REPUBLIC ACT NO.

6645

AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence
of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days not later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That
if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election.

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due
distribution and publication, to the Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who
in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many
conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and public
markets, and in the municipal buildings.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers
of general circulation.

Approved, December 28, 1987.

Source: CDAsia

CASE DIGEST: DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON,Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA,
Respondents. G.R. No. 189466; February 11, 2010.

FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization
that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters,
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner
Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives,
since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a
national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, woelecmen, youth, urban poor,
and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for
quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of
Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but
upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for
reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on prompting Abayon to file the present petition for
special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that
won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents
Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito
Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a
petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan
was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security
guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the
party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives.
Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility
as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.

Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of
the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to the Party-List System Act.

ISSUE: Does respondent HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively,
who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007
elections?

HELD: HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission
on Elections, a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of
Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification of party-list nominees.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they
ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent."

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the
facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party
or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29

Facts:

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative:
from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list organization, on the
other.

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization... registered... under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,
also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).

Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for
the 10 May 2010 Elections.

it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee

OMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.

Ating Koop earned a seat in the House... of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath
of office... and thereafter assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,... Ating Koop
issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by
its nominees

Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term

Ating Koop... introduced amendm... ents to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was
the composition of the Central Committee,... The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National

Convention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.

The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.

almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him
from Ating Koop for disloyalty.

Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner

Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.

Rimas Group... h COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico... prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered
to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives

COMELEC

RESOLVES... to:

DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of Representatives
and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr.
Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack of... jurisdiction

Issues:

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative:
from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list organization, on the
other.

Ruling:

the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of
Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of
the House, and therefore it was... the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had
jurisdiction over the Petition.

the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when
the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in
hold-over capacity even after their terms had... expired;... and that the COMELEC was not in a position
to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion.

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House
of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity
of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution... ndows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions
on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET
acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group,
oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representative

In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his
oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over
the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon... the qualification requiring a party-list
nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not
intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the... jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The
jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.

In the pre

The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of... bona fide
membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution,
the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31
January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it... declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from
Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T.
Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

SANTIAGO V. COMELEC

FACTS

Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly approving
applications for legalization of the stay of a number of aliens in the Philippines. She was charged in
relation to her position as the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
suspended Miriam from her position as Senator of the Philippines and from any gov’t position she was
holding for 90 days. This is in the form of a preventive suspension pending investigation of the case
before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE

Was the act of the Sandiganbayan valid?

RULING

YES. RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. It is also
the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of
the information filed before it. The court reiterated that the preventive suspension is not a penalty since
if acquitted, the accused is reinstated to his previous position plus back wages. The order of suspension
under RA 3019 is different from the power of Congress to discipline its members under the Constitution.
The constitutional provision is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon an erring
member. On the other hand, R.A. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members
of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering
the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with
pending in criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April
1991, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On
13 May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved,
forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
 "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise
of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization for the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini Narendra,
Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan,
Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Qiui, Wu Hong Guan Qui @
Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu @ Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao
Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu
Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin
Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits
the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are disqualified
thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-
94555 and No. 91-94897.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.
Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating
from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty
until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court.
Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his
office on 20 May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.

Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.

On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.

The Sandiganbayan, thus informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the Court.

On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.

On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioner's intention to accept a
fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.

On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from
the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November
1992, her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed
G.R. No. 99289-90. At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly
approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.

The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner's
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.

On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.
The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and
directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed
against her.

Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No.
109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.

Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to
cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceedings with
her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by
the Court.

On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman
to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31
July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.

On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
(Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.

In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995
motion of the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its
03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by
the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled
"Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan," docketed G.R. No. 123792.

On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend her.
On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration
and hereby suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding
 at present or hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take
effect immediately upon notice.

"Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President,
Senate of the Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of
the Senate, for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the
Senate shall inform this Court of the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt
hereof.

"The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the
suspension order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be
lifted at that time." 2

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage
of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the
service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."

In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 the Court reiterated:

"The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended — treating of the suspension pendente
lite of an accused public officer — may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly
upheld by this Court.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or
temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service." 4

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it." 5 Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan 6 observed:

"x x x . It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact,
if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension." 7

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear
and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than
once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused. 8

En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of
the information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to
the conduct thereof. It has been said that —

"'x x x . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged
do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions
of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under
section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the
grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x .'

"xxx xxx xxx

"Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or
of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to
quash the information on any other grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.

"However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts
for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act
3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the
same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to
the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the
Revised Penal Code." 9

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 10

The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioner's case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called
upon to resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, 11 petitioner
sought to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez, 12 petitioner sought the nullification of the hold
departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from
Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena, 13 petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which
deemed as "filed" the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan, 14 petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these
cases, 15 the Court declared:

"We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she
failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the
splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

"Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the official acts complained therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in
the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not
granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:

(1) She was a public officer,

(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;

(3) Those aliens were disqualified;

(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

 (5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions.'

"The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019." 16

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each —

"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of
Congress. The Court ruled:

"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution — which deals
with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly
behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject
to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure,
prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as
a Member of the House of Representatives."

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable," but also in the determination of "whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any
possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been
couched in general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any
emerging milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the
question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court
subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription
thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other
two branches of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any part of the
Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the
Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.