p. 220.4 Thesleff.
112) PI. R. 396b; Baltussen 1993, 213 and 2000, 236-7. ??f?? in this sense
(and without further qualifications) seems to be specifically Aristotelian, see Ax
1986, 122-6.

in the 'loose (or: improper) sense' in which it may also pertain to

animals and
things. Though is has been shown that most of the
time Plato does use f??? of humans,113) a rigorous distinction between
them and the rest is never formulated in his oeuvre. But as we
have noted it is presupposed in Theophrastus' critique of Plato's
use of f???; no wonder, since Aristode had done much to clarify
the difference between articulate and
significant sound on the one
hand and other kinds of sound on the other.114) And because it is
not exclusively Stoic, I cannot agree with Baltussen's view that "the
concept of 'articulatephone'' here is certainly Stoic",115) though I
accept that
the specific technical formula looks like being originally
Stoic.116) His conclusion that the gist of Theophrastus5 critical remark
is only "remotely akin to the [second half of the] Aetian passage"117)
should be revised. The relationship is closer, for Theophrastus, as
we have seen, severely criticizes Plato's indiscriminate use of f???
for all living beings.
We may perhaps render Ax's Umlemmatisierung into English as
'translemmatization', and may well ask what is the cause of this
modification in the present case. I believe that someone at some
time stood Theophrastus' criticism on its head.
Theophrastus in his
critique says that Plato defines
hearing through voice; in order to
defend Plato we react by starting with voice straightaway. Theo-
phrastus criticizes Plato (from a Peripatetic point of view righdy,
one may say) for using f??? in a broad sense, according to which
it applies to both humans and other living beings. This we admit,
but we stipulate that (of course!) he distinguished between the proper
and the loose (or: improper) use of the word so knew what he was
doing.
113) ?? 1986, 102-13.

114) ?? 1986, 98 ?. 119, 130-8 and 1993, 18-9 on Aristode on d???e?t??,
d??????s??, and ?????. Cf. also Dierauer 1977, 234-5, Sorabji 1993, 81, Schenkeveld
1999, 185.
115) Baltussen 1993, 212 n. 56 and 2000, 235 n. 31.
116) The formula is attested twice in the verbatim fragment SVF 3 Diog. 29
ap. Gal. PHP 2.5.9 cited above, n. 73; cf. further D.L. 7.55 (SVF 3 Diog. 17), S.E.
M. 7.38 {SVF 2.132) and 8.275-6 (SVF 2.135/223), cf. above, n. 48. Already for
Philo f??a? ??a??????, 'articulate utterances', belong with the domain of 'gram-
mar' (??a??at???), see Opif 126 and above, n. 47.
117) Baltussen 1993, 211 and 2000, 235.

392 JAAP MANSFELD
This person must have been a Platonist. Confirmation is fortu-

nately forthcoming. It has been noticed that the account of sense-
perception and its objects in
chapters 19 and 20 of Alcinous'
Didascalicus has been significandy influenced by Theophrastus' dis-
cussion of Plato's views in the De sensibus.U8) Litde attention how-
ever has been
paid to the first sentence of ch. 19, which states that
'hearing has come into being for the cognizance of voice'.119) This
is translemmatization with a vengeance: the whole purpose of hear-
ing turns out to be knowledge of 'voice'. Theophrastus' criticism
has been successfully neutralized.
SoPlato is updated, not only in Alcinous (or rather in the tra-
dition upon which Alcinous depends), but also, and even much more
so, in the A?tian lemma. The Stoics had given the part of logic
dealing with 'voice' a prominent position on the philosophical agenda.
Earlier philosophers, Aristode,
esp. had dealt with various aspects
of this theme in different
works and contexts; the Stoics brought
all this together, made it more systematic, and considerably revised
and added to it. The majority of the Stoics, Diogenes La?rtius tells
us, 'are agreed that dialectical theory begins with thepart (t?p??)
dealing with voice'.120) Porphyry tells us that the Early Academic
Xenocrates too began dialectic with 'voice', but all that is further
attributed to him is a distinction between scriptible and musical and
118) Whittaker 1987, 104-5 and 1990, 124-5; and first apparatus ad be, fol-
lowed by Dillon (1993, 143-5) and Baltussen (2002, 44).
119) Ale. p. 173.42 Hermann, a??? d? ?????e p??? f???? ???s??. This is pp.
173.42-174.4 followed by a??????? ??? ?p? t?? pe?? t?? ?efa??? ????se??,
te?e?t?sa d? pe?? ?pat?? ed?a? ? d? f??? ?st?? ? d?' ?t?? e????e?? e??e-
f???? te ?a? a??at??, d?ad?d????? d? ????? ????? p????, 'beginning from a
movement situated in the head, and terminating in the seat of the liver. Sound is
a blow transmitted through the ears, the brain, and the blood, and penetrating as
far as the soul' (tr. Dillon); 'physical' definition based on 77. 67b (quoted above,
n. 91) again. Whittaker (1990, 124 n. 342) submits that "Alcinoos a oubli? de pr?-
ciser que le son est transmis ?p' a????". But if the criticism voiced by Porphyry
(above, text after n. 109) was already known to Alcinous (or his tradition), the
words ?p' a???? may have been omitted on purpose. Tim.Locr. 58, p. 220.4
Thesleff has ?? a???.
120) D.L. 7.55 (SVF 2.136), t?? d? d?a?e?t???? ?e???a? s??f???? d??e? t???
p?e?st??? ?p? t?? pe?? f???? ?????es?a? t?p??. This is followed by Diogenes'
definition cited above, n. 78 and below, text to n. 124. For the Stoic revision of
earlier efforts see Ax 1986, 152-62 and 1993, 12-5, 17; for the t?p?? in general
see Schenkeveld 1999, 184-6.

melodious voice.121) Melodious voice is mentioned in the Stoic t?p??

on voice,122) but as far as one can see it is quite unimportant in
this context, while in Xenocrates it is the second subdivision. Even
so, the position of Xenocrates may not only have influenced the
Stoics to some extent, but will also have been a factor of some
weight in so to speak preparing Platonic doctrine for its updating
modo Stoico. One may add that in the group of grammatical and
logical definitions in the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones,m) itself undoubt-
edly attesting a modernization of Platonic doctrine, d???e?t?? ('phrase')
is two times said to be 'without melody', ??e? ???????could this
be an echo of Xenocrates' main division?
We have seen that the Stoic Diogenes of Seleucia is the first
philosopher on record to have distinguished sharply between
?????,
or the meaningful articulate voice of human adults sent out from the
mind, and the(eventually but not necessarily also articulate and
meaningful) voices, or utterances, of other living beings sent out
from impulse.124) It is precisely this distinction which is at the basis
of the statement at A?t. 4.19.1, 'in a loose (or: improper) sense
'voice' is also used in the case of irrational animals and lifeless
things, such as whinnyings and mere noises, but in the proper sense
it is articulate voice'.
At the end of another A?tian lemma a comparable point of view
is formulated, one book further down:
? 13 Pythagoras Plato (hold) that also the souls of so-called irrational

animals are rational, but not rationally active because of the bad
composition of their bodies, and because they lack the apparatus for
121) Fr. 10 Heinze = fr. 88 Isnardi Parente ap. Porph. in Harm. p. 8.20-30
During, ?st? t?? f???? t? ??? t????t??, ???? ?? ??a???t?? s???e?s?a?, t? d?
t????t??, ???? ?? d?ast???t?? te ?a? f??????. See Frede 1978, 50 = 1987, 319,
?? 1986, 160-1.
122) In the short account of dialectic, D.L. 7.44 (FDS 474), see Schenkeveld
1990b, 303.
123) [PI.] Def. 414d-e. I cannot deal with this rather neglected passage here.
No comment on the formula ??e? ?????? in Ingenkamp 1966; parallels S D.T.
p. 451.4 Hilgard, Dicaearch. fr. 89 Wehrli. Def is generally believed to be Academic,
see Ingenkamp 1966, 8-12, 110-4; the earliest and first attestation is in the lexi-
gographer Ammonius (first-second century CE?), the second in Olympiodorus
(Ingenkamp 1966, 104, 112).
124) Cf. above, n. 78 and text thereto.

394 JAAP MANSFELD
speaking, as in the case of apes and dogs; for they prattie, but do
not speak.125)
This tenet distinguishes between between humans and other liv-

ing beings as to their utterances. The animals' inability to speak is
attributed entirely to their bodily constitution.126) The view that they
have rational souls can be paralleled in the so-called
Pythagorean
Hypomn?mata preserved in Diogenes La?rtius, and in the tradition
upon which Philo, Aenesidemus in Sextus Empiricus, and Porphyry
depend in the passages referred to above.127) Note that only the
final colon of ? 13, viz. 'they pratde but do not speak5, provides
a parallel to what is at A?t 4.19.1. But as we have seen the refusal to
allow 'speech' to animals is not consistent with Plato's own attitude.
Such attempts to attribute a more up-to-date view to Plato can
be paralleled in the paragraph on f??? in the so-called Divisiones
Aristoteleae which purportedly report Plato's doctrine: a short abstract
at D.L. 3.107, a longer version in Marcianus gr. 257.128) Though the
version in Diogenes La?rtius is formulated as a bipartite division
into 'animate' and 'inanimate', its first part, 'animate', is further
subdivided into articulate (humans) and inarticulate (animals).
125) A?t. 5.20.4 (ps.Plutarch only), ???a???a? ???t?? ?????a? ??? e??a? ?a?
t?? ?????? ???? ?a???????? t?? ?????, ?? ??? ??????? e?e????sa? pa?? t??
d?s??as?a? t?? s???t?? ?a? tf ?? ?'?e??t? f?ast????, ?spe? ep? t?? p??????
?a? t?? ????? ?a???s? ??? ?a? ??t?? ?? f?????s? d?.
126) Cf. e.g. Porph. Abst. 3.4.6, some animals 'do not speak because they are
thwarted by their vocal organs', t? ?p? t?? ??????? t?? t?? f???? ??p?d??es?a?.
This ultimately goes back to Ar. HA 4.9.535a27-b3.
127) For the Pyth.Hyp. see Burkert 1972, 75. He also compares what he calls 'the
Stoic' doctrine of internal and uttered speech, but according to the Stoics the fun-
damental difference between humans and beasts is not a matter of uttered but one
of internal speech (see above, n. 48 and text thereto). Gal. Protr. 1, p. 103.2-6
Marquardt, knows this doctrine too but does not attribute it to specific people; he
says that though maybe 'all (animals) do not possess speech (?????) in respect of
voice, which they call uttered (p??f??????), they share in that in respect of soul,
which they call internal (??d???et??)?some more, some less'. See Sorabji 1993,
80 with n. 21. For Philo, Sextus, and Porphyry see above, n. 61 and text thereto.
128) Tabarroni (1988, 108 n. 12) compares D.L. 3.107 and A?t. 4.19.1. Baltussen
(1993, 211 n. 55 and 2000, 235 n. 30) too refers to D.L. 3.107 only. I quote from
the obsolete edition of Mutschmann (1906). DivArist. is now believed to be (Early)
Academic, see e.g. Rossitto 1984 (and 200-2 on the present passage), but the text
of such manuals is unstable, as the various mss. versions show; see Dorandi 1996.

The longer version presents a division into four. First, voice is

divided into animate and inanimate, just as in Diogenes La?rtius;
then into 'in letters'/'scriptible' (e??????at??) and 'not in let-
ters'/'unscriptible' (a?????at??). Animate voice is that of living beings,

inanimate voice is 'e.g. sounds and noises and the voice of the lyre
and the flutes'. 'Scriptible' is the 'voice of men and of some ani-
mals, e.g.
nightingales and swallows and sparrows and the like,
unscriptible the unarranged (ad???et??) voice, such as duckings and
sounds and noises and the like'. The word ad???et?? (not at D.L.
3.107) can only be paralleled in late authors. It would seem that
whoever is responsible for this unhistoric scholastic exercise attempted
to bring Plato in line with a more Peripatetic point of view.129)
6. Plato Interpretatus
To sum up. The ingredients of the first lemma of A?tius' chap-

ter On Voice (4.19.1) can be shown to be Platonic, or 'Platonic'. It
has long been seen that the formula 'breath (p?e??a) impelled from
the mind through the mouth' is a Stoicized version (p?e??a!) of the
'stream' of speech
or 'flow' described in Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist,
Philebus, and Timaeus (?e??a, or ???, or ???a, of ?????, or ?????,
from the d?????a, or ????, or f????s?? through and from the mouth,
d?a t?? st??at??, e?? ????).130) The translemmatization, or transfer
from to f???
????? of the descriptive formula, is paralleled in the
spurious Definitiones, where the original term ?e??a has been pre-
served.131) The fact that the location of the mind in the body (accord-
ing to Plato this was the head, according to the Stoics the heart)132)
is left undecided in this A?tian chapter helps the re-formulation of
the Platonic ?e??a etc. as p?e??a.
129) Mutschmann ad be, followed by Rossitto (1984, 202), aptly quotes Ar. de
An. 2.8.420b5-10.
130) Tht. 206d quoted below n. 137, Sph. 263e quoted below n. 145, ??. 75e
quoted below n. 141 (for ???a cf. Phdr. 235d), Phlb. 17b (only f??? . . . d?a t??
st??at?? ???sa).
131) Def 414d. For this translemmatization see above, nn. 94 and 95, and text
thereto.
132) I have discussed part of the evidence at Mansfeld 1990, 3092-107, start-
ing from another Aetian chapter, viz. 4.5, t? t? t?? ????? ??e??????? ?a? ?? t???
est??.

396 JAAP MANSFELD
The formula 'shock propagated by the air through the ears and
brain and blood to the soul' is an abridged version of a passage in
Timaeus}'0'0) This descriptive formula too has been transferred to
f????but from Plato's account of hearing, a???, a translemmati-
zation paralleled in the Middle Platonist author Alcinous. Xenocrates
is said to have begun dialectic with a treatment of voice. More
important, however, is the fact that the Stoics did so too and, as
far as we can see, in a much more systematic and influential fash-
ion. The updating of Plato in the first part of the lemma is indeed
indebted to the Stoic example.134)
The added comment, viz.: 'in a loose (or: improper) sense 'voice'
is also used in the case of irrational animals and lifeless things, such
as whinnyings <und Eselsgeschrei?> and mere noises, but in the
proper sense it is articulate voice' is more difficult to determine. I
have argued that someone who knew his Plato well (and had seen
Theophrastus' critique) was aware of the fact that the master mosdy,
though not exclusively, uses f??? of the human voice. Updating
Plato in this case meant applying to him the rigorous Stoic dis-
tinction between humans and animals, and rewriting his doctrine
in a more up-to-date terminology: 'articulate voice', and 'in a loose
(or: improper) sense/in the proper sense'.135)
We are left with the etymological definition of f??? ad finem,
articulate human voice 'considered as illuminating what is thought',
which describes the function of voice as making what is thought
accessible. This
etymology cannot
paralleled be in such evidence
for Stoicphilosophy as is still available. That it is at least Hellenistic,
and must have been quite familiar, is proved by the fact that in
some form or other it was known e.g. to the grammarian Philoxenus
(late first century BCE), the Platonizing exegete Philo of Alexandria
(early first century CE), and Heraclitus the Allegorist (perhaps first
century CE). A similar etymology was used by the grammarian
Seleucus (early first century CE).136)
133) ??. 67b, quoted above ?. 91.

134) Above, sections 4 and 5.
135) Above, section 4.
136) Above, sections 2 and 3.

I believe that this formula, too, should be interpreted as a mod-

ernization of something in Plato. We should look again at the pas-
sage in Theaetetus, where Socrates says:
? 14.1 The first [sc, meaning of ?????] would be making one's

thought visible through voice by means of names and verbs?when
a man impresses his opinion upon the stream through the mouth, as
if upon water or in a mirror. Don't you think this kind of thing is
speech (?????)?137)
The crucial bit is t? t?? a?t?? d?????a? e?fa?? p??e?? d?a f????,
'to make one's thought visible through voice' (my emphasis). The
locution e?fa?? p??e?? is surprisingly rare.138) That thought, or men-
tal speech, is so to speak made visible is further emphasized by the
illuminating image added by Plato: thought is reflected in voice as
in a mirror, or as upon the surface of water. This however could
entail that spoken language is inferior to mental speech, for accord-
ing to a well-known passage in the Republic images in water and
other mirroring surfaces represent the lowest mode of cognition.
Furthermore, a few pages down in Theaetetus ????? in the sense
described in ? 14.1 is said to be 'so to speak the image (e?d????,
my emphasis) of mind [i.e., thinking mind] in voice',139) and we
137) Tht. 206d, t? ??? p??t?? e?? a? t? t?? a?t?? d?????a? e?fa?? p??e??
d?a f???? ?et? ????t?? te ?a? ?????t??, ?spe? e?? ??t?pt??? ? ?d?? t?? d??a?
??t?p???e??? e?? t?? d?a t?? st??at?? ????. ? ?? d??e? s?? t? t????t?? ?????
e??a?; A definition of ????? meaning 'account' is provided by giving a far too wide
definition of ????? meaning 'speech*. Cf. Chiesa 1991, 303. Sedley believes this
passsage influenced Diogenes' physicalistic description of significant speech, but see
above, n. 75, and below, p. 401 f., Appendix.
138) Mosdy found in later authors; in Plato only paralleled Lg. 634c.
139) Tht. 208c?Chiesa's view (1992, 26) that e?d???? here is "neutre" is arbi-
trary, but note that he also discusses its "connotations negatives" "m?me dans le
corpus platonicien"; for examples in Tht. cf. 150b-151c, 19ld (the quality of the
impression varies because it depends on that of the receiving material). Further
Platonic passages on speech at Derbolav 1972, 187-94, who however fails to men-
tion Tht. 206d in this context. Plutarch states that 'verbs and names' are mere
'images and likenesses of what is thought' see van der Stockt 1990, 181-2, but
links this up with the Aristotelian notion of 'symbols' (Gen. Socr. 589C, ????t??
??d' ?????t??, ??? ????e??? p??? a??????? ?? ?????p?? s???????? e?d??a t??
????????? ?a? e????a? ???s??). Context is decisive; as Teun Tieleman points out
to me, Phd. 99d-100a is more positive than R. 510a, 510e about looking at reflections
in water. But note that Socrates in this passage is ironic and even a bit reluctant
(100a, ?? ?a? p??? s?????? t?? ?? t??? ?????? s??p???e??? ta ??t? ?? e???s?
?????? s??pe?? ? t?? ?? t??? e?????). Tht. 208c is echoed Plot. 5.1 [10] 3.7-8 and
paraphrased 1.2 [19] 3.27-8; here the hierarchy is very clear.

398 JAAP MANSFELD
know that in Plato an image of something is on a lower level than

what it is an image of.
We should also acknowledge that earlier in the dialogue Plato
presents the part of this tenet concerned with what is going on
inside because he wishes to define (silent) opinion (Socrates again):
? 14.1a to opine I call 'speak' and opinion 'speech that has been
said'?not to someone else and not with voice, but silendy to one-
self.140)
That 'the flow of ????? streaming out [i.e., uttered speech] which
is subservient to thought5 is praised as 'the most beautiful and best
of all flows' at Ti. 75e141) is presumably due to a difference of con-
text rather than a change of mind, for in Timaeus this outgoing
stream is set off against that of food and drink which goes in. But
the point that uttered speech ministers to thought entails that it is
thought which is in command and so is superior, and therefore is
consistent with the hierarchy implied in Theaetetus. The metaphor
of speech as the 'servant' of the mind is close to that of speech as
its 'interpreter', which we have encountered in philo-Platonic later
authors such as Cicero, Philo of Alexandria, and Calcidius.142)
We have seen that the connection between mental and spoken
language argued by Chrysippus, Diogenes of Seleucia and other
Stoics appears to have led to the widely occurring technicality 'inter-
nal speech'/'uttered speech'.143) It has long been seen (but as a rule
the all-important differences have been ignored) that this combination
140) Tht. 189e-190a, t? d????e?? ???e?? ?a?? ?a? t?? d??a? ????? e????????,
?? ???t?? p??? ????? ??d? f???, ???a s??? p??? a?t??. Sedley (1993, 331 with
n. 70) believes that the 'internal speech' (i.e. the ????? ??d???et??) at S.E. M. 275-
6 (cf. above, n. 48) derives from this Theaetetuspassage, but at the very least it
does not do so directly (cf. above, n. 75); we have moreover seen in section 4
above that the pair 'internal'/'uttered speech' was very widely used. Also note the
emphasis on opinion in the full Platonic sense both in this passage and in ? 14.2a
below; for this aspect of Tht. 189a-190e (and Sph. 263d-264b) see Chiesa 1992,
18, and Trabattoni 2002, 176-7: "il passo platonico . . . non ha come suo scopo
quello di dire che cos'? il pensiero, ma piuttosto di dire appunto che cos'? la
d??a".
141) t? d? ????? ???a ?'?? ???? ?a? ?p??et??? f????se? ?????st?? ?a? ???s-
t??. Cf. the paraphrase Apul. de Plat. 1.212, 'quae prudentia corde conceperit, ea
sensa promat oratio'.
142) Above, text to n. 44, and n. 86.
143) Above, section 4.

plus distinction is to some extent anticipated by Plato, not only in

the Theaetetus passage just quoted, but also elsewhere; such passages
have already been referred to above, in various contexts.144) Another
well-known passage we may look at again is in Sophist?the visitor
from Elea (V.) is addressing Theaetetus (Th.):
? 14.2 V.: Aren't thought and speech the same, except that what
we call thought is a dialogue with itself [sc. of the soul with the soul]
that occurs without the voice inside the soul? Th.: Of course. V.:
And the stream from the soul that goes through the mouth accom-
panied by sound is called speech?145)
But this time too the tenet is presented in order to determine

opinion:
? 14.2a When this [viz., affirmation or denial] takes place silendy

in the mind in the soul, can you call it anything but opinion?146)
Sph. 263e-264b is the first of the three abstracts from Plato which
(now) constitute Stobaeus' chapter On Opinion (1.53, pe?? d????).
144) E.g. above, nn. 5, 91, text to nn. 59, 101, 103, and text to n. 130. The
Aristotelian parallel already cited by Zeller (above, n. 59), and then by Pohlenz
(above, n. 57 and text to n. 59) who is followed by others, viz. Ar. APo. 1.10.76b24
?? ?a? p??? t?? e?? ????? ? ?p?de????, ???a p??? t?? ?? t? ????, is not so
significant, because ????? here means 'argument'; the parallel with Plato only
obtains when the phrase is quoted out of context. For ????? as 'speech' in Aristode
see Pol. 1.2.1253a7-18 with Sch?trumpf ad be. (1991, 212-5), and Sens. 1.437a9-
17 where the doctrine of Int. chs. 1 and 4 is presupposed.
145) Sph. 263e, ??. ?????? d?????a ??? ?a? ????? ta?t?? p??? ? ??? e?t??
t?? ????? p??? a?t?? d??????? ??e? f???? ??????e??? t??t' a?t? ???? ?p?????s??,
d?????a; T???. p??? ??? ???. ??. t? d? ?* ?p' e?e???? (se, t?? ?????) ?e??a d?a
t?? st??at?? i?v ?et? f?????? ?????ta? ?????; Cf. Chiesa 1991, 302-3; but there
is no need to distinguish with Chiesa (1992, 18) the "structure profonde", viz. the
"identit? du langage et de la pens?e", from the "structure superficielle" indicated
by the "clause restrictive" beginning with p???. Note however that Chiesa's dis-
cussion of the ambiguities of the Platonic passages (ibid., 19-22, 24) sometimes
comes close to the view argued in the present paper. As to the tradition concerned
with the Sophist passage, see the version in the handbook of Alcinous, who omits
??e? f???? (possibly a case of Stoic influence), p. 155.17-20 Hermann: t?? d?
d??????? f?s? t?? a?t?? t?? ????? p??? a?t?? d???????, ????? d? t? ?p' e?e????
?e??a d?a t?? st??at?? ?????? ?et? f??????, that of Cale. p. 153.23-5 Waszink
quoted above, n. 89, and that of Nemes, nat.hom. p. 71.9-10 Morani, est? d?
??d???et?? ??? ????? t? ?????a t?? ????? t? ?? tf ??a????st??f ?????e??? ??e?
t???? ??f???se?? (note the intrusion of ??d???et?? . . . ?????).
146) Sph. 264a, ?ta? ??? t??t? ?? ???? ?at? d??????? ???????ta? ?et? s????,
p??? d???? ??e?? dt? p??se?p?? a?t?;

400 JAAP MANSFELD
Quotations or paraphrases of Sph. 263e in other sources147) as a rule

do not take the doxastic aspect into account.
An important difference between Plato's view of the relation
between thought and speech and that of the Stoics discussed above
(in section 4) is that the hierarchical ordering which is part of Plato's
descriptions is lacking in the verbatim or quasi-verbatim Stoic evi-
dence.148) The etymological explicatio concluding the A?tian lemma
on Plato on voice too does not show any trace of a such a dis-
tinction. So this is the extent to which Plato's view has been Stoicized:
no hierarchy involved.
I do not know who first thought of the etymologies of f??? as
f?t????sa t? ?????e???, or as f?t????, or as fa???, or as derived
from f?? or f??, or from f?/fa???. Several of these derivations
could be quite early, just as the related etymology of fa?tas?a from
f??? or f??, which is not only found in Stoic texts but already in
Aristode.149) However this may be, what I think happened is that
someone modernized the striking formula found in Theaetetus by
replacing it with an equivalent (and apparendy quite popular) etymo-
logical explanation.
Thus Plato's incidental remarks concerned with speech, voice,
and hearing in Theaetetus, Sophist and Timaeus were abstracted from
their context, and coalesced to form a single account dedicated to
voice, just as the Stoics had assembled and then worked out much
further the of their predecessors
suggestions in order to create a
single t?p?? pe?? f????. And these remarks were modernized by
borrowings from other philosophical traditions, esp. from Peripatetic
(think e.g. of Theophrastus' De sensibus) and Stoic philosophy. This
is typical of so-called Middle Platonism.150) We may suppose this
Platonist ?e?? f???? to have contained more than is now to be
147) See above, ?. 145.

148) See Chiesa 1992, 24-5 on the ????? ??d???et?? and p??f??????; cf. also
above, ?. 59.
149) Chrysippus ap. A?t. 4.12.2 (SVF 2.54) on which see Long & Sedley 1987,
1.239, Long 1999, 572; cf. S.E. M. 7.162 (SVF 2.63); Arist. de An. 3.2.429al-4.
Tabarroni (1988, 107 n. 9) correctly points out that the etymology of f??? from
f?? "is highly reminiscent of the Chrysippean derivation of representation (phan-
tasia) from light {ph?s)"but has missed the passage in Aristode.
150) Excellent surveys in Runia 1986, 49-52, 495-9. See further Whittaker 1987,
110-4 on "The Aristotelian component in Middle Platonism" and ibid., 114-7 on
"The Stoic component in Middle Platonism".

found in the abstract in the Placita, which does not give us much
more than the first section of a treatment of Voice. Perhaps a bit
more is extant in the pseudo-Platonic Definitiones.X5X)
The Didascalici^ of Alcinous may be the best known example of
this approach to Plato; think for instance of the results of a scan
of the Platonic dialogues for anticipations of Aristode's syllogistic in
eh. 6.152) The revised and abridged Timaeus which constitutes the
De naturae mundi et animae of pseudo-Timaeus Locrus is another exam-
ple. This author (or rather the tradition to which
he belongs) too
is capable of appropriating Stoic and Peripatetic material as
Platonic.153) Several of the ancient sources referred to above also
modernize Plato's doctrine in other respects, e.g. as to the function
of the liver.154)
Accordingly, I believe that we should position the immediate
source for A?t. 4.19.1, 'Plato On Voice', in a Middle Platonist context.155)
Utrecht University, Department of Philosophy

Jaap.Mansfeld@phil.uu.nl.
APPENDIX: IMPRINTED WAX
According to Democritus the

air between the visual organ and
the thing seen is 'imprinted', cf. Thphr. Sens. 50, t?p??s?a?, ibid.
t??? ?p?t?p????????; 51, ?p?t?p?s??, t? t?p???e???, ?p?t?p?s??; 53,
t?p?s??, ??ap?t?p??s?a?; esp. Sens. 51, quasi-verbatim: ?spe? ?a?
a?t?? ???e? pa?a?????? t??a?t?? e??a? t?? ??t?p?s??, ???? e? ????-
?e?a? e?? ?????, 'even as Democritus himself, in illustrating the char-
acter of the "impression", says that "it is as if one were to take a
'
mould in wax" (tr. Stratton; taken up 52, e? d? d? t??t? s???a??e? ?a?
? a?? ?p???tteta? ?a??pe? ?????, 'if such an imprint occurs and
the air is moulded like wax'). Note that Friedl?nder (1960, 456-7
151) Cf. above, ?. 123 and text thereto.

152) See e.g. Whittaker 1990, xxi-ix on vocabulary, modernization, quotation
out of context, and his commentary (passim) on doctrine, and Dillon 1993, xxx-
xl on doctrine.
153) Baltes (1972, 25) argues that the tract is pardy based on classes where the
teacher used "das Material der Stoa und des Peripatos als letztlich platonisches
Eigentum".
154) See Tieleman 1996, xxix, and esp. xxxi.
155) For other Middle Piatonist elements in the Placita see Tarrant 2000, 75-6.

402 JAAP MANSFELD
?. 60) refuses to accept ?????, (unsuccessfully) defends ms. s??????,

and of course argues that ?a??pe? ????? is Theophrastean not
Democritean; he flady denies that Democritus is quoted at Sens. 51
and clearly holds Democritean influence to be infra dignitatem Platonis.
The t?p?s??, naturally, cannot be denied, see e.g. Baldes 1975. One
should add that the verbal forms ?????e?a? and ?p???tteta? are
paralleled by ??ap??e?a?????? in Zeno's definition of the cognitive
presentation (SVF 1.18, cf. 2.53 (D.L. 7.46, LS 40C), 2.60 (D.L.
7.50, which adds ??ap?tet?p?????), 2.65 (S.E. M. 7.250-1 cf. LS
40E, where note da?t????? sf?a??de? . . . ??ap???tt??ta? tf ???f,
'markings from signet-rings are stamped on the wax'), ?p???tte??
is found elsewhere in Plato, viz. 71 55e (describing imprints in the
Receptacle), while several forms of the verb ????tte?? occur in the
passage about memory (Tht. 191d-e). Forms of the substantive
???a?e??? (one instance quoted above, n. 75) are found ibid., 19??-
?96c. Also compare A?t. 4.20.2 (SVF 2.387; ps.Plutarch only) on
the corporeality of voice according to the Stoics: 'we hear and per-
cieve it (sc, voice) when it strikes against the sense of hearing [which
is a part of the soul, JM] and stamps it like (the stamp) of a signet-
ring in wax' (??????e? ?a? a?t?? ?a? a?s?a???e?a p??sp?pt??s??
t? ???? ?a? ??t?p??s?? ?a??pe? da?t????? e?? ?????). This metaphor
= SVF 2.53, t?? ????at??
(cf. D.L. 7.46 ???e??? ?ete???e?????? ?p?
t?? t?p?? ?? tf ???f ?p? t?? da?t????? ?????????, 'the metaphor-
ical designation being derived correcdy from the imprints from the
signet-ring which are produced in the wax') is Zenonian and
Cleanthean, not Chrysippean, see Ar.Did. fr. 39 Diels ap. Eus. PE
15.20.2 D.L. 7.50 = SVF 2.55 (LS 39A) with
{SVF 1.141, 1.519),
reference to Book 2 of Chrysippus ?e?? ?????, and the distinction
between Cleanthes and Chrysippus =
Zeno, e.g. at S.E. M. 7.227-31
SVF 1.58, 1.484, 2.56. Hoffmann
(1921) convincingly argued that
Plato depends on Democritus here, but as we have seen this is
rejected out of hand by Friedl?nder (loe. cit.), who believes the
"Pr?gemasse" is an idea of Plato himself, and by Pohlenz (1938,
175-6 with n. 2 = 1965, 3-4 with n. 2), who argues (a bit out of
the blue) that the theory is originally pre-Democritean. On the other
hand Pohlenz makes the important point that Chrysippus' criticism
of Zeno's and Cleanthes' view of t?p?s?? (taken literally this would
preclude the simultaneous or successive presence of many 'voices'

in the same air-space) is anticipated by Theophrastus' criticism (see

Baldes 1975, 102-5) of Democritus, Sens. 53: 'when several things
are looked at in the same place, how will all these stampings get
on the same piece of air?' "Chrysipp kennt also die ?ltere Debatten"
(Pohlenz ibid., 177 = 5). One cannot therefore exclude that Zeno
(and then, indirectly or direcdy, some
of his followers) were influenced
not only by Plato (and perhaps by Aristode, see below), but also
by Democritus, presumably even by Theophrastus' critical report
as well. The views of Democritus and Aristode (possibly influenced
by both Democritus and Plato), esp. de An. 2.12.424a 17-20 on sense-
perception as 'the reception of sensible forms without matter, just
as wax recieves the sign of the signet-ring' (t? de?t???? t?? a?s??t??
e?d?? ??e? t?? ????, ???? ? ????? t?? da?t????? ... t? s??e???, cf.
Mem. 1. 450a30-b3 on memory), part of a theory of perception, are
qua type of theory even closer to Stoic epistemology.
Burkert (1977, 99 with n. 6), referring to passages in Tht., Aristode,
and SVF, follows Hoffmann and implicidy rejects Friedl?nder's apo-
dictic pronouncement (but he has missed Pohlenz' contribution). He
tersely and accurately points out that Democritus, using "the pic-
ture of seal-imprints on wax", created "a comparison which has
loomed large in ancient and modern epistemology".
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'Illuminating What Is Thought'.

A Middle Platonist placitum on 'Voice' in Context

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? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Mnemosyne,Vol. LVIII, Fase. 3

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The first ?ef??a??? of A?tius, Piacila 4.19, the chapter On Voice

? 1 Plato defines Voice' (f???) as

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and epistemologica! approaches need cause no surprise: book four

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2. Grammarians and L??cographers

The main ingredients of the A?tian lemma can be paralleled from

? 2 [others begin elsewhere], but we are happy to begin with speech

Diomedes, otherwise a far from original author though his trea-

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between humans, endowed by nature with rational thought and spo-

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The secondpassage (T 3.2) is from the Scholia L?ndinens^a. This

? 3.2 (dl) ph?-n? ('voice') is spoken of as in a way being phao-n?ls)

The third of these passages (T 3.3), an explanation of t???? ('pitch

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attributed to Stephanus by Hilgard in his edition (1901, 174). No

? 3.3 (c) He says that pitch is a resonance of the enharmonic, or

In paragraph ? 3.3 (d) I have printed f?? in the footnote with-

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'light',23) in order to provide an explanatory etymology for f?(-??)

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mous but convincingly attributed fragment concerned with f???????,

This is immediately followed, ibid., by two etymologies of f??,

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? 5.1 To speak clearly (phtheggesthai):is produced [viz., from pheggesthai]

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The Byzantine Etimologica too preserve this sort of information.

The compiler of this Etymologicum abstracted the entire lemma

? 5.3 About *strong' (iphthimos) Seleucus says [it is derived] by the

Waszink (SVF 2 p. 236.21 von Arnim, see quotation below, n. 86).?Perhaps

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With the grammarian Seleucus, a contemporary of Tiberius and

? 6 aud-?: voice (ph?-n?); it is said from aug-? ('bright light') through

Anetymology of a?d? is not found in texts ? 1 and ? 3-T 5,

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The evidence studied in this section demonstrates that the sec-

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3. Philo, Cicero, Heraclitus the Allegorist

Two species of human speech are mentioned in a passage of

? 7.1 [. . .] and beside truth he set a kindred quality which he called

There are, as a matter of fact, quite a few passages dealing with

ingredients studied in the previous sections of this study, though the

? 7.2 As to articulate voice (??a????? f????), moreover, an advan-

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The mind (d?????a), according to Philo, is the 'source' (p???) of

Most of the ingredients of this somewhat fulsome passage we have

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to the everyday act of speaking. The etymology of f??? is not Stoic

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Earlier in the same chapter Heraclitus explains Hermes' epitheton

The etymologizing explicatio of f??? from f?? is also known to

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Part of this terminology is Stoic, or had become Stoic. The ety-

others, and of course demonstrates his knowledge of the Etymologicais interesting.

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