People V.

Marcaida
79 Phil. 295 G.R. No. L-953
September 18, 1947

Facts: Pedro Marcaida was convicted for the crime of treason. He contends that three errors were
incurred by the Court of Pueblo, one of which is that his citizenship was not sufficiently tested. The
defense contends that the evidence of record does not prove citizenship. The defense argues that
the witness testified in tagalog saying, “Taga Lopez”, referring to Lopez, Quezon Province.
However, no such thing is found in record, therefore, his Philippine Citizenship is not properly
tested.

Issue: Whether or not Marcaida shall be convicted of treason.

Held: No. The defendant then, according to the evidence of record, may be a Filipino or a foreigner. His
Philippine citizenship is not sufficiently tested or proven. The defendant is called Pedro Marcaida.
By his name, he can be a Filipino, Spanish or South American. There is no proof of the citizenship of
his parents. He can be a descendant of Spanish subjects who opted to remain Spanish and retain
their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. It may
also happen that he is a descendant of a South American, with his father refusing to use the
provisions of the naturalization law, thereby acquiring the nationality of his father. Certainly, his
citizenship cannot be ascertained. Foreigners owe allegiance to the government of America during
the time of the defendant's residence. Furthermore, Article 114 of The Revised Penal Code, which
reads "Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving
them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere...", is guilty of treason, has excluded the
foreign nationals in its scope. However, Executive Order No. 44, recognizing that it was not possible
under the Revised Penal Code to punish foreign residents in the Philippines that have helped the
enemies, for the crime of treason, amended Article 114, by adding the paragraph, "Likewise, any
alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of
this article shall be punished..." But in the case at bar, the events took place in 1944, a year before
Executive Order No. 44 has taken effect on May 31, 1945. If the defendant is Filipino, owing
allegiance to the Commonwealth Government, he must be condemned for treason, but if he is a
foreigner, he cannot be punished for acts committed prior to the amendment of Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code. As the evidence clearly established that the defendant is either Filipino or a
foreigner, he cannot be criminally responsible for the crime of treason.
 Full Text

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

IN BANC

GR No. L-953 September 18, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant-appealed,

vs.
PEDRO MARCAIDA, accused-appellant.

D. Victoriano H. Endaya on behalf of the appellant.

The Assistant Attorney General Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., And the Attorney General Mr. Esmeraldo
Umali on behalf of the Government.

PAUL, J .:

Satrata of an appeal filed by Pedro Marcaidaque was convicted of the crime of treason, after the
corresponding hearing, to the penalty of life imprisonment with the accessories prescribed by law
and the payment of a fine of P10,000 and the costs of the trial. The appellant points out three errors
he made, according to him, the People's Court. 1. By declaring that the defendant's care and loyalty
were sufficiently proven; 2nd By giving credit to the testimony of the witnesses of the
accusation; and 3rd when convicting the defendant of charge No. 3.

The defense contends that the evidence in the records does not prove the Philippine citizenship and
alliance of the accused Commonwealth government. The transcript of the shorthand notes says that
the defendant is a native of Lopez (a native of Lopez). The defense alleges that the witness testified
in Tagalog saying: "Taga Lopez" and did not say "ay panganak sa Lopez." There is no such thing in
the file. If it were true, it is strange that the lawyer did not ask the Court to order the stenographer to
record this in his notes. When a party is not satisfied with the translation of a witness statement, it
must request that it be recorded in the records and not only the translation but also the original
translated statement; failing that, the translation of the official interpreter will be presumed correct.

But even admitting - the defense says - that the defendant was a native of Lopez, province of
Quezon, his Filipino caretaker is not properly proven. In support of this content invokes article IV of
the Constitution, which entered into force on November 15, 1935. (Article XVI, section 6,
Constitution.) The hearing of this case took place July 15, 1946. If the accused I was born, for
example, one day after the Constitution entered into force, on the day of the hearing I would not be
more than ten years and eight months old, and then committed the crime at the age of about nine
years. Although there is no record of the date of his death, we are certain, however, that he was not
a child of that age when he entered sight. The prosecutor would not have accused him of such a
serious crime. Undoubtedly, he was born before and not after the Constitution came into force.

Article 2 of the Jones Act passed by Congress on August 29, 1916, thus states: "That all the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that on April 11, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine
were Spanish subjects and that at that time they resided in said Islands, and their children born after
that date, will be considered and held as caretakers of the Philippine Islands, except those who have
preferred to retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, in accordance with the provisions of the Peace
Treaty between the United States and Spain, signed in Paris on December 10th, one thousand eight
hundred and ninety-eight, and with the exception of those others that after that date have taken care
of some other country: ....

Article 4 of the Philippine constitutional law of July 1, 1902, is as follows: "All the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands residing in them and that the eleven April of one thousand eight hundred ninety-
nine were resident Spanish subjects in said Islands and their children born after that date, they will
be considered and held as caretakers of the Philippine Islands and as such a right to the protection
of the United States, except those who have chosen to retain their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, of
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain
signed in Paris on December 10, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. "

The defendant is called Pedro Marcaida. By name and surname, it can be Filipino, Spanish or South
American. There is no proof that he was a resident of the Philippines and a Spanish subject on April
11, 1899. If he was a resident and was not a Spanish subject, he could not acquire Filipino care
because he would continue to be a foreigner.

If he was a Spanish subject and resided in the Philippine Islands on April 11, 1899, he became
automatically a Filipino care unless he had chosen to maintain Spanish care; but since there is no
evidence in this regard, the presumption is that he is Filipino.

If he was born after April 11, 1899 of parents who were subjects Spanish would follow the nationality
of those: Spanish, if his parents wanted to keep their loyalty to the Crown of Spain, and Filipino, if
they chose to lose it. There is no evidence presented in one way or another: it can be Spanish or
Filipino then.

If he was born after April 11, 1899, Filipino parents are Filipinos.

It may happen that a descendant of a South American who has settled in the province of Quezon
after the signing of the Treaty of Paris; If his father did not want to accept the provisions of the law of
naturalization, then the accused is a foreigner: according to the nationality of his father.

If he is a descendant of a Spanish citizen who has begun to reside in the Philippines after the Treaty
of Paris, he would continue to be Spanish unless he had naturalized. Nor is there evidence in this
regard; So it's Spanish, foreigner.

Paz Chua Uang for the mere fact of being born in the Philippines was declared Filipino because she
was not a Spanish sibdita or daughter of a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. (Chua v. Secretary of
Labor, 68 Phil., 649.) This doctrine it has implicitly revoked Roa v. Insular Customs Administrator (23
Jur. Fil., 321) and later. (Vaño vs. Insular Customs Administrator, 23 Jur. Fil., 491; United
States v. Ong Tianse, 29 Jur. Fil., 352; United States v. Ang, 36 Jur. Fil., 915; Go
Julian v. Government of the Philippine Islands , 45 Jur. Fil., 301; Haw againstInsular Customs
Administrator, 59 Jur. Fil., 646.) In the case of Torres and Gallofin against Tan Chim, the theory
sitting on Roa's matter was again adopted, but the Court was divided into a proportion of four by
three. The current President of the Court and the Imperial Magistrate were dissenters. The
magistrate Villareal thought that the simple birth in the Philippines does not make one a Filipino
citizen; but he participated in the operative part because Roa's side was being applied for more than
20 years. The principle of stare decisis is the main reason that moved most to re-adopt Roa's
theory. In his dissent, the current President of the Court said:
 The majority says nothing in support of the correctness of the Rao ruling, and seeks simply
to justify its continued observance upon the fact that it "had been adhered to and accepted
for more than 20 years before the adoption of the Constitution," and that not " only this Court
but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; the executive and
administrative agencies of the Government had theretoore abide by it; and the general public
had acquiesced in it.I do not yield to this judicial policy. and the public to follow and accept
an error for some time, it does not seem to be a good policy to continue inducing them to
follow and accept the same error discovered eleven. The rule of stare decisisdoes not apply
to the extent of perpetuating an error (15 CJ, p. 918.) It is the duty of every court to examine
its own decisions without fear and to revise them reluctance (Baker vs. Lorillard, 4 NY, 257.)
As was well said in a case, "I hold itto be the duty of this court freely to examine its own
decisions, and, when satisfied that it has fallen into a mistake, to correct the error by
overruling its own decision. An acknowledged error must be more venerable and more
inveterate than it can be made by any single decision before it can claim impunity upon the
principle of stare decisis . " (Leavitt vs. Blatchaford, 17 NY, 521, 523.) "Precedents are to be
considered as the great storehouse of experience; not always to be followed, but to be
looked to as beacon lights in the progress of judicial investigation." (Per Bartley, CJ, in
Leavitt vs. Morrow, 6 Ohio St., 71, 78.) Their "authority must often yield to the force of
reason, and to the paramount demands of justice as well as to the decencies of civilized
society , and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to these demands.
" (Norton vs. Randolph, 176 Ala., 381, 383, 58 S. 283.) "(Torres and Gallofin vs. Tan Chim,
69 Phil., 518.)

In the affairs of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, p. 249, ante , and Lam Swee
Sang v. Commonwealth of the Philippines, p. 249, before , we have declared this theory definitively
abandoned and adopted the deChua against the Secretary of Labor. The reason is simple. The
theory of jus soli in the United States is absolute: American elsimple birth according to its
constitution and the decision in United States v . Wong Kim Ark (169 US, 649). The American
constitution never entered into force in the Philippines. Jus soli's theory in the Philippines according
to the law of July 1, 1902, approved by the American Congress which, according to the Treaty of
Paris, is the one to determine the conditional: that the Philippine-born person considered a Filipino
citizen if he was a resident and subject Spanish or son of a resident and Spanish subject on April 11,
1899. If he was a foreigner or son of a foreigner on that date he cannot be a Filipino citizen.

The defendant, then, according to the evidence at work, may be Filipino or foreign.

Under the treason law No. 292 of the Civil Commission, any resident in the Philippines who, owing
fidelity to the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, will make war on them or
form common cause with their enemies by helping and helping them inside or outside of said
Islands, committed the crime treason. Article 1 of this law is a simple transplantation of the
provisions of the American Criminal Code which is as follows: "Whoever, owing allegiance to the
United States, levies war against them or adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason. " (Sec. 1, Crim. Code: RS, sec. 5331; Mar.
4,1909, c. 321, sec. 1, 35 Stat., 1088.)

"Treason against the United States," says the American Constitution, "shall consist only in levying
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort." (Section 3 [1], Article
III.)

In Americana, both foreigners and nationals can commit the crime of treason. Foreigners owe
allegiance to the government of America during the time of their residence. (Carlisle vs. US, 21 Law.
Ed., 426; Raditch vs .. Hutchins, 24 Law. Ed., 409.) The English hold the same theory. (From
Jager vs. Attorney General of Natal, 8 Ann. Cas., 76.) It is not necessary to be an American citizen
so that they can commit the crime of treason. But the Revised Criminal Code I have excluded
foreigners, only nationals can commit it. Article 114 reads as follows: "He who, owing fidelity to the
United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, without being of foreign nationality, made
war on them or formed common cause with his enemies, helping them or helping them inside or
outside those Islands , will be punished with temporary imprisonment penalties to death and a fine
not exceeding twenty thousand pesos. "Executive Order No.44, recognizing that it was not possible
under the Revised Criminal Code to punish for the crime of treason to foreigners residing in the
Philippines who have helped the enemies, enmendo Article 114, adding a paragraph of the following
tenor: "Likewise, any alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined
in paragraph 1 of this article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine not to
exceed 20,000 pesos. "(Executive Order No. 44, May 31, 1945.)

If the accused is Filipino, he must loyalty to the Commonwealth Government and must be convicted
of treason; but if you are a foreigner, you cannot be punished for acts committed by him before the
amendment of article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. As the evidence does not establish in a clear
way that the accused is Filipino, he cannot be criminally responsible for the crime of treason.

It revoked the original ruling. Their immediate freedom is ordered with the ex officio costs .

Moran, Pres., And Briones, M., are satisfied.

BENGZON, M .:

According to the result.

Separate Opinions

PERFECT, J., concurring:

Charged in the People's Court with the crime of treason on four courts, appellant was found guilty
only on count No. 3 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua , with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law, and to pay a fine of P1,000 and the costs .

No evidence was presented by the defense. The prosecution presented the testimonies of four
witnesses.

1. Illuminada Zurbano, 40 years, widow, residing at Lopez, Tayabas, testified that she knows
appellant as a "Japanese soldier," because "he was already carrying a revolver while going around
our town, and he used to arrest guerrillas and took them to the garrison. " On April 13, 1944,
appellant was in the company of San Juan "and they arrested my brother Epimaco Zurbano, in front
of the Cinema and they took my brother to the garrison." The witness brought food to her brother
from April 13 to the 23d. After that she was told by the Japanese that her brother was no longer in
the garrison. Since then shedid not hear anything from her brother. When he made the arrest,
appellant "was in civilian clothing, but always carried a revolver around his waist." There was an
organization in Lopez known as "Yoin," founded by San Juan and appellant. The members of the
organization "used to go around the houses of the guerrillas and watched them." The witness saw
the arrest because "we were in the theater looking at the people going out. I was outside the theater.
Outside the building." There were many people; around eighty. The arrest was made about 7 o'clock
in the evening. There were lights. Besides Lamberto San Juan, Alejandro Enguanso was also in the
company of appellant. The witness did not know whether the weapon carried by appellant was a
revolver or a pistol because "it was hidden." When the arrest was made, the witness was at about
twelve meters away from appellant. The witness was accompanied by Mariano Catan. She said: "My
companion was Mariano Catan," her brother-in-law. The witness does not know where the "Yoin"
was organized. "What I know was that he came to our place together with other people to organize
it." Epimaco was 23 years old, aguerrilla under General Gaudencio Vera. The witness was at the
place because the moon "was then bright and" we were having a walk. "

2. Marianito Catan, 34 years, married, merchant, testified that "I remember that on April 13, 1944,
while I was in front of the Cine in Lopez, Tayabas, my brother (Epimaco Zurbano) was arrested by
the accused." The arrest was made by appellant and Lamberto San Jaun. The witness did not ask
why. "I simply followed my brother and then went home and reported the case to my parents." His
brother was taken to the Japanese garrison, and since his arrest on April 13, the witness has not
heard of his brother. The witness did not hear about the organization known as "Yoin." Epimaco
Zurbano "is my brother-in-law." He was arrested at 7 o'clock pm "in front of the cine" and, answering
the question whether he was "the only person present" when the arrest took place, said: " I was the
only one there. I was taking a walk. "Only Lambert San Juan and appellant were the persons who
arrested Epimaco, and the witness was sure that there was" no other. "The witness was about ten
meters away from them. About half an hour elapsed from the moment of the arrest to the time the
witness reported the incident to his parents. Lambert San Juan was carrying an exposed revolver on
his right hip. It had a shell handle. Appellant was also carrying a revolver "on his right hip," also
visible because "it was outside the polo shirt." Appellant was wearing a polo shirt. About half an hour
elapsed from the moment of the arrest to the time the witness reported the incident to his
parents. Lamberto San Juan was carrying an exposed revolver on his right hip. It had a shell
handle. Appellant was also carrying a revolver "on his right hip," also visible because "it was outside
the polo shirt." Appellant was wearing a polo shirt. About half an hour elapsed from the moment of
the arrest to the time the witness reported the incident to his parents. Lamberto San Juan was
carrying an exposed revolver on his right hip. It had a shell handle. Appellant was also carrying a
revolver "on his right hip," also visible because "it was outside the polo shirt." Appellant was wearing
a polo shirt.

Illuminada Zurbano said that appellant was carrying his revolver "on his left hip" and was covered by
his "Chinese shirt," and that Alejandro Enguanso "was always with" Lamberto San Juan and
appellant.

On re-direct examination, Marianito Catan emphasized that he was the only one who was present at
the placeof the arrest, adding: "I was the only one who was in front of cine." No one entered the
cinema. "A polo shirt is different from a Chinese shirt." The witness knows Alejandro Enguanso who
was not in the company of Lamberto San Juan and appellant. Answering also questions from one
judge, the witness repeated that he did not see his sister-in-law Illuminada Zurbano in the place of
the arrest.

3. Domingo Villasoto, 34, married, farmer, testified that he knows appellant because the same
arrested his father Sixto Targa on August 12, 1944, because theysuspected him of being a
guerrilla. "We took food to him (to his father), but after one month we did not know where he was
taken. He did not return any more." The witness heard about the "Yoin" which is the "same as
Ganap soldiers of the Japanese." Sixto Targa was the father-in-law of the witness. The arrest of
Sixto Targa took placeat 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Appellant was accompanied by four companions,
but he was the only one who went up the house. They were all Ganaps. Those present at his arrest
were Pastora Targa, wife of the witness, Porfirio Targa, his brother-in-law and his wife, Flora
Salvacion, and Silveria Abmes, wife of Sixto. The witness did not try to follow his father-in-law after
his arrest.

4. Luisa de Mondragon. - The testimony of this witness was vigorously objected to by the defense,
because she is not mentioned in the information as one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The
lower court allowed her to testify, and she testified that she is 48 years old, widow, and that at about
7 o'clock of April 13, 1944, "I came from the house of the mayor because I was looking for my
husband "who was missing because the Japanese took him. She saw appellant in Real Street
watching for people. Epimaco Zurbano was looking around Real Street. Appellant arrested
him. Appellant was accompanied by Enguanso and another person. The witness knows Pio Tabien,
Dominador Argosina Jr., Mamerto Canlar, Felipe Marquez and Miguel Marquez. All of them were
arrested and killed by the Japanese "on orders of these people." When appellant arrested Epimaco
Zurbano at about 7 o'clock on April 13, 1944, he was accompanied by Pablo Cortes and Benito
Villaruz besides Enguanso. They were only four and no more. Appellant was wearing a
whiteChinese shirt . "I had a revolver behind his body covered by his shirt ." Atthe time of the arrest
of Epimaco there were many people, but the witness recognized only Enguanso and appellant.

From the foregoing, it appears that, although three witnesses testified as to the arrest of Epimaco
Zurbano effected by appellant to be later brought to the Japanese garrison, for all legal purposes, it
is the same as if no witness had testified at all. The second witness contradicted the first one on very
important facts related to the arrest, and the third contradicted both the first and the second. The
reciprocal contradictions between them have the effect of engaging the three witnesses for the
prosecution in a veritable three-cornered fight. A striking characteristic of it is the fact that the first
witness is the sister of Epimaco Zurbano, the arrested person, and the second witness is a brother-
in-law of both, the firts witness and the arrested person,

( a ) As to the presence of about eighty persons at the scene;

( b ) As to whether Mariano or Marianito Catan was, as stated by Illuminada Zurbano, "my

companion;"

( c ) As to the presence of Illuminada Zurbano at theplace of the arrest;

( d ) As to whether appellant was wearing a Chinese shirt or polo shirt;

( e ) As to whether appellant had his revolver at his left or right hip;

( f ) As to whether said weapon was exposed and visible or not;

( g ) As to whether Alejandro Enguanso was accompanying appellant or was not in the place
at the time of the arrest.

To increase the prosecution's predicament, comes Luisa de Mondragon, a third witness in discord,
by further belying the first two witnesses when she testified that appellant was accompanied by
Pablo Cortes and Benito Villaruz, but not by Lamberto San Juan, the one, who, according to the first
two witnesses, was accompanying him.

As a general rule, the testimony of one witness is enough, if truthful or reasonably credible, to prove
the truth of a controverted fact in court. The special nature of the crime of treason requires that the
accused be afforded a special protection not required in other cases, so as to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The extreme seriousness of the crime, for which death is one of the penalties provided by
law, and the fact that the crime is committed on abnormal times, when large portions of the people
are undergoing nervous hypertension, and when small differences may and in mortal enmity, which
may wipe out all scruples in sacrificing the truth, the law requires that, at least, two witnesses must
testify as to overt acts of treason, if the same should be accepted by the tribunals as legal basis to
condemn a person as a traitor .

These two witnesses must equally be truthful and credible. It is not enough that the testimony of one
of them can be relied upon on the existence of the overt act in controversy, while the other
cannot. The requirement of the law is not complied with because three witnesses or any greater
number of them have testified as to the same overt act if among them there are not two whose
testimonies are believed, by a competent court, beyond all reasonable doubt. In the present case
each and every one of the three witnesses for the prosecution testified to the effect of belying the
testimonies of the other two, in such a way that it is not possible to accept the testimony of one of
them without rejecting at the same time the testimonies of the other two. Even without the two-
witness rule in treason cases, there is no legal basis to convict appellant upon the testimony of any
one of the three witnesses, as each one is belied by the other two. Each of them is unreliable under
the maxim "falsus in unus, falsus in omnibus."

We vote to acquit appellant.

PARAS, J .:

On the merits of the case I agree to the foregoing concurring opinion.

TUASON, J., with whom concur FERIA, HILADO, and PADILLA, JJ., Dissenting:

The findings of the People's Court are fully sustained by the testimony of two or more direct
witnesses. The defendant did not introduce any evidence. The sole ground of the majority decision
for reversing the lower court's judgment is that the defendant has not been shown to be a Filipino
citizen.

I disagree with this conclusion. Although there is no direct evidence of the defense citizenship, Luisa
de Mondragon testified that she "knew him because he is a native of Lopez and he is always
there." This testimony has not been denied. "In the absence of proof to the contrary every man is
considered a citizen of the country in which he resides." "A man is ... to be considered as a citizen of
his native state until it can be shown that he has acquired citizenship elsewhere. Every person at his
birth is presumptively a citizen or a subject of the state of his nativity, and where his parents were
then both subjectsof that state, the presumption is conclusive. " (11 CJ, 786, citing numerous
authorities including decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and lower US courts.)