ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., now known as ALILEM MULTIPURPOSE and the latter family.
and the latter family. As opposed to respondent claim that the accusation is a mere fabrication of
COOPERATIVE, INC., Petitioner, v .SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR., Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent was employed by petitioner as bookkeeper. Petitioner's Board of Directors (the
Board) received a letter from a certain Napoleon Gao-ay (Napoleon) reporting the alleged
immoral conduct and unbecoming behavior of respondent by having an illicit relationship with
Napoleon sister, Thelma G. Palma (Thelma). This prompted the Board to conduct a preliminary
investigation. During the preliminary investigation, the Board received evidence of respondent
alleged extramarital affair.
Respondent, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He, instead, claimed that the
accusation was a result of the insecurity felt by some members of the cooperative and of the
Board because of his growing popularity owing to his exemplary record as an employee.Thelma
executed an affidavit likewise denying the allegations of extra-marital affair.
Meanwhile, on June 7, 1997, the Board received a petition from about fifty members of the
cooperative asking the relief of respondent due to his illicit affair with Thelma.
In its Summary Investigation Report, the Ad Hoc Committee of petitioner concluded that
respondent was involved in an extra-marital affair with Thelma. On July 10, 1997, the Chairman
of the Board sent a letterto respondent informing him of the existence of a prima facie case
against him for "illicit marital affair, an act that brings discredit to the cooperative organization and
a cause for termination per AMPC (Alilem Multi-Purpose Cooperative) Personnel Policy.
Respondent was directed to appear and be present at the AMPC office for a hearing. He was
likewise advised of his right to be assisted by counsel.
On the day of the hearing, respondent requested for postponement on the ground that his lawyer
was not available. The request was, however, denied and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.
In a Memorandum dated July 16, 1997, respondent was informed of Board Resolution No. 05,
series of 1997 embodying the Board decision to terminate his services as bookkeeper of
petitioner, effective July 31, 1997, without any compensation or benefit except the unpaid balance
of his regular salary for services actually rendered.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioner before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed respondent complaint for lack of merit. The
LA concluded that respondent had been or might still be carrying on an affair with a married
woman. The LA found it unforgiving in the case of a married employee who sleeps with or has
illicit relations with another married person for in such case, the employee sullies not only the
reputation of his spouse and his family but the reputation as well of the spouse of his paramour
some of the directors or cooperative members who were allegedly envious of his growing
popularity, the LA gave more credence to the testimonies of petitioner witnesses who were
relatives of Thelma and who had no motive to falsely testify because their family reputation was
likewise at a risk of being tarnished. The LA, thus, found respondent to have been validly
dismissed from employment for violation of the cooperative Personnel Policy. The LA also found
no violation of respondent right to due process as he was given ample opportunity to defend
himself from the accusation against him.
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the LA decision. The NLRC found petitioner Personnel Policy to
be of questionable existence and validity because it was unnumbered. It held that even assuming
that respondent had an extra-marital affair with a married woman, the latter is not his fellow
worker in petitioner business establishment.It, thus, concluded that respondent dismissal was not
founded on any of the just causes for termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, as amended.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, but it failed to obtain a favorable decision. Petitioner now
comes before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari insisting on the validity of
respondent dismissal from employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner illegally dismissed respondent.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
It is undisputed that respondent was dismissed from employment for engaging in extramarital
affairs, a ground for termination of employment stated in petitioner Personnel Policy. This basis of
termination was made known to respondent as early as the first communication made by
petitioner. In its June 20, 1997 letter, petitioner directed respondent to explain in writing or
personal confrontation why he should not be terminated for violation of Section 4.1.4 of the
Personnel Policy. Respondent merely denied the accusation against him and did not question the
basis of such termination. When the LA was called upon to decide the illegal dismissal case, it
ruled in favor of petitioner and upheld the basis of such dismissal which is the cited Personnel
Policy. The NLRC, however, refused to recognize the existence and validity of petitioner
Personnel Policy on which the ground for termination was embodied.
The existence of the Personnel Policy containing provisions on the grounds for termination of
employees was not questioned by respondent. In his position paper, respondent only assailed the
effectivity of the policy, as for him as it was amended on the same date as the letter-complaints
against him. In other words, he claimed that the policy was amended in order to include therein
the ground for his termination to make sure that he is removed from his position.
Contrary to respondent claim, with the amendment of the Personnel Policy, petitioner did not
create a new ground for the termination of employment to make sure that respondent is removed
from his position. The ground under the old policy is similar to that provided for in the new policy.
The enumeration containing the specific act of "illicit marital affairs" is not an additional ground,
but an example of an act that brings discredit to the cooperative. It is merely an interpretation of
what petitioner considers as such. It is, thus, clear from the foregoing that engaging in extra-
marital affairs is a ground for termination of employment not only under the new but even under
the old Personnel Policy of petitioner. The effectivity of the policy as to respondent cannot,
therefore, be questioned.
To be sure, an employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment.It may make reasonable
rules and regulations for the government of its employees which become part of the contract of
employment provided they are made known to the employee.In the event of a violation, an
employee may be validly terminated from employment on the ground that an employer cannot
rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose lack of morals, respect and
loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer rules and application of the dignity and
responsibility, has so plainly and completely been bared.
Applying now the above-discussed ground for termination, we now determine whether
respondent was properly dismissed from employment. In other words, did petitioner adequately
prove that respondent indeed engaged in extra-marital affairs, an act which petitioner considers
as would bring discredit to the cooperative?
the accusation against him. Upon receipt of the complaint, petitioner conducted a preliminary
investigation and even created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the matter. Respondent was
directed to explain either in writing or by a personal confrontation with the Board why he should
not be terminated for engaging in illicit affair. Not only did petitioner give him the opportunity but
respondent in fact informed petitioner that he opted to present his side orally and did so as
promised when he specifically denied such allegations. Moreover, respondent was also allowed
to peruse the investigation report prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee and was advised that he
was entitled to assistance of counsel.Afterwhich, hearing was conducted. It was only after
thorough investigation and proper notice and hearing to respondent that petitioner decided
whether to dismiss the former or not. The decision to terminate respondent from employment was
embodied in Board Resolution No. 05, series of 1997 a copy of which was furnished respondent.
With this resolution, respondent was adequately notified of petitioner decision to remove him from
his position. Respondent cannot now claim that his right to due process was infringed upon.
GRANTED

We answer in the affirmative.

The employer evidence consists of sworn statements of either relatives or friends of Thelma and
respondent. They either had direct personal knowledge of the illicit relationship or revealed
circumstances indicating the existence of such relationship.

There is also no reason to doubt the statement of Melanie Gao-ay, the wife of Napoleon, who
witnessed the embarrassing "encounter", to borrow the term she used, between [respondent] and
Thelma in her own boarding house.

While respondent act of engaging in extra--marital affairs may be considered personal to him and
does not directly affect the performance of his assigned task as bookkeeper, aside from the fact
that the act was specifically provided for by petitioner Personnel Policy as one of the grounds for
termination of employment, said act raised concerns to petitioner as the Board received
numerous complaints and petitions from the cooperative members themselves asking for the
removal of respondent because of his immoral conduct.

The next question is whether procedural due process was observed in the termination of
respondent services. "Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, the
employer must furnish him two written notices: (a) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity
to explain his side; and (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination."The employer must inform the employee of the charges against him and to hear his
defenses. A full adversarial proceeding is not necessary as the parties may be heard through
pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memorandum or oral argument.

In this case, respondent was adequately afforded the opportunity to defend himself and explain
 BPI v. BPI Employees Union - Metro Manila
G.R. No. 175678 / AUG 22, 2012/ PERALTA, J./Liberal Construction/ IN case of Doubt
NATURE Petition for Review
PETITIONERS BPI
RESPONDENTS BPI EU- MM
FACTS.
BPIEU-MM, a LLO and SEBA of all the regular rank-and-file employees of BPI in Metro Manila, and
BPI have an existing CBA. The CBA provides for loan benefits and relatively low interest rates.
(Consisted of Fringe benefits including Multi-Purpose loans, Real Estate loans, all of whose
interests may be reduced to 6% subject to certain conditions; said CBA also included Emergency
loans)
Thereafter, petitioner issued a "no negative data bank policy" (see notes for this policy) for the
implementation/availment of the manpower loans which the Union objected to, thus, resulting into
labor-management dialogues. Unsatisfied with the result of those dialogues, Union brought the
matter to the grievance machinery and afterwards, the issue, not having been resolved, the parties
raised it to the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).
VA ruled for respondent The imposition of the NO NEGATIVE DATA BANK as a new condition
for the implementation and availment of the manpower loan benefits by the employees evidently
violates the CBA (also awarded 10% atty’s fees)
CA affirmed the decision of VA with the modification that the award of atty’s fees be deleted.
Petitioner’s MR denied.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the No Negative Data Bank conforms to the CBA. – NO.
BPI: The rationale behind the use of the "no NDB policy" aims to encourage employees of a
banking institution to exercise the highest standards of conduct, considering the bank's fiduciary
relationship with its depositors and clients.
A scrutiny of the CBA reveals an express conformity to petitioner's prerogative to issue policies that
would guide the parties in the availment of manpower loans under the CBA.
The subject policy does not only conform to the provisions of the parties' CBA, but it is also in
harmony with the circulars and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
CBA: Law between the parties
A CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer
concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining
unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration machineries. As in all other
contracts, there must be clear indications that the parties reached a meeting of the minds. Therefore,
the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties.
“No NDB Policy” NOT in CBA
The CBA in this case contains no provision on the "no negative data bank policy" as a prerequisite
in the entitlement of the benefits it set forth for the employees. In fact, a close reading of the CBA
would show that the terms and conditions contained therein relative to the availment of the loans are
plain and clear, thus, all they need is the proper implementation in order to reach their objective.
Although it can be said that petitioner is authorized to issue rules and regulations pertinent to the
availment and administration of the loans under the CBA, the additional rules and regulations,
however, must not impose new conditions which are not contemplated in the CBA and should be
within the realm of reasonableness. The "no negative data bank policy" is a new condition which is
never contemplated in the CBA and at some points, unreasonable to the employees because it
provides that before an employee or his/her spouse can avail of the loan benefits under the CBA, the
said employee or his/her spouse must not be listed in the negative data bank, or if previously listed
therein, must obtain a clearance at least one year or six months as the case may be, prior to a loan
application.
Remedies of ER if it wants to include “No NDB Policy”
It must be remembered that negotiations between an employer and a union transpire before they
agree on the terms and conditions contained in the CBA. If the petitioner, indeed, intended to include
a "no negative data bank policy" in the CBA, it should have presented such proposal to the union
during the negotiations. To include such policy after the effectivity of the CBA is deceptive and goes
beyond the original agreement between the contracting parties.
This Court also notes petitioner's argument that the "no negative data bank policy" is intended to
exact a high standard of conduct from its employees. However, the terms and conditions of the CBA
must prevail. Petitioner can propose the inclusion of the said policy upon the expiration of the CBA,
during the negotiations for a new CBA, but in the meantime, it has to honor the provisions of the
existing CBA.
In Favor of Labor
NCC 1702 provides that, in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer. Thus, this Court has ruled that any
doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the union members should be resolved
in favor of the latter.
DECISION.
Petition Denied
NOTES
No Data Bank Policy: As bank employees, one is expected to practice the highest standards of
financial prudence and sensitivity to basic rules of credit and management of his/her financial
resources and needs, it is for this reason that Management deemed fit that reference to the Negative
Data Bank (NDB) and other sources of financial data handling shall be made for purposes of
evaluation of manpower loans.

xxx These procedures apply to all employees, whether officer or staff, regardless of loan type (multi-
purpose, emergency, car, housing).

NDB (whether record is in his own name or spouse's)

1. Outstanding obligation should be fully paid at least one year prior to loan application.
- even if cleared/fully paid, but within the one-year penalty box, the application wili not be considered.

2. Clearance certification should be obtained from the card company/lending company/bank/court:

- if card or lending company, the date of full payment should be clearly indicated in the certification.
- if closed account due to mishandling, date of account closure.
- f court case, date of dismissal of case.

3. Employees will be asked to explain in writing the reason/circumstances for being in the NDB.

4. Final approval of the loan will be with the HR Head, SVP Jess Razon.
- if provincial Business Center account, the employee to submit 2 and 3 to BC with his/her loan
application; BC to send to HR for evaluation and approval prior to implementation of the loan.

Suspended/Past Due (not vet in NDB) Accounts within the Unibank.

1. Outstanding obligation should be fully paid at least six months prior to the loan application.
- even if cleared/fully paid, but within the 6-month penalty box.

2. Clearance certification from BCC or other Unibank unit where the obligation occurred.

Other Past Due Obligation

Management reserves the right to evaluate an employee's credit-worthiness based on his handling of
other obligations, outside of NDB or Unibank units, as basis for granting manpower loans. This is
particularly considered in the case of housing ioan take-out, if the employee-applicant has been
grossly delinquent in his payments to the previous financing company. (Id. at 49-50).
 Toyota Motors v. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789, October 19, 2007
Topic: Requisites for a valid strike
Doctrine: Prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code : (1) a notice
of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of
unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike.
FACTS:
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (Union) and its dismissed officers and
members seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC), declaring
illegal the strikes staged by the Union and upholding the dismissal of the 227 Union officers and
members.
On the other hand, in the related cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 158798-99, Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation (Toyota) prays for the recall of the award of severance compensation to the 227
dismissed employees, which was granted.
In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-
and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra
denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but
the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a
notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the
notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on
Toyota’s appeal.
In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed
to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this, many Union
members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which caused Toyota to
lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of
Labor Relations.
Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned
their work.
This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of
Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.
In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-
work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union
members still conducted rallies and pickets.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the mass actions committed by the union on different occasions are
illegal strikes;
(2) Whether separation pay should be awarded to the union members who
participated in the illegal strikes.
HELD: #1 YES.
We rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23,
2001 are not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for redress of
their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. The Union’s position is weakened
by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies.” Shrouded as demonstrations, they were
in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees
who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the
BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila, on February 21 to 23, 2001.
The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their rights against any abuse which
the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. However, the Union failed to advance convincing
proof that the med-arbiter was biased against them. The acts of the med-arbiter in the performance of
his duties are presumed regular. Sans ample evidence to the contrary, the Union was unable to justify
the February 2001 mass actions. What comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days
was designed and calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious that the
real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole
bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to
demand redress of grievance.
It is obvious that the February 21 to 23, 2001 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying
the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with
the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date
of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before
the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike
illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy
objectives embodied in the law. As they failed to conform to the law, the strikes on February 21, 22,
and 23,2001 were illegal
The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:
 1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing
governmental functions; or
2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on
the requisites of a valid strike]; or
3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an
unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or
order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.

#2 NO.

The Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissalrecognized under Art.
282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent
or they
reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees.

We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct, indismissals based on other grounds under
Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust,
and commission of a crime against the employer or his family, separation pay should not be
conceded to the dismissed employee. Based on existing jurisprudence, the award of separation pay
to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained.
REYNALDO HAYAN MOYA VS FIRST SOLID RUBBER INDUSTRIES INC. LA – Dismissal was valid. However, LA ruled that dismissal was too harsh as a penalty.
GR NO. 184011, SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 NLRC – Affirmed
CA – Deleted the award on separation pay.
FACTS:
Reynaldo Moya was hired by respondent First Solid, a business engaged in manufacturing of
tires and rubbers, as a machine operator. He was promoted as head of the Tire Curing Department of
the company. He reported an incident about under curing of tires within his department which led to
the damage of five tires. The incident was investigated by the company which he was later required to
explain. Upon explanation he stated that the damage was caused by machine failure and the incident
was without any fault of the operator. His employment was then terminated by the company. As a
result, he filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal against First Solid Rubber Industries,
Inc. And its President Edward Lee Sumulong. The company insisted on its right to validly dismiss an
employee in good faith if it has a reasonable ground to believe that its employee is responsible of
misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him absolutely unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position.

ISSUE:
Does the termination from employment of Moya was valid on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence?

LAW APPLICABLE:
ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
XXX
RULING: Yes. The termination from employment of Moya was valid.
Moya was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. He was holding a supervisory rank being an
Officer-in-Charge of the Tire Curing Department. The position, naturally one of trust, required of him
abiding honesty as compared to ordinary rank-and-file employees. When he made a false report
attributing the damage of five tires to machine failure, he breached the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by the company.
It is a general principle of labor law to discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in the
conduct of his business. As already noted, even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees, it also recognizes employer’s exercise of management prerogatives. As long as the
company’s exercise of judgment is in good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise
will be upheld.

CASE HISTORY:
SAN MIGUEL CORP vs. NLRC arisen between SMC and Vega, and whether it has been breached, are
legal questions that labor legislations cannot resolved because it’s recourse is the law on contracts.
FACTS: Where the claim is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute
or a collective bargaining agreement BUT by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) sponsored an Innovation Program which grants cash belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and NLRC.
rewards to all “SMC employees who submit to the corporation ideas and suggestions found to
beneficial to the corporation.

Private Respondent Rustico Vega, who is a mechanic in the Bottling Department of the SMC
submitted an innovation proposal which supposed to eliminate certain defects in the quality and taste
of the product “San Miguel Beer Grande.”

Petitioner Corporation did not accept the said proposal

and refused Mr. Vega’s subsequentdemands for cash award under the innovation program. Hence,
Vega filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment in Cebu. He argued that his
proposal had been accepted by the methods analyst and was implemented by the
SMC and it finally solved the problem of the Corporation in the production of Beer Grande.

Petitioner denied of having approved Vega’s proposal. It stated that said proposal was turned down
for “lack of originality” and the same, even if implemented, could not achieve the
desire result.Further, petitioner Corporation alleged that theLabor Arbiter had no jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the claim of Vega is “not a
necessary incident of his employment” and does not fall under Article 217 of the Labor Code.
However, in a gesture of compassion and to show the government’s concern for the working man, the
Labor Arbiter ordered petitioner to pay Vega P2, 000 as “financial assistance.” Both parties
assailed said decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
ordered SMC to pay complainant the amount of P60, 000

Issue:
Whether the Labor Arbiter and the Commission has jurisdiction over the money claim filed by private
respondent

HELD:
NO
The Labor Arbiter and the Commission has no jurisdiction over the money claim of Vega.
The court ruled that the money claim of private respondent Vega arose out of or in connection with his
employment with petitioner. However, it is not enough to bring Vega’s money claim within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the CAB, the undertaking of petitioner SMC to
grantcash awards to employees could ripen into anenforceable contractual obligation on the part of p
etitioner SMC under certain circumstances. Hence, the issue whether an enforceable contract had
G.R. No. 101619 July 8, 1992
SANYO PHILIPPINES WORKERS UNION-PSSLU vs. CANIZARES
FACTS:
PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo. The CBA contained a union security clause. PSSLU wrote
Sanyo that the private respondents/employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were
cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty
and for joining another union called KAMAO. In accordance with the security clause of the CBA,
Sanyo dismissed the employees. The dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal
dismissal. Named respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo. PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article 217
(c) of the Labor Code which provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the CBA shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery
and voluntary arbitration. Nevertheless, the Labor Arbiter assumed jurisdiction. Public respondent
through the Sol Gen, argued that the case at bar does not involve an "interpretation or
implementation" of a collective bargaining agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company
policies but involves a "termination." Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or
enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA or by voluntary
arbitration. Where there was already actual termination, i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable
by the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents
was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the
CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to
the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. No
grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or
dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union
and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before
an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company
cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the
dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been
an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO, DANIEL S.L. BORBON II,
HERMINIA REYES, MARCELA PURIFICACION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 166, RTC,
PASIG, and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents.
186 SCRA 496 | G.R. No. 87700
June 13, 1990
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Writ of Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of RTC Branch 166 of Pasig where the petitioners’
plea is that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion, a labor dispute being involved.
FACTS
San Miguel Corporation entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D’Rite
companies, both independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE, to maintain its competitive position,
and in keeping with the imperatives of efficiency, business expansion and diversity of operation. In the
contracts, it was expressly agreed that the workers employed by the contractors were not to be
deemed employees or agents of San Miguel. Thus, no employer-employee relationship.
Later on, San Miguel executed a CBA which specifically provides that “temporary, probationary, or
contract employees and workers are excluded from the bargaining unit and therefore, outside the
scope of this Agreement.”
The Union, petitioner, advised San Miguel that some of the workers of Lipercon and D’Rite had
signed up for union membership and sought regularization. The Union alleged that some the workers
have been continuously working for San Miguel for a period ranging from 6 months to 15 years, and
that the nature of their work is neither casual nor seasonal.
Strikes were held and a series of pickets were held for the reason that the Union failed to receive any
favourable response from San Miguel. Thereafter, San Miguel filed a complaint for Injunction and
Damages before the RTC of Pasig to enjoin the Union to prevent the peaceful and normal operations
of the former. The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss but was subsequently denied by the RTC
reasoning that the absence of employer-employee relationship negates the existence of labor dispute.
Thus, the RTC issued Orders enjoining the Union from commiting acts that disrupt the operations of
San Miguel.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether or not there is a labor dispute between San Miguel and the Union?
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The decision of the RTC is SET ASIDE.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
A labor dispute includes any controvery or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging
the terms and conditions or employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
What the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Liparcon and D’Rite
and that they be absorbed into the working unit of San Miguel. In this wise, the matter dwells on the
working relationship between the said employees and San Miguel. Terms, tenure and conditions of
their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the
purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent the workers, who have signed
for union membership, for the purpose of collecting bargaining. Obvious then is that representation
and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In
fact, the injunction sought by San Miguel was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again,
the matter of representation falls squarely within the ambit of a labor dispute.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to labor tribunals.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is
SET ASIDE.
Molave Motor Sales vs. Judge Laron
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles.Private respondent is the
sales manager of PLAINTIFF. At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the question of
jurisdiction of the Court stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-employee
relationship, and he subsequently moved for dismissal. Such complaint was dismissed by the judge
because it must be the juris of the LA and NLRC to decide cases on ER-EE relationship. However,
although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no
jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In this case, PLAINTIFF had sued for monies loaned to
DEFENDANT, the cost of repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of
vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have no relevance to the Labor Code. hence, the civil
has the juris over the matter.
Issue
Whether or not there was still a relationship of employer and employee between the parties.
Held
The dismissal of the case below on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose
from employer-employee relationship was erroneous. Claims arising from employer-employee
relations are now limited to those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217. There is no
difficulty in stating that those in the case below should not be faulted for not being aware of the last
amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code.
The claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because
the latter has not sought clearance for his separation from the service, will not affect the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge to resolve the complaint of PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still be liable to
PLAINTIFF for payment of the accounts sued for even if he remains an employee of PLAINTIFF.
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
Labor law, Jurisdiction; A complaint for damages filed by an employee against an officer of their
corporation based on slanderous language allegedly made by the latter falls under the jurisdiction of
the ordinary courts.—It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair
labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the
defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It
results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise. WHEREFORE, the petition is
granted; the respondent judge is hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150 and render a
decision on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Ernesto Medina, Plant General Manager, and Jose G. Ong, Plant Comptroller, filed a civil case
against Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc in May 1979. Medina
was the former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former Plant Comptroller of the company. In
the complaint, Medina and Ong alleged that Cosem de Aboitiz went to the Pepsi-Cola Plant in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated them with
the use of the following slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the
presence of the plaintiffs’ subordinate employees. De Aboitiz also fired both plaintiffs on such
occasion.
The herein plaintiffs filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation against the defendant Cosme
de Aboitiz but was dismissed. The plaintiffs filed a Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary
of Justice which reversed the resolution of the Provincial Fiscal and directing him to file against
defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an information for Grave Slander.
“The Court agreed with defendants that the complaint alleges unfair labor practices which under Art.
217 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1691, has vested original and exclusive jurisdiction to
Labor Arbiters, and Art. 248, thereof . . . ‘which may include claims for damages and other affirmative
reliefs.’ Under the amendment, therefore, jurisdiction over employee-employer relations and claims of
workers have been removed from the Courts of First Instance. Hence, the case arose from such
employer-employee relationship which under the new Presidential Decree 1691 are under the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.
A motion to reconsider the above order was then filed but denied. Hence, they filed a petition to the
Supreme Court alleging that the respondent court committed an error in divesting itself of its
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case despite the fact that jurisdiction had already attached and by
giving PD 1691 retroactive effect and in holding that labor arbiters have acquired jurisdiction over the
claims for damages arising from employer-employee relationship to the exclusion of the regular
courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs.
RULING:
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is
a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the
case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under
review are based on a wrong premise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case
No. 33150 and render a decision on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.

The plaintiffs also alleged that they were dismissed merely for the alleged delay in the use of Cosme SO ORDERED.
de Aboitiz did not really have a strong reason to humiliate and dismiss them and that he was moved
by evil motives in doing so.

Thereafter, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by the
defendants. They alleged that the complaint for civil damages is clearly not based on an employer-
employee relationship but on the manner of plaintiffs’ dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom.
However, the trial court denied the motion. According to the court, the mere asking for reinstatement
does not remove from the CFI jurisdiction over the damages. The case must involve unfair labor
practices to bring it within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC).

The defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint based on the promulgation of
P.D. No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Blg.
70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the Labor Code.
SOLIMAN SECURITY SERVICES, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO
VALENZUELA, respondents.
Respondent Eduardo Valenzuela, a security guard, was a regular employee of petitioner Soliman
Security Services assigned at the BPI-Family Bank, Pasay City. On 09 March 1995, he received a
memorandum from petitioners relieving him from his post at the bank, said to be upon the latters
request, and requiring him to report to the security agency for reassignment. The following month, or
on 07 April 1995, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground that his services
were terminated without a valid cause and that, during his tenure at the bank, he was not paid his
overtime pay, 13th month pay, and premium pay for services rendered during holidays and rest days.
He averred that, after receiving the memorandum of 09 March 1995, he kept on reporting to the office
of petitioners for reassignment but, except for a brief stint in another post lasting for no more than a
week, he was put on a floating status.
Petitioners contended that the relief of respondent from his post, made upon request of the client, was
merely temporary and that respondent had been offered a new post but the latter refused to accept it.
Petitioners argued that respondents floating status for barely 29 days did not constitute constructive
dismissal.
On 31 July 1995, the Labor Arbiter, Ariel Cadiente Santos, arrived at a decision holding petitioners
guilty of constructive dismissal and ordering the reinstatement of the complainant to his former
position with full backwages from the date of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement; directing the
Research and Information Unit to compute the various monetary benefits awarded to the complainant;
and adjudging the payment, by way of attorneys fees, of ten percent (10%) of all sums owing to the
complainant.
On 16 October 1998, petitioners filed an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On 11 November 1998, the NLRC issued an order directing petitioners to submit an affidavit to the
effect that their appeal bond was genuine and that it would be in force and effect until the final
disposition of the case. In his reply memorandum, dated 28 November 1998, respondent,
asseverating that petitioners failed to deposit the required bond for the appeal, sought the appeal to
be declared as not having been validly perfected. On 19 January 1999, petitioners submitted a
manifestation and affidavit in compliance with the 11th November 1998 order of the NLRC. i
Apparently satisfied, the NLRC, on 30 April 1999, gave due course to the appeal and rendered the
presently assailed decision, reversing that of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE.
A motion for reconsideration, filed by herein private respondent Valenzuela, was denied by the NLRC.
Valenzuela forthwith brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals. On the thesis that the only issue
interposed was whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it took
cognizance of the appeal and reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter despite the failure of herein
petitioners to validly post the appeal bond, the appellate court responded in the affirmative, set aside
the assailed decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. A motion to reconsider the
decision was denied.
In the instant recourse before this Court, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals (Eleventh
Division) has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioners to have failed in perfecting their appeal with the NLRC.
This Court finds merit in the petition.
Private respondent would posit that the appeal of petitioners to the NLRC should be considered to
have been made on 19 January 1999 (when petitioner submitted, pursuant to the NLRC order, a
statement under oath to the effect that the surety bond it had posted was genuine and confirmed it to
be in effect until the final termination of the case) which was beyond the ten-day period for perfecting
an appeal. The records before the Court would show, however, that an appeal bond was posted with
the NLRC at the same time that the appeal memorandum of petitioners was filed on 16 October 1998.
A certified true copy of the appeal bond ii would indicate that it was received by the Commission on 16
October 1998, the date reflected by the stamp-mark thereon. The surety bond issued by the
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation bore the date of 14 October 1998 or two days before the
appeal memorandum was seasonably filed on 16 October 1998. The Order, iii dated 11 November
1998, of the NLRC categorically stated that records [would] disclose that the instant appeal [was]
accompanied by a surety bond, as the Decision sought to be appealed involved a monetary award.
The NLRC, in fact, ordered petitioner to submit an affidavit to confirm that its appeal bond was
genuine and would be in force and effect until the final disposition of the case. The Commissions
declaration that the appeal was accompanied by a surety bond indicated that there had been
compliance with Article 223iv of the Labor Code.
An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant files the memorandum of appeal, pays the
required appeal fee and, where an employer appeals and a monetary award is involved, the latter
posts an appeal bond or submits a surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company. v In line with
the desired objective of labor laws to have controversies promptly resolved on their merits, the
requirements for perfecting appeals are given liberal interpretation and construction. vi
The only issue on the merits of the case is whether or not private respondent should be deemed
constructively dismissed by petitioner for having been placed on floating status, i.e., with no
reassignment, for a period of 29 days. The question posed is not new. In the case of Superstar
Security Agency, Inc., vs. NLRC,vii this Court, addressing a similar issue, has said:
x x x The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The records show that a month after
Hermosa was placed on a temporary off-detail, she readily filed a complaint against the petitioners on
the presumption that her services were already terminated. Temporary off-detail is not equivalent to
dismissal. In security parlance, it means waiting to be posted. It is a recognized fact that security
guards employed in a security agency may be temporarily sidelined as their assignments primarily
depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties (Agro Commercial Security
Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 82823-24, 31 July 1989). However, it must be emphasized
that such temporary inactivity should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency
concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal.viii
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain, on the part
of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego
continued employment.ix The temporary off-detail of respondent Valenzuela is not such a case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
RODENTO NAVARRO, ANTONIO BOCABAL and JULIAN R. DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), ARACELI CORNEJO and OLIMPIO
BRETON, Respondents.
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the decision promulgated on July 29, 1993, by
public respondent in NLRC NCR Case No. 003279-92, and its resolution dated April 11, 1994, which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
Petitioners allege that they were jeepney drivers of private respondent Araceli Cornejo on boundary
system. They regularly ply the jeepneys assigned to them for eleven hours a day, five times a week
and each of them earn an average of P350.00 daily.
On April 20, 1991, when petitioners Rodento Navarro and Antonio Bocabal were about to get the keys
of their respective jeepneys, private respondent Olimpio Breton, the dispatcher, told them that they
cannot go out on the usual working hours of 5 PM to 4 AM (night shift) because their working hours
were moved to a new schedule of work, 7 PM to 6 AM. Expecting that the sudden change of working
hours will adversely affect their earnings, Navarro, Bocabal and seven other night shift drivers
decided not to ply their routes that day to protest the sudden change of working hours. Petitioner
Julian De Guzman reported to work as usual. However, he cut short his trip because he allegedly felt
dizzy and suffered stomach pain.
The following day, all the drivers who participated in the protest action were summoned by Breton and
were meted a one-day suspension but were asked to pay the boundary for April 20. However, Breton
promised to restore the night shift hours to 5 PM to 4 AM.
On April 23, 1991, petitioners were surprised to find somebody else were assigned to their respective
jeepneys. Breton told petitioners to look for work elsewhere, although the other drivers who
participated in the protest action were allowed to work.
For their part, private respondents claim that on April 20, 1991, at about 5:45 PM, Breton advised the
night shift drivers to take out the jeepneys at 7 PM. This action was made considering that the regular
hours were no longer observed by the drivers. Frequently, the jeepneys were no longer checked-up
because immediately after the day shift drivers return the jeepneys at around 6 PM, the night shift
drivers take them out without giving time for inspection. Because of this strict implementation of time
of work, the night shift drivers left the compound and convinced other drivers to stop their operation.
As a consequence, the jeepneys were not taken out that night resulting in the loss of income to the
operator.
On April 21, 1991, Breton met with the night shift drivers wherein they agreed that the working hours
starting the next day would be from 5 AM to 4 PM for the day shift, and 5 PM to 4 AM for the night
shift. Nonetheless, the night shift drivers were not able to drive their units on that day since Breton
advised the day shift and extra drivers to continue driving the units. This was a precautionary step in
the event the regular drivers would continue their strike as what happened in December 1990 when
all the drivers went on strike for five days.
Private respondents also claim that they were surprised petitioners never returned to work. Since their
business is imbued with public interest, extra drivers were made to drive the jeepneys assigned to
petitioners. They maintain that no new drivers were hired to replace petitioners. It was only on June 7,
1991, after the first hearing of this complaint, when petitioners made clear their refusal to return to
work before the labor arbiter that replacements for them were hired. Private respondents insist that
petitioners were not dismissed but abandoned their work.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
On May 15, 1991, petitioners filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The minutes of the proceedings indicate that the counsel for private respondents informed
the labor arbiter of the willingness of private respondents to take petitioners back. Petitioners
reportedly turned down private respondents’ offer since the drivers just want separation pay.
On June 28, 1991, petitioners amended their complaint in which they sought payment for severance
pay, backwages, with 12% legal interest per annum; P50,000.00 to each complainant for moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On November 26, 1991, the labor arbiter rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and decreed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are ordered to pay complainants: RODENTO
NAVARRO separation pay in the amount of P40,950.00 (9 yrs. P350 x 13 days x 9 yrs.); ANTONIO
BOCABAL separation pay in the amount of P22,750.00 (5 yrs. P350.00 x 13 days x 5 yrs.) and
JULIAN DE GUZMAN separation pay in the amount of P31,850.00 (7 yrs. P350.00 x 13 days x 7 yrs.)
and the equivalent of 10% of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees in the amount of P9,555.00
(10% of 95,550.00).
SO ORDERED." 1
On April 3, 1992, private respondents were served a copy of the decision of the labor arbiter.
Aggrieved, they filed on April 13, 1992 with NLRC their memorandum on appeal. Nevertheless, it was
only on April 30, 1992 , that private respondents filed the appeal bond. Unfortunately, the aforesaid
bond was later discovered to be spurious because the person who signed it was no longer connected
with the insurance company for more than ten years already. It was only on July 20, 1993, that private
respondents posted a substitute bond issued by another company in the amount of P95,550.00.
In a decision dated July 29, 1993, public respondent ruled for private respondents,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and another
entered directing the complainants, under pain of losing their employment, to report back to work
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED." 2
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I beyond the ten-day reglementary period, a procedural lapse admitted by private respondents. Private
"IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE ABANDONED THEIR JOBS;
II
IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS WAS WITHOUT NOTICE AND
HEARING.
III
IN ACTING ON THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN THE DECISION HAS
BECOME FINAL FOR NON-FILING OF A SUPERSEDEAS BOND WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD TO APPEAL." 3
We shall first discuss the third issue raised by the petitioners inasmuch as it deals with a jurisdictional
question.
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executory. Such requirement cannot be trifled with. 4
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of such decisions, awards, or orders.
x x x receipt of the decision. Hence, the decision became immutable and it can no longer be amended nor
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph
x x x In view of the foregoing disposition, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this
Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of appeal
containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought
and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal bond. In case where the judgment involves a
monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC. 5 The amount of the
bond must be equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
The records indicate that private respondents received the copy of labor arbiter’s decision on April 3,
1992, hence, they had only until April 13, 1992 to perfect their appeal. While private respondents filed
their memorandum of appeal on time, they posted surety bond only on April 30, 1992, which is
respondents’ failure to post the required appeal bond within the prescribed period is inexcusable. 6
Worse, the appeal bond was bogus having been issued by an officer no longer connected for a long
time with the bonding company. Unfortunately, this irregularity was not sufficiently explained by
private respondents. For sure, they cannot avoid responsibility by disavowing any knowledge of its
fictitiousness for they were required to secure bond only from reputable companies. Corollary, they
should have ensured that the bond is genuine, otherwise, the purpose of requiring the posting of
bond, that is, to guarantee the payment of valid and legal claims against the employer, would not be
served.
We are mindful of the fact that this Court, in a number of cases, 7 has relaxed this requirement on
grounds of substantial justice and special circumstances of the case. However, we find no cogent
reason to apply this same liberal interpretation herein when the bond posted was not genuine. In this
case, there is really no bond posted since a fake or expired bond is in legal contemplation merely a
scrap of paper. It should be stressed that the intention of lawmakers to make the bond an
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the
provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond. The word ‘only’ makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or
surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be
perfected. 8
As the appeal filed by private respondents was not perfected within the reglementary period, the
running of the prescriptive period for perfecting an appeal was not tolled. 9 Consequently, the
decision of the labor arbiter became final and executory upon the lapse of ten calendar days from
altered by the labor tribunal. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely posting of appeal bond is an
indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law, the NLRC has no
authority to entertain the appeal, much less to set aside the decision of the labor arbiter in this case.
Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. 10
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision rendered on July 29, 1993,
by public respondent and its Resolution dated April 11, 1994, are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Labor Arbiter dated November 26, 1991, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondents.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.

CESARIO L. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant petition stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner, Cesario L. del Rosario, against
herein respondent, Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), for illegal dismissal with money claims.
Petitioner claims that he was hired by PJI as a libel scanner in March 1997 and was receiving the
benefits and privileges of a regular managerial employee of the newspaper and magazine company.
On April 6, 1999, petitioner received a notice of termination of employment from respondent.
According to petitioner, the termination of his services was illegal for want of just or authorized cause
and for non-compliance with procedural requirements prior to his dismissal.1
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that petitioner was hired only as a consultant whose term of
employment was deemed renewed on a month-to-month basis, unless either party opted for its
termination by a written notice of at least five (5) days before the end of any month, based on the
contract of employment issued by the company on April 15, 2007.2
On November 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 3 in favor of petitioner.
Respondent elevated its case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On January 6,
2003, it filed its memorandum of appeal together with the appeal bond issued by Philippine Pryce
Assurance Corporation (PPAC).5
On December 15, 2003, the NLRC issued a resolution 6 dismissing the appeal for failure to perfect the
same due to the posting of the appeal bond from a bonding company not duly accredited by the
Court. The NLRC stated that PPAC was not authorized by the Supreme Court to transact business
with courts anywhere in the Philippines since December 2, 2002, per Certification of the Office of the
Court Administrator.7
On January 23, 2004, respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion
for reconsideration, alleging that it had no knowledge that PPAC was no longer authorized to transact
business with the courts.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Acting on the motion and in a bid of liberality, the NLRC issued a resolution8 on February 23, 2004,
directing respondent to post a new bond, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents [PJI] are now directed to post a new bond
accompanied by all requisites as provided in Sec. 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the
Commission in lieu of bond posted herein within an unextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt
hereof. Otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed.
No further motions of this nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent failed to comply. Thus, on March 31, 2005, the NLRC issued a resolution10 dismissing
the appeal for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Court of Appeals (CA). On November 29, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision, 11 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the public respondent are
SET ASIDE.
Public Respondent NLRC is directed to admit the appeal and decide the same on the merits.
Petitioner [PJI] is directed to replace the surety bond it posted with a new one to be obtained from a
bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing PJI's appeal based on
an erroneous finding that the surety bond respondent posted was void. The CA ratiocinated that at
the time the subject bond was issued, PPAC was still authorized to issue the same. The CA found
that the Supreme Court placed PPAC on a blacklist only on October 9, 2003, while the Chairperson of
the NLRC cancelled PPAC's accreditation on November 3, 2003. When PJI obtained the surety bond
on January 2, 2003, PPAC was still existing and duly accredited by the Court. Thus, there was no
legal basis to dismiss PJI's appeal because it had actually posted a valid bond. 13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 24, 2008, the CA issued a
Resolution14 denying the same for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presented the following issues for resolution of the Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW AND WENT
AGAINST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE:
(A) IN SETTING ASIDE THE NLRC RESOLUTIONS DISMISSING RESPONDENT PJI'S
DEFECTIVE APPEAL FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH, AMONG OTHERS, THE REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD TO APPEAL AND THE REQUISITE OF POSTING AN APPEAL BOND;
(B) IN ORDERING THE NLRC TO ADMIT RESPONDENT PJI'S DEFECTIVE APPEAL AND TO
DECIDE THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS;
(C) IN DIRECTING RESPONDENT PJI TO REPLACE WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM NOTICE THE
DEFECTIVE SURETY BOND IT POSTED AS ITS APPEAL BOND WITH A NEW BOND TO BE
OBTAINED FROM A BONDING COMPANY DULY ACCREDITED BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
(D) IN REMANDING THE CASE TO THE NLRC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, INSTEAD OF
AFFIRMING THE NLRC RESOLUTIONS DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT PJI ON
LEGAL AND JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS.15
The issues need not be belabored. We find no reversible error committed by the CA in issuing the
assailed decision and resolution. Based on substantial evidence on record, the CA found that at the
time the bond was issued by PPAC, it was still authorized to issue bonds.16
Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases of judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Appurtenant thereto, Section 6, Rule VI of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC17 provides:
SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond. The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.
In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by
the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be accompanied by:
(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding company, attesting
that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.
(b) a copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and bonding company; and
(c) a copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.
A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the appellee who shall verify
the regularity and genuineness thereof and immediately report to the Commission any irregularity.
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine, the Commission shall
cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of
a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding
paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
The filing of a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.18 The
requirement that employers post a cash or surety bond to perfect their appeal is apparently intended
to assure workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor
upon the dismissal of the former's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an
appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligations to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims. 19
At the time of the filing of the surety bond by PJI on January 2, 2003, PPAC was still an accredited
bonding company. Thus, it was but proper to honor the appeal bond issued by a bonding company
duly accredited by this Court at the time of its issuance. The subsequent revocation of the authority of
a bonding company should not prejudice parties who relied on its authority. The revocation of
authority of a bonding company is prospective in application.
Still, the Court takes due notice of the opportunity given to PJI to post a new bond issued by an
accredited bonding company in the NLRC resolution dated February 23, 2004. Yet, PJI insisted on
the validity of the bond it had filed despite the fact the PPAC was no longer accredited to act as a
surety. This notwithstanding, guided by the principle that technical rules of procedure should not
hamper the quest for justice and truth, this Court deems it prudent that the case be reviewed and
decided on the merits, in view of the question on the employer-employee relationship of the parties
and its resultant legal consequences. But, so as not to prejudice the rights of petitioner in this case,
the Court reiterates the CA directive for PJI to post a new bond issued by an accredited bonding
company.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89513
are hereby AFFIRMED.
The National Labor Relations Commission is DIRECTED to GIVE DUE COURSE to the appeal and
decide the case on the merits with dispatch, upon the filing by respondent, within ten (10) days from
finality of this decision, of a bond issued by an accredited bonding company.
SO ORDERED.

ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner, v. EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E.
GANZON, INC., Respondents.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
On October 4, 2002, Andrew James McBurnie (McBurnie), an Australian national, instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against Eulalio Ganzon, EGI-Managers,
Inc., and E. Ganzon, Inc., (respondents). McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he signed a 5-year
employment agreement with the company EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the
management of the company hotels and resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the
company until sometime in November 1999, when he figured in an accident that compelled him to go
back to Australia while recuperating from his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by
respondent Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended project would no
longer push through.
The respondents contend that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a
company for the management of the hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee
relationship, and the execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie was
solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an alien work permit in the Philippines, and that
McBurnie had not obtained a work permit.
On September 30, 2004, the Labor Arbiter (LA) declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed
from employment. The respondents filed their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond,
and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. They claimed that an award of more than
P60 Million Pesos to a single foreigner who had no work permit and who left the country for good one
month after the purported commencement of his employment was a patent nullity.
On March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond explaining that in cases involving
monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the LA decision to the Commission is unconditionally
required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond equivalent to the monetary award.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents appealed to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition (with extremely urgent prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90845.
The NLRC dismissed their appeal due to respondent's failure to post the required additional bond.
The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on June 30, 2006. This prompted
respondents to filed with the CA the Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R SP No. 95916, which
was later consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 90845
The CA granted the respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction on February 16, 2007.
It directed the NLRC, McBurnie, and all persons acting for and under their authority to refrain from
causing the execution and enforcement of the LA decision in favor of McBurnie, conditioned upon the
respondents posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000,000.00. The reconsideration of issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction sought by McBurnie was denied by the CA.
McBurnie filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 178034 and
178117) assailing the CA resolutions that granted the respondent's; application for the injunctive writ.
On July 4, 2007, the Court denied the petition. A motion for reconsideration was denied with a finality
on October 7, 2007.
McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and (2) to
Admit the Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 2,
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the motion for leave was denied by the Court and the July 4,
2007 became final and executor on November 13, 2007.
On October 27, 2008, the CA ruled on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 90845 and CA-G.R. SP No.
95916 and rendered a decision allowing the respondent's motion to reduce appeal bond and directing
the NLRC to give due course to their appeal. The CA also ruled that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in immediately denying the motion without fixing an appeal bond in an amount that
was reasonable, as it denied the respondents of their right to appeal from the decision of the LA.
McBurnie filed a motion for reconsideration. The respondents moved that the appeal be resolved on
the merits by the CA. The CA denied both motions. McBurnie then filed with the Supreme Court the
Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. Nos. 186984-85)
The NLRC, acting on the CA order of remand, accepted the appeal from the LA decision and
reversed and set aside the decision of the LA, and entered a new on dismissing McBurnie complaint.
On September 18, 2009, the third division of this court rendered its decision granting respondents
motion to reduce appeal bond. This Court also reinstated and affirmed the NLRC decision dismissing
respondent's appeal for failure to perfect an appeal and denying their motion for reconsideration. The
aforementioned decision became final and executor on March 14, 2012.
The respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Motion for Reconsideration, with an
attached Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Refer These Cases to the Honorable Court En
Banc. The Court En Banc accepted the case from the third division and issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the LA Decision. McBurnie filed a Motion for
Reconsideration where he invoked that the Court September 18, 2009 decision had become final and
executor.

ISSUE: Whether or not McBurnie was illegally dismissed?
HELD: There was no employer-employee relationship.
REMEDIAL LAW: second motion for reconsideration
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as
a general rule, prohibited.Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that n]o second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. The rule rests
on the basic tenet of immutability of judgments.t some point, a decision becomes final and executory
and, consequently, all litigations must come to an end./span>
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of
settled exceptions. In a line of cases, the Court has then entertained and granted second motions for
reconsideration n the higher interest of substantial justice,as allowed under the Internal Rules when
the assailed decision is legally erroneous,patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. In Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-
Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), we also explained that a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed
in instances of xtraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave shall have been
obtained.In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, we allowed a second motion for
reconsideration as the issue involved therein was a matter of public interest, as it pertained to the
proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right in the government implementation of its
agrarian reform program.In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the Court set aside the decisions of the
LA and the NLRC that favored claimants-security guards upon the Court review of San Miguel
Corporation second motion for reconsideration.In Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC, et al., the Court en banc reversed on a third motion for reconsideration the ruling of the Court
Division on therein private respondentsclaim for wages and monetary benefits.
The instant case qualifies as an exception to, first, the proscription against second and subsequent
motions for reconsideration, and second, the rule on immutability of judgments; a reconsideration of
the Decision dated September 18, 2009, along with the Resolutions dated December 14, 2009 and
January 25, 2012, is justified by the higher interest of substantial justice.
In League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections, we reiterated a ruling that
when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court,
the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration.In such a case, the
second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. Similarly in this case, there was
then no reason for the Court to still consider the respondent's second motion for reconsideration as a
prohibited pleading, and deny it plainly on such ground.The Court intends to remedy such error
through this resolution.
Upon review, the Court is constrained to rule differently on the petitions.We have determined the
grave error in affirming the NLRC rulings, promoting results that are patently unjust for the
respondents, as we consider the facts of the case, pertinent law, jurisprudence, and the degree of the
injury and damage to the respondents that will inevitably result from the implementation of the Court
Decision dated September 18, 2009.
LABOR LAW: rule on appeal bonds
The crucial issue in this case concerns the sufficiency of the appeal bond that was posted by the
respondents. The present rule on the matter is Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, which was substantially the same provision in effect at the time of the respondents appeal
to the NLRC, and which reads: No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious
grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding
paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
While the CA, in this case, allowed an appeal bond in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 and
then ordered the case remand to the NLRC, this Court Decision dated September 18, 2009 provides
otherwise, as it reads in part: While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is
subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant,
otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash
bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety
bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period.If the NLRC does eventually grant the
motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to reduce
the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period.
To begin with, the Court rectifies its prior pronouncement the unqualified statement that even an
appellant who seeks a reduction of an appeal bond before the NLRC is expected to post a cash or
surety bond securing the full amount of the judgment award within the 10-day reglementary period to
perfect the appeal.
LABOR LAW: suspension of the period to perfect the appeal upon the filing of a motion to
reduce bond
To clarify, the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the filing of a motion to reduce
bond, coupled with compliance with the two conditions emphasized in Garcia v. KJ Commercial for
the grant of such motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount, shall suffice to suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal from the labor arbiter
decision to the NLRC. To require the full amount of the bond within the 10-day reglementary period
would only render nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to seek a reduction of the
bond.
The rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule. In Intertranz Container Lines, Inc. v. Bautista,
the Court held: Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an appeal from a decision involving a
monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond.The Court, however,
has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve
controversies on their merits.These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of
substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special
circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.
A serious error of the NLRC was its outright denial of the motion to reduce the bond, without even
considering the respondent's arguments and totally unmindful of the rules and jurisprudence that
allow the bond reduction.Instead of resolving the motion to reduce the bond on its merits, the NLRC
insisted on an amount that was equivalent to the monetary award.
When the respondents sought to reconsider, the NLRC still refused to fully decide on the motion.It
refused to at least make a preliminary determination of the merits of the appeal.
LABOR LAW: allowance of the reduction of appeal bonds
Time and again, the Court has cautioned the NLRC to give Article 223 of the Labor Code, particularly
the provisions requiring bonds in appeals involving monetary awards, a liberal interpretation in line
with the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits.
Although the general rule provides that an appeal in labor cases from a decision involving a monetary
award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond, the Court has relaxed this
requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their
merits.These circumstances include: (1) the fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (2) the
prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case
combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. Guidelines that are applicable
in the reduction of appeal bonds were also explained in Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation. The
bond requirement in appeals involving monetary awards has been and may be relaxed in meritorious
cases, including instances in which (1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2)
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or
good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period.
It is in this light that the Court finds it necessary to set a parameter for the litigantsand the NLRC
guidance on the amount of bond that shall hereafter be filed with a motion for a bond reduction.To
ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give parties the
chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however defeating
the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to reduce bond that are
to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to
10% of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the
reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant motion is pending resolution by the
Commission.In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the monetary award, for the purpose of computing
the necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and attorney fees. Only after the posting of a
bond in the required percentage shall an appellant period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules
be deemed suspended.
The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the NLRC exercise of its discretion, given
that the percentage of bond that is set by this guideline shall be merely provisional. The NLRC retains
its authority and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of bond that shall be
posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable
amount Should the NLRC, after considering the motion merit, determine that a greater amount or the
full amount of the bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply
accordingly.The appellant shall be given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within
which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
LABOR LAW: employment permit for non-resident aliens; illegal dismissal
Considering that McBurnie, an Australian, alleged illegal dismissal and sought to claim under our
labor laws, it was necessary for him to establish, first and foremost, that he was qualified and duly
authorized to obtain employment within our jurisdiction.A requirement for foreigners who intend to
work within the country is an employment permit, as provided under Article 40, Title II of the Labor
Code.
In WPP Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Galera, we held that a foreign national failure to seek an
employment permit prior to employment poses a serious problem in seeking relief from the Court.
Clearly, this circumstance on the failure of McBurnie to obtain an employment permit, by itself,
necessitates the dismissal of his labor complaint.
McBurnie failed to present any employment permit which would have authorized him to obtain
employment in the Philippines.This circumstance negates McBurnie claim that he had been
performing work for the respondents by virtue of an employer-employee relationship.The absence of
the employment permit instead bolsters the claim that the supposed employment of McBurnie was
merely simulated, or did not ensue due to the non-fulfillment of the conditions that were set forth in
the letter of May 11, 1999.
McBurnie failed to present other competent evidence to prove his claim of an employer-employee
relationship. iven the partiesconflicting claims on their true intention in executing the agreement, it
was necessary to resort to the established criteria for the determination of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee conduct. The rule of thumb
remains: the onus probandi falls on the claimant to establish or substantiate the claim by the requisite
quantum of evidence.Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his
or her right thereto. McBurnie failed in this regard.As previously observed by the NLRC, McBurnie
even failed to show through any document such as payslips or vouchers that his salaries during the
time that he allegedly worked for the respondents were paid by the company. In the absence of an
employer-employee relationship between McBurnie and the respondents, McBurnie could not
successfully claim that he was dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, by the latter.Even granting
that there was such an employer-employee relationship, the records are barren of any document
showing that its termination was by the respondentsdismissal of McBurnie.

The complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED.
Grand Asian Shipping Lines v. Galvez
G.R. No. 178184; January 29, 2014
Facts:
 Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc (GASLI) is a domestic corporation engaged in
transporting liquified petroleum gas (LPG) from Petron’s refinery in Bataan to Pasig and
Cavite.
 Respondents are crewmembers of one of GASLI’s vessels, M/T Dorothy Uno.
 On January 2000, Richard Abis (vessel’s oiler) reported to GASLI an alleged illegal activity
being committed by respondent who would misdeclare the consume fuel in the Engineer’s
Voyage Reports and the save fuel oil were sold to other vessel out at sea (at nighttime).
Profits would be divided amongst themselves.
 After investigation, from the period of June 30, 1999 to Feb 15, 2000 the fuel it consumption
was overrate by 6,954.3 liters amounting to 74,737.86.
 Acting upon the anomaly, GASLI placed respondents under preventive suspension and after
conducting administrative hearings decided to terminate them for breach of trust, commission
of crime against employer.
 Respondents filed with the NLRC separate complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal,
underpayment/nonpayment of salaries/wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and
rest day, service incentive pay, tax refunds and indemnities for damages and attorney’s fees
against petitioner.
 On August 30, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision finding the dismissal of 21
complainants to be illegal.
 Petitioner then filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Bond before the NLRC citing
economic depression, legality of termination, and compliance with labor standards. NLRC
denied petitioner’s motion to reduce bond and directed an additional bond.
 Despite petitioner’s failure the pay the bond, NLRC found the appeal meritorious and ruled for
petitioners. Stating that the dismissal was valid with the exception of Sales.
 NLRC struck down the monetary awards given by the Labor Arbiter as they were based on
computations made by respondents.
 On appeal to the CA, the court ruled in favor of respondent stating that the NLRC’s decision
had jurisdictional error since petitioner did not comply with the additional bond.
LABOR LAW
Issue:
I. WON the CA erred in holding that respondents were illegally dismissed
II. WON the CA erred when it concluded petitioner were not able to perfect the appeal of the Labor
Arbitrer’s decision
Held/Ratio:
I. No, the CA did not commit any error in finding that respondent’s were illegally dismissed. According
to the termination notice, respondents were dismissed based on the grounds of (a) serious
misconduct (b) engaging in pilferage wile navigating at sea (c) willful breach of the trust reposed by
the company (d) commission of a crime against their employer. After examination of the evidence, the
court finds that petitioners failed to substantiate the charges of pilferage against respondents. The
quantum of proof that should be presented is substantial evidence. Mere filing of formal charge does
not automatically make dismissal valid. The affidavit executed simply contained accusations while
allegations remained uncorroborated. Also there is no sufficient evidence to show respondents
participation in the commission of the crime.
Respondent’s termination due to loss of trust and confidence should have a distinction
between managerial and rank and file employees. Rank-and-file employees require proof of
involvement while managerial employees mere existence of a basis for belief is sufficient. Given that
Galvez and Gruta have managerial positions there is some basis for the loss of employer’s
confidence—regarding the overstatement of fuel consumption without any evidence to the contrary.
While the others, who are ordinary rank and file employees, were not proven to have any involvement
in the loss of the vessel’s fuel. Rendering their dismissals illegal. The employer bears the burden of
proof in illegal dismissal cases thus the employer must first establish by substantial evidence the fact
of dismissal.
With regard to the contention of the Labor Arbiter’s Authority to impose the penalty of double
indemnity for violations of the Minimum Wage Law. Petitioner’s contention is untenable since there is
no provision in RA 6727 or RA 8188 that precludes that labor from imposing the penalty of double
indemnity against employers. Article 217 of the Labor Code gives the labor arbiter jurisdiction over
cases of termination disputes and those cases accompanied with a claim of reinstatement.
The Labor arbiter erred in awarding damages by lumping, moral, actual, and exemplary
damages. These should rest on different jural foundations and must independently identified and
justified.
Glaze and Gruta, as managerial employees, are not entitled to claims for holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and premium pay for holiday and restday—according to Art. 82 of the Labor
Code. The same way the other rank-and-file employees cannot be classified as field personnel under
Article 82 of the Labor Code. According to Article 82, “non-agricultural employees who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.” Here,
respondents remain inside a vessel and were constantly supervised under effective control of a ship
captain. Also they cannot claim to be entitled of these because they have already been paid all the
days of the month, which include benefits. As for the overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and
rest day, no evidence was presented to prove that they worked in excess of the regular working
hours. For their claim of service incentive leave pay, respondents did not specify what year they were
not paid—in accordance with Art. 95.
II. Yes, the CA erred in holding that there was no compliance on the part of petitioner regarding the
appeal bonds. According to Art. 223 of the Labor Code, the posting of a bond, either in cash or surety,
must be in the amount equivalent to them entry award.
Nonetheless, the court held that rules should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense—the same
in labor cases were substantial merits serve the interest of justice. In this case, the petitioner appeals
from the awarding of 7,104,483.84 to respondents and only complied with the posting of 500,000
PHP. We find this to be in substantial compliance with the Labor Code.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin
Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed
between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22,
1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner
on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of
Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the management of the business.
Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the
parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the SC were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action for certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in
relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed
to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is
particularly concerned here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals
by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of the
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
REBECCA R. VELOSO, Petitioner, v. CHINA AIRLINES, LTD., K.Y. CHANG and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), Respondents.
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution of the NLRC promulgated on
January 2, 1992 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-02329-87, setting aside the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter that found private respondents guilty of unfair labor practice, declared the dismissal of
petitioner as illegal, and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages and damages.
Petitioner was employed as supervisor of the ticketing section at the Manila branch office of
respondent China Airlines Ltd. (CAL). At the ticketing section, petitioner was assisted by a senior
ticketing agent, Eleanor Go; and two ticketing agents, Julie Chua and Josephine Lobendino.
On October 29, 1986, private respondent K.Y. Chang, then district manager of the Manila branch
office of CAL, informed petitioner that management had decided to temporarily close its ticketing
section in order to prevent further losses. Petitioner's three assistants were likewise notified that they
too will be temporarily laid off from employment effective October 30, 1986.
Thereafter, CAL decided to permanently close said ticketing section. Thus, on November 5, 1986,
petitioner and her staff members were informed that their recent lay-off from employment will be
considered permanent, effective one month from receipt of such notice. A notice of said retrenchment
was filed with the labor department on November 11, 1986.
Later, petitioner was advised to claim her retirement pay and other benefits. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner sent a letter to private respondent Chang assailing the validity of her termination from the
service.
On July 1, 1987, petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and
attorney's fees.1cräläwvirtualibräry
In a decision dated June 8, 1990, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and decreed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring respondents China Airlines, Inc. and K. Y. Chang guilty of unfair labor practice and
ordering them to cease and desist from further committing said acts or similar acts of unfair labor
practice/s;
(2) Declaring the dismissal of complainant Rebecca Veloso as illegal and ordering respondents China
Airlines, Inc. and K. Y. Chang to reinstate her to her former position, or to a substantially equivalent
position, without loss of seniority rights and to pay her, jointly and severally, backwages from the time
she was effectively dismissed on October 29, 1986 until June 8, 1990, the date of this Decision and
other benefits which she would have had received had she not been illegally dismissed, in the amount
as set forth below;
(3) Ordering respondents to pay, jointly and severally, complainant, within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Decision the total sum of FOUR MILLION THREE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TWENTY (P4,326,520.00) PESOS broken as follows:
(a) P731,560.00 - representing her back monthly salary in the amount of P16,440.00 from October
29, 1986 and every month thereafter until June 8, 1990, the date of Decision;
(b) P65,760.00 - representing her 13th month pay in the amount of P16,440.00 per year for the years
1986,1987, 1988 and 1989;
(c) P24,600.00 - representing her Mid-year bonus in the amount of P8,200.00 per year for the years
1987, 1988 and 1989;
(d) P8,000.00 - representing the cash equivalent of her yearly medical hospitalization benefits in the
amount of P2,000.00 per year for the years 1986, 1987 and 1989;
(e) P6,600.00 - representing her monthly transportation allowance of P150.00 per month beginning
October 1986 and every month thereafter until June 6, 1990, the date of this Decision;
(f) P2,000,000.00 - as moral damages;
(g) P1,000,000.00 - as exemplary damages
(h) P240,000.00 - as attorney's fees, and
(i) P10,000.00 - as litigation expenses.
(4) Further, respondent are hereby directed to show, within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision,
proof of compliance as to the reinstate aspect of this Decision as compulsorily mandated under the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.
SO ORDERED."2
Dissatisfied with the above judgment, private respondents appealed to the NLRC which in its
resolution dated January 2, 1992, set aside the decision of the labor arbiter. According to public
respondent, the charge of unfair labor practice had no factual and legal basis. It noted that petitioner
was not an elective officer of the union; and she was just an adviser with no formal designation. The
labor tribunal also observed that only those in the ticketing section were affected by the retrenchment
program and not one of the elective union officers were laid off. Hence, public respondent declared
that dismissing a union adviser while retaining all union officers is far from any intent to bust the
union. Accordingly, public respondent ruled that the retrenchment was validly effected and disposed
of the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from dated June 8, 1990, is hereby set aside. The respondent
are however directed to pay the complainant the sum of P428,895.04 as her retrenchment pay.
SO ORDERED."3
Petitioner received copy of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent on January 7,
1992.4 However, instead of filing the required motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari. In doing so, petitioner boldly avers that a recourse to the NLRC via a motion for
reconsideration is futile and will only injure further her rights to a speedy and unbiased judgment of
the case. She did not expect the labor tribunal to rectify itself.
This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of
the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we have consistently held in
numerous cases,5 a motion for reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be
had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. 6 In this case, the plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the impugned
resolution, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned
resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional.7 Hence, the filing of the petition
for certiorari in this case is patently violative of prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without
undue damage to the fundamental doctrine that undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.
Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-
day reglementary period, an order, decision or resolution of the NLRC, becomes final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.8 Hence, the resolution of the NLRC had become
final and executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is concerned, because she admits
under oath having received notice thereof9 on January 7, 1992. The merits of her case may no longer
be reviewed to determine if the public respondent might be faulted for grave abuse of discretion, as
alleged in her petition dated March 14, 1992. Thus, the court has no recourse but to sustain the
respondent's position on jurisdictional and other grounds, that the petition ought not be given due
course and the case should be dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the RESOLUTION of public
respondent NLRC dated January 2, 1992, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.