THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131909. February 18, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO

CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and
RODERICK ODIAMAR, Respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision1 of the

Court of Appeals in CA GR. No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24,
1995 and June 14, 1996 orders2 of the lower court granting
accused-respondents Motion for Bail and denying petitioner Peoples
Motions to Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995 and to
Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995 confirming the
hospitalization of accused-respondent.

Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon

the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary
liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he be
released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real,
documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however,
granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the
trial, this court is constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty
of the accused Roderick Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00.
(Italics supplied)

Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the

evidence against him was strong, the prosecution filed the two
abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995
both filed by Atty. Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby
denied, for lack of merit.

The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before

the Court of Appeals with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition
reasoning thus:

We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of

this case, and find that the claim of the People that the respondent
judge had over-stepped the exercise of his jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not inclined to
declare that there was grave abuse in respondent courts exercise of
its discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave
abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. We do not find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based
not only on the respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the
trial court, which had the advantage (not available to Us) of having
observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic proference and the
documentary exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the liberal slant given by
the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated, in the absence of
clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared to
supplant the exercise of the respondent courts discretion with that
of Our own.

Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant
petition submitting the following sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT
THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENTS GUILT FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court
granting accused-respondents application for bail which it justified
through its summary of the evidence presented during the hearing.
Said order states, thus:

Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the

petition for bail filed by the accused through counsel, the court
believes that the evidence so far presented by the prosecution is not
strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be presumed;
consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between
man and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight
alone support such presumption. It is the teaching of applicable
doctrines that form the defense in rape prosecution. In the final
analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the
untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise
reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the
complainant (sic) strong evidence and an indication of great weight
(People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the
instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the
prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R. No.
94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the
offense of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior,
during and subsequent thereto may provide conclusion whether
they may negate the commission thereof by the accused (People v.
Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do
presuppose that the evidence for the prosecution is not strong.
More so, because in the instant case, the facts and circumstances
showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof were
mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they
deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to
test accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias
or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of Evidence). The
facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the

jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick Odiamar in that
evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 oclock from the Poblacion,
Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy ride.
In fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney
proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose,
Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same municipality, where she
and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said jeepney was
already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact
which shows voluntariness on the part of the offended party and,
therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape should not be
received with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an insight into
the human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495).
And it is only when the testimony is impeccable and rings true
throughout where it shall be believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-
41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because the aphorism that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with
the common experience and observation of mankind is nowhere of
moral relevance than in cases involving prosecution of rape (People
v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and

companions allegedly forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to
drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and even did not swallow it but
later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there (was)
no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick
Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the said offended party to
inhale smoke, out of a small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it
becomes doubtful because the prosecution, however, failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it
present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the
said cigarette would cause dizziness. Rightly so, because
administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised
Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the
Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden
of proof rests with the prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar

allegedly brought the offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former
was able to consummate the alleged offense of rape by removing
the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on her knee,
separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently
pushed the head of the accused but the latter was able to insert his
penis when the said offended party was no longer moving and the
latter became tired. Neither evidence has been presented to show
that the offended party suffered an injury much less any part of her
pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was an
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the accused
towards the offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d,
March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in the offense
of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength
of the parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo,
102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 oclock

in the early morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille,
Stephen Florece and the latters companions all boarded the same
jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said
offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of
grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until
the jeepney reached the house of Roderick Odiamar where the
latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony of the offended
party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free
from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be
defended by the party accused though innocent (People v. Francisco
G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore,
for the courts to exercise the most painstaking care in scrutinizing
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v.
Dayag, L-30619, March 29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically

examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July
27, 1994 and it states, among others, that there was a healed
laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have been sustained
by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a
year, prior to the said examination and that the said laceration
might have been caused by repeated penetration of a male sex
organ probably showing that the offended party might have
experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming
from an expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court,
Moran, op.cit, vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the

Station Commander of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga
City and upon the suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended
party submitted for medical treatment before the same physician
per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the
said physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin
diseases but the said offended party claim they were made by the
accused after the sexual acts. As such, there were contradictions on
material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People v. Palicte 83
Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No.
13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was
made by the accused subsequent to the commission of the act, it is
immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.

The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It
opined that aside from failing to include some pieces of evidence in
the summary, the trial court also misapplied some well-established
doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed
out the following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for
bail:

First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the
heinous crime of rape against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83
SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille

testified that based on her psychiatric examination of the latter,
Cecille manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual
fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation,
poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptoms. These abnormal psychological manifestations, according
to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN,
November 22, 1994.)
Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an
implied admission of guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered

unconscious by intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, no bail was recommended in the information
constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt of (all) the
accused (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages

5-7, Order) that respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her
because she was already weak and dizzy due to the effect of the
smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.

Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts

manifesting her lament, torment and suffering due to the rape. She
went to Stephen Florece, cried and complained about the incident.
Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her and her
family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille
are positive statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are
stronger than the denials put forth by respondent (Batiquin v. Court
of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).

Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to

the effect that the lacerations suffered by Cecille might have been
sustained by the latter a month, six (6) months or even a year prior
to the examination (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995) thus
implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is
highly misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell how old is an old
hymenal laceration because she cannot indicate when an old
laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she
could not point the exact cause (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9,
1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not
indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an
essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561
[1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical
examination of the victims genitalia is not an indispensable element
for the successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is
merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406
[1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr. Decena positively

testified that the wounds could have been caused by cigarette butts
as alleged by the victim (Page 6, TSN, December 9, 1994) which
confirms Cecilles testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that
respondent burned her right side of the stomach thrice.

The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this
Court the merits of the instant petition.

The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights

provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on

bail and in accordance with its rule-making powers,3 the Supreme
Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following
provision:

Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.4 (Italics supplied)

In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape

qualified by the use of a deadly weapon punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.5 As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter
of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore,
dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the
lower court should determine in a hearing called for the purpose.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this
regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the lower court
would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise
judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial
courts findings if found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of

whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is
strong.6 Proof evident or Evident proof in this connection has
been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-
guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense
has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent,
and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.7 Presumption great exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn
therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment
and excludes all reasonable probability of any other
conclusion.8 Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail
should be refused.9 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes

guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident
guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is
ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are
present which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as
defined above.10 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

This Court has observed that the lower courts order failed to
mention and include some significant factors and circumstances
which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing.
First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her
psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her findings that the
latter manifested psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual
fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation,
poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptom.11 This particular testimony should have been considered
and included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness.
Second, the unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent
is an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted as an
offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible
evidence against the party making it.12 cräläwvirtuali brä ry

Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence

and testimonies, this Court has likewise observed that the lower
court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the lower
court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with common
experience and observation of mankind.

According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is

suspect because she willingly went with accused-respondent to the
resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the crime,
complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The
complainant, likewise, never protested nor cried while they were on
their way to accused-respondents house. Because of those findings,
the lower court doubted the credibility of complainant and stated
that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that sexual acts
between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In
overcoming such presumption, much depends on the credibility of
the complainant.

This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive
on the part of complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-
respondent. This should have been taken into consideration. The
following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is
more credible:

It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by
respondent to drink gin with the help of his friends by holding her
hair and putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-7, TSN, November
17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke into her
face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she
attempted to leave the place, she was forced to sit down by
Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN, November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by
Florece with a gun (Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are

relative and must be viewed in light of the victims perspective and
the offenders physical condition (People v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724
[1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter
submits herself against her will because of fear for life and personal
safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [1995])

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of
the incident in question. At her age, it is reasonable to assume that
a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin must
have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or reason.
The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of
reason, will and freedom must be viewed in light of her perception
and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not
by any hard and fast rule because in rape cases, submission does
not necessarily imply volition. (Querido , 229 SCRA 745 [1994])

It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went

with the group of accused-respondent, she was of the impression
that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the trial court
that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she
acquiesced to go with them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of
any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed to
accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also agreed
to the bestial acts later committed against her person.

Second, the lower court stated that force and violence in the offense
of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength
of the parties and their relation to each other. The lower court
enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually
a consensual act since the prosecution was unable to show that
complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her
pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that
accused-respondent exerted overpowering and overbearing moral
influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked
the above doctrine, it readily concluded that complainant agreed to
the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence to
complainants allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as
well as rendered weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the
marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the prosecution,
in order to prove the elements of force or intimidation to show that
Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her
testimony to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the
prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate Cecilles claim by
presenting the examining physician who testified that Cecille
suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area.
Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to ignore these
telling pieces of evidence.

In addition, the lower court doubted complainants allegation that

she was forced to smoke a small cigarette, presumably marijuana,
due to the fact that the prosecution failed to present any portion of
that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert
witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette
would cause the said offended party to suffer weakness and
dizziness. Said ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is
even misleading as complainant categorically asserted that what
made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the
intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the
smoke alone. In any case, complainant could not be expected to
produce that portion of that so-called small cigarette. Moreover, one
does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common
knowledge - that four shots of gin have a weakening and dizzying
effect on the drinker, especially one as young as the fifteen-year old
complainant.

More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law

doctrines is the lower courts misinterpretation of the medical
findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which would
have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed
have been raped. The following pieces of evidence cited in the
summary of the assailed order are indications of misleading
findings:

First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical
certificate issued after complainants physical examination. On the
contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended party is already
experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician
had testified that the hymenal lacerations might have been
sustained a month, six months or even a year prior to the
examination. Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that
Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell how old is an old
hymenal laceration because she cannot indicate when an old
laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she
could not point the exact cause.

This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court
with concern and agrees with petitioner, in accordance with well
established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is not
indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an
essential element of the crime. Further, in crimes against chastity,
the medical examination of the victims genitalia is not an
indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime.
The examination is merely corroborative in nature.13 And contrary
to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is
not conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual intercourse.

Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to

the effect that the cigarette burns indicated that the lesions near
complainants umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably,
however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena
likewise positively testified that the wounds could have been caused
by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim which corroborates
Cecilles testimony that respondent burned her right side of the
stomach thrice.

It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower

court abused its discretion and showed manifest bias in favor of
accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to be
considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-
respondent. In this regard, it must be remembered that the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according
to Basco v. Rapatalo14 is not absolute nor beyond control. It must
be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial
discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judges
individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules
which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.
An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is
a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: But
discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound
discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by
humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular.

The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been
irregularly disregarded indicate that they have not been considered
at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This irregularity is
even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal
law doctrines cited to support the grant of the bail application. This
Court cannot help but observe that the lower court exerted
painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-
respondent is not strong by its non sequitur justifications,
misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital
prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not
misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.

It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena
confirming complainants allegation that accused-respondent burned
the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2) the testimony
of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological
manifestations which are traceable to the rape incident, and (3) the
unrebutted offer of compromise, are indications of the strength of
the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.

Lending credence to petitioners case is the fact that after the

conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, no bail was
recommended in the information. According to Baylon v.
Sison,15 such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence
of guilt of the accused.

Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which

circumstances and pieces of evidence are to be considered, the
lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v.
Maglalang,16 discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions
of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this
Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and
justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.

The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in

crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, bail is not a matter of right. This Court has reiterated this
mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this
Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge
Rapatalo17which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application
for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of

whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong

based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics
supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be
denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the

hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution.18 A summary is
defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a
text or statement.19cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the
summary of the evidence in the order is an extension of the hearing
proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence
presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having
been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to
include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by the
prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be
tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said
hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at
all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due
process, for due process means not only giving every contending
party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider
every piece of evidence presented in their favor.20 Second, the
summary of the evidence in the order is the basis for the judges
exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his
own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong based on his discretion.21 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should

necessarily be a complete compilation or restatement of all the
pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower
court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of
evidence should be included in the summary. While conceding that
some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was
incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of
pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable
recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A summary
that is incomplete is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v.
Tamin,22 the absence of a summary in the order would make said
order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order
containing an incomplete summary would likewise be defective in
form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a
semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang,23 said order was
considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated.24 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August

1, 1997 and the resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No.
42318 are REVERSED and the order dated March 24, 1995 in
Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a
warrant for the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has
been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the
disposition of said case. This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.

PEOPLE VS. CABRAL

Not Cited Recently
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 131909, February 18, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, PRESIDING JUDGE,
RTC, BRANCH 30, CAMARINES SUR AND RODERICK ODIAMAR, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR. No. 42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders[2] of the
lower court granting accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying petitioner
People's Motions "to Recall and Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall
and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995" confirming the hospitalization of accused-
respondent.

Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of
Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion
praying that he be released on bail which petitioner opposed by presenting real,
documentary and testimonial evidence. The lower court, however, granted the motion
for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is
constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in
the amount of P30,000.00." (Italics supplied)
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him
was strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court
disposed of, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty.
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit."
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary Injunction. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition reasoning thus:

"We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find
that the claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of
his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not
inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent court's exercise of its
discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not
find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be accorded
the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage (not available to Us) of
having observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic proference and the documentary
exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, but is
grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated,
in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared to
supplant the exercise of the respondent court's discretion with that of Our own."
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the
following sole issue:

"WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE
PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S
GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED."
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting accused-
respondent's application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence
presented during the hearing. Said order states, thus:

"Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by
the accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by
the prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man
and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such
presumption. It is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the
untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful
doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an
indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in
the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so,
because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R.
No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the offense of rape
the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent thereto may
provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by the accused
(People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that
the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant case, the
facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof
were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith
and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of
Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:

a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then driven by the
accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00 o'clock from
the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the former knew that it was for a joy ride. In
fact, she did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the Pilapil
Beach resort at Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same
municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when the said
jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going down
from the jeepney also without protest on her part, a fact which shows voluntariness on
the part of the offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape
should not be received with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an insight into the
human nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is only when the
testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be believed (People v.
Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly so, because the aphorism that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but
it must be credible in itself in conformity with the common experience and observation of
mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases involving prosecution of rape
(People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);

b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first, refused and
even did not swallow it but later on voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there
(was) no force. And as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and
companions allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small
cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the prosecution,
however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it
present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would
cause dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335,
par. 2 Revised Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests with the
prosecution but it failed to do so;

c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly brought the
offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the alleged
offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of the offended party, placed them on her
knee, separating them thereby freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the head
of the accused but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended party
was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has been
presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury much less any part of her
pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that there was an overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the offended party (People v.
Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in
the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077 January 4, 1994);

d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning
of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy,
without the said offended party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief
regarding the alleged commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the
house of Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the testimony
of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free
from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by the party accused though
innocent (PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO G.R. No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes
necessary, therefore, for the courts to exercise the most painstaking care in scrutinizing
the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-30619, March
29, 1974);

e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically examined by Dr.
Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states, among
others, that there was a healed laceration on the hymen, her laceration might have been
sustained by the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year, prior to
the said examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by repeated
penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the offended party might have
experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an expert, such
finding is binding to court (Rules of Court, Moran, op.cit, vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).

f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station Commander of
Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the suggestion of Gov.
Bulaong, the said offended party submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said
physician the lesions near the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such,
there were contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People v.
Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 13086,
March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said Lesion was made by the accused
subsequent to the commission of the act, it is immaterial. As such, it has no probative
value."
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside
from failing to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial court also
misapplied some well-established doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor
General pointed out the following circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:

"First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247
SCRA 637 [1995]).

Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on
her psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and
symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptoms.
These abnormal psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable
to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of

guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).

Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by

intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.

Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, `no bail was
recommended in the information' constitutes `clear and strong evidence of the guilt of
(all) the accused' (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].

Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and
dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.

Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament,
torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and
complained about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her
and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are
positive statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials
put forth by respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).
Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille `might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination' (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995)
thus implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced.

Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell `how old is an old hymenal laceration'
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size
of the vagina she `could not point the exact cause' (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9,
1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for
rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray,
257 SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of
the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of
the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature. (PEOPLE V. ARCE, 227
SCRA 406 [1993]).

Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr. Decena positively testified that the
wounds could have been `caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim' (Page 6,
TSN, December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecille's testimony (quoted in the Order at
page 9) that respondent burned her `right side of the stomach' thrice."
The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the
instant petition.

The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:

"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required." (Italics supplied)
In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance
with its rule-making powers,[3] the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court,
adopted the following provision:

"Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."[4] (Italics supplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.[5] As such, bail is
discretionary and not a matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for bail is,
therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court
should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While the
lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial
discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if found to be
laced with grave abuse of discretion.

By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or
the presumption of guilt is strong.[6] "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this
connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally
if the law is administered.[7] "Presumption great" exists when the circumstances
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong,
clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability
of any other conclusion.[8] Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused
is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.[9] (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable
doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such,
the court is ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present
which would show evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.[10]

This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and include some
significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear
and convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric
examination of the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic
signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts,
psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and
symptom."[11] This particular testimony should have been considered and included in the
summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of
compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have
been noted as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence
against the party making it.[12]

Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this
Court has likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal
law. First, the lower court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself in conformity with common experience and observation of mankind."

According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she
willingly went with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In
the scene of the crime, complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The
complainant, likewise, never protested nor cried while they were on their way to
accused-respondent's house. Because of those findings, the lower court doubted the
credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and
that sexual acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In
overcoming such presumption, much depends on the credibility of the complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of
complainant in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have
been taken into consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the
lower court is more credible:

"It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink
gin with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth
(Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke
into her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to
leave the place, she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7,
TSN, November 17, 1994).

Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun
(Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).

The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be
viewed in light of the victim's perspective and the offender's physical condition
(PEOPLE V. PLAZA, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos,
245 SCRA 405 [1995])

In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the incident in
question. At her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy.
Thus, four (4) shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of
will or reason. The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason,
will and freedom must be viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases,
submission does not necessarily imply volition." (Querido , 229 SCRA 745 [1994])"
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of
accused-respondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The
conclusion made by the trial court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act
because she acquiesced to go with them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any
legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed to accompany them for a
joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later committed against
her person.

Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of rape are
relative terms, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation
to each other." The lower court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape
was actually a consensual act since the prosecution was unable to show that
complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her pants or blouse was
torn. Neither was there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted overpowering
and overbearing moral influence over the offended party.

This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it
readily concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies
lending credence to complainant's allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as
well as rendered weak and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but
also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not
imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the elements of force or intimidation to
show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony
to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to
corroborate Cecille's claim by presenting the examining physician who testified that
Cecille suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately,
however, the lower court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.

In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was forced to
smoke a small cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution
failed to present any portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an
expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause the
said offended party to suffer weakness and dizziness." Said ratiocination is trifling and
unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as complainant categorically asserted that
what made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating
effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke alone. In any case,
complainant could not be expected to produce that "portion of that so-called small
cigarette." Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on what is common
knowledge - that four shots of gin have a "weakening and dizzying" effect on the
drinker, especially one as young as the fifteen-year old complainant.

More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower
court's misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some
testimonies which would have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could
indeed have been raped. The following pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the
assailed order are indications of misleading findings:

First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after
complainant's physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the
offended party is already experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining
physician had testified that the hymenal lacerations might have been sustained a
month, six months or even a year prior to the examination. Interestingly, the lower court
failed to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell "how old is an old
hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted
and that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause."

This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with concern and
agrees with petitioner, in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of
hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is
not an essential element of the crime. Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical
examination of the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful
prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.[13] And
contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not
conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual intercourse.

Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
cigarette burns indicated that the lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin
diseases. Notably, however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena
likewise positively testified that the wounds could have been "caused by cigarette butts
as alleged by the victim" which corroborates Cecille's testimony that respondent burned
her "right side of the stomach" thrice.

It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abused its
discretion and showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining
which circumstances are to be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of
accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be remembered that the discretion to be
exercised in granting or denying bail, according to Basco v. Rapatalo[14] "is not absolute
nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial
discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion. It is
because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided
by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord
Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said:
`But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by
law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful; but legal and regular.'"

The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly
disregarded indicate that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision
to grant bail. This irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication of the
two criminal law doctrines cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court
cannot help but observe that the lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the
evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by its non sequitur justifications,
misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution evidence
and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.

It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant's
allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette
butts, (2) the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological
manifestations which are "traceable to the rape incident", and (3) the unrebutted offer of
compromise, are indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of accused-
respondent.

Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2)
preliminary investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the information. According
to Baylon v. Sison,[15] such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of
guilt of the accused.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and
pieces of evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with
jurisprudential guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v.
Maglalang,[16] discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution
and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by
those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land.

The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not a matter of right. This
Court has reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently,
this Court laid down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo[17]which outlined the
duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;

(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;

(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied)

(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied."
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution.[18] A summary is defined as "a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or
digest of a text or statement."[19]

There are two corollary reasons for the summary. First, the summary of the evidence in
the order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process
wherein the evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as
having been presented and most importantly, considered. The failure to include every
piece of evidence in the summary presented by the prosecution in their favor during the
prior hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the opportunity to be heard in said
hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at all in weighing the
evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means not
only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to
consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor.[20] Second, the summary of the
evidence in the order is the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only
after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the summary will the judge
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong based on his discretion.[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete

compilation or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing
proper. The lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence
should be included in the summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence
were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or
selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order cannot be
considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any
evidence presented by the prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is not a
summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin,[22] the absence of a summary in the
order would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order
containing an incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance
which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity. In Carpio v.
Maglalang,[23] said order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the order
granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated.[24]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the
resolution dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the
order dated March 24, 1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a
warrant for the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and
thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This resolution is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., please see Dissenting Opinion.

Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner and concurred in by Justices Antonio

[1]

M. Martinez (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros.

Penned by Judge Alfredo Cabral of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch
[2]

30.

[3] Article VIII, Sec. 5, Par. (5) of the 1987 Constitution.

[4] Rule 14, Rules of Court.

Republic Act No. 7659, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
[5]

Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other
Special Laws, and For Other Purposes.

[6] Montalbo v. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 955 [1930].

[7] 8 CJS p. 70.

[8]
See Note 7 citing Ford v. Dilley, 156 N.W. 513.

[9] See Note 7, pp. 71-72.

[10]
Supra.

[11]
Petition, Rollo, p. 19.

[12] People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995).

[13]
Supra, p. 21.

[14] 269 SCRA 220 (1997).

[15] 243 SCRA 284, [1995].

[16] 196 SCRA 44 (1991).

[17] See note 14.

[18]
People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968].

The Oxford Companion to the English Language, Tom McArthur; Oxford University
[19]

Press, 1992.

[20] Ginete v. CA, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998.

[21]
See note 20.

[22] Supra.

[23]
See note 16.

[24] Borinaga v. Tamin, 226 SCRA 206 (1993).

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MANUEL ESCOBAR, Respondent.

DECISION
 LEONEN, J.:

This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the accused's second petition for
bail. Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case,1 not in an interlocutory order in a criminal
case.2 An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.3 This order does not attain finality when a new
matter warrants a second look on the application for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail Petition), which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court in the Order4 dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the Decision5 dated
March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the accused's case6 compelled him to file a second petition for
bail (Second Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied7 this on the ground of res
judicata. In the Decision8 dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court
Order and granted the Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace),
daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims.9 Robert was
the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,10 a manufacturing company of foams and mattresses.11

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B. Torres (Torres), and her driver
Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City when a vehicle blocked their way.12 Another group of suspects helped as lookouts.13

Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres inside the vehicle.14 The
incident happened in broad daylight.

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects then travelled and detained Mary
Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas.15 Afterwards, the group headed to Club
Solvento, a resort16 in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,17 who personally served them food.18

Some of the accused19 stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the others, namely, Villaver, Cesar
Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.20 Cheng
paid the ransom of P15,000,000.00.21

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club Solvento,22 followed by co-accused brothers
Rolando and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver.23 The group then
locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom money.24 Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the
group's driver,25 confessed to have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation.26

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally released.27 They were freed
somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12 hours since they were abducted.28

Cubillas became a state witness.29 On June 3, 2002, he executed an extrajudicial confession and implicated
respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver.30 Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw
Escobar talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.31 In his extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also
claimed that Escobar received a portion of the ransom money from Villaver.32

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court charging Escobar
as a co-conspirator33 in the kidnapping for ransom.34 The charging portion stated:

That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and grouping themselves together, with others not present during the actual kidnapping
but performing some other peculiarly contributory roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with
the use of long firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
thereafter detain at some undisclosed place, after having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena
Avenue, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her driver DIONISIO F. BURCA
and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES, against their will and consent thereby depriving them of their
liberty for more than twelve (12) hours for the purpose of extorting ransom for their release in the amount
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), and which amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father,
Mr. Robert Cheng, owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at E. Rodriguez
Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release of the kidnap victims somewhere in Alaminos,
Laguna at about 10:30 p.m. of the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3) victims and
their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families under the provisions of the Civil
Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.35
Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008.36

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional Trial Court.37 During the hearing on
Escobar's bail application, Cubillas testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers.38

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied39 Escobar's First Bail Petition. The
dispositive portion read:c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of merit considering that state witness
Cancio Cubillas positively identified said accused as the owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna;
that he was the one who served food to the group of Rolando Villaver, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver,
Danny Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre, Biboy Lugnasin and witness himself, Cancio
Cubillas; that it was also in said Club Solvento where Cancio Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver,
Danny Velasquez, Mike and Alan Celebre rested and slept after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin and
Cesar Olimpiada left to negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on
the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw accused Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.

SO ORDERED.40
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.41 On March 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed42 the
denial of the First Bail Petition. It recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was generally
incompetent evidence against his co-accused and was admissible against himself only43 for being hearsay
and for violating the res inter alios acta rule.44 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to
this rule and held that the Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of
Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on Cubillas' testimony during the bail hearing.45

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011 Decision.46

Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of the co-accused Fajardo brothers,
Rolando Fajardo (Rolando),47 who applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court.48 As in Escobar's bail
hearing, the prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish the strength of Fajardo's guilt.49 In
an Order dated September 13, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail.50

However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court reversed its previous order and
granted Rolando's bail application.51 The Regional Trial Court stated: chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry

To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that accused Rolando Fajardo
participated during the actual abduction of Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual abduction,
accused Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. The evidence for the
prosecution likewise does not establish that accused Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando
Villaver and his group in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is no testimony as to
what advice or instructions were made by accused Rolando Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the
victims herein. There is thus a paucity of evidence establishing the participation of accused Rolando Fajardo
in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and Torres.52 (Emphasis supplied)
The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not
present before, during and after the kidnapping."53 There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged
participation.54

Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's motion for reconsideration.55 He no
longer appealed before this Court.56

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final judgment on the merits of the case as
all the other accused who had active participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail.57 Escobar saw
Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a different view" on his own bail
application.58

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second Bail Petition) before the Regional
Trial Court.59 He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and
that both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping.60 Hence, if Rolando's
petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial
court should likewise grant him provisional release.61

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied62 Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res
judicata,63 reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already
attained finality, accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail[,] must be necessarily
denied."64

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional Trial Court.65 On January 14, 2013,
he appealed before the Court of Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition.66

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted67 the petition for certiorari and ordered
the Regional Trial Court to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive
portion read: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012, September 14, 2012, September 17, 2012 and
November 6, 2012 Orders, are SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the appropriate bail for
the provisional liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.68
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.69 According to the Court of
Appeals, Escobar's Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former
judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order.70 An order denying a petition for bail is
interlocutory in nature.71

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed72 Escobar's bail at P300,000.00. The dispositive portion
read:chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014, the bail for the provisional
liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby fixed at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.73
In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied74 the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Petition for
Review75 via Rule 45 before this Court. In its Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision;76 rather, in assailing the grant of Escobar's
Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.77

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,78 arguing that res judicata did not apply here,79 that there
was no strong evidence of his guilt,80 and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in the
greater interest of justice.81 According to Escobar: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused, [Rolando], and considering that
both [Rolando] and [Escobar]'s alleged participation in the crime are based on the same court-declared
unreliable "speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying when questioned
during [Escobar]'s own bail hearings, it was in the interest of justice and fairness to re-open the matter of
bail with respect to [Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And the Honorable Court of Appeals agreed.82
This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden Randel H. Latoza (City Jail Warden
Latoza) to review Escobar's case.83 In his manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail Warden Latoza
informed this Court that there was no temporary restraining order against the Regional Trial Court April 4,
2014 Order, which fixed Escobar's provisional liberty at P300,000.00. He also acknowledged the Court of
Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar the right to bail.84 He mentioned that Escobar had posted
the P300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the trial court.85 Thus, he moved to allow Escobar's provisional release
on bail.86

City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety bond87 and attached a copy of
Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's surety bond undertaking to his manifestation.88 However, the
attached surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved by the Regional Trial Court judge.89

In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution of the case as Escobar was already 78 years old.90
For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and

Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but
"whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt.91 The right to bail is cognate to the
fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:92
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded
to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she]
enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before
any court, as required under specified conditions.93 (Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is
"not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court.94 However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment—"regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of
one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.95

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death,96 reduced to reclusion
perpetua.97 Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is
not strong.98

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states: chanRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

....

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
- No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court denied99 Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The Court of
Appeals overturned100 this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.

In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged."101 This doctrine bars the re-litigation of the
same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment.102 It likewise
bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as issue
preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement.103 It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness,
expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity."104

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan105 held that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule
39"106 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

....

(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal
proceedings.107

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or their
successors-in-interest.108Trinidad v. Marcelo109 declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings."110 Rule 124, Section
18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. - The provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases,111 Rule 39
of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In Trinidad:112
Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no
sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a
supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and
circumstances — do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.

But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or the
criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.113 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise
to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply.114 Double
jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has
been dismissed or terminated without his express consent.115 Here, while there was an initial ruling on
Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or
terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition
cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.

Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter;

3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action.116

In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A final
judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal
has already ruled on the case.117 In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning
and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the
entire controversy.118

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action";119 in
other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final
judgment.120Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be
availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.121 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:122
Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17, 1997 [interlocutory]
Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417.
She insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.

We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted
interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so
has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second
sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is
interlocutory. The phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles
only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a
trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and
conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.

....

For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a
subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the
rendition of the final judgment.123 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter124—whether accused is entitled to
provisional liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a
hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try
the merits of the case.125 Thus:chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum
the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the
hearing.126 (Emphasis in the original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying bail is an interlocutory
order."127 The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar's First Bail
Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res
judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should
have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt
against him.

In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail
Petition on March 8, 2011.

Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive him or her of
fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its present
form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances:128
[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment] impossible
or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order
to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances."129 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality."130 Thus, an accused
may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a "new matter or fact
which warrants a different view."131

Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case.132 The Court of Appeals has pointed out
that the other alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail
because Cubillas' testimony against him was weak.133 "[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same
way, but [Escobar]'s bail was denied."134 Escobar's fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the
meantime.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlibra ry

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not used similarly in Escobar's favor.
As the Court of Appeals found:135
We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused were all granted bail except him.
Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him.136
In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition, his Second Bail Petition should
have been given due course. It should not be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.

II

The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile, City Jail Warden Latoza has
informed this Court of the absence of any temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals Decision
granting the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his bail at
P300,000.00.137 Thus, the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar's provisional liberty
can be executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the surety bond.

In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the prosecution
to prove Escobar's guilt in the main case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from
making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."138 As the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for the prosecution to submit
additional evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt in the course of the proceedings in the primary case.139
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must be contained in a
public document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 564 Phil. 382, 389 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc]; Alvarez
v. People of the Philippines, 668 Phil. 216, 253 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].

Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-18 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
2

Pobre v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 360, 369 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
3

4
Rollo, p. 38, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014. Copies of the Regional Trial
Court Order and the First Petition for Bail are not attached to the records.

5
Id. at 51-61. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107641, was penned by Associate Justice Rodil V.
Zalameda and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of the
Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

6
Id. at 137, Comment.

7
Id. at 40, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014. A copy of the Regional Trial
Court Order dated April 26, 2012 is not attached to the records.

8
Id. at 36-46. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128189, was penned by Associate Justice Mario V.
Lopez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting of the Eighth Division
of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

9
Id. at 12.

10
Id.
11
See https://www.uratex.com.ph/

Rollo, p. 36.
12

13
Cecille Suerte Felipe, 15 charged for Cheng Kidnap, Philippine Star, August 10,
2001 http://www.philstar.com/metro/129492/15-charged-cheng-kidnap (last visited July 17, 2017).

Rollo, p. 36 and 38.

14

15
Id.

16
Included in the list of private pools and resorts in Calamba, Laguna is a "Club Solviento," not a "Club
Solvento" (see http://www.lagunatravelguide.com/index.php?page=directory-of-private-pools-and-resorts-
in-laguna). Club Solviento is also in the Yellow Pages directory of resorts in Calamba, Laguna
(http://www.yellow-pages.ph/search/hot-springs/laguna/page-1). The records do not state whether Club
Solvento is the same as Club Solviento. The only information available is that it is a place where guests may
dine and sleep.

Rollo, p. 37, 51.

17

18
Id. at 51.

19
Id. at 52. Those who stayed in Club Solvento were Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez,
Mike Celebre, Alan Celebre, and Cancio Cubillas.

20
Id. at 57.

21
Id. at 12.

22
Id. at 37-38.

23
Id.

24
Id. at 37.

25
Id. at 24.

26
Id. at 37.

27
Id. at 12.

28
Id.

29
Id. at 36-37.

30
Id.

31
Id. at 38.

32
Id. at 37.

33
Id. at 38. The other co-accused were Rolando Villaver y Libores, Edgardo Decipulo y Didal, Eugene
Radam, Florente Concepcion y Navelgas, Joven Arcado y Patag, Nicomedes Gerilla y Dela Cruz, Cancio
Cubillas y Ignacio, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Vicente Lugnasen, Danny Velasquez, Cesar
Olimpiada, Chris Opulencia, Abner Opulencia, Apolonio Opulencia, Roily Fajardo, Harold Fajardo, Allan
Celebre, Idoy Trota, Lito Mercado, and three (3) John Does.

34
Id. at 38.

35
Id. at 52-53.
36
Id. at 72.

37
Id. at 38.

38
Id.

39
Id. at 51.

40
Id. at 51-52.

41
Id. at 38-39.

42
Id. at 51-61.

43
Id. at 58.

44
Id.

45
Id. at 59.

46
Id. at 39.

47
Id. at 137.

48
Id. at 39.

49
Id. at 137.

50
Id.

51
Id. at 39.

52
Id., See footnote 10.

53
Id. at 137.

54
Id. at 39-40.

55
Id. at 39, See footnote 8.

56
Id. at 62-63. The judgment became final and executory on June 19, 2012.

57
Id. at 39-40.

58
Id. at 39.

59
Id., See footnote 11.

60
Id. at 39-40. See footnote 10.

61
Id. at 40.

62
Id. at 64. The Order was penned by Acting Presiding Judge/Pairing Judge Charito B. Gonzales of Branch
81, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

63
Id. at 41.

64
Id. at 64.

65
Id. at 40.

66
Id. at 65-113.
67
Id. at 36-46.

68
Id. at 45.

69
Id. at 114-118.

70
Id. at 41-44.

71
Id.

72
Id. at 185. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Madonna C. Echiverri of Branch 81, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City.

73
Id.

74
Id. at 47-50-B. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by
Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting of the Former Eighth Division, Court of Appeals,
Manila.

75
Id. at 10-35.

76
Id. at 28.

77
Id. at 18-19.

78
Id. at 133-147.

79
Id. at 134.

80
Id. at 138.

81
Id. at 137.

82
Id.

83
Id. at 180.

84
Id. at 180-183.

85
Id. at 183.

86
Id.

87
Id.

88
Id. at 186.

89
Id.

90
Id. at 213.

Leviste v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587, 597 (2010) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
91

92
536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

93
Id. at 424.

94
RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 4.

95
RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 5 in relation to sec. 7.
96
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense. (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 18 and 1084).

See Rep. Act No. 9346, sec. 2.

97

Ocampo v. Bernabe, 11 Phil. 55, 58 (1946) [Per CJ Moran, En Banc].

98

Rollo, p. 40, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014. A copy of the Regional Trial
99

Court Order dated April 26, 2012 is not attached to the records.

100
Id. at 36-46.

101
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

102
See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

103
See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

104
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

105
757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

106
Id. at 384.

107
RULES OF COURT, Rule 124, sec. 18.

108
Res judicata is found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, but not in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

109
564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

110
Id. at 389.

111
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 124.

112
564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

113
Id. at 389.

114
564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

115
Rules of Court, Rule 117, sec. 7 provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following
instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was entered
in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

Mallion v. Alcantara, 536 Phil. 1049, 1055-1056 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna, Second Division].
116

Macahilig v. Magalil, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
117

Pobre v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 360, 369 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
118

Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
119

120
Id.

Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
121

122
398 Phil. 802 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

123
Id. at 817-818.

See Leviste v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587, 597 (2010) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
124

Santos v. How, 542 Phil. 22, 30 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
125

126
Id.

Rollo, p. 20.
127

Industrial Timber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303 Phil. 621 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, First
128

Division].

129
Id. at 625.

Republic v. Ballocanag, 593 Phil. 80, 99 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
130

131
See People v. Kho (409 Phil. 326 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. Kho involves three (3) petitions
for bail filed before the Regional Trial Court. Then Regional Trial Court Judge Lucas Bersamin (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice) denied the first bail petition, and then the second bail petition on the ground that
there was no new matter or fact that would lead the trial court to reconsider its previous denial of the bail
application. Judge Bersamin granted the third bail petition, ruling that the prosecution failed to establish any
linkage between the accused and the alleged gunman. The case primarily involved the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Bersamin after he granted the third bail application. This Court ordered Judge Bersamin to proceed
with the trial of the case as his voluntary inhibition "was not in the exercise of sound discretion[.]" Simply
put, this Court found nothing irregular about Judge Bersamin's reversal of his earlier rulings that denied the
bail application. At the very least, Kho implicitly recognized that a court may validly reverse its previous
denials of a bail application.

Rollo, pp. 39-40.

132
133
Id. at 42.

134
Id. at 42-43.

135
Id. at 36-46.

136
Id. at 42.

137
Id. at 216.

People v. Sandiganbayan, 556 Phi!. 596, 611 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc]
138

Rollo, p. 45.
139

LEONEN, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Court of Appeals Decision to grant the
accused's second petition for bail. Res judicata applies only in a final
judgment in a civil case,[1] not in an interlocutory order in a criminal
case.[2] An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory.[3] This order
does not attain finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the
application for bail.

Respondent Manuel Escobar (Escobar) filed a petition for bail (First Bail
Petition), which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the
Order[4] dated October 6, 2008 and by the Court of Appeals in the
Decision[5] dated March 8, 2011. A subsequent development in the
accused's case[6] compelled him to file a second petition for bail (Second
Bail Petition). On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[7] this on
the ground of res judicata. In the Decision[8] dated March 24, 2014, the
Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court Order and granted
the Second Bail Petition.

Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary

Grace Cheng-Rosagas (Mary Grace), daughter of Filipino-Chinese
businessman Robert G. Cheng (Robert), and two (2) other victims.[9] Robert
was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines,[10] a manufacturing company of
foams and mattresses.[11]

On June 18, 2001 at 7:40 a.m., Mary Grace, her bodyguard Valentin B.
Torres (Torres), and her driver Dionisio F. Burca (Burca) were passing by
the front of Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City when a vehicle blocked their way.[12] Another group of suspects helped
as lookouts.[13]

Clad in police uniform, four (4) armed men forced Mary Grace, Burca, and
Torres inside the vehicle.[14] The incident happened in broad daylight.

Alleged group leader Rolando Villaver (Villaver) and some of the suspects
then travelled and detained Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an
undisclosed location in Batangas.[15] Afterwards, the group headed to Club
Solvento, a resort[16] in Calamba, Laguna owned by Escobar,[17] who
personally served them food.[18]

Some of the accused[19] stayed in Club Solvento to rest or sleep while the
others, namely, Villaver, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy
Lugnasin, left to negotiate the price for the victims' release.[20] Cheng paid
the ransom of P15,000,000.00.[21]

At 7:00 p.m. on the same day, Villaver's group returned to Club

Solvento,[22] followed by co-accused brothers Rolando and Harold Fajardo
(the Fajardo brothers), who were alleged advisers of Villaver.[23] The group
then locked themselves in a room where Villaver partitioned the ransom
money.[24] Cancio Cubillas (Cubillas), the group's driver,[25] confessed to
have received a total of P1,250,000.00 for the kidnapping operation.[26]

At 10:30 p.m. on the same day, Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres were finally
released.[27] They were freed somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna, more than 12
hours since they were abducted.[28]

Cubillas became a state witness.[29] On June 3, 2002, he executed an

extrajudicial confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser
for Villaver.[30] Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw
Escobar talk to Villaver while they were in Club Solvento.[31] In his
extrajudicial confession, Cubillas also claimed that Escobar received a
portion of the ransom money from Villaver.[32]

On February 17, 2004, an Amended Information was filed before the

Regional Trial Court charging Escobar as a co-conspirator[33] in the
kidnapping for ransom.[34] The charging portion stated:
That on or about June 18, 2001 at around 7:40 in the morning, at Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, with others not present during
the actual kidnapping but performing some other peculiarly contributory
roles, did, then and there, by force and intimidation, with the use of long
firearms and clad in police uniform, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, carry away and thereafter detain at some undisclosed place, after
having blocked their car in front of Malcolm Hall, Osmena Avenue, UP
Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, MARY GRACE CHENG-ROSAGAS, her
driver DIONISIO F. BURCA and her bodyguard VALENTIN B. TORRES,
against their will and consent thereby depriving them of their liberty for
more than twelve (12) hours for the purpose of extorting ransom for their
release in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
and which amount was in fact paid by Mary Grace's father, Mr. Robert
Cheng, owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, and have the same delivered at
E. Rodriguez Compound, Calamba, Laguna thereby resulting to the release
of the kidnap victims somewhere in Alaminos, Laguna at about 10:30 p.m.
of the same day all to the damage and prejudice of the three (3) victims and
their families in such amount as may be awarded to them and their families
under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[35]
Escobar was arrested on February 14, 2008.[36]

On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed the First Bail Petition before the Regional
Trial Court.[37] During the hearing on Escobar's bail application, Cubillas
testified that Escobar and the Fajardo brothers were Villaver's advisers.[38]

In the Order dated October 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court

denied[39] Escobar's First Bail Petition. The dispositive portion read:

The Petition for Bail filed by accused Manny Escobar is denied for lack of
merit considering that state witness Cancio Cubillas positively identified
said accused as the owner of Club Solvento located in Calamba, Laguna;
that he was the one who served food to the group of Rolando Villaver, Jun
Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Cholo, Cesar
Olimpiada, Mike, Alan Celebre, Biboy Lugnasin and witness himself,
Cancio Cubillas; that it was also in said Club Solvento where Cancio
Cubillas, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike and
Alan Celebre rested and slept after Rolando Villaver, Cholo, Biboy Lugnasin
and Cesar Olimpiada left to negotiate for the ransom of kidnap victim Mary
Grace Cheng Rosagas, and that on the night of June 18, 2001, Cubillas saw
accused Rolando Villaver gave part of the ransom money to him.

SO ORDERED.[40]
Escobar appealed before the Court of Appeals.[41] On March 8, 2011, the
Court of Appeals affirmed[42] the denial of the First Bail Petition. It
recognized that Cubillas' extrajudicial confession was generally
incompetent evidence against his co-accused and was admissible against
himself only[43] for being hearsay and for violating the res inter alios
acta rule.[44] Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals invoked an exception to
this rule and held that the Regional Trial Court "did not rely solely on the
extrajudicial confession of Cubillas"; rather, the trial court also relied on
Cubillas' testimony during the bail hearing.[45]

Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals March 8, 2011

Decision.[46]

Pending the proceedings on Escobar's case, the police arrested one (1) of
the co-accused Fajardo brothers, Rolando Fajardo (Rolando),[47] who
applied for bail before the Regional Trial Court.[48] As in Escobar's bail
hearing, the prosecution relied solely on Cubillas' statements to establish
the strength of Fajardo's guilt.[49] In an Order dated September 13, 2011, the
Regional Trial Court denied Rolando's petition for bail.[50]

However, in an Order dated October 14, 2011, the Regional Trial Court
reversed its previous order and granted Rolando's bail application.[51] The
Regional Trial Court stated:

To summarize, the evidence for the prosecution does not establish that
accused Rolando Fajardo participated during the actual abduction of
Rosagas, Burca and Torres or that during the actual abduction, accused
Rolando Fajardo gave advice or instruction to the other accused herein. The
evidence for the prosecution likewise does not establish that accused
Rolando Fajardo acted as adviser to accused Rolando Villaver and his group
in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is no
testimony as to what advice or instructions were made by accused Rolando
Fajardo in connection with the kidnapping of the victims herein. There is
thus a paucity of evidence establishing the participation of accused
Rolando Fajardo in the kidnapping of Rosagas, Burca and
Torres.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
The reversal came about after the trial court considered that, according to
Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the
kidnapping."[53] There was paucity of evidence on Rolando's alleged
participation.[54]

Meanwhile, on October 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied Escobar's

motion for reconsideration.[55] He no longer appealed before this Court.[56]

By January 2012, only Escobar was left in detention pending the final
judgment on the merits of the case as all the other accused who had active
participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail.[57] Escobar saw
Rolando's release on bail as a new "development which warrant[ed] a
different view" on his own bail application.[58]

Thus, on January 27, 2012, Escobar filed another petition for bail (Second
Bail Petition) before the Regional Trial Court.[59] He noted that Cubillas
could not explain how either Rolando or Escobar advised Villaver and that
both Rolando and Escobar were absent before, during, and after the
kidnapping.[60] Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on
the unreliability of Cubillas' testimony, Escobar reasoned that the trial
court should likewise grant him provisional release.[61]

On April 26, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied[62] Escobar's Second Bail
Petition on the ground of res judicata,[63] reasoning thus: "[i]n deference to
the Decision of the Court of Appeals which has already attained finality,
accused's Petition for Bail which is actually a second petition for bail[,]
must be necessarily denied."[64]

Escobar moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Regional
Trial Court.[65] On January 14, 2013, he appealed before the Court of
Appeals via Rule 65, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition.[66]

In the Decision dated March 24, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted[67] the
petition for certiorari and ordered the Regional Trial Court to determine
the appropriate bail for Escobar's provisional liberty. The dispositive
portion read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 26, 2012,
September 14, 2012, September 17, 2012 and November 6, 2012 Orders,
are SET ASIDE. The trial court is directed to determine the appropriate
bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner, Manuel Escobar, with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.[68]
The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration.[69] According to the Court of Appeals, Escobar's Second
Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the
former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory
order.[70] An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.[71]

On April 4, 2014, the Regional Trial Court fixed[72] Escobar's bail at

P300,000.00. The dispositive portion read:

In view of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on 24 March 2014,

the bail for the provisional liberty of accused Manuel Escobar is hereby
fixed at Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[73]
In the Resolution dated September 11, 2014, the Court of Appeals
denied[74] the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration.

On November 6, 2014, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor

General, filed a Petition for Review[75] via Rule 45 before this Court. In its
Petition, the prosecution does not pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order of the Court of Appeals Decision;[76] rather, in assailing
the grant of Escobar's Second Bail Petition, the prosecution avers that the
doctrine of res judicata must be respected.[77]

On October 19, 2015, Escobar filed his Comment,[78] arguing that res
judicata did not apply here,[79] that there was no strong evidence of his
guilt,[80] and that the Court of Appeals could rectify errors of judgment in
the greater interest of justice.[81] According to Escobar:

13. Due to this sudden development of the grant of bail to his co-accused,
[Rolando], and considering that both [Rolando] and [Escobar]'s alleged
participation in the crime are based on the same court-declared unreliable
"speculations" of the state witness Cubillas, who even admitted he was lying
when questioned during [Escobar]'s own bail hearings, it was in the interest
of justice and fairness to re-open the matter of bail with respect to
[Escobar] and thereby grant the same. And the Honorable Court of Appeals
agreed.[82]
This Court's program to decongest holding jails led City Jail Warden
Randel H. Latoza (City Jail Warden Latoza) to review Escobar's case.[83] In
his manifestation dated August 18, 2016, City Jail Warden Latoza informed
this Court that there was no temporary restraining order against the
Regional Trial Court April 4, 2014 Order, which fixed Escobar's provisional
liberty at P300,000.00. He also acknowledged the Court of Appeals March
24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar the right to bail.[84] He mentioned that
Escobar had posted the P300,000.00 bail, as ordered by the trial
court.[85] Thus, he moved to allow Escobar's provisional release on bail.[86]

City Jail Warden Latoza alleged that Escobar had paid the necessary surety
bond[87] and attached a copy of Traveller's Insurance Surety Corporation's
surety bond undertaking to his manifestation.[88] However, the attached
surety bond undertaking was neither notarized nor approved by the
Regional Trial Court judge.[89]

In a Letter dated May 15, 2017, the Commission on Human Rights wrote to
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio to ask for the speedy resolution of the
case as Escobar was already 78 years old.[90]

For resolution are the following issues:

First, whether Manuel Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res
judicata; and

Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been
arrested and detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court
beyond reasonable doubt.[91] The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental
right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:[92]
The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be
presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who
may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her]
appearance before any court, as required under specified
conditions.[93] (Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the
right to bail if the offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment" before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court.[94] However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of
which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—"regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution"—and when evidence of one's guilt is
not strong, then the accused's prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of
the trial court.[95]

In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is

death,[96] reduced to reclusion perpetua.[97] Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter
of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.[98]

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.

....

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court denied[99] Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the
ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned[100] this and
correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged."[101] This
doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also
known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment.[102] It likewise bars
the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same
parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of
judgement.[103] It "exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness,
expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity."[104]

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan[105] held that "[t]he doctrine of res

judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39"[106] of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, thus:

Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or

final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

....

(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine
is not recognized in criminal proceedings.[107]

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the
dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest.[108] Trinidad v.
Marcelo[109] declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on criminal
proceedings."[110] Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.
- The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in
the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed
civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
applied in criminal cases,[111] Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is
excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In Trinidad:[112]

Petitioner's arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the
Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases
earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening
event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of
facts and circumstances — do not lie.

Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing

on criminal proceedings.

But even if petitioner's arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate

"res judicata in prison grey" or the criminal law concept of double
jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.[113] (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being
criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if
we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to
contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the same will
still not apply.[114] Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been
dismissed or terminated without his express consent.[115] Here, while there
was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been
convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil
cases, Escobar's Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final
judgment on the merits.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:

1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction

over the parties and the subject matter;

3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of

parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[116]

In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or

an interlocutory order. A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done"
because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already
ruled on the case.[117] In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if,
between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a
point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire
controversy.[118]

An interlocutory order "settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral

matter arising in an action";[119] in other words, something else still needs to
be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final judgment.[120] Res
judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case;
it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not
appealed.[121] In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:[122]

Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the
September 17, 1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No.
3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She
insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit
did not appeal it.

We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in

Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it
is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has
expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible
tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves
nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The
phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a judgment or an
order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter
arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a
motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res
judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under
the second category.

....

For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise
to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such order
is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of
the final judgment.[123] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter[124]—
whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is not a final
judgment on accused's guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a
hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s] unnecessary
thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.[125] Thus:

Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the
evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence
as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness
in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details
that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.[126] (Emphasis in the
original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that "the first order denying
bail is an interlocutory order."[127] The merits of the case for kidnapping
must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.

Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision

denying Escobar's First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata.
The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res judicata has
not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional
Trial Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition
and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.
In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision,
notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail Petition on March 8, 2011.

Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and

deprive him or her of fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order
may be modified where executing it in its present form is impossible or
unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances:[128]

[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of
a judgment] impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, "in
the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the
disposition with the prevailing circumstances."[129] (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Appellate courts may correct "errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve
the sacrifice of justice for technicality."[130] Thus, an accused may file a
second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a
"new matter or fact which warrants a different view."[131]

Rolando's release on bail is a new development in Escobar's case.[132] The

Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators are
already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because
Cubillas' testimony against him was weak.[133] "[Escobar] and [Rolando]
participated in the same way, but [Escobar]'s bail was
denied."[134] Escobar's fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in
the meantime.

Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not
used similarly in Escobar's favor. As the Court of Appeals found:[135]

We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused
were all granted bail except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail
due to the weakness of Cubillas' testimony against him.[136]
In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar's First Bail Petition,
his Second Bail Petition should have been given due course. It should not
be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.

II

The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar's bail petition. Meanwhile,

City Jail Warden Latoza has informed this Court of the absence of any
temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals Decision granting
the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his
bail at P300,000.00.[137] Thus, the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014
Decision granting Escobar's provisional liberty can be executed upon the
approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the surety bond.

In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of

additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar's guilt in the main
case. "[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from making a
final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits."[138] As the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice

for the prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]'s guilt
in the course of the proceedings in the primary case.[139]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.

Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond
that must be contained in a public document and approved by the Regional
Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.

August 29, 2017

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sir/Madam:

Please take notice that on July 26, 2017 a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case,
the original of which was received by this Office on August 29, 2017 at 1:24
p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
MA. LOURDES C.
PERFECTO
Division Clerk of
Court

By:

TERESITA
AQUINO TUAZON
Deputy Division Clerk
of Court

Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman, 564 Phil. 382, 389 (2007) [Per J.
[1]

Carpio-Morales, En Banc]; Alvarez v. People of the Philippines, 668 Phil.

216, 253 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
 Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-18 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban,
[2]

Third Division].

Pobre v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 360, 369 (2005) [Per J. Austria-
[3]

Martinez, Second Division].

Rollo, p. 38, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24,
[4]

2014. Copies of the Regional Trial Court Order and the First Petition for
Bail are not attached to the records.

Id. at 51-61. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107641, was

[5]

penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and concurred in by

Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of
the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

[6] Id. at 137, Comment.

[7]Id. at 40, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014.
A copy of the Regional Trial Court Order dated April 26, 2012 is not
attached to the records.

Id. at 36-46. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 128189, was

[8]

penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting of the Eighth Division of
the Court of Appeals, Manila.

[9] Id. at 12.

[10] Id.

[11] See <https://www.uratex.com.ph/>

[12] Rollo, p. 36.

Cecille Suerte Felipe, 15 charged for Cheng Kidnap, Philippine Star,

[13]

August 10, 2001 <http://www.philstar.com/metro/129492/15-charged-

cheng-kidnap> (last visited July 17, 2017).

[14] Rollo, p. 36 and 38.

[15] Id.

Included in the list of private pools and resorts in Calamba, Laguna is a

[16]

"Club Solviento," not a "Club Solvento"

(see http://www.lagunatravelguide.com/index.php?page=directory-of-
private-pools-and-resorts-in-laguna). Club Solviento is also in the Yellow
Pages directory of resorts in Calamba, Laguna (http://www.yellow-
pages.ph/search/hot-springs/laguna/page-1). The records do not state
whether Club Solvento is the same as Club Solviento. The only information
available is that it is a place where guests may dine and sleep.

[17] Rollo, p. 37, 51.

[18] Id. at 51.

Id. at 52. Those who stayed in Club Solvento were Jun Jun Villaver, Ning
[19]

Ning Villaver, Danny Velasquez, Mike Celebre, Alan Celebre, and Cancio
Cubillas.

[20] Id. at 57.

[21] Id. at 12.

[22] Id. at 37-38.

[23] Id.

[24] Id. at 37.

[25] Id. at 24.

[26] Id. at 37.

[27] Id. at 12.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 36-37.

[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 38.

[32] Id. at 37.

Id. at 38. The other co-accused were Rolando Villaver y Libores,

[33]

Edgardo Decipulo y Didal, Eugene Radam, Florente Concepcion y Navelgas,

Joven Arcado y Patag, Nicomedes Gerilla y Dela Cruz, Cancio Cubillas y
Ignacio, Jun Jun Villaver, Ning Ning Villaver, Vicente Lugnasen, Danny
Velasquez, Cesar Olimpiada, Chris Opulencia, Abner Opulencia, Apolonio
Opulencia, Roily Fajardo, Harold Fajardo, Allan Celebre, Idoy Trota, Lito
Mercado, and three (3) John Does.

[34] Id. at 38.

[35] Id. at 52-53.

[36] Id. at 72.

[37] Id. at 38.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at 51.

[40] Id. at 51-52.

[41] Id. at 38-39.

[42] Id. at 51-61.

[43] Id. at 58.

[44] Id.

[45] Id. at 59.

[46] Id. at 39.

[47] Id. at 137.

[48] Id. at 39.

[49] Id. at 137.

[50] Id.

[51] Id. at 39.

[52] Id., See footnote 10.

[53] Id. at 137.

[54] Id. at 39-40.

[55] Id. at 39, See footnote 8.

Id. at 62-63. The judgment became final and executory on June 19,
[56]

2012.

[57] Id. at 39-40.

[58] Id. at 39.

[59] Id., See footnote 11.

[60] Id. at 39-40. See footnote 10.

[61] Id. at 40.

Id. at 64. The Order was penned by Acting Presiding Judge/Pairing

[62]

Judge Charito B. Gonzales of Branch 81, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

[63] Id. at 41.

[64] Id. at 64.

[65] Id. at 40.

[66] Id. at 65-113.

[67] Id. at 36-46.

[68] Id. at 45.

[69] Id. at 114-118.

[70] Id. at 41-44.

[71] Id.

Id. at 185. The Order was penned by Presiding Judge Madonna C.

[72]

Echiverri of Branch 81, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

[73] Id.

[74]Id. at 47-50-B. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Mario V.

Lopez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Socorro
B. Inting of the Former Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

[75] Id. at 10-35.

[76] Id. at 28.

[77] Id. at 18-19.

[78] Id. at 133-147.

[79] Id. at 134.

[80] Id. at 138.

[81] Id. at 137.

[82] Id.

[83] Id. at 180.

[84] Id. at 180-183.

[85] Id. at 183.

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id. at 186.

[89] Id.

[90] Id. at 213.

Leviste v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587, 597 (2010) [Per J. Corona,
[91]

Third Division].

[92] 536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

[93] Id. at 424.

[94] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 4.

[95] RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 5 in relation to sec. 7.

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —
[96]

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public

officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense. (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 18 and
1084).

[97] See Rep. Act No. 9346, sec. 2.

[98] Ocampo v. Bernabe, 11 Phil. 55, 58 (1946) [Per CJ Moran, En Banc].

Rollo, p. 40, as cited in the Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24,
[99]

2014. A copy of the Regional Trial Court Order dated April 26, 2012 is not
attached to the records.

[100] Id. at 36-46.

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015) [Per J.

[101]

Brion, Second Division].

See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J.

[102]

Brion, Second Division].

See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J.

[103]

Brion, Second Division].

Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015) [Per J.

[104]

Brion, Second Division].

[105] 757 Phil. 376 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

[106] Id. at 384.

[107] RULES OF COURT, Rule 124, sec. 18.

Res judicata is found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, but not in the
[108]

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

[109] 564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

[110] Id. at 389.

[111] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 124.

[112] 564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

[113] Id. at 389.

[114] 564 Phil. 382 (2007) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

[115] Rules of Court, Rule 117, sec. 7 provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another

prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the
same act or omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of
the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in section 1(f)
of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole
or in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of
conviction for the graver offense.
 Mallion v. Alcantara, 536 Phil. 1049, 1055-1056 (2006) [Per J. Azcuna,
[116]

Second Division].

Macahilig v. Magalil, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J.

[117]

Panganiban, Third Division].

Pobre v. Court of Appeals, 501 Phil. 360, 369 (2005) [Per J. Austria-
[118]

Martinez, Second Division].

Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J.

[119]

Panganiban, Third Division].

[120] Id.

Macahilig v. Magalit, 398 Phil. 802, 817-818 (2000) [Per J.

[121]

Panganiban, Third Division].

[122] 398 Phil. 802 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

[123] Id. at 817-818.

See Leviste v. Court of Appeals, 629 Phil. 587, 597 (2010) [Per J.
[124]

Corona, Third Division].

Santos v. How, 542 Phil. 22, 30 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third

[125]

Division].

[126] Id.

[127] Rollo, p. 20.

Industrial Timber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303

[128]

Phil. 621 (1994) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].

[129] Id. at 625.

Republic v. Ballocanag, 593 Phil. 80, 99 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third

[130]

Division].

[131] See People v. Kho (409 Phil. 326 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First
Division]. Kho involves three (3) petitions for bail filed before the Regional
Trial Court. Then Regional Trial Court Judge Lucas Bersamin (now
Supreme Court Associate Justice) denied the first bail petition, and then the
second bail petition on the ground that there was no new matter or fact that
would lead the trial court to reconsider its previous denial of the bail
application. Judge Bersamin granted the third bail petition, ruling that the
prosecution failed to establish any linkage between the accused and the
alleged gunman. The case primarily involved the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Bersamin after he granted the third bail application. This Court
ordered Judge Bersamin to proceed with the trial of the case as his
voluntary inhibition "was not in the exercise of sound discretion[.]" Simply
put, this Court found nothing irregular about Judge Bersamin's reversal of
his earlier rulings that denied the bail application. At the very least, Kho
implicitly recognized that a court may validly reverse its previous denials of
a bail application.

[132] Rollo, pp. 39-40.

[133] Id. at 42.

[134] Id. at 42-43.

[135] Id. at 36-46.

[136] Id. at 42.

[137] Id. at 216.

People v. Sandiganbayan, 556 Phi!. 596, 611 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, En

[138]

Banc]

[139] Rollo, p. 45.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification1 petitioner Maximino B. Gamido's conviction by the Regional Trial Court on eleven
counts of having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in
11 cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines in the following documents and
making it appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the
Philippines:

1. Criminal Case No. 85-40361 — Special Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Confidential

Presidential Representative dated November 30, 1984;2

2. Criminal Case No. 85-40362 — Memorandum/Order No. 1489 informing all Heads of Ministries,
Bureaus, Instrumentalities of the Government, and Government Controlled Corporations and others
on the existence of Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) dated July 29,
1985;3

3. Criminal Case No. 85-40363 — Appointment of Maximino Gamido as Presidential Regional

Executive Assistant and Executive Director of the PRAMS dated November 7, 1983;4

4. Criminal Case No. 85-40364 — Memorandum to Land, Air and Navigation Transportation
Operators in the Philippines dated July 11, 1985;5

5. Criminal Case No. 85-40365 — Memorandum Order to all Heads of Ministries, Bureaus,
Government Corporations, Government Agencies and Instrumentalities, and Government Controlled
Corporations dated July 29,
1985;6

6. Criminal Case No. 85-40366 — Memorandum Order No. 1480 — To: Hon. Maximino B. Gamido,
Presidential Regional Executive Assistant/Executive Director PRAMS-PREMO dated November 23,
1984;7

7. Criminal Case No. 85-40367 — Memorandum/Circular to all Operators: (1) Transportation; (2)
Shipping Transportation; (3) Air Line Transportation dated November 30, 1984;8

8. Criminal Case No. 85-40368 — A letter addressed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru the
Minister of the Budget, submitting the required STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)
specifying the functions and duties of PRAMS personnel and their salaries allegedly approved by the
President on November 23, 1984;9

9. Criminal Case No. 85-40369 — Executive Order No. 820 Creating the Presidential Regional
Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) in all Regions of the Philippines dated October 11, 1983; 10

10. Criminal Case No. 85-40370 — Special Presidential Certification dated September 9,
1985; 11 and
11. Criminal Case No. 85-40371 — Presidential Permission for Free of Fare (sic) in any
Transportation in the Philippines dated February 28, 1985. 12

The prosecution was made under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
forging the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the
Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief
Executive.

It appears that on March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C. Tuvera issued Memorandum
Circular No. 1281 13 which read:

INFORMING ALL HEADS OF MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT

CORPORATIONS AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REGIONAL ASSISTANT MONITORING
SERVICES (PRAMS) WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

The Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services (PRAMS) is a non-existent

agency within the Office of the President. Its alleged Executive Director, Mr.
Maximino B. Gamido is likewise not connected, in any capacity, with this Office.

It is gathered that personnel from the PRAMS have been using Presidential
directives, particularly Executive Order No 819; Memorandum Order No. 811; and
Memorandum Circular No. 1278, to support its fraudulent activities. These issuances,
however, refer to the creation, designation/appointment, and operationalization of the
Presidential Regional Monitoring Officer (PREMO) System, the duly authorized
regional monitoring arm of the Office of the President, which is charged to provide
the President with the information on development in the region.

Furthermore, Mr. Gamido has not been given any authorization to sign for and on
behalf of the President of the Philippines. As such, all memorandum/directives issued
by Mr. Gamido on behalf of the Office of the President are fraudulent. All
memorandum/directives issued by alleged PRAMS personnel are likewise fraudulent.

By
Authori
ty of
the
Preside
nt:

JUAN
C.
TUVER
A
 Preside
ntial
Executi
ve
Assista
nt

Following the issuance of this memorandum, the Presidential Security Command and the Office of
the President, through the Malacañang Complaints and Investigation Office (CIO), investigated
petitioner.

On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner
appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed
them in his (petitioner's) presence.

The lone witness for the prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the
Malacañang Records Office (MRO), testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in
his office and that the signatures thereon did not appear to be those of the former President.

For his part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director of the Presidential Regional Assistant
Monitoring Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then President Marcos and that his
appointment and the related documents, subject of the prosecution, had been signed by the former
President in petitioner's presence.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, in finding the petitioner guilty, held:

The defense put up by the accused, that all the subject documents were actually
signed by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his office at Malacañang, and in
the presence of said accused, is as preposterous as it is unbelievable, the said
defense, besides being completely negated and belied by the established facts (that
subject documents, do not exist in the Malacañang Records Office, and therefore,
are spurious) is an imposition on human belief and all sense of propriety. Further, the
accused does not appear to the Court, and has not shown himself, to be of such
stature as to enjoy the privilege of having the former Chief Executive sign documents
in his presence. Moreover, the testimony of the accused in support of his defense is
totally untrustworthy and unreliable.

On the basis of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, the Court is
convinced, beyond any shadow of doubt, that the felony of the forging the signature
of the President, as defined and penalized under Art. 161 of the Revised Penal
Code, was committed by the accused on eleven (11) counts.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime forging the signature of the Chief Executive, and/or violation of Art. 161 of the
Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases, or a
total of eighty (80) years up to one hundred fifty-four (154) years, with costs against
the accused.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals 14 affirmed with the modification already
noted on the margin of this opinion.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction for the following reasons:

(1) The fact that the documents in question are not on file in the Malacañang Records Office does
not ipso facto prove that they are forged but only that they were lost or destroyed.

(2) The lone prosecution witness, Melquiades T. dela Cruz, is incompetent to testify that the
documents were forgeries since there is no evidence to show that he had seen then President
Marcos sign documents. Indeed, this witness could not say with certainty that the signature on each
of the 11 documents was not that of President Marcos.

(3) No handwriting expert was presented in court to give an opinion as to the genuineness of
President Marcos' signatures.

(4) The Court of Appeals and the RTC committed the fallacy of "argumentum ad elenchi" in
concluding that the signatures in the documents were forgeries from the documents' "unusual format
and atrocious grammar" when these documents were not offered to prove their appearance and
grammar.

(5) Assuming these defects in format and grammar, there is no forgery since the documents could
not have deceived any person.

(6) A writing or instrument in order to constitute a forgery must possess some apparent legal efficacy
(36 Am. Jur. 2d 690), and if PRAMS is a non-existent entity as Memorandum Circular No. 1281
declared, then the documents executed under it cannot acquire such "apparent legal efficacy."

(7) Assuming further that the signature of former President Marcos on the document creating the
PRAMS was a counterfeit (Exh. C), the criminal liability of the author thereof absorbed all acts of
forgery committed under the fictitious office, because there was only one intent, i.e. to discharge the
imagined functions of a non-existent office.

(8) Assuming that the signatures of then President Marcos in the documents were spurious,
petitioner, the possessor of the documents, must be exempted from criminal responsibility because
no person of sound mind would make it appear that the President created an office and appointed
him to that office.

The petition has no merit.

First. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang Records Office, testified that his office
did not have a record of the documents. For his part Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared
the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent and its alleged Executive
Director, herein petitioner, as not in any capacity connected with the Office of the President. From
these premises it is rational to conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been
signed by then President Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals
correctly found petitioner to be the author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and
user of a falsified document is the forger thereof . 15
Second. Petitioner contends that Melquiades T. dela Cruz was incompetent to testify as to whether
the signatures on the documents, purporting to be those of President Marcos, were forgeries
because there is no showing that he had witnessed President Marcos signing his name.

What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature of President Marcos and that the
signatures on the documents in question were not those of President Marcos. 16 This is sufficient to
establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, §22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is
not required that the person identifying the handwriting of another must have seen the latter write the
document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness "has seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's]
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has been record custodian at Malacañang for so many
years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired familiarity with the signature not only of President
Marcos but of other Presidents under whom he had served.

There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of the challenged
signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not a highly technical
issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular
biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on
the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an
opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The signatures on a questioned
document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of such signatures." 17 Here, as the trial court observed, "the forgeries were not
only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly discernible to the naked eye or mere
ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from their appearance. . . . " 18

Third. Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that forgery could not be said to exist since the
documents, because of their "unusual format, atrocious grammar, and misspelled words" could not
have defrauded or deceived anyone, and that moreover they lack apparent legal efficacy." That is
not so. If the documents were fanciful or whimsical, as for example, a commission appointing
petitioner mayor of a mythical kingdom, the forgery could simply be dismissed as a spoof. But as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Office of the President had to issue a memorandum
denouncing the legality of PRAMS because of the possibility that the less wary would be deceived,
especially because that the documents pertaining to it bear the Great Seal and were typed on
stationary which have the appearance of official stationery of the Office of the President.

Fourth. Petitioner also argues that he should have been charged under only one information
because there was only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions of a non-existent office." The
argument has no merit. The documents in this case were forged on different dates. One act was not
done to commit another. There is therefore no basis for considering the various acts as constituting
only one crime of forgery.

Fifth. As a last-ditch effort of sorts to escape criminal liability, petitioner claims that since "no person
of sound mind would [make] it appear that the Chief Executive created an office for him and
appointed him thereto," he must be exempt from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code. This, again, is not necessarily so since the purpose may be to deceive others.
Moreover, this defense now invoked should have been raised below. At all events, the presumption
is in favor of sanity. 19 In this case there is no evidence to show that petitioner was insane at the time
he committed the acts for which he is being prosecuted.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's petition for review and petition for bail pending appeal are DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The RTC sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for each of the 11 criminal cases, or a total of 88 years up to 154 years,
with costs. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence by imposing on petitioner the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each of the 11
criminal cases.

2 Exh. F.

3 Exh. M.

4 Exh. G.

5 Exh. H.

6 Exh. J.

7 Exh. L.

8 Exh. N.

9 Exh. K.

10 Exh. C.

11 Exh. D.

12 Exh. E.

13 Exh. JJ.

14 Gutierrez, J., ( ponente), with Imperial and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concurring.

15 Caubang v. People, 210 SCRA 377 (1992).

16 TSN, January 7, 1987, pp. 15-22.

17 Alcon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833 (1988).

18 RTC decision, p. 10, Rollo, p. 34.

19 People v. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 (1922).