MARIA USON vs.

MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO
NEBREDA, Jr. G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador,
Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and
Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-
law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their
answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public
document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel
of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his
death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to
restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of
lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears
that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir,
his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs.
Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under
the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they
are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article
2264 and article 287, NCC), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, NCC).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time
shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so
only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should
be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have
been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired
right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands
that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new
Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria
Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed
to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother
and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim
is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves
no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same
document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the
alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO v. TASIANA VDA. DE BORJA + [ GR No. L-28040, Aug 18, 1972 ]
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the
testate estate of Francisco de Borja[1] , from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in
its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana
O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix". And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of
the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of
the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under
administration in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the
probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator; in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was
appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother,
Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's
death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special
administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and
counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate
of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise
agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963[2] , by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage,
namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr." The terms
and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
"AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate
of Josefa Tangco, AND The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein to terminate and settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims,
counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets
as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement
under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration
in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows: 'Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang
que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con la Laguna
de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla'
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos Philippine Currency, in cash, which represents P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs
Crisanto,Cayetano,and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832- Nueva Ecija and Sp.
Proc. No. 7866 - Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for
this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, Poblacion.
3. That Tasiana Ongsingcd Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja
in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and
also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of
P3,500.00, more of less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala 'Poblacion' from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children
of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala 'Poblacion' is hereby authorized to pay directly Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the
payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators,
and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions,
cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity,
which they ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and
Sp. Proc. No. 832 - Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI-Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other,
their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration,
settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of
Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over
any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de
Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall
issue in turn the corresponding receipt thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this
agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property 'Poblacion', otherwise, the
non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 12th day of
October, 1963."
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding
No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the
Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's
order of approval (now Supreme Court G. R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.
R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is,
nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de
Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on
this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against
the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly
conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives *
* *." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered
into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting
opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided
the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a
different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at
bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco - "shall be considered as full - complete
payment - settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, * * * and
to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos
or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise."
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt
to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the
contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the
estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary
share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)[3] there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation
of the estate[4] . Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that
the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82)
are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his
compulsory heir under articles 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her
successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament, and would exist even if such will were not probated
at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the
case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the
perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037
of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance
with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its performance, the same
was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit
was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to
wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the considerations was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex 1
Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39-46) and which contained the following clause:
"III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of
the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano
and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of
the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null
and void and of no further effect."
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that
the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this - day of October 1963"; and while signed
by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause.
Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total
consideration of P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "pro rata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde,
all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the
duly notarized contract entered into with Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the
separate unformalized agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter
(Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the
stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's
co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be
sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until
authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of
120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties of the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de
Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she
was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband,
not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija
could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose.
Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor."
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise
as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement
with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that
would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of
the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September
1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October
1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its
order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself,
in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What
the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise
agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page
23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was
not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevara vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a
compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed.
It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before
seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy.
That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages
35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G. R. No. L-28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and
the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a
novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court
order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement
be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the
contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the
purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that
her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement
(Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our
currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA, 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly apposite in the
present case.
Coming now to Case G. R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by
Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor
of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code. We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco
and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G. R. No.
L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsinco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for
the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quitclaims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of
possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja,
Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja, and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case
No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Borja vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was
partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part
in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja, 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as - "Una Parcela de terreno situada en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja, O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410."
(Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa
Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of Francisco,
while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the
Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife."
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de
Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed
to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
partnership de Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings
aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted
therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special
Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955 an inventory wherein she listed
the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in
the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de
Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal
presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal
property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences:
(a) the sworn statement by Francisco de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that - "He tomado posesion del pedazo de terreno ya
delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal)."
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for
P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000.00 by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a
subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes in the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco
(son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issued a check for P17,000.00 to pay
the back taxes and said that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that -
"Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived
from his business transactions." (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Italics supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by
defendant-appellant Jose de Borja, since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that
the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his own private funds,
for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to
Article 1396(4) of the Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
*** *** ***
"(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband."
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of
the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating
what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and
Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or
occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo.
A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 373) does not clearly demonstrate that
the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal)" refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits
3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600,
and a much bigger one of 1,357,260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the
affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo"
is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the
conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted - but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the
corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pronouncement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed;
while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de Borja in all three (3) cases.
[ GR No. L-41715, Jun 18, 1976 ]

ROSALIO BONILLA WHO REPRESENTS MINORS v. LEON BARCENA +

This is a petition for review[1] of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena
vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case. On
March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil
action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the
counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint
was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead
and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but
the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no
legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he
moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.[2]
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On
September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for
the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation
of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders
denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can
be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena
took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules
of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies * * * it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly
of such death * * * and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty
was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died
on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dis-missed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777
of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law.[3] The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent.[4] The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings.[5] When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was
not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution
as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order,
upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be
granted * * *." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for.[6] In
the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental.[7] Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action
to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff
to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff
that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment
of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila
earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still
minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant
case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as
guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision
of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of
First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent
Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners herein for the deceased plaintiff and to
appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS vs. VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, G.R. No. L-
46364 April 6, 1990

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1)
Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2)
Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land
situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275
(Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
 The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2)
sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933
(Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took
possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant
Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion
to the latter, who has been in occupation since.On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto
herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle.
Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square
meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of
the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the
land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes
San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration.
But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the
following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE
DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO
SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION
CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS
AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM
OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not
the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence
to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia
Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the
estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property
subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the
Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of
title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights
pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be
the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or
adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child-for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit.(Civil Code (1889) Art. 807, 935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and
Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to
Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child
and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion
of the land could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the
same to herein private respondents.
 Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision of the respondent court,
which is that the said court sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray,
No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:

. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners. They merely claim to have acquired by succession, their alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs
herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property under litigation by
prescription. We cannot agree with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and important difference between the case at bar
and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered
in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under the
Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said
cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who
was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now
in question, from February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the
registered owner of the land covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she segregated it into a new
title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always
covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights
thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in
question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine
of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs
of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only
in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand;
each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful
inheritance. Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the land in
question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties
then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue
or other heirs. After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the law which established
the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines depends on the
confidence of the people in the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to file an
action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are
SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

ROMARICO G. VITUG v. CA + [ GR NO. 82027, Mar 29, 1990 ]

This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court[1] involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco
Vitug, who died in New York, U.S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said
decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita AIonte as co-special administra-tor of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower,
petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock
and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum or P667,731.66, plus interests, which
he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals,[2] the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment
of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto."[3] According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the
sums of P518.834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account
No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement.
She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate."
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his
late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter
referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of
us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors,
and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt
or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our above mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient
release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal.[5]
The trial court[6] upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the
proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 x x x." On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil
Code,"[8] and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of
the Civil Code.[9]
The dispositive portion of the decision or the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private
respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the estate,
but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in
Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of actual properties possessed by the spouses at the
time of the decedent's death. With costs against private respondent.[10]
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's
Bank and Trust Co.[11] and Macam v. Gatmaitan in which we sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as
aleatory contracts.
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first or all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined
as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies
with duties to take effect after his death."[14] In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator.[15] In this case, the
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds. In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and
Trust Co.,[16] we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other,
but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx xxx Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds
deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana River "served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person
deposits money in the bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master for about
nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name
of himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no relation of kinship
between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account.
In the absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect
that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that
either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death
of either, belonged to the survivor.
In Macam v. Gatmaitan,[18] it was held:
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C, is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case
of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of
the house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the
house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first.
In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die first,
the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any
other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the
ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if
Juana had died first.[19]
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired
during the existence of the marital relations.[20]
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of
one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the
other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification of the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals,[21]
by "mere stipulation,"[22] and that it is no "cloak"[23] to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are
not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking
parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put
what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other which would have arguably
been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured
the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a
mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code.
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of
what the other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening of an event which is
(1)"uncertain," or (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction
stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or
pension under Article 2021, et sequenta, has been categorized under the second.[25] In either case, the element of risk is present. In the
case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For
instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud
of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed
and established against the agreement involved in this case.[26]
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or as held by the
respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her
death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court
ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of
petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988,
are SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.