Title: People v. Genosa, GR No.

135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times,
but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason
why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the
killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the
accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel
or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
 G.R. No. 175605. August 28, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNORLD GARCHITORENA Y
CAMBA A.K.A “JUNIOR”, JOEY PAMPLONA A.K.A “NATO” AND JESSIE GARCIA Y
ADORINO, accused-appellants
Facts:
September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 in the evening, Dulce Borero along with his brother
Mauro Biay y Almarinez was selling “balut” at Sta. Inez Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela
Paz, Biñan, Laguna.
Dulce Borero was about seven (7) arms length away from her brother Mauro Biay.
Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay approached Jessie, the
latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessie’s companions (co-accused) Arnold
Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed
instrument. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself while being stabbed
by the (3) accused, until her brother slumped face down on the ground.
Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away.
Borero claims she wanted to shout but nothing came out from her mouth.
Witness went home to call for her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when they return to the
scene the victim was no longer there as he had been brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital.
Trial Court: Guilty, Court of appeals: Affirmed, Supreme Court: Affirmed and Modifications

Defense:
Joey Pamplona – denied that he participated in the stabbing
Jessie Garcia – defense of alibi
Arnold Garchitorena – defense of insanity
Issue/s:
Is there conspiracy shown in the case? (Art. 8 RPC)
Held:
Yes, accuse appellants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their
common objective. Jessie Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted his arms; in turn,
Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold Garchitorena, strangled Mauro Biay and straddled the
Mauro Biay on the ground, then stabbed him.

List of characters:
Mauro Biay y Almarinez – victim
Dulce Borero – eye witness and victim’s sister
Teodoro Biay – elder brother of Dulce Borero
Dr. Rolando Poblete – physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay
Joey Pamplona – accused
Jessie Garcia – accused
Arnold Garchitorena – accused
Mang Tony – Barangay official
Aling Bel – Mang Tony’s wife
Alfredo Arcega – Barangay Captain
Miguelito Gonzalgo – defense witness
Dr. Evelyn Belen – physician who examined accused Arnold Garchitorena
 Topic: INTENT/MOTIVE
PEOPLE VS. ESPONILLA
June 20, 2003 (404 SCRA 421)
PARTIES:
Plaintiff and Appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendants and Appellant: Felipe Esponilla and Samson Esponilla
FACTS:
1. Felipe Esponilla and Samson Esponilla were convicted of murder by the lower court for shooting
one Jose Eumag at the back with a firearm which caused his immediate death.

2. A criminal case for frustrated murder against the appellants for the shooting of Jose was pending
in the RTC, Branch 36, Iloilo City.

ISSUES:
1. WON the lower court erred in convicting the accused of murder based on one circumstantial
evidence; and

2. WON, granting for the sake of argument that accused are guilty, the lower court erred in finding a
case of murder and not homicide

HELD:
1. NO. Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence. Coupled
with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the
accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. The prosecution
convincingly established that the appellants were driven by a personal grudge against the victim. In
addition, the testimony Enriqueta (wife of the deceased) and the medical officer, taken together,
constitute one unbroken chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the appellants shot
the victim to death.

2. NO. The trial court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified the killing of the victim to
murder. In this case, the victim was in a wide open field, plowing his farm. The attack was a
complete surprise and was unprovoked. There was hardly any risk at all to the appellants. The victim
was plowing his farmland, completely impervious that death was at hand. He was unarmed and was
not in a position to defend himself against the assault of the appellants. Clearly, he was killed in a
treacherous manner.
Facts: Court of First Instance (CFI) convicted Nilo De Jesus and Wilfredo Yalong of murder
qualified by treachery and conspired in killing Feliciano de los Santos. Fernando de los Santos,
son of the victim has testified for the prosecution. According to him, he was awakened by a
shout of the small boy informing him that his father was engaged in a quarrel. He stated in his
testimony that he saw Yalong aiming a gun at his father and when he shouted at him to run the
latter had already fired before he could do so, afterwards de Jesus grabbed the gun and also
shot his father which felled him and caused his death. Petitioners interposed self-defense.
Yalong admitted to shot Feliciano twice after the victim almost stab him with a knife.

Issue: Whether the claim of self-defense be consider or conviction of conspiracy be sustained?

Held: Fernando's testimony that it was De Jesus who shot the victim was found to be
fabricated. Based on the record, Yalong admitted the shooting, corroborated by De Jesus and
another witness, Mrs. Anita Bernales' testimony. It was likewise found that Fernando was the
one who had a previous quarrel with the deceased, thus the former was with motive to harm the
latter. And if conspiracy existed, accused-appellants would not have to do it at the place where
they can be seen conspicuously. The qualifying circumstance of treachery by the lower court
cannot be sustained as Yalong's decision to shoot the deceased appeared to be sudden,
brought about by the latter's unlawful aggression to stab the former by a dagger.Yalong is
entitled to the benefit of the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
inasmuch as there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without any
provocation coming from Yalong, but it was not proven that the means employed by the latter
was reasonably necessary.
De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was MODIFIED to homicide
 PEOPLE v. BINGKY CAMPOS AND DANNY "BOY" ACABO
GR No. 176061 | July 04, 2011
DIVISION
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Although it is a cardinal principle in criminal law that the prosecution
has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits the
commission of the crime and invokes self-defense.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: In an Information was filed by the Assistant Prosecutor of Dumaguete charging Bingky Campos
and Danny Acabo of murder.
On, August 19, 2001 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening at Negros Oriental, Campos and Acabo were
armed with a "plamingco" - a bladed weapon, and by means of treachery, and disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of his age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
stab and wound Romeo Abad.
They, however, denied this. According to them, while on their way to the house of their uncle, Campos
and Acabo met four men who mauled Campos. When Campos was able to run away, they approached
Acabo and kicked his buttocks. Acabo pulled out a knife and thrust it towards one of the men. Acabo then
ran away to escape.
RTC meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced both to reclusion perpetua. The CA found no
error in the appreciation of the evidence and applicable law by the trial court.
Campos and Acabo pray before the Supreme Court for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They claim that the stabbing of the victim
was done in self-defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not Campos and Acabo should be acquitted on the ground that the killing was a result
of self defense.
HELD: No, they should not be acquitted. They are guilty of murder and cannot invoke self defense.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once the accused admits the commission of the
offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He
cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be
doubted especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.
Danny categorically admits that he stabbed Romeo. However, he boldly claims that he did it in self
defense. The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which the accused must
prove by clear and convincing evidence are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused defending himself. The first element of
unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression
from the person injured or killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
SUMMARY FORMAT
Q:Campos and Acabo were charged of Murder. The RTC and CA ruled that they are guilty beyond
reasonable. In their prayer before the Supreme Court, they seek the reversal of their conviction alleging
that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They claim that the stabbing of
the victim was done in self-defense.
A:Campos and Acabo are guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt. It is a rule in criminal cases that the
prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
However, once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has
admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.