Objection To Illegal Sanctions Rev Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush

Filed: 1/15/2020 9:32 AM
Lynne Finley
District Clerk
Collin County, Texas
By Keri Crow Deputy
Cause No. 416-00049-2020 Envelope ID: 39967543
RYAN GALLAGHER §

IN DISTRICT COURT
§
v.
§
416TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
COLLIN COUNTY, et al
§
COLLIN COUNTY, TEXAS
Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county
I have now provided evidence of a false felony left on my record from 2010-2017 that I was never
informed of, and a dismissed misdemeanor case. Both are at the center of this lawsuit, as the Felony
is a false charge that went undismissed, and the misdemeanor is the case where my Religious Rights
were violated upon arrest and during the time I was in jail. That is the time Collin County claims I
requested Marijuana in jail, which is a false claim. Collin County is simply attacking my Religion.
In the County's motion to declare e a vexatious litigant they clearly are just attacking my religion they
do not agree with my religion and they hope so silence me and make an example of me for practicing it
and for attempting to request my religious rights be honored in the State of Texas. The county has
claimed that there are over 30 cases that have been decided adversely to myself but that is simply not
true and either the Defendant is lying or is unaware of the meaning of the phrase without prejudice and
attached to this document are a series of cases that the county claimed has been decided against me
when in fact they were dismissed without prejudice
Although the trial court was acting within its discretion in proceeding to trial in the absence of
Kenneth and Clarke and in granting Lisa all of the relief sought in her counter-petition, the mere
failure of Kenneth and Clarke to appear for trial should not expose them to sanctions. A defendant
who fails to appear for trial may be subject to a judgment following trial in his absence, but the worst-
case scenario for such a defendant should be an adverse judgment for all relief sought in the plaintiff's
pleadings. See Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 698-702 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)
(affirming sanctions against defendant that were limited to a post-answer default judgment as to
liability and damages after defendant moved from Texas to Canada, refused to accept correspondence
from court and counsel regarding the lawsuit, and failed to appear at two deposition settings, a
sanctions hearing, and a trial setting).
In the Interest of K.A.R. No. 14-03-00970-CV Court of Appeals of Texas,Houston (14th Dist.
2005)
Gilbert Maxwell appeals that order, complaining in four issues that the trial court abused its discretion
in assessing sanctions pursuant to its "inherent power over attorneys appearing before it" and because
the new order is not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
Gilbert v. Tx. Mut. Insu. Co. No. 03-05-00787-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2008)
violation of a vague and uncertain court order cannot be punished by contempt.

Ex Parte Price 741 S.W.2d 366 (1987)
"Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The
proper place today, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding
spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already
put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on
parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race, should find them; on that separate but
more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her but against her—the
only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor
If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the
State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is
stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has
experienced a little in his own person."
-Henry David Thoreau, The Duty of Civil Disobedience
Appellant Reidie Jackson, a prison inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, sued appellees,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees David Ellis and Andrew Gratz, individually.
Jackson's pleadings alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights and asserted claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. On the defendants' motion, the trial court found Jackson to be a
vexatious litigant, ordered him to deposit security of $150, and entered a pre-filing order. When
Jackson did not post security within the period required, the court dismissed his suit. This appeal
followed. We find Ellis and Gratz failed to prove Jackson is a vexatious litigant, and will reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
Jackson v. Ellis No. 07-13-00184-CV (Tex. App. Jun. 4, 2015)
Appellant, Allen Glenn Thomas, is currently incarcerated at the Robertson Unit of the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,located in Jones County, Texas. Appearing pro
se, he challenges the trial court’s orders finding him to be a vexatious litigant and dismissing his
claims as frivolous. We reverse the order declaring him to be a vexatious litigant, and we affirm the
dismissal of his claims
Allen Glenn Thomas v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 11-12-00121-
CV (Tex. App. 2014)
This original habeas corpus proceeding arises out of a judgment holding John Wiley Price in violation
of a permanent injunction orally rendered on May 2, 1986. The permanent injunction, however, was
not reduced to writing and signed until May 9, 1986, after the allegedly contemptuous conduct
occurred on May 3, 1986 and after a motion for contempt was filed on May 6, 1986. We hold that the
judgment of contempt is void insofar as it is based upon the May 2, 1986 oral order purporting to
render a permanent injunction, and order relator Price discharged. In view of this holding, it is
unnecessary to address the remainder of Price's statutory and constitutional arguments.
Ex Parte Price 741 S.W.2d 366 (1987)
S/_Ryan_Gallagher___
Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher

Mahatmajapa@gmail.com
1723 Candleglow
Castle Rock, Co 80109
Case 4:18-cv-00575-ALM-CAN Document 89 Filed 09/10/19 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 645
United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
RYAN GALLAGHER §
§ Civil Action No. 4:18-CV-575
v. § (Judge Mazzant/Judge Nowak)
§
KEN PAXTON, ET AL. §
MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORTS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Came on for consideration the reports of the United States Magistrate Judge in this action,
this matter having been heretofore referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
On May 15, 2019, the reports of the Magistrate Judge (Dkts. #80, #81) were entered containing
proposed findings of fact and recommendations that: (1) each of Defendants Collin County and
Judge Rippel’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #51), Judge Wheless’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #58), and Attorney General Paxton’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #59) be
granted and Plaintiff’s “Request for Writs of Quo Warranto, Prohibition and Mittimus” (Dkt. #36)
be denied; and (2) Defendant Collin County’s Motion for Sanctions and to Declare Plaintiff a
Vexatious Litigant (Dkt. #65) and Supplement (Dkt. #73) be granted in part and denied in part.
Having received the reports of the Magistrate Judge, having considered Defendant Collin County’s
Limited Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. #82), Plaintiff’s Objection (Dkts. #83, #84, #85),
Defendant Collin Count’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objection (Dkt. #86), and having conducted a
de novo review, the Court is of the opinion that the Magistrate Judge’s reports should be adopted,
as set forth herein.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On July 2, 2018, Plaintiff Ryan Gallagher initiated suit in the Northern District of Texas
(Dkt. #3). The Northern District of Texas transferred the matter to the Eastern District of Texas,
Sherman Division, on August 13, 2018 (Dkts. #33, #34). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
September 21, 2018, against Defendants Collin County, Texas, Texas Attorney General Ken
Paxton, Judge David Rippel, and Judge Ray Wheless (Dkt. #39).
In 2010, Plaintiff was charged in Collin County with a violation of Texas Penal Code
§ 481.121(b)(1), possession of marijuana, in a quantity of less than two ounces after a search of
his residence revealed the presence of marijuana.1 State of Texas v. Ryan Gallagher, Cause
No. 0058313010. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, and was placed on deferred
adjudication, sentenced to one year of probation, thirty hours of community service, and directed
to attend the Drug Offenders Program. Plaintiff failed to report for probation, and instead fled
Texas for Colorado, among other states, until he returned to Texas, where he served time at the
Collin County jail (Dkt. #39 at pp. 2–3). Throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff avers that his
religious rights were violated because he was not permitted to smoke marijuana and was told he
could not be Hindu (Dkt. #39 at p. 3). Plaintiff was released from custody in 2015. Plaintiff
contends he was unable to obtain employment or rent property following his release due to being
“labeled a ‘Criminal.’” In addition, when trying to apply for a job in 2017, Plaintiff alleges his
record erroneously or falsely showed a felony (not misdemeanor) conviction (Dkt. #39 at p. 3).
Plaintiff sued Collin County in state court on March 20, 2017, raising his alleged right to
smoke marijuana as part of his religion (the “2017 State Court Lawsuit”). Ryan Gallagher v.
Collin County, Cause No. 005-00650-2017. On March 27, 2017, the 2017 State Court Lawsuit
was transferred to Judge Cynthia Wheless, Cause No. 417-01458-2017.2 On November 14, 2017,
the state court dismissed the 2017 State Court Lawsuit (Dkts. #51-4, #51-5).
1
Plaintiff alleges he “is a Hindu Shaivite, and Marijuana is considered to be the Flesh of the Lord Shiva”
(Dkt. #39 at p. 2) and its use is necessary to his religious practices.
2
Plaintiff names Judge Ray Wheless, rather than Judge Cynthia Wheless, as Defendant in the instant case (Dkt. #51-
1).
2
In the instant suit, which also seeks to litigate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs related to
marijuana, Plaintiff does not delineate specific claims against each of Defendants, but instead, lists
his various grievances with how his state criminal proceedings and the 2017 State Court Lawsuit
were handled. Relevant to Plaintiff’s Objection (hereinafter defined), as relief, Plaintiff requests
to “[o]verturn these Sanctions simply on Free Speech and Redress of Grievance Grounds, if not
on Texas Statutory Grounds, provide Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Investigation, and
Punitive, Real and other Damages as requested in the Original Lawsuit against the County 417-
01458-2017, in the amount of $10,000,000.00” (Dkt. #39 at p. 4). Plaintiff does not clarify what
specific declaratory or injunctive relief he seeks.
Defendants Collin County and Judge Rippel, Judge Wheless, and AG Paxton all filed
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims (Dkts. #51, #58, #59). Defendant Collin County also filed
a Motion for Sanctions and Supplement, requesting monetary sanctions, a declaration that Plaintiff
is a vexatious litigant, and pre-filing injunction (Dkts. #65, #73). On May 15, 2019, the Magistrate
Judge entered two Reports, recommending that: (1) each of Defendants Collin County and Judge
Rippel’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #51), Judge Wheless’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #58), and Attorney General Paxton’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #59) be
granted and Plaintiff’s “Request for Writs of Quo Warranto, Prohibition and Mittimus” (Dkt. #36)
be denied; and (2) Defendant Collin County’s Motion for Sanctions and to Declare Plaintiff a
Vexatious Litigant (Dkt. #65) and Supplement (Dkt. #73) be granted in part and denied in part.
The Report recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims specifically found that: (1) his claims
against Judges Rippel and Wheless and AG Paxton in their official capacities are barred by
sovereign immunity; (2) Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Rippel and Wheless in their individual
capacities are barred by judicial immunity; (3) Plaintiff’s claims against AG Paxton in his
3
individual capacity are barred by prosecutorial immunity; and (4) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
does not reference any county policy or a persistent, widespread practice, and therefore, Plaintiff
has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Collin County. On May 16, 2019, Defendant Collin
County filed its “Limited Motion for Reconsideration of the Scope of the Pre-filing Restrictions
Contained in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (Dkt. #82), asking only to
modify the terms of the pre-filing injunction recommended by the magistrate judge. On May 24,
2019, Plaintiff filed his “Motion to End ECF, Request for Transfer and Response to Magistrate”
(“Plaintiff’s Objection”) (Dkts. #83, #84, #85). Defendant Collin County responded to Plaintiff’s
Objection on May 24, 2019, reasserting its request to alter the language of the proposed pre-filing
injunction (Dkt. #86).
OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
A party who files timely written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is entitled to a de novo review of those findings or recommendations to which
the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)-(3). Plaintiff’s
Objection does not specify to which of the Magistrate Judge’s Reports he objects; rather, Plaintiff
broadly asserts three arguments in “response to the Magistrate:” (1) “[t]his Magistrate failed to
recognize the key issue in the case, the fact that [Plaintiff] was given a false felony for 7
years. . . .which affected [his] ability to get jobs and rent”; (2) this case belongs in the Northern
District of Texas, and “[i]f this were a Case meant to be dismissed, it would have been dismissed
in the Northern District”; and (3) “[Plaintiff] also asked for declaratory relief. . . .[judges] are not
immune from declaratory relief” (Dkts. #83, #84, #85).
4
False Felony
Plaintiff argues that “[t]his Magistrate failed to recognize the key issue in the case, the fact
that [Plaintiff] was given a false felony for 7 years. A false felony, which affected my ability to
get jobs and rent. This Magistrate has ignored the main issue in the case” (Dkt. #83). Plaintiff is
mistaken; the Report expressly enumerated and considered Plaintiff’s argument:
Plaintiff also contends that as a result of his criminal proceedings, he could not
receive employment or rent property due to being “labeled a ‘Criminal;’” Plaintiff
specifically recounts trying to apply for a job in 2017, but having his record
erroneously show a felony conviction, which he attributes to “Judge Rippel
[leaving] it open as ‘Released from Jail’ rather than ‘Dismissed’”
(Dkt. #80 at p. 3). The Report found that such allegation did not alter the conclusion that Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants were barred by sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, prosecutorial
immunity and/or did not establish Monell liability (see Dkt. #80). Neither Plaintiff’s Objection,
nor the record, demonstrate that such findings by the Magistrate Judge are incorrect. The
Magistrate Judge did not ignore the “main issue.” Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
Transfer to the Northern District of Texas
Plaintiff next argues that his claims should not be dismissed because the instant case should
be transferred back to the Northern District of Texas, and had dismissal been appropriate, the
Northern District would have dismissed the matter prior to transferring the case to the Eastern
District of Texas (Dkt. #83). The Northern District of Texas transferred this matter to the Eastern
District of Texas “[b]ecause all of the events upon which this case is based appear to have occurred
in the Eastern District, and at least two of the current defendants are located there”
(Dkt. #33 at p. 2). Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions do not demonstrate that the Eastern District is
an improper venue for this lawsuit, and further, there is no indication in the record, aside from
Plaintiff’s baseless speculation, that the Northern District would have reached a different result.
5
Plaintiff also requests that the instant case be transferred back to the Northern District of
Texas. Prior to the pending Objection, Plaintiff has never moved to transfer this matter to the
Northern District or any other federal court from the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiff’s objection
is overruled.
Absolute Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff also argues that “[he] also asked for declaratory relief. [The Magistrate Judge]
claims judges are immune, but they are not immune from declaratory relief” (Dkt. #85). As an
initial matter, the Court finds that although Plaintiff lists “Declaratory Relief” as a request from
the Court, nowhere in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does he provide any specific details about
this request, namely what he requests the Court to declare (Dkt. #39 at p. 4). Even so,
“although judicial immunity does not bar [certain] claims for injunctive or declaratory relief in
civil rights actions, [herein] Plaintiff cannot obtain any requested declaratory or injunctive relief
because federal courts have no authority to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties.” See Bailey v. Willis, 417CV00276ALMCAN, 2018 WL 3321461, at
*11 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 4:17-CV-276, 2018 WL
2126476 (E.D. Tex. May 8, 2018) (Mazzant, J.) (quoting Hunter v. Price, No. A-15-CV-405-LY,
2015 WL 2454118, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 21, 2015) (quoting LaBranche v. Becnel, 559 F. App'x
290, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2014))). Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
Plaintiff’s Remaining Complaint – Motion to End ECF
Plaintiff further complains that the Magistrate Judge denied his request to e-file, but
granted him permission to receive electronic notifications in the case. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that he “asked for Electronic Case Filing (ECF), not E-Service. I can not [sic] use PACER because
I am Indigent and have Fees, so to use E-Service to serve me literally doesn’t work, and is a
6
Violation of my Right to be Served” (Dkt. #83). Plaintiff’s complaint is irrelevant to the issue of
dismissal; it does not affect the Report’s finding that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed and
this matter closed.
Pre-Filing Injunction
Finally, the Report addressing Defendant Collin County’s Motion for Sanctions and
Supplement found that: (1) Collin County’s request to impose § 1927 sanctions on pro se Plaintiff
should be denied; (2) Collin County’s attorney fees should not be awarded as a sanction; but (3) the
imposition of a pre-filing injunction is appropriate in this matter to deter further vexatious, abusive,
and harassing litigation by Plaintiff because “Plaintiff has now filed over 24 cases nationwide, the
bulk of which related to his perceived rights to use marijuana religiously and/or which were
deemed to be frivolously filed” and “Plaintiff is already subject to at least one pre-filing injunction
(of which the Court is aware) in a federal court” (Dkt. #81 at pp. 9–10).
Using the pre-filing injunction imposed on Plaintiff by the District of Colorado in
Gallagher v. DEA, Civil Action No. 18-CV-2505-GPG (Dkt. #10), the Court recommended that
Plaintiff not be allowed to proceed pro se in the Eastern District of Texas until he meets certain
requirements, including providing the Court with: (1) “A list of all lawsuits currently pending or
filed previously in the Eastern District of Texas”; and (2) “A statement of the legal issues to be
raised in the proposed new pleading and whether he has raised the same issues in other proceedings
in the Eastern District of Texas” (Dkt. 81 at p. 11).
Plaintiff has not objected to the proposed pre-filing injunction; Defendant Collin County,
however, requests that the requirements of the proposed pre-filing injunction be broadened in light
of Plaintiff’s conduct subsequent to entry of the Reports (Dkts. #82; #86 at pp. 4–5). Specifically,
Defendant argues, “[u]nder the current recommended process, [] Plaintiff could avoid the complete
7
disclosure of his entire litigation history. . . .[and] could comply. . . by just disclosing the instant
lawsuit -- the only one filed in the Eastern District -- and in doing so present a very
skewed. . . picture of the scope and breadth of Plaintiff’s actual ligation history” (Dkt. #82 at pp. 2–
3). Defendant suggests, as a solution, that the proposed pre-filing injunction “be slightly modified
so that. . . the disclosure requirement be for ‘all lawsuits currently pending or previously filed in
any Federal or State Court’ and a statement ‘of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new
pleading and whether Plaintiff has raised the same issues in other proceedings in any Federal or
State Court.’” Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s request to modify the proposed pre-filing
injunction. The language suggested by Defendant Collin County in its Objection would best serve
the Court’s purpose in imposing this pre-filing injunction. Accordingly, Defendant’s objection is
sustained, and the pre-filing injunction shall be modified as set forth herein.
CONCLUSION
Having considered Defendant Collin County’s Limited Motion for Reconsideration
(Dkt. #82), Plaintiff’s Objection (Dkts. #83, #84, #85), and having conducted a de novo review,
the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s reports (Dkt. #80, #81) as the findings and conclusions of
the Court, as set forth below.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that each of Defendants Collin County and Judge Rippel’s
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #51), Judge Wheless’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. #58), and Attorney General Paxton’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #59) are GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Judges Wheless and Rippel and AG Paxton in their
official capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Defendants Judges Wheless and Rippel and AG Paxton in their individual capacities are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
8
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s “Request for Writs of Quo Warranto, Prohibition
& Mittimus” (Dkt. #36) is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant Collin County’s Motion for Sanctions and to
Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (Dkt. #65) and Supplement (Dkt. #73) be GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Plaintiff shall be enjoined from future filings in
this District as follows:
Plaintiff is prohibited from filing new actions in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas without the representation of a licensed attorney
admitted to practice in the Eastern District of Texas, unless he obtains permission
to proceed pro se. In order to obtain permission to proceed pro se, Plaintiff is
directed to take the following steps:
1. File with the clerk of this Court a motion requesting leave to file a pro se action.
2. Include in the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action the following
information:
A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously in any Federal

or State Court, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of
each case, and the current status or disposition of each case; and
B. A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new pleading

and whether he has raised the same issues in other proceedings in any
Federal or State Court. If so, he must cite the case number and docket
number where the legal issues previously have been raised.
C. A notarized affidavit, in proper legal form, which certifies that, to the

best of Plaintiff’s knowledge, the legal arguments being raised are not
frivolous or made in bad faith, they are warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
that the action is not interposed for any improper purpose such as delay,
harassment, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, and that he will
comply with all federal and local rules of this Court.
3. Submit the proposed new pleading to be filed in the pro se action.
The above-described documents shall be submitted to the Clerk of the Court, who
shall forward them the Chief Judge, or other judge designated by the Chief Judge,
for review. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action is denied, the matter
will be dismissed. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action is granted,
9
the case will proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
. the Local Rules.
All relief not previously granted is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this civil action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 10th day of September, 2019.
___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
Case 1:18-cv-02154-TJK Document 21 Filed 11/25/19 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
REV. RYAN “SASHA” GALLAGHER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 18-2154 (TJK)
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION et
al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
For the reasons explained in the Court’s accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is
hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED and this
action is DISMISSED without prejudice. This is a final, appealable Order. The Clerk of Court
is directed to close the case.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly

TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: November 25, 2019

Case 1:16-cv-01117-SS Document 8 Filed 11/04/16 Page 1 of 2
ILL
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS j(j
NOV PM 2: 147
AUSTIN DIVISION
BYJL
CLERiC U.S. O1STRCT COURT
WESTERN OSTRICT OF J.çXS
RYAN GALLAGHER, DEPUTY CE

Plaintiff,
CAUSE NO.:
-vs- A-16-CA-01117-SS
CHUCK ROSENBERG, DRUG

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; LORETTA
LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
STEPAN COMPANY, MALLINCKRODT
PHARMACEUTICALS,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause,
and thereafter enters the following.
On October 3, 2016 Ryan Gallagher tendered to the Court as a petitioner pro se a large
volume of papers entitled "Complaint" and requested the right to proceed in this litigation in
forma pauperis. Mr. Gallagher's pleadings were referred to the United States Magistrate Judge
who granted Mr. Gallagher's request to proceed in forma pauperis but recommended the case be
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Subsequently, Mr.
Gallagher filed a pleading entitled "In Addition to the Original Claim in Response to Magistrate
Judge Mark Lane's Recommendation" on October 27, 2016 and his motion "Request to Certify
Class Action and Appoint Counsel" [#6] also filed on October 27, 2016 and, finally, his
"Objection to Recommendation" filed October 31, 2016.
After review, the Court ACCEPTS the recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge and DISMISSED this case without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Case 1:16-cv-01117-SS Document 8 Filed 11/04/16 Page 2 of 2
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically state:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain. . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction,. . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and. . . a demand
for the relief sought. .
The United States Supreme Court has clarified the pleadings requirement in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) by ordering
that any claim for relief must specifically set out sufficient facts to establish a cause of action and
the remedy for the cause of action as well as specific factual allegations regarding the damages
requested. Even considering Mr. Gallagher as a pro se litigant and construing the rules liberally,
there is no way to construe his pleadings comply with the Federal Rules.
The United States Magistrate Judge adequately describes his allegations and rantings. He
specifies no specific cause of action, only editorializing and surrounding each of his opinions
with meaningless legal citations.
Present before the Court is his Motion to Certify a Class pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Again, Mr. Gallagher fails to specify in his pleadings any legitimate class that
any federal judge could certify, particularly in light of his pleadings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause is
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SIGNED this the " day of November 2016.
SAM1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
-2-
Case 1:18-cv-02153-UNA Document 5 Filed 11/05/18 Page 1 of 1
Case 1:20-cv-00027-GPG Document 6 Filed 01/09/20 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 3

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 20-cv-00027-GPG
RYAN SASHA GALLAGHER, Rev., The Saivite Temple FEIN #37-1949939,also known
as Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush,
Plaintiff,
v.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,

LOREN T. MILLER,
DAN MCCORMICK,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, Ryan Sasha Gallagher, resides in Castle Rock, Colorado. On
November 26, 2019, he submitted pro se a “Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis”
(ECF No. 1) and a Complaint (ECF No. 2) in the Southern District of New York. The
Southern District of New York transferred the action to this Court. (ECF No. 3).
Mr. Gallagher is enjoined from filing a civil action pro se in this Court unless he
complies with the requirements of the filing restrictions imposed in Gallagher v. DEA,
18-cv-02505-LTB. To file an action in this Court without the representation of a
licensed attorney admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, Mr. Gallagher must obtain permission to proceed pro se. In order to
obtain such permission, he must take the following steps:
1. File with the clerk of this Court a motion requesting leave to file a pro se
action.
1
information:
A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously in the District

of Colorado, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of
B. A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new

pleading and whether he has raised the same issues in other
proceedings in the District of Colorado. If so, he must cite the case
number and docket number where the legal issues previously have
been raised.

frivolous or made in bad faith, they are warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, that the action is not interposed for any improper purpose
such as delay, harassment, or to needlessly increase the cost of
litigation, and that he will comply with all federal and local rules of this
Court.
(See Gallagher v. DEA, 18-cv-02505-LTB, ECF No. 10 at 10-11).
Mr. Gallagher is not represented by counsel in this action and he has failed to
comply with the filing restrictions. Specifically, he has not filed a motion requesting leave
to file a pro se action and he has not included any of the required information.
Therefore, the action will be dismissed because Mr. Gallagher has failed to comply with
the sanction order.
The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this Order is not taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status will be
denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962).
If Mr. Gallagher files a notice of appeal, he must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or
2
file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to comply with the
sanction order restricting his ability to file pro se actions in the District of Colorado. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gallagher is denied leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 9th day of January , 2020.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock
LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge
3
Case 1:18-cv-02595-CMA Document 6 Filed 11/01/18 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 9

Civil Action No. 18-cv-02595-KLM
RYAN “SASHA” GALLAGHER, Rev.
Plaintiff,
v.
GALLAGHER, Magistrate Judge,

LEWIS BABCOCK, Judge,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher is a resident of Castle Rock, Colorado. On
October 9, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint (ECF No. 1) and an Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2). On October
10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher issued an Order of Recusal (ECF No.
4) and the action was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix for initial review
pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 8.1(b). Magistrate Judge Mix granted Plaintiff leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5).
The Court must construe Plaintiff’s filings liberally because he is not represented
by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court cannot act as an advocate
for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, this
action will be dismissed.
1
I. Mr. Gallagher’s Filing History
Mr. Gallagher is no stranger to this Court. Since February of 2018, he has
initiated fourteen actions in this Court, including the instant action. They are as follows:
1. Gallagher v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 18-cv-00387-LTB (D. Colo. March

26, 2018), dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies.
2. Gallagher v. National Security Agency, No. 18-cv-00388-LTB (D. Colo. March 26,
2018), dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies.
3. Gallagher v. NSA, No. 18-cv-01525-RM-KMT (filed June 18, 2018), FOIA action
currently pending.
4. Gallagher v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 18-cv-01674-LTB (D. Colo. Aug. 21,
2018), dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
5. Gallagher v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, No. 18-cv-

01693-LTB (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2018), dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8.
6. Gallagher v. YouTube, LLC, No. 18-cv-01694-LTB (D. Colo. July 5, 2018), a

DMCA case still under initial review.
7. Gallagher v. Wray, No. 18-cv-1697-LTB (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2018), dismissed for
failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
8. Gallagher v. Colorado Department of Revenue, No. 18-cv-01699-LTB (D. Colo.

Aug. 22, 2018), dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
9. Gallagher v. Facebook, No. 18-cv-2029-LTB (D. Colo. August 8, 2018),

dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies.
10. Gallagher v. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, No. 18-cv-02263-

LTB (D. Colo. August 31, 2018), dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies.
11. Gallagher v. No Named Defendants, No. 18-cv-02263-GPG (D. Colo. Filed

August 31, 2018), an order to show cause why action should not be dismissed
and filing restrictions imposed was entered on October 4, 2018.
12. Gallagher v. Colorado DoR, No. 18-cv-2503-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1,
2018), an order to show cause why action should not be dismissed and filing
restrictions imposed was entered on October 4, 2018.
2
13. Gallagher v. DEA, No. 18-cv-02505-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1, 2018), an
order to show cause why action should not be dismissed and filing restrictions
imposed was entered on October 4, 2018.
14. Gallagher v. Gallagher, No. 18-cv-2595-KLM (D. Colo. Filed October 9, 2018),
instant case.
On October 4, 2018, in three of these actions, Judge Gallagher entered an order
to show cause why the action should not be dismissed and why filing restrictions should
not be imposed against Mr. Gallagher. See Gallagher v. No Named Defendants, No. 18-
cv-02263-GPG (D. Colo. Filed August 31, 2018) (ECF No. 9); Gallagher v. Colorado
DoR, No. 18-cv-2503-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1, 2018) (ECF No. 4); Gallagher v.
DEA, No. 18-cv-02505-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1, 2018) (ECF No. 4). In those
orders, Judge Gallagher determined that Mr. Gallagher is unable to represent himself
properly and that filing restrictions should be imposed. Mr. Gallagher has now filed the
instant action naming Judge Gallagher and Judge Babcock as Defendants.
II. Instant Complaint
The Complaint asserts the following two claims against Judge Lewis T. Babcock
and Magistrate Judge Gallagher: (1) Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law;” and (2)
“Civil Conspiracy.” He seeks damages and declaratory relief.
The supporting facts for his first claim state, in their entirety:
Due to either Criminal Negligence, or outright Willingly

seeing Homeless, Indigent, and Pro Se Plaintiff’s [sic], in this
case myself and Frank Sturgell, as underserving of due
process, and basing Rights to access the Court on payment
of Court Fees, these 2 judges are causing real damages in
the form of lost rights, and prolonged Homelessness.
Homeless is not a Noun it is a verb. Rule 83(a)(2) could
overcome this, but they refuse to acknowledge [sic]
Example: in my case Gallagher v. YouTube, 1:18cv01697,

he is requesting another Amended complaint. I am not a
3
Law book, I do not have all my citations I used, I am

homeless, and This Judge has refused to waive my PACER
fees. He needs to take action to make this EASIER because
I am homeless, not harder.
More Evidence in Judicial Complaints #10-18-90033 &

90034 [sic]
“He would not anticipate those counsels which rather

bestowed by circumstances on men, than by men on
Circumstances.” -Livy
(ECF No. 1 at 4).
For his second claim, Plaintiff’s allegations, in their entirety, are that:
Judge Gallagher and Judge Babcock are a Pro Se, Indigent,

or Homeless tag team. See Judicial Complaint #10-18-
90033/90034 [sic]
I sued the FBI and Department of Revenue of Colorado and

asked for Marshals to protect us in a gathering, instead,
Judge Gallagher called the FBI (and did not recuse himself)
then pretended I was an aggressor and called the Marshalls
[sic] for himself, then dismissed all my cases in violation of
Rule 83(a)(2) and my right to access the courts and
Discovery [sic]
Judicial Complaint #10-18-90033/90034 are key [sic]
This is a civil action follow up to that current investigation,

which will bring more evidence.
The Colorado Bill of Rights provides a Right of Petition and

Remonstrance [sic]
(Id. at 5).
III. Analysis of Instant Complaint
Mr. Gallagher’s complaint is deficient for numerous reasons. First, the complaint
fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Mr. Gallagher
has been informed numerous times, see e.g., Gallagher v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
4
Firearms, and Explosives, 18-cv-01693-LTB, ECF No. 6; Gallagher v. Wray, 18-cv-
01697-LTB, ECF No. 6, Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for
the relief sought.” Prolix, vague, or unintelligible pleadings violate the requirements of
Rule 8.
Rule 8 requires that Plaintiff identify the specific claims being asserted, against
which Defendant or Defendants each claim is asserted, the specific facts that support
each claim, and what each Defendant did that allegedly violated his rights. See
th
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10 Cir. 2007) (noting
that, to state a claim in federal court, “a complaint must explain what each defendant did
to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed him or her;
and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated”). The general
rule that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally has limits and “the court cannot
take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments
and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
th th
(10 Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7 Cir. 1991)
(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”).
Mr. Gallagher’ s complaint fails to provide a short and plain statement of the
claims showing that he is entitled to relief. There are no specific credible factual
allegations that the Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s legal rights.
For his first claim, Mr. Gallagher alleges that Defendants violated his due process
rights and access to the courts, which resulted in lost rights and homelessness. As an
5
example, Plaintiff explains that Judge Gallagher ordered him to file an amended
complaint in one of his pending actions. He also states that “This Judge” has refused to
waive his PACER fees. However, there is no constitutional right to PACER access.
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to adequately assert that Defendants violated his legal rights.
His conclusory allegations of “due process” and “access to the courts” violations also fail
to adequately assert a constitutional violation. Moreover, there are no factual
allegations to support Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants’ actions caused Plaintiff’s
homelessness. Thus, Plaintiff fails to show that he is entitled to any relief for claim one.
Similarly, for his second claim, Plaintiff’s allegations that Judge Gallagher called
the FBI and the Marshals and that he dismissed “all of [Plaintiff’s] cases” fails to
adequately assert any civil conspiracy or constitutional violation. Therefore, Plaintiff
fails to show that he is entitled to any relief for claim two.
As a result, this action will be dismissed because Mr. Gallagher has failed to file
a Complaint that complies with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A
decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is within the trial court’s sound
discretion. See Atkins v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1992);
Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969).
Additionally, Defendants Gallagher and Babcock are entitled to absolute judicial
immunity. Judges are absolutely immune from a civil rights suit based on actions taken
in their judicial capacity, unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1994). Judicial immunity “is
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, or an
6
assertion that the judge acted in error or exceeded his authority, see Stump, 435 U.S. at
1105. Further, a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction only when he “acts
clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686
(10th Cir.1990). To the extent that the Court is able to ascertain what Plaintiff is
asserting against Defendants Babcock and Gallagher, it appears he is challenging
judicial orders and that Judge Gallagher called the FBI and Marshals Office. However,
these actions were taken within their judicial capacities and they were not acting in clear
absence of all jurisdiction.
To determine whether an act is a judicial act taken in a judge’s judicial capacity,
the Court must consider whether the act is a function normally performed by a judge
and whether the affected party was dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity. See
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. The act of issuing orders, including orders of dismissals and
orders to amend, in pending actions is a function normally performed by a judge.
Similarly, a judge alerting the Marshals Service or the FBI to concerns a judge has for
his own security or that of his fellow judicial officers, is an act normally performed by a
judge. “[I]n circumstances in which a judge reasonably perceives a threat to himself or
herself arising out of the judge's adjudicatory conduct, the judge's response, be it a
letter to a prosecutor or a call to the Marshall's office for security, is a judicial act within
the scope of judicial immunity.” Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 78 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 259 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a judge
was entitled to judicial immunity for actions that included letters she wrote on judicial
letterhead to state and federal prosecutors requesting an investigation of the plaintiff,
7
against whom she had previously rendered judgment, after concerns arose for her
safety based on the plaintiff's actions)).
The next question is whether Magistrate Judge Gallagher and Judge Babcock
were acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356 (1978) (““[T]he necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is
immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had
jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.”). The Court notes that “the scope of the
judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the
judge.” Id. Mr. Gallagher’s allegations regarding Magistrate Judge Gallagher and Judge
Babcock do not demonstrate the Defendants were acting in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. Thus, Magistrate Judge Gallagher and Judge Babcock appear to be
entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief, absolute judicial immunity may
not bar such claims. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (judicial immunity is not
a bar to prospective injunctive relief against judicial officer acting in her judicial
capacity). But See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding federal judges
were immune from injunctive relief in a Bivens action). However, regardless of judicial
immunity, Mr. Gallagher fails to allege specific supporting facts to demonstrate his
constitutional rights have been violated and that he is entitled to declaratory relief.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and the action are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8
because Mr. Gallagher has failed to file a pleading that complies with the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of a motion seeking leave to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
DATED: November 1, 2018
BY THE COURT:
_________________________
CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO
United States District Judge
9
Case 1:18-cv-01674-LTB Document 67 Filed 03/07/19 USDC Colorado Page 1 of 5
Appellate Case: 18-1352 Document: 010110135330 Date Filed: 03/07/2019 Page: 1
FILED
United
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________ March 7, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
RYAN GALLAGHER, Rev. “Sasha,” Clerk of Court
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 18-1352
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-01674-LTB)
DRUG ENFORCEMENT (D. Colo.)
ADMINISTRATION; JAMES
ARNOLD; SUSAN A. GIBSON; and
DREW, Agent in Centennial Office,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________
This appeal is brought by Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher, who
identifies himself as a Hindu Shaivite. Rev. Gallagher allegedly regards
marijuana as a religious sacrament, so he asked the Drug Enforcement
*
Oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of the
appeal, so we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited as otherwise appropriate. See Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1(a) and Tenth Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Administration for an exemption allowing him to use marijuana. According
to Rev. Gallagher, the DEA failed to timely respond but eventually asked
for a meeting with him. Rev. Gallagher responded by suing, alleging that
the delay violated his constitutional rights and that the DEA’s request for a
meeting constituted a subterfuge to force him to incriminate himself. The
district court dismissed the action, concluding that the allegations in the
complaint were frivolous and failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). We affirm.
On appeal, we apply a two-part standard based on the two different
grounds for dismissal. For the dismissal based on frivolousness, we apply
the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333, 1335
n.4 (10th Cir. 2003) (“This court reviews frivolousness dismissals for an
abuse of discretion.”). For the dismissal involving failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, we apply de novo review. See Perkins v.
Kan. Dept. of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that we
apply de novo review to a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 based on
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted).
In the complaint, Rev. Gallagher alleged that the DEA took too long
to respond to his request for a religious exemption. The district court
pointed out that Rev. Gallagher hadn’t identified the drug he wanted to use
or how it is used in his religion. Without such basic information, the
district court concluded that Rev. Gallagher’s claim was frivolous and did
2
not amount to a constitutional violation. In his appeal brief, Rev. Gallagher
does not say how the district court erred in its analysis of this claim.
Rev. Gallagher also alleged in the complaint that the DEA was trying
to force him to incriminate himself. For this allegation, the district court
reasoned that Rev. Gallagher had not explained how arrangement of a
meeting would violate his constitutional rights. In his appeal brief, Rev.
Gallagher again fails to say how the district court erred in its consideration
of this claim.
In his appeal brief, Rev. Gallagher adds allegations involving the
“incorporation doctrine” and “bill of attainder.” But he did not include
these allegations in district court, so they are considered forfeited. Carney
v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1351–52 (10th Cir. 2017).
And even here, Rev. Gallagher fails to explain (1) how his allegations
would implicate the so-called “incorporation doctrine” or (2) how he was
subjected to a bill of attainder.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
characterizing Rev. Gallagher’s claims as frivolous. Nor did the court err
in deciding that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
3
Affirmed. 1
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
1
We grant Rev. Gallagher’s motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
4

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Byron White United States Courthouse
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257
(303) 844-3157
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Chris Wolpert
Clerk of Court March 07, 2019 Chief Deputy Clerk
Ryan Gallagher
1723 Candleglow Street
Castle Rock, CO 80108
RE: 18-1352, Gallagher v. DEA, et al

Dist/Ag docket: 1:18-CV-01674-LTB
Dear Appellant:
Enclosed is a copy of the order and judgment issued today in this matter. The court has
entered judgment on the docket pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. Rule 36.
Please contact this office if you have questions.
Sincerely,
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of the Court
EAS/lg

RYAN GALLAGHER, Rev. “Sasha,”
Plaintiff,
v.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,

ROBERT W. PATTERSON,
DEMETRA ASHLEY,
DEPUTY ADMIN OF DIVERSION CONTROL,
DEA DIVERSION CONTROL,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD SESSIONS III, US Attorney General,
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
KARL KRAMER,
CHRISTOPHER POIRIER,
STATE OF COLORADO,
GOVERNOR HICKENLOOPER,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher, currently resides in Castle Rock,
Colorado. On February 15, 2018, he submitted pro se a “Complaint/ Request for
Review” (ECF No. 1) and an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (Long Form) (ECF No. 3).
On February 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher ordered Plaintiff to
cure certain designated deficiencies in his Complaint if he wished to pursue his claims
in this action. (ECF No. 4). Specifically, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit his
1
Complaint on the court-approved form. Plaintiff was warned that the action would be
dismissed without further notice if he failed to cure the deficiency within thirty days.
On March 13, 2018, the copy of Magistrate Judge Gallagher’s February 20, 2018
order that was mailed to Plaintiff at his Castle Rock, Colorado address was returned to
the Court undelivered. (ECF No. 6). The returned envelope was marked: “RETURN TO
SENDER – NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED – UNABLE TO FORWARD.” (Id.)
Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies as directed within the time allowed and
he has failed to respond in any way to Magistrate Judge Gallagher’s February 20, 2018
order. Therefore, the action will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute
and cure the deficiencies.
Furthermore, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal, he also must pay the full $505
appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 24. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and the action are dismissed without prejudice for
failure to cure the deficiencies and failure to prosecute. It is
2
denied without prejudice to the filing of a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 26th day of March , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock_________________
3

Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,

RODGERS, Director Admiral,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher, currently resides in Castle Rock,
Colorado. On February 15, 2018, he submitted pro se a “Complaint/ Request for
Review” (ECF No. 1) and an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees or Costs (Long Form) (ECF No. 3).
On February 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher ordered Plaintiff to
cure certain designated deficiencies in his Complaint if he wished to pursue his claims
in this action. (ECF No. 4). Specifically, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit his
Complaint on the court-approved form and to submit an in forma pauperis motion that
included all of the required financial information. Plaintiff was warned that the action
would be dismissed without further notice if he failed to cure the deficiencies within thirty
days.
1
On March 14, 2018, the copy of Magistrate Judge Gallagher’s February 20, 2018
order that was mailed to Plaintiff at his Castle Rock, Colorado address was returned to
the Court undelivered. (ECF No. 5). The returned envelope was marked: “RETURN TO
SENDER – NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED – UNABLE TO FORWARD.” (Id.)
Plaintiff has failed to cure the deficiencies as directed within the time allowed and
he has failed to respond in any way to Magistrate Judge Gallagher’s February 20, 2018
order. Therefore, the action will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute
and cure the deficiencies.
Furthermore, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal, he also must pay the full $505
appellate filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App.
P. 24. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and the action are dismissed without prejudice for
failure to cure the deficiencies and failure to prosecute. It is
2
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 26th day of March , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
3

Plaintiff,
v.
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES, (ATF),

BYRON TODD JONES,
THOMAS E. BRANDON,
REGINA LOMBARDO,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher, currently resides in Fountain, Colorado.
On July 5, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint. (ECF No. 1).
On July 10, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to cure certain designated
deficiencies if he wished to pursue his claim in this action. (ECF No. 3). Specifically,
Plaintiff was directed to either pay the $400.00 filing fee or submit a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on the court-approved form. Additionally, Plaintiff was directed to file
his complaint on the current court-approved form.
In response, on July 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion to File Electronically (ECF
No. 4) and an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5). On July 25, 2018, the Court
determined that the submitted documents were still deficient. (ECF No. 6). Because it
appeared that Plaintiff had attempted to cure some of the deficiencies, Mr. Gallagher
was given an additional opportunity to cure deficiencies and file an amended complaint.
1
(Id.) Specifically, Mr. Gallagher was ordered to either pay the $400.00 filing fee or
submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the court-approved form. (Id.)
Additionally, Mr. Gallagher was ordered to file a complaint that contained addresses for
all of the defendants and that complied with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Id.) He was warned that the action would be dismissed without further
notice if he failed to cure the deficiencies and file an amended complaint within thirty
days. (Id.)
Following the Court’s July 25, 2018 Order, Mr. Gallagher filed an Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form). (ECF No. 7).
In addition, Mr. Gallagher filed thirteen (13) additional documents, including Letters,
Motions, Notices, and Briefs. (ECF Nos. 8-13 and 15-21). However, he has failed to file
an Amended Complaint that included addresses for all Defendants and complied with
Rule 8 of the Civil Rules of Federal Procedure within the time allowed. Therefore, the
Court will review the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) filed on July 19, 2018. The Court
must construe the Amended Complaint liberally because Mr. Gallagher is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
th
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10 Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an
advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons discussed
below, the action will be dismissed.
The twin purposes of a pleading are to give the opposing parties fair notice of the
basis for the claims against them so that they may respond and to allow the Court to
conclude that the allegations, if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See
Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of
2
th
Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10 Cir. 1989); see also Nasious v. Two Unknown
th
B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10 Cir. 2007) (stating that a complaint “must
explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the
defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes
the defendant violated.”).
The requirements of Rule 8 are designed to meet these purposes. See TV
Communications Network, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991),
th
aff’d, 964 F.2d 1022 (10 Cir. 1992). Specifically, Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint
“must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, .
. . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Furthermore, the philosophy of Rule 8(a)
is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that “[e]ach allegation must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Taken together, Rules 8(a) and (d)(1) underscore the emphasis
placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules. As a result, prolix, vague, or
unintelligible pleadings violate the requirements of Rule 8.
The Amended Complaint fails to provide a clear and concise statement of each
claim that demonstrates Plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Monument Builders of Greater
th
Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10
Cir. 1989). Mr. Gallagher asserts the following two claims: (1) “Not responding to
petition/ redress;” and (2) “Taxing Religion out of Existence.” (ECF No. 5). However,
Mr. Gallagher provides no supporting factual allegations for his claims. Instead of
providing supporting factual allegations for his claims, he states “see initial filing.” (Id. at
3
4 and 5). As Magistrate Judge Gallagher explained in the July 25 Order, the Court will
not “see initial filing” in order to discern Plaintiff’s supporting factual allegations.
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Gallagher that Plaintiff fails to provide a
short and plain statement of his claims that demonstrates he is entitled to relief. As a
result, Mr. Gallagher fails to provide Defendants fair notice of the specific claim being
asserted against them and the specific factual allegations that support the claim.
Furthermore, despite the instructions provided by Magistrate Judge Gallagher, Mr.
Gallagher has failed to file an amended complaint that clarifies his claims. Mr.
Gallagher also fails to provide addresses for all of the defendants.
The general rule that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally has limits and
“the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in
constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
th
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10 Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d
th
955, 956 (7 Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”);
Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D. Colo. 1991) (vague and conclusory
allegations that his rights have been violated does not entitle a pro se pleader to a day
in court regardless of how liberally the pleadings are construed), aff’d, 961 F.2d 916
th
(10 Cir. 1992). “[I]n analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need
accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory
allegations.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
The action will be dismissed for failure to comply with the pleading requirements
of Rule 8. The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
4
will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $505 appellate filing
fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Additionally, the Court warns Mr. Gallagher that his numerous unnecessary and
unresponsive filings submitted in this action (and his other numerous actions in this
Court) appear abusive of the judicial system. "[T]he right of access to the courts is
neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of access to the
courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious." Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d
351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) (per curiam). "Federal courts have the
inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully
tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances." Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070,
1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Sieverding v. Colo. Bar. Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th
Cir. 2006); Tripati, 878 F.2d at 351).
Specifically, injunctions restricting further filings are

appropriate where the litigant’ s lengthy and abusive history
is set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what the
litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and
the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the
court’ s order before it is implemented.
Id.
A pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation will support an order enjoining a
litigant from filing any claims without first seeking prior leave of court. See Ketchum v.
Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992); Winslow v. Romer, 759 F. Supp. 670, 677- 78
(D. Colo. 1991); Colorado ex rel. Colo. Judicial Dep't v. Fleming, 726 F. Supp. 1216,
1221 (D. Colo. 1989). Therefore, Mr. Gallagher is warned that if he files new frivolous
5
actions or continues to file additional unresponsive documents, he will be subject to
sanctions.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) and the action are
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because Mr. Gallagher has failed to file a pleading that complies with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is
pauperis on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 30th day of August , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
6

Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS (FBI),
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On July 5, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint. (ECF No. 1).
No. 4) and an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5). On July 25, 2018, the Court
determined that the submitted documents were still deficient. (ECF No. 6). However,
because it appeared that Plaintiff had attempted to cure some of the deficiencies, he
was given an additional opportunity to cure deficiencies and file an amended complaint.
(Id.) Specifically, Mr. Gallagher was ordered to either pay the $400.00 filing fee or
1
submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on the court-approved form. (Id.)
Additionally, Mr. Gallagher was ordered to file an amended complaint that contained
addresses for all of the defendants and that complied with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. (Id.) He was warned that the action would be dismissed without
further notice if he failed to cure the deficiencies and file an amended complaint within
thirty days. (Id.)
Following the Court’s July 25, 2018 Order, Mr. Gallagher filed an Application to
In addition, Mr. Gallagher filed twenty-five (25) additional documents, including Letters,
Motions, Notices, and Briefs. (ECF Nos. 8-20 and 22-33). However, he has failed to file
an Amended Complaint that included addresses for all Defendants and complied with
Rule 8 of the Civil Rules of Federal Procedure within the time allowed. Therefore, the
Court will review the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) filed on July 19, 2018. The Court
must construe the Amended Complaint liberally because Mr. Gallagher is not
represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
th
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10 Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not be an
advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons discussed
below, the action will be dismissed.
The twin purposes of a pleading are to give the opposing parties fair notice of the
basis for the claims against them so that they may respond and to allow the Court to
conclude that the allegations, if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See
Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of

th
Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10 Cir. 1989); see also Nasious v. Two Unknown
2
th
B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10 Cir. 2007) (stating that a complaint “must
explain what each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the
defendant’s action harmed him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes
the defendant violated.”).
The requirements of Rule 8 are designed to meet these purposes. See TV
Communications Network, Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991),
th
aff’d, 964 F.2d 1022 (10 Cir. 1992). Specifically, Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint
“must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,
. . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Furthermore, the philosophy of Rule 8(a)
is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that “[e]ach allegation must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Taken together, Rules 8(a) and (d)(1) underscore the emphasis
placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules. As a result, prolix, vague, or
unintelligible pleadings violate the requirements of Rule 8.
The Amended Complaint fails to provide a clear and concise statement of each
claim that demonstrates Plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Monument Builders of Greater
th
Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass’n of Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10
Cir. 1989). Mr. Gallagher asserts the following two claims: (1) “Failure to respond to
FOIAs over a Period of 2 years;” and (2) “Possible discrimination/ Malicious
investigation.” (ECF No. 5). However, Mr. Gallagher provides no supporting factual
allegations for his claims. For his first claim, the supporting facts alleged, in their
entirety, are: “See initial filing. ECF will provide more evidence.” (Id. at 4). Similarly, for
his second claim, he states: “see attachment” in a separate case and that “there will be
3
further filings regarding this claim.” (Id. at 5). As Magistrate Judge Gallagher explained
in the July 25 Order, the Court will not “see initial filing” or “see attachment” in a
separate case in order to discern Plaintiff’s supporting factual allegations.
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Gallagher that Plaintiff fails to provide a
short and plain statement of his claims that demonstrates he is entitled to relief. As a
result, Mr. Gallagher fails to provide Defendants fair notice of the specific claim being
asserted against them and the specific factual allegations that support the claim.
Furthermore, despite the instructions provided by Magistrate Judge Gallagher, Mr.
Gallagher has failed to file an amended complaint that clarifies his claims. Mr.
Gallagher also fails to provide addresses for all of the defendants.
The general rule that pro se pleadings must be construed liberally has limits and
“the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in
constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
th
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10 Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d
th
955, 956 (7 Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”);
Ketchum v. Cruz, 775 F. Supp. 1399, 1403 (D. Colo. 1991) (vague and conclusory
allegations that his rights have been violated does not entitle a pro se pleader to a day
in court regardless of how liberally the pleadings are construed), aff’d, 961 F.2d 916
th
(10 Cir. 1992). “[I]n analyzing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need
accept as true only the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory
allegations.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
The action will be dismissed for failure to comply with the pleading requirements
of Rule 8. The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
4
from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status
will be denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he also must pay the full $505 appellate filing
fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Additionally, the Court warns Mr. Gallagher that his numerous unnecessary and
unresponsive filings submitted in this action (and his other numerous actions in this
Court) appear abusive of the judicial system. "[T]he right of access to the courts is
neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of access to the
courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious." Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d
351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted) (per curiam). "Federal courts have the
inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully
tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances." Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070,
1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Sieverding v. Colo. Bar. Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th
Cir. 2006); Tripati, 878 F.2d at 351).
Specifically, injunctions restricting further filings are

appropriate where the litigant’ s lengthy and abusive history
is set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what the
litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and
the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the
court’ s order before it is implemented.
Id.
A pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation will support an order enjoining a
litigant from filing any claims without first seeking prior leave of court. See Ketchum v.
Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992); Winslow v. Romer, 759 F. Supp. 670, 677- 78
(D. Colo. 1991); Colorado ex rel. Colo. Judicial Dep't v. Fleming, 726 F. Supp. 1216,
5
1221 (D. Colo. 1989). Therefore, Mr. Gallagher is warned that if he files new frivolous
sanctions.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) and the action are
dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because Mr. Gallagher has failed to file a pleading that complies with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 30th day of August , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
6

Plaintiff,
v.
YOU TUBE, LLC,

GOOGLE,
DARRIN MCGILLIS,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On July 5, 2018, Plaintiff, Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher submitted pro se a
Complaint. (ECF No. 1). At the time he initiated this action, he resided in Fountain,
Colorado.
No. 4) and a Complaint (ECF No. 5). On January 23, 2018, he filed an Application to
1
On July 25, 2018, the Court ordered Mr. Gallagher to cure deficiencies and file
an amended complaint. (ECF No. 7). The Court ordered Mr. Gallagher to file a
Complaint that included his original signature and to provide addresses for all of the
defendants. Additionally, he was ordered to file an amended complaint that complied
with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following the Court’s July 25, 2018 Order, Mr. Gallagher filed an Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 8) and eighteen additional documents (see ECF Nos. 9-14, 16-20,
22-28). On September 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Gallagher ordered Mr. Gallagher to
file a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 29). Specifically, Mr. Gallagher was
ordered to file a Second Amended Complaint that complied with Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, that contained specific factual allegations demonstrating that
Defendants were liable under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), and that
adequately alleged a First Amendment violation. He was warned that if he failed to file
a Second Amended Complaint within the time allowed, the action would be dismissed
for failure to follow a court order.
Plaintiff has failed to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time allowed.
The district court has “‘the inherent power to dismiss a plaintiff's action for failure to . . .
comply with the rules of federal procedure or any order of the court.’” Gardner v.
Arrowichis, 543 Fed. Appx. 891, 891 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Meeker v. Rizley, 324
F.2d 269, 271 (10th Cir. 1963)). Therefore, this action will be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to follow a court order.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
Order is not taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for
2
the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). If
Plaintiff files a notice of appeal she must also pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or file
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply
with a Court Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). It is
DENIED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are denied as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 1st day of November , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock_______________
LEWIS T. BABCOCK
U.S. Senior District Judge
3

Plaintiff,
v.
CONGRESS,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS,
US SECRET SERVICE,
FACEBOOK,
MSNBC,
DNC- DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION,
TWITTER,
MEGYN KELLY,
JOE ROGAN,
AMERICAN ATHEISTS,
HICKENLOOPER, Gov.,
NSA/CSS CO CRYPTO CENTER,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On August 8, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint. (ECF No. 1). On August 14,
2018, he improperly sent emails and various attachments directly to numerous judicial
chambers. (ECF No. 5). On August 15, 2018, he submitted an Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 3). On August 15 and 16, 2018, he also submitted a “Motion for Recusal and
Contacting the FBI about Public Corruption” (ECF No. 6), a “Motion for Leave to
Proceed on Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Block Judicial Retaliation for Complaint
1
Filed with the 10th Circuit” (ECF No. 7), and Briefs in Support of Motion for Recusal and
Contacting the FBI (ECF Nos. 8-10).
After reviewing all of the documents, on August 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge
Gordon P. Gallagher denied the motion for recusal and ordered Plaintiff to cure certain
designated deficiencies if he wished to pursue his claims. (ECF No. 11). Specifically,
Plaintiff was ordered to file his Complaint on the current court-approved form.
Additionally, Plaintiff was ordered to either pay the $400.00 filing and administrative fees
or file an in forma pauperis motion on the current court-approved form. Plaintiff was
warned that the action would be dismissed without further notice if he failed to cure the
deficiencies within thirty days. Plaintiff was also informed that “[t]he only proper filings
at this time are a Complaint on the court-approved form and an Application to Proceed
in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form) on the court-approved
form (or payment of the $400.00 filing fee). No other filings will be considered and may
be stricken.” (ECF No. 11 at 4-5). He was also warned that if he filed new frivolous
sanctions.
Following the Court’s August 16 Order, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form) (ECF No. 12), an Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 23), and twenty-one (21) other documents. The Amended
Complaint was not on the court-approved form. On August 18, 2018, the Court ordered
that Plaintiff’s CM/ECF access be immediately revoked and that Plaintiff may only file
documents specifically referenced and allowed by Court order. (ECF No. 35). On
August 20, 2018, the Court ordered that the unnecessary and unresponsive documents
2
submitted to the Court on August 16, 2018 (ECF No. 13), August 17, 2018 (ECF Nos.
14-18), and August 18, 2018 (ECF Nos. 19-22 and 24-34) be stricken because they
were filed in direct defiance of the Court’s August 16 order.
Following the Court’s August 20 Order, Plaintiff has filed two other documents.
(ECF No. 37 and 38). Neither of these documents are a Complaint or an in forma
pauperis motion. Therefore, these documents are also unnecessary, unresponsive and
in direct defiance of the August 16 Order. The documents will be stricken.
Mr. Gallagher has failed to cure the deficiencies as directed within the time
allowed. He has failed to file a Complaint on the court-approved form as directed.
Therefore, this action will be dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies as directed.
The Court also certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from
this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status will be
If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal, he also must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or
Accordingly, it is
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies
as directed. It is
3
FURTHER ORDERED that the documents filed on August 31, 2018 (ECF No.
37) and September 6, 2018 (ECF No. 38) are STRICKEN. It is
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 20th day of September , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
_s/Lewis T. Babcock_________________
4

RYAN “SASHA” GALLAGHER,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLORADO DoR,
COLORADO AG,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher is a resident of McKinney, Texas. On October
1, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint (ECF No. 1) and an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2). At the time he initiated this
action, he was a resident of Castle Rock, Colorado.
In an order filed on October 4, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause
why the instant action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and why certain filing restrictions should not be
imposed. (ECF No. 4). Mr. Gallagher was warned that the instant action would be
dismissed and the specified filing restrictions would be imposed if he failed to show
good cause within thirty days. Mr. Gallagher was warned that the only proper
responsive filing was a response to the order to show cause and any other submitted
documents would be ordered stricken.
1
In response to the October 4 Order to Show Cause, Mr. Gallagher filed four
separate Responses (ECF Nos. 5, 6, 8, & 9), and a Notice of Change of Address (ECF
No. 7).
for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the
instant action will be dismissed.
I. The Complaint
The Complaint asserts the following two claims: (1) “Causing Eviction”; and
(2) “Plant Count violates Religion.” (ECF No. 1). He requests injunctive relief and
damages. (Id. at 6).
In support of his first claim, Plaintiff states:
I am a Hindu Shaivite Minister, I breed Marijuana strains and

Marijuana is the flesh of Lord Shiva. In October 2017 I
contacted the Colorado DoR, and we set up a Religious
meeting for Nov 2017. At this meeting I was denied a
license and told “We do medical and recreational, not
Religious” Gallagher v. CoDoR, 1:18cv01699. I was then
evicted for growing Marijuana in Dec 2017 . . . and left
before full eviction could occur[.] Eviction case in Colorado,
Arapahoe County Court 17-c-101071[.] Had I been given
exemption, this would not have occurred.
(ECF No. 1 at 4).
For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges: “Co Amendment 64, Section 16, #2[:] This
states ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ and provides a plant count of 6-12 per
person. This is a Land Use Regulation[.] 42 U.S.C. §2000cc. And the Context,
Religion, otherwise requires.” (Id. at 5).
2
As discussed in the October 4 Order to Show Cause, the Complaint fails to
comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Mr. Gallagher has been
informed numerous times, see e.g., Gallagher v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives, 18-cv-01693-LTB, ECF No. 6; Gallagher v. Wray, 18-cv-01697-LTB,
ECF No. 6, Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief
sought.” The philosophy of Rule 8(a) is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Taken together, Rules 8(a) and
(d)(1) underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading
rules. Prolix, vague, or unintelligible pleadings violate the requirements of Rule 8.
th
to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’ s action harmed him or her;
th th
(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). A decision to dismiss a
3
complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is within the trial court’s sound discretion. See Atkins v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1992); Gillibeau v. City of
Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969).
Mr. Gallagher’s complaint fails to provide a short and plain statement of the
allegations that the Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s legal rights. Mr. Gallagher
provided no credible explanations in his Responses to the show cause order as to why
the instant action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. (See ECF
Nos. 5, 6, 8, & 9). Therefore, the instant action will be dismissed.
II. Filing Restrictions
As explained in the October 4 Order to Show Cause, Mr. Gallagher is no stranger
to this Court. Since February of 2018, he has initiated fourteen actions in this Court,
including the instant action. His cases, including updated case statuses, are as follows:

currently pending. Mr. Gallagher filed a Notice of Appeal, which was dismissed
on October 2, 2018 for lack of prosecution. (See id. at ECF No. 53).

Civ. P. 8.
6. Gallagher v. YouTube, LLC, No. 18-cv-01694-LTB (D. Colo. July 5, 2018),

dismissed, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), for failure to comply with a Court
Order.
4




August 31, 2018), an order of dismissal is being entered today.
2018), instant case.
13. Gallagher v. DEA, No. 18-cv-02505-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1, 2018), an
order imposing filing restrictions and dismissing action is being entered today.
14. Gallagher v. Gallagher, No. 18-cv-02595-CMA (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2018),

dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
In one of Mr. Gallagher’s other cases, Gallagher v. DEA, No. 18-cv-2505-GPG,
the Court is entering an order today imposing filing restrictions against Mr. Gallagher.
Therefore, the issue of filing restrictions does not need to be addressed in this action.
III. In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal
denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee
or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
5
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to
file a pleading that complies with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s pending motions are denied as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 9th day of November , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock___________________
6

Plaintiff,
v.
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Organization of American

States,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On August 10, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint. (ECF No. 1). On August 14,
2018, he submitted an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs (ECF No. 3), Briefs in Support of his Application to Proceed Without Prepaying
Fees (ECF Nos. 4 and 6), a Motion for Discovery of OAS Documents and Names (ECF
NO. 5), and a Motion to Compel (ECF No. 7). He also improperly sent emails and
various attachments directly to numerous judicial chambers. (ECF No. 9). ON August 15
and 16, 2018, he submitted a Motion for Recusal and Contacting the FBI About Public
Corruption (ECF No. 10), a Brief in Support of Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 11), a
Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Block Judicial
Retaliation for Complaint Filed with the 10th Circuit (ECF No. 12), and Briefs in Support
of Motion for Recusal (ECF Nos. 13-15).
1
After reviewing all of the documents, on August 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge
Gordon P. Gallagher denied Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and ordered him to cure
certain designated deficiencies if he wished to pursue his claims. (ECF No. 16).
Specifically, Plaintiff was ordered to file his Complaint on the current court-approved
form. Additionally, Plaintiff was ordered to either pay the $400.00 filing and
administrative fees or file his in forma pauperis motion on the current court-approved
form. Plaintiff was warned that the action would be dismissed without further notice if
he failed to cure the deficiencies within thirty days. Plaintiff was also informed that “[t]he
only proper filings at this time are a Complaint on the court-approved form and an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form)
on the court-approved form (or payment of the $400.00 filing fee). No other filings will
be considered and may be stricken.” (ECF No. 16 at 4-5).
Following the Court’s August 16 Order, Plaintiff electronically filed two documents
(ECF Nos. 17 and 18), but neither of the documents were a complaint or an in forma
pauperis motion. Therefore, on August 20, 2018, the Court issued a Minute Order
striking the documents. (ECF No. 19). The Court warned Plaintiff that if he continued to
file unnecessary and unresponsive filings, he could be subject to sanctions. On August
31, 2018, he filed a document titled “Request for Writ of Quo Warranto.” (ECF No. 20).
This document is also unnecessary, unresponsive and in direct defiance of the August
16 Order. As such, it is ordered stricken.
Despite Mr. Gallagher’s numerous filings, he has failed to cure the deficiencies
as directed within the time allowed. He has not submitted a complaint on the court-
approved form and he has not paid the filing fee or submitted an in forma pauperis
2
motion on the court-approved form. Therefore, this action will be dismissed for failure to
cure deficiencies as directed.
If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal, he also must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee or
Accordingly, it is
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to cure the deficiencies
as directed. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the document filed on August 31, 2018 (ECF No. 20)
is STRICKEN. It is
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 20th day of September , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
_s/Lewis T. Babcock__________________
3

RYAN “SASHA” GALLAGHER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEA,
JAMES A. ARNOLD,
Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION AND IMPOSING FILING RESTRICTIONS
Plaintiff Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher is a resident of McKinney, Texas. On October
1, 2018, he submitted pro se a Complaint (ECF No. 1) and an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (ECF No. 2). At the time he initiated this
action, he was a resident of Castle Rock, Colorado.
In an order filed on October 4, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause
why the instant action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and why certain filing restrictions should not be
imposed. (ECF No. 4). Mr. Gallagher was warned that the instant action would be
dismissed and the specified filing restrictions would be imposed if he failed to show
good cause within thirty days. Mr. Gallagher was warned that the only proper
responsive filing was a response to the order to show cause and any other submitted
documents would be ordered stricken.
1
In response to the October 4 Order to Show Cause, Mr. Gallagher filed four
separate Responses (ECF Nos. 5, 7, 8, & 9), and a Notice of Change of Address (ECF
No. 6).
for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the
instant action will be dismissed and filing restrictions will be imposed against Plaintiff.
I. Complaint
The Complaint asserts the following two claims: (1) “[s]ubstantial [d]elay causing
eviction;” and (2) “[t]he DEA has no right to [l]icense religions.” (ECF No. 1 at 4-5). He
seeks damages and injunctive relief.
In support of his first claim, Plaintiff states:
I am a Hindu Shaivite Minister, I breed Marijuana strains and

Marijuana is the flesh of Lord Shiva. In October 2017 I
mailed a petition to the DEA for an RFRA exemption,
Gallagher v. DEA, 1:18cv01674[.] I did not even receive a
response until April 2018, causing me to be evicted, in
violation of my religion, in December 2017, I left before being
evicted and was not served, but was forced to stop
practicing my religion[.] [E]viction case in Colorado,
Arapahoe County Court 17-c-101071[.] I have yet to receive
my exemption, and it is financially crippling[.] . . . The
eviction is for growing Marijuana, and we were give [sic] 3
days to leave, I left, but a roommate stayed for the 30 day
eviction.
(ECF No. 1 at 4).
2
For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges: “It is Illegal to force Religions to retrieve a
License[.] . . . The DEA cannot make me get a license, but needs to protect Religions
like mine from being attacked like in the eviction.” (Id. at 5).
As discussed in the October 4 Order to Show Cause, the Complaint fails to
comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As Mr. Gallagher has been
informed numerous times, see e.g., Gallagher v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives, 18-cv-01693-LTB, ECF No. 6; Gallagher v. Wray, 18-cv-01697-LTB,
ECF No. 6, Rule 8(a) provides that a complaint “must contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief
sought.” The philosophy of Rule 8(a) is reinforced by Rule 8(d)(1), which provides that
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Taken together, Rules 8(a) and
(d)(1) underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading
rules. Prolix, vague, or unintelligible pleadings violate the requirements of Rule 8.
th
to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’ s action harmed him or her;
3
th th
(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”). A decision to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is within the trial court’s sound discretion. See Atkins v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1197, 1203 (8th Cir. 1992); Gillibeau v. City of
Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969).
Mr. Gallagher’s complaint fails to provide a short and plain statement of the
allegations that the Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s legal rights. Mr. Gallagher
provided no credible explanations in his Responses to the show cause order as to why
the instant action should not be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8. (See ECF
Nos. 5, 7, 8, & 9). Therefore, the instant action will be dismissed.
II. Filing Restrictions
As explained in the October 4 Order to Show Cause, Mr. Gallagher is no stranger
to this Court. Since February of 2018, he has initiated fourteen actions in this Court,
including the instant action. His cases, including updated case statuses, are as follows:

currently pending. Mr. Gallagher filed a Notice of Appeal, which was dismissed
on October 2, 2018 for lack of prosecution. (See id. at ECF No. 53).
4

Civ. P. 8.
6. Gallagher v. YouTube, LLC, No. 18-cv-01694-LTB (D. Colo. July 5, 2018),

dismissed, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), for failure to comply with a Court
Order.




August 31, 2018), an order of dismissal is being entered today.
2018), an order of dismissal is being entered today.
13. Gallagher v. DEA, No. 18-cv-02505-GPG (D. Colo. Filed October 1, 2018),
instant case.
14. Gallagher v. Gallagher, No. 18-cv-02595-CMA (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2018),

dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
In four of these actions, Mr. Gallagher failed to cure deficiencies. In three of the
actions, Mr. Gallagher failed to file an amended complaint that complied with the
pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Two other actions were dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as legally frivolous or failure to state a claim. In all of his actions,
Mr. Gallagher has filed numerous nonsensical and unnecessary documents.
Additionally, he has sent numerous emails directly to judicial officers, even after
being explicitly ordered to cease doing so. (See e.g., Gallagher v. Facebook, 18-cv-
5
02029-GPG, ECF No. 4; Gallagher v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 18-cv-01699-LTB,
ECF. No. 19). He has been repeatedly warned that the Court may impose appropriate
sanctions if he persists in filing new frivolous lawsuits. (See e.g., Gallagher v. Colorado
Dept. of Revenue, 18-cv-01699-LTB, ECF No. 40; Gallagher v. Wray, 18-cv-01697-LTB,
ECF No. 34).
Despite the Court's repeated efforts to allow Mr. Gallagher to proceed pro se in
this Court, he is unable to represent himself properly. As Mr. Gallagher previously has
been informed, the Court has the power to enjoin litigants who abuse the judicial
system. See Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The Court
will not tolerate abuse of its limited judicial resources by pro se litigants.
"[T]he right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and
there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is
frivolous or malicious." Id. at 353 (citation omitted). "Federal courts have the inherent
power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored
restrictions in appropriate circumstances." Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077
(10th Cir. 2007); Tripati, 878 F.2d at 351.
Sanctions may be imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), even against a pro se
plaintiff, if a pleading or other paper lacks "claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
. . . warranted by existing law" and the "factual contentions" lack "evidentiary support."
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (imposing same standard on both attorneys and
"unrepresented part[ies])." Rule 11 serves several purposes, including, but not limited
to, (1) deterring future litigation abuse; (2) punishing present litigation abuse; and (3)
streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management. White v. General Motors
6
Corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing American Bar Association,
Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1988), reprinted in, 5 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure 212, 235-36 (Supp. 1989)). Deterrence is the primary goal of a sanction.
See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
In order to comply with Rule 11 and avoid sanctions thereunder, a pro se party's
actions must be objectively reasonable. White, 908 F.2d at 683. A pattern of
groundless and vexatious litigation will justify an order enjoining a litigant from filing any
claims without first seeking prior leave of court. See Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916,
921 (10th Cir. 1992); Winslow v. Romer, 759 F. Supp. 670, 677-78 (D. Colo. 1991);
Colorado ex rel. Colo. Judicial Dep't v. Fleming, 726 F. Supp. 1216, 1221 (D. Colo.
1989).
Specifically, injunctions restricting further filings are appropriate where the
litigant's lengthy and abusive history is set forth; the court provides guidelines as to what
the litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and the litigant receives
notice and an opportunity to oppose the court's order before it is implemented. Tripati,
878 F.2d at 353-54.
In response to the October 4 Order to Show Cause, Mr. Gallagher again displays
that he is unable to properly represent himself in this Court. After being informed that
the only proper filing was a response to the show cause order, instead of filing a single
response to the show cause order, he filed four separate responses.
In his first response, he states that he has not yet received the order to show
cause, but has only seen the docket text. (ECF No. 5 at 1). He states that “showing
7
cause is one thing I can absolutely do.” (Id.) He then asks the Court to review several
different cases and he states that he has been “Hindu from the Age of 14, and a
minister from the age of 17. This kind of problem with the government has been
happening from the Age of 14.” (Id. at 2). He states that “since sanctions are being
considered, [he] would like to point to the fact that this court has allowed ZERO
Discovery.” (Id. at 3). In his second response, he states that “[t]his Judge has a
problem with Rule 83(a)(2), which states: ‘Requirement form – A local rule imposing a
requirement of form must not be enforced in a way that causes a party to lose any right
because of NON-WILLFULL failure to comply.’” (ECF No. 7 at 1). He also states: “Rule
5.1 Challenge to Rule 8” and alleges that he does not own a Printer and he is homeless.
(Id.) He alleges that several of his actions have been dismissed because he doesn’t
own a printer. (Id.) In his third response, he states: “[o]ur issue seems to be with the 28
U.S.C. 1915 – in Forma Pauperis, Judicial Review. You are hinging everything on Rule
8, but you have a higher duty, under 1915 and Rule 83(a)(2). . . . I now see where our
main problem is, and the remedy is a stronger review process, beyond doubt burden.”
(ECF No. 8 at 1). Finally, in his fourth response, he states “Cause[:] Rule 5.1 – Chevron
Deference & Principles of Construction.” (ECF No. 9). He then cites some caselaw and
states: “5.1 UnConstitutional Vagueness by DEA, as outlined in [this instant action] and
Colorado Amendment 64, as outlined in [case 18cv2503].” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s responses do not show cause as to why the specific filing restrictions
should not be imposed. The Court has reviewed all the cases Mr. Gallagher has filed in
this Court, and finds that he is not capable of proceeding pro se in litigation in this Court.
Although some of Plaintiff’s actions were dismissed for failure to cure deficiencies,
8
including failure to use court-approved forms, Plaintiff never informed the Court that he
was unable to cure the deficiencies because he did not have a printer. If requested, the
Court will mail court-approved forms to pro se litigants. Further, in numerous actions,
Plaintiff utilized the court-approved forms. It is unclear why he was able to use court-
approved forms in some actions but not in others. Therefore, his allegation that
numerous of his actions were dismissed because he doesn’t own a printer is
unfounded. While this Court has an obligation to give pro se litigants wide latitude, see
Haines, 404 U.S. at 519, the Court cannot accept the filing of vexatious, meritless
lawsuits from a pro se party who fails to follow court orders.
Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Gallagher’s abusive history of filing actions
demonstrates that imposition of filing restrictions is appropriate. The Court will prohibit
Mr. Gallagher from filing new actions in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado without the representation of a licensed attorney admitted to practice in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado unless he obtains permission to
proceed pro se. In order to obtain permission to proceed pro se, Mr. Gallagher will be
directed to take the following steps:
1. File with the clerk of this Court a motion requesting leave to file a pro se
action.
information:
A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously in the District

of Colorado, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of
B. A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new

pleading and whether he has raised the same issues in other
proceedings in the District of Colorado. If so, he must cite the case
9
number and docket number where the legal issues previously have
been raised.

frivolous or made in bad faith, they are warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, that the action is not interposed for any improper purpose
such as delay, harassment, or to needlessly increase the cost of
litigation, and that he will comply with all federal and local rules of this
Court.
The above described documents shall be submitted to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall forward them to the judicial officer designated by the Chief Judge pursuant to
D.C.COLO.CivR 8.1(a) for review. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se action
is denied, the matter will be dismissed. If the motion requesting leave to file a pro se
action is granted, the case will proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado-Civil.
III. In Forma Pauperis Status on Appeal
denied for the purpose of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438
(1962). If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal he must pay the full $505 appellate filing fee
or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit within thirty days in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 24.
10
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff failed to
file a pleading that complies with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Gallagher is prohibited from filing any new action
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado without the representation
of a licensed attorney admitted to practice in the District of Colorado unless he obtains
permission to proceed pro se as described in this order. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall add Mr. Gallagher to the
list of sanctioned litigants. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s pending motions are denied as moot.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 9th day of November , 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Lewis T. Babcock________________
11

Objection To Illegal Sanctions Rev Ryan Sasha-Shai Van Kush

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RYAN GALLAGHER §

Supplement to Objection to Vexatious Litigant motion by county

violation of a vague and uncertain court order cannot be punished by contempt.

Rev. Ryan “Sasha” Gallagher

United States District Court

MEMORANDUM ADOPTING REPORTS AND

as set forth herein.

specific declaratory or injunctive relief he seeks.

injunction (Dkt. #86).

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

recommendation is entitled to a de novo review of those findings or recommendations to which

immune from declaratory relief” (Dkts. #83, #84, #85).

mistaken; the Report expressly enumerated and considered Plaintiff’s argument:

Transfer to the Northern District of Texas

Absolute Judicial Immunity

performance of their duties.” See Bailey v. Willis, 417CV00276ALMCAN, 2018 WL 3321461, at

290, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2014))). Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

Plaintiff’s Remaining Complaint – Motion to End ECF

this matter closed.

Using the pre-filing injunction imposed on Plaintiff by the District of Colorado in

in the Eastern District of Texas” (Dkt. 81 at p. 11).

Having considered Defendant Collin County’s Limited Motion for Reconsideration

the Court, as set forth below.

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

& Mittimus” (Dkt. #36) is DENIED.

this District as follows:

A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously in any Federal

B. A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new pleading

C. A notarized affidavit, in proper legal form, which certifies that, to the

3. Submit the proposed new pleading to be filed in the pro se action.

All relief not previously granted is DENIED.

The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this civil action.

SIGNED this 10th day of September, 2019.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

REV. RYAN “SASHA” GALLAGHER,

For the reasons explained in the Court’s accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is

is directed to close the case.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly

Date: November 25, 2019

RYAN GALLAGHER, DEPUTY CE

CHUCK ROSENBERG, DRUG

and thereafter enters the following.

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Subsequently, Mr.

"Objection to Recommendation" filed October 31, 2016.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically state:

with meaningless legal citations.

any federal judge could certify, particularly in light of his pleadings.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause is

DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

SIGNED this the " day of November 2016.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Civil Action No. 20-cv-00027-GPG

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,

Plaintiff, Ryan Sasha Gallagher, resides in Castle Rock, Colorado. On

November 26, 2019, he submitted pro se a “Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis”

18-cv-02505-LTB. To file an action in this Court without the representation of a

obtain such permission, he must take the following steps:

A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously in the District

B. A statement of the legal issues to be raised in the proposed new

C. A notarized affidavit, in proper legal form, which certifies that, to the

3. Submit the proposed new pleading to be filed in the pro se action.

(See Gallagher v. DEA, 18-cv-02505-LTB, ECF No. 10 at 10-11).