January 16, 2018 A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 since 19 August 2009.
-11-2301 since 19 August 2009. Two cases had recently been submitted for
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs.
JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERAFALLER, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OPHELIA G.
SULUEN and PROCESS SERVER RIZALINO RINALDI B. PONTEJOS, all
of the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, Respondents
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, ,
vs.
RESIDING JUDGE FERNANDO L. FELICEN, CLERK OF COURT V ATTY.
ALLAN SLY M. MARASIGAN, SHERIFF IV ANSELMO P. PAGUNSAN,
JR., COURT STENOGRAPHERS ROSALIE MARANAN and TERESITA P.
REYES, COURT INTERPRETER IMELDA M. JUNTILLA, and PROCESS
SERVER HIPOLITO O. FERRER, all of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite; PRESIDING JUDGE NORBERTO J. QUISUMBING, JR., CLERK
OF COURT ATTY. MARIA CRISTITA A. RIVAS-SANTOS, LEGAL
RESEARCHER MANUELA O. OSORIO, SHERIFF IV FILMAR M. DE VILLA,
COURT STENOGRAPHERS MARILOU CAJIGAL, WENDILYN T. ALMEDA
and HELEN B. CARALUT, COURT INTERPRETER ELENITA T. DE VILLA,
and PROCESS SERVER ELMER S. AZCUET A, all of the RTC, Branch
21, Imus, Cavite; PRESIDING JUDGE CESAR A. MANGROBANG,
CLERK OF COURT VI ATTY. REGALADO E. EUSEBIO, CLERK OF COURT
V ATTY. SETER M. DELA CRUZ-CORDEZ, LEGAL RESEARCHER DEVINA
A. REYES BERMUDEZ, COURT STENOGRAPHERS PRISCILLA P.
HERNANDEZ, NORMITA Z. FABIA, MERLY O. PARCERO, and JOYCE
ANN F. SINGIAN, COURT INTERPRETER MICHELLE A. ALARCON, and
PROCESS SERVER ELMER S. AZCUET A, all of the RTC, Branch 22,
Imus, Cavite; EXECUTIVE JUDGE PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER, CLERK
OF COURT ZENAIDA C. NOGUERA, SHERIFF IV TOMAS C. AZURIN,
OIC LEGAL RESEARCHER OPHELIA G. SULUEN, COURT
STENOGRAPHERS JESUSA B. SAN JOSE, ROSALINA A. COS TUNA,
and MARIA LOURDES M. SAPINOSO, COURT INTERPRETER MERLINA
S. FERMA, and PROCESS SERVER RIZALINO RINALDI B. PONTEJOS,
all of the RTC, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite,Respondents
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE PERLA V.
CABRERA-FALLER, Branch 90, Regional Trial Court, Dasmariñas
City, Cavite, relative to Civil Case No. 1998-08
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 is an administrative complaint for gross
irregularity in the conduct of proceedings in annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriage cases. The complaint was born
of a judicial audit conducted at the Regional Trial Court of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90 (RTC Dasmariñas 90), on 15-17
September 2010.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 stemmed from a report on a judicial audit
conducted on 3-11 February 2011 and treated as an
administrative complaint against the judges and personnel of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branches 20, 21 and 22 (RTC
Imus 20, 21 and 22); and RTC Dasmariñas 90.
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC stemmed from an anonymous complaint
against Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller (Judge Cabrera-Faller) of
RTC Dasmariñas 90 relative to the irregularity of the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 1998-08 for declaration of nullity of marriage.
FACTS
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301
In a Report dated 23 February 2011,1 the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) narrated its findings on the judicial audit
conducted on 15-17 September 2010 at RTC Dasmariñas 90.
At the time of audit, the court had a total case load of 827 cases,
417 of which were criminal and 410, civil.
Of the criminal cases, the judicial audit team found that the court
had failed to take action on three cases for a considerable
length of time. Its last action on one case was on l0 June 2008,
when the private prosecutor was given five days within which to
submit a formal offer of evidence; the two other cases had not
been acted upon since the denial of the motion for judicial
1
determination of probable cause on 3 June 2009. Another
Page
criminal case had a pending motion to lift a warrant of arrest
decision, and one case was scheduled for the promulgation of
judgment.
The civil cases proved more problematic. Still not acted upon
from the time of their filing were 106 cases, some of which went
as far back as 2008.1âwphi1 The court had not acted on 51
cases for a considerable length of time. In fact, the last court
action on 35 of these cases was from 2003 to 2009. There were 28
civil cases with pending incidents. Their pendency was relatively
recent, because 26 of them were filed only in 2010, one was filed
2009 and another in 2008. There were 17 civil cases submitted for
decision - 16 of them were recent, but one had been submitted
for decision since 8 December 2008.
The judicial audit team observed that the case records in the
court were not stitched, but held together by fasteners only, and
that they were not chronologically arranged or paginated.
Nevertheless, the stitching of the records was immediately done
upon advice of the audit team. It also appeared that the court
personnel were not wearing the prescribed uniform for the trial
courts.
The team noted several irregularities in the petitions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage:
1. Improper service of summons
Process Server Rizalino Rinaldi B. Pontejos (Process Server
Pontejos) had been in the habit of making a substituted service
of summons without compliance with the mandatory
requirements for validly effecting it, as enunciated in Manotoc v.
CA.2 In two cases, it is indicated that the summonses were "duly
served but despite diligent efforts x x x exerted, the same proved
ineffectual."3 In at least 12 cases cited, summonses were not
attached to the records.
2. No appearance by the Solicitor General In nine cases, the
hearing of the petition proceeded even without the filing of a
notice of appearance by the Solicitor General.
3. No categorical finding on whether collusion existed between
the parties/no collusion report at all
In all his reports regarding the existence of collusion between the
parties, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos stated that
"the undersigned Prosecutor is not in the position to tell whether
collusion exists."4 In 10 cases, the hearing of the petition
proceeded even without the submission of the collusion report by
the public prosecutor.
4. No pretrial briefs
No pretrial briefs can be found in the records of 11 cases at the
trial stage and three that have been submitted for decision.
5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence
Two cases were submitted for decision without any formal offer of
exhibits/evidence.
6. Non-attachment of the minutes to the records
The minutes were not attached to the records of several cases,
and the audit team had doubts whether the
psychiatrist/psychologist who had prepared the evaluation report
testified in court.
7. Irregular psychological evaluation reports
Some of the Psychological Evaluation Reports attached to the
records were mere photocopies. In two cases, the affidavits of
the psychiatrist/psychologist were unsubscribed. The
psychological report attached to the record of one case was
unsigned and undated.
8. Absence of the public prosecutor's signature in the jurat of the
judicial affidavit of the petitioner in one case
In a Resolution dated 11 October 2011,5 the Court resolved to
docket the Report as A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, a case for gross
irregularity in the conduct of proceedings in petitions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Judge
Cabrera-Faller, Officer-in-Charge Ophelia G. Suluen (OIC Suluen)
and Process Server Pontejos were required to explain, within 30
days from notice, the irregularities observed by the judicial audit
team.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was likewise directed to take appropriate
action on all cases that the court had failed to act upon for a
considerable length of time from the date of their filing. She was
 further directed to act on those without further setting, with
pending incidents or those submitted for decision. She was
required to submit a copy of the actions taken thereon within 10
days from notice.
During the audit, it was brought to the attention of the team that
family court cases falling within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC
Dasmariñas 90 were being raffled to RTC Imus 20 and 21.
Accordingly, the Court also amended the Resolution dated 16
June 1998 in A.M. No. 92-9- 855-RTC6 to read as follows: "[F]amily
court cases originating from the municipalities of Dasmariñas shall
be heard and tried exclusively by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmariñas, Cavite."7
Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos
submitted their joint compliance or explanation in a letter dated
8 December 2011.8 They also attached relevant court orders and
decisions to cases that were cited by the audit team as awaiting
action by the court.9 The Court referred these documents to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.10
In its Memorandum dated 12 August 2014,11 the OCA
recommended that Judge Cabrera-Faller be fined in the amount
of ₱10,000 for her failure to comply fully with the Resolution dated
11 October 2011. According to the OCA, she did not take
appropriate action on all the cases enumerated in the Comi's
Resolution, in defiance of the directive given to her. For the same
reason, it also recommended that OIC Suluen be fined in the
amount of ₱20,000.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, the OCA observed that while
he signed the joint compliance or explanation dated 8
December 2011, he gave no explanation regarding his practice
of making a substituted service of summons without compliance
with the mandatory requirements for validly effecting it. Thus, it
recommended that he be suspended for three months without
salary and other benefits for his utter failure to comply with the
Resolution dated 11 October 2011.
The OCA recommended the foregoing penalties not for the
irregularities observed by the audit team, but for the failure of
Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos to
comply fully, if at all, with the Resolution dated 11 October 2011.
Noting this deficiency, the Court opted to defer the imposition of
penalties and instead require complete compliance with the
Resolution.12 In addition, the irregularities discovered involved
petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage,
which are among the subjects of A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 and A.M.
No. 12-9- 188-RTC. Hence, the Court consolidated the two cases
with the instant administrative matter, which has a lower, and
therefore earlier, docket number.
Judge Cabrera-Faller and OIC Suluen complied through their
submissions dated 8 December 2011,13 29 January 201514 and 30
September 2015.15 Process Server Pontejos submitted his
explanation in a compliance dated 30 September 2015.16
As regards several irregularities in the petitions for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriage noted by the judicial audit
team, the following explanations were offered by Judge
Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos:
1. Improper service of summons
Process Server Pontejos explained that while some summonses
were made through substituted service, they were served upon
persons who were immediate relatives, had relations of
confidence with the respondent, or were residing at the given
address.17 These are persons who usually know the situation and
expect that court personnel will serve summons, which they are
willing to receive and acknowledge on behalf of the
respondent.18 Some of them also call or text the respondent
before receiving the summons.19 However, if the relatives refuse
to receive the summons, Process Server Pontejos sets an
appointment with the respondent and makes a second or third
attempt to serve the summons. When it is not possible to make a
second or third attempt due to the distance of the respondent's
address, he explains to the relatives the importance of the
summons and of notifying the respondent about the petition. In
case only caretakers, security guards or minors are at the given
address, he makes several attempts to locate the respondent or
submits a written report with the notation "UNSERVED."20
2
Page
Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos
claim that the rules and jurisprudence on the service of summons
are largely observed, although they admit that due to the heavy
work load of the process server, some of these rules may have
been overlooked.21
Judge Cabrera-Faller explains that no "proforma summons"22 was
attached to the records of some cases, because summonses
were made by publication. In summons by publication, the order
granting the summons already incorporates it as a form of cost-
cutting.
2. No appearance by the Solicitor General
Judge Cabrera-Faller insists that there is nothing in the rules
prohibiting the court from proceeding with the case without the
entry of appearance of the Solicitor General.23 She says that it is
enough that there be proof of service on the Solicitor General
and the provincial prosecutor to commence proceedings. She is
aware of the mandatory period for the disposal of cases and,
considering that the Office of the Solicitor General takes ages
before the latter transmits its entry of appearance, she sees a
need to speedily proceed with the hearing of the cases.24
3. No categorical finding on whether collusion exists between the
parties/no collusion report at all
Judge Cabrera-Faller believes that the proceedings in the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor are not under the direct control and
supervision of the judge.25 She points out that the rules do not
state that the court shall order the prosecutor to conduct the
collusion investigation in a manner that the court deems fit.26 She
further points out that it is not true that in all the reports of
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos regarding the
existence of collusion between the parties, he merely indicated
that "the undersigned Prosecutor is not in the position to tell
whether collusion exists."27 Attached to the compliance dated 8
December 2011 is a report of the prosecutor stating that "the
undersigned is of well-considered opinion that no collusion exists
between the parties to this petition."28
She also considers it highly improbable for the court to proceed
with the hearing of annulment cases when no report of collusion
is attached to the record.29 While she admits that the audit team
identified 10 cases in which the hearings proceeded even
without the submission of the public prosecutor's collusion report,
she emphasizes that these are contested cases. The prosecutor
no longer submits any collusion report in cases where the
respondent has vigorously opposed the petition by filing an
answer.30
4. No pretrial briefs
Judge Cabrera-Faller believes that pretrial briefs are simply
guides for the parties on the stipulation of facts, admissions, and
the manner in which the case shall proceed.31 She allows the
parties to proceed to pretrial even without the required pretrial
briefs if the parties agree, in the case of contested proceedings;
or if the prosecutor agrees, in the case of uncontested petitions. It
is a strategy she has devised in order to shorten the proceedings
and lessen the costs of litigation.
5. No formal offer of exhibits/evidence
It is not true that two cases were submitted for decision without
any formal offer of exhibits or evidence.1awp++i1 In those cases,
the offer of evidence was made orally in open court, as there
were only few documentary exhibits offered.32
6. Nonattachment of minutes to the records33
Judge Cabrera-Faller states that the audit team seemed to
equate the nonattachment of the stenographic notes to the
record with the non-taking of the actual testimonies of the
parties.34 The stenographic notes are kept in the stenographers'
files to keep them safe. They are not attached to the records,
which are kept in a container van outside the Hall of Justice and
exposed to the elements.35
Despite repeated orders by this Court and several compliances
by Judge Cabrera-Faller, OIC Suluen and Process Server Pontejos,
no explanation or comment was included with regard to the
irregularities involving the psychological evaluation reports of the
psychiatrists/psychologists.
In a Resolution dated 20 October 2015,36 the Court referred this
administrative case, together with A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2302 and 12-
9-188- RTC, to the Court of Appeals (CA) for its immediate raffle
among the members thereof. The investigating CA justice was
 directed to evaluate the cases and make a report and
recommendation within 90 days from notice.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
In a Report dated 29 June 2011,37 the OCA narrated its findings
on the judicial audit conducted on 3-11 February 2011 at RTC
Imus 20, 21 and 22; and RTC Dasmariñas 90. According to the
OCA, the four branches have generally violated A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC38 and specific provisions of the Rules of Court in handling
petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage,
adoption, and correction of entries.
In the Resolution dated 10 April 2012,39 the Court considered the
irregularities found by the audit team sufficient to warrant the
conduct of a full investigation. Accordingly, the Report was
treated as an administrative complaint against the judges and
personnel of the four branches, and they were required to
comment on the findings. The OCA was directed to submit its
evaluation, report and recommendation to the Court.
Meanwhile, until the conclusion of the investigation, the presiding
judges of the four branches were prohibited from acting on all
cases for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage,
adoption, and correction of entries.
The investigation, conducted from 22 April to 8 May 2013,
covered the decided cases for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage filed from the year 2008 to
2011.40 Thereafter, the OCA submitted an Investigation Report
dated 13 February 2014.41 The findings of the comprehensive
investigation were itemized per court, to wit:
The findings of the comprehensive investigation were itemized
per court, to wit:
RTC Imus20
l. Improper venue
Out of 65 cases, 49 are indicative of improper venue.42 While the
petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage
show that one or both of the parties reside under the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Imus 20, most of the given addresses were
vague or incomplete.43 The notices sent to several parties were
"returned to sender" because the addresses were insufficient,
incomplete, unknown or could not be located. In others, the
addressees were unknown at the given addresses, or they were
abroad, or had moved out. Worse, there were four different
cases in which the parties had common addresses, leading to
the suspicion that the private counsels might have also been
involved in the use of bogus addresses in order to fulfill the
residence requirement.
In Civil Case No. 2785-09 for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
respondent filed an Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, because the petitioner had allegedly been living in
Taoyuan, Taiwan, since 1994; and none of the parties resided in
Imus, Cavite.44 In fact, the order setting the case for pretrial and
sent to the petitioner's address bore the notation "RTS-moved
out." Nevertheless, the OCA found that Judge Fernando L.
Felicen (Judge Felicen) ignored the Answer entirely when he
granted the petition. He said in his Decision dated 7 June 2010
that "[d]espite the service of summons, no responsive pleading
was filed by respondent within the reglementary period. "45 A
certification from the Bureau of Immigration showed that the
petitioner had no record of arrival or departure in the country
from January 1993 to 28 May 2013.46 Yet she apparently testified
before the court on 3 March 201047 based on the minutes of the
proceedings prepared by Interpreter Imelda M. Juntilla
(Interpreter Juntilla) and the transcript prepared by Stenographer
Teresita P. Reyes (Stenographer Reyes).48
In Civil Case No. 3141-09 for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
respondent also filed an Answer stating that the petition was filed
in the wrong venue, because petitioner was in fact a resident of
Caloocan City. The petition was still given due course, despite the
fact that mail matters sent to the petitioner were returned
because of the vague Cavite address.
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Process Server Hipolito O. Ferrer (Process Server Ferrer) claims to
have personally served summons at the given Cavite addresses,
even though subsequent notices sent to them were "returned to
3
sender" for the abovementioned reasons.49 Together with Sheriff
Page
Anselmo P. Pagunsan, Jr. (Sheriff Pagunsan), Process Server Ferrer
also resorts to substituted service of summons without observing
the requirements therefor.50 There was clearly a practice of
leaving the summons at the front door or resorting to a
substituted service, even when the recipient refused to sign or
acknowledge receipt. Sheriff Pagunsan made a substituted
service on a person named "Jose Justino" on two separate
occasions in two different addresses.51
In Civil Case No. 3222-09, Sheriff Pagunsan issued a return dated
16 November 2009 stating that the summons was served on the
respondent through a certain Gino Uson.52 However, the
respondent sent a letter dated 21 January 2010 requesting copies
of the pertinent records of the case to enable him to file an
Answer. Nevertheless, initial trial proceeded on 25 January 2010,
and a decision granting the petition was rendered on 12 March
2010, stating that the respondent had "failed to tender his
responsive pleading within the reglementary period to file the
same."53
3. Questionable raffling of cases
Of the 65 cases examined, 37 were filed and raffled on the same
day.54 In one case, the petition had already been assigned to
RTC Imus 20 even before it was stamped "received" by the RTC
Office of the Clerk of Court and raffled to that branch. In others,
there are clear indications that the court had already acted
upon the petition even before the case was assigned to it by
raffle.55 This circumstance led to a suspicion that the petitions
were just stamped "received" on the day of the raffle, so that
they could be assigned to predetermined courts.56
4. No categorical finding on whether collusion existed between
the parties/no collusion report at all
Of the 65 case records examined, 59 contained an investigation
report submitted by Prosecutor Rosa Elmina Catacutan-Villarin
stating that "she is not in a position to tell whether collusion exists
or not."57 Civil Case Nos. 2666-09 and 2916-09 proceeded to trial,
and the petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage were
granted even if no investigation reports were found in the
records.
5. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the
decisions on the respondents
In four cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of absolute
nullity of marriage were issued despite the fact that the copy of
the decision sent to the respondents bore the notation "returned
to sender."58
6. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence
of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered with the
local civil registrar
In 40 cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity
were issued on the same day; in seven cases, the decree of
nullity was even issued ahead of the certificate of finality.59
7. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Of the 65 case records examined, 50 were found to have been
granted in six months or less from the date of filing to the rendition
of judgment.60
RTC Imus 21
1. Improper venue
Out of the 62 cases examined, 19 have indications of improper
venue.61 In the petition in Civil Case No. 2329-08, while the body
alleged that the petitioner was a resident of Damariñas, Cavite,
and the respondent of Valenzuela City, the verification expressly
stated that the petition was to be filed in Pasay City.62 In the
petition in Civil Case No. 2691-09, while the body alleged that the
petitioner was a resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, the verification
stated that she was a resident of Silang, Cavite, which was
outside the jurisdiction of the court. There were eight cases in
which a party had the same address as a party in another case.63
In Civil Case No. 3026-09, the petition stated that both parties
were based in Italy. Despite the fact that the petitioner had no
record of travel back to the Philippines since 18 July 2002, she
was able to execute a judicial affidavit in Makati City, and it was
allowed in court by Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr. (Judge
Quisumbing).64
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
 Improper service of summons was shown in 25 cases, mainly
because Sheriff Wilmar M. De Villa (Sheriff De Villa) resorted to a
substituted service of summons without observing the
requirements therefor.65 In Civil Case No. 2963-09, the summons
was returned unserved because the respondent was in the
United States, and yet the case proceeded and the petition was
eventually granted.66 The respondents in Civil Case Nos. 3208- 09
and 2733-09 had the same address, but Sheriff De Villa was able
to make both a personal and a substituted service on the two
respondents in that address.
3. No collusion report
Despite the lack of answer from the respondents, no investigation
report regarding collusion can be found in 13 out of all the cases
examined.67
4. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Of the 62 case records examined, 15 were found to have been
granted in six months or less from the date of filing to the rendition
of judgment.68
RTC lmus 22
1. Improper venue
Out of 118 cases examined, 36 have clear indications of
improper venue.69 Some of the addresses in Cavite indicated in
the petitions appear to be highly suspicious, if not fictitious. In Civil
Case No. 3227-09, the petitioner alleged in the petition that he
resided in Imus, Cavite, but likewise indicated an "alternative"
address in Quezon City where summons and other court
processes may be served on him.70 In Civil Case No. 2545-09, the
petitioner stated in his petition that he resided in Imus, Cavite,
while the respondent lived in Quezon City. However, the body of
the petition stated that petitioner had earlier initiated the same
proceeding before the R TC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18.
Petitioner's verification in Civil Case No. 2839-09 bears no
signature of the alleged notary public. The notices sent to several
parties were "returned to sender" because the addresses were
insufficient, incomplete, vague, unknown or could not be
located. In others, the addressees were unknown at the given
address, or they were abroad, or had moved out. Despite these
irregularities, Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang (Judge Mangrobang)
allowed these cases to prosper.
There were eight cases in which a party had the same address as
a party in another case.71 Furthermore, the address of Process
Server Elmer S. Azcueta (Process Server Azcueta) appears to be
the same as the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 1256-
07.72
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons In 88
cases, there were indications of questionable jurisdiction or
improper service of summons.73 Copies of orders setting the cases
for pretrial were "returned to sender" for the following reasons:
unknown address; unlocated/no such name and number of
house on the given address; unknown/unlocated; or no such
name. However, Process Server Azcueta indicated in the prior
returns of summons that he was able to make a substituted
service on the respondents in those addresses.74 He also made a
substituted service on a person named "Shiela G. Villanueva" on
two separate occasions in two different addresses in two different
cases.75 The same irregularity is shown in the case of an individual
named "Rosemarie Magno."76
Process Server Azcueta also served summonses on persons in
distant provinces outside the jurisdiction of the court, such as
Sorsogon, Isabela, and Cagayan de Oro City. There were
numerous cases in which he indicated in the returns that he was
able to make a personal service of summons, but that the
respondent refused to sign or acknowledge receipt.77 He also
resorted to a substituted service without observing the
requirements therefor. Worse, there are cases in which no
summonses or returns thereof were found in the records.
3. No collusion report Despite the lack of answer from the
respondents, no investigation report regarding collusion can be
found in 16 out of 118 cases examined.78
4. In one case, the rendition of a decision even before the
admission of exhibits
4
Page
The decision in Civil Case No. 3702-10 was rendered four days
ahead of the issuance of the order admitting all documentary
exhibits and submitting the case for decision.79
5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification
against forum shopping
The petition in Civil Case No. 3092-09 was given due course
despite the absence of a verification and certification against
forum shopping.80
6. Finality of judgment despite the non-service of copies of the
decisions on the respondents
In eight cases, the certificate of finality was issued despite the
fact that the copy of the decision sent to the respondents bore
the notation "returned to sender."81
7. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite the
absence of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered
with the local civil registrar
In four cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity
were issued on the same day.82
8. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Out of the 118 cases examined, 46 were found to have been
granted in six months or less from the date of filing to the rendition
of judgment.83 In fact, Civil Case No. 2434-08 for declaration of
nullity of marriage was granted at the record speed of 25 days
from the date of filing to the rendition of judgment granting the
petition.84
RTC Dasmariñas 90
1. Improper venue
Out of 88 cases examined, 28 have clear indications of improper
venue.85 Some of the addresses in Cavite are incomplete or
vague.86 The notices sent to several parties were "returned to
sender" because the addresses were insufficient, incomplete or
unknown.
There were four cases in which a party had the same address as
a party in another case.87 Furthermore, the address of Social
Worker Officer Alma N. Serilo (Social Worker Serilo) of the RTC
Office of the Clerk of Court was the same as the address of the
petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 2893- 09 and 3179-09.88
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
In 45 cases, there were indications of questionable jurisdiction or
improper service of summons.89 There were numerous cases in
which Process Server Pontejos indicated in the returns that he was
able to make a personal service of summons, but that the
respondent refused to sign or acknowledge receipt.90 He also
resorted to a substituted service of summons without observing
the requirements therefor.91 In Civil Case Nos. 2940-09 and 1860-
08, Process Server Pontejos allegedly served summonses
personally on the respondents who resided in Camarines Norte. In
Civil Case No. 3374-09, summons for the respondent was served
by the sheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Iloilo City
and received in Iloilo City by the sister of the petitioner. The
summons in Civil Case No. 1528-07 was returned unserved, and
yet the case proceeded and the petition was eventually
granted.
3. In one case, the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage even without the appearance of any of the parties
Civil Case No. 3443-10 was a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of lack of the formal requisite of a
marriage license. During the initial trial on 7 June 2010, petitioner's
counsel and the public prosecutor entered into a stipulation with
respect to a certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that no license was issued relative to the questioned
marriage.92 Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and
eventually granted. None of the parties appeared, as they were
both nonresidents of the Philippines as alleged in the petition.
4. Questionable raffling of cases
Of the 88 cases examined, 65 were filed and raffled on the same
day.93 This circumstance leads to a suspicion that the petitions
were just stamped "received" on the day of the raffle, so that
they could be assigned to predetermined courts. The record of
Civil Case No. 3676-10 shows that it was raffled on 12 April 2010,
yet the return of summons showed that it was personally served
 on the respondent on 25 March 2010. This discrepancy indicates
that the court had already acted upon the petition even before
the case was assigned to it by raffle.
5. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence
of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered with the
local civil registrar
In 36 cases, the certificate of finality and the decree of nullity
were issued on the same day.94
6. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Out of the 88 cases examined, 50 were found to have been
granted in six months or less from the date of filing to the rendition
of judgment.95 In the Resolution dated 12 August 2014,96 the Court
required the following to submit their comments on the findings of
the OCA:
RTC Imus 20: Judge Felicen, Clerk of Court Atty. Allan Sly M.
Marasigan (Clerk of Court Marasigan), Court Interpreter Juntilla,
Court Stenographer Reyes, Sheriff Pagunsan, and Process Server
Ferrer;
RTC Imus 21: Judge Quisumbing and Sheriff De Villa;
RTC Imus 22: Judge Mangrobang,97 Clerk of Court Atty. Seter M.
Dela Cruz-Cordez (Clerk of Court Cordez), and Process Server
Azcueta;
RTC Dasmarifias 90: Judge Cabrera-Faller and Process Server
Pontejos;
Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Imus, Cavite: Clerk of
Court Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio (Clerk of Court Eusebio), and
Social Worker Serilo.
The Court also referred a copy of the Investigation Report to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action relative to the
findings on the possible involvement of private practitioners in the
anomalies relative to the declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage cases.
The charges against all other court personnel were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
In their comments, respondents explained:
RTC Imus20
1. Improper venue
Process Server Ferrer states that his duty as process server is
ministerial, and that whatever is referred to him for service on the
parties is served by him.98 He is not in a position to determine or
ascertain whether the names or addresses appearing in the court
processes are genuine or bogus. Sheriff Pagunsan echoes this
argument.99 Clerk of Court Marasigan states that his duty of
signing the summons to be served is also ministerial, for it is not his
duty to determine whether the addresses of the parties are valid,
existing, certain, and verifiable.100 He adds that he has no
authority to question, much less prevent, the continuation of the
trial of particular cases if there is a question on the residence of
the parties.101 The matter rests upon the judicial discretion of the
judge.
Judge Felicen insists that the parties who indicated that they
resided in Cavite were indeed residents of Cavite. They were
able to attend the hearings in court.102 F0urthermore, the public
prosecutor also sent notices to the parties at their given
addresses, and they were able to appear before her for the
collusion investigation.103 He adds that the allegation that a party
has resided within the jurisdiction of the court for six months is not
part of the "complete facts constituting the cause of action" as
provided under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.104 At any rate, a falsified
address as stated in the petition constitutes extrinsic fraud and
may be the subject of an appeal. In these cases, no appeal was
filed by the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General.105
As regards Civil Case No. 2785-09, Judge Felicen explains that the
statement of the respondent in the latter's Answer that the
petitioner was not a resident of Imus, Cavite, was immaterial. It
must be noted that the respondent submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.106 Furthermore, he did not submit a
pretrial brief or present evidence to support his claim. Thus, Judge
Felicen found that a discussion in the decision regarding the
5
respondent's allegation was unnecessary. Between the
Page
petitioner's affirmative allegation that she was a resident of Imus,
Cavite, and the respondent's baseless denial, the court ruled in
favor of the petitioner.
Judge Felicen also emphasizes that the petitioner appeared in all
stages of the proceedings and testified in open court.107 He does
not know about the alleged certification from the Bureau of
Immigration showing that the petitioner had no record of arrival
in or departure from the country from January 1993 to 28 May
2013. But when the petitioner testified, she gave her name and
personal circumstances under oath. With her counsel, an officer
of the court, assisting her, the court had no reason to doubt her
identity.108
For their part, Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes explain
that on 3 March 2010, a verbal oath was administered to the
witness, who identified herself as the petitioner in Civil Case No.
2785-09.109 She was even asked to state her name and other
personal circumstances for the record. After her testimony, she
signed the minutes of the proceedings, and a visual comparison
of the signatures therein and the verification of the petition
showed a match. Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes
argue that they were in no position to question the identity of the
witness, who appeared before the court and testified under pain
of criminal prosecution. If it later turns out that the witness is a
charlatan, any falsity committed with respect to the latter's
personal circumstances should not be attributed to them.110
As regards Civil Case No. 3141-09, Judge Felicen explains that the
mere allegation of the respondent that the petitioner was not a
resident of Cavite is not supported by any evidence
whatsoever.111 The court could not have ordered the outright
dismissal of the petition because of respondent's bare allegation.
It does not matter that mail matters addressed to the petitioner
at her given Cavite address were returned with the notation "RTS-
address is unknown and incomplete," because she was able to
appear and fully participate in the proceedings of the case.112
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Process Server Ferrer insists that he personally served summons on
parties at their given addresses in Cavite.113 The fact that the
notation "returned to sender" was made on the subsequent
orders of the court sent to the same addresses may be explained
by the possibility that the parties no longer resided there at the
time. He laments that, considering the nature of these cases in
which the parties were at odds with each other, the respondents
and their next of kin may not have been inclined to sign or
acknowledge their receipt of summons, much less entertain him
as process server.114 Still, he exerted diligent efforts to serve the
summons by returning on two separate occasions. But when they
still refused to sign the summons, he had no choice but to reflect
in the return that the recipient received the summons but refused
to sign or acknowledge receipt.
Sheriff Pagunsan believes that when he made a substituted
service of summons on the respondents by leaving copies thereof
at the front door of their houses, he was merely doing his duties
and functions, because there was no one who would receive
them.115 It was actually an act of prudence on his part in
anticipation of the actual receipt of the summons by the
respondents at a later time. He echoes the lament of Process
Server Ferrer regarding the cold treatment that the latter gets
from the respondents and their next of kin.116 Sheriff Pagunsan
also admitted that in Civil Case No. 3259-09, he served summons
on the respondent in Camarines Sur. His travel expenses were
shouldered by the petitioner therein.
For his part, Clerk of Court Marasigan claims that he does not
possess any express authority to reject or order the amendment
of a return of summons if the service thereof was done with a
procedural lapse by the process server and the sheriff.117
With regard to Civil Case No. 3222-09, Judge Felicen states that
the mere existence of the respondent's request letter for a copy
of the petition should not be construed as indicative of the sheriffs
failure to tender a copy thereof upon the respondent through
Gino Uson.118 The respondent eventually secured a copy of the
petition when he went to court, but he never filed a responsive
pleading, nor did he participate in the proceedings of the
case.119
3. Questionable raffling of cases
Judge Felicen and Clerk of Court Marasigan point out that the
raffling of cases is a process under the direct control of the Office
 of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff and under the
supervision of the executive judge.120 Clerk of Court Marasigan
states that, as such, the process was beyond the regular scope of
his duty, so he had no participation therein whatsoever.121 On the
other hand, Judge Felicen emphasizes that the judges of the RTC
Imus 20, 21, 22 and RTC Dasmariñas 90 have no option or
privi1ege to choose or se1ect cases to be assigned to their
courts.122
They explain that with regard to Civil Case No. 1852-08 - the
records of which were received by RTC Imus 20 on 4 February
2008 - the allegation of irregularity originated from the erroneous
stamp of the Office of the Clerk of Court stating that the case
was filed on 24 February 2008.123 Based on the receipts for the
payment of legal fees, the case was actually filed on 1 February
2008.
The alleged irregularity in Civil Case No. 3309-09 stems from the
return stating that although an attempt to serve the summons
was made on 6 November 2009, the case was transmitted to RTC
Imus 20 only on 23 November 2009.124 Again, it is claimed that
there was an error in the date of the return of the summons,
caused by the use of an old return and the mistaken use of the
"copy and paste" functions of the word processor.125
4. No categorical finding on whether collusion existed between
the parties/no collusion report at all
Judge Felicen explains that the statement of the public
prosecutor that "she is not in a position to tell whether collusion
exists or not" is always accompanied by a manifestation that she
will actively participate in the proceedings to safeguard against
collusion or fabricated evidence.126 The court relies on the regular
performance of duties by the public prosecutor and proceeds to
hear and try the petition. The judge has no control over how the
public prosecutor conducts the investigation.127 To reject the
latter's report would result in an unreasonable and indefinite
deferment of trial.128
5. Finality of judgment despite non-service of the copies of the
decisions to the respondents
Judge Felicen and Clerk of Court Marasigan explain that the
certificate of finality is only given to them for signature by the
clerk in charge, who is tasked with verifying the records in order
to determine whether the decision has indeed attained
finality.129 At any rate, Clerk of Court Marasigan notes that copies
of the decisions were not served on the respondents, because
the returns bore the notation "RTS-moved
out/moved."130 Respondents are duty-bound to inform the court
of any change in their addresses, and the finality of the decisions
cannot be held hostage by the absence of forwarding
addresses.
6. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence
of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered with the
local civil registrar
Judge Felicen points out that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, the immediate issuance of a decree of nullity of marriage
upon the finality of the decision is mandated if the parties have
no properties.131 Thus, there was no need for prior registration of
the entry of judgment with the civil registrar, considering that the
parties in the identified cases had no properties declared in their
petitions.132
7. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Judge Felicen argues that because the petitions in these cases
were uncontested,133 only the petitioners presented evidence.
Furthermore, the court is tasked to render a decision within 90
days from the time the case is submitted for decision. Thus, the
early disposition of cases should not be taken against the judge,
as it is just in keeping with the mandate of speedy administration
of justice.
RTC Imus21
1. Improper venue
Judge Quisumbing alleges that there is no merit in the
observation of the OCA that 19 out of the 62 cases examined
showed vague addresses indicating improper venue. He explains
6
that the addresses in Cavite and other provinces do not have
Page
house numbers.134 Some addresses are identified only by their
block and lot numbers.
In Civil Case No. 2329-08, Judge Quisumbing states that the
verification of the petition expressly stating that the petition was
to be filed in Pasay City did not mean that the petitioner was a
resident of that city.135 What was controlling was her allegation in
the petition that she was a resident of Cavite, a fact she
repeated when she testified in court. Judge Quisumbing explains
that the same is true regarding the verification in Civil Case No.
2691-09, in which the petitioner stated that she was a resident of
Silang, Cavite. He, however, points out that the respondent in
that case was a resident of Kawit, Cavite, which was within the
jurisdiction of his sala. 136
As regards those instances when a party in one case had the
same address as a party in another case, Judge Quisumbing
offers the possibility that the petitioners really lived in the same
house, because they were both separated from their respective
spouses.137 Also, considering that two of these parties had
addresses that did not contain house numbers, it was possible
that they only lived in the same street.138
Finally, with regard to the observation in Civil Case No. 3026-09
that the petitioner therein had no record of travel back to the
Philippines since 18 July 2002, Judge Quisumbing only knows that
on 19 July 2010, a person who introduced herself as the petitioner
in the case testified under oath in open court in his presence and
that of his court staff, the public prosecutor, and the petitioner 's
counsel.139
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Sheriff De Villa explains that he only resorts to substituted service
when he is able to talk with the addressee over the phone.140 He
confirms the identity of the addressee through the details in the
petition and its annexes. The latter usually advises him to give the
summons to the person present in the house.141 Afterwards, he
also interviews the person present and verifies that person's
relationship with the addressee. He believes that this procedure
fulfils the requirement that he exert all efforts to serve the
summons. He also points out that no party in the cases examined
by the OCA ever complained that there was an improper service
of summons.142 He admits that he even went as far as Nueva Ecija
to serve a summons on the respondent in Civil Case No. 2908-09.
As the summons was given to him for service, he believed that he
was duty-bound to obey the order of the court.143
Judge Quisumbing explains that he reminds Sheriff De Villa to be
careful in the service of summons. The judge also points out that
the immediate resort to substituted service is the problem not only
of his court, but of all other courts as well. However, he believes
that this practice should not be branded as a "blatant
irregularity."144
In Civil Case No. 2963-09, Sheriff De Villa says that it is not true that
summons was returned unserved. According to the sheriff's return,
the summons was received by the respondent's brother after
several failed attempts to serve it on the respondent himself.145
Sheriff De Villa says it is only now that he realizes that the
respondents in Civil Case Nos. 3208-09 and 2733-09 have the
same address, because his main concern then was to obey the
order to serve the summons.146 Judge Quisumbing offers the
possibility that one respondent lived in that address after the
other had left it.147
3. No collusion report
Judge Quisumbing explains that in the 13 cases where there was
no investigation report regarding collusion, the public prosecutor
manifested that he would forego the submission of that report
and instead actively participate in the proceedings.148 At times,
the nonexistence of collusion is determined by the public
prosecutor through a cross-examination of the petitioner during
the latter's court testimony or deposition. Judge Quisumbing
stresses that these manifestations are clearly stated in the
records.
4. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Judge Quisumbing explains that it is the practice of his court to
resolve cases as soon as they are submitted for decision,
especially where there is no reason to delay the resolution of
uncontested cases.149 He states that judges are always reminded
to devise means for the quick disposition of cases. At any rate,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not prescribe a period within which to
decide cases for the declaration of nullity of void marriages and
 annulment of voidable marriages, except that provided in the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.150
RTC Imus 22
1. Improper venue
Judge Mangrobang submits that it is not within his bounden duty
to ascertain whether the parties are truthful in their allegations as
to their respective residences.151 Assuming it were so, the court
may not dismiss an action motu proprio on the mere ground of
improper venue.152 He stresses that no motion to dismiss on that
ground was filed either by the respondent or the public
prosecutor on behalf of the Solicitor General.153
Clerk of Court Cordez submits that her duties to receive
pleadings, motions and other court-bound papers is purely
ministerial.154While it is possible that parties feigned their addresses
in their petitions, she is not in a position to determine the veracity
thereof.155
Process Server Azcueta argues that he did not allow the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1256-07 to use his address in
Cavite.156 He says that he did not serve court processes on the
petitioner because these were coursed through her counsel.
Neither did he have any chance to catch a glimpse of the
address when he served the summons on the respondent;
otherwise, he would have called the attention of the court.157 At
any rate, he offers the possibility that the encoding of the address
may have been due to a typographica1 error.158
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Clerk of Court Cordez emphasizes that she was not remiss in her
duties to constantly remind the process server of the proper
service of summons.159 She believes that the process server
complied in good faith pursuant to the doctrine of regularity in
the performance of official duties. The fact that subsequent
orders sent to the addresses of the parties were returned with the
notation "unknown addressee or moved out" might only mean
that the addressees had indeed moved out, or that the postal
worker had not diligently performed his duties.160
This opinion was echoed by Judge Mangrobang.161 He adds that
it is not within the power of the court to ensure that respondents
remain in their residence in the course of the proceedings. They
are considered to have waived their right to present evidence if
they do not participate in the proceedings, or if they transfer to
another residence without informing the court.
He also submits that the rules provide that if the respondent
refuses to receive or sign the summons, it is enough that the same
is tendered to the latter.162 Indeed, if the service of summons was
questionable, the court's attention should have been called by
the public prosecutor.163 The court is not required to conduct a
hearing motu proprio on the validity of the service of summons in
view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions. Process Server Azcueta claims that he normally
serves a summons personally, and only when he cannot locate
the person after several attempts does he resort to substituted
service.164 He also believes that he prepares the returns for
substituted service in accordance with the rules, because he
indicates therein the reason for the substituted service and the
dates when he attempted personal service.165 He argues that
none of the parties in the cases before RTC Imus 22, and not even
the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General, complained about
any improper service of summons.166 This argument is echoed by
Clerk of Court Cordez.167
Process Server Azcueta also points out that the format of the
return of summons under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court allows process servers or sheriffs to indicate that the
recipient of the summons refused to sign or acknowledge
receipt.168 The reason for behind this format is that they have no
power to coerce the recipient to sign the summons being served.
Contrary to the allegation of the OCA, he says that he made a
substituted service on a person named "Shiela G. Villanueva" only
in Civil Case No. 3170-09, because the summons in Civil Case No.
3151-09 was received by one "Ma. Paz C. Baun."169 He made a
substituted service on a person named "Rosemarie Magno" only
in Civil Case No. 2942-09, because the summons in Civil Case No.
2946-09 was received by one "Rosan M. Aringo."170 He admits,
7
though, that he has indeed served a summons in Cagayan de
Page
Oro City, but that he did so in good faith. Based on his mistaken
reading of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12 dated 12
October 1985,171 he thought that the directive applies only to the
execution of writs, garnishments and attachments.172 He
apologizes for the mistake and undertakes to never again serve a
summons outside the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite.
He states that attaching the returns to the records is the job of the
clerk in charge of civil cases. However, the fact that no returns of
summons were attached to the records of some cases does not
mean that there was an improper service of summons on
respondents. Evidence shows that they were able to file answers
or receive subsequent orders from the court.173 This statement was
echoed by Clerk of Court Cordez, who attached to her
comment the summonses bearing the signature of the
respondents who received them.174 She and Judge Mangrobang
add that it is not impossible for the summonses and returns to be
accidentally detached from the records, considering that the
folders of closed and terminated cases are packed and
cramped in a small space inside the courtroom.175 Numerous
instances of retrieval and photocopying might have damaged
the folders and their contents.
3. No collusion report
Judge Mangrobang explains that despite repeated orders from
the court, the public prosecutor failed to submit a collusion
report. Nevertheless, the latter actively participated in the court
proceedings. In an effort to resolve the cases with dispatch, the
court proceeded with trial despite the non-submission of a
collusion report. While this tack may be a deviation from the rules,
it does not constitute grave misconduct; it is, instead, an error of
judgment that may be properly raised in a judicial forum and not
in administrative proceedings against the judge.176
4. In one case, the rendition of the decision even before the
admission of exhibits
Judge Mangrobang explains that because of a typographical
error, the order admitting all documentary exhibits and submitting
the case for decision bore the date 31 August 2010.177 In truth, it
was issued earlier than the decision, which was dated 27 August
2010.
5. In another, the absence of a verification and certification
against forum shopping
Judge Mangrobang offers the possibility that, since the
verification and certification against forum shopping are usually
on in one page, that page was accidentally detached from the
records.178 The lack of a verification and certification against
forum shopping could not have escaped the notice of the Office
of the Clerk of Court and the public prosecutor, who would have
filed the appropriate pleading to inform the court of the
deficiency.
6. Finality of judgment despite non-service of copies of the
decisions on the respondents
Clerk of Court Cordez emphasizes that she never issued a
certificate of finality unless there was proof of receipt of the
decision by the parties and the Solicitor General.179 She states
that she cannot be blamed if the copy of the decision sent to the
parties were "UNSERVED" with the added notation "unknown
address or moved out," because they should have informed the
court of their new addresses.180 Nevertheless, she says that her
issuance of the certificates of finality was not motivated by any ill
motive, but by an honest belief that the procedure she followed
did not violate any law, rule or administrative order.181
For his part, Judge Mangrobang states that there is nothing amiss
in the issuance of a certificate of finality when the records reveal
that notices and copies of the decisions were sent to the parties
at their last known addresses.182 Failure of the parties to be
vigilant in monitoring their cases should not be blamed on the
court.
7. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence
of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered with the
local civil registrar
Judge Mangrobang submits that the requirement that the entry
of judgment be registered with the local civil registrar before the
issuance of a decree of nullity is applicable only when the
grounds for the declaration of nullity are Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code.183 It is not required for marriages declared void ab
initio under Article 36.
 8. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Judge Mangrobang explains that cases involving the declaration
of nullity of marriage are not difficult to decide. Hence, he finds
no reason to delay the promulgation of the decision after the
parties have terminated the presentation of their evidence.184 He
laments the possibility that judges would be penalized for
resolving cases with dispatch rather than for unreasonable delay
in resolving them.
RTC Dasmariñas 90
1. Improper venue
Social Worker Serilo states that she has no knowledge as to how
or why her address was used as the address of the petitioners in
Civil Case Nos. 2893-09 and 3179-09.185 She explains that she is not
acquainted with the parties or their counsels, and that she does
not know how they came to know her address. However, she
points out that she testifies in open court in adoption cases, and
that her personal circumstances - including her address - have
become part of the records of these cases.
2. Questionable jurisdiction/improper service of summons
Process Server Pontejos explains that the "refused to sign"
annotation he makes on the summonses just means that the
recipient refused to sign the latter's name.186 He deems it best to
make this annotation in order to indicate that the summons was
properly served. He even leaves his contact number with the
recipients of the summons in case they need to reach him.
He also explains that his failure to abide by the rules on
substituted service of summons was due to inadvertence,
because he had in mind the immediate service of summons
without going through the tedious process provided in the
rules.187 He points out, though, that he zealously seeks the
whereabouts of the addressees. He resorts to a substituted
service only if they are not around, in which case he explains to
the person present the consequences of receiving the summons
on behalf of the addressee.188 As regards Civil Case Nos. 2940-09
and 1860-08, in which he served a summons in Camarines Norte,
he explains that he is a Bicolano; as such, he is familiar with the
Bicol region.189
3. In one case, the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage even without the appearance of any of the parties
Judge Cabrera-Faller narrates the entire history of the case and
insists that, contrary to the observation of the OCA, a hearing was
conducted for the presentation of one witness. However, the
latter's testimony was later dispensed with pursuant to a
stipulation between the public prosecutor and the petitioner's
counsel.190
4. Questionable raffling of cases
Judge Cabrera-Faller claims that the raffle and distribution of
cases on the same day is not a baffling situation; rather, it is an
efficient system of working out the early disposition of cases.191 In
other courts, the distribution of cases to the concerned courts is
done a week after the raffle.192
With regard to Civil Case No. 3676-10, while it was indeed raffled
on 12 April 2010, the return of the summons showed that it was
personally received by the respondent on 14 April 2010, and not
25 March 2010 as reported by the OCA.193
5. Issuance of the decree of nullity of marriage despite absence
of proof that the entry of judgment had been registered with the
local civil registrar
Judge Cabrera-Faller explains that the issuance of actual court
processes is not always done by the books, and that it sometimes
has to give way to the convenience of the court and the
requesting persons.194
She explains the procedure in her court. After the issuance of a
decision granting the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of marriage, they send copies to the parties, their counsels, the
public prosecutor, the Solicitor General, the National Statistics
Office, and the local civil registrars of both the place where the
parties were married and the place where the court is
sitting.195 Thereafter, the winning party can return to the court to
secure the entry of final judgment after the lapse of the appeal
8
period. Usually, the court issues the entry of final judgment and
Page
the decree of nullity of marriage on the same day as the request
therefor, so that the winning party can have the documents
registered with the local civil registrar.196 This procedure is
designed precisely for facility in the registration of these
certificates.197
6. Grant of petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage at the extraordinary speed of six months or less
Judge Cabrera-Faller sees nothing "extraordinary" about resolving
cases within six months, especially since these cases are
uncontroverted even by the State.198 She explains that she did
not want to burden the court's calendar by prolonging the
proceedings therein.
As regards the questionable raffling of cases in his office, Clerk of
Court Eusebio submits that the raffle of cases are held every
Monday at 11:45 a.m. and are attended by the judges of RTC
Imus 20, 21 and 22; and RTC Dasmariñas 90.199 All cases filed in
the afternoon of every Monday up to 11:30 in the morning of the
following Monday are included in the next raffle.
He and Judge Quisumbing, the executive judge, reiterate the
explanation of Judge Cabrera-Faller with regard to the regularity
of the raffle of Civil Case No. 3676-10; and of Judge Felicen and
Clerk of Court Marasigan with regard to Civil Case Nos. 1852-08
and 3309-09.200 They aver that those cases, identified to have
been filed and raffled on the same day, were indeed filed in the
morning of a Monday and, hence, included in the raffle at 11:45
a.m. that day.201
For his part, Judge Quisumbing states that he does not have any
control over the number of cases filed and raffled.202 After each
raffle, the clerk of court distributes the case records not later than
3:00 p.m. of the same day to the branches to which they have
been raffled.
In a Resolution dated 20 October 2015,203 the Court referred this
administrative case, together with A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and 12-
9-188-RTC, to the CA for immediate raffle among the members
thereof. The investigating CA justice was directed to evaluate the
cases and make a report and recommendation thereon within
90 days from notice.
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
In a letter dated 1 June 2012 addressed to the OCA,204 a
"concerned employee" of RTC Dasmariñas 90 claimed to have
personal knowledge that the decision rendered by Judge
Cabrera-Faller in Civil Case No. 1998-08 was for a cash
consideration. According to the letter writer, the petitioner
therein, Armando Tunay, was an American citizen who had never
been a resident of the Philippines. However, in his petition, he
allegedly used a fictitious address in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Despite
being fully aware of this fact, Judge Cabrera-Faller granted the
petition in less than six months. The letter writer added that the
judge did not deserve to be in the judiciary because of her
partiality and corruption.
At the time of the receipt of the anonymous letter, a full
investigation by the OCA of the proceedings in A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2302 was underway; hence, it recommended that the letter be
included among the subjects of the investigation.205 In a
Resolution dated 12 November 2012,206 the Court approved the
OCA recommendation and consolidated A.M. No. 12-9-188- RTC
with A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302. Judge Cabrera-Faller was likewise
required to comment on the anonymous letter.
In her comment dated 6 February 2013,207 Judge Cabrera-Faller
expressed disbelief that the letter could have been written by her
staff in view of the letter writer's impeccable English. She
suspected that the real perpetrator of the evil scheme just
wanted to put her in even worse light at a time when she was
already facing several other administrative complaints. She
pointed out that Armando Tunay never hid the fact of his
citizenship, as he definitively alleged in his petition that he was a
naturalized American citizen. Upon an ocular inspection of the
given address in the petition, Judge Cabrera-Faller was able to
verify that the address truly existed; hence, it was not true that it
was fictitious. Based on the attached affidavit of Armando
Tunay,208 he stayed in that house owned by their family friend six
months before the filing of the petition and until a year after the
termination of the proceedings. Judge Cabrera-Faller
emphasizes that she does not accept cash considerations for
favorable decisions in her court.
 She points out that the State never questioned the address of the
petitioner as stated in the petition, nor did it file any opposition
during the proceedings.209 While admitting that Civil Case No.
1998-08 was indeed decided in less than six months, she
emphasizes that she has always observed the rule on the speedy
disposition of both civil and criminal cases.
In a Resolution dated 20 October 2015,210 the Court referred this
administrative case, together with A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and RTJ-
11- 2302, to the CA for immediate raffle among the members
thereof. The investigating CA justice was directed to evaluate the
cases and make a report and recommendation thereon within
90 days from notice.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTIGATING JUSTICE
The instant administrative cases were raffled to CA Associate
Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes (Justice Paredes). She
submitted her Amended Report211 on 4 October 2016.212
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301
Justice Paredes agreed with the OCA finding that Judge
CabreraFaller did not take appropriate action in all the cases
that had not been acted upon for a considerable length of time
from the dates of their filing, including those without further
setting, with pending incidents or submitted for decision.213 In this
light, Justice Paredes recommends that the judge be fined in the
amount of ₱l0,000 for failure to comply with the Court's
Resolution.
On the other hand, OIC Suluen fails to satisfactorily explain why
certain cases for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage pending with the court proceeded despite the
absence of vital documents.214 As OIC branch clerk of court, she
was charged with the efficient recording, filing and management
of court records besides having administrative supervision over
court personnel. For lack of diligence in the performance of
administrative functions amounting to simple neglect of duty,
Judge Paredes recommends that a fine in the amount of ₱20,000
be imposed on OIC Suluen.
Justice Paredes found the practice of Process Server Pontejos of
serving summonses on the immediate relatives of respondents
unacceptable.215 Considering that it is through the service of
summons by process servers that courts acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, he was duty-bound to discharge his duties with the
prudence, caution and attention that careful persons usually
exercise in the management of their affairs. His failure to comply
with the requirements set in Manotoc v. CA amounted to simple
neglect of duty. For his offense, Justice Paredes recommends the
imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
On the allegation of improper venue for the declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage cases lodged against all four judges,
Justice Paredes found only Judge Felicen liable.216 Justice
Paredes recalled that while the plaintiff or the respondent must
be residents of the place where the action was instituted at the
time it is commenced, improper venue as a ground to dismiss
may be raised only by the parties to the action. In this case, none
of the parties, or even the State, raised this ground during the
proceedings in the audited cases. The only one who raised it was
the respondent in Civil Case No. 2785-09 filed before RTC Imus
20.217 The respondent thereon sought to dismiss the petition on
the ground that none of the parties were residents of Cavite. The
complaint could have only been filed before the court in the
place where the respondent resided because the petitioner had
been living in Taiwan and had no residence in the Philippines.
Thus, Justice Paredes found that Judge Felicen erred when he
failed to dismiss the case.
On the improper service of summons, Justice Paredes clears all
four judges.218 She indicates that while an improper service of
summons may mean lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent, the latter may waive that defense by voluntarily
appearing before the court or by failing to seasonably object to
its jurisdiction. In all the audited cases, not one of the respondents
upon whom a substituted service of summons was made filed a
timely motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the
respondent's person.
9
However, Justice Paredes finds that Process Server Pontejos,
Page
Sheriff Pagunsan, Process Server Azcueta and Sheriff De Villa had
failed to comply with the guidelines of Manotoc.219 Sheriff
Pagunsan even admitted to leaving copies of the summons at
the doors of the houses of respondents in anticipation of their
receipt of it at a later time. For this negligence, Justice Paredes
finds them guilty of simple neglect of duty.220 Considering that all
of them admitted to serving summons outside the territorial
jurisdiction of their courts, Justice Paredes also finds them guilty of
abuse of authority.221 She recommends that Sheriff Pagunsan,
Process Server Azcueta and Sheriff De Villa be fined in the
amount of ₱5,000 each for simple neglect of duty and another
₱5,000 each for abuse of authority, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
For their failure to properly supervise the court personnel in their
respective branches, specifically with regard to the proper
service of summons on litigants, Clerks of Court Cordez and
Marasigan were likewise found guilty of simple neglect of
duty.222 Justice Paredes recommends that they be fined in the
amount of ₱20,000 each, with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, he was already found guilty of
simple neglect of duty in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301. The circumstances
in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 further reveal his gross and palpable
neglect of duty, for which the penalty of dismissal from service
should be meted out to him.223
All four judges were cleared for issuing certificates of finality
simultaneously with the decree of nullity of marriage. Justice
Paredes elucidates that pursuant to Section 19(4) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, and as illustrated in Diño v. Diño,224 the court shall
forthwith issue the decree of nullity upon the finality of the
decision, if the parties have no properties.225
On the extraordinary speed with which petitions were granted,
Justice Paredes found that Judge Felicen carried the highest
percentage of petitions granted in six months or less at
77%.226 She also considered it notoriously impossible and
improbable for Judge Mangrobang to decide a case within 25
days from the date of filing, regardless of the fact that it was an
uncontested petition.227 Justice Paredes reminds Judge Cabrera-
Faller that petitions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage are regular family court cases, and not special
proceedings for which jurisdictional requirements need to be
established. Yet, despite this unnecessary layer in the conduct of
proceedings, Judge Cabrera-Faller was still able to decide 57% of
the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage cases
before her in six months or less.
Justice Paredes reminds the judges that they must behave at all
times in ways that would promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. They must, therefore,
avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all
their activities. Indeed, the judicial audit in these cases was
prompted by reports that Cavite was a haven for "paid-for
annulments."228
Thus, Justice Paredes finds Judge Felicen guilty of grave abuse of
authority for failing to dismiss Civil Case No. 2785-09 for improper
venue and for granting petitions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage with extraordinary speed.229 She
recommends that he be fined in the amount of ₱40,000, which is
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Justice Paredes finds that Judge Mangrobang's cavalier attitude
towards marriage - shown when he granted a petition 25 days
after its filing - does not speak well of the reverence that the
Constitution, society and Filipino culture holds for marriage as the
foundation of the family.230 She finds him guilty of grave abuse of
authority and recommends that he be fined in the amount of
₱40,000, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Judge Cabrera-Faller was also found guilty of grave abuse of
authority for granting petitions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage with extraordinary speed. It is
recommended that she be fined in the amount of ₱40,000 and
permanently enjoined from handling family court cases.231
On the other hand, Justice Paredes recommends that the
charges against Judge Quisumbing be dismissed.232 Likewise, she
finds no sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold
Interpreter Juntilla and Stenographer Reyes administratively
liable, because they cannot be expected or required to go
beyond the usual practice of asking for names and personal
 circumstances in ascertaining the real identities of the parties
appearing before them.233 At the time that the petitioner in Civil
Case No. 2785-09 testified in court, nothing had put them on
guard as to the witness's identity.
The charge against Social Worker Serilo is also recommended to
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.234 There was no
evidence that she was directly involved in the filing of the
petitions in which her address was used as the petitioners' own.
Neither was there any clear showing that she had consented to
the use of her address in that manner.
Similarly, there was insufficient evidence to hold Process Server
Ferrer administratively liable, because a reading of his comments
and returns shows that he sufficiently complied with the
guidelines in Manotoc.235 Justice Paredes holds that there is a
valid tender of summons even if the respondent or another
person of suitable age and discretion refuses to sign the original
copy of the summons.
Justice Paredes recommends that charges against Clerk of Court
Eusebio be dismissed. She believes that he was able to explain
that the seemingly questionable raffling of cases among the RTC
branches was only brought about by inadvertence or mistakes in
the indication of dates.236
A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC
Justice Paredes points out that the issue in this administrative
matter is whether money exchanged hands for a favorable
judgment in Civil Case No. 1998-08. She holds the considered
opinion that the purported graft and corruption reported in the
anonymous complaint is just a figment of the letter writer's
imagination.237
During the clarificatory hearing conducted on 12 January 2016,
Mrs. Orlinda Ojeda-Tunay testified that the letter writer was her
brother. He had allegedly been against her marriage with
Armando Tunay, whose remarriage was made possible by the
grant of the petition in Civil Case No. 1998-08.238 For Justice
Paredes, this testimony - as against the amorphous, undefined
and unsupported charge in the anonymous letter - should be
upheld. Thus, she recommends that the charge against Judge
Cabrera-Faller be dismissed.
OUR RULING
In the present administrative disciplinary proceedings against
judges and court personnel, respondents spring the defense that
no objection from the parties, the public prosecutor, the Solicitor
General, or the State was ever raised against these alleged
irregularities. To our mind, the fact that respondent judges and
court personnel are using judicial arguments does not speak well
of the strength of their position in these administrative complaints.
The waiver of venue of civil actions or the waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over persons - or, for that matter, any failure
to raise an objection - is relevant only to the judicial proceedings
where that waiver was made.
Court personnel are, first and foremost, public officials.239 They are
held to a high standard of ethics in public service and exhorted
to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, and loyalty, as well as to uphold public interest
over personal interest.240 As professionals, they are expected to
perform their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
intelligence and skill. The presence or absence of objections
cannot be the measure by which our public officials should
perform their sacred duties. First and foremost, they should be
guided by their conscience; and, in the case of those employed
in the judiciary, by a sense of responsibility for ensuring not only
that the job is done, but that it is done with a view to the proper
and efficient administration of justice.
Judges and court personnel are expected to avoid not just
impropriety in their conduct, but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.241 In the instant administrative cases, respondents
miserably failed in this regard. Note must be taken that what
prompted the judicial audit in the four courts involved herein are
reports that they have become havens for "paid-for annulments."
Improper Venue
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
10
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which
took effect on 15 March 2003, provides that petitions shall be filed
Page
in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or
the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing.242 In the case of nonresident respondents, it shall
be filed where they may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner.
In OCA v. Flores,243 this Court has ruled that a deliberate disregard
of the foregoing rule may be shown by the judge's inexplicable
persistence in trying and resolving cases despite glaring
circumstances that "should have created doubt as to the
veracity of the residential addresses declared in the petitions."244
In these cases, the records are replete with glaring circumstances
that should have created doubt in the minds of the respondent
judges as to the veracity of the residential addresses declared in
the petitions. In all four courts, the OCA and the judicial audit
teams found that most of the given addresses were vague or
incomplete. It may be true, as explained by Judge Quisumbing,
that some residential addresses in the provinces have no house
numbers. Yet, the fact that most of the court notices sent to the
parties by R TC Imus 20 and 22 and R TC Dasmariñas 90 were
"returned to sender" shows that there was something amiss in the
given addresses. It is even more curious that the notices were
"returned to sender" for the reason that the addressees were
unknown at the given address or could not be located.
More important, cases where parties have the same address as
those in another case cannot be explained away. In fact, out of
the four respondent judges, only Judge Quisumbing attempted
to give an explanation of this anomaly. But his statement, instead
of clarifying the matter, only operated to strengthen the cases
against them. He offers the possibility that the petitioners really
lived in the same house, because they were separated from their
respective spouses. If this is indeed the case, then the fact that
these parties were represented by the same counsels shines an
even more disturbing light upon the observed irregularity.
In four cases decided by RTC Imus 20, the address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3045-09 is the same as that of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3118-09, while the address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3117-09 is the same as that of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3430-10.245 The counsel for the
petitioners in Civil Case Nos. 3045-09, 3118-09 and 3117-09 was
Atty. Allan Rheynier D. Bugayong, while the counsel for the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3430-10 was Atty. J.T. Leonardo Santos.
In RTC Imus 21, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No.
2729- 09 is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No.
3534-10. They were represented by Atty. Ruel B. Nairo.246 The
address of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2733-09 is the same as
that of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 3208-09, and they were
represented by Atty. Norman R. Gabriel.247 The address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3490-10, represented by Atty. Aimee
Jean P. Leaban, is the 8ame as that of the petitioner in Civil Case
No. 3558-10, represented by Atty. Ruel B. Nairo. The address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3636-10 is the same as that of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3786-10, and they were both
represented by Atty. Allan Rheynier D. Bugayong.
In RTC Imus 22, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case No.
2781- 09 is the same as that of the petitioners in Civil Case Nos.
3040-09 and 3370-09.248 The address of the respondent in Civil
Case No. 2781-09 is the same as that of the respondents in Civil
Case Nos. 3370-09 and 3371-09. The counsel for petitioners in all of
these cases was Atty. Clarissa L. Castro. The address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 2994-09 is the same as that of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 3092-09, and they were both
represented by Atty. Bernard R. Paredes.249 The address of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 2589-09 represented by Atty. Herminio
Valerio, is the same as that of the petitioner in Civil Case No.
3170-09, represented by Atty. Cesar DC Geronimo.
In RTC Dasmariñas 90, the address of the petitioner in Civil Case
No. 3623-10 is the same as that of the respondent in Civil Case
No. 2815-09.250 The address of the respondent in Civil Case No.
2991-09 is the same as that of the respondent in Civil Case No.
3456-10, and they were both represented by Atty. Omar
Francisco.
It would appear that counsels maintain residences within the
jurisdiction of friendly courts for their declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage cases. Considering, however, that the
notices sent to most of these addresses were also "returned to
sender," we cannot even make the kindest assumption that the
parties actually resided in those addresses just for the sole
 purpose of having their marriages declared null and void or
annulled by a friendly court. What is clear is that there is a
conspiracy, at least between the counsels of these parties and
the four courts, in order to reflect paper compliance with the rule
on venue.
In Civil Case No. 2785-09 before RTC Imus 20, it may be true that
the respondent did not present any proof to support his
allegation in his Answer that the petitioner was not a resident of
Imus, Cavite. Nonetheless, Judge Felicen still made a false
statement in his decision in that case when he stated therein that
"[d]espite the service of summons, no responsive pleading was
filed by respondent."251 He thought perhaps that the addition of
the phrase "within the reglementary period" would place the
statement within the purview of the truth. Such dishonesty,
aggravated by the fact that it was committed in no less than a
decision of the court, cannot be countenanced.
On the other hand, the recommendation of Justice Paredes with
regard to the dismissal of the charge against Interpreter Juntilla
and Stenographer Reyes is well-taken. Indeed, at the time that
the petitioner in Civil Case No. 2785-09 testified in open court,
there was sufficient basis to believe that she was indeed who she
said she was. After all, the witness identified herself under oath,
stated her name and other personal circumstances for the
record, and signed the minutes of the proceedings. The
evidence also shows that the signatures in the minutes of the
proceedings and in the verification of the petition are the
same.252 Furthermore, we cannot rely too much on the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration in this
case.253 While it states that the petitioner did not have any record
of arrival in the Philippines from January 1993 to 28 May 2013, it
also states that she did not have any record of departure during
the same period. To recall, the respondent in the case alleged in
his Answer that the petitioner had been living in Taiwan since
1994.
In Civil Case No. 1256-07, before RTC Imus 22, the address of the
court's very own Process Server Azcueta appeared as the
address of the petitioner therein. In Civil Case Nos. 2893-09 and
3179-09 before RTC Dasmariñas 90, the address of Social Worker
Serilo also appeared as the address of the petitioners therein. We
cannot accept their explanation regarding the alleged
unauthorized use of their addresses. It should be noted that
relative to the majority of the vague and incomplete addresses
given by the parties in the other petitions, those given by the
petitioners who used the addresses of Process Server Azcueta
and Social Worker Serilo stick out in their specificity: the block and
lot number, street, subdivision and even the barangay were
indicated. Furthermore, the addresses of the respondents in these
petitions were not in Cavite. Thus, the addresses of Process Server
Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo were the ones that provided
the opportunity for these petitions to be in compliance with the
venue requirement. This single most important fact negates any
declaration that they did not consent to, or that they were even
aware of the use of their addresses. In A.M
In A.M. No. 12-9-188-RTC, the Court notes that the address given
by Armando Tunay in his petition was "c/o Christina B. Toh, xxx
Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmariñas, Cavite."254 As we pronounced
in Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Br. 60,
Barili, Cebu,255 the use of the abbreviation "c/o" connotes that
that petitioner was not an actual resident of the given address.
This fact, together with the admission of the petitioner that he is a
naturalized American citizen, should have engendered suspicion
on the part of Judge Cabrera-Faller that the former did not reside
within the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Dasmariñas 90. The affidavit
executed by Armando Tunay stating that he resided in that
address for six months before the filing of the petition and until a
year after the termination of the case is, at best, self-serving.
What he stated in his affidavit may be relevant only to the
proceedings for his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
It cannot operate to excuse the gross ignorance of the law
committed by Judge Cabrera-Faller with regard to the
application of the rules on venue for petitions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriages.
Improper Service of Summons
11
Section 6 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that the service of
summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Page
Under that Rule, the summons may be served by the sheriff, the
deputy sheriff, or other proper court officer, or, for justifiable
reasons, by any suitable person authorized by the court issuing
the summons.256 Whenever practicable, the summons shall be
served by handing a copy thereof to respondents in person or, if
they refuse to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
them.257 However, if the service cannot be done personally for
justifiable causes and within a reasonable time, it may be
effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons with some other
person of suitable age and discretion then residing at
respondent's house; or (b) leaving copies of the summons with
some competent person in charge of the respondent's office or
regular place of business.258
Manotoc v. CA259 operationalized the provision for a valid
substituted service of summons by laying down the following
requirements:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that
the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a reasonable time to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame
is mentioned. Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done. having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party. Under the Rules, the
service of summons has no set period. However, when the court,
clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of
the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then
the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for
an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then
is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff: reasonable time means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff
wants. To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus,, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered reasonable time with regard to
personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available,
there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. Several attempts [mean] at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made
to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on
Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in
the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial
Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires
 that impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts, which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein. A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
(18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined
as the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or
wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be of sufficient discretion,
such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at
the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate
action. Thus, the person must have the relation of confidence to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least
be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons
and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly w1d specifically described in the Return of
Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at [defendant's] office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on
whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained
in the Return.260
The return for a substituted service should state, with more
particularity and detail, the facts and circumstances such as the
number of attempts at personal service, dates and times of the
attempts, inquiries made to locate the respondent, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and reasons for failure in
order to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken.261 The exertion
of efforts to personally serve the summons on respondent, and
the failure of those efforts, would prove the impossibility of prompt
personal service.262
Manotoc also emphasized that while substituted service of
summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and a
departure from the usual method of service.263 As such, it must
faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements
and circumstances authorized by the rules.264
In these cases, it was clear that no faithful and strict compliance
with the requirements for substituted service of summons was
observed by Sheriffs De Villa and Pagunsan and Process Servers
Ferrer, Azcueta, and Pontejos.
Contrary to the findings of Justice Paredes, those arrived at by
this Court show that the returns made by Process Server Ferrer did
not sufficiently comply with the guidelines in Manotoc. To
illustrate, he submitted the following return in Civil Case No. 2511-
09:
This is to certify that on January 29, 2009, the undersigned
personally served the Summons together with the copy of a
Petition and its annexes in the above-entitled case upon the
respondent thru Candy Socorro, house maid but she refuse[d] to
affix by [sic] her name and signature in the original copy of the
Summons.
That all diligent efforts were exerted to serve the said Summons as
the undersigned went also to the above stated address on
January 21 and 24, 2009 but the same proved ineffectual.
12
The original copy of the Summons is therefore respectfully
returned duly served.265
Page
Notably, this return fails to establish the impossibility of prompt
personal service. Although it states that he went to the
respondent's address three times on three different dates, it does
not show that efforts were made to find the respondent
personally or cite why those efforts "proved ineffectual." Neither
does it show that he ascertained whether or not the recipient
comprehended the significance of the receipt of the summons
and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least to notify
the latter about the receipt of the summons.
In Civil Case Nos. 2216-08 and 2243-08, Process Server Ferrer
indicated in his returns that he had made a personal service of
summons on the respondents at their given addresses. However,
subsequent orders sent to the same addresses were "returned to
sender." Indeed, it is possible that after personal service of
summons on respondents, they moved to another residence, but
it is a different matter if the subsequent orders were returned to
sender because respondents were "unknown at given
address."266 This notation overturns whatever presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties may be accorded
to the prior return of Process Server Ferrer stating that personal
service on the respondent was made at that address.
Furthermore, Civil Case No. 2216-08 was decided by RTC Imus 20
in three months and 10 days and Civil Case No. 2243-08 in four
months and 17 days from filing.267 It would be hard to imagine
that in such a short span of time, the respondents would be
"unknown at given address," if they had really been found there
just a few months previously.
Sheriff Pagunsan was in the habit of stating in his returns that "no
one was around to receive the court process. Hence, a copy of
the summons was left at the door of the defendant's
place."268 The Court cannot even begin to describe how far-off
this practice is from the prescribed requirements and
circumstances authorized by the rules. It does not even fall under
the category of substituted service of summons, which, as we
have said, is already a departure from the usual method of
service. The following is an example of Sheriff Pagunsan's return
for a substituted service of summons:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on November 8, 2009, the undersigned
personally served the copy of Summons together with the Petition
and its annexes in the above captioned case to the defendant
VINCENT CHRISTIAN OBLENA at xxx Parañaque City thru Gino
Uson [who] claims to be a relative of the defendant of sufficient
age and discretion to receive the court process as [sic] however
refused to affix his signature on the original copy of the Summons.
Earnest efforts were made by the undersigned in the morning
and afternoon of the said date to serve the summons personally
upon the respondent but failed on the grounds that respondent
was always out at the time of the said service, hence, substituted
service was resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The original copy of the summons is, therefore, respectfully
returned DULY SERVED.269
The foregoing return clearly shows that while there were two
attempts to serve the summons personally, they were made on
the same day. He does not mention if he made any inquiry to
locate the respondent; or if the recipient, who "claims to be a
relative" of the respondent, comprehended the significance of
the receipt of the summons and the duty to deliver it to the
respondent or at least to notify the latter about the receipt
thereof.
The blatant nonobservance of the rule regarding personal and
substituted service of summons was shown by Sheriff De Villa in
Civil Case No. 2693-09 when he resorted to substituted service of
summons on the very same day that it was issued.270 He was also
found to have served summons - one was personal and the other
substituted - on two different respondents in two different cases
at the same address in Makati.271 We cannot countenance his
alleged practice of resorting to substituted service after being
advised by the respondent over the phone to leave the summons
with the person present in the house. Contrary to his belief, this
practice does not fulfill the requirement that he exert all efforts to
personally serve the summons. In these instances, since he had
already contacted the respondent by phone, it would have
been more prudent and dutiful to have set an appointment for
another day to enable him to personally serve the summons on
the respondent himself, rather than to resort to a substituted
service at the first instance.
 The following is an example of a return that he submitted for a
substituted service of summons:
Respectfully returned to ATTY. MARIA CRSITITA A. RIVASSANTOS,
Clerk of Court V, RTC Br. 21, Imus, Cavite the enclosed original
copy of the Summons issued in the above-captioned case to
respondent, PAUL JEFFREY R. SANTOS of xxx, Pasig City with the
information that copy of the Summons together with the
attached Petition and its Annexes was received by respondent's
mother, LINA R. SANTOS on March 10, 2010, as evidenced by her
signature appearing at the face bottom of said summons.272
Again, this return fails to establish the impossibility of a prompt
personal service. It does not show that Sheriff De Villa went to the
respondent's address three times on at least two different dates,
or that he exerted efforts to find the respondent and serve the
summons personally. Neither does the return show that he
ascertained whether the recipient comprehended the
significance of receiving the summons and the duty to deliver it
to the respondent or at least to notify the latter about the receipt
of the summons.
In a number of the returns submitted by Process Server Azcueta,
he claimed to have made a substituted service of summons to
recipients who refused to sign or acknowledge receipt thereof.
However, subsequent orders sent to the same addresses were
"returned to sender," because "no such defendant/name" or
"unknown address;" or, worse, the address was "unlocated, no
such name and number of house on given address."273 Again,
these notations overturn whatever presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties may be accorded to the prior
return of Process Server Azcueta that substituted service on
respondents was made at the given addresses.
No return of summons was attached to the records of five cases
before RTC Imus 22.274 Process Server Azcueta explains that
attaching the returns to the case records was not his job. On the
other hand, Judge Mangrobang and Clerk of Court Cordez offer
the possibility that the returns were accidentally detached from
the records due to numerous instances of retrieval and
photocopying. All of them claim that just because no returns
were attached to the records did not mean that there was an
improper service of summons. Curiously, whether it was a matter
of failure to attach the returns to the records or accidental
detachment of the returns therefrom, no evidence of the actual
existence of the missing returns has been shown. If it was a matter
of failure to attach the returns, their submission to the judicial
audit team would have been easy. In any event, the accidental
detachment of the returns could have been proven by a gap in
the pagination of the records.
The following is an example of a return that Process Server
Azcueta submitted for a substituted service of summons:
Respectfully return[ed] to the Honorable Court the attached
original copy of the summons and petition dated September 29,
2009 issued by this Honorable Court with the following
information:
1. That on October 1, 2009, the undersigned
caused the service of Summons to the
respondent but said respondent was not
around on the said date.
2. That earnest effort to personally serve the
summons failed as the said respondent is still
not around at the given address when service
was effected on October 10, 2009. To satisfy
the Rules, substituted service was made by
tendering a copy of the summons with petition
and its annexes thru MA. PAZ C. BAUN, a
person of competent age and discretion as
evidenced by her signature appearing on the
original copy of summons.
WHEREFORE, the original copy of the summons is hereby
respectfully returned DULY SERVED.275
From a reading of the return, it evidently fails to establish the
impossibility of prompt personal service. While it shows that
Process Server Azcueta went to the respondent's address twice
13
on two different dates, it does not show that he exerted efforts to
find the respondent and serve the summons personally. Despite
Page
its use of the phrase "[t]o satisfy the Rules," it does not indicate the
relation of the recipient with the respondent or whether the
former comprehended the significance of the receipt of the
summons and the duty to deliver it to the respondent or at least
to notify the latter about the receipt of the summons.
As regards Process Server Pontejos, it bears noting that there were
findings of improper service of summons in both A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-
2301 and RTJ-11-2302. Out of the 32 cases in A.M. No. RTJ-11-
2301and45 in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 in which he made a
substituted service of summons without compliance with the
mandatory requirements of Manotoc, only one case overlapped-
Civil Case No. 3746-10.
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302, the service of summons in 18 out of the 45
cases audited was made personally. However, all the returns in
these 18 cases indicate that respondents refused to sign the
original copy of the summons. Below is an example of such
returns:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on February 19, 2010, the undersigned
caused the service of summons issued by the Clerk of Court of
this Court together with the copy of complaint in the above-
entitled case upon respondent Aurora T. Frias at xxx Dasmariñas,
Cavite, who received the summons personally, but she refused to
sign in the original copy of summons.
The original copy of summons is, therefore, respectfully returned,
DULY SERVED.276
In the other cases in which substituted service of summons was
made, Process Server Pontejos did not even indicate the relation
of the recipient with the respondent.277 Below is an example of a
return for a substituted service of summons:
THIS IS TO CERTTFY that on August 5, 2009, the undersigned
caused the service of summons issued by the Clerk of Court of
this Court together with the copy of complaint in the above-
entitled case upon respondent Shirly Manzana-Luzarraga at xxx
Camarines Norte thru Lydia
Brayus, a person residing thereat of sufficient age and discretion
to receive summons, as evidenced by her signature appearing in
the original copy of summons.
That all diligent efforts were exerted to serve the said summons
personally upon respondent Shirly Manzana-Luzarraga, but the
same proved ineffectual.278
Then again, even Process Server Pontejos admits that he only had
in mind the immediate service of summons "without going
through the tedious process"279 provided under Administrative
Circular No. 12 dated 1 October 1985.280
As borne out by the records and admitted by Sheriffs De Villa and
Pagunsan and Process Servers Ferrer, Azcueta, and Pontejos, they
have all served summons outside the territorial jurisdictions of their
respective courts. Process Server Ferrer has served summons in
Makati and Muntinlupa City,281 Sheriff Pagunsan in Camarines
Sur,282 Process Server Pontejos in Camarines Norte,283 Sheriff De
Villa in Nueva Ecija,284 and Process Server Azcueta in Cagayan
de Oro City.285
Their service of summons outside the territorial jurisdiction of their
respective courts is regrettable for two reasons. First, it was
contrary to Administrative Circular No. 12 dated 1 October 1985,
which provides that the service of all court processes and the
execution of writs issued by the courts shall only be made within
their territorial jurisdictions. Second, the level of industry,
commitment and diligence that went into the service of
summons in places very far from the territorial jurisdictions of the
courts in question unfortunately failed to find its way into the
service of summons within the territorial jurisdictions of the
concerned courts or into the preparation of the corresponding
returns.
The purpose of a summons is twofold: to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of respondents and to notify them that an action has
been commenced, so that they may be given an opportunity to
be heard on the claim being made against them.286 The
importance of the service and receipt of summons is precisely the
reason why the Court has laid down very strict requirements for
undertaking substituted service of summons. As we said
in Manotoc, to allow sheriffs and process servers to describe the
facts and circumstances of substituted service in inexact terms
would encourage routine performance of their precise duties. It
would be quite easy for them to shroud or conceal carelessness
or laxity in such broad terms.287
 Having administrative supervision over court personnel, Clerks of
Court Marasigan and Cordez in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302 and OIC
Suluen in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 had the responsibility to monitor
compliance with the rules and regulations governing the
performance of their duties. Their responsibility gains more
significance considering that they are the ones who issue the
summons288 and receive the returns from the sheriffs and process
servers.289 They should have insisted on strict compliance with the
rules and imposed a corresponding punishment for repeated
violations.
The same is true with regard to the four respondent judges in
these cases. That they allowed and tolerated noncompliance
with the strict requirements of the rules for a long period of time
shows their unfitness to discharge the duties of their office.
Despite the improper service of summons, they continued with
the conduct of the proceedings in the petitions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage. These findings tie up with the
allegation of the OCA and the judicial audit teams that a
conspiracy existed and thereby turned the courts in Cavite into
havens for "paid-for annulments."
Lack of Collusion Report
Under Section 8(1) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the respondent is
required to submit an Answer within 15 days from receipt of the
summons. If no answer is filed, the court shall order the public
prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the
parties.290 Within one month from receipt of the order of the court,
the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are indeed in collusion.291 If it is found that
collusion exists, the public prosecutor shall state the basis of that
conclusion in the report.292 The court shall then set the report for
hearing; and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall
dismiss the petition. If the public prosecutor reports that no
collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial.293
Notably, the rules do not merely ask whether the public
prosecutor is in a position to determine whether collusion exists.
They require that the investigating prosecutor determine whether
or not there is collusion. In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Judge Cabrera-
Faller tolerated the public prosecutor's practice of submitting
investigation reports stating merely that "the undersigned
Prosecutor is not in the position to tell whether collusion
exists."294 Judge Cabrera-Faller still proceeded with the hearing of
the cases.
Furthermore, in declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage
cases, the investigation report of the prosecutor on whether there
is collusion between the parties is a condition sine qua non for
setting the case for pretrial or further proceedings.295
Thus, it matters not that the public prosecutors manifested before
Judges Felicen, Quisumbing and Mangrobang that they would
just actively participate in the proceedings to safeguard against
collusion or fabricated evidence, in lieu of an investigation report
on collusion. No further proceedings should have been held
without the investigation report.
In Corpus v. Ochotorena,296 the Court found the respondent
judge therein administratively liable for failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of ordering the investigating public
prosecutor to determine whether collusion existed between the
parties. The Court emphasized that the active participation of the
public prosecutor in the proceedings of the case could not take
the place of the investigation report:
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M.
Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001 with the
respondent judge's court, stating, among others, that he
appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-
parte presentation of plaintiffs evidence, even cross-examining
the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos,
and that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not
suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement that the court
should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a
collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made
by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the
merits of the case had already been had. Notably,
14
said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had
ordered the termination of the case.297
Page
There is no merit either in the contention that the active
participation of the public prosecutor in the proceedings in lieu of
an investigation report facilitates the speedy disposition of the
cases. In OCA v. Aquino, 298 we enunciated that shortcuts in
judicial processes cannot be countenanced, because speed is
not the principal objective of a trial.
It is the considered opinion of this Court that the reason why the
public prosecutors are not in a position to determine whether
there is collusion between the parties 1s that one or both of them
cannot be summoned to appear before the public prosecutor.
Presumably, the irregularity regarding the non-submission of
collusion investigation reports is likewise tied with the anomalous
addresses of the parties. Hence, the non-submission of the reports
is another manifestation of the conspiracy to reflect paper
compliance with the rule on venue.
Failure to Serve Copies of the Decisions on Respondents
If a counsel or party moves to another address without informing
the court of that change, the former's failure to receive a copy of
the decision sent to the last known address will not stay the finality
of the decision.299 It is a different matter, however, if from the very
inception of the proceedings there is already doubt as to the
genuineness of a party's given address.
In Civil Case No. 2904-09 filed before RTC Imus 20, summons was
served on the respondent through substituted service. A copy of
the order setting the pretrial was sent to respondent's address,
but was returned to sender for the reason "no such name at
given address."300 A copy of the decision granting the petition for
the annulment of marriage sent to the respondent's address was
again returned to sender for the reason "unknown at given
address." Nevertheless, a certificate of finality and decree of
absolute nullity was issued by the court.
In Civil Case No. 1799-08 filed before RTC Imus 22, a copy of the
order setting the pretrial was sent to the respondent's address,
but was returned to sender for the reason "unlocated, no such
name and number of house on given address."301 A copy of the
decision granting the petition for the annulment of marriage sent
to the respondent's address was again returned to sender for the
reason "unlocated/unknown." Nevertheless, a certificate of
finality was issued by the court. In other cases before RTC Imus 22,
copies of the decision sent to the respondents' addresses were
returned to sender with the notations "unknown," "no such name,"
or "no such address." Yet, certificates of finality were issued by the
court.
These notations should have put Judges Felicen and
Mangrobang and Clerks of Court Marasigan and Cordez on
guard regarding the propriety of issuing a certificate of finality,
considering that the notations meant that this was not just a
simple matter of failure of the parties to inform the court of their
new addresses. At best their failure to be circumspect constituted
neglect of duty. At worst, it was another manifestation of the
conspiracy to grant fast and easy annulments to those who
needed it.
Grant of Petitions at Extraordinary Speed
In RTC Imus 20, 50 out of the 65 cases examined were granted in
six months or less from filing.302 Sixteen cases were granted in
three months, 12 in four months, 13 in five months, and nine in six
months.
In RTC Imus 21, 15 out of the 62 cases examined were granted in
six months or less from filing.303 One case each was granted in
two, three or four months; seven cases in five months; and five
cases in six months.
In RTC Imus 22, 46 out of the 118 cases examined were granted in
six months or less from filing.304 One case was granted in record 25
days. Five cases were granted in two months, 6 in three months,
21 in four months, 7 in five months, and 6 in six months.
In RTC Dasmariñas 90, out of the 88 cases examined, 50 were
granted in six months or less from filing.305 Three cases were
granted in three months, 10 in four months, 14 in five months, and
23 in six months.
Considering that this Court continuously reminds our judges to
resolve cases with dispatch, we cannot be so quick to reprove
the practice of the four respondent judges herein. After all, as we
said in Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice: 306
 Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an
injudicious performance of functions. For one's prompt dispatch
may be another's undue haste. The orderly administration of
justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration,
with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each
case.307
However, the surrounding circumstances in these cases for the
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage render the
speed with which they were decided suspect.
More important, the findings in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 involving
Judge Cabrera-Faller include those of the judicial audit team
showing a number of criminal and civil cases pending before RTC
Dasmariñas 90 that have not been acted upon for a
considerable length of time; some of them, even as far back as
the time of their filing.
During the material period when Judge Mangrobang was
deciding the declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage
cases with extraordinary speed, he failed to resolve two pending
motions before his sala within the 90-day reglementary period.
In Castro v. Mangrobang,308 this Court found him guilty of undue
delay in resolving pending matters and fined him in the amount
of ₱l0,000. In another case, he was admonished for his failure to
decide a motion on time.309
Judge Felicen had also been previously admonished to be more
mindful of his duties, particularly in the prompt disposition of cases
pending and/or submitted for decision and resolution before his
sala.310
These independent findings lend weight to the conclusion of the
OCA and the judicial audit teams that the irregularities in the
proceedings before the four courts were systemic and
deliberate, rather than caused by inadvertence or mere
negligence. If it is true that the four judges are committed to the
speedy resolution and disposition of cases, this commitment
should have been reflected in all the cases pending before their
courts, and not just in the declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage cases.
Lack of Registration with the Local Civil Registrar
Under Section 19(3) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a decision of the
court granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage becomes final upon the expiration of 15 days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal, is filed by any
of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General. If
the parties have no properties, the court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding decree of declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage upon the finality of the
decision.311 Otherwise, upon the finality of the decision, the court
shall observe the procedure prescribed for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
including custody, support of common children, and delivery of
their presumptive legitimes.
In both cases, the entry of judgment shall be registered in the civil
registry where the marriage was recorded and in the civil registry
where the family court granting the petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage is located.312
If the parties have properties, the decree of declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage shall be issued only
after the registration of the approved partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses in the proper Register of Deeds
where the real properties are located; and after the delivery of
the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound
securities.313 The approved deed of partition shall be attached to
the decree.314
Again, in both cases in which the parties have or do not have
properties, the decree shall be registered in the civil registry
where the marriage was registered, the civil registry of the place
where the family court is situated, as well as in the National
Census and Statistics Office.315
In these administrative cases, absent a finding by the OCA and
the judicial audit teams that the parties in the identified cases
15
have properties, the Court cannot condemn the practice of the
issuance on the same day of the certificate of finality and the
Page
decree of declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage. The rule is clear that courts shall forthwith issue the
corresponding decree upon the finality of the decision if the
parties have no properties. Considering further that both the entry
of judgment and the decree must be registered with the civil
registry where the marriage was registered and the civil registry of
the place where the family court is situated, it is in fact easier for
the parties to secure both from the courts on the same day and
have them registered at the same time.
Questionable Raffling of Cases
The recommendation of Justice Paredes regarding the dismissal
of charges against Clerk of Court Eusebio is well taken. Records
show that Civil Case No. 1852-08 was filed on 1 February 2008 and
received by RTC Imus 20 on 4 February 2008. The stamp of the
Office of the Clerk of Court indicating that it was filed on 24
February 2008 was only due to inadvertence.
The same is true with Civil Case No. 3309-09. The case was raffled
and transmitted to RTC Imus 20 on 23 November 2009, and the
statement in the return of summons that an attempt to serve the
summons was made on 6 November 2009 was merely due to
Sheriff Pagunsan's failure to update the old return format. With
regard to Civil Case No. 3676-10, summons was personally
received by the respondent on l 4 April 2010, not 25 March 2010.
The finding that most of the cases were filed and raffled on the
same day, without more, cannot make the judges and court
personnel administratively liable. Under Supreme Court Circular
No. 7-74 dated 23 September 1974,316 the notice of the day and
hour of the raffle should be posted prominently on the bulletin
boards of the courts and at a conspicuous spot on the main door
of the session hall of the executive judge. Thus, it is not impossible
for counsels to habitually choose the date of the raffle as the
date on which to file their petitions for whatever reason.
Other Irregularities
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, other irregularities committed in RTC
Dasmariñas 90 include the continuation of proceedings even
without the appearance of the Solicitor General, the
continuation of the pretrial despite the non-submission of pretrial
briefs by the parties, the lack of formal offer of evidence in two
cases submitted for decision, the non-attachment of the minutes
to the records, the submission of unsigned and photocopied
psychological evaluation reports of the psychiatrist/psychologist,
and the submission of an unsigned jurat in the judicial affidavit of
the petitioner in one case.
These irregularities speak for themselves and require no in-depth
discussion. In Maquilan v. Maquilan, 317 we enunciated that the
appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the public
prosecutor in proceedings for the declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage are mandatory. Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, the failure of the petitioner to file a pretrial brief or even
comply with its required contents has the same effect as the
failure to appear at the pretrial,318 which means the dismissal of
the case.319 While an oral offer of evidence is allowed by the
Rules of Court,320 the offer should be reflected at least in the
minutes of the proceedings or in the court order issued at the end
of each proceeding covering what transpired during the court
session. As against the finding of the judicial audit team that no
formal offer of evidence was made in two cases submitted for
decision, no minutes of the proceedings or court order was
submitted by Judge Cabrera-Faller to controvert the finding.
In A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302, other irregularities committed in RTC Imus
22 include the rendition of judgment ahead of the issuance of
the order admitting the documentary exhibits and the giving of
due course to a petition without a verification and certification
against forum shopping. We find no merit in the explanation of
Judge Mangrobang regarding the date indicated in the order
admitting the documentary exhibits. He says that the date, which
shows that the order admitting the exhibits was issued four days
after the date of the decision, was a mere typographical error. As
keenly observed by the OCA and the judicial audit teams, even
the stitching and the pagination of these two rulings show that
the decision is ahead of the order admitting the documentary
exhibits.321 As regards the missing page containing the verification
and certification against forum shopping, its alleged accidental
detachment from the records could have been proven by a gap
in the pagination of the records. No evidence of this sort was
offered by Judge Mangrobang.
 Again, in RTC Dasmariñas 90, one petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage was granted even without the appearance of
the parties. Judge Cabrera-Faller merely explained that a
hearing was conducted, but she did not belie the finding that the
parties had not at all appeared before her during the entire
proceedings.
LIABILITY AND APPROPRIATE PENALTIES
Judges Felicen, Quisumbing, Mangrobang and Cabrera-Faller
A blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.322 This Court has ruled that
for a judge to be liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not
enough that the decision, order or actuation in the performance
of official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.323 It
must also be proven that the judge was moved by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or committed an error so
egregious that it amounted to bad faith.324
In Department of Justice v. Mislang, 325 we said:
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it
must also be established that he was moved by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and
apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand.
When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
betrays the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of
the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe it to the public
to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more
than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules; they must know them by heart. When the
inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and
elemental rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his
functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of
the position and the prestigious title he holds or he is too vicious
that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both cases, the judge's
dismissal will be in order.
But when there is persistent disregard of well-known rules, judges
not only become liable for gross ignorance of the law, they
commit gross misconduct as well.326 It is then that a mistake can
no longer be regarded as a mere error of judgment, but one
purely motivated by a wrongful intent.327
The four courts herein have allowed themselves to become
havens for "paid-for annulments." Their apparent conspiracy with
the counsels of the parties in order to reflect paper compliance
with the rules if not complete disregard thereof, as well as their
failure to manage and monitor the regularity in the performance
of duties by their court personnel, shows not only gross ignorance
of the law but also a wrongful intention that smacks of
misconduct.
Misconduct refers to any unlawful conduct on the part of a judge
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of
the cause.328 It entails wrongful or improper conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or deliberate purpose.329 Simple
misconduct is defined as an unacceptable behavior that
transgresses the established rules of conduct for public
officers.330 On the other hand, gross misconduct connotes
something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be
excused; flagrant; shameful."331
The four judges also violated the following Canons of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:332
CANON 2
Integrity
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
16
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Page
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
xxxx
CANON 6
Competence and Diligence
xxxx
Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and
enhance their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary
for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage
for this purpose of the training and other facilities which should be
made available, under judicial control, to judges.
xxxx
Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
xxxx
Section 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with
the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
As judges, more than anyone else, they are required to uphold
and apply the law. They should maintain the same respect and
reverence accorded by the Constitution to our society's
institutions, particularly marriage. Instead, their actuations
relegated marriage to nothing more than an annoyance to be
eliminated. In the process, they also made a mockery of the rules
promulgated by this Court.
Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious charges
under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Justices and
judges found guilty of these charges may be penalized by any of
the following:
1. Dismissal from the service. forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and di8qualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided. however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months: or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.333
We have had occasion to impose the penalty of suspension for a
period of three months on judges found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and gross misconduct.334 However, in a line of
cases335 where the judges found guilty of the same offenses had
already compulsorily retired from service and therefore could no
longer be penalized with suspension, a fine was ordered
deducted from their retirement benefits.
In Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller,336 Judge Cabrera-Faller was ordered
dismissed from the service for gross ignorance of the law. As
stated above, Judge Mangrobang was found guilty of undue
delay in resolving pending matters in Castro v.
Mangrobang.337 He was also previously reprimanded in Miranda
v. Mangrobang338 for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the judiciary. In Bartolome v. Maranan,339 Judge Felicen was also
involved in an alleged pattern of corruption involving the
annulment of marriage cases in RTC Imus 20.
Considering that Judge Cabrera-Faller has already been
dismissed from service, and Judges Mangrobang and Felicen
have already compulsorily retired, the penalty of suspension can
no longer be imposed on them. Thus, they are hereby ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of ₱80,000 each. Notably, Judge
Mangrobang had already passed away. At any rate, the fine
shall be deducted from the retirement benefits of Judges
Mangrobang and Felicen. The same fine shall be deducted from
whatever amounts may still be due Judge Cabrera-Faller.
The irregularities committed in these administrative cases took
place and festered under the watch of Judge Quisumbing. As
executive judge, he performs the functions of a court
administrator within his administrative area.340 He was supposed
to provide leadership and coordinate the management of the
courts, as well as implement policies concerning court operations
laid down by the Supreme Court.341 Unfortunately, instead of
 exercising his prerogatives in order that those under his
management be kept in line, he joined in the commission of
some of the reprehensible practices described in these
administrative cases.
Thus, the Court cannot adopt the recommendation of Justice
Paredes to completely absolve Judge Quisumbing of all liability.
To note, the sala of Judge Quisumbing was also involved in the
irregularities regarding cases where parties had the same address
as those in another case. Of the four pairs of parties before the
RTC Imus 21 who had the same addresses, three were
represented by the same counsels. Judge Quisumbing also failed
to observe the mandatory requirement of ordering the
investigating public prosecutor to determine whether collusion
existed between the parties in cases for the declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage.
Nevertheless, considering that his infractions are not as grave as
those of the other three judges, he shall be liable for gross
ignorance of the law and simple misconduct. In Adriano v.
Villanueva,342 a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
simple misconduct, and undue delay in deciding a case was
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of ₱40,000. In the case of
Judge Quisumbing, a fine in the amount of ₱21,000 shall suffice.
Considering that he had retired from judicial service, this amount
shall be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa; and Process Servers Ferrer,
Azcueta and Pontejos
We have had occasion to emphasize the importance of the
responsibilities of process servers in the efficient and proper
administration of justice:
A process server should be fully cognizant not only of the nature
and responsibilities of his task but also of their impact in the
speedy administration of justice. It is through the process server
that a defendant learns of the action brought against him by the
complainant. More importantly, it is through the service of
summons of the process server that the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the defendant. As a public officer, the
respondent is bound virtute oficii to bring to the discharge of his
duties the prudence, caution, and attention which careful men
usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Relevant in
the case at bar is the salutary reminder from this Court that the
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel - hence, it
becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in
the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true
temple of justice.343
Sheriffs and process servers are required to exercise utmost care
in seeing to it that all notices assigned to them are duly served
upon the parties.344 Their failure to perform their duties can never
be excused by a heavy work load.345
Again, in a line of cases,346 we have ruled that the failure to serve
court processes promptly and properly amounts to simple
neglect of duty. It is the failure of employees to give their
attention to a task expected of them, which thereby shows a
disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.347 On
the other hand, there is gross neglect of duty when, from the
gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, the neglect
becomes so serious in character as to endanger or threaten
public welfare.348
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service,349 simple neglect of duty is punishable by suspension
for one month and one day to six months for the first offense and
dismissal from service for the second offense. Gross neglect of
duty is punishable by dismissal from service for the first offense.
We find Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa and Process Servers Ferrer,
Azcueta, and Pontejos guilty of simple neglect of duty.
In Holasca v. Pagunsan,350 Sheriff Pagunsan was found guilty of
gross inefficiency, for which he was suspended for a period of
nine months and one day without pay. Since gross inefficiency is
closely related to gross neglect, as both involve specific acts of
omission on the part of the employee,351 that previous
17
administrative liability shall make this instant administrative
infraction a second offense that should merit the severe penalty
Page
of dismissal from service.
In Espero v. De Villa, 352 Sheriff De Villa was found guilty of simple
neglect of duty for his failure to file a retun1 of a writ of execution
and to make periodic reports to the court. The penalty of
suspension for a period of one month and one day was meted
out to him. As this is already his second offense, Sheriff De Villa
should be dismissed from service.
In Tan v. Azcueta,353 Process Server Azcueta was found guilty of
simple neglect of duty and was accordingly reprimanded and
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be
dealt with more severely. While mitigating circumstances were
appreciated in that case, making the penalty imposed lower
than that prescribed by the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, there is no question that
this is already his second offense. Accordingly, Process Server
Azcueta should also be dismissed from service.
In the case of Process Server Pontejos, he is hereby found guilty of
two counts of simple neglect of duty in A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2301 and
RTJ- 11-2302. Again under the Revised Unifo1m Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, if the respondent is found
guilty of two charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed shall
correspond to the more serious charge or count, and the other
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.354 The
presence of an aggravating circumstance shall increase the
penalty to the maximum provided under the rules.355 As the
maximum of the penalty for simple neglect of duty is dismissal
from service, that penalty should be imposed on Process Server
Pontejos.
The foregoing notwithstanding, we have always taken
advantage of every opportunity to show compassion and
leniency in the imposition of administrative penalties on erring
court employees. This is because work is as much a source of
one's dignity as it is of one's income. While this Court will never
tolerate any act of wrongdoing in the performance of duties, it
would not be remiss in its mandate, should it extend just one more
chance for court employees to improve their ways. That chance
shall be given to Sheriffs Pagunsan and De Villa and to Process
Servers Azcueta and Pontejos. They would do well not to waste it.
The penalty of suspension for a period of one year shall instead
be imposed on Sheriff Pagunsan. On the other hand, the penalty
of suspension for a period of six months shall be imposed on
Sheriff De Villa and Process Servers Azcueta and Pontejos.
The penalty of suspension for one month and one day shall be
meted out to Process Server Ferrer for the instant first offense of
simple neglect of duty.
Clerks of Court Cordez and Marasigan and OIC Suluen
Clerks of Court Marasigan and Cordez in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2302
and OIC Suluen in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301 are likewise found guilty
of simple neglect of duty. They failed to monitor compliance with
the rules and regulations governing the performance of duties by
court personnel under their administrative supervision. Also, Clerks
of Court Marasigan and Cordez failed to exercise the required
circumspection prior to issuing certificates of finality in declaration
of nullity and annulment of marriage cases, considering that
notices of the court's decisions had not been served at the time
upon the respondents.
The penalty of suspension for one month and one day shall be
meted out to them for the instant first offense of simple neglect of
duty.
Considering that Clerk of Court Cordez has transferred to another
government agency, the penalty of suspension can no longer be
imposed on her. Accordingly, in lieu of suspension, a penalty of
fine equivalent to her salary for a period of one month shall be
imposed.
Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo
In Japson v. Civil Service Commission, 356 the petitioner therein was
a former senior member services representative assigned at the
Social Security System (SSS) branch in Baguio City. In conspiracy
with others, the petitioner enticed benefit claimants to file their
claims before SSS Baguio, where he could guarantee prompt
releases because he was assigned at the claims section. As the
claimants were residing in outlying provinces, they used in their
claim forms the address of the petitioner in Baguio City. When the
claims were released, the petitioner was able to secure a chunk
of each claimant's benefits.
 In a case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service against the
petitioner, the SSS found him guilty on all counts. It ruled that it
was not necessary to show concrete proof of the receipt of a
consideration for the arrangement, following the principle of res
ipsa loquitur. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission ruled that
while there was no strong evidence showing that the petitioner
received, collected, or took a share from the benefits awarded
to the claimants, he was still liable. His irregular conduct and
indiscriminate judgment relative to the handling of the claims
were found to have caused a serious breach in the integrity of
the system observed by the SSS, as well as endangered the
welfare of the public at large.
After the denial of his petition for review before the CA, the
petitioner therein came to this Court claiming, among others, that
there was no evidence showing that he had specifically
authorized any of the claimants involved to use his address. The
Court denied the petition for lack of merit. We ruled that his acts
clearly reflected his dishonesty and grave misconduct. He was
less than forthright in his dealings and led claimants to believe
that he could give them undue advantage by processing their
claims faster than others without the same connection.
The surrounding facts in Japson are analogous to those in the
case of Process Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo. Both
involve the use of a government employee's address in order for
others to comply with the residence requirement laid down by
the rules. In their defense, the petitioner therein and Process
Server Azcueta and Social Worker Seri lo herein claim that they
did not authorize anyone to use their address. As in Japson, the
Court's conclusion here shall be the same.
Considering, however, that the infraction committed by Process
Server Azcueta and Social Worker Serilo is not directly connected
with the performance of their official duties, they are liable not for
misconduct but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. "The word 'prejudicial' means 'detrimental or derogatory
to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing about a wrong
result."’357 Their conduct placed the entire judiciary in a bad
light;358 that our rules are easily circumvented by our very own.
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is punishable by suspension for six months and one day to
one year for the first offense and dismissal from service for the
second offense. Accordingly, the penalty of suspension for six
months and one day shall be meted out to Social Worker Serilo
for the instant first offense of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
As regards Process Server Azcueta, in addition to his suspension
for six months for the second offense of simple neglect of duty,
the penalty of suspension for six months and one day shall be
meted out to him for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court has arrived at the
following findings:
1. Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
A FINE in the amount of ₱80,000 shall be deducted from
his retirement benefits.
2. Judge Norberto J. Quisumbing, Jr., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and simple
misconduct. A FINE in the amount of ₱21,000 shall be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
3. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. A FINE in the amount of ₱80,000 shall
be deducted from his retirement benefits.
4. Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller, Presiding Judge,
18
Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90, is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and gross
Page
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Considering that she had been
previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4141-RTJ), a FINE in the amount
of ₱80,000 shall be deducted from whatever amounts
may still be due her.
5. Atty. Allan Sly M. Marasigan, Clerk of Court V,
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. He is
ordered SUSPENDED for a period of one month and one
day.
6. Atty. Seter M. Dela Cruz-Cordez, Clerk of Court V,
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, is
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is ordered
to pay a FINE equivalent to her salary for a period of
one month to be taken from whatever sums may be
due her as retirement, leave or other benefits.
7. Ophelia G. Suluen, Officer-in-Charge and Legal
Researcher, Regional Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
Branch 90, is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She
is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of one month and
one day.
8. Anselmo P. Pagunsan, Jr., Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is found GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a
period of one year.
9. Hipolito O. Ferrer, Process Server, Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, is found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of
one month and one day.
10. Wilmar M. De Villa, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, is found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of
six months.
11. Elmer S. Azcueta, Process Server, Regional Trial Court
of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, is found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. He is ordered SUSPENDED for a
period of one year and one day.
12. Rizalino Rinaldi B. Pontejos, Process Server, Regional
Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90, is
found GUILTY of two counts of simple neglect of duty.
He is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of six months.
13. Alma N. Serilo, Social Worker Officer II, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, is
found GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. She is ordered SUSPENDED for a period of
six months and one day.
Atty. Allan Sly M. Marasigan, Atty. Seter M. Dela Cruz-Cordez,
Ophelia G. Suluen, Anselmo P. Pagunsan, Jr., Hipolito 0. Ferrer,
Wilmar M. De Villa, Elmer S. Azcueta, Rizalino Rinaldi B. Pontejos
and Alma N. Serilo are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall warrant a more severe penalty.
The complaints against Atty. Regalado E. Eusebio, Clerk of Court
VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite; Imelda M. Juntilla, Court Interpreter; and Teresita P. Reyes,
Court Stenographer, both of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 20, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Court hereby ORDERS the Office of the Bar Confidant to
submit, within 30 days from notice, its compliance with the
Resolution dated 12 August 2014, which required its appropriate
action relative to the findings on the possible involvement of
private practitioners in the anomalies in the declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage cases.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General, and the Prosecutor-General for their
information and possible remedial action to prevent farther
irregularities, including possibly by persons under their supervision.
The Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc shall prepare the
appropriate cover letter therefor.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
 [G.R. NO. 161135. April 8, 2005]
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC., Petitioners, v. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, and NEAL B. CHRISTIAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was
filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the
pendency of the case? This is the basic issue raised in this petition
for the Court's consideration.
Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and
Travel, Inc., through Atty. Leonor L. Infante and Rodney David
Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, obtained
from private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by
three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and
14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest
of 15% per annum payable every three months.1 In a letter dated
16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corporation
that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter
payment in the total amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid interests
in the total amount of US$13,500.2
On 2 February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a complaint for a
sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation,
Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. The complaint alleged as follows: On 7
August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997, the petitioner, as
well as its president and vice-president obtained loans from him
in the total amount of US$150,000 payable after three years, with
an interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or every three
months. For a while, they paid an interest of 15% per annum every
three months in accordance with the three promissory notes.
However, starting January 1998 until December 1998, they paid
him only an interest of 6% per annum, instead of 15% per annum,
in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes. Thus,
Christian prayed that the trial court order them to pay him jointly
and solidarily the amount of US$150,000 representing the total
amount of the loans; US$13,500 representing unpaid interests from
January 1998 until December 1998; P100,000 for moral
damages; P50,000 for attorney's fees; and the cost of the suit.3
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-
president, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of
action and novation of the principal obligations. According to
them, Christian had no cause of action because the three
promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. In
December 1997, since the petitioner corporation was
experiencing huge losses due to the Asian financial crisis,
Christian agreed (a) to waive the interest of 15% per annum, and
(b) accept payments of the principal loans in installment basis,
the amount and period of which would depend on the state of
business of the petitioner corporation. Thus, the petitioner paid
Christian capital repayment in the amount of US$750 per month
from January 1998 until the time the complaint was filed in
February 1999. The petitioner and its co-defendants then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed and that Christian be ordered to
pay P1 million as moral damages; P500,000 as exemplary
damages; and P100,000 as attorney's fees.4
In due course and after hearing, the trial court rendered a
decision5 on 5 May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes
dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and
demandable and that the interest on the loans had been
reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then
ordered the petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of
$100,000 representing the principal obligation covered by the
promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997, "plus
interest of 6% per month thereon until fully paid, with all interest
payments already paid by the defendant to the plaintiff to be
deducted therefrom."
The trial court ratiocinated in this wise:
(1) There was no novation of defendant's obligation to the
plaintiff. Under Article 1292 of the Civil Code, there is an implied
novation only if the old and the new obligation be on every point
19
incompatible with one another.
The test of incompatibility between the two obligations or
Page
contracts, according to an imminent author, is whether they can
stand together, each one having an independent existence. If
they cannot, they are incompatible, and the subsequent
obligation novates the first (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 384). Otherwise, the old obligation
will continue to subsist subject to the modifications agreed upon
by the parties. Thus, it has been written that accidental
modifications in an existing obligation do not extinguish it by
novation. Mere modifications of the debt agreed upon between
the parties do not constitute novation. When the changes refer to
secondary agreement and not to the object or principal
conditions of the contract, there is no novation; such changes will
produce modifications of incidental facts, but will not extinguish
the original obligation. Thus, the acceptance of partial payments
or a partial remission does not involve novation (id., p. 387).
Neither does the reduction of the amount of an obligation
amount to a novation because it only means a partial remission
or condonation of the same debt.
In the instant case, the Court is of the view that the parties merely
intended to change the rate of interest from 15% per annum to
6% per annum when the defendant started paying $750 per
month which payments were all accepted by the plaintiff from
January 1998 onward. The payment of the principal obligation,
however, remains unaffected which means that the defendant
should still pay the plaintiff $50,000 on August 9, 1999, March 14,
2000 and July 14, 2000.
(2) When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of
the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date
however, the first and the second promissory notes have already
matured. Hence, payment is already due.
Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by
evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff
had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint,
as defendants' obligation are not yet due and demandable
then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory
notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the
obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due
and demandable.
(3) Individual defendants Rodney Hegerty and Atty. Leonor L.
Infante can not be held personally liable for the obligations
contracted by the defendant corporation it being clear that they
merely acted in representation of the defendant corporation in
their capacity as General Manager and President, respectively,
when they signed the promissory notes as evidenced by Board
Resolution No. 1(94) passed by the Board of Directors of the
defendant corporation (Exhibit "4").6
In its decision7 of 5 September 2003, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court, holding as follows:
In the case at bench, there is no incompatibility because the
changes referred to by appellant Swagman consist only in the
manner of payment. . . .
Appellant Swagman's interpretation that the three (3) promissory
notes have been novated by reason of appellee Christian's
acceptance of the monthly payments of US$750.00 as capital
repayments continuously even after the filing of the instant case
is a little bit strained considering the stiff requirements of the law
on novation that the intention to novate must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken. Under the circumstances, the more
reasonable interpretation of the act of the appellee Christian in
receiving the monthly payments of US$750.00 is that appellee
Christian merely allowed appellant Swagman to pay whatever
amount the latter is capable of. This interpretation is supported by
the letter of demand dated December 16, 1998 wherein
appellee Christian demanded from appellant Swagman to return
the principal loan in the amount of US$150,000 plus unpaid
interest in the amount of US$13,500.00
...
Appellant Swagman, likewise, contends that, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, appellee Christian ha[d] no cause of
action because none of the promissory notes was due and
demandable.
Again, We are not persuaded.
...
 In the case at bench, while it is true that appellant Swagman
raised in its Answer the issue of prematurity in the filing of the
complaint, appellant Swagman nonetheless failed to object to
appellee Christian's presentation of evidence to the effect that
the promissory notes have become due and demandable.
The afore-quoted rule allows a complaint which states no cause
of action to be cured either by evidence presented without
objection or, in the event of an objection sustained by the court,
by an amendment of the complaint with leave of court (Herrera,
Remedial Law, Vol. VII, 1997 ed., p. 108).8
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution of 4 December 2003,9 the petitioner
came to this Court raising the following issues:
I. WHERE THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DROPPING TWO
DEFENDANTS HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, MAY THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS STILL STUBBORNLY CONSIDER
THEM AS APPELLANTS WHEN THEY DID NOT
APPEAL?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ii. Where there is no cause of action, is the decision of the lower
court valid?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
III. MAY THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY AFFIRM A
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS INVALID DUE TO LACK
OF CAUSE OF ACTION?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
IV. Where there is a valid novation, may the original terms of
contract which has been novated still prevail?10
The petitioner harps on the absence of a cause of action at the
time the private respondent's complaint was filed with the trial
court. In connection with this, the petitioner raises the issue of
novation by arguing that its obligations under the three
promissory notes were novated by the renegotiation that
happened in December 1997 wherein the private respondent
agreed to waive the interest in each of the three promissory
notes and to accept US$750 per month as installment payment
for the principal loans in the total amount of US$150,000. Lastly,
the petitioner questions the act of the Court of Appeals in
considering Hegerty and Infante as appellants when they no
longer appealed because the trial court had already absolved
them of the liability of the petitioner corporation.
On the other hand, the private respondent asserts that this
petition is "a mere ploy to continue delaying the payment of a
just obligation." Anent the fact that Hegerty and Atty. Infante
were considered by the Court of Appeals as appellants, the
private respondent finds it immaterial because they are not
affected by the assailed decision anyway.
Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission by which a party violates
the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not to violate such right; andcralawlibrary
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.11
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a
cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an
action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.
It is undisputed that the three promissory notes were for the
amount of P50,000 each and uniformly provided for (1) a term of
three years; (2) an interest of 15 % per annum, payable quarterly;
and (3) the repayment of the principal loans after three years
from their respective dates. However, both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court found that a renegotiation of the three
promissory notes indeed happened in December 1997 between
the private respondent and the petitioner resulting in the
reduction - not waiver - of the interest from 15% to 6% per annum,
which from then on was payable monthly, instead of quarterly.
The term of the principal loans remained unchanged in that they
20
were still due three years from the respective dates of the
promissory notes. Thus, at the time the complaint was filed with
Page
the trial court on 2 February 1999, none of the three promissory
notes was due yet; although, two of the promissory notes with the
due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000 matured during
the pendency of the case with the trial court. Both courts also
found that the petitioner had been religiously paying the private
respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and even
during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that
the private respondent had accepted all these monthly
payments.
With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that
when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed
with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as
yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in
violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by
the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action,
the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in
court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his
complaint.
Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate
the modified terms of the three promissory notes and that the
payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the
complaint was filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint,
citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads:
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. - When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with
the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and
the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court
may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be
made.
According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of
Appeals, this Section allows a complaint that does not state a
cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without
objection during the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private
respondent had no cause of action when he filed the complaint
for a sum of money and damages because none of the three
promissory notes was due yet, he could nevertheless recover on
the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March
1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in
view of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during the
trial.
Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case
may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive
manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other
matters included in the case may be determined in a single
proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.12 Section 5
thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the
issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during
the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint
which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence
presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a
cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but
the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
For example, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a
condition precedent upon which the cause of action depends,
evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled
when the complaint was filed may be presented during the trial,
and the complaint may accordingly be amended
thereafter.13 Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni,14 this Court upheld the
trial court in taking cognizance of an otherwise defective
complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the plaintiff
during the trial. In that case, there was in fact a cause of action
and the only problem was the insufficiency of the allegations in
 the complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. Court of
Appeals.15
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet
accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a
cause of action while the case is pending.16 Such an action is
prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which
should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably
filed by the defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a
person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to
answer for complaints which are immature. As this Court
eloquently said in Surigao Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris:17
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either
at law or in equity, that to recover at all there must be some
cause of action at the commencement of the suit. As observed
by counsel for appellees, there are reasons of public policy why
there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and
why people who are in no default and against whom there is yet
no cause of action should not be summoned before the public
tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. We say
groundless because if the action is immature, it should not be
entertained, and an action prematurely brought is a groundless
suit.
It is true that an amended complaint and the answer thereto
take the place of the originals which are thereby regarded as
abandoned (Reynes v. CompañÃa General de Tabacos [1912],
21 Phil. 416; Ruyman and Farris v. Director of Lands [1916], 34 Phil.,
428) and that "the complaint and answer having been
superseded by the amended complaint and answer thereto, and
the answer to the original complaint not having been presented
in evidence as an exhibit, the trial court was not authorized to
take it into account." (Bastida v. Menzi & Co. [1933], 58 Phil., 188.)
But in none of these cases or in any other case have we held that
if a right of action did not exist when the original complaint was
filed, one could be created by filing an amended complaint. In
some jurisdictions in the United States what was termed an
"imperfect cause of action" could be perfected by suitable
amendment (Brown v. Galena Mining & Smelting Co., 32 Kan.,
528; Hooper v. City of Atlanta, 26 Ga. App., 221) and this is
virtually permitted in Banzon and Rosauro v. Sellner ([1933], 58
Phil., 453); Asiatic Potroleum [sic] Co. v. Veloso ([1935], 62 Phil.,
683); and recently in Ramos v. Gibbon (38 Off. Gaz., 241). That,
however, which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by
amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a
cause of action: Nihil de re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jus
accresceret habet.
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that unless the
plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his
action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied
by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending,
and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such
after-accrued cause of action is not permissible. (Emphasis ours).
Hence, contrary to the holding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, the defect of lack of cause of action at the
commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of this case arising from the
alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August 1999
and 14 March 2000.
Anent the issue of novation, this Court observes that the petitioner
corporation argues the existence of novation based on its own
version of what transpired during the renegotiation of the three
promissory notes in December 1997. By using its own version of
facts, the petitioner is, in a way, questioning the findings of facts
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal to the Supreme Court18 as long as they are borne out by
the record or are based on substantial evidence.19 The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by
the lower courts. Among the exceptions is when the finding of
fact of the trial court or the Court of Appeals is not supported by
21
the evidence on record or is based on a misapprehension of
facts. Such exception obtains in the present case.20
Page
This Court finds to be contrary to the evidence on record the
finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
renegotiation in December 1997 resulted in the reduction of the
interest from 15% to 6% per annum and that the monthly
payments of US$750 made by the petitioner were for the
reduced interests.
It is worthy to note that the cash voucher dated January
199821 states that the payment of US$750 represents "INVESTMENT
PAYMENT." All the succeeding cash vouchers describe the
payments from February 1998 to September 1999 as "CAPITAL
REPAYMENT."22 All these cash vouchers served as receipts
evidencing private respondent's acknowledgment of the
payments made by the petitioner: two of which were signed by
the private respondent himself and all the others were signed by
his representatives. The private respondent even identified and
confirmed the existence of these receipts during the
hearing.23 Significantly, cognizant of these receipts, the private
respondent applied these payments to the three consolidated
principal loans in the summary of payments he submitted to the
court.24
Under Article 1253 of the Civil Code, if the debt produces interest,
payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have been
made until the interest has been covered. In this case, the private
respondent would not have signed the receipts describing the
payments made by the petitioner as "capital repayment" if the
obligation to pay the interest was still subsisting. The receipts, as
well as private respondent's summary of payments, lend
credence to petitioner's claim that the payments were for the
principal loans and that the interests on the three consolidated
loans were waived by the private respondent during the
undisputed renegotiation of the loans on account of the business
reverses suffered by the petitioner at the time.
There was therefore a novation of the terms of the three
promissory notes in that the interest was waived and the principal
was payable in monthly installments of US$750. Alterations of the
terms and conditions of the obligation would generally result only
in modificatory novation unless such terms and conditions are
considered to be the essence of the obligation itself.25 The
resulting novation in this case was, therefore, of the modificatory
type, not the extinctive type, since the obligation to pay a sum of
money remains in force.
Thus, since the petitioner did not renege on its obligation to pay
the monthly installments conformably with their new agreement
and even continued paying during the pendency of the case,
the private respondent had no cause of action to file the
complaint. It is only upon petitioner's default in the payment of
the monthly amortizations that a cause of action would arise and
give the private respondent a right to maintain an action against
the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
obstinately included its President Infante and Vice-President
Hegerty as appellants even if they did not appeal the trial court's
decision since they were found to be not personally liable for the
obligation of the petitioner. Indeed, the Court of Appeals erred in
referring to them as defendants-appellants; nevertheless, that
error is no cause for alarm because its ruling was clear that the
petitioner corporation was the one solely liable for its obligation.
In fact, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court, which means that it also upheld the latter's ruling that
Hegerty and Infante were not personally liable for the pecuniary
obligations of the petitioner to the private respondent.
In sum, based on our disquisition on the lack of cause of action
when the complaint for sum of money and damages was filed by
the private respondent, the petition in the case at bar is
impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of 5
September 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68109, which affirmed the Decision of 5 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 59, granting in part private
respondent's complaint for sum of money and damages, and its
Resolution of 4 December 2003, which denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-R is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of cause of action.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. L-18453 September 29, 1962
CAMPOS RUEDA CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, as Presiding Judge, HON. BALTAZAR M.
VILLANUEVA, HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. AMANDO C.
BUGAYONG, as Associate Judges, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, and MANUEL MUYOT, respondents.
Montenegro, Madayag, Viola and Hernandez for petitioner.
Per O. Olandesca for respondent Manuel Muyot.
DIZON, J.:
Respondent Muyot was employed by petitioner at its gasoline
station located at 1012 Azcarraga St. (now Recto Avenue),
Manila, at a monthly salary of P200.00 from May 21, 1949 to May
31, 1953, and at P230.00 from June 1 to December 31, 1953. On
November 26, 1958 he filed a complaint against petitioner with
the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1140-V) to recover
compensation for alleged overtime, Sunday and holiday services
rendered during said period.
On December 8, 1958 petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint
on the following grounds: that the claims set forth therein were
barred by (a) the statute of limitations; (b) the decision rendered
by Regional Office No. 1, Department of Labor in Case No. C-
4364 entitled "Manuel Muyot Complainant, vs. Super Service and
Auto Supply, Jose A. Campos, Manager, Respondent"; and by
the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case
No. 30138 entitled "Manuel Muyot, Plaintiff, vs. Campos Rueda
Corporation, Defendant", and in Civil Corporation, Civil Case No.
36060 entitled "Campos Rueda petitioner, vs. Juliano E. Estrella,
etc., et al., Respondents".
Respondent Muyot opposed said motion to dismiss alleging that,
as the decisions relied upon therein were rendered by courts that
had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the same did not
constitute res judicata; that his causes of action were not barred
by the statute of limitations because the legal period provided for
in Section 7-A of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1993, was interrupted when he filed a case with
the Department of Labor on October 27, 1955 and another with
the Court of First Instance on July 7, 1956.
On March 17, 1959, petitioner filed a supplementary motion to
dismiss alleging that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter because the complaint did not seek the
reinstatement of Muyot who, according to the complaint,
ceased to be an employee of petitioner since December 31,
1953. In other words, the claim merely involved collection of pay
for overtime, Sunday and holiday work.
On August 3, 1959, the Court of Industrial Relations, through
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, denied petitioner's motion to dismiss
and required him to answer the complaint. In its order of August
15, 1959, the respondent court, in banc, also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
On November 11, 1959, petitioner filed its answer denying
respondent's claim for overtime and Sunday and holiday services
pay. Among other affirmative defenses it reasserted its
contention that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
During the trial, upon motion of respondent Muyot, respondent
court issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the petitioner "to
bring the Daily Time Records of employees working at the Super
Service Station for the years 1952-1953".
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the subpoena on the ground
that (a) it did not reasonably designate the particular employee
or employees' daily time record concerned, but gave a blanket
description which the rules do not allow; (b) that the records
sought to be produced did not appear to be prima
facie relevant to the issue involved in the case and (c) that the
respondent in whose behalf the subpoena duces tecum was
issued had not offered or tendered to advance the reasonable
cost of producing the records sought to be produced.
22
On June 24, 1960, the respondent court, through Judge Jose S.
Bautista, denied the motion to quash, and on July 11, 1960, the
Page
court, in banc, also denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1awphîl.nèt
Hence the present original action for Certiorari, and Prohibition
filed by Campos Rueda Corporation, to annul the respondent
court's orders of August 3 and 15, 1959, June 24 and July 11, 1960
mentioned heretofore.
The allegations made in Muyot's complaint against petitioner
show conclusively that his employment with the latter was
terminated on December 31, 1953 — almost five years before
said complaint was filed; that, without asking for his
reinstatement, neither directly nor indirectly, he only sought to
collect what, in his opinion, was due and payable to him for
overtime Sunday and holiday services he had rendered to his
former employer during the period of his employment.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop, etc. vs. Jimenez Yanson, et al.,
G.R. Nos. L-12341 and L-12345 decided on April 30, 1958, we held:
In the present case, it is apparent that the petition
below is simply for the collection of unpaid salaries and
wages alleged to be due for services rendered years
ago. No labor dispute appears to be presently involved
since the petition itself indicates that the employment
has long terminated and petitioners are not asking that
they be reinstated. Clearly, the petition does not fall
under any of the cases enumerated in the law as
coming within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, so
that it was error for that court not to have ordered its
dismissal.
In the Mindanao Bus Employees, etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., we also held:
The petitioner union claims, that its members employed
by the respondent company are entitled to overtime
wages which have not been paid notwithstanding
repeated demands, and prays 'that after due hearing,
respondent employer be ordered to pay for the herein
claims and for such other relief as justice and equity
may merit.' It is clear that the case is for collection of
overtime wages claimed to be due and unpaid and
does not involve hours of employment under
Commonwealth Act No. 444. Hence the Court does not
have jurisdiction over the case and correctly dismissed
the petition.
Again, in Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13806, decided on May 23, 1960, we
clearly and unequivocably restated the same view as follows:
. . . where the employer-employee relationship is still
existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its
wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks
reinstatement), the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection
with employment, such as those related to the Minimum
Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law. After the
termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is
sought, such claims become mere money claims, and
come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
We are aware that in 2 cases, Mindanao Bus Employees
Labor Union (PLUM) v. Mindanao Bus Co., et al., G.R. No.
L-9795, prom. December 28, 1957; Gomez v. North
Camarines Lumber Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-11945, prom.
August 18, 1958, some statements implying a different
view have been made but we now hold and declare
the principle set forth in the next preceding paragraph
as the one governing all cases of this nature.
Three days after the promulgation of the decision in the Price
Stabilization case (supra), we again held in Sta. Cecilia Saw Mills
Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. Nos. L-14254-55:
It appears from the "compliance" of the respondents . . .
that they are no longer in the service of the petitioner, . .
. and that they are not seeking reinstatement to their
respective positions. Hence no labor dispute is involved
in the case and for that reason the Court of Industrial
Relations has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
respondents' petition.
The decisions abovequoted apply squarely to the present case,
making it clear and beyond question that the Court of Industrial
Relations does not have jurisdiction over respondent Muyot's
claims subject matter of case No. 1140-V filed with said court.
 Respondent Muyot must have finally realized that the Court of
Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction over his claims for,
according to his answer filed in the present case, he had filed on
July 14, 1961 — more than two years after the filing of his action
— a motion for leave to amend his complaint and to admit the
amended complaint attached to his motion, the amendment
consisting precisely in the addition of a third cause of action
where inter alia, he alleged that on May 31, 1953, he was illegally
dismissed by herein petitioner and that, as a consequence he
was entitled to reinstatement, with back wages from the date of
his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.
Obviously the purpose of the amendment was to make his case
fall within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. This attempt is in
our opinion, of no avail.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations made in the complaint or petition.
On the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this
principle applies to proceedings in the Court of Industrial
Relations (Administrator, etc. vs. Alberto, et al., G.R. No. L-12133,
October 31, 1958).
The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place
his action within the jurisdiction of the respondent court could not
be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we
clearly held that "a complaint can not be amended so as to
confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of
action originally set forth was not within the court's jurisdiction."
(51 O.G. 2387, April 28, 1955).
Moreover, the record does not show at all that the Court of
Industrial Relations had admitted the amended complaint.
In the light of our view on the question of jurisdiction, we deem it
unnecessary, for the purpose of this decision, to decide the
questions of res judicata and prescription of the causes of action
raised in the petition under consideration.
WHEREFORE the writs prayed for are granted and, as a
consequence, the orders complained of are annulled. With costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
23
Page
 G.R. No. 206147, January 13, 2016
MICHAEL C. GUY, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GLENN C.
GACOTT, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Michael C. Guy (Guy),
assailing the June 25, 2012 Decision1 and the March 5, 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
94816, which affirmed the June 28, 20093 and February 19,
20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan (RTC), in Civil Case No. 3108, a case for
damages. The assailed RTC orders denied Guy's Motion to Lift
Attachment Upon Personalty5 on the ground that he was not a
judgment debtor.
The Facts
It appears from the records that on March 3, 1997, Atty. Glenn
Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new
transreceivers from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in
Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas (Medestomas),
amounting to a total of PI 8,000.00. On May 10, 1997, due to
major defects, Gacott personally returned the transreceivers to
QSC and requested that they be replaced. Medestomas
received the returned transreceivers and promised to send him
the replacement units within two (2) weeks from May 10, 1997.
Time passed and Gacott did not receive the replacement units
as promised. QSC informed him that there were no available units
and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several
demands, both oral and written, Gacott was never given a
replacement or a refund. The demands caused Gacott to incur
expenses in the total amount of P40,936.44. Thus, Gacott filed a
complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and
Medestomas, afterwhich they filed their Answer, verified by
Medestomas himself and a certain Elton Ong (Ong). QSC and
Medestomas did not present any evidence during the trial.6
In a Decision,7 dated March 16, 2007, the RTC found that the two
(2) transreceivers were defective and that QSC and Medestomas
failed to replace the same or return Gacott's money. The
dispositive portion of the decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Purchase price plus 6% per annum from March 3,1997 up to
and until fully paid -------------------------------------------------------- P
18,000.00
2. Actual Damages ----------------------------------- 40,936.44
3. Moral Damages ----------------------------------- 75,000.00
4. Corrective Damages ---------------------------- 100,000.00
5. Attorney's Fees ------------------------------------ 60,000.00
6. Costs.
SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary
The decision became final as QSC and Medestomas did not
interpose an appeal. Gacott then secured a Writ of
Execution,8 dated September 26, 2007.
During the execution stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a
corporation, but was in fact a general partnership registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the articles of
partnership,9 Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC.
To execute the judgment, Branch Sheriff Ronnie L. Felizarte (Sheriff
Felizarte) went to the main office of the Department of
24
Transportation and Communications, Land Transportation Office
(DOTC-LTO), Quezon City, and verified whether Medestomas,
Page
QSC and Guy had personal properties registered therein.10 Upon
learning that Guy had vehicles registered in his name, Gacott
instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one of
the motor vehicles of Guy based on the certification issued by
the DOTC-LTO.11
On March 3, 2009, Sheriff Felizarte attached Guy's vehicle by
virtue of the Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Personalty12 served
upon the record custodian of the DOTC-LTO of Mandaluyong
City. A similar notice was served to Guy through his housemaid at
his residence.
Thereafter, Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon
Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment debtor and,
therefore, his vehicle could not be attached.13 Gacott filed an
opposition to the motion.
The RTC Order
On June 28, 2009, the RTC issued an order denying Guy's motion.
It explained that considering QSC was not a corporation, but a
registered partnership, Guy should be treated as a general
partner pursuant to Section 21 of the Corporation Code, and he
may be held jointly and severally liable with QSC and
Medestomas. The trial court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be
without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all
debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result
thereof x x x. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any
partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership x x x, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so
acting or omitting to act. All partners are liable solidarity with the
partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under
Article 1822 and 1823.14cralawlawlibrary
Accordingly, it disposed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, with the ample discussion of the matter, this Court
finds and so holds that the property of movant Michael Guy may
be validly attached in satisfaction of the liabilities adjudged by
this Court against Quantech Co., the latter being an ostensible
Corporation and the movant being considered by this Court as a
general partner therein in accordance with the order of this court
impressed in its decision to this case imposing joint and several
liability to the defendants. The Motion to Lift Attachment Upon
Personalty submitted by the movant is therefore DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.15cralawlawlibrary
Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion. He argued that he was neither impleaded as a
defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; that under
Article 1824 of the Civil Code, the partners were only solidarily
liable for the partnership liability under exceptional
circumstances; and that in order for a partner to be liable for the
debts of the partnership, it must be shown that all partnership
assets had first been exhausted.16
On February 19, 2010, the RTC issued an order17 denying his
motion.
The denial prompted Guy to seek relief before the CA.
The CA Ruling
On June 25, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision
dismissing Guy's appeal for the same reasons given by the trial
court. In addition thereto, the appellate court
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We hold that Michael Guy, being listed as a general partner of
QSC during that time, cannot feign ignorance of the existence of
the court summons. The verified Answer filed by one of the
partners, Elton Ong, binds him as a partner because the Rules of
Court does not require that summons be served on all the
partners. It is sufficient that service be made on the "president,
 managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer or in-house counsel." To Our mind, it is immaterial
whether the summons to QSC was served on the theory that it
was a corporation. What is important is that the summons was
served on QSC's authorized officer
xxx.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
The CA stressed that Guy, being a partner in QSC, was bound by
the summons served upon QSC based on Article 1821 of the Civil
Code. The CA further opined that the law did not require a
partner to be actually involved in a suit in order for him to be
made liable. He remained "solidarity liable whether he
participated or not, whether he ratified it or not, or whether he
had knowledge of the act or omission."19
Aggrieved, Guy filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated March 5, 2013.
Hence, the present petition raising the following
ISSUE
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER GUY IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE
WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE BREACH
OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE WITH RESPONDENT
GACOTT.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
Guy argues that he is not solidarity liable with the partnership
because the solidary liability of the partners under Articles 1822,
1823 and 1824 of the Civil Code only applies when it stemmed
from the act of a partner. In this case, the alleged lapses were
not attributable to any of the partners. Guy further invokes Article
1816 of the Civil Code which states that the liability of the
partners to the partnership is merely joint and subsidiary in nature.
In his Comment,21 Gacott countered, among others, that
because Guy was a general and managing partner of QSC, he
could not feign ignorance of the transactions undertaken by
QSC. Gacott insisted that notice to one partner must be
considered as notice to the whole partnership, which included
the pendency of the civil suit against it.
In his Reply,22 Guy contended that jurisdiction over the person of
the partnership was not acquired because the summons was
never served upon it or through any of its authorized office. He
also reiterated that a partner's liability was joint and subsidiary,
and not solidary.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The service of summons was
flawed; voluntary appearance
cured the defect
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam - the
power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject
the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other
rulings rendered in the action - is an element of due process that
is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem.23 Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in court. As
the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper
service of the summons, or by his voluntary appearance in the
action.24
Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
25
Procedure, when the defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the
Page
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete
with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive
enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for
juridical entities.25cralawred
The records of this case reveal that QSC was never shown to
have been served with the summons through any of the
enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely:
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Service of summons upon
persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is
invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of
summons. The CA was obviously mistaken when it opined that it
was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on the
theory that it was a corporation.27
Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to
vest the court jurisdiction over the defendant, the same is merely
procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of
summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a
responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not
disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective
summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was acquired through
voluntary appearance.
A partner must be separately
and distinctly impleaded before
he can be bound by a judgment
The next question posed is whether the trial court's jurisdiction
over QSC extended to the person of Guy insofar as holding him
solidarity liable with the partnership. After a thorough study of the
relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court answers in the
negative.
Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual
agency, whereby any partner can generally represent the
partnership in its business affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit
against the partnership is necessarily a suit impleading each and
every partner. It must be remembered that a partnership is a
juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality from
the persons composing it.28
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a
judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and their successors-in-interest after the commencement
of the action in court.29 A decision rendered on a complaint in a
civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person
not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected
by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not
a party.30 The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a
ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not
been made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law.31
In Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr.,32 the Court declared that a person not
impleaded and given the opportunity to take part in the
proceedings was not bound by the decision declaring as null and
void the title from which his title to the property had been
derived. The effect of a judgment could not be extended to non-
parties by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them,
for no man should be prejudiced by any proceeding to which he
was a stranger.
In Aguila v. Court of Appeals33 the complainant had a cause of
action against the partnership. Nevertheless, it was the partners
themselves that were impleaded in the complaint. The Court
dismissed the complaint and held that it was the partnership, not
its partners, officers or agents, which should be impleaded for a
cause of action against the partnership itself. The Court added
that the partners could not be held liable for the obligations of
the partnership unless it was shown that the legal fiction of a
different juridical personality was being used for fraudulent,
unfair, or illegal purposes.34
Here, Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have
any participation in the entire proceeding until his vehicle was
 levied upon and he suddenly became QSC's "co-defendant
debtor" during the judgment execution stage. It is a basic
principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only
against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment
debtor.35 Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against
a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment
debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one
man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.36
In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be
impleaded before he could be prejudiced by the judgment
against the partnership. As will be discussed later, a partner may
raise several defenses during the trial to avoid or mitigate his
obligation to the partnership liability. Necessarily, before he could
present evidence during the trial, he must first be impleaded and
informed of the case against him. It would be the height of
injustice to rob an innocent partner of his hard-earned personal
belongings without giving him an opportunity to be heard.
Without any showing that Guy himself acted maliciously on
behalf of the company, causing damage or injury to the
complainant, then he and his personal properties cannot be
made directly and solely accountable for the liability of QSC, the
judgment debtor, because he was not a party to the case.
Further, Article 1821 of the Civil Code does not state that there is
no need to implead a partner in order to be bound by the
partnership liability. It provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs,
and the knowledge of the partner acting in the particular
matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his mind, and
the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and
should have communicated it to the acting partner, operate as
notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of
fraud on the partnership, committed by or with the consent of
that partner.
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]
cralawlawlibrary
A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any
partner, under certain circumstances, operates as notice to or
knowledge to the partnership only. Evidently, it does not provide
for the reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice
to the partners. Unless there is an unequivocal law which states
that a partner is automatically charged in a complaint against
the partnership, the constitutional right to due process takes
precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he
can be considered as a judgment debtor. To rule otherwise
would be a dangerous precedent, harping in favor of the
deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing, which
the Court certainly cannot countenance.
Partners' liability is subsidiary
and generally joint; immediate levy
upon the property of a partner
cannot be made
Granting that Guy was properly impleaded in the complaint, the
execution of judgment would be improper. Article 1816 of the
Civil Code governs the liability of the partners to third persons,
which states that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 1816. All partners, including industrial ones, shall be
liable pro rata with all their property and after all the partnership
assets have been exhausted, for the contracts which may be
entered into in the name and for the account of the partnership,
under its signature and by a person authorized to act for the
partnership. However, any partner may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.
[Emphasis supplied]
cralawlawlibrary
26
This provision clearly states that, first, the partners' obligation with
Page
respect to the partnership liabilities is subsidiary in nature. It
provides that the partners shall only be liable with their property
after all the partnership assets have been exhausted. To say that
one's liability is subsidiary means that it merely becomes
secondary and only arises if the one primarily liable fails to
sufficiently satisfy the obligation. Resort to the properties of a
partner may be made only after efforts in exhausting partnership
assets have failed or that such partnership assets are insufficient
to cover the entire obligation. The subsidiary nature of the
partners' liability with the partnership is one of the valid defenses
against a premature execution of judgment directed to a
partner.
In this case, had he been properly impleaded, Guy's liability
would only arise after the properties of QSC would have been
exhausted. The records, however, miserably failed to show that
the partnership's properties were exhausted. The report37 of the
sheriff showed that the latter went to the main office of the
DOTC-LTO in Quezon City and verified whether Medestomas,
QSC and Guy had personal properties registered therein. Gaeott
then instructed the sheriff to proceed with the attachment of one
of the motor vehicles of Guy.38 The sheriff then served the Notice
of Attachment/Levy upon Personalty to the record custodian of
the DOTC-LTO of Mandaluyong City. A similar notice was served
to Guy through his housemaid at his residence.
Clearly, no genuine efforts were made to locate the properties of
QSC that could have been attached to satisfy the judgment -
contrary to the clear mandate of Article 1816. Being subsidiarily
liable, Guy could only be held personally liable if properly
impleaded and after all partnership assets had been exhausted.
Second, Article 1816 provides that the partners' obligation to third
persons with respect to the partnership liability is pro rata or joint.
Liability is joint when a debtor is liable only for the payment of
only a proportionate part of the debt. In contrast,
a solidary liability makes a debtor liable for the payment of the
entire debt. In the same vein, Article 1207 does not presume
solidary liability unless: 1) the obligation expressly so states; or 2)
the law or nature requires solidarity. With regard to partnerships,
ordinarily, the liability of the partners is not solidary.39 The joint
liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised by a
partner impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the
partners' liability be solidary in nature. Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824
of the Civil Code provide for these exceptional conditions, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any
partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is
caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or
any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the
same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the
loss:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent
authority receives money or property of a third person and
misapplies it; and
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives
money or property of a third person and the money or property
so received is misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody
of the partnership.
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarity with the partnership
for everything chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822
and 1823.
[Emphases Supplied]
cralawlawlibrary
In essence, these provisions articulate that it is the act of a
partner which caused loss or injury to a third person that makes all
other partners solidarity liable with the partnership because of the
words "any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business, " "one partner acting within the
scope of his apparent authority" and "misapplied by any partner
 while it is in the custody of the partnership." The obligation is
solidary because the law protects the third person, who in good
faith relied upon the authority of a partner, whether such
authority is real or apparent.40

In the case at bench, it was not shown that Guy or the other
partners did a wrongful act or misapplied the money or property
he or the partnership received from Gacott. A third person who
transacted with said partnership can hold the partners solidarity
liable for the whole obligation if the case of the third person falls
under Articles 1822 or 1823.41 Gacott's claim stemmed from the
alleged defective transreceivers he bought from QSC, through
the latter's employee, Medestomas. It was for a breach of
warranty in a contractual obligation entered into in the name
and for the account of QSC, not due to the acts of any of the
partners. For said reason, it is the general rule under Article 1816
that governs the joint liability of such breach, and not the
exceptions under Articles 1822 to 1824. Thus, it was improper to
hold Guy solidarity liable for the obligation of the partnership.

Finally, Section 21 of the Corporation Code,42 as invoked by the

RTC, cannot be applied to sustain Guy's liability. The said provision
states that a general partner shall be liable for all debts, liabilities
and damages incurred by an ostensible corporation. It must be
read, however, in conjunction with Article 1816 of the Civil Code,
which governs the liabilities of partners against third persons.
Accordingly, whether QSC was an alleged ostensible corporation
or a duly registered partnership, the liability of Guy, if any, would
remain to be joint and subsidiary because, as previously
stated, all partners shall be liable pro rata with all their property
and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted for the
contracts which may be entered into in the name and for the
account of the partnership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision

and the March 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94816 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto Princesa
City, is ORDERED TO RELEASE Michael C. Guy's Suzuki Grand Vitara
subject of the Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.
27
Page
 G.R. No. 204796, February 04, 2015
REICON REALTY BUILDERS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DIAMOND
DRAGON REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions
dated May 21, 20122 and November 21, 20123 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 which dismissed
outright petitioner Reicon Realty Builders Corporation’s
(Reicon) certiorari petition on procedural grounds.
The Facts
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey
building erected thereon located at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon
City,4 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 330668 (subject
property).5 On January 9, 1991, Reicon and respondent Diamond
Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) entered into a
Contract of Lease6 (January 9, 1991 Contract), whereby Reicon
leased the subject property to Diamond for a period of twenty
(20) years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011, for a
monthly rental of P75,000.00, subject to periodical increments.7 In
turn, Diamond sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee
Foods Corporation8 (Jollibee) and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises
(Maybunga), represented by its proprietor, Andrew D. Palangdao
(Andrew).9cralawlawlibrary
Beginning June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals
due, and the checks it had issued by way of payments from June
2006 to December 2006 were all dishonored upon
presentment.10 This prompted Reicon to send, through counsel, a
letter11 dated July 23, 2007 demanding the payment of the
accrued rentals and terminating the January 9, 1991
Contract.12 Thereafter, it entered into separate contracts with
Jollibee13 and Maybunga14 over the portions of the subject
property they respectively occupy.
On December 14, 2009, Diamond filed a complaint15 for breach
of contract with damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga,
Andrew, and a certain Mary Palangdao (Mary) (defendants)
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166 (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 72319, alleging that the January 9,
1991 Contract did not provide for its unilateral termination by
either of the parties.16 It also alleged that the act of defendants in
entering into separate contracts, despite the existence of the
January 9, 1991 Contract, constitutes unlawful interference,17 for
which they must be held solidarily liable for damages. As such,
Diamond prayed that the unilateral termination of the January 9,
1991 Contract effected by Reicon, as well as the separate
contracts of lease it entered into with Jollibee and Maybunga, be
declared invalid and illegal.18 Further, it sought the award of
unpaid rentals from Jollibee and Maybunga starting July 23, 2007
up to the present, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.19cralawlawlibrary
By way of special appearance, Reicon filed a motion to
dismiss20 the complaint on the following grounds: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons was not
served upon its president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel, as required by
the Rules of Court (Rules),21 but upon a certain Fernando Noyvo,
a houseboy/gardener, at a residence located at 1217 Acacia St.,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, which is not the principal office
of Reicon;22 (b) lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person
on the part of Diamond, its certificate of registration having
already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as early as September 29, 2003, per
certifications23 issued by the latter;24 and (c) lack of cause of
action, in the absence of the requisite allegations of the ultimate
facts constituting bad faith and malice on the part of the
defendants as would support the cause of action of “unlawful
interference.”25cralawlawlibrary
28
Opposing Reicon’s motion to dismiss, Diamond argued26 that,
even assuming that summons was not properly served upon
Page
Reicon, improper service is not a ground to dismiss its
complaint.27 It also insisted that it has legal capacity to sue,28 as
the corporation whose certificate of registration was revoked
was “Diamond Dragon Realty and Mgt. Inc.,” while its name, per
its General Information Sheet29 for 2009, was “Diamond Dragon
Realty & Management, Inc.” Moreover, it claimed that its legal
existence cannot be attacked except in a quo
warranto petition.30cralawlawlibrary
In its reply,31 Reicon pointed out, inter alia, that the corporation
whose certificate of registration was revoked by the SEC on
September 29, 200332 was registered under SEC No. 144830.33 Per
the SEC’s Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information34 dated
February 1, 2010 which referred to “Diamond Dragon Realty &
Mgt. Inc.” as well as Certificate of Corporate
Filing/Information35 dated March 2, 2010 which referred
to “Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc.,” both
corporations were registered under SEC No. 144830, which can
only mean that it is one and the same corporation. Reicon also
reiterated its previous arguments in its motion to dismiss.
For its part, Jollibee filed a separate motion to dismiss36 the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, the
summons having been improperly served; lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, as Diamond failed to allege the value of the
subject property, which is required in an action involving title to,
or possession of, real property, as in this case; and improper
venue.37 As for Maybunga, records do not show that they filed a
similar motion for the dismissal of the complaint.
The RTC Ruling
In an Order38 dated June 9, 2010, the RTC denied Reicon’s (and
Jollibee’s) motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of
summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section
1,39 Rule 16 of the Rules allowing for the dismissal of a complaint.
With regard to the legal capacity of Diamond to sue as a juridical
person, the RTC cited Section 2040 of the Corporation Code,41 in
relation to Sections 142 and 543 of Rule 66 of the Rules, in ruling that
Diamond’s legal existence can only be impugned in a quo
warranto proceeding.
Reicon moved for reconsideration44 thereof which was, however,
denied in an Order45 dated September 16, 2010.
The Proceedings Before the CA
Aggrieved, Reicon elevated the matter to the CA via petition
for certiorari46 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules, ascribing grave
abuse of discretion upon Presiding Judge Rowena De Juan
Quinagoran (Judge Quinagoran) of the RTC in not dismissing
Diamond’s complaint on the grounds discussed in Reicon’s
motion to dismiss, particularly the issue respecting Diamond’s lack
of legal capacity to sue.47 Reicon filed its certiorari petition on
November 18, 2010, entitled “Reicon Realty Builders Corporation
v. Hon. Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran and Diamond Dragon
Realty and Management, Inc.,” docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
116845.
In a Resolution48 dated March 28, 2011, however, the CA required
Reicon to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari should
not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Diamond, as private respondent, as required under
Section 4,49 Rule 46 of the Rules. It appears that the CA’s earlier
Resolution dated January 5, 2011 addressed to Diamond, with
address at “Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave.,
cor[.] Garnet50 Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig City” was
returned to it, with the notation “RTS-Moved
Out.”51cralawlawlibrary
In its Compliance,52 Reicon stated that the address “Suite 305,
AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City” was Diamond’s address on record in
Civil Case No. 72319, the civil case from which
the certiorari petition originated. From the institution thereof up to
the filing of Reicon’s petition before the CA, Diamond has not
submitted any paper or pleading notifying the RTC of any
change in its address. As such, Reicon maintained that the
service of its petition to Diamond’s address as above-indicated
should be deemed effective. In the alternative, it proffered that
 Diamond may be served through its counsel of record in Civil
Case No. 72319, Atty. Anselmo A. Marqueda (Atty. Marqueda) of
A.A. MARQUEDA LAW OFFICES, at the latter’s office
address.53cralawlawlibrary
Alleging that it received a copy of Reicon’s Compliance,
Diamond, through its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, filed a
manifestation,54 under a special appearance, averring that
Reicon’s petition for certiorari must be dismissed outright for its
failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record (i.e., Atty.
Marqueda).55 It cited the rule that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon said
counsel to constitute valid service.56cralawlawlibrary
In a Resolution57 dated May 21, 2012, the CA dismissed
Reicon’s certiorari petition without passing upon its merits based
on the following grounds: (a) non-compliance with the
requirements of proof of service of the petition on Diamond
pursuant to Section 3,58 Rule 46 of the Rules, and (b) non-
compliance with the rule on service upon a party through
counsel under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules.
Reicon’s motion for reconsideration59 was denied in a
Resolution60 dated November 21, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The sole issue to resolve is whether or not
Reicon’s certiorari petition before the CA was properly served
upon the person of Diamond.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules, which covers cases
originally filed61 before the CA, provide as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual
background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the
relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate
the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice
of the denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with
proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and
shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling
subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are
referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. x x x.cralawred
xxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how
acquired. – The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
29
A punctilious review of the records, particularly of
the certiorari petition filed by Reicon before the CA, shows that it
Page
contains the registry numbers corresponding to the registry
receipts62 as well as the affidavit of service and/or filing63 of the
person who filed and served the petition via registered mail on
behalf of Reicon. These imply that a copy of
Reicon’s certiorari petition had been served to the RTC as well as
to Diamond through its address at “Suite 305 AIC Burgundy
Empire Tower, ADB Avenue corner Garnet Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City,”64 in compliance with Section 13,65 Rule 13 of the Rules
on proof of service as well as with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 46
above-quoted.66cralawlawlibrary
On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the
aforesaid address as its business address67 in its complaint before
the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had
since changed its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon
cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a
copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the
requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of the Rules as
above-cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the
respondent itself, not upon his counsel.
The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari
proceeding is, by nature, an original and independent action,
and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of.68 Hence, at the preliminary point of serving
the certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be
said that an appearance for respondent has been made by his
counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2,69 Rule
13 of the Rules, which provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel, should
not apply.
Thus, the CA erred when it dismissed Reicon’s certiorari petition
outright for non-compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
as well as the rule on service upon a party through counsel under
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The service of said pleading upon
the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what
the rule properly requires, as in this case.
II.
On a related note, the Court further observes that jurisdiction
over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the
CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the
Manifestation dated May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty.
Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had consistently
represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a
quo and even before this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of
the Rules provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. —
The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the
petition, i.e., the Resolution dated January 5, 2011 requiring
Diamond to comment, was returned with the notation “RTS-
Moved Out,” the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary
appearance was enough for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over
its person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking
the convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere
“special appearance,” considering that it affirmatively sought
therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an
affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary
appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without
the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court’s
jurisdiction. Here, Diamond’s special appearance cannot be
treated as a specific objection to the CA’s jurisdiction over its
person for the reason that the argument it pressed on was about
the alleged error in the service of Reicon’s certiorari petition, and
not the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on
the said pleading. Properly speaking, this argument does not
have anything to do with the CA’s acquisition of jurisdiction over
Diamond for it is the service of the appellate court’s resolution
indicating its initial action, and not of the certiorari petition itself,
which is material to this analysis.
 Note that the conclusion would be different if Diamond had
actually objected to the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May
initial action; if such were the case, then its special appearance 21, 2012 and November 21, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
could then be treated as a proper conditional appearance are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the CA
challenging the CA’s jurisdiction over its person. To parallel, in is DIRECTED to REINSTATE the petition for certiorari, docketed as
ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance to object to a trial CA-G.R. SP No. 116845 under the parameters discussed in this
court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be Decision.
made when said party specifically objects to the service of
summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special
appearance but grounds the same on the service of the Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.c
considered as an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his
person. It must be underscored that the service of the initiatory
pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in an ordinary civil action.
Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons –
same as the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial
action on the certiorari petition – which remains material to the
matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendant’s/respondents’ person.

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy,70 it

was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion
to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e.,
set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.”71

Considering that the tenor of Diamond’s objection in its special

appearance had actually no legal bearing on the CA’s
jurisdiction over its person (that is, since it objected to the
propriety of Reicon’s service of its petition, and not the CA’s
service of its order indicating its initial action), it cannot be said
that the proper objection to the appellate court’s jurisdiction, as
above-discussed, had been made by Diamond. Thus, by asking
for an affirmative relief, i.e., the dismissal of
Reicon’s certiorari petition, bereft of the proper jurisdictional
objection, the Court therefore concludes that Diamond had
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

In fine, the proper course of action would be for the CA to

reinstate Reicon’s certiorari petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
116845, given that it had already acquired jurisdiction over
Diamond’s person. In order to ensure that Diamond’s due process
rights are protected, Reicon should, however, be directed to
submit proof that the service of its petition had actually been
completed in accordance with Rule 1372 of the Rules.73 Diamond,
in the meantime, should be ordered to furnish the CA the details
of its current address and confirm whether or not Atty. Marqueda
would be representing it as its counsel of record in the main (and
not only through special appearance); if Diamond will be
represented by a different counsel, it must so notify the appellate
court. Henceforth, all pleadings and papers should be addressed
30

to such counsel and would equally bind Diamond as client.

Throughout the proceedings, the CA is exhorted to bear in mind
Page

the judicial policy to resolve the present controversy with utmost

dispatch in order to avoid further delay.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183370, August 17, 2015
NATION PETROLEUM GAS, INCORPORATED, NENA ANG, MARIO
ANG, ALISON A. SY, GUILLERMO G. SY, NELSON ANG, LUISA ANG,
RENATO C. ANG, PAULINE T. ANG, RICKY C. ANG,1 AND MELINDA
ANG, Petitioners, v. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,
SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE ASSET GROWTH ONE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) seeks to reverse and set
aside the December 12, 2007 Decision2 and June 17, 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787,
which affirmed the March 29, 2007 Order4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 06-882,
denying petitioners' Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss for alleged improper service of summons.
On October 16, 2006, respondent Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation filed against petitioner corporation and its
directors/officers a Complaint5 for civil damages arising from
estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts Law. On
October 26, 2006, after an ex parte hearing was conducted,
respondent's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was
granted and the corresponding writ was issued.6 Thereafter,
Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the
summons, complaint, application for attachment, respondent's
affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment. The
Sheriffs Report dated November 13, 2006
narrated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The undersigned sheriff respectfully submits the following report to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
On 26 October 2006, [a] copy of Writ of Attachment dated 26
October 2006, issued by the Court in the above-entitled case was
received by the undersigned for service and implementation.
On even date, the undersigned served the Summons, copy of
[the] Complaint, application for attachment, the plaintiffs
affidavit and bond, and the Order and Writ of Attachment, on
the defendants Nation Petroleum Gas et al, at BPI Building, Rizal
Street, Candelaria, Quezon. Said summons and all pertinent
papers, upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang,
were received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer,
as evidenced by her signature at the original copy of Summons
and Writ. I also served copies to other defendants at their given
addresses, but they refused to acknowledge receipt thereof.
On the same day, at the instance of the plaintiff's counsel and
representative, the undersigned levied the real properties of the
defendants at the Register of Deeds of Lucena City, Makati City,
Pasig City, Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Manila. I
also levied a property (plant equipment) in NPGI plant in Sariaya,
Quezon. Copies of the notices of levy on attachment are hereto
attached.
WHEREFORE, the original copies of the Summonses, Order, Writ of
Attachment and all pertinent papers are hereby returned to the
Court of origin for record and information.7
Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss8 on November 15, 2006. They asserted that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since
the summons was improperly served upon Claudia Abante
(Abante), who is a mere liaison officer and not one of the
corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14
of the Rules. Likewise, the individual petitioners argued that the
sheriff and/or process server did not personally approach them at
their respective address as stated in the Complaint. Neither did
he resort to substituted service of summons, and that, even if he
did, there was no strict compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules. The Court's pronouncements in Spouses Mason v. Court of
31
Appeals,9E. B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito,10Laus
v. Court of Appeals,11 and Samartino v. Raon12 were invoked in
Page
praying for the dismissal of the complaint and the discharge of
the writ of attachment.
Respondent countered in its Opposition with Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default13 that there was valid service of summons
upon petitioners. With respect to the corporation, Abante
received the summons upon the express authority and instruction
of the corporate secretary, petitioner Melinda Ang (Ang). As
regards the individual petitioners, the Sheriffs Report reflects that
they were served "at their given addresses, but they refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof." Respondent stressed that said
Report is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and
that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official functions. In any case, it averred that,
according to Oaminal v. Castillo,14 petitioners already voluntarily
submitted to the court's jurisdiction when they prayed for the
discharge of the writ of attachment, which is an affirmative relief
apart from the dismissal of the case.
A Reply with Comment/Opposition (to the motion to declare
defendants in default)15 was then filed by petitioners. In support
of their contention that the court lacks jurisdiction over their
persons, they submitted their Joint Affidavit16 and the Affidavit17 of
Abante, claiming, among others, that they neither personally met
the sheriff and/or the process server nor were handed a copy of
the court documents; that Ang did not give Abante telephone
instructions to receive the same; and that Abante did not receive
any instruction from Ang. Petitioners further held
that Oaminal finds no application in the instant case since they
only filed one motion and that the additional relief prayed for,
which is the discharge of the writ, is complementary to and a
necessary consequence of a finding that the court has no
jurisdiction over their persons. Instead, Our ruling in Avon
Insurance PLC v. Court of Appeals18 was relied upon.
In its Rejoinder with Motion to Strike,19 respondent stood firm in
defending the court's jurisdiction. The denials of Ang and Abante
were viewed as self-serving and could not prevail over the
presumption of regularity which the sheriff enjoys as an officer of
the court. Even assuming that the Sheriffs Return does not state in
detail the fact that the summons was served upon the individual
petitioners through substituted service, respondent asserted that
this does not conclusively prove that such service is invalid
because it may still be shown through extraneous evidence
similar to the case of BPI v. Spouses Evangelista.20redarclaw
On March 29, 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' motion to dismiss
and respondent's motion to declare them in default. In upholding
the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of petitioners and
requiring them to file an Answer, the Order
ratiocinated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The very essence of service of summons is for the defendants to
be aware of an existing suit against them and for them to file an
answer or responsive pleading thereto. When corporate and
individual defendants were served with summons through the
[liaison] officer who received the same for and in their behalf as
per instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, and when defendants
filed a responsive pleading in the form of a Motion to Dismiss, the
essence of service of summons was met and defendants are
deemed to have ultimately received the summons despite their
protestations. There is no reason for the Court to doubt the
regularity of the Sheriffs service of summons as in fact its regularity
is presumed. It bears stressing that defendants did not per
se deny having received summonses. Perforce, they are
challenging the manner of service of the same. Having ultimately
received the summonses upon them and considering the rules on
service of the same was substantially complied with, the Court
finds no reason to deny the instant Motion to Dismiss.21
Petitioners elevated the jurisdictional issue to the CA via petition
for certiorari and prohibition.22 As afore-stated, the appellate
court later dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration; hence, this petition raising the following issues for
resolution:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
 OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE
OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BY
RESORTING TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS DESPITE
ABSENCE OF EARNEST EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SERVING
OFFICER TO SERVE SUMMONS PERSONALLY.23
We deny.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her.24 Its purpose is two-fold: to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the
defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may
be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against
him.25 "[C]ompliance with the rules regarding the service of
summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person
can be deprived of his property, he should first be informed of the
claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised."26redarclaw
Service of summons on domestic corporation, partnership or
other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules, which states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When
the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein
petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the
persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.27 The
enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is
restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory
construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.28 Substantial
compliance cannot be invoked.29 Service of summons upon
persons other than those officers specifically mentioned in
Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said
corporation.30
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Basic is the rule that a strict compliance with the mode of service
is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation.
The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is
named in the statute; otherwise, the service is insufficient. The
purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person will know what
to do with the legal papers served on him.31
As correctly argued by petitioners, Sps. Mason already resolved
that substantial compliance on service of summons upon a
domestic corporation is no longer an excuse.
Thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still
applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to
the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address
at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Parailaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with
development agreement with private respondent Imperial
Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its
contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for
breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of
32
Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon
Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Page
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons
and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and
ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it
acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the
denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We decided in
Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid
service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a
person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13,
Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's
basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondent's substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons, and fully agreed with petitioner's assertions that the
enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and
exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction
that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule,
we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millennium to
support their position for said case is not on all fours with the
instant case. We must stress that Millennium was decided when
the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the
instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases
cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is
the later case.
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the
other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
ingredient of due process. x x x32
The foregoing notwithstanding, We agree with the CA that there
was a valid and effective service of summons upon petitioner
corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of
the corporate secretary. It ruled:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner corporation asserts that based on the said rule [Section
11, Rule 14 of the Rules], the service of summons made by the
sheriff upon its liaison officer, Claudia Abante, was defective for
the reason that a liaison officer is not one of the corporate
officers enumerated therein upon whom service of summons is
authorized to be made. It contends that there having been no
valid service, the trial court consequently did not acquire
jurisdiction to hear the complaint a quo.
The contention deserves full credence only if it is to be assumed
that Claudia Abante received the summons in her official
capacity as petitioner corporation's liaison officer. However, this is
not true in the instant case, since according to the sheriff, Abante
proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying
documents only after receiving instructions to do so from Melinda
Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner
corporation's corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that
Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in representation of
Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers
competent under the Rules of Court to receive summons on
behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that
there was no direct, physical handing of the summons to Ang,
the latter could at least be charged with having constructively
received the same, which in Our view, amounts to a valid service
of summons.
Having herself instructed Abante to receive the summons, Ang,
and for that matter, petitioner corporation, is thus now precluded
from impugning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of
invalid service of summons. In point in this regard is the principle
of estoppel which, under our remedial laws, is an effective bar
against any claim of lack of jurisdiction. Under said doctrine, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against
the person relying thereon.
 Thus, despite the assertions of Ang and Abante that, as between
them, no such instruction had been relayed and received, the
sheriffs statement belying the allegations should be accorded
weight.
The sheriffs report is further bolstered by the presumption of
regularity in the performance of public duty as the same is
provided for in Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. The presumption
applies so long as it is shown that the officer, in performing his
duties, is not inspired by any improper motive, a fact that is true
with the sheriff in the case at bar. And, if the presumption may be
made to apply to public officers in general, with more reason
should its benefit be accorded to the sheriff, who is an officer of
the court.
True, the presumption is disputable, but to overcome the same,
more concrete evidence than the affidavit of Abante is required.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent, in line with the ruling
of the Supreme Court in R. Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals and Talsan Enterprises, Inc. vs. Baliwag, Abante's
affidavit is self-serving in nature, and being so, is not sufficient to
overturn the said presumption.
On this aspect, petitioners score the respondent, asserting that
the two above-cited cases are not applicable to the case at
hand inasmuch as these were decided before the advent of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, adding likewise that the
cited cases and the instant case differ in their respective factual
milieus. We are not persuaded. Under either the former or the
present rules, it is clear that Abante's denial that she received
instructions from Ang is evidence that would pale in comparison
to the declaration of an officer of the court indisputably
performing his duty objectively and free from any malicious and ill
motives.33
Petitioner corporation cannot conveniently rely on the sworn
statements of the individual petitioners and Abante. Upon
examination, Ang's denial of having spoken with any process
server to give instruction to serve the summons and other
pertinent papers to Abante34 is not incompatible with the Sheriffs
Report stating that "[s]aid summons and all pertinent papers,
upon telephone instruction of defendant Melinda Ang, were
received by Claudia Abante, [defendants'] [Liaison] Officer, as
evidenced by her signature at the original copy of Summons and
Writ." While it may be true that Ang had not talked to the sheriff or
process server, it still does not rule out the possibility that she in
fact spoke to Abante and instructed the latter to receive the
documents in her behalf. As to the Affidavit of Abante, her
disavowal of having spoken to Ang or receiving telephone
instructions from her is truly self-serving. Evidence as simple as a
telephone billing statement or an affidavit of a disinterested third
person, among others, could have been presented to refute the
sheriffs claim, but there was none. Likewise, no substantial proofs
were credibly shown to support Abante's allegation that the
sheriff insisted on having the court processes received and that
she was "intimidated by the presence of a court personnel who
was quite earnest in accomplishing his task."35redarclaw
It is well to note that the certificate of service of the process
server is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out therein. This is
fortified by the presumption of the regularity of performance of
official duty. To overcome the presumption of regularity of official
functions in favor of such sheriffs return, the evidence against it
must be clear and convincing. Sans the requisite quantum of
proof to the contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith
and credit.36redarclaw
The same conclusion, however, could not be said with respect to
the service of summons upon the individual petitioners.
Section 7, in relation to Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules, provides for
substituted service of summons:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handling a copy
33
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Page
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules cannot be construed to apply
simultaneously and do not provide for alternative modes of
service of summons which can either be resorted to on the mere
basis of convenience to the parties for, under our procedural
rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service.37 Resort to the latter
is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly served on
the defendant in person and after stringent formal and
substantive requirements have been complied with.38 The failure
to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.39redarclaw
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals40 painstakingly elucidated the
requirements of the Rules as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We can break down this section into the following requirements
to effect a valid substituted service:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that
the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame
is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Under the Rules, the
service of summons has no set period. However, when the court,
clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of
the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then
the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for
an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then
is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days
since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff
wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch
clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the
succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of
summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to
personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of
summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable
promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious
dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best
efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and
evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the
defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available,
there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve
the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt
service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferrably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made
to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts
done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on
Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in
the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial
Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires
that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure
of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and
discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity
(18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined
as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or
wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion,
such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at
the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate
action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least
be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must
therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons
and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters
must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of
Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or
regular place of business, then it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on
whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained
in the Return.41
In resorting to the substituted service, the sheriff in this case pithily
declared in his Report that he "also served copies to other
defendants at their given addresses, but they refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof." Obviously, the Sheriffs Report
dated November 13, 2006 does not particularize why substituted
service was resorted to and the precise manner by which the
summons was served upon the individual petitioners. The
disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed will not apply where it is patent from the sheriffs or
server's return that it is defective.42redarclaw
To avail themselves of substituted service of summons, courts
must rely on a detailed enumeration of the sheriffs actions and a
showing that the defendant cannot be served despite diligent
and reasonable efforts.43 The Court requires that the Sheriffs
Return clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
34
hopelessness of personal service.44 The impossibility of personal
service justifying availment of substituted service should be
Page
explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof
of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted service
cannot be upheld.45redarclaw
Under exceptional terms, the circumstances warranting
substituted service of summons may be proved by
evidence aliunde.46 Substituted service will still be considered as
regular if other evidence of the efforts to serve summons was
presented.47BPI v. Spouses Evangelista48 teaches Us that a defect
in the service of summons, which is apparent on the face of the
return, does not necessarily constitute conclusive proof that the
actual service has in fact been improperly made. In the interest
of speedy justice, the trial court has to immediately ascertain
whether the patent defect is real and, if so, to fully determine
whether prior attempts at personal service have in fact been
done and resort to the substituted service was justified. Should the
returns not show compliance with the Rules on substituted
service, actual and correct service may still be proven by
evidence extraneous to it. If substituted service is indeed
improper, the trial court must issue new summons and serve it in
accordance with the Rules.
In the present case, while no actual hearing was conducted to
verify the validity of the grounds for substituted service of
summons, the parties exchanged pleadings in support of their
respective positions. To justify, respondent
contends:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
34. In the instant case, representatives of the undersigned
counsel and plaintiff RCBC personally observed the service of
summons on the defendants. Based on their account, the
following facts and circumstances transpired:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a. On [October 26, 2006], the Sheriff served summons on
defendant NPGI at the G/F BPI Building, Rizal Street, Candelaria,
Quezon, the reported office address of defendant NPGI in the
latter's General Information Sheet submitted with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a. 1. In the said address, the Sheriff met a person who introduced
herself as Ms. Claudia Abante, the Liaison [Officer] of defendant
NPGI.
a.2. Upon inquiry, the Sheriff was informed that defendants NPGI
Officers were all not around to receive the summons for
defendant NPGI considering that, according to Ms. Abante, the
defendant NPGI Directors do not hold office at said address.
a.3. However, Ms. Abante volunteered to call defendant Melinda
Ang on the phone to inform her that summons was beings served
upon defendant NPGI.
a.4. Subsequently, Ms. Abante informed the Sheriff that
defendant Melinda Ang authorized her to receive the summons
for defendant NPGI.
a.5. Considering that she claimed to be authorized by defendant
Melinda Ang, who is the Corporate Secretary of defendant NPGI,
to receive the summons on behalf of defendant NPGI, the Sheriff
entrusted the same to her, as well as the Complaint and the Writ
of Attachment, among others, and Ms. Abante voluntarily signed
the receiving copy thereof.
a.6 the Sheriff did not intimidate Ms. Abante into receiving the
summons. In fact, she volunteered to receive the same.
b. Copies of the Complaint, summons and Writ of Attachment,
among others, were likewise served to defendant NPGI at its
office located at 39th Floor, Yuchengco Tower, RCBC Plaza, 6819
Ayala Avenue, corner Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, Metro
Manila ('RCBC Plaza Office').
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b.1. The personnel from said office also stated that all the
defendant NPGI Directors were not around and were probably at
home. As such, a copy of the Complaint, summons and Writ of
Attachment, among others, were left with said office.
 c. Thereafter, summons on the individual defendants were served
at the following addresses:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
c. 1. Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline Ang - 1348
Palm Avenue, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City;
c.2. Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso Streets, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati City;
c.3. Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive, Greenmeadows,
Quezon City;
c.4. Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag Street,
Candelaria, Quezon; and
c.5. Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon.
d. Upon service of the summons upon them, it became apparent
that the individual defendants were evading service of summons
considering that the sheriff was being given a run-around.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
d.1. In their respective residences, their house helpers stated that
the individual defendants were not at home but in the RCBC
Plaza Office.
d.2. However, considering that the Sheriff had already been to
the RCBC Plaza Office and the personnel at said office previously
stated that all the defendants were not at said office, it became
apparent that all the defendants were trying to evade service of
summons.
d.3. Given the obvious attempt of defendants to evade service
of summons, it was futile for the Sheriff to go back to the RCBC
Plaza Office.
d.4. Hence, summons were served to the individual defendants
through substituted service by entrusting the same to their house
helpers residing at the respective addresses, all of whom are of
suitable age and discretion.
xxxx
36. Indeed, in the instant case, contrary to the allegations
contained in the Motion to Dismiss, the summons were properly
served to the individual defendants through substituted service
considering that there were justifiable causes existing which
prevented personal service upon all the individual defendants
within a reasonable time.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
36.1. It should be noted that aside from defendant NPGI, there
are ten (10) other individual defendants in the instant case who
are residing in addresses which are far apart (i.e., Makati City,
Pasig City, City of Manila and Quezon Province).
36.2. Summons were attempted to be served to all defendant
NPGI Directors, Luisa Ang, Guillermo Sy and Pauline Ang on the
following addresses:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Renato Ang, Nena Ang, Melinda Ang, Pauline
Ang - 1348 Palm Avenue, Dasmarinas Village,
Makati City;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. Guillermo Sy and Alison Sy - 1320 Glorioso
Streets, Dasmarinas Village, Makati
City;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. Nelson Ang, Luisa Ang - 19 Swallow Drive,
Greenmeadows, Quezon
City;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. Mario Ang - Diamond Furniture, Cabunyag
Street, Candelaria, Quezon; and
5. Ricky Ang - Rizal Street, Candelaria, Quezon.
36.3. To require the sheriff to return several times at the residences
of the ten (10) defendants as suggested by the defendants,
despite the apparent intention of the defendants to evade
service of summons, and the considerable distances between all
35
their residences (i.e., Makati City, Pasig City, City of Manila and
Quezon Province), would clearly be unreasonable.49
Page
According to respondent's version, copies of the complaint,
summons and writ of attachment, among others, were served to
petitioner corporation at its offices in Candelaria, Quezon and
RCBC Plaza. In the Quezon office, the sheriff was informed that
the individual petitioners were all not around to receive the
summons for the corporation considering that they do not hold
office at said address. Likewise, a staff from the RCBC Plaza office
stated that all them were not around and were probably at
home. Thereafter, summons was served on the individual
petitioners at their respective addresses in Makati City, Quezon
City, and Candelaria, Quezon. Their house helpers told that they
were not at home but were in the RCBC Plaza office. Considering
that the sheriff already went there and its personnel said that they
were not at said office, it became apparent on the sheriff that
the individual petitioners were trying to evade service of
summons. Thus, given this predicament, it was futile for him to go
back to the RCBC Plaza office.
It is argued that the summons was properly served to the
individual petitioners through substituted service because there
were justifiable causes existing which prevented personal service
within a reasonable period of time. Respondent asserts that
requiring the sheriff to return several times at the residences of the
ten (10) individual petitioners despite their intention to evade
service of summons and the considerable distances of their
residences would clearly be unreasonable.
Respondent's explanations do not suffice.
In the instant case, it appears that the sheriff hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without
actually exerting any genuine effort to locate the individual
petitioners. The "reasonable time" within which to personally serve
the summons - 7 days for the plaintiff or 15-30 days for the sheriff
as stated in Manotoc - has not yet elapsed at the time the
substituted service was opted to. Remarkably, based on the
Sheriffs Report and the narration of petitioners, the personal
service of summons upon the corporation and the individual
petitioners as well as the levy of their personal and real properties
were all done in just one day. Manotoc stresses that for
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons
within a reasonable period which eventually resulted in failure in
order to prove impossibility of prompt service. To reiterate,
"several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferrably on at
least two different dates.
Further, except for the Quezon Province, there is, in fact, no
considerable distance between the residences of the individual
petitioners since the cities of Makati and Quezon are part of the
National Capital Region; hence, accessible either by private or
public modes of transportation. Assuming that there is, the
distance would not have been insurmountable had respondent
took its time and not unnecessarily rushed to accomplish personal
service in just a single day.
Finally, respondent alleges that the summons was served to the
individual petitioners through substituted service by entrusting the
same to their house helpers, all of whom are of suitable age and
discretion. It did not, however, elaborate that these persons know
how to read and understand English to comprehend the import
of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the individual petitioners at the
earliest possible time for them to take appropriate action. There is
no way for Us to conclusively ascertain that the sheriff ensured,
among others, that the persons found in the alleged dwelling or
residence comprehend the significance of the receipt of the
summons and the duty to immediately deliver it to the individual
petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt of summons.
The foregoing considered, it can be deduced that since there
were no actual efforts exerted and no positive steps undertaken
to earnestly locate the individual petitioners, there is no basis to
convincingly say that they evaded the personal service of
summons and merely gave the sheriff a run-around, thus,
justifying substituted service upon them.
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the
 individual petitioners are deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary appearance. The
second sentence of Section 20,50 Rule 14 of the Rules that "[t]he
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance" clearly refers to affirmative
defenses, not affirmative reliefs.51redarclaw

In the present case, the individual petitioners prayed, among

others, for the following: (1) discharge of the writ of attachment
on their properties; (2) denial of the motion to declare them in
default; (3) admission of the Comment/Opposition (to the motion
to declare them in default) filed on December 19, 2006; and (4)
denial of respondent's motion to strike off from the records (their
opposition to the motion to declare them in default). By seeking
affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual petitioners are
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said
court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.52 Therefore, the CA cannot be considered to have
erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the Special
Appearance with Motion to Dismiss for alleged improper service
of summons.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

December 12, 2007 Decision and June 17, 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98787, which sustained the
March 29, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
Makati City, in Civil Case No. 06-882, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De

Castro,*Perez,** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
36
Page
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193420, October 14, 2015
7107 ISLANDS PUBLISHING, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HOUSE PRINTERS
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:*
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 10
November 20091 and 17 August 20102 resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. UDK-SP No. 6325. The CA dismissed the
petitioner's petition for certiorari challenging the 30 January 2009
and 29 June 2009 orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (RTC), Branch 221, in Civil Case No. Q-06-58473.3 This RTC
ruling, in turn, denied its motion to dismiss.
ANTECEDENTS
On 25 July 2006, respondent The House Printers Corporation
(House Printers) filed a complaint for a sum of money and
damages against the 7107 Islands Publishing, Inc. (7107
Publishing) before the RTC. House Printers alleged that 7107
Publishing refused to pay for PHP 1,178,700.00 worth of magazines
it purchased in 2005. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-06-58473.
On 1 August 2006, Manuel S. Paguyo, Sheriff IV, served the
summons and a copy of the complaint on 7107 Publishing
through its Chief Accountant Laarni Milan. Sheriff Paguyo
explained on his return that the President and the in-house
counsel were not at the office when he arrived so he served the
summons on the highest ranking officer.
On 16 August 2006, 7107 Publishing filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over its
person. 7107 Publishing argued that if the defendant was a
corporation, service of summons could only be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel pursuant to Rule 14,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner further argued that this
was an exclusive list, citing E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd v.
Benito4 and Delta Motor Sales Corporation v. Mangosing5
On 4 September 2006, House Printers filed its opposition to
petitioner's motion to dismiss. House Printers argued that there
was substantial compliance with the requirement of service,
citing G&G Trading Corporation v. Court of
Appeals6 and Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v.
Tan.7
On 30 January 2009, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack
of merit. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with
the rule on service of summons and directed the petitioner to file
its answer within five days from receipt of the denial.
On 16 March 2009, 7107 Publishing moved for the reconsideration
of the denial. It reiterated that Rule 14, Section 11 is an exclusive
list that requires strict compliance.
On 29 June 2009, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
It held that although a Chief Accountant was not included in the
enumeration under Rule 14, Section 11, Chief Accountant Milan
was able to turn over the summons and the complaint to the
defendants; therefore, the purpose of Rule 14 was attained. The
petitioner received a copy of the order on 4 August 2009.
On 2 October 2009, 7107 Publishing filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA against the 30 January 2009 and 29
June 2009 orders of the RTC. The petition was filed by registered
mail.
On 7 October 2009, 7107 Publishing manifested before the CA
that it had filed a petition for certiorari on 2 October 2009.
On 10 November 2009, the CA dismissed the petition outright
37
because the petitioner failed to pay the docket and the other
legal fees.
Page
On 18 December 2009, 7107 Publishing moved for the
reconsideration of the dismissal. It explained that: (1) it was
constrained to file the petition by registered mail on 2 October
2009, prior to the last day of the reglementary period; (2) on 7
October 2009, petitioner's counsel went to the RTC to give an
advance copy of the petition and pay the docket and other
lawful fees; (3) however, the court personnel at the receiving
section refused to accept payment; (4) instead, the court
personnel instructed the petitioner to file a manifestation that the
petition was filed by registered mail then wait until the CA
receives and dockets the petition, to avoid double docketing
and double payment; (5) the petitioner complied and was
instructed by the Civil Cases Section to wait for a notice from the
CA to pay the docket fees; (6) petitioner relied in good faith on
the court personnel's advice, but the notice to pay never arrived;
(7) instead, the petitioner received the 10 November 2009 order
of dismissal on 14 December 2009. The petitioner prayed for the
CA to allow him to pay the required fees and to give due course
to the petition.
On 17 August 2010, the CA denied reconsideration. It held that
even if the court personnel refused to accept the petitioner's
tender of payment, it could have simply paid the required fees
by postal, money order.
On 8 October 2010, 7107 Publishing filed the present petition for
review on certiorari .
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues: (1) that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied its motion to dismiss because the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) that the CA
was not justified in dismissing its petition for certiorari for
nonpayment of the required fees because of the court
personnel's refusal to accept its tender of payment on four
separate occasions. The petitioner begs this Court to brush aside
any procedural barriers and give due course to its petition.
In its Comment dated 16 May 2011, the respondent maintains: (1)
that the petitioner did not suffer any undue prejudice from the
service of summons on its accountant; and (2) that the petitioner
failed to substantiate its allegations that court personnel refused
his tender of payment four times.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit. Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. - When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. (emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We have long established that this enumeration is an exclusive list
under the principle of expresso unius est exclusio alterius.8 Under
the present Rules of Court, the rule of substantial compliance
invoked by the respondent is no longer applicable. To quote our
decision in Sps. Mason v. Court of Appeals:
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still
applicable under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to
the instant case. In the said case, petitioner E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address
at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City, and with branches at 2492 Bay
View Drive, Tambo, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered into a sale with
development agreement with private respondent Imperial
Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its
contractual obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for
breach of contract and damages at the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Summons, together with the complaint, was served upon
Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons
and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and
ruled that there was substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it
 acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa. The latter questioned the for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
denial before us in its petition for certiorari . We decided in 221 is DIRECTED to proceed with Civil Case No. Q-06-58473 and
Villarosa's favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to the petitioner is ORDERED to file its answer within five (5) days from
take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid receipt of this decision. No costs.
service of summons on Villarosa as service was made through a
person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which revised the Section 13,
Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial court's Peralta,** Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private
respondents' substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons, and fully agreed with petitioners' assertions that the
enumeration under the new rule is restricted, limited and
exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction
that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language. Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule,
we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to

support their position for said case is not on all fours with the
instant case. We must stress that Millenium was decided when the
1964 Rules of Court were still in force and effect, unlike the instant
case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is
the later case.9 (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the petitioner's argument is meritorious; service of

summons on an officer other than those enumerated in Section
11 is invalid.10

However, although the petition before the CA was meritorious,

the petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees and other
legal fees. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the filing of a petition for certiorari .11 The
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fees. The payment of the full amount of
the docket fee is a condition sine qua non for jurisdiction to rest.

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner failed to

substantiate his allegations that the Court of Appeals personnel
refused his offer of payment four times. Moreover, these are
factual allegations that we cannot entertain because we are not
a trier of facts. Nevertheless, the petitioner pleads that
technicalities be set aside in order to dispense substantial justice.

The payment of docket fees, like the rule of strict compliance in

the service of summons, is not a mere technicality of procedure
but is an essential requirement of due process. Procedural rules
are not to be set aside simply because their strict application
would prejudice a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they
must be observed. They can only be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons where a litigant's degree of
noncompliance with the rules is severely disproportionate to the
injustice he is bound to suffer as a consequence.12

In the present case, the petitioner appeals to our sense of equity

and justice to relax the procedural rules in his favor because his
petition for certiorari is meritorious. However, we cannot overlook
the inequity of relaxing the procedural rules for the petitioner
in CA-G.R. UDK-SP No. 6325 in order to dismiss the respondent's
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-06-58473 for the Sheriffs
noncompliance with the rule on the service of summons. If we will
be equitable to the petitioner, then fairness demands that we
must also be equitable to the respondent.

In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to

be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not
the other way around.13 As the petitioner itself said, the ends of
justice would be best served if we do away with the technicalities
as we dispense substantial justice. We thus believe that the best
38

course of action under the circumstances is to allow the RTC to

decide the case on the merits.
Page

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition

 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 184333 : April 1, 2013
SIXTO N. CHU, Petitioner, v. MACH ASIA TRADING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision1 dated July 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70666, and the Resolution2 dated August 28, 2008
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation
engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. On
December 8, 1998, petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on
installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator worth P900,000.00 from the
respondent. Petitioner initially paid P180,000.00 with the balance
of P720,000.00 to be paid in 12 monthly installments through Prime
Bank postdated checks. On March 29, 1999, petitioner again
purchased two (2) heavy equipments from the respondent on
installment basis in the sum of P1,000,000.00, namely: one (1)
motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made a down
payment of P200,000.00 with the balance of P800,000.00 payable
in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated
checks.3chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they
were dishonored by the bank either by reason of "closed
account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or "payment
stopped." Respondent informed petitioner that the checks were
dishonored and invited him to its office to replace the checks. On
September 16, 1999, respondent sent petitioner a formal demand
letter urging the latter to settle his accounts within five days from
receipt of the letter. In response, petitioner sent respondent a
letter explaining that his business was badly hit by the Asian
economic crisis and that he shall endeavor to pay his obligation
by giving partial payments. He said that he shall also voluntarily
surrender the subject units should he fail to do
so.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 11, 1999, respondent filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money,
replevin, attorney's fees and damages against the petitioner.
Respondent prayed for the payment of the unpaid balance
of P1,661,947.27 at 21% per annum until full payment, 25% of the
total amount to be recovered as attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On November 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order6 allowing the
issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments.
On December 9, 1999, Sheriff Doroteo P. Cortes proceeded at
petitioner's given address for the purpose of serving the summons,
together with the complaint, writ of replevin and bond. However,
the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the
petitioner, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff then resorted
to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint
received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the
petitioner.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, which prompted
respondent to move for the declaration of defendant in default.
On January 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order declaring
defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to
present its evidence ex parte.
On December 15, 2000, after respondent presented its evidence,
the RTC rendered a Decision against the petitioner,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. By adjudicating and adjudging plaintiff's right of ownership and
possession over the subject units mentioned and described in the
complaint, and which were already seized and turned over to
the plaintiff by virtue of the writ of replevin.
2. Ordering defendants to pay to plaintiff the sum of (sic)
equivalent to 25% of the total amount recovered or value of the
heavy equipments possessed as attorney's fees, and to reimburse
39
no less than P15,000.00 as expenses for litigation, plus the cost of
the premium of replevin bond in the amount
Page
of P11,333.50.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 70666. Petitioner argued that the RTC erred in
concluding that the substituted service of summons was valid,
and that, consequently, there was error on the part of the RTC
when it declared him in default, in proceeding with the trial of the
case, and rendering an unfavorable judgment against him.
On July 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision9 affirming the
Decision of the RTC, the decretal portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. CEB-
24551, rendered on December 15, 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with
the sole modification as to award of attorney's fees, which is
hereby reduced to 10% of the value of the heavy equipments
recovered.
SO ORDERED.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ruling in favor of the respondent, the CA opined, among others,
that the requirement of due process was complied with,
considering that petitioner actually received the summons
through his security guard. It held that where the summons was in
fact received by the defendant, his argument that the Sheriff
should have first tried to serve summons on him personally before
resorting to substituted service of summons deserves scant
consideration. Thus, in the interest of fairness, the CA said that the
process server's neglect or inadvertence in the service of
summons should not unduly prejudice the respondent's right to
speedy justice.
The CA also noted that petitioner failed to set up a meritorious
defense aside from his contention that summons was not properly
served. It went further and decided the case on the merits and
ruled that petitioner has an unpaid obligation due to respondent
for the heavy machineries he purchased from the latter. It,
however, reduced the amount of attorney's fees awarded to 10%
of the value of the heavy equipments recovered.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in
the Resolution11 dated August 28, 2008.
Hence, the petition assigning the following
errors:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN FINDING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT EVEN WHEN THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
OF SUMMONS WAS IMPROPER.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN DEFIANCE OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN HOLDING
THAT HEREIN PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE SET UP A MERITORIOUS
DEFENSE EVEN WHEN THE SUMMONS WAS IMPROPERLY
SERVED.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that there was no valid substituted service of
summons in the present case. He maintains that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is acquired only through a valid
service of summons or the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court. Hence, when there is no valid service of
summons and no voluntary appearance by the defendant, any
judgment of a court, which acquired no jurisdiction over the
defendant, is null and void.
On its part, respondent posits that the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner and the judgment by default of
the RTC was based on facts, law, and jurisprudence and,
therefore, should be enforced against the petitioner.
The petition is meritorious.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in
a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the
defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally
within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may
be resorted to.15 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
 SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant Evidently, plaintiff-appellee cannot be penalized, through no
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the fault of its own, for an irregular or defective return on service of
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving summons. x x x.
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some x x x.
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b)
by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of In the interest of fairness, the process server's neglect or
business with some competent person in charge thereof. inadvertence in the service of summons should not, thus, unduly
prejudice plaintiff-appellee's right to speedy justice. x x
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should x 19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of
defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly
would actually receive the summons.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person,
and a judgment rendered against them is null and void.20 Since
Also, impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be
personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary considered binding upon him for being null and void.
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 25, 2007, as well as
by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must its Resolution dated August 28, 2008, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70666 is
be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
other than that authorized by statute is considered Trial Court dated December 15, 2000 is declared NULL and VOID.
ineffective.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to validly serve
summons upon Sixto N. Chu and, thereafter, proceed with the
In the case at bar, the Sheriff's Return trial of the main action with dispatch.
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Cebu City, the Summons and writ issued in the above-
entitled case with the following information, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. That the Summons, together with the complaint, writ of replevin
and bond was received on December 7, 1999, by Rolando
Bonayon, a security guard on defendant Sixto Chu at his given
address who received and signed receipt thereof.
2. That the writ of replevin was duly executed on the same date,
December 7, 1999, Tacloban City and San Jorge, Samar of the
following properties subject of the writ.
a) Excavator Hitachi with Serial No. WHO44-116-0743
b) Motorgrader with Serial No. N525PS-1014
c) Payloader with Serial No. KLD70-54224
After the issuance of the Sheriff's inventory receipt, the units were
turned over to Al Caballero and companion, representatives of
plaintiff, who shipped the same to Cebu to be deposited with
MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, Block 26 MacArthur
Highway, Reclamation Area, Cebu City, for safekeeping, subject
to the provision of Sec. 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received
the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would
definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service
contemplated by law. Thus, service on the security guard could
not be considered as substantial compliance with the
requirements of substituted service.
Moreover, the reasoning advanced by the CA in ruling against
the petitioner was based merely on conjectures and surmises. The
CA even went as far as to conclude that the process server's
neglect should not have unduly prejudiced the respondent,
thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Hence, if Chu had actually received the summons through his
security guard, the requirement of due process would have
nevertheless been complied with. x x x. Based on the
presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,
the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take
possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu;
otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for the said units.
Chu, for his part, would not have given his permission without
being informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of
replevin issued by the lower court, which permission includes the
authority to receive the summons and the writ of replevin.
Thus, where summons was in fact received by defendant, his
argument that the sheriff should have tried first to serve summons
40

on him personally before resorting to substituted service of

summons is not meritorious.
Page

x x x.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147369 : October 23, 2003
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, Petitioners, v. Spouses
HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a
clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally
possible. Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in
rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present
one which is for specific performance.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 26, 2001
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60888.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision is worded as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of what prescinds, the assailed
resolution and orders issued by the public respondent are
perforce ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. This pronouncement is
nonetheless rendered without prejudice to the refiling of the
same case by the private respondents with the court a quo.3
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are narrated by the CA in
this wise:
On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a
complaint for specific performance against [respondents] Helen
and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of
ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The
action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
which is presided by herein public respondent Judge N.C. Perello.
On July 21, 1998, respondent judge, through the acting Branch
Clerk of Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued
summons to the [respondents]. As per return of the summons,
substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed
before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to
Effect Summons by Publication. On December 28, 1998, public
respondent issued an Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On July 30,
1999, the respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an
Order declaring herein [respondents] in default for failure to file
their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of
default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence ex-
parte. Ultimately, on December 7, 1999, respondent judge issued
the assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
x x x Therefore, Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to
execute the necessary document with the effect of withdrawing
the Affidavit of Loss they filed and annotated with the Register of
Deeds of Makati City so that title to the parcel of land subject of
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred
in their names. Thereafter the Register of Deeds of Makati City or
Muntinlupa City may cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title No.
149635 of the Defendants and issue another to Plaintiff under the
deed of sale, clean and free of any reported encumbrance.
Defendants are also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in
the amount of P20,000 and attorneys fees of P20,000 including
costs of this suit.
xxx
On January 5, 2000, [respondent] Helen Boyon, who was then
residing in the United States of America, was surprised to learn
from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the
respondent court. On January 18, 2000, [respondents] filed an Ad
Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the
service of summons effected by the court a quo. On March 17,
2000, the public respondent issued an Order denying the said
motion on the basis of the defaulted [respondents] supposed loss
of standing in court. On March 29, 2000, the [respondents] once
again raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion
41
for reconsideration. On June 22, 2000, however, an Order was
issued by the public respondent denying the said motion. The
Page
[petitioners] moved for the execution of the controverted
judgment which the respondent judge ultimately
granted.4cräläwvirtualibräry
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a Petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court (RTC).
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the
questioned Resolution and Orders. According to the appellate
court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents
because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the
sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted
service of summons, because he did not specify in the Return of
Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the
impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by
personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by
publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit
for specific performance and therefore an action in personam.
Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void,
since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Hence, this Petition.5
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our
consideration:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
assailed Resolution dated December 7, 1999 was already final
and executory
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to
the Petition for Certiorari of private respondents despite the
pendency of an appeal earlier filed
C. The Honorable Court erred in not holding that the Petition for
Certiorari was time barred
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
proceedings in the lower court are null and void due to invalid
and defective service of summons and the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents.6cräläwvirtualibräry
In sum, the main issue revolves around the validity of the service
of summons on respondents.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Service of Summons
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that the service of
summons on respondents was invalid. They submit that although
the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an
action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in
rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the
Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in
rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the
trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by
publication, which they effected subsequent to the substituted
service of summons, was allegedly sufficient.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the proceedings in
the trial court were null and void because of the invalid and
defective service of summons. According to them, the Return of
Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state
that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of
summons. He allegedly tried to serve it personally on them on July
22, 1998 at No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang. He,
however, resorted to substituted service on that same day,
supposedly because he could not find respondents in the above
address. They further allege that the person to whom he gave the
summons was not even a resident of that address.
Respondents contend that when summons is served by
substituted service, the return must show that it was impossible to
serve the summons personally, and that efforts had been exerted
toward that end. They add that noncompliance with the rule on
substituted service renders invalid all proceedings relative
thereto.
 As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by
petitioners, respondents argue that the case filed before the trial
court was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an
action in personam. As such, the summons by publication was
insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of respondents.
Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of
summons by publication was permissible under the
circumstances, it would still be defective and invalid because of
the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like
an Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a
copy of the summons and of the order of publication, paid the
postage, and sent the documents by registered mail to the
formers last known address.
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is
in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or
substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6
and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal
service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the
former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to
the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant.7 It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the
proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.8
Defective Personal
Service of Summons
In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and
capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without
actually exerting any genuine effort to locate respondents. A
review of the records9 reveals that the only effort he exerted was
to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22,
1998, to try to serve the summons personally on respondents.
While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were
ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the
United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention
exactly what efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find
respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom
the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts. The pertinent portion of the Return of Summons is
reproduced as follows:
That efforts to serve the said Summons personally upon
defendants Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon were made but the
same were ineffectual and unavailing for the reason that
defendant Helen Boyon is somewhere in the United States of
America and defendant Romeo Boyon is in Bicol thus substituted
service was made in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14, of the
Revised Rules of Court.10cräläwvirtualibräry
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted
and no positive step taken by either the process server or
42
petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged
Page
whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge
thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant
circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for
purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.
The necessity of stating in the process servers Return or Proof of
Service the material facts and circumstances sustaining the
validity of substituted service was explained by this Court
in Hamilton v. Levy,11 from which we quote:
x x x The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the
service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of
personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used
only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by
statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure to faithfully,
strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted
service renders said service ineffective.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the requirements of substituted service of summons
and the effect of noncompliance with the subsequent
proceedings therefor were discussed in Madrigal v. Court of
Appeals13 as follows:
In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of
personal service justifying availment of substituted service should
be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards
personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances
attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof
of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the substituted service
cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of
summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the
resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do
so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional
grounds.14
Summons by
Publication Improper
It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or
summons by publication applies only when the action is in
rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject
that individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or
loan burdening it.15
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an
action for specific performance directed against respondents.
While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership
or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert
any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently
declared that an action for specific performance is an action in
personam.16cräläwvirtualibräry
Having failed to serve the summons on respondents properly, the
RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings
conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and
void.17cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.