G.R. No.

211062, January 13, 2016

PEREZ, J. FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: Manuel arrived home in Tacloban City from Manila. But
before Manuel could reach the bedroom, he was warned by Arvin, his
brother-in-law, not to go inside the bedroom where his wife, Auria, was
with a man, for he might be killed. Ignoring Arvin’s admonition, Manuel
kicked the door open, and saw his wife Auria and a man seated
beside each other conversing. Furious by what he had seen, Manuel
went out of the room, got a knife and delivered a stab blow towards
the man but the latter was shielded by Auria. In the process, the stab
blow landed on Auria. After Auria was accidentally stabbed, the man
ran outside and fled. Out of frustration for not killing the man, Manuel
wounded himself on the chest. He then left the house and went to the
hospital for medical treatment. Auria died of stab wounds, and
thereafter Manuel was charged for the crime of parricide. In his
defense, Manuel sought the application of Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e. death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, in order to exonerate him of criminal liability.
ISSUE: Is Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e. death or
physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances applicable
in this case?
HELD: No. For Article 247 of Revised Penal Code to apply, the
defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills
any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
(3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife
(or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the
accused must prove to the court that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
Here, when Manuel saw Auria with a man, the two were just seated
beside each other and were simply conversing. Hence, Article 247 is
not applicable in the present case.
Intestate Estate of Vda. De
Carungcong vs. People Case
Digest
Facts:

William was married to Zenaida. They have two daughters, Karen and
Wendy. Zenaida died ahead of her mother Manolita, William's mother-in-law.
In 1992, William made Manolita sign special powers of attorney appointing
Wendy, then only 20 years old, as Manolita’s attorney-in-fact to sell and
dispose four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. William told Manolita
(who was already completely blind) that the documents she
was signing was merely for paying taxes. Believing William's
misrepresentation, Manolita signed the documents. The parcels of land were
sold and William misappropriated the proceeds thereof amounting
to P22,034,000.

After the death of Manolita, Mediatrix, one of the surviving daughters, filed
a petition for the settlement of Manolita’s intestate estate before the RTC
praying the she be appointed administratrix thereof. After her appointment
as such, Mediatrix learned from her niece Wendy about the fraudulent sale
of the parcels of land and the misappropriation committed by William. Thus,
as the duly appointed administrator of the estate of her deceased mother,
she filed a case for estafa against her brother-in-law, William.

William moved to quash the Information claiming that under Article 332 (1)
of the RPC, his relationship to Manolita, his mother-in-law exempts him from
criminal liability. The RTC sustained William’s motion and dismissed the
information. The court said that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the
relationship by affinity of her husband William and her mother Manolita, and
therefore Article 332(1) exempting him from criminal liability was still
applicable. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issues:

1. Did the death of Zenaida dissolve the relationship by affinity of her

surviving spouse William and her mother Manolita?

2. Should William be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his

relationship to Manolita?

Held:

1. There are two views on the subject:

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce
which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. Under
this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and
necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only
for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso
facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the
deceased spouses blood relatives.

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless
of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage
that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said
marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent
to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people
and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon
the death of one of the married parties.

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two
views, we hold that the second view is more consistent with the language
and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of
laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives
by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the
continuing affinity view is more appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity

in the same line is couched in general language. It made no distinction
between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones
deceased child.

Third, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal. That relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of
the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family
solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal

laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When
in doubt, rule for the accused.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the
justifying circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of
the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article
13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of
accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

2. No. The coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification.

The Information against William charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information,
not by the designation of the offense. What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
the Information. In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of
the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
being charged in the Information.

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that William is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. He resorted to falsification of public
documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale)
as a necessary means to commit the estafa. Since the crime with which
respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, he cannot avail himself of
the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
in his favor.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate

scandal. Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply
concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is
limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party.
When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes
beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among
themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches
public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the
property rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective
mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332 (Intestate Estate of Vda.
De Carungcong vs. People, G.R. 181409, February 11, 2010).

Case#31. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

(SELF-DEFENSE)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(TREACHERY AND EVIDENT
PREMIDITATION)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ENRIQUE REYES
G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018
Facts:
Accused-appellant, ENRIQUE REYES was
charged with murder in an Information which
alleges that the said accused, with
treachery and evident premeditation,
attack DANILO ESTRELLA Y SANCHEZ by
firing his armalite rifle at said Danilo who was
then walking home and hitting him on
different parts of the body, depriving the
latter of a chance to defend himself from
the attack thereby inflicting upon him mortal
gunshot wounds which caused his immediate
death.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant
argued that he was informed by Adelardo that
Danilo and four other men are planning to kill
him. Fearing for his family's safety, accused-
appellant prepared his Armalite rifle. When
Celia was on her way to accused-appellant's
house, she saw a man holding a gun
approaching accused-appellant from behind.
When Celia shouted "Ricky," accused-
appellant turned towards Celia and saw
Danilo holding a gun in the act of shooting
him. Accused-appellant drew and fired his
Armalite rifle, hitting Danilo who fell on the
ground.
Issue: 1. Whether or not accused-appellant
can validly claim self-defense.
2. Can accused-appellant be held liable for
the aggravating circumstance of treachery?
3. Can accused-appellant be held liable for
the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation?
Ruling:
1. Self-defense cannot be validly claimed.

By invoking self-defense, the burden of proof

shifted to accused-appellant to show that the
killing was attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person invoking
self-defense.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable
element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing for
there is nothing to repel.
In this case, accused-appellant claimed that
when Celia shouted his name, he saw Danilo
who was about to shoot him. However, based
on Celia's testimony, Danilo was only
approaching accused-appellant while holding
a gun. Celia did not witness any positive
act showing the actual and material
unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.
2. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA

that the qualifying circumstance of

evident premeditation was not
sufficiently proved.
The elements of evident premeditation are:
(1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. Every element of the
circumstance must be shown to exist beyond
reasonable doubt. To be considered an
aggravation of the offense, the circumstance
must not merely be premeditation but must
be evident premeditation. The foregoing
elements have not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
3. The Supreme Court, however, disagrees

with the CA's finding that the qualifying

circumstance of treachery was absent.
There is treachery when the offender, in
committing any of the crimes against
persons, employs means or methods which
tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might
make. When alleged in the information and
clearly proved, treachery qualifies the killing
and elevates it to the crime of murder.
Treachery was established in this case.
Prosecution witnesses, whose testimonies
were found to be credible by both the RTC
and the CA, showed that Danilo was walking
towards his house after tending to his fighting
cock, and was three steps away from his
residence when accused-appellant suddenly
rushed towards his direction and shot him.
Accused-appellant's shots, fired from an
assault rifle, were multiple and successive,
depriving Danilo of any chance to run or to
defend himself and repel the attack. The
foregoing circumstances are manifestly
indicative of the presence of the conditions
under which treachery may be appreciated.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is
held guilty of murder.
CASE#32. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
(BWS AS SEF-DEFENSE) AND
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(TREACHERY)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. GENOSA
GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004.
FACTS:

Appellant was married to the victim Ben

Genosa. In their first year of marriage,
Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and
their fights would become violent. Ben, a
habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he
would provoke her, slap her, pin her down on
the bed or beat her. These incidents
happened several times and Marivic would
often run home to her parents. She had tried
to leave her husband at least five times, but
Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was
then eight months pregnant, and the victim
quarreled. The latter beat her, however, she
was able to run to another room. Allegedly
there was no provocation on her part when
she got home that night, and it was her
husband who began the provocation.
Frightened that her husband would hurt her
and wanting to make sure she would deliver
her baby safely, appellant admitted having
killed the victim, who was then sleeping at
the time, with the use of a gun. She was
convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts
opined that Marivic fits the profile of a
battered woman syndrome and at the time
she killed her husband, her mental condition
was that she was re-experiencing the trauma,
together with the imprint of all the abuses
that she had experienced in the past.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly
invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as
constituting self-defense;
2.) Whether or not treachery attended the
killing.
RULING:

No, the Court ruled in the negative on

both issues.
1.) The Court held that the defense failed to

establish all the elements of self-defense

arising from the battered woman syndrome, to
wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner; (b) the
final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life; and (c) at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable – not necessarily immediate and
actual – grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.
Under the existing facts of the case, however,
not all of these were duly established. Here,
there was a sufficient time interval between
the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. In fact, she had already
been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children’s
bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased
and the reality or even imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben
was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel,
treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated
aggression from the assailant.

NORBERTO CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R.

No. 166441, October 08, 2014)
SEPTEMBER 10, 2016 / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law 1- Attempted Rape
Laws Applicable: RPC Art. 6
Ponente: Justice Lucas Bersamin

Doctrine: The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the

showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

FACTS:

In December 1993, Norberto Cruz (Norberto) and his wife went

to La Union to sell plastic and glass wares. Along with them is
AAA and BBB. Upon reaching their destination, they set up a tent
in order that they will have a place to sleep.
At around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. The person was Norberto who was
mashing her breast and touching her private parts. He fought back
and kicked Norberto twice. He was not able to pursue his lustful
desires; he offered AAA money and told her not to tell the
incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later, when AAA retured
to her tent, she again saw Norberto touching private parts of BBB.
Later that day, they reported the incident to the police. Norberto
was summoned to the police station which resulted to an
argument. He deined the allegations contending that there were
many people around who were preparing for the “simbang gabi”,
and that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the
municipal hall could hear them.
RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS. CA promulgated its decision affirming the
conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case
No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of attempted rape.

RULING: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having
carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage
requires the commencement of the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only
means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is
to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was
already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively
ended his designs on her. It is obvious that the fundamental
difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is
the offender’s intent to lie with the female.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of
the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the
external genitalia of the female Without such showing, only the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against
the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless
he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. In People v.
Bugarin, the Court said that The accused was held liable only for
acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape “is not
apparent from the act described,” and the intent to have sexual
intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her
genitalia.
The
Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO
CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS.

EDEN ETINO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018]

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in
an Information dated June 19, 2003 which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of November 2001, in the
Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm of unknown caliber,
with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot JESSIEREL LEYBLE with said unlicensed firearm he
was then provided at the time, hitting and inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wounds on the different parts of ills body, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of some cause or causes independent of
the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance
rendered to the said Jessierel Leyble which prevented his death.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial

thereafter ensued.

The Issue:

1. Whether the CA erred in holding that his guilt for the charged
crime of frustrated homicide was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, since the physician who examined the victim was not
presented in court;

Ruling:
In Palaganas v. People,[31] the Court outlined the distinctions
between a frustrated and an attempted felony:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment
of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other
than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.

In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases

that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of
timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated
murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any
of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If
there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the
wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime
committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical
injury.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is
attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide, or only
lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are: a)
whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and b)
whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused.[33]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The August 29, 2012 Decision and the March 11, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00896 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that, petitioner Eden
Etino is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.