Albrecht, James F - Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN CRIMINOLOGY
POLICING
James F. Albrecht
Police Brutality,
Misconduct, and
Corruption
Criminological
Explanations and
Policy Implications
123
SpringerBriefs in Criminology
Policing
Series editor
M.R. Haberfeld
City University of New York
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
New York, NY, USA
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11179

James F. Albrecht
Police Brutality, Misconduct,

and Corruption
Criminological Explanations
and Policy Implications
James F. Albrecht
Pace University
New York, NY, USA
ISSN 2192-8533 ISSN 2192-8541 (electronic)

SpringerBriefs in Criminology
ISSN 2194-6213 ISSN 2194-6221 (electronic)
SpringerBriefs in Policing
ISBN 978-3-319-64437-0 ISBN 978-3-319-64438-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017948032
© The Author(s) 2017

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I have to extend my sincerest appreciation to
my family. My parents made sure I knew the
difference between right and wrong and taught
me the importance of a good education.
My children, Jimmy and Kristiana, keep me
energized with their daily enthusiasm, their
love, and their desire to learn.
This book is dedicated to police officers
across the globe who continue to make
sacrifices to ensure that society remains safe
and secure and especially those who have lost
their lives while serving their communities.
“Blessed are the peacemakers: for they
shall be called the children of God.”
Matthew 5:9—King James Bible
Contents
1 Introduction and Overview �� 1

Introduction�� 1
The Need for a Clear Typology for Police Deviance �� 1
Understanding Police Deviance �� 2
Examining Police Deviance Through Trends�� 2
Research Must Have Purpose: Practical Recommendations�� 2
2 Understanding Police Deviance�� 3
Police Deviance in the United States �� 3
Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review�� 4
Theories of Crime and Police Deviance�� 5
Defining Police Deviance: A Clear Typology�� 6
References�� 7
3 Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious
Misconduct in the United States �� 9
Timetable of American Police Deviance and Serious
Misconduct (1960s–Present)�� 9
The 1960s�� 9
The 1970s�� 10
The 1980s�� 11
The Early 1990s (1990–1993) �� 12
The Late 1990s (1994–2000) �� 14
2001 to the Present�� 21
Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD�� 22
Summary: Police Deviance�� 23
References�� 24
4 Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance�� 27
Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance�� 27
Theories of Crime and Police Corruption�� 27
Theories of Crime and Police Criminality �� 29
vii
viii Contents
Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force �� 30

Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority�� 31
Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct�� 32
Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”�� 32
Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury�� 33
References�� 34
5 Policy Options for Enhancing Individual
and Organizational Integrity�� 35
Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity�� 35
Pre-employment Screening for Law Enforcement Officials�� 35
Pre-employment Screening to Deter Police Deviance�� 36
Personality Testing and Psychological Screening�� 37
Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel �� 39
Mandatory Hiring Qualifications �� 40
Post-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity
and Professionalism �� 42
References�� 44
6 Discussion and Conclusion�� 47
Discussion and Conclusion�� 47
Bibliography�� 47
Index�� 53
About the Author
James F. Albrecht is presently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal

Justice and Homeland Security at Pace University in New York. James F. Albrecht
received a prestigious Fulbright Fellowship in 1998 and worked as a Professor at the
National Police College of Finland, and is considered an authority in Police Use of
Force, Community/Zero Tolerance Policing initiatives, Police Response to
Terrorism, Emergency Incident Planning and Management, Democratic Policing,
Law Enforcement Leadership Practices, Corruption Control, Instituting Police
Volunteer Programs, and other International Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement
issues. Professor Albrecht has lectured at police facilities and at universities in
China, Taiwan, Russia, Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, Finland, Italy,
Turkey, Canada, Dubai, Kosovo, Macedonia, Malta, Ukraine, Trinidad & Tobago,
the UK, and throughout the USA; and serves as a consultant to the United Nations,
the US Department of Homeland Security, the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, and the National Institute of Justice on terrorism and policing matters.
Jimmy Albrecht has extensive practical policing experience as he retired as a NYPD
Captain and Commanding Officer after serving in the New York City Police
Department for more than 22 years. Afterwards he served three years as the Police
Chief of Criminal Investigations in the joint United States/European Union Rule of
Law (EULEX) Mission in Kosovo (former Yugoslavia). He was a first responder
and incident command team manager at the terrorist attack on the World Trade
Center on 11 September 2001 and at numerous critical events within New York City.
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
Introduction
One of the most contentious issues impacting America today is the perception that
police personnel in the United States have consistently acted in an abusive and cor-
rupt fashion, particularly as it relates to their interaction with minority group mem-
bers. When these allegations have been substantiated, law enforcement administrators
often react on a case-by-case basis, without routinely acknowledging systemic or
organizational trends that may warrant more comprehensive action.
The Need for a Clear Typology for Police Deviance
One of the flaws in many prior studies is that researchers have attempted to explain
unacceptable police practices uniformly while not acknowledging that there are
clear distinctions across the spectrum of potential deviant police behaviors. As such,
in order to better grasp the plethora of concepts and variables that are commonly
referred to as police deviance, it would be beneficial to specifically define the differ-
ent types of serious police misconduct. A close examination of these incidents
nationally (and globally to a general extent) has revealed to the author that police
deviance can be categorized into five basic types:
1. Police corruption
2. Police criminality
3. Excessive use of force
4. Abuse of authority
5. Police misconduct
This typology will ultimately permit tangible analysis and theoretical
discussion.
© The Author(s) 2017 1

J.F. Albrecht, Police Brutality, Misconduct, and Corruption, SpringerBriefs
in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7_1
2 1 Introduction and Overview
Understanding Police Deviance
To be more specific, police corruption involves situations when police officers lose
integrity in their professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for
violating their mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiv-
ing reward for official misconduct, and official misconduct. Police criminality
occurs when police officials engage in direct acts of crime, such as robbery or theft,
whether on or off duty. The use of excessive force involves engaging in menacing
(i.e., threatening with a weapon) actions, assault, battery, and perhaps murder, when
it is not legally justified while acting in the capacity of a police professional. Abuse
of authority involves violating the legal mandate of the police position. Such infrac-
tions could include illegal stops, searches, and arrests. Finally, police misconduct
includes acts that violate the rules and regulations of the respective law enforcement
agency. Such agency infractions could include arriving to work late or an unprofes-
sional appearance (which could be indicators of other serious personal issues that
could negatively affect police performance). By understanding the distinctions
between these misbehaviors, researchers can more easily incorporate theoretical
analysis into future research endeavors. As a direct result, many sociological and
criminological theories can be applied to the distinct tendencies and patterns that
have been revealed.
Examining Police Deviance Through Trends
In order to better understand the patterns apparent in American policing as it relates

to police deviance, historical trends in the United States over the last five decades
will be evaluated, and specific incidents of serious police misbehavior occurring
within the New York City Police Department, a large urban law enforcement agency
often viewed as a “trend setter” (but not always for positive accomplishment), the
Los Angeles Police Department, and other American police departments will be
closely examined. Sociological theories will be applied to apparent patterns that
have been revealed.
Research Must Have Purpose: Practical Recommendations
As no research can be considered as meaningful without resulting in practical impli-

cations, the sociological theories that have been identified will be followed by rec-
ommendations to the pre-employment and in-service practices and policies generally
present in American law enforcement agencies in an effort to deter police deviance,
enhance organizational professionalism and transparency, and improve executive
leadership capabilities.
Chapter 2
Understanding Police Deviance
Police Deviance in the United States
The United States routinely ranks in the top 20 nations (of 182 United Nations
member states) when the public perception of government corruption is ranked.
However, the United States has consistently received a score that indicates that the
public believes that approximately 25–30% of American government officials
engage in acts of corruption (Transparency International 2017). Clearly this is
alarming, but this would be even more disturbing if the agencies responsible for
enforcing the law were excessively involved in these practices. Fortunately the evi-
dence appears to point predominantly in the direction of private corporations and
special interest groups attempting to obtain advantages within the political arena.
When the American law enforcement profession was recently examined, the rate
of police misconduct within the United States was noted to be below 0.5%, i.e., less
than half of 1% of all police personnel had been the subject of allegations of crimi-
nality or serious misconduct in 2009 and 2010 (Packman 2010). This supports the
findings of the Christopher Commission that revealed that less than 0.5% of LAPD
officers could be labeled as being “problematic” (Independent Commission on the
Los Angeles Police Department 1991). Even when examining involuntary termina-
tions from law enforcement agencies, less than 2% of police officers were found to
have been separated from the organization for cause, including dismissals, termina-
tions, and forced resignations or retirements. Of those involuntary separations, more
were found to be attributable to profit-oriented corruption than to brutality or other
allegations of civilian abuse and were found to likely involve male rather than
female officers (Fyfe and Kane 2006). Other studies have supported the notion that
a small percentage of officers account for a disproportionate amount of agency mis-
conduct (Harris 2009). While ultimately the goal should be total eradication of
police deviance, it should be noted that the number of reported incidents of police
misconduct is relatively minimal and that many empirical analyses have based their
findings on the total amount of allegations made and not the number of substantiated

4 2 Understanding Police Deviance
cases or criminal convictions, which undoubtedly would result in a much smaller

value for identified deviant police personnel. Regardless, any accusation of police
deviance or criminality often taints the reputation of the entire agency involved, and
the more sensational cases (e.g., the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles, the
Abner Louima attack in New York City, etc.) have often placed the credibility and
legitimacy of the entire law enforcement profession into question.
Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review
The first issue that researchers should attempt is to specifically delineate what police
deviance is. Unfortunately there is no one common definition or typology for this
phenomenon, and many researchers have listed different inappropriate behaviors
when discussing the topic. Kappeler et al. (1998) included corruption, abuse of
authority, police crime, and occupational deviance as categories of police deviance,
but this examination was not inclusive of all potential classes of police misbehavior.
Klockars et al. (2003) produced the seminal survey instrument to examine the per-
ceptions of corruption. Actions which they described as involving police corruption
also included working in the security profession while off duty,1 accepting free cof-
fee and meals,2 police officers referring victims to specific businesses, drinking
alcohol while on duty, and other questionable or illegal actions by law enforcement
personnel. Their research has been replicated in other countries including Poland,
Slovenia, and Croatia (Haberfeld et al. 2000). Barker and Carter (1993) identified
five patterns of police deviance which included corruption, courtroom perjury,
police brutality, sex on duty, sleeping on duty, and drinking on duty. Punch (2000)
separates the concept of police deviance into three categories, namely, corruption,
1
In New York City and other jurisdictions, police officers are permitted to work in most security
positions with the specific permission of their agency administrators, so this does not necessarily
mean that police personnel who work a second job in the security field are deviant or corrupt. As
such, classifying the option of working security as a secondary profession as ‘police deviance’ or
‘corruption’ would not always be accurate.
2
Accepting free coffee has presented some discomfort to police administrators. On one hand, the
police should move closer to the community, and accepting a cup of coffee or a nonalcoholic bev-
erage would be considered appropriate within the boundaries of community policing. Some busi-
nesses that operate 24 h (e.g., 7/11 stores, Dunkin Donuts, diners, and some gas stations) have
established the standard practice of providing free coffee to uniformed police personnel, more so
on the night shift. On the other hand, there are businesses that provide free coffee and/or dis-
counted meals to police personnel often with an expectation (e.g., no traffic tickets issues in front
of their business or perhaps permitting illegal activity such as gambling to take place on those
premises). Again, this is a sensitive situation as each instance may have to be judged on its own
specific characteristics and intentions. A troubling issue for frontline police personnel is that they
often see high-ranking administrators attending community, business, or interagency meetings
where meals are served and they do not understand how that is different from them accepting cof-
fee or discounted meals from local restaurants. The matter also has to be evaluated in relation to its
perception by the public.
Theories of Crime and Police Deviance 5
misconduct, and police crime. We are thus left with no universally accepted defini-
tions or typology for police deviance, police corruption, and other forms of profes-
sional abuse and the absence of a distinct typology is apparent. More importantly,
this vacuum has often made it difficult for researchers, practitioners, and policy
makers to comprehensively address these troubling phenomena.
Theories of Crime and Police Deviance
Many noteworthy researchers have attempted to apply specific theoretical explana-

tions for police deviance or corruption, but there has been no universal consensus as
to the specific actions or categories that would define deviant police behavior, nor to
the distinct criminological or sociological theories that would help in better under-
standing these phenomena. One interesting viewpoint promoted by Kappeler et al.
(1998) and Erikson (1962) is that deviance must be measured from two separate
perspectives, the perception of the actors who are committing the corruption and the
other view through the eyes of those who observe, investigate, or research the matter.
As such, while the public may view certain actions of the police as being inappropri-
ate or deviant, the law enforcement officers involved, due to the subcultural environ-
ment, may believe that their acts should be construed as being appropriate or ‘correct’
in order to more effectively deter crime and remove criminals from the streets.
Some more common examples of police deviance include professional courtesy
at traffic stops, not reporting police misconduct involving colleagues to supervisors
or administrators, and even courtroom perjury. Unfortunately fidelity to other police
officers under these circumstances has exceeded their loyalty to their oath of office
and their service to the public, as these deviant officers have clearly opted to engage
in and to justify obvious illegal behavior. The use of excessive force against criminal
suspects and falsifying evidence or courtroom testimony have often been rational-
ized through the “just desserts” conception, in which no true harm has been done to
society through these actions, since criminals deserve to be punished. Such acts
have been routinely referred to as “noble cause” corruption (Crank and Caldero
1999), since officers may have considered their efforts to ensure that criminals be
properly punished, regardless of methods used, to be an acceptable option to control
crime. As a result, some police officers have incorporated aspects of police deviance
into their law enforcement and order maintenance practices. These disconcerting
actions clearly must be addressed in order to reintroduce professionalism, integrity
and legitimacy into policing in practice. Emphasis on ethics and public service must
be paramount.
Many other studies on the application of criminological theory to inappropriate
police behavior have been reported. One significant research publication made an
attempt to apply control balance theory (Tittle 1995) to police deviance. Tittle
(1995) and Hickman et al. (2001, p. 503) theorized that “the amount of control to
which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise (the control
ratio) affects both the probability of deviance as well as the specific form of devi-
ance.” Control balance theory outlines that actual deviance is a product of complex
interactions between three factors: motivation, constraint, and opportunity. Each
person has a “psychic need” that draws them toward deviant action and a desire for
autonomy. Their actions within a specific opportunity are therefore triggered by an
imbalance within their “control ratio.” A person could then be motivated to act in a
deviant fashion if they could escape a “control deficit” and extend a “control sur-
plus.” As a result, the opportunity for some type of deviance is almost always pres-
ent (Tittle 1995). Within police work, the frequency of the opportunities and the
isolated and unsupervised nature of the events add to the potential that officers may
act in a deviant fashion. The findings of this research revealed that police personnel
with control deficits were more likely to report police misconduct to supervisors and
agency administrators (Hickman et al. 2001), which is counter to what is commonly
observed in many police organizations. As such, this conclusion poses that officers
with stronger attitudes toward ethics were more likely to engage in appropriate con-
duct and less likely to engage in activity that would support the “blue wall of
silence” phenomenon. This theory would appear to provide support for the need for
effective pre-employment screening methods, organizational and supervisory lead-
ership, and mandatory integrity control measures.
Once again, however, using one criminological theory to generalize all catego-
ries of police deviance leads to challenges in developing and implementing appro-
priate policy measures to enhance individual and organizational professionalism.
Defining Police Deviance: A Clear Typology
Police deviance can take many forms, from serious crime to simple violations of
agency rules. In simplest terms, police deviance can be defined as disregarding
agency policy, rules and regulations, policies, and/or criminal law. The observations
and research conducted by the author concluded that there are five basic categories
of police deviance:
1. Police corruption
2. Police criminality
3. Excessive use of force
4. Abuse of authority
5. Police misconduct
Police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their
professional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their
mandated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for
official misconduct, and official misconduct. Police criminality occurs when police
officials engage in direct acts of crime, such as robbery or theft, whether on or off
duty. The use of excessive force involves engaging in menacing (i.e., threatening
with a weapon) actions, assault, battery, and perhaps murder, when it is not justified
while acting in the capacity of a police professional. Abuse of authority involves
References 7
violating the legal mandate of the police position. Such infractions could include
illegal stops, searches, and arrests. Finally, police misconduct includes acts that
violate the rules and regulations of the respective law enforcement agency. Such
agency infractions could include arriving to work late or an unprofessional appear-
ance (which could be indicators of other serious personal issues that could nega-
tively affect police performance). Most acts of police misconduct are not illegal but
are violations of agency policies and procedures. They are usually punished through
administrative means (e.g., loss of a fixed amount of pay, suspension from duty for
a fixed period, demotion, or a change in assignment).
In order to establish a more concrete understanding of police deviance, signifi-
cant related events, incidents, and agency protocols that have occurred within the
New York City Police Department,3 as an example of an American municipal police
agency, over the last 50 years will be comprehensively examined. Additional exami-
nation of sensational police scandals in the Los Angeles Police Department and
other American law enforcement agencies will be conducted.
After describing the accomplishments and ignominious experiences of the
NYPD, an evaluation of the research related to law enforcement pre-employment
screening and the application of theoretical explanations for crime will be con-
ducted in order to determine if there are any effective means to screen out poten-
tially problematic individuals before hiring or during the police academy and field
training stages to avoid and deter later criminality and serious misconduct within
police organizations. In addition, concluding recommendations will follow that will
outline practical measures to enhance individual and organizational integrity and to
prioritize professional and ethical standards.
References
Barker, T., & Carter, D. L. (1993). Police deviance (3rd ed.). Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing
Company.
Crank, J. P., & Caldero, M. A. (1999). Police ethics: The corruption of noble cause. Cincinnati,
OH: Anderson Publishing Company.
Erikson, K. T. (1962). Notes on the sociology of deviance. Social Problems, 9, 307–314.
Fyfe, J. J., & Kane, R. (2006). Bad cops: A study of career-ending misconduct among New York
City police officers. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice.
Haberfeld, M. R., Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Pagon, M. (2000). Police officer per-
ceptions of the disciplinary consequences of police corruption in Croatia, Poland, Slovenia,
and the United States. Police Practice and Research: An International Journal, 1(1), 41–72.
Harris, D. A. (2009). How accountability-based policing can reinforce—Or replace—The fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 7, 149.
Hickman, M. J., Piquero, A. R., Lawton, B. A., & Greene, J. R. (2001). Applying tittle’s control
balance theory to police deviance. Policing, 24(4), 497–519.
3
The author worked for the New York City Police Department for 22 years from 1982 through
2003, including an assignment conducting internal investigations.
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department. (1991). Report of the indepen-
dent commission on the Los Angeles police department. Los Angeles: Independent Commission
on the LAPD.
Kappeler, V. E., Sluder, R. D., & Alpert, G. P. (1998). Forces of deviance: Understanding the dark
side of policing (2nd ed.). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
Klockars, C. B., Kutnjak Ivkovich, S., & Haberfeld, M. R. (2003). The contours of police integrity.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Packman, D. (2010). National police misconduct Reporting system. Washington, DC: Cato
Institute.
Punch, M. (2000). Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research, 8, 301–324.
Tittle, C. (1995). Control balance: Toward a general theory of deviance. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Transparency International. (2017). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Berlin: Transparency
International.
Chapter 3
Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious
Misconduct in the United States
imetable of American Police Deviance and Serious

T
Misconduct (1960s–Present)
In order to avoid making generalizations about police deviance by evaluating a

small number of incidents or isolated events, the more effective approach will be to
examine the most significant and disturbing trends observed over the last five
decades. National and local occurrences will be outlined, with those taking place in
the New York City Police Department over that time frame given the most attention,
in line with the resulting impact that those media and government reports have
placed on the policing profession across the United States. In addition, the New York
City Police Department often considers itself to be a national and global trend setter,
whether it is dealing with crime reduction efforts or measures to increase organiza-
tional professional standards and integrity.’
The 1960s
From a law enforcement perspective, the 1960s were notable for a number of criti-
cal events. The civil rights movement placed law enforcement personnel in a posi-
tion to attempt to maintain the peace at demonstrations that often turned violent.
When police officers countered disruptive or threatening demonstrators with force
(mainly physical force or use of the police baton), many groups, including minority
group advocates and the media, often alleged that the force used by police was
excessive (Mara 2009). What made matters worse was the formation of extremist
groups (e.g., Black Panthers, Red Army Faction, Weather Underground, Puerto
Rican Independence Front, etc.) who engaged in planned attacks and routine assas-
sinations of police resources across the United States. This placed police patrol
officers continually on the defensive.

10 3 Timetable: Police Deviance and Serious Misconduct in the United States
In order to counter the rising crime rate, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the
US Congress in 1965 with a specific request which was called “Special Message to
the Congress on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice” (Johnson
1965). As a result of the president’s request, the Office of Law Enforcement
Assistance was developed. A number of initiatives resulted including developing
strategies on the federal and local level to address the growing organized crime
threat, maintaining universal crime statistics at the national level, conducting vic-
timization surveys, imposing drug control measures, and developing strategies to
reduce juvenile delinquency (Katzenbach 1967). As part of these many recommen-
dations, the Commission also called for enhanced training for police personnel.
Traditionally police officers had previously served in the military and were deployed
with only limited police academy exposure and were presented with a brief list of
agency rules and regulations. Most police officers were left to learn their trade on
the streets. The Commission recommended not only enhanced training but also col-
lege education for law enforcement personnel and provided funding to universities
for these purposes (Katzenbach 1967).
Likely the most significant events that impacted the law enforcement profession
were US Supreme Court cases that restricted and developed police authority.
Examples include Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 [1968]), Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S.
436 [1966]), Elkins v. United States (364 U.S. 206 [1960]), and Rios v. United States
(364 U.S. 253 [1960]). Each one of these cases (among others) redefined the author-
ity of police officers and created concrete direction to ensure that law enforcement
actions were in line with constitutional guidelines.
In summary, the 1960s left a notable impression on the New York City Police
Department and many American law enforcement agencies, which often imple-
mented formalized police academy training measures and distributed detailed rules,
regulations, and directives, based on policy recommendations made by government
commissions and resulting from the findings of major US Supreme Court
decisions.
The 1970s
New York City and other large American municipalities were faced with dramati-
cally increasing serious and violent crime rates throughout the 1970s, much of it
revolving around a growing organized crime and street level illicit drug distribution
threat. Of similar importance was federally imposed legislation that mandated that
minorities and women be granted equal hiring and promotional opportunities in
private and public organizations. Federal laws prohibiting discrimination strength-
ened continually from the early 1960s to 1970s (Player 2009). This drastically
changed the work atmosphere within the predominantly white male New York City
Police Department. Most notably, both females and blacks were granted opportuni-
ties that had previously been organizationally (albeit often unofficially) prohibited.
The 1980s 11
Two major events radically influenced policing in New York City during the
1970s. The first was the uncovering of a corruption scandal that essentially reached
all levels of the New York City Police Department. The agency’s corruption prac-
tices came to light when a number of officers reported their concerns to the New York
Times in 1970. This action led New York City Mayor John Lindsay to form a panel,
called the Knapp Commission, which would investigate corruption practices within
the New York City Police Department from 1971 to 1972 (Mass 1973). Although
only a small number of NYPD officers lost their jobs or were arrested, it was
strongly believed that the corruption, which routinely involved weekly payoffs to
patrol officers to permit organized crime activity to continue, went to the top levels
of the police department.
The final half of the 1970s was defined by overwhelming budgetary problems in
New York City, with the Mayor coming close to publically declaring bankruptcy. As
a result, the New York City Police Department cut thousands of police officers.
With the limited number of patrol officers, NYPD personnel were moved from tra-
ditional foot patrol to police vehicles equipped with new two-way radios (Kavanaugh
2010). The belief thereafter was that this would permit law enforcement officers to
respond quickly to crime calls and apprehend the majority of criminal suspects
shortly after the act. This never came to fruition and the only thing that resulted was
the movement of police officers away from close contact with the community.
The 1980s
With the start of the 1980s came political and financial stability. The New York City
Police Department commenced an 8-year trend of hiring a minimum of two 2000
strong police candidate classes each year.1 While this may sound unbelievable, the
New York City was attempting to bring the complement of police personnel to pre-
1975 levels while also addressing the escalating crime and violence rates. With the
dawn of crack cocaine, drug-related murders quickly became rampant. And crime
committed by drug abusers to feed their addictive habits resulted in notable increases
in theft, robbery, and assault complaints. With such a quick and dramatic increase in
patrol personnel, the New York City Police Department implemented the Community
Patrol Officer Program in 1983 in one police station but reported initial successes
resulted in department-wide implementation to all 75 police stations throughout
New York City. As a direct result of this initiative, each police station was tasked
with deploying ten police officers in large fixed area beats. These officers, called
community policing beat cops, were to evaluate crime problems, look for underly-
ing causes, and recommend strategies for correcting them in partnership with com-
munity members and government and private agencies (Vera Institute of Justice
1984). The program was essentially a combination of the foot patrol program
1
The author was hired by the NYPD in January 1984 with more than 2200 other police officers,
after having served more than two years as a volunteer NYPD auxiliary police officer.
promoted by Trojanowicz (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1998) and the problem-

solving concept made popular by Goldstein (1990). Ultimately, this endeavor had
no significant impact on crime, as the murder rate exceeded 2000 annually in
New York City during the final years of the 1980s (United States Department of
Justice 1989; United States Department of Justice 1990).
In 1986, the New York City Police Department was once again embarrassed by
a major corruption scandal that took place in the 77th Precinct (police station), a
high crime neighborhood within the borough of Brooklyn. In this isolated case, a
small cadre of police officers had been caught engaging in thefts and robberies of
drugs from small street level drug dealers and later with resale of the stolen con-
trolled substances in the same neighborhoods. At times, they accepted payoffs to
“protect” drug dealers from arrest by fellow officers. The New York City Police
Department was finally able to complete the investigation by granting the two lead
corrupt officers immunity from prosecution in return for their cooperation, which
ultimately led to the arrest of many of the police officers who were working the
midnight shift at that police station (McAlary 1989).
The predominant lesson learned from this sad episode was that these police offi-
cers believed that they were above the law, particularly as New York City Police
Department management distanced themselves from these events in order to save
their careers. Ultimately no upper level manager within the agency was held respon-
sible for this relatively long-term and glaring violation of the criminal law.
The Early 1990s (1990–1993)
The most significant case that negatively affected the law enforcement profession in
the United States in the 1990s was the incident involving the Los Angeles Police
Department and suspect Rodney King in March 1991. Following a long vehicle
pursuit, suspect Rodney King allegedly failed to comply with the directions of Los
Angeles Police Department personnel who were attempting to place him under
arrest. To counter the suspect’s resistance, police personnel opted to repeatedly
strike the suspect with their batons. The suspect was eventually arrested. The inci-
dent was videotaped by a bystander. Four LAPD officers were eventually cleared in
a California state court of assault and related charges but were later convicted of
violating the suspect’s civil rights in federal court. The acquittal in state court in
April 1992 led to widespread rioting across Los Angeles. This was the first major
case where videotaped police behavior led to social unrest across the United States
and allegations of excessive use of force quickly became more relevant.
The 1990s as it relates to the New York City Police Department must be divided
into two eras. From 1990 through 1993, the NYPD embarked on a comprehensive
overhaul of the agency’s philosophy with the implementation of community polic-
ing as the agency-wide strategy. Violent crime rates had risen to unforeseen levels,
and the citizens of New York City actually agreed to pay increased taxes in order to
pay for the hiring of thousands more police officers. In exchange for this proposal,
The Early 1990s (1990–1993) 13
both the Mayor of New York City and the Governor of New York State mandated
that the new police officers be placed on neighborhood foot patrol in every com-
munity throughout the city. Over 3 years, this deployment greatly increased the
visibility of uniformed police officers who were assigned to fixed foot patrol beats
(ranging between 30 and 70 in every police station) and who were required to utilize
long-term problem-solving approaches (New York City Police Department 1990).
The enhanced police presence had an immediate and striking result in that crime
rates across all categories, including murder, began to stabilize and actually declined
slightly by the end of 1993.
Another important agency development was the imposition of steady shifts for
all NYPD police stations. This brought an end to a rotating work schedule which
resulted in patrol personnel moving from a 5-day work week of midnight shifts
(from 11 PM to 7 AM), to a 5-day work week of day shifts (7 AM to 3 PM), to a
5-day work week of evening shifts (3–11 PM), and so on. Since 1990, NYPD patrol
personnel have worked steady day shifts, or steady evening shifts, or steady night
shifts, and the rotating schedule was eliminated since it was believed to cause undue
health and stress risks to employees (Cosgrove and McElroy 1986).
In contrast to these positive developments, the New York City in 1992 was once
more disgraced by two separate large-scale corruption scandals that involved two
high crime, drug-ridden police stations, the 75th Precinct in eastern Brooklyn and
the 30th Precinct in northern Harlem in Manhattan. In the 75th Precinct, a team of
police officers on the midnight shift were found to be stealing drugs from drug deal-
ers for personal use and for resale. More embarrassing was that it was not the NYPD
but rather another police agency in Long Island, New York, that apprehended these
police officers for dealing narcotics. In the 30th Precinct, numerous police officers
on the midnight shift were caught by NYPD internal investigators stealing drugs
and committing perjury in court as it related to facts involving drug arrests. The
New York City Mayor appointed a panel of experts, called the Mollen Commission,
to investigate these cases and make recommendations to better control corruption
and criminality by police personnel within the New York City Police Department
(Mollen 1994).
As a direct result of the report by the Mollen Commission, the New York City
Police Department revised the internal affairs investigation mechanism through a
number of critical steps: enhancing the number of investigators and supervisors
assigned to the Internal Affairs Bureau, naming a civilian commissioner to head the
Internal Affairs Bureau, performing both random and target integrity tests,2 con-
ducting random and promotional drug tests,3 increasing the hiring qualifications by
2
Integrity tests evaluate a police officer’s reaction to found currency or narcotics and ensure that
legal and police department procedural guidelines are complied with. Most tests are randomly
administered but can also be conducted on targeted police officers when there is suspicion that they
may be engaging in thefts or other criminality.
3
Drug tests can also be administered for cause when there is reasonable suspicion that the police
employee has smoked or ingested illegal narcotics.
raising the minimum age from 20 to 224 and the educational requirement from a
high school diploma to 60 college credits, implementing mandatory routine ethical
and integrity training, and selecting Internal Affairs Bureau investigators and super-
visors not only from direct applicants but from the list of all applicants seeking an
investigative assignment5 (Mollen 1994).
Another outcome of the public outcry regarding the most recent NYPD corrup-
tion scandal was that the New York City Mayor in 1993 shifted the Civilian
Complaint Review Board and its investigators from NYPD supervision to an inde-
pendent agency under direct civilian oversight (NYC Civilian Complaint Review
Board 2012).
The Late 1990s (1994–2000)
In January 1994, Republican candidate Rudolph W. Giuliani was sworn in as

New York City’s Mayor. His platform promoted a hard stance against crime and a
promise to improve the quality of life throughout the city. To spearhead these efforts,
Mayor Giuliani appointed former Boston Police Chief William Bratton as the
New York City Police Commissioner. His first month in office saw the total restruc-
turing of the upper executive corps with highly motivated “young blood” adminis-
trators taking over the top executive positions. In addition, a number of radical
initiatives were immediately commenced that revolved around the corporate man-
agement model favored by Commissioner Bratton. The most significant strategies
included the implementation of the “zero tolerance” proactive policing model and
the use of timely crime statistics to permit the strategic deployment of police
resources to crime-plagued locations (Albrecht 2011).
In 1994, NYPD crime reduction strategists theorized that individuals who com-
mitted lower-level offenses may later be responsible for participating in more vio-
lent criminal activity.6 By targeting and detaining offenders for less serious
infractions, the police may be preventing a more tragic incident from occurring
(Albrecht 2011). While this concept may sound like a recent innovation, it was first
introduced by Patrick Colquhoun (1795) in the 1790s, when he advocated targeting
4
This would permit a potential police candidate to have served 4 years in the military or complete
a bachelor’s degree.
5
When a police officer, detective, sergeant, or lieutenant applied for a position within the NYPD’s
Detective Bureau, Narcotics Division, or other criminal investigative units, the Internal Affairs
Bureau (IAB) received “first choice” in transferring that applicant to the IAB to ensure that the
IAB had experienced investigative staff and management.
6
The author was a supervisor within the NYPD’s research and planning units from 1990 through
1994, and his firsthand exposure to the various elements of community policing from its inception
in the early 1980s through his promotion to police station commander at the turn of the millennium
makes it difficult to reference many aspects since programmatic elements and statistics were
obtained while in service and were common knowledge to NYPD practitioners, particularly those
in executive ranks.
The Late 1990s (1994–2000) 15
nonviolent unlawful activity, e.g., gambling, public intoxication, etc., to deter more
serious illegal activity. The NYPD quickly initiated a “zero tolerance” policy and
began proactively enforcing lower-level offenses including panhandling, public
intoxication, excessive noise, and disorderly conduct. All NYPD patrol personnel
were supplied with pocket-sized cards outlining legal references and procedural
guidelines involving the lower-level infractions. An additional goal of this strategy
was to improve the quality of life in public areas (Albrecht 2011). In line with
George Kelling’s and James Q. Wilson’s “Broken Windows” posed theory, both
sociologists and practitioners believed that addressing the quality of life concerns of
the community should improve public confidence in the police and reduce the level
of fear in the traditionally higher-crime neighborhoods in the city (Wilson and
Kelling 1982).
Since its inception in January 1994, this initiative has been highly effective and
has greatly contributed to the impressive −87% decrease in FBI Index Crime levels
in New York City through 2017.7 As a result, New York City continues to be
regarded as the safest city in the United States of America with a population exceed-
ing one million residents (Albrecht 2011).
The other half of the corporate management model was the implementation of a
new agency mindset that would hold police command executives completely
accountable for all operations within their respective police stations and units.
Police commanders were granted the discretion to assign their personnel as they
deem necessary and no longer as per predesignated staffing percentage guidelines.
In order to be best informed and to appropriately deploy manpower, it is clear that
police commanders must have information regarding current crime trends and pro-
ductivity indicators readily available. Due to the archaic handwritten fashion in
which criminal incidents were recorded in the past, statistical information regarding
index crimes, arrests, and summary activity was routinely available 90 days to 6
months after the fact. In order to remedy this situation, the NYPD undertook the
task of inputting all crime incident reports and arrest information into a computer-
ized database. Precinct commanders and police executives thereafter received a
weekly report that outlines summary statistics involving command demographics,
precinct/unit staffing levels, civilian complaints, overtime, summons activity, sick
rate, radio runs, and response time with comparisons to prior year and city-wide
data. Of even more importance is the weekly comparison report that documents
criminal incident, arrest, and summons activity on a week-, month-, and year-to-
date basis. Each commander must prepare a weekly response delineating efforts
being made by their respective units to further improve the statistics and reduce
serious crime (Albrecht 2011).
7
The author recognizes that there may be other contributing factors that have supported the dra-
matic drop in crime in New York City and across the United States since 1993, which include rela-
tive economic stability and low unemployment rate, decrease in the American juvenile and
adolescent populations, increased incarceration and lengthened prison terms, notable decline in
crack cocaine usage and addiction, more effective treatment in the correctional and probationary
environments, enhanced use of technology (e.g., DNA analysis, video surveillance, etc.) to prevent
and solve crime, etc.
In order to ensure that police commanders had been (and are) continually analyz-
ing this information and addressing necessary concerns, they were (and continue to
be) summoned to unannounced “COMPSTAT” (COMPuter STATistic) meetings at
police headquarters, at least once each month. These commanders are subjected to
direct questioning by the police commissioner, the NYPD chief of department and
other high ranking police executives regarding the respective efforts being under-
taken to address recent violent and serious crimes and trends within their specific
areas of jurisdiction and to ensure that crime reduction strategies, as instituted, have
been and continue to be effective.8 Police commanders are additionally asked about
their most recent contacts with community leaders and groups and about civilian
complaints made against their personnel (Albrecht 2011).
Ultimately what was revealed is that by closely analyzing crime and crime trends
and by strategically deploying police resources to crime-prone locations in an effort
to remove the criminal element from the streets by employing a “zero tolerance”
philosophy for crime and disorder, serious offences and violence can be tackled and
the quality of life can be markedly improved.
On the other hand, the community policing concept, which promoted community
participation and involvement, became the unforeseen victim of the success of the
proactive strategic deployment model. Community policing foot patrol officers were
slowly transferred to enforcement teams such as those within the Narcotics Division
and Street Crime Unit. The practice of the precinct community council9 selecting the
three priority problems slowly came to an end, and direct community involvement
into agency decision making has essentially disappeared (Albrecht 2011).
It was clear that Mayor Giuliani’s “get tough on crime” stance had a clear impact
on illegal and violent conduct and improved the quality of life on New York City’s
streets. Thorough analysis of crime has resulted in the strategic deployment of
NYPD resources in the neighborhoods with the highest crime rates. In New York
City, these areas tend to be predominantly minority (i.e., African-American and
Hispanic) communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. The dramatic
increase in uniformed police presence initially drew cries of a “police state” in these
neighborhoods, but once violent crime subsided, most community leaders quickly
supported the new initiatives. It is now relatively safe to walk on the streets again,
8
As a tenured police commander or deputy police commander in different police stations, the
author personally experienced positive results in drops in crime and increased arrests of criminal
suspects by strategically deploying police resources to areas where crime patterns and trends had
developed. Although refuted by some, the author believes that there is a direct relationship between
the crime analysis/proactive enforcement model of policing and the sharp reduction in index crime
rate.
9
In 1990, all NYPD police station commanders were tasked with chairing the monthly “Community
Council Meetings” that were held directly in each police station and that were open to all precinct
residents and business persons. The purpose of these gatherings was to allow all members of the
public to relay their concerns and complaints directly to the police station commander, who in
1994 was given the new responsibility as problem-solving coordinator for the jurisdiction. Three
members of each Precinct Community Council would sit with the police station commander and
the community policing unit commander and identify the three primary “problems” that police
personnel would address over the next 30-day period.
The Late 1990s (1994–2000) 17
even in communities that traditionally had high crime rates. However, some minor-
ity leaders and political activists have publicly extolled that the increased police
presence in minority neighborhoods is racially motivated and is a coordinated effort
to target only African-Americans and Hispanics for summary action and arrest
(Albrecht 2011). Some of these minority community leaders often refuse to pub-
licly acknowledge the positive impact of the statistical analysis of violence and
crime trends, the strategic deployment of police personnel to high-crime neighbor-
hoods, and refuse to accept the reality that the majority of serious crime in New York
City is committed by minority males [85%], most of whom are African-American
[55%] (Ridgeway 2007). The same leaders maintain that relying on statistics will
result in stereotyping which in essence promotes racism (Albrecht 2011). Two inci-
dents compounded these beliefs and drew public and media criticism upon the pro-
active police practices that are credited with dramatically decreasing crime rates.
In August 1997 in the early morning hours, as a crowd was leaving a dance club
that was closing for the night, a large group of Haitian immigrants began fighting
with each other. When NYPD 70th Precinct police personnel responded to the call
for assistance, they themselves were turned upon by the intoxicated crowd. After
further police officers arrived and the crowd was finally separated, one of the origi-
nal combatants, Abner Louima, punched a uniformed police officer in the face with-
out provocation. That officer, Justin Volpe, placed the individual under arrest. What
happened next was clearly bizarre and difficult to comprehend. Later the same day,
the suspect made the sensational allegation that the officer that had arrested him had
brutally and sexually attacked him in the police station bathroom. The Haitian and
African-American communities immediately staged large-scale demonstrations.
The media grasped the allegation as the major headline for months, relying mainly
on the fabricated claim by certain African-American leaders that this single isolated
incident was an indication that police brutality against minorities in New York City
was widespread. Almost 2 years later in the summer of 1999, Police Officer Volpe
pleaded guilty to this unbelievable crime. This brutal attack on an unarmed and
handcuffed suspect was the first of a small number of incidents that have drained
police-community relations in minority neighborhoods and have initiated a sense of
mistrust in the New York City Police Department (Albrecht 2011).
Another event that led to scrutiny of the New York City Police Department
occurred in February 1999, when the NYPD’s elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit,
with its reputation for arresting large numbers of violent and armed suspects through-
out New York City, was deployed in the Soundview section in the Bronx in search of
a violent serial rapist. One evening while patrolling the streets in their unmarked
vehicles, two officers observed a male in a dimly lighted doorway that they believed
resembled the sketch of the wanted suspect. As they exited their auto, the first two
officers were joined by two colleagues who had also observed the suspect. The four
officers identified themselves as police officers and directed the suspect to stop and
raise his hands. The suspect, in apparent defiance, started turning away and reached
into his pocket while standing in the dark apartment building doorway. The officer
standing closest to the suspect observed the male removed a black object from his
pocket and yelled the word “gun!” to his colleagues, and, in self-defense, the police
officer drew his firearm and fired. The three other officers also fired, believing that
the ricocheting bullets were actually bullets being fired at them. At the conclusion of
the event, which lasted only 5 s, the four officers had fired 41 bullets, and the suspect
lay dead in the building doorway. The object in the suspect’s hand turned out to be a
black wallet. It is unclear why the suspect made the evasive and furtive movements.
All four officers involved in the incident were white, and the same African-American
leaders once again proclaimed that the incident was a clear example of racism and
racial profiling and called for large-scale demonstrations and civil disorder. The
media also fueled the “antipolice” environment by reporting that the police had shot
and killed an “unarmed street peddler,” when the victim’s occupation had nothing to
do with the incident. The Bronx prosecutor, Robert Johnson, himself an African-
American, in an apparent effort to gain political favor, charged the four officers with
intentional premeditated murder (Albrecht 2011).
The media attention and public outcry compelled the New York City Police
Department to evaluate recent trends in the stopping of criminal suspects based on
Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]) guidelines.10 The African-American community
alleged that NYPD personnel had routinely engaged in racial profiling and thereby
intentionally targeted mainly African-American and Hispanic individuals when
conducting criminal investigations (Albrecht 2011)11.
The NYPD analyzed documents to ascertain if these claims were true. The results
of this investigation were interesting and notable. Although 90% of suspects
described by crime victims were minorities, only 85% of the suspects stopped and
investigated by police were African-American or Hispanic, and 13% were white.
These statistics therefore counter the claim that NYPD officers engage in racial
profiling by intentionally detaining a larger proportion of minority suspects. It
appears that police officers in New York City are merely stopping suspects in
response to descriptions provided by crime victims, who in 81% of violent crime
incidents are minorities themselves (New York City Police Department 2000).
Mayor Giuliani and NYPD executives were quick to emphasize that their own find-
ings countered the claim made by the US Department of Justice that NYPD person-
nel engage in widespread racial profiling (Albrecht 2011).
10
The Terry v. Ohio (392 US 1 [1968]) decision by the US Supreme Court in 1968 directed that
police officers across the United States could stop suspects, even forcefully if necessary, if they had
reasonable suspicion that the suspect had been, is presently, or would be engaging in criminal
conduct and, in addition, that police officers could frisk those suspects if they reasonably suspected
that those individuals may be armed.
11
Advocates for some minority groups have repeatedly alleged that since the percentage of minor-
ity group members that have been stopped by the police during these constitutionally permissible
“Terry” encounters has exceeded the percentage of African-Americans or Blacks in the general
population, that these police actions should be considered to be evident of disparate or discrimina-
tory law enforcement practices. The police across the United States have generally stated, however,
that African-Americans, Blacks, and Hispanics in many cities and jurisdictions disproportionally
engage in a greater proportion of serious and violent crimes and that police officers working within
these communities are merely reacting to crime trends and public demands.
The Late 1990s (1994–2000) 19
The four officers were tried in Criminal Court and in February 2000 were acquit-
ted of all charges, having been found to have acted in self-defense. The African-
American leaders disregarded the jury’s findings and continued to cause more
controversy. In two subsequent cases in which African-American suspects were
killed by police in New York City, these same leaders claimed that racism played a
role, even though the police officers involved were themselves minorities and, in
both cases, were involved in life-and-death struggles in which the suspect was try-
ing to take the officer’s firearm. It often appeared as if the media enjoyed causing
increased sensationalism and community unrest by emphasizing inaccurate infor-
mation in their headline reports (Albrecht 2011).
In August 1997, in response to the 70th Precinct police brutality case, the NYPD
released a new strategy aimed at improving the professional image of the police by
emphasizing increased courtesy and respect to the public, criminal suspects, and
NYPD supervisors and peers. A copy of the report, entitled Courtesy Professionalism
Respect (New York City Police Department 1997), was distributed to each of the
41,000 police officers and 9000 civilian employees of the NYPD. The ultimate goal
of this strategy, nicknamed “CPR,” was to “breathe new life” into police-community
relations (Albrecht 2011).
The report emphasized positive interaction with the public and noted that if
“crime levels decline, but members of the community are reluctant to approach
police for fear of a negative encounter, then the police have not met their obligations
to the public” (New York City Police Department 1997, p. 3). The document contin-
ued that “negative perceptions of police behavior toward the public” may emanate
“not only from incidents of actual misconduct, but also from situations where proper
police actions were mistakenly viewed by the public as inappropriate” (New York
City Police Department 1997, p. 3). What has to be acknowledged is that not only
actual acts of police deviance but also perceived acts of inappropriate police con-
duct will cause the public to lose trust in that police agency.
The NYPD has undertaken considerable effort to improve the image of the
police. New initiatives have been instituted to enhance the quality of newly hired
police officers. The applicant screening process has been revised to emphasize the
“screening in” of candidates with desirable characteristics, rather than the “screen-
ing out” of unqualified candidates. In addition, efforts have been made to recruit
most candidates from the pool of New York City residents, rather than from the
surrounding suburbs (New York City Police Department 1997). Many sociologists
believe that persons who reside outside of major American cities may not appreciate
the diversity and comprehend the cultural differences in the various communities in
the neighboring metropolis (Albrecht 2011). New York City residents now receive
extra points toward the final score on hiring and promotional exams, and increased
effort has been made to conduct recruitment drives at colleges and schools in minor-
ity neighborhoods. Educational requirements for supervisory ranks were increased
to mandate fixed levels of college education as one progresses up the management
ladder (New York City Police Department 1997).
In 1994, the NYPD introduced the “verbal judo” concept when interacting with
suspects and other members of the public (Albrecht 2011). Every member of the
NYPD has attended the “verbal judo” course, which emphasizes verbal de-
escalation techniques to help police officers avoid and defuse conflicts while
obtaining voluntary compliance, improve communication skills, and reinforce
concepts of professionalism and respect to ensure the minimal use of necessary
force (Thompson 1983).
In addition to attending mandatory community meetings with representatives from
the respective neighborhoods in which they serve, all police officers have obtained
and will continue to receive both ethical and cultural awareness training and have the
opportunity to obtain language instruction to overcome barriers and better communi-
cate with neighborhood residents (New York City Police Department 1997).
The NYPD has six separate performance monitoring programs which are
designed to proactively identify and track police officers who have had histories of
disciplinary infractions, appear to use excessive force, or have personal difficulties
which may impact their job performance. This computerized early warning system
supplies numerical points to incidents that occur within a police officer’s career.
When a police officer obtains a target number of points, the individual is called into
police headquarters and is interviewed by a peer counselor who apprises officers of
the situation and the negative impact it may have on their career aspirations. If the
negative conduct fails to improve, then the officer concerned will be assigned to a
non-patrol function. In addition, precinct and unit commanders are apprised of the
special monitoring status of personnel within their command and must then con-
tinue to reevaluate the performance and progress of the individual officers (New
York City Police Department 1997).
As for new initiatives in the New York City Police Department that have been
developed to enhance police cooperation into the investigation of allegations of
police corruption and other deviance, a new policy was enacted in 1997 that directed
that any police officer caught lying or making false statements during an internal
investigation would be immediately terminated (New York City Police Department
2002). This policy was implemented to overcome the “blue wall of silence,” a com-
mon practice in which police officers12 routinely will not provide any information
that would implicate another police officer in an internal investigation. In return for
volunteering information about acts of police deviance and for openly cooperating
in these investigations, police officers who did so were quickly rewarded with desir-
able assignments and promotions. On the other hand, those who clearly lied when
talking to internal investigators were administratively charged and eventually termi-
nated. When these investigations were conducted by federal authorities, police offi-
cials who did not properly cooperate or who were believed to have lied where also
criminally charged in federal court. These policies and practices have considerably
changed the mindset of NYPD personnel.13
12
This is also noted in other tight-knit and dangerous professions such as firefighting and in the
military services.
13
What the author and most police officers have come to realize is that those who engage in the
isolated events of police deviance tarnish the reputation of every officer working in that agency. It
is therefore in the agency’s best interests to proactively counsel or to terminate these individuals as
soon as possible.
2001 to the Present 21
In summary, the 1990s in the New York City Police Department has been looked
upon positively due to successful endeavors to dramatically reduce crime, but others
may say that the sensational incidents of police corruption and deviance have taken
away from the positive reputation of the NYPD.
2001 to the Present
Clearly the most significant event that has impacted law enforcement in the United
States and internationally since the start of the new millennium involves the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. Considerable resources have been
redeployed to counterterrorism-related responsibilities since that tragic day.14
The New York City Police Department however has continued its effective
deployment with the accompanying impressive crime reduction throughout the new
millennium. Ultimately since crime levels have declined to levels not seen since
before crime statistics were maintained,15 federal, state, and local governments have
considerably reduced budgetary financing for law enforcement endeavors.
Essentially the police in America have become the victims of their own success. The
police manpower of the NYPD has declined from a high exceeding 41,000 in 2001
to the present level of approximately 36,000 in 2017. Even with the drastic reduc-
tion in the number of NYPD personnel since 2001, there has been a continuous push
to maintain the amount of summary activity, i.e., arrests, traffic tickets, criminal
court summonses, “Terry” stops, etc., to maintain the positive effects of the highly
respected proactive police strategy.
This quest to ensure that NYPD officers maintain a certain expected level of
summary activity has led to repeated allegations that police personnel have been
given “quotas” for monthly police activity that they are mandated to meet. With the
steep decline in personnel resources and due to supervisory pressure, a small num-
ber of police officers are alleged to have engaged in criminal misconduct by falsely
arresting suspects, placing fake evidence on arrested individuals,16 and writing
“phantom” traffic tickets and other summonses to individuals or vehicles that did
not commit any violation of the law.17 In addition, in 2010 and 2011, a number of
police officers were found to have “taken care of”18 parking and traffic tickets for
14
This event and the resultant counterterrorism responsibilities have not significantly affected
police integrity, ethics, or deviance, other than concerns regarding the implementation of the
Patriot Act, which does not overwhelmingly affect local law enforcement agencies like the NYPD.
15
As noted, uniformed crime reports were first maintained in the 1960s.
16
The practice of making false arrests and of planting fake evidence on suspects is called
“flaking.”
17
Some police officers were found to have used the phone book and information found on depart-
ment databases to write “phantom” summonses and tickets to individuals and vehicles. The sum-
monses and tickets were actually never issued, but individuals only found out about them when the
courts notified them that they had failed to pay a fine or show up in court.
18
A police officer could “take care of” a traffic ticket by discreetly disposing of it or by providing
false testimony in traffic court.
relatives and friends of police officers. This practice was apparently coordinated by
police union representatives (Baker and Goldstein 2011).
Even with the normally effective measures that the NYPD and its Internal Affairs
Bureau have in place, there have been isolated arrests of off-duty NYPD officers
who have provided “protection” for illegal drug groups or who have robbed or
stolen money from drug dealers in the middle of illegal narcotics transactions. Some
have even participated in bank robberies (New York City Police Department 2012).
Contemporary allegations involving police abuses and brutality routinely revolve
around allegations of racial bias in deployment and enforcement practices. The
high-profile death of Eric Garner in July 2014 while resisting his arrest by NYPD
officers had shortly followed another sensationalized shooting by police in Ferguson,
Missouri. These events among others across the United States have given rise to the
“Black Lives Matter” movement, whose supporters have alleged racial bias and
excessive use of force by law enforcement personnel across America, particularly as
it relates to African-American criminal suspects. While these accusations continue
to be made, there has been limited investigatory evidence or empirical support to
substantiate these claims. However, the president’s task force on twenty-first-
century policing has made considerable recommendations to address these claims
and to enhance community perceptions and trust in the police (COPS Office 2015).
Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD
Police corruption and other forms of police deviance are clearly unacceptable.
Police officers, due to their oath of office and the amount of authority that they have
been granted, are held to a higher standard than the average citizen. That is why
reported police deviance is so sensationalized and why punishments tend to be
severe. However, from another perspective, the incidents of police corruption and
police deviance are notably rare and have normally involved only an isolated num-
ber of officers. The number of NYPD police officers arrested each year (since the
early 1990s) encompasses less than 0.5% of the entire complement of uniformed
police personnel. The vast majority of these arrests routinely involve domestic and
alcohol-related incidents (New York City Police Department 2012).19
When analyzing the larger-scale corruption events that have involved the New York
City Police Department since the 1980s, a number of common factors have been iden-
tified (Albrecht 2013). The major scandals all occurred within high-crime police sta-
tions, namely, the 77th Precinct, the 30th Precinct, the 75th Precinct, and the 70th Precinct.
19
The number of NYPD police officers arrested on an annual basis is less than 0.5% of the total
complement of police officials, and this has remained stable since 1990. The overwhelming num-
ber of arrests is made for domestic incidents and alcohol-related offences such as bar altercations
or drunk driving. The extreme (ab)use of excessive force, police corruption, and police criminality
are exceptionally rare events and have tended to involve one or two police officers and not a large
team of officers as seen during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.
Summary: Police Deviance 23
These communities are plagued by widespread street-level and indoor drug dealing.
Since these police stations were undesirable to police personnel, they were the most
common locations where troublesome police officers were transferred to after they
had been identified as “problem” employees.20 The police station commander often
assigned these officers to the midnight shift in an effort to limit their contact with com-
munity residents. Since these police stations had high workloads, the supervisors
assigned within these precincts were normally overwhelmed with work, which lim-
ited time to provide “problem” officers with extra supervision. In addition, some of
the “problem” employees were supervisors themselves with poor or indifferent man-
agement skills. Due to the high crime rate, these police stations were not routinely
visited or inspected by police managers from NYPD’s central headquarters or from
the regional command office. Even those involved in NYPD internal investigation
units avoided travel to these areas and opted to spend more time conducting surveil-
lances in more desirable and safer communities. In essence, police personnel who
worked in high-crime, drug-prone police stations, specifically those who worked on
the midnight shift, were not tightly supervised by the police station and external police
management. This eventually provided the problem officers with “free reign” to per-
form their duties as they wanted to (Albrecht 2013).
When closely examining the police officers who eventually turned to corruption
and criminality in the identified large-scale cases, most of the officers involved actu-
ally were later identified as being “proactive” employees who routinely made arrests
for drug offences and other serious crimes. The high crime rates made it easy to take
summary action (i.e., make arrests). A common trend was often observed. These
officers initially engaged in proper arrest processing but eventually, and likely due
to the lack of appropriate supervision, engaged in evidence and inventory abuses,
which included drug disposal to avoid paperwork, and then moved on to theft of
some of the drugs to reward cooperative informants, then to theft of some of the
currency that was recovered, to theft of all the money retrieved from the suspects or
crime scenes, and finally to the theft of the drugs seized for resale to other drug deal-
ers. Almost all of the officers engaged in some form of perjury when preparing
police reports or while testifying in court (Albrecht 2013).
Summary: Police Deviance
As mentioned above, police deviance cannot be generalized to one form of inap-

propriate or illegal conduct. The five general classifications within the police devi-
ance typology are (1) police corruption, (2) police criminality, (3) excessive use of
force, (4) abuse of authority, and (5) police misconduct. In addition, the phenomena
20
“Problem” employees include police officers who were involved in higher-level disciplinary
cases. As part of the punishment process, these officers would be transferred to undesirable work
locations, and those who had performed in an exemplary fashion at those same police stations were
permitted to transfer to a more desirable precinct.
involving the “blue wall of silence” and the recent and consistent occurrences of
courtroom perjury and “ticket fixing” are also unacceptable practices that must be
included within the umbrella of serious police misconduct. It should also be noted
that officers involved in police misbehavior at times take part in more than one of
the outlined classifications.
References
Albrecht, J. F. (2011). Analyzing the implementation and evolution of community policing in the
United States and Scandinavia. In I. M. Guzman, A. M. Das, & D. K. Das (Eds.), Strategic
responses to crime: Thinking globally, acting locally. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Albrecht, J. F. (2013, October). Corruption control through effective leadership: Understanding
police deviance. Philadelphia: Presentation at the Annual Conference of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police.
Baker, A., & Goldstein, J. (2011, October 28). Unsealed indictments shed light on procedures
for ticket-fixing by officers. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/nyregion/
in-ticket-fixing-scandal-16-officers-to-be-charged.html
Colquhoun, P. (1795). A treatise on the police of the metropolis. Patterson Smith Reprint Series in
Criminology, Law Enforcement and Social Problems (7th ed.), Publication No. 42 (reprinted
1969).
COPS Office. (2015). President’s task force on 21st century policing implementation guide:
Moving from recommendations to action. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services.
Cosgrove, C. A., & McElroy, J. E. (1986). The fixed tour experiment in the 115th precinct: Its
effects on police officer stress, community perceptions, and precinct management. Executive
Summary. New York: Vera Institute of Justice.
Elkins v. United States 364 U.S. 206. (1960).
Goldstein, H. (1990). Problem-oriented policing. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Johnson, L. B. (1965, March 8). Special message to the congress on law enforcement and the
administration of justice. Online by G. Peters & J. T. Woolley. The American Presidency
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26800
Katzenbach, N. D. (1967). The challenge of crime in a free society: A report by the president’s
commission on law enforcement and administration of justice. Washington, DC: United States
Government Printing Office.
Kavanaugh, J. J. (2010). No back-up needed: How veteran New York City cops struggled through
the summer of 1975, when New York City went broke. Oakland, OR: Red Anvil Press.
Mara, W. (2009). Perspectives on civil unrest in the 1960s: Riots and their aftermath. New York:
Benchmark Books.
Mass, P. (1973). Serpico, the cop who defied the system. New York: Viking Press.
McAlary, M. (1989). Buddy boys: When good cops turn bad. Kirkwood, NY: Putnam Publishing
Group.
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436. (1966).
Mollen, M. (1994). Commission report: Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption
and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department. New York: City of New York.
New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board. (2012). History of the CCRB. NYC Civilian
Complaint Review Board Website. http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/history.html
New York City Police Department. (1990). NYPD staffing needs plan. New York: NYPD Printing
Office.
New York City Police Department. (1997). Courtesy, professionalism, respect. New York: NYPD
Printing Office.
References 25
New York City Police Department. (2000). NYPD response to the draft “Police practices and civil
rights in New York City”. New York: NYPD Printing Office.
New York City Police Department. (2002). NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau Annual Report 2001.
New York: NYPD Printing Office.
Player, M. A. (2009). Federal law of employment discrimination in a nutshell (6th ed.). St. Paul,
MN: West Publishing Company.
Ridgeway, G. (2007). New York: Analysis of racial disparities in the New York City Police
Department’s stop, question and frisk practices. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Rios v. United States 364 U.S. 253. (1960).
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1. (1968).
Thompson, G. (1983). Verbal judo: Words as a force option. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas
Publishers.
Trojanowicz, R., & Bucqueroux, B. (1998). Community policing: How to get started (2nd ed.).
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company.
United States Department of Justice. (1989). Crime in the United States 1988. Washington, DC:
United States Department of Justice.
Vera Institute of Justice. (1984). The community patrol officer program: A pilot program in com-
munity oriented policing in the 72nd precinct. Interim Progress Report (Internal Document).
New York: Vera Institute of Justice.
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety.
Atlantic Quarterly, 256, 29–38.
Chapter 4
Criminological Explanations for Police
Deviance
Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance
Now that a typology for police deviance has been delineated, there is the need to
better understand the criminological explanations and roots for these categories of
police misconduct.
Theories of Crime and Police Corruption
Police corruption involves situations when police officers lose integrity in their pro-
fessional actions and accept benefits or rewards in exchange for violating their man-
dated responsibilities. Examples include bribe receiving, receiving reward for
official misconduct, and engaging in official misconduct. After the Knapp
Commission review in 1972 involving the NYPD agency-wide payoff scheme, most
incidents involving corruption payoffs were eliminated. However, with the emer-
gence of the highly profitable illicit drug trading that developed across New York
City through the 1980s, the potential for bribery attempts and offers of other bene-
fits to law enforcement personnel in exchange for allowing local drug dealing to
flourish arose. The most lucrative areas for drug dealing were in the impoverished
and crime-ridden areas.
In applying theories of crime to police corruption, which involves the willful
acceptance of bribes and other rewards, the officer has in essence committed to
engaging in official misconduct. In most cases, the incentive to engage in this devi-
ance would involve the reception of money or other valuable item or items. One
possible theory of crime that could be applied is the strain theory as it has been clari-
fied by Merton (1968). Merton’s strain theory proposed that societal pressure to
achieve unattainable material goals can coerce individuals to engage in criminality.
Specifically as it applies to the New York City Police Department, whose officers

28 4 Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance
have been recognized as some of the most underpaid within the northeastern US
region and are the one of the lowest paid among America’s largest municipal police
agencies,1 one can identify the potential for NYPD officers to desire more material
goods to keep up with the social pressures of the high cost of living in New York
City. Many of those who were later apprehended were found to own lavish homes,
sport cars, and other luxury items (McAlary 1989). One routine recommendation by
three NYC mayoral commissions that have followed the major scandals has been an
increase in salary for NYPD personnel to counter the potential for temptation to
engage in deviance or corruption (Mollen 1994).
In the newer generation of identified corrupt NYPD officers, some have been
found to have had prior associations or contacts with criminal gangs or street-level
criminals. These relationships were not revealed during the pre-employment screen-
ing process. These younger officers continued their involvement with some of these
criminal elements and were drawn into corrupt activities to further their commit-
ment to their private associates.2 These officers have likely been influenced by dif-
ferential association, but in this case, their loyalty is stronger to outside contacts and
friends, rather than to their work cohort. Their socialization to the deviant elements
in the community had been developed prior to their police employment. As such, in
these isolated cases, this form of corruption (and associated criminality) could be
attributed to Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord and Galliher
1988), which suggested that individuals learn their personal values, techniques, and
motives for their illegal activities through contact with others within their respective
social network.
One final theoretical explanation to explain police corruption could involve
Becker’s rational choice theory. Rational choice theory proposes that criminals, and
all people, weigh the costs and risks and potential rewards and benefits when con-
sidering whether to engage in criminal conduct. Economic factors also play a sig-
nificant role. Proper planning to avoid detection and apprehension will be devised,
and criminals actually conduct a probability analysis before engaging in deviant
acts (Becker 1968). In the case of police officers, they may believe that since they
are the actors charged with the enforcement of the law, the potential for detection or
arrest would be relatively low. As such, some corrupt police personnel may have
believed that their position has left them “above the law.”
1
At one point in 2004, the New York City Mayor actually decreased the starting salary for new
police officers by more than −25%. Even with tax surpluses that at times exceeded $4 billion annu-
ally over the last 15 years, no raises or cost of living increases were provided to NYPD personnel
on a routine basis. The situation changed in 2007 when New York City was embarrassed that the
NYPD could not fill their budgeted police academy complements.
2
This is one reason why the NYPD does not permit enforcement personnel to live in the area in
which they work. However, the policy does not preclude police officers from working in areas
where they had previously lived, attended school, or had been employed.
Theories of Crime and Police Criminality 29
Theories of Crime and Police Criminality
Police criminality encompasses criminal actions undertaken by police personnel

other than corruption and the excessive use of force. These incidents would involve
theft, robbery, drug dealing, and other illegal endeavors. In the three most signifi-
cant cases, New York City Police Department officers assigned to the crime-ridden,
drug-prone 30th, 75th, and 77th Precincts engaged in the routine theft of money,
drugs, and other valuables, at times threatening violence. In many cases, stolen
drugs were used to reward informants or were resold by the police officers them-
selves to increase criminal profit (McAlary 1989; Mollen 1994). The investigation
and some of the interviews of the officers involved later revealed that many of the
police officers had started their careers by engaging in productive enforcement of
the laws. They expressed frustration when seeing the criminal offenders promptly
returned to the street (commonly referred to as the “revolving door court system”)
with little or no punishment. The detailed and tedious evidence inventory process
led many to destroy some of the drugs recovered. As this went on undetected, the
officers slowly progressed to removing some and eventually all of the recovered
currency for their personal use. Eventually further greed developed, and the officers
reverted to not making arrests and merely stealing the criminal proceeds and either
delivering the recovered drugs to cooperative drug dealers or selling the drugs either
within the boundary of the police station or outside the New York City borders
(McAlary 1989; Mollen 1994). Clearly there was an evolution to the deviance that
had arisen in almost all cases.
From a theoretical perspective, the most likely explanation for these develop-
ments would rely on Becker’s rational choice model (Becker 1968). It would appear
that the officers calculated the likelihood of detection and, noting its unlikelihood,
progressed from low-level criminality to serious crime and violence. In the perspec-
tive of these criminal officers, Tittle’s proposed “control ratio” (Tittle 1995) theory
would have weighed in on the side of deviance, as the lack of personal integrity and
effective supervisory practices appeared to be deficient or absent in many of the
identified scandals. This was most obvious in the NYPD’s sensational cases in the
late 1980s and early 1990s and in the LAPD’s Rampart Division events in the late
1990s, where isolated but small teams of officers engaged in the theft of drugs and
currency and other criminality without the fear of detection or apprehension. In
addition, since these three scandals involved a small cadre of criminal police offi-
cers all routinely working together on the same shift, one could propose that
Sutherland’s differential association theory (Gaylord and Galliher 1988) played a
role in their illicit conduct. In these scenarios, which involved groups of officers and
not simply individual actors, it would appear that many officers believed that they
would not be identified as a member of “the team” unless they participated in crimi-
nal activities. The absence of personal ethics, limited integrity control measures,
and specific instances of weak supervision appear to have often resulted in unre-
stricted criminal actions in these scandal-plagued police stations.
Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force
Police brutality involves the use of more than the minimal amount of force needed
to overcome resistance or counter an attack or threat. The criminal law and police
policy and procedure almost universally delineate that the use of force by law
enforcement officers must involve no more than what is needed to overcome the use
or threat of force directed at them or a third party. When police officers exceed the
amount of force necessary, then they may be acting with criminal intent or in a reck-
less manner. Law enforcement personnel who utilize excessive force are therefore
acting in a deviant manner.3
It is obvious that police agencies, either through initial police academy, proba-
tionary, field, or in-service training or through agency policies and procedures, do
not foster more than the use of minimal, necessary, and reasonable force to counter
the specific threat involved. As such, other practical and theoretical explanations
should be considered.
Regarding the excessive use of force, the phenomenon can best be explained in
similar fashion to other criminal behavior in which the perpetrators inflict injury to
their intended victims. As it relates to the use of excessive force by police, this use
of violence, intentionally and often without remorse, could best be elucidated
through trait theory, which promotes that biological, genetic, or psychological fac-
tors influence an individual to engage in violent outbursts (Siegel 2011). In essence,
the police officers who engage in police brutality may be plagued by a biological
deficit that leaves them prone to inflict guilt-free physical punishment. The use of
disproportionate or unwarranted force or violence can also be explained through
social learning theory (Widom 1989), which proposed that those who have had
childhood or adolescent exposure to violence or have been victimized by physical
abuse are more likely to engage in violence against others, and as such, these aggres-
sive behaviors had been learned earlier by these individuals as being socially accept-
able. If either (or both) of these theories are accepted, then one must question the
effectiveness of the psychological, background, and other screening processes that
have taken place during the pre-employment period.
In either case, whether trait theory or social learning theory is acknowledged as
the primary explanation, it is highly likely that police officers who engage in brutal
conduct have done so in the past and will do so in the future unless efforts are made
to terminate these problematic individuals from the police agency, either through
criminal or administrative processes (Albrecht 2017). Another critical matter that
3
This has to be contrasted with the “perceived” use of excessive force by police personnel, which
is more common than the actual incidents involving force-related police deviance. The sensational-
ized cases often highlighted by the media have routinely resulted in prosecutorial or jurist conclu-
sions that the police officers had acted appropriately given the known circumstances and facts at
the time of the decision to deploy force. This often differs dramatically from the related allegations
of racism and police brutality made by minority group and other community advocates. It is clear
that the perception of police brutality has to be addressed by police administrators, but it should not
be confused with the actual use of excessive force by law enforcement actors.
Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority 31
will be addressed later is the practice of the blue wall of silence, in which police
officer who work with these abusive colleagues fail to report the unacceptable inci-
dents to police command staff.
Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority
While the use of excessive force would fall under the domain of abuse of authority,
this has been addressed separately (see above). The remaining categories of police
abuse of authority include discourtesy, abusive language, ethnic slurs, and verbal
threats. In practice, since these matters deal more so with disrespect than ethical
issues, allegations involving these incidents are routinely referred to as “civilian
complaints” against the police and are often investigated by an independent agency
staffed by non-law enforcement investigators.4 In the field, it is not uncommon for
patrol officers to escalate their verbal discourse when confronted with an uncoop-
erative individual. If one considers the potential increases in the police use of force
spectrum that match the threat posed by a suspect, so too do police personnel cater
their verbal interactions to the amount of verbal or physical cooperation or resis-
tance displayed by persons with whom they are interacting. When a suspect or other
civilian encountered continues to be uncooperative with law enforcement person-
nel, the verbal requests and directives presented by the police will likely get louder
and possibly escalate to the use of abusive language. While clearly unprofessional,
some officers perceive that the use of louder verbal direction coupled with abusive
language will result in a higher likelihood for cooperation and thus negate the need
to elevate the interaction to one that requires the use of physical force. As such, in
many police organizations, the use of abusive language (e.g., cursing) does not nec-
essarily lead to instruction or reprimand by agency supervisors. Under these cir-
cumstances, frontline police personnel, supervisors, and even police administrators
may have rationalized this type of behavior as being acceptable. This is in line with
Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993; Kappeler et al.
1998), which opined that individuals can justify specific conduct, often illegal or
socially unacceptable, through a process of personal rationalization. These individ-
uals undertake “techniques of neutralization” in which they deny the existence of
personal responsibility and injury to intended victims while condemning the crimi-
nal justice system and promoting their noble calling to ensure criminals receive
“appropriate punishment.”
The utilization of discourteous or abusive language is viewed in stark contrast to
the use of ethnic slurs or unjustified threats that police officers may verbally convey
to suspects or encountered civilians. This type of behavior is unquestionably unac-
ceptable. One theoretical explanation for these two categories of abusive dialogue
is social learning theory (Widom 1989), in that abusive and threatening dialogue
4
In New York City, allegations involving abuse of authority are investigated by an independent
agency staffed by civilian employees and supervised by the Civilian Complaint Review Board.
and discriminatory representations of different ethnic groups may have been

learned during infancy and adolescence from family members and friends and later
through peers. These officers involved have opted to disregard agency ethical and
cultural awareness training and continue to engage in these forms of police abuse
of authority.
Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct
Police misconduct involves the failure to abide by agency policy, procedure, rules,
and/or regulation. While some infractions may rise to the level of criminal conduct,
most are rule violations normally addressed by verbal or written reprimand and
instruction or through a formal administrative process. While issues like tardiness,
unprofessional appearance, sick leave abuse, and other minor rule infractions would
not normally warrant overwhelming attention, repeat violations could be signs of a
more serious issue. Chronic tardiness, disheveled appearance, routine unplanned
absences, or excessive sick leave may be signs of a more serious personal disorder
or issue. Within the law enforcement profession, recurring incidents involving one
or all of the above could be a sign of alcohol or substance abuse or familial instabil-
ity. Without instruction or early intervention, these employees could engage in crim-
inal conduct (e.g., theft) to support an alcohol or drug addiction or could exhibit
abusive conduct (verbal or physical) in response to fatigue or abuse experienced at
home. It is quite common for police colleagues and agency managers to overlook
these infractions and the potential future problems as part of the subcultural custom
involving the “blue wall of silence” (which will be addressed later). Unfortunately
this lack of attention may lead these officers, who unquestionably require assis-
tance, to engage in harmful behavior and possibly to later commit suicide. As previ-
ously outlined, the New York City Police Department and many law enforcement
agencies across the United States have developed a comprehensive early warning
and intervention mechanism in an effort to effectively identify potentially problem-
atic employees.
Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”
The “blue wall of silence” involves the common practice in which police officers do
not take the initiative to report misconduct or other police deviance involving work
colleagues, nor do they cooperate in internal or external investigations that are
examining forms of corruption or police deviance. Similar practices have been
noted in other dangerous professions (e.g., military personnel and firefighters). The
common belief is that by reporting others who commit misconduct or deviance, one
could place themselves in harm’s way since there is a likelihood that work col-
leagues will not come to their assistance when needed. This practice is not learned
Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury 33
prior to employment and is initiated when first deployed to the post-training field
work. This informal code is prevalent in all ranks and not only in frontline person-
nel. In the upper ranks, misconduct and deviance may be overlooked to spare the
agency from embarrassment. As such, except in extreme cases or in instances when
the incidents have been drawn to the public’s attention through another mechanism
(e.g., media), it is believed that much of the misconduct and deviance that takes
place within law enforcement agencies goes unaddressed or unpunished.
While it had been common practice to remain silent as it has pertained to miscon-
duct and deviance by fellow police colleagues, the move to enhanced professional-
ism, agency transparency, media access, and the use of technology (e.g., patrol car
video cameras, body cameras, and civilian cell phone cameras) have moved police
officer actions into a “fish bowl” environment. Even in situations when officers may
have opted to not cooperate in the past, they have been forced to provide supporting
testimony since the evidence against their misbehaving and deviant colleagues may
have been obvious. To also ensure cooperation, the New York City Police Department
in 1997 implemented a policy that any employee openly covering up or lying in an
internal investigation will be terminated (New York City Police Department 2002).
As a result, the “blue wall” is slowly being “torn down” in the NYPD, and many
other law enforcement agencies as police personnel have acknowledged that the
agency’s and their own personal reputations are routinely criticized, questioned, and
ridiculed due to the detected misconduct of one or a small number of their peers.
From a theoretical perspective, the “blue wall” phenomenon can be explained by
applying Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993;
Kappeler et al. 1998) to this custom. The same could be said of the practice of pro-
viding police officers and government officials with “professional courtesy” during
traffic stops.5 The officers could rationalize their actions through the belief that nei-
ther of these rituals causes overwhelming harm to the public, thereby neutralizing
the effect of their actions. As these practices are normally learned through organiza-
tional exposure, social learning theory (Widom 1989) would provide a reasonable
explanation for this form of misconduct.
Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury
Courtroom perjury could have been included within the police criminality category
of police deviance; however, it will be looked at separately due to its recurrence in
recent NYPD scandals. In those cases closely examined by the Mollen Commission
and some subsequent incidents, NYPD officers were found to fabricate certain
aspects of the events leading up to arrests in order to strengthen the likelihood of
5
“Professional courtesy” during traffic stops often involves the reservation of on-duty police per-
sonnel to issue traffic summonses to off-duty law enforcement officials and often their family
members.
conviction.6 Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory (Hunt and Manning 1993;
Kappeler et al. 1998) could be applied as a theoretical explanation as police officers
may have rationalized this form of criminality by believing that their intent was
simply to place “bad people behind bars.” As previously indicated, this practice has
often been referred to as “noble cause” corruption (Crank and Caldero 1999). In
addition, this form of deviance could be supported practically by instruction or
coercion by peers, trainers, or perhaps even other criminal justice actors (e.g., pros-
ecutors). As such, Widom’s social learning theory (Widom 1989) could provide a
plausible explanation for this serious criminal misconduct.
References
Albrecht, J. F. (2017, February). Critical concepts of police leadership. Presentation at the
Norwegian Police College, Oslo, Norway.
Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 196–217.
Gaylord, M. S., & Galliher, J. F. (1988). The criminology of Edward Sutherland. Piscataway, NJ:
Transaction Publishers.
Hunt, J., & Manning, P. (1993). The social context of police lying. In K. Delos (Ed.), Deviant
behavior. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Group.
Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New York: Free Press.
Siegel, L. J. (2011). Criminology: The core (4th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishers.
Press.
Widom, C. S. (1989). The cycle of violence. Science, 244, 160–166.
6
The most common examples included police officers testifying that they discovered a gun or illicit
narcotics on the body of the suspect, when in fact the contraband had been found on the floor
nearby, in the suspect’s car, or in the suspect’s home. When questioned, the officers often admitted
that they merely wanted to strengthen the criminal case (Mollen 1994).
Chapter 5
Policy Options for Enhancing Individual
and Organizational Integrity
olicy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational

P
Integrity
The challenge now will be to outline particular policy recommendations and options
to enhance individual and organizational integrity and to improve the professional
standards across the agency. There are two primary alternatives available to police
administrators and government leaders. One option would target the quality of indi-
vidual police personnel and the second involves the potential reformation of organi-
zational policy, procedure and practice.
Specific measures can be undertaken to improve the quality of police personnel,
during the pre-employment vetting stage, while at the police academy or training
facility, and throughout the professional careers of police resources. As will be
delineated in further detail, a more intensive pre-employment vetting procedure,
combined with enhanced recruit qualification, e.g. required pre-employment col-
lege or military experience, have the potential to improve the inherent quality of
police personnel. In addition, the implementation of hightened professional stan-
dards and leadership criteria for all agency resources and the incorporation of
proven mechanisms that can more effectively deter, identify and address acts of
police deviance must be instituted in an effort to improve organizational integrity
and to enhance public confidence in the police.
Pre-employment Screening for Law Enforcement Officials
One of the potential options for enhancing professionalism within law enforcement
organizations involves improving the effectiveness of the pre-employment screen-
ing processes. Pre-employment screening for law enforcement and other

36 5 Policy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational Integrity
government officials involves a number of common endeavors in an attempt to

employ the highest quality candidate. Routinely the prehiring process will include
all or most of the following:
1 . Test of cognitive ability
2. Background investigation
3. Physical ability test
4. Medical screening
5. Drug testing
6. Personality testing and psychological screening
7. Personal interview
This procedure has been generally designed to “screen out” undesirable indi-
viduals for government employment. On the other hand, there are many desirable
qualities that police officers should possess, including integrity, commitment, and
loyalty, with a recent move toward enhanced abilities for critical thinking and prob-
lem solving. In addition, evaluations, challenges, and examinations posed during
the police academy and field training periods serve as the critical steps to eliminate
potentially problematic employees.
Pre-employment Screening to Deter Police Deviance
It is imperative that personnel seeking employment in police agencies and other

organizations entrusted with security and other sensitive responsibilities be prop-
erly and effectively screened prior to hire. In addition to physical and medical
issues, there is the need to closely evaluate the character, background, and past
experiences of police candidates. Personality testing, background investigation, and
psychological screening are tightly interwoven as it relates to the critical task of
selecting a suitably capable law enforcement officer. A number of research endeav-
ors have involved the examination of police deviance and corruption in an attempt
to identify personality qualities or indicators common among police officers who
act inappropriately and, conversely, determining those attributes and qualities that
would indicate that these law enforcement recruits will perform exceptionally. The
New York City Police Department internally has called for revising recruitment and
selection criteria to promote the “selecting in” of applicants with positive attributes
while “weeding out” inappropriate personality characteristics (Albrecht 2011b).
One challenge has been accurately identifying distinct positive qualities that would
identify an individual as a potential productive and problem-free police officer dur-
ing the pre-employment process. Those characteristics that would not be suitable
for law enforcement personnel have been much easier to identify (Burbeck and
Furnham 1984).
Personality Testing and Psychological Screening 37
Personality Testing and Psychological Screening
While the Wickersham Commission in 1931 promoted the use of intelligence test-
ing as the proper screening mechanism for police recruits (Wickersham Commission
Reports 1931), the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice (Johnson 1965) first recommended the widespread use of psychological
personality testing for law enforcement personnel as a major step in enhancing the
professionalism of police officials.1 A specific recommendation from the
Commission was for jurisdictions to consider the use of “psychological tests, such
as the MMPI {Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory}, and interviews to
determine emotional stability” of police candidates (The President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967, p. 129). In addition, two
significant judicial decisions have highlighted the requirement to screen applicants
properly during the prehiring stage. In Hardy v. Town of Hayneville (1999), it was
decided that the jurisdiction could be held responsible for the negligent hiring of a
police officer who was later deemed to be unfit when a more thorough review of his
background was conducted. And in Bonsignore v. City of New York (1982),
New York City was held civilly responsible for the failure of the New York City
Police Department to adopt an effective psychological screening protocol.
In practice, the New York City Police Department and most American law
enforcement agencies employ the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
(MMPI)2 (or MMPI-II) as the predominant psychological screening mechanism
(Sanders 2008) during pre- and post-employment evaluation. One main criticism is
that the MMPI was originally designed to test for psychological problems in
patients, not to assess job performance in normal populations (Barrick and Mount
1991). In addition, since normative sample data of the MMPI did not include an
ample number of female, black, and other minority police officers and since the
MMPI questionnaire has included questions about religious attitudes and sexual
orientation, the MMPI could face claims of discriminatory biases (Arrigo and
Claussen 2003) that could question the instrument’s validity and effectiveness, par-
ticularly in a diverse profession such as law enforcement. More importantly, the
MMPI fails to measure the construct of conscientiousness, which has been identi-
fied by many as being one of the best predictors of job performance and work
behavior (Kornfield 1995). A contemporary concern is that the MMPI and other
commonly used psychological screening mechanisms may have to be revalidated in
order to properly assess the attitudes of younger generation police applicants (e.g.,
“Generation X,” “Generation Y,” the “new Millennials,” and “Generation Z”).
1
The Los Angeles Police Department had commenced the first psychological screening for police
personnel in the 1950s.
2
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
Given these noted deficiencies, many jurisdictions and agencies have opted to
concurrently utilize a number of other personality testing mechanisms. The most
common alternatives, either used independently or in combination, include the
Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI), the California Psychological Inventory (CPI),
the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), the NEO Personality Inventory-
Revised (NEO-PI-R), or the 16 Personality Factor (Dantzker 2011).
The predictive ability of these personality screening instruments has been com-
prehensively researched. One meta-analysis that analyzed the relationship between
the MMPI, MMPI-II, and the IPI has reported significant preferable outcomes when
predicting successful performance of law enforcement patrol personnel (Simmers
et al. 2003). Closer examination of distinct elements of the MMPI, in particular the
“Goldberg Index,” which evaluates psychosis has been found to be highly indicative
of future poor performance (Costello et al. 1982). Pallone (1992) also reported that
a number of individual scales within the MMPI were either correlated positively or
negatively to job performance. Certain scales and indexes within the MMPI have
been found to have predictive correlations to negative job performance (Workowski
and Pallone 1999), early career disciplinary suspensions (Costello et al. 1996), job
terminations (Bartol 1991), the unnecessary use of force (Hargrove et al. 1988), and
violence proclivity (Travis 1994) involving police personnel.
Most jurisdictions and police agencies, however, have moved on to using a com-
bination of personality tests with the goal of predicting later police deviance or
superior job performance. Arrigo and Claussen (2003) have advocated employing
the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) and the Inwald Personality
Inventory (IPI) together as part of the pre-employment procedure and eliminating
the MMPI in order to obtain a better predictor instrument for future police deviance.
Their findings have revealed that the IPI may permit a more effective prediction of
antisocial behavior, while the NEO-PI-R may perceive future conscientiousness to
a better degree (Arrigo and Claussen 2003). Similar conclusions had previously
been drawn by Costa and McCrae (1992) who reported that although the IPI is not
considered effective in measuring conscientiousness, when combined with the
NEO-PI-R, the IPI can be utilized to evaluate the potential for antisocial behavioral
characteristics, while the NEO-PI-R can be helpful in assessing the personality trait
of conscientiousness. The NEO-PI-R is additionally considered a predictor of lower
job performance, as those who received lower performance evaluation ratings were
found to also have had higher neuroticism and lower conscientiousness scores
(Detrick and Chibnall 2006). The IPI when applied alone emerged as a significant
predictor of citizen complaints (Scogin et al. 1995), absences and tardiness (Knatz
et al. 1992), and absences and minor misconduct (Inwald and Shusman 1984). The
IPI was found to more accurately predict termination from the agency (Arrigo and
Claussen 2003). Yet, when the IPI and MMPI were utilized together, there was a
dramatic increase in the capability for predicting both negative and positive job
performance (Inwald and Brockwell 1991).
The California Psychology Inventory has been found to be a reasonable predictor
of later problematic behavior as the instrument has been found to be useful in
screening out individuals who could be classified as being less dependable, less
Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel 39
willing to observe social norms and customs, less disciplined, less stable, and less
likely to plan ahead (Hargrove and Hiatt 1989). In addition, the tolerance scale of
the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) has been reported to be the single best
personality predictor of law enforcement performance (Aamodt 2004). The CPI has
also been recommended as a tool to measure the Big Five, or five-factor model of
personality, as a test for predicting police behavior (Sarchione et al. 1998).
Of the “Big Five” personality indicators, Sanders (2008) discovered that active
police officers in one metropolitan police agency scored highest in their conscien-
tiousness score and lowest with the neuroticism score. Of interest is that one factor
that supervisors rated as highly important in police personnel is age, in that older
officers were believed to be better and more effective employees. Police managers
also reported that work attitude was a better predictor of job performance than were
any of the Big Five personality traits (Sanders 2008). Personality characteristics that
have been common among deviant police personnel in the past have included imma-
turity, unreliability, and egocentricity (Gips 1998). Emotional instability was found
to be the strongest predictor of future problematic behavior, while openness was the
best predictor of police academy grades and conscientiousness was the best predic-
tor of supervisory performance rating (Aamodt 2004).
Once any one or a combination of the above personality and psychological
screening instruments have been used, the responses and results should be reviewed
by agency psychologists or psychiatrists. Aamodt (2000) has recommended that the
best suited psychologist for this responsibility is the industrial/organizational psy-
chologist. In addition, when marginal screening results have been produced, the
police candidate should be interviewed separately by more than one psychologist or
psychiatrist with a final agreement and recommendation being made by the entire
assessment team (Colaprete 2012).
Some jurisdictions rely on vocational interest inventories, but they have not been
shown to be valid predictors of employee performance. As it relates to the law
enforcement profession, vocational interest inventories do not appear to be corre-
lated to job performance (Aamodt 2004). On the other hand, assessment center and
job-related structured interview ratings have been shown to be highly related to later
job performance (Aamodt 2004). Unsurprisingly, physical ability tests were not
strong forecasters of future accomplishment or misbehavior (Aamodt 2004).
Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel
Since law enforcement organizations are tasked with enforcing laws regulating con-
trolled substance and marijuana possession and the sale and transfer of these illegal
drugs, it is prudent to include drug testing in the prescreening process. In addition,
drug testing of career personnel should continue to be part of the in-service process
to ensure the highest standards of ethics and integrity. Probationary period, random,
for-cause, and voluntary promotional drug testing should be incorporated into
agency practices with specific policy guidelines in place to insure compliance and
comprehension of potential penalties. The New York City Police Department con-

tinues to use all of these options to deter employee illegal drug usage and the abuse
of prescription medications.
Contemporary challenges include the recent legalization of recreational and
medical usage of marijuana and the misuse and abuse of over-the-counter and
prescription medicine, particularly involving opioids (such as Oxycontin and
Vicodin), stimulants, anabolic steroids, and drugs commonly used to treat ADHD,
e.g., Adderall and Ritalin. Jurisdictions and police agencies will have to prepare
specific protocols for drug testing involving these substances and must prepare
procedures that outline termination or treatment-oriented options for violations.
Of note is that female officers have been found to be more likely than males to fail
agency drug tests (Fyfe and Kane 2006) and are more likely to abuse prescription
drugs (Colaprete 2012).
Mandatory Hiring Qualifications
One of the more noteworthy findings related to background screening and pre-
employment qualifications has involved the college education requirement in
place or being considered by many departments. Studies indicate that requiring
college education prior to hiring police personnel may lead to improved police
academy grades, higher performance ratings, enhanced enforcement activity,
fewer disciplinary events, decreased number of citizen complaints, reduced absen-
teeism, less frequent vehicle accidents, and diminished use of force (Aamodt
2004).3 These positive findings remained consistent regardless of which major or
field of study was undertaken at the college or university by the police officer prior
to his police employment.
While many law enforcement agencies provide hiring and promotional prefer-
ence to candidates with prior military experience, a number of notable correlations
were noted. Police officers with prior military experience were found to receive
more commendations, were more likely to perform better while in field training, and
were likely to be injured less often in confrontational situations (Aamodt 2004). On
the other hand, prior military experience was related to an increased likelihood for
dismissal due to misconduct (Fyfe et al. 2002). Another relevant issue is that provid-
ing hiring preference to military veterans has the potential to create a disparate
effect as it relates to the hiring of females (Aamodt 2004).
One of the stronger indicators of future poor performance and problem behavior
can be revealed during the character or background investigation. Individuals who
have an arrest record, who possess a history of school or work disciplinary prob-
lems, or who have frequently received traffic tickets tend to receive lower perfor-
3
What is most interesting is these factors were found to be statistically significant regardless if
criminal justice was the college major, i.e., criminal justice majors fared no better than other col-
lege majors.
Mandatory Hiring Qualifications 41
mance evaluations and use more sick time (Aamodt 2004; Fyfe and Kane 2006). Of
relevance is that individuals who experienced these negative events were more
likely to have not been hired, so permitting those with these variables to become
police officers is rare. However, these negative indicators do exhibit strong validity
(Aamodt 2004) and should be strongly taken into consideration in an effort to avoid
problematic behavior and misconduct within law enforcement agencies. It is highly
recommended that the questionnaires completed for medical, psychological, per-
sonality, and background screening be compared to ensure consistency and to ana-
lyze the integrity of the applicant (Colaprete 2012).
Following the Mollen Commission recommendations, the New York City Police
Department in 1994 conducted its own internal assessment4 to determine if there
were any personality traits that would predict effective job performance or future
police deviance. This analysis revealed that some level of college education and
increased age were predictors of reduced police misconduct in NYPD personnel.
These findings were used in 1994 to support the increase in minimum hiring age
from 20 to 22 years of age and the application of a 60-credit college requirement to
newly hired police officers. On the other hand, the police officers who were involved
in the police deviance investigated by the Mollen Commission on average started
their police careers at a later age (i.e., 25 years old) and had undertaken some col-
lege studies (Albrecht 2011a), which would appear to counter the recommendations
made. Another interesting conclusion was that police officers who resided outside
of the New York City limits were determined to be less empathetic to the plight of
individuals and neighborhood residents in minority communities and those in the
lower socioeconomic class. As a result, the New York City Police Department con-
tinues to provide extra points on hiring and promotional exams to those who reside
with the metropolitan borders, rather than in the surrounding suburbs.
In summary, there has been limited but noteworthy success in identifying traits
or actions that may be useful in predicting future corruption or deviance by police
personnel. This list of potential predictors includes prior criminal or traffic viola-
tions and arrests; disciplinary incidents in high school, college, or involving prior
employment; and documented history of other irresponsible conducts. In addition,
certain factors revealed during personality inventory screening have been shown to
be predictive of future law enforcement deviance or potential exemplary
performance,5 and efforts should be made to replicate those findings in an effort to
eventually apply them generally across geographical American regions, communi-
ties, ethnicities, races, genders, and cross-generationally.
4
This internal NYPD report was informally called the “Bad Boys Report.” The author was a mem-
ber of the team that conducted the evaluation.
5
Since most of the studies that have reported correlations between personality index scales or
responses and later predictions of deviant or problematic behavior have been conducted on small
samples with little if any replication, it is critical that these studies be evaluated on a larger scale to
ascertain if there is validity to these findings; it would appear that agency psychologists should
consider giving a battery of personality tests to police candidates and then evaluating the scales and
indices that prior research has preliminarily shown to be correlated to disciplinary incidents or
poor performance.
ost-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity

P
and Professionalism
Given the plethora of behaviors that could classify as police deviance, law enforce-
ment administrators should take a number of measures to enhance agency profes-
sionalism, strengthen integrity, and improve supervisory leadership. Firstly, law
enforcement executives should clearly define the relevance of ethical standards and
professional practices by delineating them in agency mission statements, proce-
dures, policy statements, and rules and regulations and by incorporating them into
all training curricula, including continuously through in-service instruction.
Pre-employment screening must include the thorough examination of the psy-
chological and behavioral history of police department applicants. As noted, studies
have shown that a record of disciplinary events in school or in prior employment,
arrests for criminal conduct (even those that do not result in conviction), and repeat
traffic violations are indicative of future misconduct and deviant behavior (Gips
1998). Personality and psychological screening mechanisms can be used to effec-
tively screen out applicants by evaluating indices and scales that have been shown
to be correlated to later misconduct or termination.6 Agencies should consider
employing a battery of personality screening tests (i.e., MMPI-II, NEO-PI-R, IPI,
and the CPI) to “weed out” potentially problematic individuals and to “screen in”
likely productive candidates for police positions. When there are indications
revealed during the psychological screening process that require further analysis, it
is recommended that follow-up interviews be conducted independently by at least
two psychologists and that there be unanimous agreement that the individual should
be recommended for hiring or retention. In addition, positive actions like involve-
ment in community programs and volunteer activities could be granted more atten-
tion during the background screening processes.
Disciplinary events and performance evaluations during the police academy and
field training/probationary period should be closely scrutinized, and efforts should
be made to document the negative actions of chronically problematic employees
with the potential goal of terminating persistent violators at the earliest opportunity
rather than waiting for a more serious or criminal event to occur (likely later in their
careers when termination proceedings may be more tedious). In addition, if they do
not already do so, police agencies should strongly consider requiring 2–4 years of
pre-employment college education, which has repeatedly been shown to be corre-
lated to enhanced performance and diminished problematic behavior.
Law enforcement supervisors should receive comprehensive leadership training
that advocates strong decision making and routine documentation of misconduct
6
Prior research has indicated that specific indices or scales in the MMPI, CPI, NEO-PI-R, and IPI
have been shown to be predictive of misconduct and termination. Further research is needed to
validate these findings, but agency psychologists should at the minimum pay close attention to
these factors when interviewing these job candidates prior to employment.
Post-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity… 43
and other inappropriate activity by police personnel. In addition, agency managers

should use the monthly and annual performance evaluation processes to provide
mentoring, instruction, and corrective discourse to subordinate personnel. All nega-
tive incidents should be promptly addressed, and constructive instruction should be
provided, but if ineffective, the agency should make an effort to commence termina-
tion proceedings for repeat offenders at the earliest stages in an officer’s career. If
not already in place, an early intervention mechanism should be implemented in an
effort to proactively monitor apparently problematic employees and to provide the
opportunity for counseling and personal enrichment. On the other hand, the agency
should develop a transparent reward and promotion system for personnel who per-
form in an exemplary fashion and for those who proactively report deviance and
serious misconduct by coworkers. In addition, any actions that could result in poten-
tial criminal charges should be referred to the prosecutor’s office for guidance and
formal investigation. This will eliminate future allegations of preferential treatment,
cover-up, or conflict of interest.
In an effort to deter deviance in police stations that have been shown to be more
prone to negative behavior by law enforcement personnel,7 regular supervisory vis-
its should be made by upper and middle management from the agency central and
regional headquarters at all times of the day (i.e., on all working shifts and in par-
ticular during the night time hours) to police stations that are plagued by high crime
and rampant drug dealing. Internal affairs investigations must be conducted in an
effective fashion in an effort to conduct inquiries into the specific misconduct
alleged. Command and control could also be strengthened by decreasing the
supervisor-to-officer ratio to no more than eight uniformed police officers assigned
to patrol or administrative duties or four officers, investigators, or detectives for
each supervisor tasked with managing undercover personnel or those working in
civilian attire.
Police administrators must continue to reward those who bring forward informa-
tion about corrupt and abusive police officers and appropriately punish those who
do not cooperate in these investigations. Police managers who have been found to
have condoned unacceptable behavior or have ignored it should be held responsible
and face appropriate disciplinary action (e.g., administrative charges of “failure to
supervise” or criminal charges of “official misconduct”). Additionally, all police
agencies should implement integrity and drug testing on random and targeted bases
to ensure compliance with criminal law and department procedure, with renewed
attention placed on the potential for misuse of prescription medication.
Ultimately, police executives should pride themselves in maintaining highly pro-
fessional standards throughout their organizations and allowing for transparency to
ensure the highest levels of citizen confidence.
7
Those police stations that are located in high-crime and drug-prone communities have been
shown to be of higher risk of police deviance.
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Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion and Conclusion
Police deviance unfortunately takes many forms. Criminological analyses have

revealed that no one theoretical model has been found to apply to all forms of inap-
propriate law enforcement misbehavior; however, there are clear sociological trends
when each of the five specific categories of police deviance is independently and
more closely examined. Police executives and government leaders can take specific
steps to ensure that only the highest-quality candidates are hired, deployed in the
field, and are left to interact with the public. Effective pre-employment screening
and accurate entry level and in-service performance evaluation may hold the key to
a superior and professional work force. Given that deviance is present in all aspects
of life and in all fields of employment, eliminating gross misbehavior from the law
enforcement profession will continue to provide a compelling challenge to those
responsible for ensuring the safety and well-being of the community at large. Law
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confidence and trust in the police and if the organization’s legitimacy and credibility
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Index
A Civilian Complaint Review Board, 31

Abuse of authority, police, 31, 32 Civilian complaints, 31
Administrators, police, 43 Commanders, police, 15
Advocates, 9 Community Council Meetings, 16
African-American communities, 17, 18 Community Patrol Officer Program in 1983, 11
Agency-wide payoff scheme, NYPD, 27 Community policing, 11, 12, 16
American law enforcement agencies, 10, 37 COMPSTAT meetings, 15
American police, deviance and misconduct Control balance theory, 5
early 1990s (1990–1993), 12–14 Control ratio theory, 29
1960s, 9, 10 Corporate management model, 14, 15
1970s, 10, 11 Corruption, 1, 2
1980s, 11, 12 scandal, 11–14
late 1990s (1994–2000), 14–20 police, 27, 28
2001 to present, 21, 22 Counterterrorism, 21
involving NYPD, 22, 23 Courtesy professionalism respect (CPR), 19
Antipolice environment, 18 Courtroom perjury, 33–34
Applicant screening process, 19 Criminal gangs, 28
Criminal justice, 40
Criminality, police, 29
B Criminological analyses, 1, 2, 47
Bad Boys Report, 40
Becker’s rational choice theory, 28
Big Five personality traits, 38 D
Blue wall of silence, 20, 32, 33 Deviance and misconduct, American police
Bratton, W., 14 early 1990s (1990–1993), 12–14
Brutality, police, 30 1960s, 9, 10
Budgetary problems in New York City, 11 1970s, 10, 11
Bullets, 17 1980s, 11, 12
late 1990s (1994–2000), 14–20
2001 to present, 21, 22
C involving NYPD, 22, 23
California Psychological Inventory (CPI), Disciplinary events, 42
37, 38 Drug dealers, 12
Civil rights movement, 9 Drug testing, police, 39
Civilian commissioner, 13 Drug tests, 13

in Criminology, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-64438-7
54 Index
E Lindsay, J., 11
Economic factors, 28 Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),
Elite plainclothes Street Crime Unit, NYPD, 17 12, 36
Emotional instability, 38
Extremist groups, formation of, 9
M
Managers, police, 43
F Media, 9
Federal laws, 10 Merton’s strain theory, 27
Fish bowl environment, 33 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
Five-factor model, 38 (MMPI), 36–38
Fixed foot patrol beats, 13 Misconduct, police, 32
Flaking, 21 Mollen Commission, 13, 33, 40
Foot patrol program, 11 Municipalities, 10
G N
Giuliani, R.W., 14 NEO Personality Inventory-Revised
(NEO-PI-R), 37, 38
New York City Police Department (NYPD),
H 9–14, 17–23, 27–29, 32, 33, 36, 37,
Haitian immigrants, 17 39, 41
Noble cause corruption, 5, 34
I
Immigrants, Haitian, 17 O
Integrity tests, 13 Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, 10
Intelligence testing, 36 Opioids, 39
Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB), 13, 14, 21
Internal affairs investigation mechanism, 13
Inwald personality inventory (IPI), 37, 38 P
Patriot Act, 21
Performance evaluations, 42
J Performance monitoring programs, 20
Johnson, L., 10 Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), 37
16 Personality factor, 37
Personality testing, 36–39
K Phantom, 21
King, R., 12 Police brutality, 4
Knapp Commission, 11, 27 Police corruption, 4, 5, 22
Police deviance, 47
behaviors, 1
L categorized, 1
Law enforcement, 9, 12, 30 corruption, 4, 5
administrators, 47 definition, 6, 7
agencies, 40 examination, 2
executives, 41 practical implications, 2
misbehavior, 47 theories of crime to
officers, 11 Blue Wall of Silence, 32, 33
pre-employment screening for officials of, corruption, 27, 28
35, 36 courtroom perjury, 33–34
supervisors, 42 criminality, 29
Leadership, 41, 42 excessive use of force, 30, 31
Index 55
misconduct, 32 T
police abuse of authority, 31, 32 Techniques of neutralization, 31
understanding, 2 Theories of crime, 5, 6
in US, 3 and blue wall of silence, 32, 33
Police integrity, 41–43 courtroom perjury, 33–34
Police station, 11, 12, 22, 43 excessive use of force, 30, 31
Policing, 2 police abuse of authority, 31, 32
Potential predictors, 41 police corruption, 27, 28
Pre-employment screening, 41, 42, 47 police criminality, 29
to deter police deviance, 36 police misconduct, 32
for law enforcement officials, 35, 36 Training, police, 10
Proactive employees, 23 Trait theory, 30
Problem employees, 22 Two-way radios, 11
Problem-solving concept, 12
Professional courtesy, 33
Professionalism, 41–43 U
Psychological screening, 36–39, 42 Uniformed crime reports, 21
US Supreme Court
cases, 10, 18
Q
Qualifications, hiring, 40, 41
V
Verbal judo concept, 19
R Violent crime rates, 12
Rampart Division events, LAPD, 29 Volpe, J., 17
Revolving door court system, 29
W
S Wickersham Commission, 36
Social learning theory, 30, 33 Widom’s social learning theory, 30,
Special Message to the Congress on Law 31, 34
Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice, 10
Street-level criminals, 28 Y
Supreme Court, US “Young blood” administrators, 14
cases, 10, 18
Sutherland’s differential association theory,
28, 29 Z
Sykes and Matza’s neutralization theory, 31, Zero tolerance proactive policing model, 14, 16
33, 34

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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN CRIMINOLOGY

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Police Brutality, Misconduct,

ISSN 2192-8533 ISSN 2192-8541 (electronic)

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© The Author(s) 2017

Printed on acid-free paper

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1 Introduction and Overview ������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1

Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force �������������������������������������� 30

James F. Albrecht is presently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal

The Need for a Clear Typology for Police Deviance

© The Author(s) 2017 1

Understanding Police Deviance

Examining Police Deviance Through Trends

In order to better understand the patterns apparent in American policing as it relates

Research Must Have Purpose: Practical Recommendations

As no research can be considered as meaningful without resulting in practical impli-

Police Deviance in the United States

© The Author(s) 2017 3

cases or criminal convictions, which undoubtedly would result in a much smaller

Police Corruption and Deviance: A Brief Literature Review

Theories of Crime and Police Deviance

Many noteworthy researchers have attempted to apply specific theoretical explana-

Defining Police Deviance: A Clear Typology

 imetable of American Police Deviance and Serious

In order to avoid making generalizations about police deviance by evaluating a

© The Author(s) 2017 9

promoted by Trojanowicz (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1998) and the problem-

The Early 1990s (1990–1993)

The Late 1990s (1994–2000)

In January 1994, Republican candidate Rudolph W. Giuliani was sworn in as

Overview of Police Deviance Involving the NYPD

Summary: Police Deviance

As mentioned above, police deviance cannot be generalized to one form of inap-

Criminological Explanations for Police Deviance

Theories of Crime and Police Corruption

© The Author(s) 2017 27

Theories of Crime and Police Criminality

Police criminality encompasses criminal actions undertaken by police personnel

Theories of Crime and the Excessive Use of Force

Theories of Crime and Police Abuse of Authority

and discriminatory representations of different ethnic groups may have been

Theories of Crime and Police Misconduct

Theories of Crime and the “Blue Wall of Silence”

Theories of Crime and Courtroom Perjury

 olicy Options for Enhancing Individual and Organizational

Pre-employment Screening for Law Enforcement Officials

© The Author(s) 2017 35

government officials involves a number of common endeavors in an attempt to

Pre-employment Screening to Deter Police Deviance

It is imperative that personnel seeking employment in police agencies and other

Personality Testing and Psychological Screening

Drug Testing of Police Candidates and Personnel

comprehension of potential penalties. The New York City Police Department con-

Mandatory Hiring Qualifications

 ost-hiring Recommendations for Enhancing Police Integrity

and other inappropriate activity by police personnel. In addition, agency managers

Police deviance unfortunately takes many forms. Criminological analyses have

© The Author(s) 2017 47

A Civilian Complaint Review Board, 31

© The Author(s) 2017 53

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