1

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234,
265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406,
415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594,
599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-
839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609,
1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-
1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900,
1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-
510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570,
574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92,
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
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judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified

time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their
petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell
vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice
Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that
the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to
be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate
the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
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time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to
be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of
the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to
wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566.
It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with
respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
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Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters
nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government,
as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to
apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the
Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional
question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided
now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph
sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat,
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is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date
of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of
their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted
by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement
with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can
be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and
official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law
that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect
[only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws
or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

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I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to
be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date
of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run
counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of
laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such
as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published
in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be,
for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is
the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to
apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
 7

having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the
Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same
category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional
question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided
now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed
with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph
sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat,
is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official
Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date
of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past
presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of
their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted
by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement
with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can
be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases
 8

that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and
official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law
that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best
example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect
[only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws
or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and
essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to
be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date
of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run
counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of
laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the
Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such
as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published
in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be,
for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general
application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent
statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is
the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

 9

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

FERNAN, J., concurring: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF
LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. — The
categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made effective
seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people their
constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public concern. chanroblesv irtuallawl ib rary:red

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: jgc:chanrob les.c om.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
 10

required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next
the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view
of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted
that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it
was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication. chanrobles vi rt ual lawl ibrary

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide
that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate. cralawnad

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public
as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. chanrobles. com:c ralaw:red

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
 11

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention
of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged
the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary
for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law lib rary

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
 12

approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. chanroblesvi rtual|awl ibra ry

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I
took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused
to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime.
Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees
bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of
two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine
citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President’s nephew and the other imposing a tax on every
motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No.
1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At
the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.chanrobles vi rtua l lawlib rary

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium. chanrobles v irt ualawli bra ry chan roble s.com:c han robles. com.ph
 13

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-
G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in
said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule
65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period
for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
 14

the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to
the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding
and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF

SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff
classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country
of origin; and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for
feed grade, 7%.

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review
Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.6

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation
of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent
contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative
Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.

Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was
proper.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when
the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
 15

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days
from notice.9

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the
classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal
administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and
premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They
likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not
inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the
rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.

On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary
injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March
2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for preliminary injunction
and the Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum
Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of
Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease and
desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent
concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief
was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that
respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the
regulation in future transactions.

With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that
petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative
predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers and ports of
discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same
allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that,
since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have
observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD

WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

The Petition has no merit.

We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.

Rule 63, Section 1 provides:

Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court
meets these requirements.
 16

First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 17 we
said:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether
it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the
desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an
interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a
matter of power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to
the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate
degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)

Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily
imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.

Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-
2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has
actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003.
Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the
imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged
that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food
grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which
would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:

xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and
every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery,
setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is
easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved
are not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings
filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the
Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot
get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in
the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this petition. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration
of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to
file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.

It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the
case.

Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII,
Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against
any party of persons.
 17

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than
its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.
When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20

Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so
vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
– no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis
supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.

Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances.
Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable classification.
For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.22

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat
is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade
wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7%
tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade
wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.

It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus
prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this
end, but results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the possibility that other
corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an
assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers
are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the
state carries that burden.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs
officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. –
The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether
the packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance with the declaration in the
 18

entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate
whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples
to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper
classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.

Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and
sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties
prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the
article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation
when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.23

In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when
they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise
violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to
examine and assess imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of

Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation.
The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
 19

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation
No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.)
274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on
3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No.
172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and
2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for
disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order
No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to
cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a
Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director
of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot
to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-
in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the
area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution 6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions
of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987
when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2
of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent,
the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of
Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1
September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting
MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 20

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further,
pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE
HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN
PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON.
COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO
RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN
BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION. 15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims
were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege
that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort
Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed version of
Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476
was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law.
In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless
the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official
Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in which we
had the occasion to rule thus:
 21

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice
in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after
fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although
it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must
be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if
they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was
to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
 22

Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the
Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist
for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto
itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and

ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her
capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which
reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta
City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental

organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and
conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. 5 In line with its
objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square
meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 20016 which it rented out to the public and became
the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo
Bulawin.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and
Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its
failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop
all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents
against it on July 8, 2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance
No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity,
association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any
structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.12 On
July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the
matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the
premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto. 13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the
structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A
similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.
 23

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging
that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational
resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived
of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following
grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160, 16 otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation
should be enjoined.17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they
are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property
belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication
and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by
operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As
such, it is valid and enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision 19 declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void
based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance
was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not
suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the
national government, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 20 Based on
the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist from closing Capayas Island to the
public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid
building permits22 since they were found to have no title over the disputed property. 23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24 granting respondents’ appeal.

Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the
SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the
LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published
in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board. 26 Moreover, public consultations were
conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed. 27 The CA further ruled that the
Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject
ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC. 28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that
could create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a
municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject
ordinance is valid.30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over the
Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper. 31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution 33 dated March 9,
2009. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against
petitioners.34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
 24

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial
attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the
documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations,
which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare
such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter
its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the
action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the
mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed
from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB; 36 hence, it should be
deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed
word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the
minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the
ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of a
statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall
not be construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference
being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not
published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own
evidence reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance.
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have
complied with the publication and posting requirements.40 While it is true that he likewise failed to submit
any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v.
CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein
despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public
hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to
demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the
local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any
evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in
question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed
conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence
to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous case, United States v.
Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not
been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In
rejecting this contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory
that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was
therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the
cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions
of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the
municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the law has been complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence
of positive proof to the contrary.
 25

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in
the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge
the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject
ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its
possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on
Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as
final and conclusive upon them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March
9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated
4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the
Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared
that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure
to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, 3 which requires the
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative
issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon
respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the
business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities. 4

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the
Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate,
coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to
energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No.
1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments
and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. 5

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to
reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to
fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at
reasonable prices.6

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the
Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect
the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost,
increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues
and claims on the OPSF.7

On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the
sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at
reasonable levels.8

On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that
respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to
March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by
respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was
 26

imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:

2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85
shall be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign
exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case
of locally produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of
fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two
percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional
underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the
period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed
thereon.

In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the
transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985
and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12

On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment,
totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13

In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF
a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for
the period December 1989 to October 1991.

In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges
due. Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent’s Irrevocable Standby
Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.

On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the
President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July
1996. While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its
publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of
compliance with such requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads:16

Given the foregoing, the DOE’s implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on
Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that
administrative regulation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its
letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.17

Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9
February 200418 and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF
Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed before said office.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and
ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to
file with ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance
Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof
specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must
be filed within three months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. 20 According to the dispositive of the
appellate court’s Decision:21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and
the Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.

ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal
basis.

On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following
issues were raised:22

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF
 27

CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW
REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL
REGISTER

II

ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS
OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT REQUIRED BY
PETITIONER.

This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order
that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect, to wit:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)

Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof
specifically providing that:

Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public
inspection. (Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those
issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential
Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 – filing with the ONAR in the University of the
Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987
became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against
abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 2004 25 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR
prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed
before said office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of
the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative
issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.

In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court
emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to
enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it
specified several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe
the proper requirements, to have no force and effect:

Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses
of both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect
immediately." These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the
Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations
were not likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having
no force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the
 28

Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the
accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416
ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to
the national government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4)
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading
Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China; (5)
Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management
discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and
employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the
schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority
holders.

In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck
down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other
hand, in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993
Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite
the fact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been
published at the time. The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
can take effect."

Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious.
MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment is based on
MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.

Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no
longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is
seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication
cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing
rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:

In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance
with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact
that parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the
public consultation on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the
said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted
their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM
Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is
mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public
consultation and submission by the parties of their comments. 28 (Emphasis provided.)

Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent
enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is
irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and
regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his
administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And
while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process
requirements of publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of
Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned
requirements.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August
2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales*, Tinga*, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Assigned as Special Member.

 29

1
Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao
and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp. 55 -74.

2
Id. at 301-303.

3
Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that:

Filing.— (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open
to public inspection.

4
Rollo, p. 63.

5
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 states that:

SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Special Account in the General Fund to be designated
as Oil Price Stabilization Fund for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought
about by exchange rate adjustments and/or an increase in world market prices of crude oil
and imported petroleum products.

The Fund may be sourced from any of the following:

(a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad-valorem tax or customs duty imposed
on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with
the Board of Energy;

(b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations under Presidential Decree No. 1931, as may be determined
by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

(c) Any additional tax to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the

resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board
of Energy requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products.

The Fund created herein shall be used to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases on
crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or
increase in world market prices of crude oil.

The Fund shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy.

6
Rollo, p. 301.

7
Id. at 56-57.

8
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 137 provides that:

SECTION 1. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 is hereby amended to read as

follows:

"SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Trust Account in the books of accounts of the
Ministry of Energy to be designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for the purpose of
minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or
changes in world market prices on crude oil and imported petroleum products. The Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF) may be sourced from any of the following:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed
on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate
adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with
the Board of Energy;
 30

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultation with the Board of Energy;

c) Any Additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the

resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board
of Energy requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the
peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board
of Energy.

The Fund herein created shall be used for the following:

1. To reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase
in world market prices of crude oil;

2. To reimburse the oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as

a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products. The
magnitude of the underrecovery, if any, shall be determined by the Ministry
of Finance. ‘Cost underrecovery’ shall include the following:

i. Reduction in oil company take as directed by the Board of Energy

without the corresponding reduction in the landed cost of oil
inventories in the possession of the oil companies at the time of the
price change;

ii. Reduction in internal ad valorem taxes as a result of foregoing

government mandated price reductions;

iii. Other factors as may be determined by the Ministry of Finance to

result in cost underrecovery.

The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy."

G.R. No. 191787 June 22, 2015

MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005 Decision3 of the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010
Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5

Factual Antecedents

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio
Colleges Foundation. When applying for graduation, he was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies
despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with
deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction came
after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a graduate.

In 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra. Sometime
in September 1993, the personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that the Civil
Service Commission was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October of the
same year. Petitioner filed an application to take the examination, believing that the CSC still allowed
CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency which
they may have. However, the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since January
 31

1993 pursuant to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991 and Office Memo.
No. 63, Series of 1992.

Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of 80.52%.
Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at
Bangued, Abra. In October 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.

On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS
Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college
degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he
was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application form.

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.6

Respondent’s Letter-Complaint7 against petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary Administrative Case
No. BB-03-006.

In his Answer,8 petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He
maintained that at the time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the policy
of the CSC – that any deficiency in the applicant’s educational requirement may be substituted by his
length of service – was still subsisting.

On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a
Decision9 containing the following pronouncements:

Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing circumstances. The only issue
now left is with respect to the particular offense for which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent
Catipon is charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of respondent Catipon for
the purpose of taking the CS Professional Examination scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful
perusal of the said application form reveals that most of the entries filled up by respondent are
typewritten. The only entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to "Year Graduated" and
"School Where Graduated" which were answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF" respectively. Another
handwritten entry is with respect to "Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC" entry, however, was just
superimposed on the typewritten "Commerce".

The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten suggests that the said
application form was consciously drafted and meticulously prepared before its actual submission to the
CSC for processing. They are relevant and material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth
emphasizing however that the pre-drafted application form, considering the typewritten entries, shows
respondent’s confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent answered both the IF YES column
and IF NO column corresponding to the question "Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x

xxxx

The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate intent to defraud the
government. He manifested in his application his uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only lacks
1.5 units Military Science to be conferred a graduate status, vis-à-vis the CSC policy on educational
requirement. Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee who processed the application
would have doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of respondent’s entries in Item 8 of the Application
Form, and thus the educational status of Macario. x x x

xxxx

Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational attainment as can be
deduced from the manner he answered Item No. 8 in the application form. This may be taken as good
faith, which will serve to mitigate any liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent to
deceive or willfully distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon do not even show
blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if at all, there was attempt to
reveal the truth to the examination division processing the application.

xxxx

With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing the October 17, 1993
Career Service Professional Examination, the same needs to be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6, Rule II, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 states:
 32

Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have x x x intentionally made any false
statement of any material fact in his application, x x x the Commission shall invalidate such examination x
x x.

With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head, Social
Security System, Bangued, Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct. However, respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is suspension of six months and one day
to one year.

Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating circumstance. Thus,
respondent Macario Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six months and one day suspension, without
pay, which is the minimum period of the penalty attached to the offense committed. The Career Service
Professional eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without prejudice however to retaking of the
said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein provided should not be allowed to go
back to his current position without CS Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case respondent Catipon
fails to retake or pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any available position
that fits his subprofessional eligibility.10

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a March 23, 2006
Decision,12 which contained the following pronouncement:

Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and
Grave Misconduct, there is no longer any basis to hold respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. This contention is without legal basis. In the case of Philippine Retirement
Authority vs. Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:

Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts constitute the grave
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault under the
circumstances. To completely exonerate respondent would be inequitable and iniquitous considering the
totality of events surrounding this case. Though there was no deliberate intent to falsify or to make
dishonest entry in the Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was accomplished,
the fact that there was indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application Form is undisputedly
established. In view of such an established fact, the integrity of the Civil Service Examination, particularly
the CSPE has been blemished which is sufficient to constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Service.13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner prayed for injunctive
relief and the reversal of the above CSC-CAR decision. He argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he has been declared innocent of the
charges of dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct; that while the Supreme
Court has held that making false entries in public documents may be considered as conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, such act must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to
defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service; 14 and that with the finding that he merely
committed an innocent mistake in filling up the application form for the CSPE, he may not be found guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision [sic]
of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23, 2006 is
[sic] AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner should have interposed an
appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1),43 and 49 of the CSC
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; 16 that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner’s case is not exceptional as would
exempt it from the application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, 17 the
absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service
does not preclude a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and that
petitioner did not act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the requirements for the examination.
 33

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant recourse. Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

(A)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE
THAT GIVEN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION-CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN
SEEKING JUDICIAL RECOURSE BEFORE (THE COURT OF APPEALS);

(B)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT MISAPPLIEDIN THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

(C)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.18

Petitioner’s Arguments

In his Petition and Reply19 seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, consequently,
exoneration from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, petitioner argues
that he was constrained to file the petition for review with the CA as his decreed six-month suspension
was imminent as a consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that immediate judicial
intervention was necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him, which is why his CA petition
included a prayer for injunctive relief; that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should
not have been applied strictly in his case, given the special circumstance that his suspension would mean
loss of his only source of income;20 that he should be completely exonerated from the charges against
him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be accompanied by deliberate intent
or a willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service – which is absent in his
case; and that his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked in the interest of justice and
in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment21 seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that completion of all the academic
requirements – and not merely attendance at graduation rites – confers the necessary degree which
qualifies a student to take the CSPE; that petitioner’s claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is belied by
his Transcript of Records22 and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect the date of his graduation
as October 1995 – or after completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in Military Science; that petitioner cannot
claim to suffer irreparable injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR’s Decision, which is valid and
binding; that the revocation of petitioner’s eligibility is only proper, since he was then not qualified when
he took the CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in finding that petitioner’s act compromised the image
and integrity of the civil service, which justified the imposition of a corresponding penalty; that this Court
in the Rupa case made it clear that the act of making false entries in public documents constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a grave offense punishable by suspension for six months and
one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner
violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies when he
proceeded directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal with the CSC.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article IX-B, state that –

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
 34

instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original

charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service." 23

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of
government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or
Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it
on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period
of fifteen days from receipt thereof." 24 "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central
Office.25

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review,
under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the
Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court.26

Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-
CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s
CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought.1âwphi1 The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical
and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case."27 Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this case the
Commission Proper – is in the "best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum." 28

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence." 29 When
petitioner’s recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.

We likewise affirm the CA’s pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE application
form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. Petitioner’s
claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative
to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.30 Moreover, petitioner – as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional service through
the CSPE – cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is required for the
examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by the appellate court:

In Bacaya31 v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the deletion of the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case. Respondent judge in the
said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good faith and that it has been
a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he would simply sign the prepared
order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that negligence is the failure to observe such
 35

care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use under ordinary circumstances. An act of the
will is necessary for deliberate intent to exist; such is not necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He
simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in
Military Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of
the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and careful
person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective
examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing
substitution of one’s length of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner
have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee’s advice since it was not shown that the latter was
authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was competent and
capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a
reasonably prudent and careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his failure was not
a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in Bacaya, negligence is
not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.32

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed upon
an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of the
office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. Under our
civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as such:
misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior
notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents;
falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a
traffic altercation; a court interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant’s property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family; selling fake Unified Vehicular
Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours; a CA employee’s forging of
receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
employee’s act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network problems within his office
and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state
of security;33 a public prosecutor’s act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but by
a judge;34 and a teacher’s act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics
for Professional Teachers.35 In petitioner’s case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE application
undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence of a willful or
deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules." 36

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the
policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility
should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only
amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the
government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public
service.37 "Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the
highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and
faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected." 38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that:
 36

x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15
p.m. of the same date.

Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together
with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator
core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of
channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and
cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the
bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx
causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator
core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two
(2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.

It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and
[p]latform but without a safety lock.1

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:

1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.

2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.

3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

 THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. The
CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to the
hearsay rule.

The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what
he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. 5 This is known
as the hearsay rule.

Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence
applies to written, as well as oral statements.6

The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and
untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to
 37

light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that
cannot be tested by cross-examination.8

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are entries in official records.
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:

Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;

(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last requisite is
not present.

The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial
court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who
signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible
for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it
constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.

x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-
examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of
his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of
the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report)
as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the testimony
of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily
to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:

"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made
himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that
certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.

The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in
which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials
would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity
is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on
Evidence, Sec. 1631).

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under
such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to
require.
 38

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on
his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by
the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.

Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
Villanueva.

In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva
had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue,12 making the latter’s death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the incident 13 and saw the
platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed 15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon
inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. 17

What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the fall of the
platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the
testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions, 18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19

Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the
CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator
was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence.20

The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the
thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was
under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury
was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or
management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused
by the defendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded
upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff,
without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause,
for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the
plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in
that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is
applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part,
and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some court add
to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further
requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party
had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be
charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. 23

The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
 39

There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of
the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies
where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x.

No worker is going to fall from the 14 th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in
a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also
present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. x x x.24

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome
by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care
or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes
into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the
police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company
enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.

It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that
private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees, also assails the same
statement for being hearsay.

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as
evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the
adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an
affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 29 Petitioner,
therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it
to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to
rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to
establish any defense relating to the incident.

Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages
under the Civil Code.

Article 173 of the Labor Code states:

Article 173. Extent of liability. – Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic
Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.

The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided
that:
 40

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. – The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as under
the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the matter
in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the
employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of
First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The heirs sought relief from this Court.

Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or
fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e.,
collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts
set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
[Underscoring supplied.]

Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under the
Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The
Court reasoned:

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14,
1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra,
Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for
compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have
been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they
be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition
to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense
that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they learned of the
official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal
negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines
to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a
mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners
be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In
the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue
under the Civil Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule
that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the
Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and
that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional
benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the
 41

basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against
petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the
complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in
nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:

x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early
as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed
her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator who
recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutor’s
office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may not have
even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of
the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand
Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is
also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can
be inferred from the following statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified
pursuant to Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reason
for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot
be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the
first payment therefrom. Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on
May 9, 1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991
Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of
evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the
part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature."
(Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s
allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the
benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held
in the Floresca ruling.35

The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well:

x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of
her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code than
from the ECC. x x x.36

Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake
of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate
that issue."

Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as early
as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6, 1991, two months
before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that,
although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees, the case was "civil in nature."
These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and
every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to her and
yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.

When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not
to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an
ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to
have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but
chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
 42

person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and
has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden
private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead
waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore,
perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when
petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.

Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s death and the
rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the
"fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which
private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there
may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of
government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that
matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such
a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that
ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash
when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner
filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim
before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her
rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part
of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this
Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the total
amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K" 43 that she
received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March
1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total
monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less
than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and
the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is
greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall
be deducted from the trial court'’ award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this
adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the
award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be
greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
 43

Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-
G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in
said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule
65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received
by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment
and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period
for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated
and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986
of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is,
as yet, not strictly enforceable.
 44

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October
28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to
the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding
and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in
such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,

vs.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded
check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:

That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay
said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in
Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).2 He alleged in his
complaint the following:
 45

xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation

encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring
the latter that the check is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";

3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was dishonored on the ground
that the account of the defendant with the Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to
his representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was
duly funded and will be honored when presented for payment;

4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the payment of the value of
the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such
demand defendant refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand;

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff
has been compelled to retain the services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable
attorney’s fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per appearance.

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER

FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon
which this action is brought and that there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this
action which fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing
account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed at the
time he issued a check;

7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is one which falls under Section
1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due
the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;

8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon the payment of damages
should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.3

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.4

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring:

xxx

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another action between the
instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the
instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx

xxx

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case
No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is
the herein plaintiff’s criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon presentment for
payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of
₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of
the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached
and made integral part hereof as Annex "1".

It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately xxx.

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s
attachment bond for damages, stating:

1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is the alleged
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, contending among
 46

others that the pendency of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;

2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest;
however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil
action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in
Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff
nor is there any claim for recovery of damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in
the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all
by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal
case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied
reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court
which mandates that after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant
overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as
follows:

In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines as it is
based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted independently of the criminal action;

4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any reservation at all of the right to file
a separate civil action still the plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff
seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in
favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the alleged
circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to
bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and effective
against the drawer;

5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding the circumstances relative
to the issuance of the check it would be entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that
such check was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said
check was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;

6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from the criminal case without a
reservation is a civil action arising from the criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case
since the liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant action may still be
prosecuted;

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application for damages against the
bond is totally without any legal support and perforce should be dismissed outright. 6

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,7 dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

xxx

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the
application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages.

For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two
(2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the criminal case for violation
of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being
asserted, which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of
 47

₱336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts, are identical.

Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the
fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor
during the presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or
criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to prove and claim
them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is
made or unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all
import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and
express. And this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended
party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation as to his right to
pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the
considered view of this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred.
The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. xxx

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for sum of money is one
based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the
Rules, to wit:

"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence."

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August 14, 2000;

3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of the defendant for the damages
sustained by the latter by virtue of the implementation of the writ of attachment;

4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost dispatch to the defendant’s
physical possession the vehicle seized from him on August 16, 2000; and

5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.

Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000, 8 viz:

Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his previous submissions, and
which submissions this court have already passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the
ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff
therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint,
disposing:9

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for review, 10 challenging
the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the ground of litis pendentia.

In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in prosecuting his
alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional
 48

sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on
Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.

On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,12 overturning the RTC, viz:

xxx

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by
the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and
the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in
the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1,
2000, provides that:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.

In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced that only the civil liability
arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held:

"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which
became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud
committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently
even if there was no reservation as to its filing."

It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The complaint was also
brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the
issuance of the check which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the
criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the changes in the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil action became effective on December
1, 2000, the same may be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench,
since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.
 49

In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge damages in favor of the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13

Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously premised its decision on the
assessment that the civil case was an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v.
Velez14 stretched the meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum of money,
precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 15

In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied because the petitioners
used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil
action; and that the appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of
his separate civil action.

Issue

The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil
Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the

Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can give rise to civil
liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:

xxx

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party
may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful
act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v.
Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of
the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).

xxx

Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the
payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving
her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit.
To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her,
thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law
seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

xxx
 50

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in
contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000,
which relevantly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 18

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil
Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor
is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, or arise from, procedural laws.19 Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the
time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure,20 except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require
a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.21

Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any assumed vested right,
because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1,
1997.

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines
shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.22
 51

2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based upon the amount of the check involved which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1,
1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability by way
of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding
filing fees therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information.
If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the amount of
such fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying
the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the
actions as thus consolidated.

4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect
on November 1, 1997.

The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation
v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus:

xxx

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under
Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate
or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also
requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as
creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases
for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis
and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil
action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for
collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be
filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate
filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means
that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only
instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks
would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay
the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may
be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article
31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar. 24
 52

The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25 to give due course to the civil action of
Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees,
which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a
violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22,26 the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of
estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,27 as DMPI Employees has
allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the
reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the
bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.

To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for
the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97
and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud
and deceit.

Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action

on the ground of litis pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381)
bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third
becomes nil.28

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No.
275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued
Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other
by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground
of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err
in affirming the MeTC.

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on
October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 53

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his share of
the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging
firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30,
1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two
days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company against
Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime
charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the
salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.

Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible
error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling
rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 — i.e., that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg.
22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years
prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an
official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December
15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of
an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either
estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino
Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23,
1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17,
1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry
Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the
complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of
December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang
Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the
issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows:4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting
authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review
interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn.,
476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where
the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a
 54

guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be

considered a valid defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the
passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22,
enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co
moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the
Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991,
extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that
proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14,
1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of
justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same
Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall
have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal . . .5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which
divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does
not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA
522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior
courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a
saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order
No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94
Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the
alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104
SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings,
pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128
SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of
a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-
An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be
accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only
prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or
ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a
taxpayer: Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on
Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez
v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be
given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary
appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves
not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article
8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the
prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid
doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be
acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the
law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
 55

effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at
the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in
1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had
relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of
an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27,
1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to
DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure
sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended
was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and
respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the
Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of
the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]"
. . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-
cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot
doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its
nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.

Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared "that
presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and
effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about
the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of
these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken
the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs.
Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It
is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects —
with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of
"Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the
then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
 56

obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68
[1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer
. . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for
that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act
taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its
being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it
should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive
act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however
be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity
such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled
with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it
is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation
regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that
prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to
reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has
the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time
may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with
approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila
Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion
of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov.
28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No
34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians,
which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court, in Tan
vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be
applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that
decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians
before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer
possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of
the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created
under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is
an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule
in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether
the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local
government abolished. 13

It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
 57

retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying
the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential,
the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially
different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of
Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed,
among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could
not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance
was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the
attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to
great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by
the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their
violation.17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially
different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the
contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the
doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein
above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed
and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de
oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional
Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended
information dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named two (2) accused,
conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence
and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize their purpose, and in
the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away, with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300,00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the following personal
property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (l) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of
levis pants, one (1) travelling bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10,00) pesos, with a
total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victims
Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property
being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the
above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the aforestated
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2)
accused did then and there hack victim Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting
wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict
physical injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them
to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305,
accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court
with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:
 58

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named three (3) accused,
with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and
working together with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all
armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing [sic] themselves into a
band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with
violence against, and/or intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in cash, one (1) ring
worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos,
making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will and/or
consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused,
conspiring and working together with their companions who are still at large, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Josephine
Belesario, against their will and consent.1âwphi1.nêt

CONTRARY TO LAW.

I)

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty" to both
crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that
the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed
against them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten
(10) years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and
Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the
amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property robbed from her and also to
indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred
for his medication and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr.
Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to a death penalty and to indemnify the
members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles
taken from them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:

Criminal Case No. 18376

The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin,
Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification
made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her son Reynaldo and the latter's half-
sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305

Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified
companion, acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively
identified by the following witnesses. Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by Alex Mijaque; Josephine
Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and
Perpetua Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape
her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as
former barangay-mate for a long time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of Reynaldo. The
identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that
they tarried in the crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their
memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants. Said positive and clear identification by the
complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have ill motive to falsify the truth and to implicate
 59

accused-appellants, prevail over the latter's defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were
likewise appreciated against accused-appellant (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

The errors assigned by the accused-appellant in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The
trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial
court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the fact that the latter was arrested
without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed
the crimes charged, the trial court in erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended
upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecution's version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution
witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Josephine Belisario,
Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is summarized in the Solicitor General's
consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister
Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon Aliman were having a conversation inside
their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out
Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him and the other persons with
him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo
Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin
together with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises
(pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering, appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the
beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked
Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest
(pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed
the hacking incident and the former shouted for help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9,
TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed
Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told
them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to
the house of the latter's aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The
other man stayed put and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon
Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave him three hundred
pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise
grip, one (1) screw driver one, (1) pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1)
wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos
(P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also
dragged Corazon Aliman to her sister's house (pp. 6-8, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN,
June 30, 1988).

Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunt's house which is just
twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of whom is appellant, Alfonso Patalin,
Jr., outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunt's
name and ask that the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was
kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went in, boxed the aunt of
Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other
companions of appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were
armed with knive's a bolo and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine Belisario's
cousins, namely Rogelio, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed
Carcillar, (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario
together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala
(p. 15, TSN, June 30, 1998; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of
Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisario's aunt and the mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed
the latter and exclaimed: "Money, money". "It is money we want." Appellant Alfonso Patalin
forced Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30,
1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990.). Then, appellants and their companions seized the
following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand
pesos (P3,000.00), (2) two (2) pairs of lady's rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3)
one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed
with a butcher's knife and threatened to kill her if she will not lie down. Because of fear, she
did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque
forcibly removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but
appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the former's neck and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque
brought her inside the house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-
 60

14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a
gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p.
14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun, threatened to kill her if she will not obey his
orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the
man's orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-
16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped, appellant Alfonso Patalin was also
outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with
his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed because of her resistance. This angered
appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was
prevailed upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned
her over to one of his companions who was in the garden outside the house and armed with
a gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he
undressed her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this companion of appellant Alex
Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money.
When she told him that they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course
thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar. Then, he
brought her outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants
Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then brought back inside the house and ordered to
lie face down on the floor again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached
her and brought her outside the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaque's order
to lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards. Her strength gave out and he
succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21,
TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by
appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He threatened her with his knife and was
able to undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of
appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her cousins Rogelia and Perpetua
Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man
demanded money from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also
carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he was forcing her to
lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out . He likewise succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the
foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt and
cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living
room, she was pulled by the hair by appellant Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up.
When she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso
Patalin, armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to
undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar, who was then only thirteen (13)
years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but
did not succeed. Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a
member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length away. Appellant Nestor
Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered
her to lie down. He fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back inside the
house. When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for
money from her mother and were taking turns in beating the latter (pp.4, 15-23, TSN, July
12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated
earlier after threatening them not to report the matter to the police or else they will return
and kill all of them (p.19, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first
aid. He was then brought to West Visayas Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp.
18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May
14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hackwound, mid forearm,
area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid;
Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he
spent more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other
expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).

Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she
was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in diameter, was found on the left shoulder of
Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the
 61

ground. Josephine Belisario "vagina admits two (2) fingers". Further, hematoma was noted
in the hymen at nine o'clock and three o'clock positions and fresh lacerations was also noted
at nine, eleven, and three o'clock positions. These are indications that a foreign object,
which could be a human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the
hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).1âwphi1.nêt

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by
Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid).
Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the perineum has a lacerated wound which is one
centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations
were likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three o'clock positions (p. 3, TSN,
November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a foreign object was inserted in the
vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10,
1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of
the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower portions of the left thigh, occipital region of
the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) 1/2 cm.
lacerated wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left
shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger and right thumb, (4) 4 inches
incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the
portion below the waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the
hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four o'clock positions (pp. 10-15, TSN, November
10, 1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum
which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh
laceration at six o'clock position and a hematoma also at six o'clock position were noted on
her hymen (Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses,
Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona, Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with
other arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin

Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he
described as the land lord of Jesusa Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of
the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the stand that when the victims saw
him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn,
August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).

In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness
Josephine Belisario was asked on the stand if she recognized "the person who called [her] brother
Reynaldo," said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her brother, and that she
only recognized the caller's voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin
also alleges that he was arrested without a warrant.

Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record),
there is no mention of his name nor that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes
charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court, accused-appellant Mijaque was
also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report
mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second report,
it was blottered that the alleged offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported.
Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by Rogelia Carcillar who merely
narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.

According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the
record as "Mandurriao") received a complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen
previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was suspected as the thief and was
picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence
detained for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo
was being flashed at all police stations in Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so
accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from charges of arbitrary detention,
immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently,
three days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for
robbery with rape was filed against him by the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.

Nestor Pas
 62

The third accused-appellant, Nestor Pas, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo
Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name.
He also states that the witnesses' declarations as regards his identification are confusing and inconsistent
(pp. 208-210, Rollo).

Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what
happened to his sister Perpetua Carcillar, testified that "Nothing happened to them" (p. 210, id). And
when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses reported the alleged incident to the
police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.

As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their
respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and
children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the incident. As
corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation where he
was working, who testified that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August
9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he
was working which was located in Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was
arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for investigation. Although three of
the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the
policemen pointed to him and said, "That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he
will file a case against you." Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-
13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latter's
alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 o'clock in the evening to 12 o'clock
midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also
said that he saw Mijaque still asleep the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in
Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984 (tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he
presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she bought cassava and
sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, and that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tan, March 4, 1994, p. 4).

We are not persuaded by the above posturing and are compelled to affirm.

Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this
appraisal since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a
written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269 SCRA 472 [1997]).

A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses' credibility, particularly the
ravished victims, who, for approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare
occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to
prove any motive on the part of the private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and
raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar,
were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not
ordinarily turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they
narrated.

Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed
above in their individual defenses, they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of
the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984, Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus
Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the
robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders
were unknown persons but contained no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillar's report did not
mention that she was raped.

Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of
a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An
examination of Reynaldo Aliman's sworn statement (p. 3, I Record) shows that he clearly identified one of
the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant Mijaque's
name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked
him with the bolo at the time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was
only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the
fact that he mentioned "unknown persons" in his report does not affect Reynaldo's categorical and positive
identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery
incidents at his home.
 63

Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to
the police, otherwise, the assailants will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were
overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in reporting the multiple rapes was not
procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far
shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a
delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6 months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does
not detract from the veracity of her charge.

The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows:
(1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on
a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked down, thus placing the house in
darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in
the house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated
their house, allegedly through the plastic roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree
concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant Nestor Ras, as well as
the date when Ras was arrested.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and
do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764
[1997]). In fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than
destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience
and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People vs.
Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the
testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA
254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs.
Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA
709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 [1995];
People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr.
243 SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).

Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland
travel time from the town of Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes.
Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan, which is merely adjacent to
Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring
Iloilo, which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to
corroborate these alibis by presenting witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to
the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful credibility.

Mutatis mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-
appellants alleged they were at could be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that
accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 o'clock or 7:30 o'clock in the evening on
August 11, 1984. More importantly and damning yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat
by the victims.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal
Case No. 18376 considering that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows
that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their plans (People
vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which the victims
reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in
the victims' homes. He who goes to another's house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code — Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993
ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and Viada,
5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial court's finding on the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of band considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants
Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as accused-appellant Mijaque)
entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw
four (4) persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p.10, June 30, 1988).
These same aggravating circumstances likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with
multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by the victims thereof who
stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun,
entered their dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque's defense that they were arrested without
warrants, suffice it to say that any objection, defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
 64

before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As correctly pointed out in the
People's consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and
trial (p. 324, Rollo).

It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No.
18376 and 18305. In the first criminal case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin
and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime charged. Said culprits shared
the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the
occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified
companions), who were positively identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common
criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of committing multiple rape on the
occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunt's house and
the other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they
were staging a hold-up. After robbing the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female
victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus truly exhibiting their
concerted acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants
adduced at the trial —

. . . direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties
actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and
from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of
some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe
inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved (People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay,
G.R. No. 76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486). . .

( People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony
of the victims themselves.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the
crimes charged were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised
Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specifically Paragraph (1),
Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not
be imposed upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987
Constitution. However, said provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its
discretion, "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Simply stated, it did not prevent the
legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty
Law which took effect on January 1, 1994.

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitution's abolition of the death penalty had
retroactive effect, being beneficial to the accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on
January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered by
the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission. At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by
the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 767]).
 65

True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress' future restoration thereof
"for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." At the time of such ratification, the instant case was
still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed. Considering that the provision provides
that "[a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua," it is clear that the
framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death
having been imposed yet. Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty
already imposed is automatically — without need for any executive action — commuted (Bernas, The 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).

The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was
retroactively applied to herein accused-appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future
act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative answer would free accused-
appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life
(or lose it), or the means of living, at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 [1919]). Before us is a heinous crime indeed where people
were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human
nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman
aspect of the crime committed. However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of
government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the authority of a valid law, lacking
which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is
insufficient.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited
accused-appellants. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[p]enal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same."

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in
character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This penal provision may be
given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has
been committed and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not
begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out (Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review,
1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil. 483 [1932]).

In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits
herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them.
The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing the
death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution
the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The
Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it
shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute
which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a
subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law
(Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98
Phil. 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction
to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with vested
or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants' right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty
accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away
from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested
(Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of
the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used (Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old
law cannot be taken away from them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to
apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at issue.

As regards accused-appellant's civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded
P700.00 to Corazon Aliman representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken,
and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses incurred for medication and hospitalization.
However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the multiple rapes.
Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we
said:
 66

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated
and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes
that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the
same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized
by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount
of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape
(considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of
P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from the victims. In line with
the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the
instant case may serve as an object lesson to the public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000
per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally
liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are
solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS said judgment, with the following modifications:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the
aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime,
accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;

(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded
by the trial court in said criminal case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of
the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00 representing the expenses incurred by
Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and

(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family
representing the value of the cash and articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby
awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape, P50,000.00 for each count of rape as
moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all the
three accused-appellant are jointly and severally liable.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynarez-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

* On January 21, 1985, an Information for robbery with multiple rape was filed against Alfonso
Patalin and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305. Said criminal case was consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 18376 based on an Information for robbery with physical injuries against the
same accused and was heard by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City (pp. 1-2, 53-55, 11
Record).

On July 1, 1985, a motion for consolidation was filed by private prosecutor Rodolfo Valera
Cabado manifesting that another information was filed against Nestor Ras for robbery in
band with multiple rape, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18835, which was founded on the
same facts presented in the first two criminal cases. Eventually, the three cases were
consolidated. Later, Alex Mijaque was identified and apprehended as an additional
conspirator in the aforesaid Criminal Cases No. 18305 and 18835. Subsequently, a motion
to admit Amended Information and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 18835 was filed by the
prosecution. As a result, two cases were jointly tried by the lower court, namely, Criminal
Case No. 18305 entitled "The People of the Phils. v. Alfonso Patalin, Alias "Alpoc", Nestor
Ras, and Alex Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for Robbery in band with rape, and Criminal Case No.
18376 entitled "The People of the Phils, v. Alfonso Patalin, Jr. Alias "Alpoc", and Alex
Mijaque, Alias "Aprik" for robbery with physical injuries (pp 74-76, 86, 88-93, 11 Record).
 67

G.R. No. 162518 August 19, 2009

RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and EVA DAMASO Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the
Resolution2 dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set
aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment (Civil
Case No. 93-2588) against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73.
Petitioner is also the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 with respondent Generoso Damaso as accused. Upon motion of respondents, said civil
and criminal cases were consolidated and jointly tried.

On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision 3 dated January 16, 2003, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case
Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.

As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby rendered against the
plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is further ordered to pay to
the defendants the following:

a. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages

b. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and

c. the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003, stating that he
received a duplicate original copy of the decision on February 21, 2003. Respondents opposed said
motion. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, on May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003, stating instead that
he received a copy of the decision dated January 16, 2003 only on March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated
May 9, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration on May 19, 2003.

On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed
out of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in the presence of both
parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have received a copy of the decision on
said date of promulgation, the RTC ruled that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the
13th day (March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after
allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner on June 20, 2003, but the same was denied by the RTC on October 1, 2003.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the petition unmeritorious
and dismissed the same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that petitioner was bound by his
judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC when it was promulgated on February 21,
2003, the CA held that petitioner’s period within which to file an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice
of Appeal was filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied
per Resolution dated February 20, 2004.

Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s period to appeal had
lapsed, as such ruling was premised on misapprehension of facts and contradicted by evidence on record.
The CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the particular evidence upon which the
same was based; and there were supposedly some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would
justify a different conclusion.

The petition deserves some consideration.

 68

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals 5 that by virtue of the
power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is
allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-
day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of
only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, 7 to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the
present Petition was already pending before us. x x x

xxxx

With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that
motion.

The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the
use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," x x x.

xxxx

The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted – from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of
appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within
which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.1avvphi1

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant
may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within
fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating
that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is
irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be
computed or determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity,
such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else’s rights. (Emphasis supplied)

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of
promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,8 stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply
in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws
may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or
remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested
retroactive effect, to wit:
 69

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer
justice.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftn Procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/october2007/149508.htm - _ftn

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending
actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if not
absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will
be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders issued in the year
1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in
the instant case, will not.9

Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably,
the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh
period" of 15 days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner’s receipt of the Order denying his
motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when
he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion
for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution dated February 20, 2004, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated June
2, 2003 in Civil Case No. 93-2588, and its Order dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the June 2, 2003
Order, are hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, is
DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice