De Guzman vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

 Respondent Ernesto Cendana is a junk dealer in Pangasinan who buys used bottles and scrap
metal which he would sell in Manila. He used 2 six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling
the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in
Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower
than regular commercial rates.
 Petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company
(Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750
cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to petitioner’s
establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970.
 The merchandise was loaded in the trucks. 150 cartons were loaded in a truck driven by the
respondent himself while 600 cartons were in the other truck driven by Manuel Estrada,
respondent’s driver and employee. Only the 150 boxes were delivered because the other truck
containing 600 boxes was hijacked by armed men in Tarlac who took with them the truck, its
driver, his helper and the cargo.
 Petitioner filed an action against private respondent in the CFI of Pangasinan, demanding
payment of the value of the lost merchandise plus damages. He argued that private respondent,
being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of
him by the law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent may be characterized as common carrier.
Ruling: YES.
“Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.”
The law makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons
or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a
sideline”). It also avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” and one
who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely “back-hauled” goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and
even though private respondent’s principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There
is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that that fee
frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant.
Issue: Whether or not respondent, as a common carrier, is liable for the lost merchandise.
Ruling: NO.
Common carriers, “by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,” are held to a very
high degree of care and diligence (“extraordinary diligence”) in the carriage of goods as well as of
passengers.
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction
or deterioration of the goods which they carry, “unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.”
Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force majeure,
fall within the scope of Article 1735.
The specific cause alleged in the instant case— the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall within
any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore,
that the hijacking of the carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in
other words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
diligence on the part of private respondent.
Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the
truck and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for several days and
later releasing them in another province (in Zambales). The hijacked truck was subsequently found by
the police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all the accused of robbery, though
not of robbery in band.
The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers
are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held
liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.