HERNAEZ V.

IAC

It appears from the records that on September 2, 1980, petitioner represented by his mother and natural guardian,
Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the then Juvenile and Domestic Court (now Regional Trial Court) against
Teodoro Hernaez for acknowledgment and support with support pendente lite. Teodoro Hernaez filed a notice of
appeal of said decision. As the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days as mandated by Section
39 of Batas Pambansa 129, petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as the decision of the trial court has become
final and executory.

Realizing the defect in his notice of appeal, Teodoro Hernaez filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal or
Petition for Relief which was denied on the ground that the motion was filed out of time and the petition did not
comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Teodoro Hernaez thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that he was not
aware of the decision of the lower court. On the same date, private respondent's wife, Estrella Hernaez, together
with their six children likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motion to Intervene because they were
not included as parties in the instant case, which petitions and motion were denied for lack of merit and on the
ground that the decision had already become final and executory.

Private respondents then filed a motion for clarification inquiring as to whether their appeal which was granted on
January 25, 1986 was subsequently denied. The trial court issued an order declaring that there is no need for a
clarification.

On March 20, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to require private respondent Teodoro Hernaez to deposit support in
arrears or to be cited for contempt.

During the hearing of the motion for contempt, private respondents' counsel requested for 10 days within which to
comply with the questioned decision. However, on April 10, 1986, private respondents, instead of complying with
said decision, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an action for the annulment of
judgment with preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 which declared the decision of the trial
court null and void for lack of summons by publication being an action in rem. 6

It is petitioner's contention that the requirement of publication is not necessary in an action for compulsory
acknowledgment and support of an illegitimate child since said action is not one of the instances enumerated in
Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised Rules of Court requiring publication of the petition before jurisdiction can be
acquired by the Court. Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" principle on statutory construction, this
action should be considered a proceeding in personam.

ISSUE: WON an action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special
proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

HELD: YES. An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is not among cases of special
proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should be
governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions.

The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Court since the same applies only to cases falling
under Article 281 of the Civil Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minor natural child, i.e., prior
recognition of the minor natural child in a document other than a record of birth or a will, which is absent in the
instant case.

ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA

Facts:

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191)
left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in
equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to sell it though public auction. Vilma and
Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject
land. The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the
auction of the subject land including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public
auction sale of the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
the CA denied the said motion.

Issue:

Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

Held:

No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. According to Article
159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.

SPS. KELLY V. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.

Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent
Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum
of money against him. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of
execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on execution real property covered by
TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.

After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley (Doris) filed a
motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the ground that the subject property
was their family home which was exempt from execution. Petitioners' motion was denied for failure to comply
with the three-day notice requirement.

WON the subject property is exempt from execution.

HELD: YES. A family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There
must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried
head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is
situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried
head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the
amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions:

Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; andcralawlibrary

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his
favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum
amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the
sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of
the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that TCT
No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in accordance with the requirements of law.

RAMOS V. PANGILINAN

DOCTRINE:

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege and on both instances, the exemption must be proved.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by
Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in
Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the
judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is
not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business
address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the company
appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein
petitioners.

The appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not exempted from
execution, for while “Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that the article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family
the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it
must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233
of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242..

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the
family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,
its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as
early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the
law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

MOHAMMAD, ET AL. V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the]
Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," labels itself as
"a special proceeding" or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen" authorized under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution.

The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a measure of last resort and should be invoked by the President
only after exhaustion of less severe remedies. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should
be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law. It maintains that the
President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated
only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.

According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation in Marawi is not so grave as to require the imposition
of martial law. It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not equate to the existence of a public necessity brought
about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus". It proposes that "[m]artial law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has
reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is compelled by the needs of public safety" which, it believes, is
not yet present in Mindanao.

Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the President's Report to the Congress, to wit: that the
Maute Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they have the capability to deprive the duly constituted
authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a
grander plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are conclusions bereft of substantiation.

The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and without waiting for a
congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis
of Proclamation No. 216.

Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the
Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".
Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the
factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents. It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to
divulge relevant information" in order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual basis.

In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review, "compel respondents to
present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao" and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient
factual basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate
proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
review required of this Court when a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is promulgated.

HELD:
YES. All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.

The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as
sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section
18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as any citizen may file
it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by
the Chief Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is
likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII considering the limited period within
which this Court has to promulgate its decision.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the
manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of
executing." In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as
a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For
instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President can be found in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII.
The power of the Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections
and Commission on Audit can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).

Lansang doctrine - the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review.

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V. CA

The Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines
pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation and
a Liquidator was appointed. The Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition
entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." The petition was approved,
after which creditors filed their claims with the court. A new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.

Thereafter, the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No.
109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary
increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees
of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the
Union.

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his
September 13, 1991 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received
by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and
a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal
was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.

In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground
that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991
order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he
granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding
and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

HELD:
YES. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under
§29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and
the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order
to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days
from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.

Under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special proceeding."

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor
the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from
a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may
be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition
only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the
order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has
no interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of
the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with
insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment
provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons
under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets
and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and
the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both
instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the
declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

Guy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 138.

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina,
George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached
to private respondents’ petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping signed by their counsel, Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased
father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during
the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that
private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from
any and all liabilities.

Regional Trial Court: denied the Joint Motion

CA: denied again

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
successional rights.
(2) Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

HELD:
(1) NO. As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly
evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does
not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00
 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."
Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such
waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the
testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those
mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release
and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their
rights as heirs of the deceased.

(2) NO. Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling
on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence.
Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children
was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to
be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier
of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the
trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

Enrico vs. Heirs

G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962
and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio
married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a marriage license.
Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and
a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio
to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from
the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof
for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She
further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and
solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August
26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts.

Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria Jennifer Quiazon v. Ma. Lourdes Belen, for and in behalf
of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

FACTS: Eliseo died intestate, Elise filed a Petition for Letters of Administration and claimed that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry
each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached
to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Claiming
that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, wife of the decedent, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by
his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseo’s estate.

The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City and directed the issuance
of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the residence of the decedent as indicated in the death certificate should be taken into
account for purposes of determining the venue for the probate of the will.
2. Whether or not the natural child of the decedent may be appointed as an administrator.

HELD:
1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The word “resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. As thus defined, "residence," in the context
of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time
of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition
of properties against Amelia, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. It disproves rather
than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of
the evidence on record.

2. No. Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested
person An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next
of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate
as distributees. In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by
Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of PioFragante, 80 Phil 776

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining
the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate
Estate of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to
the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality

HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.” Fragante has rights and fulfillment of
obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs
directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights and
obligations which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

We hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

Lim v CA

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim,
represented by George Luy, Petitioner". On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition5 for
the administration of the estate.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate
of the decedent.

RTC QC: Remove lis pendens

RTC: reinstate lis pendens

Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and registered
in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of whether these
properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final
determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of
the decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations,
which are the private respondents in the instant case. Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of
the petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained
averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and
participation in the organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons
whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof,
are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the corporation
and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.

ISSUE: May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the
estate of a deceased person?

HELD: It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable
for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded
by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter
ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated;
where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come
to naught.

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a
probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court
to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by
Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the aforementioned documents possess no
weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits
are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the
proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents
would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law
and jurisprudence.

CMH v. CA

The antecedent facts show that the private respondent, Cristobal M. Hojilla, filed a complaint for "Disregarding
and Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction, Formal Declaration or Recognition of Successional Rights and
Recovery of Title with Damages"3 with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 45, docketed as Civil Case No. 6256
against his siblings namely: Carlos M. Hojilla, Cesar M. Hojilla,Cornelio M. Hojilla, Claudio M. Hojilla and Corazon
M. Hojilla (with the latter two (2) impleaded as unwilling co-plaintiffs), and CMH Agricultural Corporation (CMH
for brevity). Cristobal alleged in his complaint that CMH was a dummy corporation created to be the alter-ego
of their mother, the late Concepcion Montelibano-Hojilla, who purposely organized the same in 1975 to shield
her paraphernal properties from taxes by fictitiously assigning them to CMH, with her children acting as dummy
stockholders. Immediately upon its incorporation, the following properties of his mother were assigned to CMH:
Hacienda Manayosayao, Hacienda Nangka and a house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, consisting of Lot
Nos. 240, 241, 242, 246, 247 and 248. After their mother's death, Cristobal and his siblings extrajudicially
partitioned the properties with Carlos, Cesar and Cornelio taking Hacienda Nangka and the commercial lots of
their late father, Mattias J. Hojilla, situated in Silay City, while Corazon, Claudio and Cristobal were apportioned
Hacienda Manayaosayao, the house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City, and some lots which were not
assigned to CMH. Thereafter, with the promise that the title over the property would be delivered to them,
Corazon, Claudio and Cristobal took possession of the subject house and lots. However, Cristobal claimed that
the title over the said property had not been turned over to them and on several occasions Carlos, Cesar and
Cornelio had, without his and his co-owners' knowledge, mortgaged the said lots comprising the 23rd Street
property in Bacolod City to several banking institutions and even leased the same to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, which, however, was only curtailed by court action. Thus, Cristobal prayed that the veil of
corporate fiction be pierced as CMH was being used to deprive and defraud him of his successional rights over
the house and lots on 23rd Street, Bacolod City.

ISSUE:
WoN trial court has no jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil Case No. 6256 as it involves a suit filed by a
stockholder against other stockholders and the corporation itself; thus, it is an intra-corporate controversy
within the jurisdiction of the SEC and not of the regular courts.

HELD:
The relationship of the parties to a suit has formerly been the lone indicia for its classification either as an intra-
corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC or a civil dispute within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Thus, a dispute arising between a stockholder and the corporation, without distinction, qualification or
exemption, was previously considered an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC and not
of the regular courts. Recent jurisprudence, however, has established that in determining which body has
jurisdiction over a case, the better policy would be to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the question that is the subject of the controversy.12

A reading of the complaint filed by private respondent shows that its primary objective is to protect his
successional rights as an heir of his late mother, Concepcion M. Hojilla, whose paraphernal properties he
claimed were fictitiously assigned to CMH to evade payment of taxes. He alleged therein that the properties
had already been the subject of extra-judicial partition between the heirs with the house and lots on 23rd Street,
Bacolod City, being bestowed upon him and his co-heirs Corazon and Claudia. He claimed that the failure of his
other siblings, Carlos, Cesar and Cornelio, to turn over the title to him and his co-heirs allowed CMH to continue
claiming the house and lots as its own and even attempted to lease a few of the lots to other persons without
the knowledge of private respondent and his co-heirs. Thus, private respondent filed the complaint to
consolidate his claim over the subject properties and forestall any further intrusive act from the CMH which
would place his and his co-heirs/co-owners' rights over the properties in constant peril. Private respondent's
position as a stockholder of CMH and his relationship to the other stockholders, became incidental only to the
issue of ownership over the subject properties and did not convert the action into an intra-corporate
controversy within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC but remained a civil action cognizable by the regular
courts.

Neither does the allegation about CMH's formation as an alleged dummy corporation designed to be the alter-
ego of the late Concepcion M. Hojilla and the prayer for piercing the corporate veil convert the action into an
intra-corporate controversy as the former is merely cited as the ground relied upon by private respondent to
prove his claim of ownership over the said house and lots whereas through the said prayer, he in effect exhorts
the court to confirm his allegations and thus, protect his successional rights.