Book Reviews / 425

Book Reviews

Strategic Culture of Pakistan

AHMAD FARUQUI, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Stra-
tegic Myopia (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003). Pp. xxix + 190.
Price not stated.

There is no evidence in the period before independence, 1940–47, when the All
India Muslim League had launched the movement for Pakistan of any discussion
or awareness about the security problems the new country would face once it
became independent. This was particularly important because Pakistan was a
geographical oddity as it was divided in two wings separated from each other by
a thousand miles of Indian territory. During the Pakistan movement, there were
some casual references to the Islamic world coming to the rescue of the new
country. Even after Pakistan came into being, the new leaders believed that the
battle for East Pakistan would be fought in West Pakistan. Defending the two
wings located so far apart was beyond the military capability of the country. One
important factor, among others, that promoted the autonomy movement in East
Pakistan was the isolation that the people of the eastern province felt during the
1965 India-Pakistan war when it had been denuded of most of the forces and the
province was left at the mercy of the Indian army. Thankfully, India had no in-
tention to attack East Pakistan.
Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, according to the author himself,
is about the strategic culture of Pakistan. It is written to re-examine the fundamental
premises at the core of Pakistan’s national security policies. India and Pakistan
have fought four wars; the first broke out within a few weeks of the country com-
ing into existence. Faruqui argues that Pakistan’s preoccupation with seeking a
military solution to its conflict with India is strategically myopic on three counts.
First, it has not won any of the four wars it has fought with India. Second, it has
failed to achieve Pakistan’s political aims. Third, Pakistan’s wars have damaged
its economy as they diverted funds from much needed social development. It is
well known and is admitted even by many eminent Pakistanis that, contrary to the
establishment’s view, that all the four wars with India were initiated by Pakistan.
The reasons for this could be found in the common belief among the military de-
cision makers that India would not give a befitting reply to Pakistan’s provocations.
Thus in all its wars Pakistan did not expect India to react to its hostile actions.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 41, 4 (2004)

Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/London
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This was glaringly evident in Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure in 1999. Faruqui

has pointed out that Pakistan has viewed India as a pushover adversary that is
cowardly because the “Hindu has no stomach for a fight”.
Pakistan’s military leaders have not drawn the lessons from their repeated
failures in the wars that they have fought against India. One major reason for this
seems to be the lack of democracy in Pakistan. The author says that the primary
Indian success against Pakistan has been in the higher direction of war. He points
out that a major reason has been the complete lack of political involvement of the
Indian military. Referring to the recurring tendency of the Pakistan army to
intervene in politics, the author points out that the Pakistani military steps into
power to protect its corporate interests, and not necessarily to promote national
interests. The author regrets that when the world is moving towards democracy,
Pakistan has had twenty-nine years of direct military rule out of fifty-seven years
of independence. The eleven years of Gen. Ayub’s military rule and later another
eleven years of Gen. Zia’s regime have done incalculable damage to democratic
institutions and civil society. Whatever innovations Gen. Musharraf, the current
military ruler, might make to set up the so-called “sustainable democracy”, his
regime lacks legitimacy. The military rule in Pakistan like elsewhere in the world
has created a style of governance that is poorly suited to debate, coalition building
or bargaining since these factors are alien to military culture. Every military ruler
in Pakistan has assumed that he alone represents national interests of the country
and the elected representatives of the people are a nuisance at best or traitors at
the worst.
Ahmed Faruqui is critical of both India and Pakistan for introducing nuclear
weapons as a deterrent to war. Instead of making the two countries more secure,
nuclear weapons have merely expanded the arms race from the conventional arena
to the nuclear arena. It is erroneous to believe that national security means military
security alone. Military security is only one of the several aspects which include
political leadership, social cohesion, economic strength, and an effective foreign
policy. The solution to Pakistan’s strategic problems lies in a large part in balancing
resources with strategic perception which military and political leaders of Pakistan
are unable to accept because of their preoccupation with India. He recommends
the Israeli model for Pakistan, which has a small standing army backed by large
reserve forces.
The author has devoted an entire chapter on the India-Pakistan conflict over
Kashmir. After briefly going over the origins of the conflict, Faruqui has sum-
marized the various plans and proposals that are extant at present. He has rejected
Pakistani claims that it is only providing moral and political support to the
Mujahideen. He is conscious of the complexity of the dispute and hints that no
easy solution is possible. This is apparent from the fact that the maximalist positions
of both the sides have no overlapping zones. It appears that Faruqui would want
the US to use its influence to work towards a solution.
The author has also looked the reasons for Pakistan’s poor economic perform-
ance and finds that much of it can be traced to its strategy of conflict with India,
 Book Reviews / 427

primarily over Kashmir. It is well known that a large portion of Pakistan’s budget
is devoted to payment of interests on foreign debt and on defence which leaves
very little for economic development which, according to the author, is to the
ultimate detriment of Pakistan’s national economy. Pakistan’s large military
establishment is mainly financed by foreign loans. Its abysmal economic per-
formance could be attributed to poor governance and corruption in the admin-
istration, which are the direct result of the failure to develop political institutions
due to decades of military rule. Pakistan has been called a failed state by observers.
The author has quoted a US Central Agency Report which says that it will not re-
cover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive
policies, lawlessness, corruption, and ethnic friction. This, however, does not mean
that the Pakistani state will wither away.
Faruqui has produced a very cogent and provocative critique of Pakistan’s
strategic culture. He does not hesitate to explode the common myths about national
security which he appropriately calls “strategic myopia” that have been spread by
Pakistan’s successive military rulers over the years since independence. It is an
interesting study both for common readers as well as for specialists.

Formerly at KALIM BAHADUR

Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian
and Southwest Pacific Studies
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

Issues Confronting Central Asia

AJAY PATNAIK, Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia (New Delhi: Anamika
Publishers and Distributors, 2003). Pp. 250. Price Rs 650.

There are several critical questions about Central Asia. Some analysts have come
to believe that it is a “strategic quicksand”. There is ample evidence to support their
contention. The Russian withdrawal from Central Asia, after the disintegration of
the erstwhile Soviet Union, gave rise to a host of problems. The more serious is
the security problem, which is also related to the specificity of the ethno-national
formations in the region. The region was left without a security manager. The
intraregional feuds and overarching rivalries eroded the possibilities of region-
wide cooperation and consolidation. The republics had to contend with internal
insurgencies, growth of militancy, or what Patnaik calls “radical Islam”, cross-
border terrorism, drug and gun-running, shortage of key resources, etc. Because
of the political and security vacuum and intraethnic tensions, the whole region, as
the author puts, has been “destabilized”.