15 REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK V.

CIR legitimate interest in acting concertedly in making known their views to

FACTS:
1. Bank discharged respondent employees for having written and published “a
patently libelous letter…tending to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt…”
a. The respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his
resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment
and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees
2. At the instance of the employees, prosecutor Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR
for ULP - to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give
testimony
3. The Bank moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that respondents
were discharged not for union activities but for having written and published a
libelous letter against the bank president
4. In 1960, SC overruled the decision of the CIR in the Royal Interocean case and
held that "the charge, the filing of which is the cause of the dismissal of the
employee, must be related to his right to self-organization in order to give rise to
unfair labor practice on the part of the employer.”
5. CIR- guilty of ULP
6. Bank argues that the court should have dismissed the complaint because the
discharge of the respondents had nothing to do with their union activities as the
latter in fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-charge was not
a "union action" but merely their "individual" act
management without being discharged for that interest
 What the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance
committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed ULP
 The grievance committee, created in the CBA, would have been an appropriate
forum for such negotiation. Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the
continuous process of collective bargaining. It is intended to promote, as it were,
a friendly dialogue between labor and management as a means of maintaining
industrial peace
 Right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited, as the right of an
employer to discharge for cause is not denied. The Industrial Peace Act does not
touch the normal exercise of the right of an employer to select his employees or
to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by
interfering with the countervailing right of self-organization
 Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-
organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted ULP

ISSUE: Whether or not there was ULP since the letter-charge was not a union act.
There’s ULP.

 Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the
letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self-organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which
constitutes ULP
 When the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other
management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as
a proper sphere of collective bargaining
 In National Labor Relations Board v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.
o Employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their
mutual aid or protection even though no union activity be involved, for
collective bargaining be contemplated. Here Davis and Johnson and
other salesmen were properly concerned with the identity and capability
of the new cashier. Conceding they had no authority to appoint a new
cashier or even recommend anyone for the appointment, they had a
16 Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union c. The purpose of the law is to insure freedom of belief and religion and to avoid
discrimination against members of religious sects which prohibit labor
1. Victoriano was an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and an Iglesia ni Cristo. organization affiliation; to enable them to work and earn
a. Before, the law allows the employer to require the employee to join a labor 4. There is no violation of the non-establishment of religion clause of the
organization as a condition for employment Constitution – the law merely advances the free exercise of religion and so that
b. However, such law was amended to provide that it will not cover members in the exercise of their religion, they be not prevented from working by reason of
of religious sects which prohibit labor organization affiliation (RA 3350) the closed shop agreements
2. Iglesia prohibits labor organization affiliations, thus, Victoriano presented his 5. No violation of the equal protection clause because it allows classification
resignation with the Union a. There is a valid basis for classification between those who by reason of their
a. The Union wrote to the Company asking it to dismiss Victoriano from religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those
employment whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions
b. The company told Victoriano to arrange with the Union, otherwise he shall
be terminated.
3. Victoriano filed an action for injunction
a. RTC enjoined the company from dismissing victoriano
b. The company argues that RA 3350 is unconstitutional because it infringes on
the right to form associations in violation of the Constitution; and for
impairing obligations of contracts; and for discriminating religious sects and
violation of the equal protection clause; that in the exercise of persons to join
associations, which is a civil right, a religious test has been used.

WON the law is constitutional. YES

1. There was no prohibition to join labor organizations

a. The law merely provides that employees of religious sects that prohibit labor
organization affiliation cannot be compelled to join one as a condition for
employment
2. The right to organize has two notions: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence
of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from Joining an association
a. The right not to join is limited – because when the company and the union
agreed on a “closed shop”, the employer may only employ those members
of the said union;
b. RA 3350 made an exception as to those religious sects prohibiting labor
organization affiliation
c. RA 3350 reinforces the right to self organization – gives the employees more
freedom to choose whether to affiliate or not
3. As to the impairment of obligations of contracts
a. Such right is no absolute; it only prohibits unreasonable impairment
b. The state has the duty to safeguard the interests of the people; involves
public welfare
17 REYES v. TRAJANO (1992)
Topic: Extent and Scope of Right to Self-Organization
1. The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Relations among the employees of TriUnion Industries Corporation.
2. The competing unions were the Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEUOLALIA) and Trade Union of
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS).
a. Of the 348 workers deemed as qualified voters, only 240 took part in the
election. Among the 240, 141 of which were members of the “Iglesia ni
Kristo” (INK).
3. There were 3 choices: the two contending labor organizations and the third
choice was “NO UNION.”
a. TUEA-OLALIA got 95 votes; TUPAS got 1; No Union 1; Challenged Votes:
141.
4. The challenged votes of the INK members were segregated and excluded from
the final count because INK members should not be allowed to vote since they
are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous
certification elections.
5. The INK employees protested. Filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that
it was not fair and the results did not reflect the true sentiments of the majority
of the employees.
6. TUEU opposed saying that the INK members do not have legal personality to
protest because they are not members of either unit.
a. INK prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming
any labor organization.
7. Med-Arbiter found no merit in the INK employee’s petition. Certified TUEU as the
bargaining unit.
a. Religious belief was being utilized to render meaningless the rights of the
non-members of the INK to exercise the right to be represented.
b. INK members had no legal personality since they were not parties to the
petition for certification election.
8. INK employees appealed saying that they were disenfranchised even if they had
an overwhelming majority.
9. Bureau of Labor Relations: Denied the appeal. Lack of legal capacity; did not
participate previously because of religious beliefs.
10. SolGen: Concurred with the INK Employees.
11. NLRC: If the workers who are members of the INK in the exercise of their religious
belief opted not to join any labor organization as a consequence of which they
themselves cannot have a bargaining representative, then the right to be
represented by a bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the
bargaining unit.
ISSUE: Whether INK employees had the right to vote in the certification election. YES.
 Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to
form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining.
 Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among
others, to "interfere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self- organization."
 Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to "restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization.
 The INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit, do have the right
of self-organization. As well as the fact that when they voted that the employees
in their bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply
exercising that right of self- organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
 Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees
affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a certification election. On
the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to
vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members
of a labor organization or not.
ISSUE: Whether the employees have the right NOT to vote for any of the unions. YES.
 The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor
union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and
to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid
and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights
and interests.

 Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate
or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with,
or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein.
o The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the
right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right.
o It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a
right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise
such a conferred right.
o The fact that a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union
does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
18 Kapatiran v Calleja (1988)
1. From 1984 to 1987, Tupas was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal
Robina Corporation, with a 3-year CBA which was to expire on November 15,
1987.
2. Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, Tupas
filed an amended notice of strike as a means of pressuring the company to extend,
renew, or negotiate a new CBA with it.
3. On October 8, 1987, the New Ulo, composed mostly of workers belonging to the
Iglesia ni Kristo sect, registered as a labor union.
4. On October 12, 1987, the Tupas staged a strike. URC obtained an injunction
against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and for the parties
to negotiate a new CBA.
5. The next day, New Ulo, claiming that it has the majority of the daily wage rank
and file employees numbering 191, filed a petition for a certification election at
the Bureau of Labor Relations.
6. Tupas moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the
members of the New Ulo were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which
3 years previous thereto refused to affiliate with any labor union. It also accused
the company of using the New Ulo to defeat Tupas' bargaining rights.
7. Med-Arbiter: ordered the holding of a certification election within 20 days.
8. Tupas appealed with the BLR. While on appeal, Tupas was able to negotiate a new
3-year CBA with URC.
9. BLR Director: dismissed appeal.
ISSUE: WON the BLR Director acted with GADLEJ in affirming the Med-Arbiter’s order
for certification election.- NO.
1. The Court decision upholding the right of members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect not
to join a labor union, for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their own union. The recognition of the tenets
of the sect should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by
the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation.
2. The fact that Tupas was able to negotiate a new CBA with URC within the 60-day
freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union,
New Ulo, to challenge Tupas' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition
for certification election before Tupas' old CBA expired and before it signed a new
CBA with the company.
3. A certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the
contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their
bargaining representative thru secret ballot.
4. Since it has not been shown that the Med-Arbiter’s order is tainted with
unfairness, the Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election
19 PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS INC v. PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
and CIR
1. Respondent union, Pan-Am EEs Association, filed a notice of strike w/ the
Department of Labor and declared and maintained a strike against herein
petitioner Pan-Am World Airways.
2. The President of the PH certified the strike to the CIR as being an industrial dispute
affecting the national interest.
3. Several conferences were held. It was the position of the Union that its members
would not resume the performance of their duties unless the officers (of the
Union) were likewise included in the return-to-work order. Pan-Am was agreeable
to having the workers return to work but NOT the 5 officials of the Union.
4. Pan-Am alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-strike clause of
an existing CBA. Hence, the 5 officials, as the responsible parties, could be
dismissed. Consequently, it was not agreeable to their being allowed to return to
the positions held by them prior to the strike as they would not be only lacking in
incentive and motivation for doing their work properly but would also have the
opportunity to cause grave and irreparable injury to Pan-Am.
 The 5 officers of the union consist of 3 Passenger Traffic Representatives
and a reservation clerk who in the course of their duties could cause mix-
ups in the reservation and accommodation of passengers which could
result in very many suits for damages against Pan-Am. The other union
officer who, is in the cargo department could underweight or overweigh
cargo to the great detriment of the service or even, of the safety of Pan-
Am’s aircraft.
5. Pan-Am did offer, however, to deposit their salaries even if they would not be
working, promising that they would not even be required to refund any amount
should the right to remain in their positions be considered as legally terminated
due to calling the alleged illegal strike.
6. CIR: Required Pan-Am to accept the 5 union officers pending resolution on the
merits of the dispute involved in the strike. MR denied.
7. Hence, this petition, alleging a grave abuse of discretion, consisting in the failure
to grant Pan-Am’s demand to exclude from a return-to-work order the 5 union
officials.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CIR could be said to have acted in grave abuse of discretion. NO
2. W/N the return to work order, insofar as 5 union officers are affected, is valid.
YES
RULING:
1. NO. CIR did not act in GAD.
 Considering that this is a case certified by the President, with the CIR, its broad
authority of compulsory arbitration, the discretion it possesses cannot be so
restricted that the mere failure to grant a plea to exclude from the return-to-work
order the union officials could be considered as tantamount to a grave abuse
thereof.
 CA 103 empowers the CIR to act with broad powers and jurisdiction. If the CIR is
granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution
consists in ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended
that the CIR does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into
effect. Of what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it does not have
the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted.
 Further, if the said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of
employment, it certainly can order the return of the workers w/ or w/o backpay
as a term or condition of the employment. Section 10 of RA 875 implies is that CIR
is granted great breadth of discretion in its quest for a solution to a labor problem
so certified. Hence, the allegation as to the grave abuse of discretion is clearly
devoid of merit.
 The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right
of self-organization. There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that
laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-a-vis their
employers. Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if they
could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for
them.
 If Pan-Am’s demand would be granted, the laborers in the union would thus have
the leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible, possibly even constituting
a danger to the operations of the enterprise.
 The effect of would be to deprive effectively the rank and file of their freedom of
choice as to who should represent them. For what use are leaders so undeserving
of the minimum confidence. To that extent then, their constitutional and statutory
right to freedom of association suffers an impairment hardly to be characterized as
inconsequential.

2. YES. The return to work order is valid. The union wins!

a. No danger is expected from the union officers’ return to work.

 Pan-Am betrayed an inexcusable lack of confidence in the responsibility of union

officials and ultimately in the validity of the collective bargaining process itself.
Implicit in a regime of collective bargaining is the confidence that must be
displayed by management in the sense of responsibility of union officials to assure
that the 2 indispensable elements in industry and production could-work side by
side, attending to the problems of each w/o neglecting the common welfare that
binds them together.
 The moment management displays distrust in the union officials discharging their
functions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the collective
bargaining process itself is called into question. It would have been different if
there were a rational basis for such fears, purely speculative in character.
 The record is bereft of slightest indication that any danger, much less one clear and
present, is to be expected from their return to work. Necessarily, the union officials
have the right to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid their
salaries in the meanwhile they would not be considered as fit persons to perform
the duties pertaining to the positions held by them. Far from being generous such
an offer could rightfully, be considered insulting.

b. To allow Pan-Am’s plea would result in the impairment of the rank and
file EEs’ right to freedom of association/ right to self-organization.
20 Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 164561. August 30, 2006.
Topic: Supervisors
1. The parties are Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation (CAPASCO), a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products; and private
respondents Enrique Tamondong III, the Personnel Superintendent of CAPASCO,
and CAPASCO Union of Supervisory Employees (CUSE), a duly registered union of
CAPASCO. Four former employees of CAPASCO originally filed this labor case
before the NLRC. However, in the course of the proceedings, 3 of them executed
a Release and Quitclaim.
2. Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent Tamondong as Assistant to the
Personnel Manager for its Cainta Plant. Thereafter, he was promoted to the
position of Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of Personnel
Superintendent. Later on, the supervisory personnel of CAPASCO organized a
union, herein respondent CUSE. Tamondong was elected as one of its officers.
Consequently, CAPASCO sent a memo to Tamondong requiring him to explain and
to discontinue from his union activities, with a warning that a continuance thereof
shall adversely affect his employment. Tamondong ignored the warning, invoking
his right as a supervisory employee to join and organize a labor union. In view of
that, CAPASCO terminated his employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence, citing his union activities as acts constituting serious disloyalty to the
company.
3. Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving unfair
labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice
before the NLRC.
4. In contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by virtue of private respondent
Tamondong’s position as Personnel Superintendent, he was considered as a
managerial employee, thus, under the law he was prohibited from joining a union
as well as from being elected as one of its officers.
5. LA: finding petitioner CAPASCO guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal
and ordered Tamondong’s reinstatement.
6. NLRC: reversed the decision, dismissing the Complaint for unfair labor practice
and illegal dismissal.
7. CA: reversed the decision, finding petitioner CAPASCO guilty of unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal.
8. CAPASCO avers that Tamondong as Personnel Superintendent, was performing
functions of a managerial employee because he was the one laying down major
management policies on personnel relations such as: issuing memos on company
rules and regulations, imposing disciplinary sanctions, and executing the same
with full power and discretion. Additionally, private respondent Tamondong was
not only a managerial employee but also a confidential employee having
knowledge of confidential information involving company policies on personnel
relations.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAPASCO was guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal. NO.
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
in annulling the Decision of the NLRC because the findings that Tamondong was
indeed a supervisory employee and not a managerial employee, thus, eligible to
join or participate in the union activities of CUSE, were supported by evidence on
record. A Memorandum was issued, which required Tamondong to observe fixed
daily working hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm.
This imposition upon Tamondong, according to the Court of Appeals, is very
uncharacteristic of a managerial employee. To support such a conclusion, the
Court of Appeals cited the case of Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC where this
Court held that one of the essential characteristics of an employee holding a
managerial rank is that he is not subjected to the rigid observance of regular office
hours or maximum hours of work.
2. Tamondong may have possessed enormous powers and was performing
important functions that goes with the position of Personnel Superintendent,
nevertheless, there was no clear showing that he is at liberty, by using his own
discretion and disposition, to lay down and execute major business and
operational policies for and in behalf of CAPASCO. At the most, the record merely
showed that Tamondong informed and warned rank-and-file employees with
respect to their violations of CAPASCO’s rules and regulations.
3. Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as amended, differentiates
supervisory employees from managerial employees, to wit: supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions, if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment; whereas,
managerial employees are those who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Thus, from the foregoing
provision of the Labor Code, it can be clearly inferred that Tamondong was just a
supervisory employee. Hence, the Labor Code provisions regarding
disqualification of a managerial employee from joining, assisting or forming any
labor organization does not apply to Tamondong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.
21 FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION V. FILOIL SUPERVISORY AND CONFIDENTIAL stockholders and bondholders (capital) and should therefore be entitled under
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION the law to bargain collectively with the top management with respect to their
terms and conditions of employment
FACTS:  Supervisors as a general rule should form an association of their own and should
1. Respondent is a labor organization, composed exclusively of the supervisory and exclude all other types of personnel unless a special consideration exists, like
confidential employees of petitioner corporation example, that they are so few in number and that there are other technical men
2. There exists another entirely distinct labor association composed of the or confidential men equally few in number. In the latter case, the supervisors,
corporation's rank-and-file employees, with which petitioner executed a CBA. technical men and confidential employees may be constituted into one unit
This expressly excluded from its coverage petitioner's supervisory and
confidential employees, who in turn organized their own labor association
3. Respondent filed with court certification as sole and exclusive collective
bargaining agent
4. Corporation filed MtoD – supervisors are not employees within the Industrial
Peace Act, they are part of management, they do not have the right to bargain
collectively although they may organize an organization of their own
5. Court denied MtoD - under the Industrial Peace Act, "Individuals employed as
supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of
employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations their
own."
6. Since respondent "clearly represents the majority of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit," respondent court therefore certified it as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees in the unit
7. Petitioner pursues anew its contention that supervisors form part of management
and are not considered as employees entitled to bargain collectively, arguing that
"as supervisors form part and parcel of management, it is absurd for management
to bargain collectively with itself."

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Supervisors (and confidential employees) may
form a labor organization and enjoy right to collective bargaining. YES.

RATIO:
 In AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. C.I.R., section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
“explicitly provides that “employees” — and this term includes supervisors —
“shall have the right to self-organization, and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representations of their own choosing and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection” and that “individuals employed as supervisors … may form separate
organizations of their own”
 For this reason, supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any
discrimination against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair labor practice
 Supervisors (and confidential employees), even though they may exercise the
prerogatives of management as regards the rank and file employees are indeed
employees in relation to their employer, the company which is owned by the
22 Paper Industries vs Laguesma

1. PICOP manufactures paper and timber products

a. PICOP Supervisory Union instituted a petition to be the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of supervisory and technical staff of PICOP
b. Med-Arbiter ordered for the certification election among the union members
2. PICOP appealed and questioned the inclusion of section heads and supervisors in
the list of voters whose positions were considered as managerial employees
a. Art. 245 LC prohibits managerial employees from joining labor unions
b. That upon decentralization, and reorganization they are now considered as
managerial
c. The reorganization was a valid exercise of management prerogative

WON the employees are prohibited from joining said labor union. NO

1. Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First
Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise,
implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First-
Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-
and- file employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial
employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories, namely, the "managers" per se
composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of First-
Line Managers
a. Mere designation of manager is not sufficient to make him a manager
b. In this case, the employees in question are not really managerial employees
but only supervisory employees because they do not lay down company
policies
c. They do not have the right to hire/ fire – they can only make
recommendations subject to review
23 Metrolab Industries, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor
G.R. No. 108855. February 28, 1996
TOPIC: Right to Self-Organization; Exception; Confidential Employees
FACTS:
1. Metro Drug Corp Employees Association-Federation of Free Workers is a labor
organization representing rank and file employees of Metrolab and Metro Drug
2. The CBA between Metrolab and the Union expired. The negotiations for a new
CBA ended in a deadlock
3. The Union filed a notice to strike. After the parties failed to settle their dispute
despite conciliation, the the Labor Secretary issued an order resolving all the
disputed items in the CBA and ordered the parties involved to execute a new CBA
4. The Union filed an MR and pending said MR, Metrolab laid off 94 workers of its
rank and file employees
a. Metrolab claim that it was a valid exercise of management prerogative
since the mass lay off was a result of yearly gross revenue loss and the
workers needed to produce their product, Eskinol, was reduced
5. Labor Secretary declared the lay off illegal and ordered reinstatement with full
backwages
6. Metrolab filed an MR alleging that the lay-off did not aggravate the dispute.
Pending resolution of the MR, Metrolab, again, laid off 73 workers.
7. Labor Secretary ordered the following
a. Cease and desist order against the lay-off of workers
b. Lay-off was illegal
c. also ruled that executive secretaries are excluded from the closed-shop
provision of the CBA, not from the bargaining unit
CONTENTS OF THE CBA:
 In the assailed resolution, the Labor Secretary clarified the CBA provision on the
closed-shop and the scope of the bargaining unit.
a. The Close-Shop provision provided that all qualified employees must join
the Association immediately upon regularization as a condition for
continued employment
b. The exclusion provision included the executive secretaries and other
managerial employees
METROLAB: Labor Secretary erred in ruling that the executive secretaries are included
as part of the bargaining unit of rank and file employees
 Metrolab read the exclusion of managerial employees and executive
secretaries as exclusion from the bargaining unit and not from the closed-shop
provision
 They point out that managerial employees are lumped under one classification
with executive secretaries, so that since the former are excluded from the
bargaining unit, so must the latter be likewise excluded.
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Sec erred in including the executive secretaries in the
bargaining unit
HELD: YES
1. Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has
extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of
their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidential records.
2. Several Jurisprudence provided for the rationale behind the exclusion of
confidential employees from the bargaining unit of the rank and file employees
a. To allow the confidential employees to join the existing Union of the
rank-and-file would be in violation of the terms of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement wherein this kind of employees by the nature of
their functions/positions are expressly excluded.
b. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for
advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own
motive rather than the interest of the employers.
c. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of
collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or
individuals who are supposed to act “in the interest of the employers.
d. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might
jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect.
3. Forming part of the bargaining unit, the executive secretaries stand to benefit
from any agreement executed between the Union and Metrolab. Such a scenario,
thus, gives rise to a potential conflict between personal interests and their duty
as confidential employees to act for and in behalf of Metrolab. They do not have
to be union members to affect or influence either side.
4. Finally, confidential employees cannot be classified as rank and file. As previously
discussed, the nature of employment of confidential employees is quite distinct
from the rank and file, thus, warranting a separate category. Excluding
confidential employees from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not
tantamount to discrimination.
24. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa Asia Brewery (TPMA) may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a
v. Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI). G.R. No. 162025. Aug. 3, 2010 spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
 Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
FACTS: capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
1. ABI entered into a CBA with BLMA, the exclusive and independent representative policies in the field of labor relations.
of ABI’s rank-and-file employees.  The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
2. Art. 1 of the CBA defined the scope of the bargaining unit. The bargaining unit is considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
comprised of all regular rank-and-file daily-paid employees of the company. between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
3. Sec. 2 of Art. 1 of the CBA, among others, specifically excludes “Confidential and prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Executive Secretaries” and “Purchasing and Quality Control Staff” from the
bargaining unit.
4. Subsequently, a dispute arose when ABI stopped deducting union dues from 81
employees (18- QA Sampling inspector, 20-checkers and the rest are
secretaries/clerks), believing that their membership in BLMA violated the CBA.
5. BLMA claimed that the ABI’s action restrained the employees right to self-
organization.
6. The Voluntary Arbitrator sustained BLMA’s contention. The 81 employees qualify
under the rank-and-file category because their functions are merely routinary and
clerical.
7. The CA reversed the VA and ruled that the 81 employees are not eligible for the
inclusion in the bargaining unit as defined in Art.1 of the CBA.
8. In the meantime, TPMA won as the new bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees. TPMA filed with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration and
intervention. Both motions were denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the 81 employees are disqualified to be a member of the Union of

rank-and-file employees. – NO. There is no showing in this case that the
secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial
employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor relations policies.

HELD:
 Although Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and
assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has
extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of
their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner
to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly
confidential records. Confidential employees are thus excluded from the rank-
and-file bargaining unit.
 The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees because if
allowed to be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the Union can also become
company-denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the Union
membership. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees
25 SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC. v. SMC SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION (2011)
Topic: Confidential Employees
1. In SMCSEU v. Laguesma, SC held that even if the supervisory employees 3 and 4
and the exempt employees of SMFI handle confidential data regarding internal
business operations, they are not to be considered confidential employees
because the same do not pertain to LabRel (negotiation and settlement of
grievances)
a. They were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for CB.
b. Employees belonging the 3 plants (Cabuyao, San Fernando, Ortis) of
SMC-Magnolia constitute a single bargaining unit.
2. Pursuant to this decision, DOLE conducted pre-election conferences.
a. However, there was a discrepancy in the list of eligible voters.
3. SMFI questioned the eligibility of some of its employees to vote because some do
not belong to the bargaining unit which the Union seeks to represent or no
employment relationship exists.
a. Some of the employees should not be allowed to vote because they are
confidential employees; not covered by the bargaining unit; job grade
level 4 but performing managerial work; belong to Ugong plant; non-
SMFI employees; members of other unions.
4. Union:
a. The bargaining unit contemplated in the original petition is the Poultry
Division of SMC known as SMFI
b. It covered operations in Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas
c. It submitted individual and separate declarations of the employees
whose votes were challenged.
5. Based on the results of the votes, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating that
since the "Yes" vote received 97% of the valid votes cast, SMCSEU is certified to
be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of
SMFI's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.
6. On appeal, DOLE affirmed the Order with the modification of excluding 4
employees from the bargaining unit which the Union seeks to represent saying
that 2 of which are members of another union and the other 2 are employees of
SMC, which is separate from SMFI.
7. CA: Affirmed. Stated that those holding positions of HR Assistant and Personnel
Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.
2. Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel, should be excluded from
the bargaining unit, as their access to confidential information may become the
source of undue advantage
3. Corollarily, although Article 24530 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join,
form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence
has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason
of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary
manner to managerial employees and, hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and
highly confidential records.
4. The rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join any labor
organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial employees, because if
allowed to be affiliated with a union, the latter might not be assured of their
loyalty in view of evident conflict of interests and the union can also become
company- denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the union
membership.
5. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees may also
become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies
of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
NOTE:
 Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management policies in the field of labor relations.
 The confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations.

ISSUE: Whether the confidential employees are excluded from the bargaining unit.
YES.

1. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of
their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is
a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the “confidential employee
rule.”
26 Batangas I Electric Cooperative v Young (1988)
G.R. No. 62386
1. Batangas-I Electric Cooperative Union (union) filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election. The union alleged that it is a
legitimate labor organization; that BATELEC has 150 employees, more or less; that
the union desires to represent the regular rank and file employees for purposes
of collective bargaining; that there is no other existing union; that there is no
certified collective bargaining agreement in the said cooperative; and that there
has been no certification election conducted in BATELEC during the last 12
months preceding the filing of the petition.
2. Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a certification election.
3. BATELEC appealed, contending that there was a legal impediment to the holding
of a certification election considering that the formation of a union in a
cooperative is illegal and invalid, the officers and members of the union being the
owners thereof.
4. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations revoked the Med-Arbiter’s resolution.
G.R. No. 70880
1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment a petition for certification election. The petition alleged that it is a
legitimate labor organization; that the Bulacan II Electric Cooperative Inc. (BECO
II) is engaged in the service and supply of electric current and therefore, an
employer under the provisions of the LC; that the FFW seeks to be certified as the
sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the regular rank and file
employees and workers; that there is no other existing union; that there is no
certified collective bargaining agreement in the said establishment; and that
there has been no certification election conducted in BECO II during the last 12
months preceding the filing of the petition.
2. BECO II contended that the petition does not comply with the 30% jurisdictional
requirement considering that it has a total of 143 employees, 24 of whom are
members of the cooperative, 28 are managerial, 3 are confidential, 23 are
contractual, and 28 casual, thereby leaving only 37 belonging to the rank and file;
and that to grant the petition would be violative of Art. 243 of the LC and Sec. 35
of PD 269.
3. FFW contended that it has substantially complied with the 30% jurisdictional
requirement with the 73 signatures it submitted, and that there is nothing in the
law that prohibits or restricts cooperative members from joining labor
organizations.
4. Med-arbiter directed the holding of a certification election.
5. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations affirmed.
G.R. No. 74560
1. FFW ALECO I Chapter filed a petition for certification election, alleging that it
is a legitimate labor organization; that the Albay Electric Cooperative I (ALECO
I) is an electric cooperative servicing electricity in the Province of Albay; that
ALECO I has 160 employees, more or less, majority of whom are FFW
members; that there is no other union existing nor a CBA existing in the
cooperative; and that no certification election has been held for the past 12
months prior to the filing of the petition.
2. FFW contended that the ALECO I is covered by the LC; that it has a right to
organize and be represented by a union; that there is no legal impediment to
the holding of a certification election considering that out of the 141 rank
and file employees, 63 supported the petition.
3. ALECO I sought the dismissal of the petition on the allegation that FFW failed
to comply with 30% requirement, considering that 112 rank and file
employees have manifested in a "declaration" that they do not desire to be
represented by any union.
4. Intervenors ALECO I employees for a "no-union stand" alleged that of the 63
signatories to the petition, 51 are not qualified to join the union as they are
members-consumers of the ALECO I and are considered joint owners of the
cooperative.
5. Med-arbiter directed the holding of a certification election.
6. Director of the Bureau of Legal Relations affirmed.
ISSUE: WON employees of electric cooperatives are qualified to form or join labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining.-YES but only if such employees are
neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative.
RULING:
1. A cooperative is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being
run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members
are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its
employees.
2. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner
thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner
cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. However, in so far as it involves
cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof,
certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to
organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in
the Constitution and existing laws of the country.
3. BATELEC: The union admitted in its petition that its officers and members are also
members-consumers of the cooperative. Such being the case, the employees
belonging to the union are not qualified to form a labor organization and bargain
collectively.
4. BECO II: 24 employees are members of the cooperative. Thus, even if the 24
cooperative members, assuming that all of them supported the petition, are to
be deducted from the said 73 employees, there still remain 49, a sufficient
compliance with the 30% jurisdictional requirement.
5. ALECO I: There are 141 rank and file employees, of which 90 are rank and file
employees, nonmembers of the cooperative, who may validly form, join or assist
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. 63 rank and file
employees supported the petition for certification election but 51 of them are
members of the petitioner cooperative. Hence, only 12 rank and file employees
who were qualified to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining, signed the petition, which definitely is a number short of
the 30% jurisdictional requirement.
6. In the present Article 257 of the LC, it is now provided that in any establishment
where there is no certified bargaining agent, the petition for certification election
filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be supported by the written consent
of at least 20% of all the employees in the bargaining unit.
27 INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION v. PURA CALLEJA
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated case involving the validity of the claim of immunity by the
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice
Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine Labor Law.
ICMC Case:
1. An agreement was forged between the Philippine and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Vietnamese refugees. An operating center for processing
Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be
established in Bataan.
2. ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government. It is duly
registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.
3. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed for Certification
Election among the rank and file members of the ICMC. ICMC opposed the
petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the
United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
IRRI Case:
1. The Philippine Government and the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations signed a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing IRRI.
2. Initially IRRI was organized and registered with the SEC. However, by virtue of
PD No. 1620, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives and immunities of an
international organization.
3. Kapisanan filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with DOLE’s regional
office (Region 4).
4. IRRI opposed the petition, invoking PD 1620 conferring upon it the status of an
international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings under Philippine Laws.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor Laws. YES.
RATIO:
 There can be no question that diplomatic immunity has, in fact, been granted
ICMC and IRRI.
 Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government
and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status “similar to that of a specialized
agency.”
 IRRI is similarly situated, Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article 3, is explicit in its grant of
immunity.
 Department of Foreign Affairs, through its Legal Adviser, sustained IMCM’s
invocation of immunity. Similarly, in respect of IRRI, DFA maintained that IRRI
enjoys immunity from the jurisdiction of DOLE.
 The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive
Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political
question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political
department of the Government.
 The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly
necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The
objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country
in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor
in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield
the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
 ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of
its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section
8, and Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by
Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, relied on by the BLR Director and by
Kapisanan.
 For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to
be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that “each specialized agency
shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized
agency is a party.”
28 SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL v. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND
COATING CORPORATION (2011)
TAKE-AWAY: The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor
organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper
registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to
represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status
as a legitimate labor organization.
FACTS:
1. Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms filed a petition for certification
election among the regular rank-and-file EEs of the company w/ the Mediation
Arbitration Unit of DOLE.
2. The company filed an Answer with MTD on the ground that the union is not a
legitimate labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the
documentation requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory
employees within petitioner union.
3. Med-Arbiter: DISMISSED the petition and ruled that the union registration was
fatally defective.
4. The union is NOT a legitimate labor org because the Charter Certificate and other
docs were NOT executed under oath and certified by the union secretary and
attested to by the union president as required by Section 235 of the LC in relation
to DO No. 9.
5. The list of membership of the union consisted of employees who performed
supervisory functions and under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisory
employees are prohibited from joining the union w/c seeks to represent the rank-
and-file employees of the company.
6. DOLE: DISMISSED the union’s appeal bec the petition for certification election was
filed out of time. Although the charter certificate need not be verified and that
there was no independent evidence presented to establish that some members
were supervisory EEs, dismissal is sustained because another union, Pinag-isang
Lakas Manggagawa sa Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation, earlier filed a
petition for certification election. The decision granting said petition became final
and executory 5 months prior to the petitioner-union’s filing. Under DO No. 9, a
motion for intervention involving a certification election in an unorganized
establishment should be filed prior to the finality of the decision calling for a
certification election. The union filed an MR.
7. DOLE: REVERSED itself and found that no certification election was previously
conducted in the company. The prior certification election filed by Pinag-isang
Lakas was likewise denied by the Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was dismissed by
the DOLE for being filed out of time. Hence, the certification election is allowed.
The company appealed from this decision.
8. CA: REVERSED the DOLE because: (1) The union failed to comply w/ the
documentation requirements under the Labor Code. (2) The union consisted of
both rank-and-file and supervisory EEs. (3) The issues as to the legitimacy of the
union can be attacked collaterally in a petition for certification election and the
infirmity in the membership of petitioner union cannot be remedied through the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings in a pre-election conference. Thus, considering
that the union is not a legitimate labor organization, it has no legal right to file a
petition for certification election.
9. Hence, the instant petition, where the union argues:
a. That the litigation of the issue as to its legal personality to file the subject
petition for certification election is barred by the DOLE *stated in fact
no. 4*
b. That the lack of verification of its charter certificate and the alleged
illegal composition of its membership are not grounds for the dismissal
of a petition for certification election under Section 11, Rule XI of D.O.
No. 9, nor are they grounds for the cancellation of a unions registration
under Section 3, Rule VIII of said issuance.
c. That what is required to be certified under oath by the local union’s
secretary or treasurer and attested to by the local union’s president are
limited to the union’s constitution and by-laws, statement of the set of
officers, and the books of accounts.
d. That the legal personality of the union cannot be collaterally attacked
but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation.
10. The company argues:
a. That it cannot be precluded from challenging the DOLE decision bec it
did not attain finality after having been subsequently reversed, and it
having timely filed its MR.
b. That the law expressly requires that the charter certificate be certified
under oath.
c. That the union is not a legitimate labor organization because its
composition is a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. Thus, the illegal composition
of the union nullifies its legal personality to file the petition for
certification election and its legal personality may be collaterally
attacked.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. W/N the question as to the legal personality of the union is barred by the DOLE
decision (fact no. 4).
 NO, it is not barred. The issue as to the union’s legal personality has been
timely and consistently raised by the company before the Med-Arbiter, DOLE,
CA and now the SC.
2. W/N the charter certificate needs to be certified under oath by the local union’s
secretary or treasurer and attested to by its president.
NOTE: The SC stated that RA 9481, which took effect in 2007, introduced substantial
amendments to the LC. However, since the operative facts in this case occurred in
1999, it shall decide the issues under in accordance w/ RA 6715, amending the LC.
 NO, the union’s charter certificate need NOT be executed under oath.
 Therefore, in the instant case, the union was not divested of its status as a
legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were supervisory EEs.
It had the right to file the subject petition for certification election.
4. W/N the legal personality of the union may be collaterally attacked by the
company in the certification election proceedings. NO.

 Although Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules requires that a charter
certificate be certified under oath by the Secretary/Treasurer of the local/chapter
and attested to by its President, the Court in SMC v. Mandaue Packing, ruled that
it is not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified and attested by the
local/chapter officers. Considering that the charter certificate is prepared and
issued by the NATIONAL union and not the local/chapter, it does not make sense
to have the local/chapters officers certify or attest to a document which they had
no hand in the preparation of.
 Hence, the union validly acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization
upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of its officers, their
addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution and by-laws, the last
two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials
as borne out by the records.
 Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere
bystander to any petition for certification election. Such proceeding is non-
adversarial and merely investigative, bec the purpose thereof is to determine
which organization will represent the EEs in their collective bargaining w/ the ER.
 The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the EEs. The ER
cannot have any partisan interest therein.
 It cannot interfere/oppose the process by filing a MTD or an appeal from it, not
even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for
certification election are actually managerial EEs will lend an ER legal personality
to block the certification election.
 The ER’s only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

3. W/N the mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory EEs in the union nullifies its legal
personality as a legitimate labor organization.
 NO, the inclusion of the supervisory EEs in the union does NOT divest it of its
status as a legitimate labor organization.

 In Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., the Court found that RA 6715 omitted
specifying the exact effect that any violation of the prohibition on the co-mingling
of supervisory and rank-and-file EEs would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor
organization. The Court, in that case, cited the ruling in the Tagaytay Highlands
case, wherein the Court stated that while there is a prohibition against the
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file EEs in one labor organization, the Labor
Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, after a labor organization has
been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in
its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for
cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the LC.
 In Kawashima, the Court further noted that in the SMC v. Mandaue Packing case,
the Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not
require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper
for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of any
question pertaining to its individual members.