TORTS Reviewer

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TORTS
I. GENERAL CONCEPTS
1. Definition
 It is a civil wrong wherein one person’s conduct causes a compensable injury to the person,
property or recognized interest of another, in violation of a duty imposed by law. (SBNotes)
 Is employed to describe that branch of the law which treats of injuries which are neither
crimes nor breach of contracts.(TAD Suarez)
a. Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220;

The word “tort” taken directly from the French is a derivation of the Latin
“torquere” meaning “to twist”
An unlawful violation of a private legal right, not created by contract, and

which gives rise to a common law action for damages.
An act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous

existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a
natural outgrowth or incident.
2. Elements:
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a. Vergara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77679, 30 September

1987;
DOCTRINE/NOTES:
In case of culpa criminal the moment the accused is insolvent after conviction, the employer is
SUBSIDIARILY liable.
Defense of an employer in:
a. Criminal case- diligence is NOT a defense ; even if the employer says he exercised such
diligence in hiring and supervising his employee.
b. culpa acquiliana – diligence can be a defense
c. culpa contractual – diligence is NOT a defense
a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly,

the defects were curable and the accident preventable.
FACTS:
This case in action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) against
petitioner - Vergara by the private respondent - Azarcon. The action arose from a vehicular
accident that occurred on August 5, 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while
driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the
private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed at
P53,024.22.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
The petitioner alleged that his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent
manner, that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out tire
and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of the private
respondent, and that the said accident was an act of God for which he cannot be held liable.
LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)."
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT: The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, which
ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation,
to the private, respondent the following: (a) P53, 024.22 as actual damages; (b) P10, 000.00 as
moral damages; (c) P10, 000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5, 000.00 for attorney's
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fees and the costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay to
the petitioner the following: (a) P50, 000.00 for third party liability under its comprehensive
accident insurance policy; and (b) P3, 000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
SC RULING:
Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault or negligence is
not tenable. It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are
present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act
or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of

petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act
or omission was passed upon by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by the
respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the
"vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of
Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the surrounding
circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right
side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of
the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck
rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."2
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to
mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes
can not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the
accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption
of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his driver.
Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence on the part of
the petitioner, the petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in awarding private
respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is
untenable.
3. Kinds:
a. Negligence;
i. Article 1173, Civil Code;
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
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b. Intentional Acts;
c. Strict Liability;
4. Sources of Tort Law in the Philippines;

a. Civil Law:
b. Jurisprudence;
CIVIL LAW
i. Articles 19 – 21;
CHAPTER 2
Human Relations (n)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
ii. Article 26;
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
iii. Articles 32 – 33;

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Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

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In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
iv. Articles 684 – 770;

v. Article 1157;
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
vi. Article 1314;
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. (n)
vii. Article 2176;
CHAPTER 2
Quasi-delicts
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
viii. Article 2177;
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.(n)
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ix. Article 2180;
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
x. Article 2187;
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
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5. Jurisprudence explaining torts:
a. Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 97336, 19

February 1993;
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student

taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou
Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she
reciprocated his love. They then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He
visited Marilou’s parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced
her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude toward her changed after a while;
he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon
confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage agreement, saying
that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod.
Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations
but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his
money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-

delict in this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

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Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed
by the (Civil Code).
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning,
obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession
of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by
a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and
in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and

traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At
most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on
whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
transaction was itself procured by fraud.
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b. Dr. Filoteo A. Alano v. Zenaida Magud-Logmao,

G.R. No. 175540, 14 April 2014;
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-appellee Zenaida Magud-Logmao is the mother of deceases Arnelito Logmai.
Defendant-appellant Dr. Filoteo Alano is the Executive Director of the National Kidney
Institute (NKI)
2. On March 1, 1988 at 9:50pm, Arnelito Logmao, 18 years old, was brought to the East
Avenue Medical Center in Q.C. by two sidewalk vendors who allegedly saw him fall from
the overpass near Farmer’s Market, Cubao. He gave his name Arenelito Logmao.
3. In the ER, Arnelito was conscious and was interviewed by Dr. Paterno Cabrera, the duty
resident physician. The patient’s data sheet prepared by Dr. Cabrera identified the patient as
Angelito Lugmoso (and not Arnelito Logmao)
4. At around 4am on March 2, 1088, the patient developed generalized seizures, and his
condition progressively deteriorated. Admission to the ICU and mech vent. Support became
necessary, however there was no vacancy at East Ave, thus the patient was transferred to
NKI.
5. When the patient arrived at the NKI, his name was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. The
patient was without any relatives by his side, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was
asked to locate the patient’s family by enlisting police and media assistance.
6. Dr. Ona, observed that the patient’s brain was so severe that it manifested symptoms of brain
death. He requested to conduct a tissue typing and tissue cross-matching examination on the
patient, this was doen on the basis that if the deceased patient is found to be a suitable organ
donor and has his family’s consent, the organs could be harvested and transplanted promptly
to any of the compatible beneficiaries.
7. At about 7am of March 3, 1988, Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced
brain dead. A repeat EEG recording exhibited a flat tracing, thereby confirming that
Lugmoso was brain dead.
8. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time
being of the essence in the success of organ transplantation. Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo
A. Alano to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of Lugmoso for
transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona, likewise requested Dr. Liquete to secure permission for
the planned organ retrieveal and transplantation from the Medico Legal Office of the NBI.
9. Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a memorandum to make certain that all reasonable efforts are
exerted to locate the patient’s relatives, it further stated that permission or authorization to
retrieve or remove the internal organs of the deceased and to transplant said organs to any
compatible patient who may be in need of said organs to live and survive only if the provision
of RA 349 and PD 856
10. Despite efforts to locate the latter’s relatives, no one responded. At 3:45 in the afternoon of
March 3, 1988, a medical team conducted the removal of the heat, kidneys, pancreas, liver
and spleen of Lugmoso.
11. On March 11, 1988, the NKI issued a press release announcing its first successful double
organ transplantation. Aida Dormal , a relative of Arnelito’s mother, saw the news on TV
that the donor was an 18yr old boy whose remains were laid at La Funeraria Oro in QC,
since the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao. Zenaida and her children went
to the funeral home where they were able to retrieve Arnelito’s body.
12. Zenaida filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against the doctors of NKI.
13. The RTC rendered its decision finding Dr. Alano liable for damages. The trial court found
Dr. Alano negligent for authorizing the retrieval of the deceased patient’s organs without
first exerting reasonable efforts to locate his relatives. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision. Hence the petition.
14. Dr. Alano now, argues that there was no legal basis for the CA to hold him liable for damages
since there was no finding that he was the proximate cause of the injury or damage sustained
by Zenaida. He also argues that he acted in good faith and pursuant to law when he issued
the authorization for the organ retrieval.
ISSUE: Whether Dr. Alano should be held liable for his alleged negligence in authorizing the
removal and retrieval of Arnelito’s internal organs without Zenaida’s consent.
HELD: No.
A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain"
that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in
which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly
stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased
was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such
instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives
any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department
of Surgery has complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to
comprehend the instructions, obeying all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the doctors and personnel of
NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance of
the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued the
Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the deceased's internal organs, the
doctors concerned also the sought the opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to disseminate notifications
intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. The only question that remains pertains to the
sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did not
properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial
and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to ascertain the name of
the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the deceased's identity to NKI. The
NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because as found by
the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he was brought to the NKI.
Verily, the Court cannot, in conscience, agree with the lower court. Finding petitioner liable for
damages is improper. It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were removed
only after he had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to
the death of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence
on record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she
found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 31, 2006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against petitioner is hereby
DISMISSED.
c. Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, And Benjamin Mendiona

v. The Court Of Appeals And Eugenio S. Baltao, G.R. No.
88694, 11 January 1993;
Albenson v. CA G.R. No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)
Facts: Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries mild steel plates and as
payment, it was paid with a check amounting to P2,575 drawn against the account of E.L
Woodworks. The check was dishonored, Albenson, traced the origin of the check. The result
from the SEC shows that the president of Guaranteed Industries and the owner of E.L
Woodworks were one and the same with the name of Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson made
extrajudicial demand but Eugenio Baltao denied that he issued a check, urging the
petitioner to file a complaint through Fiscal Sumaway for violation of BP 22. Fiscal Sumaway
claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence,
but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that
he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted
by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson. The complaint of
Albenson was dismissed and Baltao’s complaint was given merit and the RTC ruled in favor
of him.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugene Baltao is entitled to such damages for abuse of rights and malicious
prosecution
Held:
No, the SC found no cogent reason to award such damages in favor of Eugene Baltao. Article 19,
known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible . . . ." What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of
P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent. It appears however, that there was a mistake in identity as there were three (3) men
having the name Eugenio Baltao that were all doing business in the building where E.L Woodworks
was situated. It was most probably the son, Eugene Baltao III who issued the check to Albenson,
which Mr. Eugene Baltao never during the investigation.
The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action
was filed in good faith. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria. Nor is he entitled to compensatory damages because he did not present proof of
the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the
unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation,
conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual
damages becomes erroneous.
There is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or
oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).The award of attorney's fees must be
disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin
vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, there was no malicious prosecution against
private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.
d. Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. G.R. No. L-24803, 26 May 1977;
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]
Facts of the Case:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A criminal
complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs
filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married
at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was
living and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless,
the civil case was finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case.
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his
father, was already legally married.
Ruling of the Court:
1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal
case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis
of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by
marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated
judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
e. Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155;

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
FACTS:
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila
to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better
right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion
with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso
to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS :

Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI :
Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a
first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete
intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner
underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact
that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the
hollow of the hands of an airline.
What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by
its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned
that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here.
The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why,
then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a
better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or
bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference
of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the
evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct
on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier
f. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al. vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 84698, 4 January 1992;
FACTS
• A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the RTC for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers.
• At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It
was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community
• Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and its president, VP, treasurer, and Chief of Security
• Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
• Petitioners herein sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article
• The TC overruled the petitioner’s contention and dismissed their petition. This was affirmed by
the CA
• The respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasidelicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

• W/N the court erred in dismissing the petition.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes. (But the court did not agree with the premise of the CA for holding such)
• Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis.
• It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the
present case. However, this does not necessarily follow that the school is exculpated from liability.
• When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with.
• Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
• Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
• A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether
express or implied.
• However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the private respondent was
awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline.
• In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only.
• It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon
their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against
an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of
its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
g. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., v. The Honorable Court Of

Appeals (Fifth Division) And Ms. Lydia Geronimo, G.R. No.
110295, 18 October 1993;
Facts: Lydia Geronimo is the proprietress of a school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a group of
parents complained before Geronimo that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and
Sprite that their children bought from her store. Geronimo examined her stock and found that there
were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the
Department of Health Regional Office and was informed that the soda samples she sent were
adulterated. Because of this, the canteen had to close down due to the big drop in its sales of soft
drinks. On Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription.
According to Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on breach of warranty, more particularly Article
1561 , the action should have been brought within six months from the delivery of the goods.
Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and
prescription. It contends that the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising
from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimo’s
cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed
within six months from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code.
Geronimo claims that the cause of action is based on injury to her right and can be brought within
four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the civil code.
Issue:
Has the action prescribed? Can Geronimo’s action based on quasi-delict exist despite the pre-
existing contract of sale?
Held: While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general
rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from
quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. In Singson vs. Bank
of the Philippine Islands," this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence
of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the
other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case.
Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascosa, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground
of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature x x x the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.'''
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file the case, reckoned from the time the cause of action
accrued.
h. Light Rail Transit Authority, et al. v. Navidad, et al., G.R. No.

145804, 6 February 2003;
Facts:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing
a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that
Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. Nicanor’s widow filed a complaint
for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. The trial court rendered decision
holding Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent
from any liability and, instead, held the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
Issue:
1) Is LRTA liable?
2)Is Roman an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held:
(1)Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not
relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Prudent’s liability, If any, could only
be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180, of the Civil Code.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply. However, the Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate
court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
(2) No. There being no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and
Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence.
i. FEBTC vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108164, 23
February 1995;
Facts:
Private respondent Luis Luna applied for and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by petitioner
FEBTC. Upon his request, a supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita
lost her card and FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy, petitioner recorded the lost
card, along with the principal card as a “hot card” or a “cancelled card”. In October, Luis used his
card to pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. However, after verifying with the bank,
the card was not honored and Luis had to pay cash. He was embarrassed by this incident. Luis,
through counsel, wrote to petitioner and asked for the payment of damages. The VP of the bank
wrote a letter to Luis and expressed his apologies in their failure to inform the latter of the bank's
security policy. Also, the VP sent a letter to the hotel to assure the latter that the private
respondents were very valued clients. Still feeling aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint
for damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary
damages. CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Held:
NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that the
bank was remiss in neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, there is no
finding that there was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to Luis. Neither could
FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Thus, the
award of moral damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis. Exemplary or
corrective damages are awarded, in the case of quasidelicts, if the defendant is shown to have been
so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-contracts,
it is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is improper.
NEVERTHELESS, the bank's failure to honor its credit card issued to Luis should entitle him to
recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
6. Distinguish from the other sources of obligation;

a. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. 12191, 14 October
1918;
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived
in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company.
Everyday, he comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and he
uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him to ride the trains free of charge.
One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack
of watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated.
It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop. Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition,
and it appeared that the injuries he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. He
instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
from the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge
concluded that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that
the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant
company, and the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that the breach was due
to the negligence of their servant.
2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held:
(1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due
to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the
selection and control of the servant.
It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to
fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-
wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at
all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in
its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article
1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection
and supervision.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to
the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than
that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot
where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of
cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by
no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have
been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age,
sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of
the passenger, and should be considered.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom
to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step, which he was required to take, or the character of the
platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
b. Barredo vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 48006, 8 July 1942;
Facts:
A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela overturned, causing death to
one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A criminal case was instituted by the parents of the
deceased against Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver of the taxicab was convicted. Subsequently,
the parents instituted the present civil action for damages against Barredo, the employer of the
taxicab driver.
Barredo contends that his liability rests only on the provision of the penal code and hence, since no
civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he too cannot be held civilly responsible.
Issue: Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the employer of the taxicab driver making
him primarily and directly responsible under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil responsibility arising from criminal
liability. Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly responsible for
the negligent acts of his employee.
There are two remedies available for the parents to choose: A. The first is under Article 100 of the
Penal Code wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the crime
committed by his employees. If the parents choose this remedy, the complainant must first exhaust
the properties of the employee, before the employer’s properties could be made answerable. B.
The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein the
negligent employer is held primarily liable, subject to the defense that he exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and engagement of his employees. In this case, the
parents chose the second type of action since it is more practical to file for damages against the
employer, who is more solvent than his employee.
NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the new Civil
Code. The principle enunciated in said case (that responsibility for fault or negligence under a quasi-
delict is separate and distinct from the negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is now
specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
c. Castillo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 48541,

21 August 1989;
FACTS
• Petitioner Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with his wife,
father and a minor child, as passengers. Just past San Nicolas bridge he noticed, a speeding
oncoming car along the same lane he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He switched
on his headlights to signal the car to return to its own right lane as the way was not clear for it to
overtake the truck.
• The car, driven by private respondent Rosario, didn’t stop so Castillo swerved his jeep to the right
towards the shoulder, because of the impact, the car was badly damaged and the passengers were
injured.
• Private respondent Rosario had a different account of what actually happened. He alleged that
because of the slow moving truck in front of him, he tried to overtake it but he first made sure that
it the road was clear and he even blew his horn. While in the process of overtaking, the car’s front
left tire suddenly burst due to pressure. Because of this, the car veered towards the left side so
private respondent just drove it to that direction to find a safe place to park the car and fix it.
• But barely had the said private respondent parked his car on the left shoulder of the road and just
as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep driven by
Castillo which came from the opposite direction.
• A civil case for the recovery of damages was instituted by the petitioners. While this case was
pending, the provincial fiscal filed an information against Rosario, for double physical injuries;
double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence. RTC
convicted him. But he was acquitted by the CA on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N an action for damages based on quasi-delict is barred by a decision of
the appellate court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the blame on the plaintiff but in
its dispositive part, declares the guilt of the accused not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes.
• There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and
distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence
• Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case.
• But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
action might arise did not exist
• Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the
recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that no negligence was
committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to the petitioners.
• It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanita
Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where
the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court
of Appeals exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence
did not exist.
d. Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000;
Facts:
Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by Vicente Calalas. She was given by the conductor an extension seat at the backdoor of
the jeepney at the rear end. On their way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passengers, just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena
which is owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney, which injured
Sunga. Sunga then filed action for damages against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage, in
failing to exercise the diligence required by him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva.
Issue: Whether or not Calalas can blame Francisco Silva as the proximate cause of the loss.
Held:
No. There was a contract of carriage between the parties, which was violated, hence, proximate
cause is immaterial. The Supreme Court found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of carriage as
a driver failed to transport Sunga safely to her destination, being negligent in
(1) not properly parking the jeepney;

(2) taking more passengers, than the allowed capacity; and
(3) the fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed in a peril greater than that to which
the other passengers were exposed.
The determination of the proximate cause of the damage incurred, whether it was the collision
between the jeepney and the truck or the negligence of the driver is immaterial. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions of quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between parties it is the parties
themselves that create the obligation and the law will merely regulate the relation created. (Since
there was a contract of carriage here in the case at bar).
e. Sps. Batal vs. Sps. Tominaga, G.R. No. 164601, 27 September

2006;
SPS. ERLINDA BATAL AND FRANK BATAL v. SPS. LUZ SAN PEDRO AND KENICHIRO TOMINAGA, GR
NO. 164601, 2006-09-27
Facts:
The spouses Luz San Pedro (Luz) and Kenichiro Tominaga (Kenichiro) are the owners of a parcel of
land, on which their house was erected, described as Lot 1509-C-3 with an area of 700 square
meters situated in Barangay Malis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Said property was... acquired by them
from one Guillermo Narciso as evidenced by a "Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa" dated March 18, 1992.
The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the services of Frank Batal (Frank) who
represented himself as a surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot for the sum of P6,500.00. As Luz
and Kenichiro wanted to enclose their property, they again procured the services of Frank for... an
additional fee of P1,500.00 in order to determine the exact boundaries of the same by which they
will base the construction of their perimeter fence.
Consequently, Frank placed concrete monuments marked P.S. on all corners of the lot which were
used as guides by Luz and Kenichiro in erecting a concrete fence measuring about eight (8) feet in
height and cost them P250,000.00 to build.
Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against Luz and Kenichiro before the barangay on the
ground that the northern portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated right-of-
way known as Lot 1509-D. Upon verification with another surveyor, Luz and Kenichiro found...
that their wall indeed overlapped the adjoining lot. They also discovered that it was not Frank but
his wife Erlinda Batal (Erlinda), who is a licensed geodetic engineer.
During their confrontations before the barangay, Frank admitted that he made a mistake and
offered to share in the expenses for the demolition and reconstruction of the questioned portion
of Luz and Kenichiro's fence. He however failed to deliver on his word, thus the filing of... the
instant suit.
In their defense, the defendants-spouses Frank and Erlinda Batal submitted that Frank never
represented himself to be a licensed geodetic engineer. It was Erlinda who supervised her
husband's work [and t]hat the house and lot of plaintiffs, Luz and Kenichiro, were already
fenced... even before they were contracted to do a resurvey of the same and the laying out of the
concrete monuments. The spouses Frank and Erlinda also refuted the spouses Luz's and
Kenichiro's allegation of negligence and averred that the subject complaint was instituted to
harass... them.
Issues:
Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs the costs of this suit.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling in favor of Respondents by premising its Decision on [a]
misapprehension of facts amounting to grave abuse of discretion . . . which is also a ground for a
Petition for Review.
ulpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is
the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an
obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other... obligation, or as culpa
contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which
already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation.[
ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of... articles 1171
and 2202, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
7. Persons involved:
a. Plaintiff:
i. Person injured;
ii. Parents and persons exercising substitute parental
authority;
iii. Unborn child;
iv. Heirs;
1. Caravan Travel And Tours International, Inc., v.
Ermilinda R. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, 10
February 2016; CALPITO
2. Antonio Geluz v. The Hon. Court Of Appeals And
Oscar Lazo, G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961;
SOMERA
3. Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc., v.
Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan, G.R. No.
199886, 03 December 2014; CARBONELL
b. Defendant:
i. Person responsible for the injury;
ii. Close corporations;
iii. Corporation by estoppel;
iv. Partnerships;
v. State and its political subdivisions;
1. National Irrigation Administration And The
Administrator Of The National Irrigation
Administration v. The Honorable Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73919, 18 September
1992; JAGODILLA
8. Remedies:
a. Preventive;
b. Compensatory;
9. Filing of cases:
a. Emerenciana Vda. De Medina, et al. vs. Cresencia, et al., G.R.

No. L-8194, 11 July 1956; KIS-ING
b. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People of the Philippines,
et al., G.R. No. 129029, April 3, 2000; KILLIP
c. Casupanan, et al. vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26,
2002;
d. Sps. Santos, et al. vs. Pizardo, et al., G.R. No. 151452, July
29, 2005;
II. NEGLIGENCE
1. Definition;
a. Article 1173, Civil Code;
b. Corlis v. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674
c. Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97626, 14 March 1997;
d. Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation v. Borja, G.R.
No. 143008, 10 June 2002;
2. Test of negligence;
a. Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809;
b. U.S. vs. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, 3 October 1912;
c. People v. De los Santos, G.R. No. 131588, 27 March 2001;
d. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. L-51806, 8 November 1988;
e. Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No. 166869,
16 February 2010;
f. R Transport Corporation v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161, 18 February
2015;
3. Degrees of Negligence:
a. Slight;
b. Ordinary;
c. Gross;
i. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad, et al., G.R. No.
4977, 22 March 1910;
ii. Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 129792, 21 December 1999;
iii. Ylarde et al. vs. Aquino, et al., G.R. No. L-33722, 29
July 1988;
iv. Associated Bank [now Westmont Bank] vs. Tan, G.R. No.
156940, December 14, 2004;
4. Factors Considered:
a. Employment or occupation;
b. Degree of intelligence;
c. Physical condition; and
d. Other circumstances regarding the person, time, and place;
i. Pangonorom, et al. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

143380, 11 April 2005;
ii. Latonio v. McGeorge Food Industries, Inc., G.R. No.
206184, 6 December 2017;
iii. Wright vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 7760, 1
October 1914;
iv. Syquia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 98695, 27
January 1993;
v. The Heirs of Redentor Completo v. Albayda, G.R. No.
172200, 6 July 2010;
5. Causation;
a. Proximate cause;
i. Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-101126, 22 October
1957;
ii. McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
68102, July 16, 1992;
iii. American Express International vs. Cordero, G.R. No.
138550, 14 October 2005;
b. Tests:
i. But-For or Sine Qua Non;
1. PLDT, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079,
29 September 1989;
2. Dy Teban v. Ching, G.R. No. 161803, 4
February 2008;
3. Villacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No.
175512, 22 October 2011;
ii. Substantial Factor;
1. Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 130068 & 130150, 1 October 1998;
2. Cayao-Lasam v. Spouses Ramolete, G.R. No.
159132, 18 December 2008;
6. Proof;
a. Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court;
b. Plaintiff must prove negligence:
i. PLDT, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079, 29
September 1989;
ii. Brown vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company,
G.R. No. 6666, 24 October 1911;
c. Presumption of Negligence:
i. Article 2184;
ii. Article 2185;
iii. Article 2188;
iv. Article 1735;
v. Añonuevo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130003,

20 October 2004;
vi. Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, 25
August 1989;
d. Evidence:
i. Testimonial;
ii. Documentary;
iii. Real;
1. Mercury Drug Corporation v. Huang, G.R. No.
172122, 22 June 2007;
e. Res ipsa loquitur
i. Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 376;
ii. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, 29
December 1999;
iii. Tan v. Jam Transit, 605 SCRA 659;
iv. BJDC Construction, Inc. v. Lanuzo, G.R. No. 183198, 25
November 2009;
v. Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., G.R. No. 180440, 5
December 2012;
vi. Cortel v. Lim, G.R. No. 218014, 7 December 2016;
vii. FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporation, G.R. No. 141910, 6 August 2002;
viii. Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-44748, 29 August 1986;
ix. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. vs. Sps. Sarangaya,
G.R. No. 147746, 25 October 2005;
III. LIABILITY
1. Liability of Tortfeasors;
a. Article 2194;
b. Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 107356, 31 March 1995;
c. Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068
& 130150, 1 October 1998;
d. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.
92594, 4 March 1994;
2. Vicarious Liability;
a. Nonapplicability of the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior;
i. Exception – Article 103, Revised Penal Code;
b. Articles 2180 – 2082;
c. Articles 218, 219, 221 and 236 of the Family Code;
d. Articles 101 – 103, Revised Penal Code;

e. Articles 58 and 201, Child and Youth Welfare Code;
f. Cases:
i. Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768;
ii. Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70890, 8
September 1992;
iii. Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160;
iv. Araneta v. Arreglado, 104 Phil. 529;
v. Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303;
vi. St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, 29
June 2010;
vii. Aquinas School v. Inton, G.R. No. 184202, 26 January
2011;
viii. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, 41 Phil. 548;
ix. Palisoc, et al. vs. Brillantes, et al., G.R. No. L-29025,
4 October 1971;
x. Salvosa, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. L-70458, 5 October 1988;
xi. Saludaga v. Far Eastern University, G.R. No. 179337,
30 April 2008;
xii. PSBA v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 729;
xiii. Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 104408, 21 June 1993;
xiv. Victory Liner v. Heirs of Andres Malecdan, G.R. No.
154278, 27 December 2002;
xv. Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 141538, 23 March 2004;
xvi. Jayme v. Apostol, G.R. No. 193609, 27 November 2008;
xvii. Spouses Africa v. Caltex, G.R. No. L-12986, 31 March
1966;
xviii. Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 212 SCRA 637;
xix. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vazquez, G.R. No.
132266, 21 December 1999;
xx. L.G. Foods Corporation and Victorino Gabor, Vice-
President and General Manager, Petitioners, versus Hon.
Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador, et al., G.R. No.
158995, 26 September 2006;
xxi. Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. Nos.
79050- 51, 14 November 1989;
xxii. Martin v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 591;
xxiii. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation vs. People et al., G.R.
No. 129029, 3 April 2000;
xxiv. Carpio vs. Doroja, et al., G.R. No. 84516, 5 December
1989;
xxv. Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom, et al., G.R. No.

143360, 5 September 2002;
xxvi. Chapman vs. Underwood, G.R. No. 9010, 28 March 1914;
xxvii. Fontanilla, et al. vs. Maliaman, et al., G.R. No. 55963,
1 December 1989;
xxviii. San Fernando La Union vs. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, 8
April 1991;
IV. DEFENSES
1. Plaintiff’s Conduct;
a. Article 2179;
b. Ilusorio vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 139130, 27
November 2002;
c. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, G.R. No.
4977, 22 March 1910;
d. Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027, 21 April 1999;
2. Contributory Negligence;
a. Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359;
b. Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 164012, 8 June 2007;
c. National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Noble Casionan, G.R.
No. 165969, 27 November 2008;
d. Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121413, 29 January 2001;
e. Rebultan v. Daganta, G.R. No. 197908, 4 July 2018;
3. Violation of Statute;
a. Ramos v. COL Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 184905, 28 August
2009;
b. Mendoza v. Soriano, G.R. No. 164012, 8 June 2007;
4. Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance;
a. Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. vs. Balandan, et al., G.R. No. L-
3422, 13 June 1952;
5. Assumption of Risk or Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria;
a. Menchavez v. Teves, G.R. No. 153201, 26 January 2005;
b. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259,
28 February 2005;
c. Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, G.R. No. 164749, 15
March 2017;
6. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance;
a. Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, G.R. No. L-7664, 29
August 1958;
b. Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil., 809;
c. LBC Air Cargo et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
101683, 23 February 1995;
d. Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa, et al., G.R. No.

79050-51, 14 November 1989;
e. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83491,
August 27, 1990;
7. Emergency Rule;
a. Gan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-44264, 19
September 1988;
b. McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, 16
July 1992;
c. Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115024 & 117944,
7 February 1996;
d. Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. vs. C & A Construction Inc., G.R.
No. 156034, 1 October 2003;
8. Prescription
a. Article 1146;
b. Kramer vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83524, 13
October 1989;
9. Diligence of a good father of a family;
a. Franco et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.
No. 71137, 5 October 1989;
10. Fortuitous Event
a. Article 1174;
b. Southeastern College v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126389, 10
July 1998;
V. ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY
1. Actions:
a. Civil liability ex delicto; or
b. Independent civil action;
2. Cases:
a. Santos et al. vs. Pizardo, et al., G.R. No. 151452, 29 July
2005;
b. Melgar, et al. vs. Buenviaje, et al., G.R. No. 55750, 8
November 1989;
c. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines vs.
Estrella, et al., G.R. No. 147791, 8 September 2006;
VI. STRICT LIABILITY TORTS

1. Definition;
2. Sources:
a. Article 2183;
b. Article 2187;
c. Article 2193;
3. Cases:
a. Johnson vs. David, G.R. No. 2789, 27 February 1906;
VII. INTENTIONAL TORTS

1. Sources:
a. Article 21; 26 – 30; 32; 34 – 35; 309;
2. Abuse of Rights;
a. Article 19;
b. Elements;
i. Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88694, 11 January 1993;
3. Acts contra bonus mores;
a. Article 21;
b. Elements;
i. Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88694, 11 January 1993;
4. Other Cases on Articles 19 and 21:
a. Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 97336, 19
February 1993;
b. University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, 17 February
2000;
c. DBP vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 137916, 8 December
2004;
5. Emotional distress tort;
a. MVRS Publications, et al vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Phil,
et al., G.R. No. 135306, 28 January 2003;
6. Interference with contractual relations tort;
a. Lagon vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119107, 18 March
2005;
VIII. MALPRACTICE
1. Medical
a. Reyes, et al. vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, et al., G.R. No.
130547, 3 October 2000;
b. Garcia- Rueda vs. Pascasio, et al., G.R. No. 118141, 5
September 1997;
c. Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334;
d. Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, G.R. No. 159132, 18 December
2008;
e. Jarcia and Bastan v. People, G.R. No. 187926, 15 February
2012;
f. Borromeo v. Family Care Hospital, Inc., G.R. No. 191018, 25
January 2016;
g. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, 29 December
1999;
h. Rubi Li v. Soliman, G.R. No. 165279, 7 June 2011;

i. Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, 2
February 2010;
j. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Capanzana, G.R. No. 189218,
22 March 2017;
2. Legal
a. STI Drivers Association, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 143196, 26 November 2002;
3. Accounting and Auditing
a. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale,
G.R. Nos. 49454 and 149507, 28 May 2004;

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TORTS and DAMAGES 1

a. Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220;

An unlawful violation of a private legal right, not created by contract, and

An act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous

a. Vergara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77679, 30 September

a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly,

LAWS RELATED TO THE CASE:

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of

4. Sources of Tort Law in the Philippines;

ii. Article 26;

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

iii. Articles 32 – 33;

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

iv. Articles 684 – 770;

Article 1157. Obligations arise from:

vi. Article 1314;

vii. Article 2176;

viii. Article 2177;

ix. Article 2180;

5. Jurisprudence explaining torts:

a. Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 97336, 19

Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and

b. Dr. Filoteo A. Alano v. Zenaida Magud-Logmao,

c. Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap, And Benjamin Mendiona

Albenson v. CA G.R. No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)

d. Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. G.R. No. L-24803, 26 May 1977;

G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]

Facts of the Case:

Ruling of the Court:

e. Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155;

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS :

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI :

f. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al. vs. Court of

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

g. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., v. The Honorable Court Of

h. Light Rail Transit Authority, et al. v. Navidad, et al., G.R. No.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

6. Distinguish from the other sources of obligation;

b. Barredo vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 48006, 8 July 1942;

c. Castillo, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 48541,

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

d. Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, 31 May 2000;

(1) not properly parking the jeepney;

e. Sps. Batal vs. Sps. Tominaga, G.R. No. 164601, 27 September

a. Emerenciana Vda. De Medina, et al. vs. Cresencia, et al., G.R.