G.R. No.
239011, June 17, 2019 Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, v. PACOL DISUMIMBA RASUMAN,
RESPONDENT.
The essential requirement for allowing substantial correction of entries in the civil registry is
that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. Section 3
requires that all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 provide for two sets
of notices to two different potential oppositors, i.e., (1) notice to the persons named in the
petition; and (2) notice to other persons who are not named in the petition, but, nonetheless,
may be considered interested or affected parties. The two sets of notices are mandated
under the above-quoted Section 4 and are validated by Section 5, also above-quoted, which
provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply
with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
In this case, while respondent impleaded the BOC when he amended his petition for
correction of entry, he did not implead the CSC. To stress, the CSC is the central personnel
agency of the government and, as such, keeps and maintains the personal records of all
officials and employees in the civil service. Notwithstanding that respondent knew that the
correction of his date of birth would have an effect on the condition of his employment, he
still did not exert earnest efforts in bringing to court the CSC, and there is no showing that
the CSC was only inadvertently left out. We, therefore, find no basis for the CA's ruling that
respondent's case falls under the exceptional circumstances where the failure to implead
indispensable parties was excused.
G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought
to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”
1
cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
“provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy (CoC) be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen
Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%)
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution
to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path
to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.
Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos.
Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings
as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as
Philippine citizens.
Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523
SCRA 390 (2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
Republic Act [RA] No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship.”
 Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cannot reverse a judicial precedent
Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires
presidential candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years,
it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there
is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one (1)
year.
Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
(CoC) which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material fact
(eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
No. L-25300. January 4, 1974.*
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP OF CHAN TECK LAO. CHAN
TECK LAO, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
Naturalization; Non-retroactivity of a judicial pronouncement that would impose an a
party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at a
time that his application was heard and favorably acted on; Reasons; Case at bar.—As
Professor Freund has put it, the issue ‘involves considerations, not only of principle, but, also,
of practical administration.” In this case, the very same consideration presents itself with equal
validity. To rely on the 1964 Tan Ten Koc ruling which, after all these years, would require that
positive proof as to the paper wherein the application was published in the place where the
proceeding was had being of general application to petitioner-appellant who, as far back as
June 15, 1950, had already been granted his citizenship by this Court, his certificate being
issued two years thereafter, would, in the language of Gan Tsitung, be far from “just, fair and
reasonable.”
2
Same; Same; Equal protection guarantee.—To impose an additional burden for the first
time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was obtained after the
most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after
a long lapse of time, would be clearly to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution,
with its pledge of equal protection, cannot countenance.
Same; Decision of court on matter of citizenship should be given preclusive effect;
Reasons.—Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to litigations, some
authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or
preclusive effect. x x x The same observation holds true with respect to a decision of a court
on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it which is affirmed
by this Court. For the “effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires
that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the parties, the general public and
the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect
and disregard of courts and their decisions and invites litigation.’
No. L-24252. June 15, 1973.
IN RE PETITION TO DECLARE ZITA NGO TO POSSESS ALL QUALIFICATIONS AND
NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT 473 FOR THE PURPOSE OF CANCELLING HER ALIEN
REGISTRY WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION.ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner-
appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Citizenship; Alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipina,
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473.—Under section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of the same law. Likewise,
an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said section 4.
Same; No necessity for alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to naturalization
proceedings for her declaration as a Filipino citizen by reason of marriage.—It is not necessary
for the alien wife of a Filipino citizen to resort to the procedure in naturalization cases before
she can be declared a citizen by reason of her marriage.
Same; Suggested administrative steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen to establish her Filipino citizenship.—"Regarding the steps that should be taken
by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a
petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to
any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
x x x, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order
or decision granting or denying the petition."
Same; No judicial action provided for by law for the declaration of the citizenship of an
individual; Case at bar.—It must be noted that the sole and only purpose of the petition is to
have petitioner declared a Filipino citizen. Under our laws there can be no judicial action or
proceeding for the declaration of the citizenship of an individual. It is as an incident only of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy that a court may pass upon and make
a pronouncement relative to their status.
Same; Definite resolution on the citizenship of an individual by a court or an
administrative agency considered conclusive provided certain requisites are complied with.—
Where the citizenship of a party is definitely resolved by a court or by an administrative
agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a fullblown hearing, with the active
participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding on the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute
conclusive proof of such person's citizenship, in any other case or proceeding. But it is made
clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be
considered conclusive or binding in any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in
accordance with the procedure herein stated.
G.R. No. 188829. June 13, 2016.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, HON. ARTHEL B.
CAROÑONGAN, HON. TEODORO B. DELARMENTE, HON. JOSE D. CABOCHAN, and
HON. FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, petitioners, vs. DAVONN MAURICE C.
HARP, respondent.
Department of Justice; Jurisdiction; As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and
naturalization regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens,” the Department of Justice (DOJ) has the power to authorize the
recognition of citizens of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA
853 (1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may resort to courts
for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is
disturbed in a deportation proceeding.
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.*
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
3
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents. Tecson vs. Commission on
Elections, 424 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 161434, G.R. No. 161634, G.R. No. 161824 March 3,
2004
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s decision on a
disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to, and could well
be taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not (being) justiciable”
controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice President; The statutory set-up under Republic Act No. 1793 would now
be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and
Phrases; Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election
scenario; Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
defined by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly brought
before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an
action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a
man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries,
from simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship,
social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish
regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the
United States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for
the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic
Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise
known as the principle of territoriality, governed.
.
Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and
Phrases; With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens”
had for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The
Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines
was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain
on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands,
resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiring such children to still elect
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted
the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns.
Same; Election Law; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; While the totality of the
evidence may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
4
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.*
RENALD F. VILANDO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO
NOGRALES, respondents.
Judgments; Moot and Academic Issues; A moot and academic case is one that ceases
to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical value.
Same; Same; Congress; Citizenship; Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and
academic, if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review”; Citizenship, being a continuing
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may be questioned at anytime.
Election Law; Election Protests; Citizenship; In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity; The proper proceeding to
assail the citizenship of a naturalized citizen should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Same; Same; Same; Electoral Tribunals; The power of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization of a member’s father in the
pursuit of disqualifying said member—to rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack
on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of
registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship—for renunciation
to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The only instance where the Supreme Court may intervene
in the exercise of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon
a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
No. L-35925. January 22, 1973.
CHARITO PLANAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., respondents.
Planas vs. Commission on Elections, 49 SCRA 105, No. L-35925, No. L-35929, No. L-
35940 January 22, 1973
CHING VS VELOSO
 G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest
in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene; The rule in
Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of
the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.—Private respondent argues that petitioner
has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as
the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final
and executory judgment.” The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner
sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the
basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is
that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to cases in which
the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the
time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been
no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified “from running for [an] elective local position” under §40(d) of R.A. No.
7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the
latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.—Nor is petitioner’s
interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that
stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of
R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.—Intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
5
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari.—The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead decided the merits of the case, the
present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention
but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification
on the ground of dual citizenship.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.—Dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3)
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d) and in
Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”—In including
§5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual
citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160,
§40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
 G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.*
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth
and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.—There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time
of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a Former
Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.—
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-
born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.—
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there
are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
6
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter; There is no
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.—The HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House. The Court’s jurisdiction over the HRET is merely
to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for
the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute
the Court’s judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a
petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. There is no such
showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
G.R. No. 179848. November 27, 2008.*
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship and Naturalization; Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225
requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.—Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign
country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to
reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship: SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Same; Same; Election Law; The law categorically requires persons seeking elective
public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate
of candidacy.—The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Same; Same; Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9225 and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.—Section 5(2) of Republic
Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a
foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective
public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Clearly
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits
under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably
complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).
This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the
oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Same; Election Law; To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only
have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.—There is little doubt, therefore, that the
intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
Appeals; As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised
in the proceedings below.—As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need
not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Courts have neither
the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The piecemeal presentation of evidence
is not in accord with orderly justice.—Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that “In the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or
in suppletory character and effect.” Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented: SEC. 34. Offer of
evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. Since the said Affidavit was not
formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and
7
controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the
piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; The only exceptions to the general rule—that a client
is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which this court finds acceptable are when the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the
application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a
technicality.—It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct,
negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. The only
exceptions to the general rule—that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which
this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. These exceptions are not attendant in this
case.
Same; Same; Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure
to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case—unless they prejudice
the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case—do not constitute gross
incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their
counsel.—The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was grossly
negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness;
the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden
of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case—unless
they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case—do not constitute
gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of
their counsel.
Same; Same; The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally
deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense.—
Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996), where therein
petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer
proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior
leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had
totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense.
This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.
Same; Same; A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation
from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.—Petitioner was
in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the
hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover,
petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance
on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position
does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of
their counsel.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate
must be strictly applied.—Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest
number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections.
The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual
citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does
not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate
must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must
owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity.
G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015.*
RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003;
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA)on August
29, 2003.—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
8
Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired
foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.—In fine, for
those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have reacquired
their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a
foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title
declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens
of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for
reacquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
Criminal Law; Falsification of Documents; Falsification of documents under paragraph
1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification
by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position, of public, private, or commercial documents.—Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position,
of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.
G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013.*
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); In Special Actions and Special
Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory
after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.―The
COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be
removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides: “(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a
decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five
(5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.” Within that five (5)
days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that will
remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within
the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the
proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen. It
is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has
been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding
against her by the COMELEC. She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to
avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became executory,
the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to
base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her
proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May
2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to
her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to “take the law into her hands” and
secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was
final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); That
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is a written constitutional provision.―Petitioner is in error when she posits
that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner
because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her
proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. Indeed, the action for
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC,
was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC.
On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case.
The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner’s ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner’s
proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from
the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
Same; Certificates of Candidacy; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The special
action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a
summary proceeding or one “heard summarily.”―The special action before the COMELEC
which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or
one “heard summarily.” The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may
designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to
receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings
are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; x x x and that “[t]his provision shall likewise apply to cases where the
hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of
its officials x x x.”
9
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its
cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally
proclaimed.―It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and
the HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its
cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed.
The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the
COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on
more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At
and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of
the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo
unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated.
The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding.―The HRET’s constitutional
authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and
legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The
HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the
COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular,
not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must
be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation
of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET
proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner
resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The
petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute
between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there
is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
G.R. No. 180088. January 19, 2009.*
MANUEL B. JAPZON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY,
respondents.
Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.—It bears to point
out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and
provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute
would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino
taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of
such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the
law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in
the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Same; Same; Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.—Residency in the Philippines
only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for
public office. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads: SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Same; Same; A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth.—The term
“residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin
is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish
residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American
citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his
domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile.—As has already been previously
discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain
his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish
his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place
10
becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined
from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
Election Law; Residence; Animus Revertendi; The principle of animus revertendi has
been used to determine whether a candidate has an “intention to return” to the place where
he seeks to be elected.—Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving
the issue of whether or not a candidate has complied with the residency requirement for
elective positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a
candidate has an “intention to return” to the place where he seeks to be333elected. Corollary
to this is a determination whether there has been an “abandonment” of his former residence
which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 229
(1990), this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals
and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on
the ground that respondent’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder,
which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in
the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18,
1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Same; Same; Same; The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home
province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.—In Co v. Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991), respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was
not a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the
ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus
revertendi or “intent to return,” stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue
studies or practice his profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration
as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence.
The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed
that he always had animus revertendi.
Same; Same; Same; It was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner,
because of the EDSA People’s Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United
States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute
an abandonment of residence.—In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408
(1993), the Court held that “domicile” and “residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,”
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile”
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established
his residence during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the
sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s Power
Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile334in the United States until favorable conditions had
been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The
Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; The Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
381 SCRA 133 (2002), that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.—The Court
recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirement.
Judgments; Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); It is
axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have
acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court.—The COMELEC,
taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found
that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative
agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and
conclusive on the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial
of due process, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain.
Same; Same; The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired
expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not
only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence.—The findings of
facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted
to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is
necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that335amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Election Law; Residence; The Court has previously ruled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.—There is no basis for this Court
to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could
be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence
11
from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. The Court also notes,
that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding
the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily
determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent
with Ty’s avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Same; Same; In Aquino v. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400 [1995]), the Court did not find
anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for
as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law.—Japzon repeatedly brings
to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could
run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC, 248
SCRA 400 (1995), the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences
so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty
that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required
by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence
that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which
he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number
of votes.
Same; Same; When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose
of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the
electorate should be respected.—When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence
qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to
the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to
give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge Ty’s
disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible
to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.*
 RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952
REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Amendments and Revisions of the Constitution; People’s
Initiative; The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people—first, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal, and, second, as an initiative upon a petition,
the proposal must be embodied in a petition; The full text of the proposed amendments may
be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment.—The essence of amendments “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the
people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments
is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the
petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of
people’s initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an
initiative clause; A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing.—The framers of the Constitution
directly borrowed the concept of people’s initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people
must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several
decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared: [A]
signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has
not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A
person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer,
without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by,
12
for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that
might not be to the signer’s liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case,
the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of
the Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people’s initiative.— Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended
that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino
Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”
Same; Same; Same; There is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—the proponents bear the burden of
proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures,
i.e., that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.—The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The
proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The
proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no
presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures—that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
Same; Same; Same; It is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment
must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people; The
Lambino Group’s citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.—The
Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that “a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act.” The Lambino Group quotes an
authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the
people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change
must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the
people to sign on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed
by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes were not
incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation
of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
Same; Same; Same; Logrolling; There is logrolling when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition; Under American jurisprudence,
the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject
matter.—The Lambino Group’s initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed
the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on
Transitory Provisions, provides: Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or
revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated
that this provision is a “surplusage” and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far
from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group’s initiative. Section 4(4)
is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling—when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no
to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable. Under American jurisprudence, the
effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject
matter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people.—
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d
1173, 1184 (1985), the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against “inadvertence, stealth and
fraud” in logrolling: Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a
greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood
of an initiative’s passage, and there is a greater opportunity for “inadvertence, stealth and
fraud” in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-
signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before
the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several
provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the
legislative
Same; Same; Same; An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception,
and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.—The signature sheets do not explain this
discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature
13
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used
to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives. An initiative that gathers signatures
from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments
is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x x x
in a petition”—meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under
a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The
Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do
not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
Same; Same; Same; “Amendment” and “Revision,” Distinguished; Words and Phrases;
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment”
and “revision” of the Constitution.—There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of
the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional
convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that
a people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and
language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions
to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
Same; Same; Same; A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures,
cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.—
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people’s initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments.
There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-
and-balances, and there is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution; Amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved; Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.—Courts have long recognized
the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest
cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term “constitution” implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term “amendment” implies such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which
it was framed. (Emphasis supplied) Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety
of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
Same; Same; Same; The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is “so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions”—the court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of change; The qualitative
test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution—the main
inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”—In California where the initiative clause
allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.” The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature
of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances.”
Same; Same; Same; Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino
Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment; A change in the structure of
government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution is reduced into two; A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution—
merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of the
government.—Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative
14
is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group’s proposed
changes overhaul two articles—Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive—
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary,
and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is
a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in
the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
Same; Same; Same; By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment.— The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the
locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of
the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system
of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By
any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and
the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
On the face alone of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory—any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.—The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the
language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent
and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory,
devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group’s position. Any theory advocating that a
proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
Same; Same; Same; Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be
considered an amendment and not a revision.—We can visualize amendments and revisions
as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions.
Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether
there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end
of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government,
requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution. Where
the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not
a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency
is an amendment and not a revision.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment
or a revision—a change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision
and not an amendment.—There can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment
or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision
and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word “republican” with
“monarchic” or “theocratic” in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the
entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects
other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to
undertake a revision.—Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited
to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also
the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have fixed
and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The basic rule in statutory construction is
that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.—In the
present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of
Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which
case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a
15
later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also
applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group’s draft of Section 2 of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of
such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision “shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government.” The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable
provisions until the earlier one “shall be amended,” which requires a future separate
constitutional amendment.
Same; Same; Same; A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution; Revision of the Constitution through a people’s initiative will only result in gross
absurdities in the Constitution.— Now, what “unicameral parliamentary form of
government” do the Lambino Group’s proposed changes refer to—the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries
with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government—the British, French, Spanish,
German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they
were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government? This drives home the point that the people’s initiative is not meant for revisions
of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many
articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people’s initiative will only
result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Initiative and Referendum Act (R.A. No. 6735); Judicial Review;
There is no need to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections, 270
SCRA 106 (1997), declaring R.A. No. 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution—an
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition; The
Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before
the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.—The present petition warrants dismissal
for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need
to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does
not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution. This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will
not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other
grounds.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the petition as signatories.—Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the “petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories.” Section
5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.” The
6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of
30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B.
Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels
for “Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners.” In the COMELEC the
Lambino Group, claiming to act “together with” the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached
the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended
petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735
that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be
submitted to the electorate; x x x.”—The Lambino Group’s logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, “No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; x x x.” The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to
the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group’s initiative will still fail.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Commission on Elections; For following the Court’s
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC.—In dismissing the
Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court’s ruling
in Santiago and People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC. For following this Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this
Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous
vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC
in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19,
1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
Same; Same; Same; A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law
in the country.—The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost
respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution
by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such change in the
fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned
by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in
the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
16
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law
in this country.
Same; Same; Same; Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let
the people decide” cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself.—No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million
signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which means subverting the
people’s sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot
and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people. Incantations of “people’s voice,” “people’s sovereign will,” or “let
the people decide” cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as
prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution—the people’s fundamental
covenant that provides enduring stability to our society—becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then,
the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation’s stability.
No. L-44640. October 12, 1976.*
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER,
respondents.
Constitutional law; Valid source of statute may be challenged by one who will sustain
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.—We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C.
Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise
of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source
of a statute—Presidential Decrees are of such nature—may be contested by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds x x x for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of P.D. No. 991 carries an
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes.
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure
of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.
Same; Amending process of the Constitution raises a judicial question.—The amending
process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true
in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of
amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted.
Same; Political question; Political questions are associated with the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular act.—Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality
of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the
contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
Same; Same; Issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question.—What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the
act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments
is therefore a downright justiciable question.
Same; Same; Whether the constitutional provision on amending procedures has been
followed or not is a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people who exercise no power of
judicial review, but by the Supreme Court.—Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision
has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves—of course—who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court
in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence
to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not.
And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and
ratification by the people.
Same; Same; There are two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation,
i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition.—There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of
the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the
members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.
Same; Same; President will determine when interim National Assembly shall initially be
convened.—This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene
the interim National Assembly.
Same; Same; Philippines is in a crisis today and in such a situation governmental
powers generally concentrated in the President.—In general, the governmental powers in
crisis government—the Philippines is a crisis government today—are more or less
17
concentrated in the President. According to Rossiter, “(t)he concentration of government
power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. x x x There are moments in the life of any
government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if
this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of
one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more
difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. x x x The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the
normal system of constitutional and legal limitations.” x x x The rationalebehind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from the “the paralysis
of constitutional restraints” so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
Same; Same; Presidential exercise of legislative powers a valid act in times of martial
law.—The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of martial law is now a conceded
valid act. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of
the Transitory Provisions.
Same; Same; It is within constitutional and legal bounds for the President to assume the
constituent powers of the interim National Assembly.—Would it then be within the bounds of
the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body’s legislative functions? The answer is yes. If
the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of
the interimAssembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that
Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar,
to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted
his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interimNational Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the
President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution. x x x The President’s action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums
of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of
the interim National Assembly.
Same; Same; In the Philippines sovereignty resides in the people.—In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty “resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.” x x x This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the
constitutional legislator, namely, the people, in sovereign. In consequence, the people may
thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of
express constitutional prohibition.
Same; Same; The October 16, 1976 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the
people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator.—The October 16
referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from
the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will
reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of
government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question
of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves
implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the
amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the
procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
Same; Same; Fact that the people are simultaneously asked to answer a referendum
and a plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite.—The fact that the voting
populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite
question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectional in consulting
the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of
proposed constitutional amendments.
Same; Same; Plebiscite; Referendum; “Plebiscite” and “Referendum” distinguished.—A
“referendum” is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public
reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which
is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. It is participated
on by all citizens from the age of 15, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-
minded, or ex-convicts. A “plebiscite,” on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those
“citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or
over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.” Literacy, property,
or any other substantive requirement is not imposed.It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
Same; Same; Martial Law; Martial law does not stultify freedom of dissent.—There
appears to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in the main
the freedom of dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the
observation of Justice Fernando, “is impressed with a mild character” recorded no State
imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on
certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The machinery for the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression
and assembly. The President himself had announced that he would not countenance any
suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a “yes” or
“no” vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. Thus, the
dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse
views on the proposed amendments and even on the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution,
which is already a settled matter.
Same; Same; The time for deliberation of the referendum/plebiscite questions, a period
of three weeks, is not too short.—The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of
3 weeks, is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues.
18
The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living with
them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975
carried the same issue of martial law.
Same; Same; Constituent body may fix the time when the people may act in a
plebiscite.—The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because, first, proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated act, x x x; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that
amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed: they
are to be considered and disposed of presently; and third, ratification is but the expression of
the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously.
G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997.*
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA
& CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People’s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
Actions; Prohibition; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for prohibition may be filed with
the Supreme Court where the COMELEC fails to act on a motion to dismiss alleging that such
body has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain a particular petition.—It must be recalled that
intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The COMELEC
made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 De-cember 1996, it
practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication
of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC’s failure to act on Roco’s
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the
instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; A petition for prohibition may be treated also as a special civil
action for certiorari where there are claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative because said petition is not supported by the required minimum number
of signatures of registered voters, and that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss said petition.—It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not
supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also
asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin
Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims,
the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section 1
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Constitutional Law; Initiative; Statutes; The right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.—Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
Same; Same; Same; The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.—The conclusion then is inevitable that,
indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress “provided” for the implementation of the
exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no
other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage
of a statute or legislative act.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do so with
respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”—Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the
people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein
was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws,
ordinances, or resolutions.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest,
or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.—While the Act
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
19
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest,
or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Na-tional Initiative” and “Local
Initiative,” Explained; The Court cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum.—
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local
Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on
the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is “national initiative,” if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress
can pass. It is “local initiative” if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance,
or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 6735 delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.—
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the
details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation
thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading
of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735
is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal
and cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; What has been delegated cannot be
delegated; Exceptions.—The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the
President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at
large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In every case of permissible delegation, there must
be a showing that the delegation itself is valid; Tests of Valid Delegation.—Empowering the
COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under No. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy the
requirements in subordinate legislation insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.—Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.—It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power
under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C
of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and
the “sufficient standard” tests.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; A petition for initiative on the Constitution must
be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein—without the required
signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.—Under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits
that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to
obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing—the petition is the initiatory pleading—and nothing before its filing is
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.—The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
20
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of
the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election
regis-trars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC acts without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in dignifying a petition for initiative that does not comply with Constitutional and
statutory requirements.—Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by
the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall
under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence,
the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing
more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and
resources.
G.R. No. 180046. April 2, 2009.*
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Executive Department; Executive Order No. 292;
Commission on Higher Education (CHED); Section 20, Title I of Book III of Executive Order
292 speaks of other powers vested in the President under the law—the exercise of the
President’s residual powers under this provision requires legislation, as the provision clearly
states that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be “provided for
under the law.”—Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the
President under the law. The exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision
requires legislation, as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s other
powers and functions has to be “provided for under the law.” There is no law granting the
President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA
7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.
Same; Same; Same; The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to
amend the functions of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) under Republic Act (RA)
7722, since, legislative power, which is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them, is vested with the Congress.—The President has no inherent or delegated legislative
power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority
to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: Section 1. The legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); Administrative
agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations—the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) may only exercise its
rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722.—Administrative
agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines
of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which
are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Valid Delegation of Power; Police power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general
welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex—the welfare
of the people is the supreme law.—Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex—the welfare of the people is the
supreme law. Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by
the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of
police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of
non-degree granting review centers.
Administrative Law; Administrative Agencies; Power of the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC); The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) has the power to
investigate any of the members of the Professional Regulatory Boards (PRB) for “commission
of any irregularities in the licensure examinations which taint or impugn the integrity and
authenticity of the results of the said examinations” this is an administrative power which
the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) exercises over members of the Professional
Regulatory Board (PRB).—The PRC has the power to investigate any of the members of the
Professional Regulatory Boards (PRB) for “commission of any irregularities in the licensure
examinations which taint or impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the said
examinations.” This is an administrative power which the PRC exercises over members of the
PRB. However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers. The PRC
has the power to bar PRB members from conducting review classes in review
centers. However, to interpret this power to extend to the power to regulate review
centers is clearly an unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981. The PRC may prohibit the
members of the PRB from conducting review classes at review centers because the PRC has
administrative supervision over the members of the PRB. However, such power does not
extend to the regulation of review centers.
21
Same; Same; Professional Regulation Commission (PRC); The Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) has no mandate to supervise review centers that give courses or lectures
intended to prepare examinees for licensure examinations given by the PRC as it is like the
Court regulating bar review centers just because the Court conducts the bar examinations,
and similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not
even take any licensure examination given by the PRC.—The assailed EO 566 seeks to
regulate not only review centers but also “similar entities.” The questioned CHED RIRR
defines “similar entities” as referring to “other review centers providing review or tutorial
services in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC including but not
limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service examinations, tutorial services in
specific fields like English, Mathematics and the like.” The PRC has no mandate to supervise
review centers that give courses or lectures intended to prepare examinees for licensure
examinations given by the PRC. It is like the Court regulating bar review centers just because
the Court conducts the bar examinations. Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate
similar entities whose reviewees will not even take any licensure examination given by
the PRC.
Ang Nars Partylist VS Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 176951. February 15, 2011.*
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National
President Jerry P. Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S.
Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Municipal Corporations; Local Government Code (LGC); Local Government Units;
Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not
be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by Republic
Act No. 9009.—Based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income
requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A.
No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent of the law, and such
were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood
bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were
carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption
clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to
exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power, which power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make
laws, and to alter and repeal them.—The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by
Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the
people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the
Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as
limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Without doubt, the Local Government Code (LGC) is a
creation of Congress through its law-making powers—Congress has the power to alter or
modify it as it did when it enacted Republic Act No. 9009, and such power of amendment of
laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws; Undeniably, Republic
Act No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code (LGC), but it is also true that, in effect,
the Cityhood Laws amended Republic Act No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein.—Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such
power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood
Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of
economic viability for the Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with
respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No.
9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a
belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting
flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development
and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth
in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true
that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses
found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from
the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24,
2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their
exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
Same; Same; Same; It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million
average annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily
made—there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice
of this amount; The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased
from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become
component cities.—It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation
by Senate President Drilon of Senator Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No
9009 was merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities”
22
and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual
income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure,
there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this
amount. The imposition of a very high income requirement of P100 million, increased from
P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become component
cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation created thereby,
R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly
urbanized cities under Section 452 of the LGC.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The existence of substantial distinction
with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the
purpose of the law, not by Republic Act No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the Local
Government Code (LGC)—Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized the
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.—The determination of the existence
of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the
mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger
picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009,
but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section2 (a), thus—SECTION
2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from
the National Government to the local government units. Indeed, substantial distinction lies in
the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic
growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their
relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a
component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely
took the 16 municipalities covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by
the abrupt increase in the income requirement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, acknowledging
the “privilege” that they have already given to those newly-converted component cities, which
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing or “class” as the
respondent municipalities.—The justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood
Laws becomes obvious, especially considering that 33 municipalities were converted into
component cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities covered thereby
from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income
requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the “privilege” that they have already given to
those newly-converted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were
undeniably in the same footing or “class” as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely
recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces.
Courts; Judgments; While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors
in judgment, it is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order
to dispel apprehensions and doubt.—We should not be restricted by technical rules of
procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest of justice and equity. While it is true
that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is nobler rather for this
Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt,
as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs: The right and power of judicial tribunals
to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional limitations and are
invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The
courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation
and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great
deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even
reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their
judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act
unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution
x x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the
constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in
favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no
doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the constitution.
To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.
G.R. No. 210164. August 18, 2015.*
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE
CAPITAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the
respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.—In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the
respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
23
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not
interfere with the resolutions of the COMELEC unless it is shown that it had committed grave
abuse of discretion. Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will
not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the
“capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” “Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.” Grave abuse of discretion has likewise
been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when two (2) or more
actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the
supposition that one (1) or the other court would make a favorable disposition.—There is forum
shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted
by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when in both
actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Under Section 3, Rule 25
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification
should be filed “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy (CoCs) but not
later than the date of proclamation.”—Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed “any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.” Here, Arnado was
proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. Thus, the petition in SPA No. 13-309
(DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Cayago vs. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it
was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is
deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal
of origin.—Arnado’s claim that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA
No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan’s motion to consolidate likewise lacks
substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his petition.
This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto. Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being
the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the COMELEC on
said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration
with the COMELEC En Banc and subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still
unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for
consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it was held that once a party
elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned
the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. “[I]t is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure
an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction.”
Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Consolidation; Under Section
9, Rule 3 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, consolidation is
only permissive. It is not mandatory.—In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads:
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.—When an action or proceeding involves a question of law
and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the
same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number.
Same; Local Government Code; Dual Citizenship; Elective Local Positions; Under
Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC), a person with “dual citizenship” is
disqualified from running for any elective local positions.—Under Section 4(d) of the Local
Government Code, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective
local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999), it was clarified that the phrase
“dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that
they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of
filing of their CoC.
Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply
with the second requisite of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 because, as held in
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his United States (US) passport after
executing said affidavit.—In the case at bench, the COMELEC Second Division, as affirmed
by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5(2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696
SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when
he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his
CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply
with said second requirement. The COMELEC also noted that while Arnado submitted an
affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same
would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. The COMELEC En Banc did not err,
24
nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the
reason for Arnado’s disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being
a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines — still
subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The COMELEC En
Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave
abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
Same; Same; The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first
case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public
office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed
of the privileges under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.—The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel
in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport
on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized
abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case
that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of
renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that
Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport,
the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-
5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be
strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of
the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run
for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting
another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we should similarly
require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective office.
Same; Same; Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport in 2009 invalidated his
oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010
elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.—The circumstances
surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and
May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado’s use of his US
passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for
mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for
the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore,
is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established. Under the doctrine, “[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where facts are substantially the same.” It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and
bars relitigation of the same issue.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower tribunal need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage.—With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J.
Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in
the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate
for clarity, Arnado’s argument in this case — that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has
satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections — is
premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more.
He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an
isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja, 74 Phil. 560 (1944), it was held that
courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that
have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that “points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.”
Election Law; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; For those who avail themselves of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides
the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC).—At any rate,
the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 3 of RA 9225. For those who
avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides
the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section
5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado’s
2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US
passport in 2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.
Same; Same; In Maquiling, the Supreme Court (SC) emphasized that popular vote does
not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.—In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote
does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide
majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same “cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications.”
In Velasco v. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 590 (2008), this Court pronounced that election victory
cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise,
certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is
Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote
cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no reason why
the Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated
under Section 40 of the same law. After all, “[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained
in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local candidates.”
25
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.*
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.
Citizenship; Renunciation of Philippine Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; While
the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act
which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.―While the act
of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado used
his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he “absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and that he
“divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United
States of America.” We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place
the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This
act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s
bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective
local position.
Same; Same; Election Law; The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack.―The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the
citizenship issue to attack. We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division
that “Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his “Affidavit of
Renunciation.” This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he
performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public
office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Same; Same; Same; While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded
the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.―Citizenship is not a
matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political
rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust.
Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
Election Law; When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the
highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and
rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates.―The ballot cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications
be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications
must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To
rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of
the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective
positions in our republic.
Same; When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided
and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications
nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.―We have ruled
in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012) and Jalosjos v. COMELEC,
683 SCRA 1 (2012), that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in
favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an
election. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes
cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to
the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
26
Same; Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as
the winner.―The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second
to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is
actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the disqualified candidate has
already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate
of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Same; Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is
his citizenship. Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate
of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code; The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made
long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections.―The disqualifying
circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code. Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.” The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals
who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election. With
Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except
that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because
he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was
already proclaimed the winner. To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long
after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the
votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under
the Local Government Code will not apply.
G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.*
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.—The State
has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now
governs the change of first name, and vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned; The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
and subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the change
of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to
the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of
sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.—The petition in the trial court
in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue
27
as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate
is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of
RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—
As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x xxx x x x (3) “Clerical or
typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408
of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable
interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction
on the ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove
the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”—The acts, events or factual
errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make
or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.—“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the
legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his
age, nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession. (emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations—it is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special law
in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex is an essential
factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status.
In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no
such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register Law,
a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth—thus,
the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex
of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words are not defined
in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish
a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words “male” and
“female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment; While a person may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in a statute they are to be
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The
words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is
defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova
or bears young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons
28
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the
term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category “female.” For these
reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations—it will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The changes sought by
petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil
Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of
the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.—
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute based.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who
has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law exists.—
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may
be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege
to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be
theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of
social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.—
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
Vice Mayor Shirlyn L. Biñas-Nograles, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999.*
ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and EUFEMIO MULI, respondents.
Election Law; COMELEC; Administrative Law; Disqualification; Conditions for the
application of the disqualification: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.—This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. It stated: “To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be
taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of
29
the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes
office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.—The two requisites for the
application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his
previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as
mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently
declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive
winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Petitioner
Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive
winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the threeterm limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service.—The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the
May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of
the term. The respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served
one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence
of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same
time respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident
in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not
by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued
by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of
continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Neither the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a
candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC divests
the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.—
The petitioner’s contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved
on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner’s proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs.
COMELEC and Trinidad that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate
against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest
the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that: “Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.—
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”
Same; Same; Same; The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue
the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is
rendered.—This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment
is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election
but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
G.R. No. 135864. November 24, 1999.*
AUGUSTO TOLEDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESURRECCION Z.
BORRA in his capacity as Executive Director, Commission on Elections and CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
Public Officers; Administrative Law; Retirement; The one-year limitation on the
extension of service of a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five imposed under Memorandum Circular No. 27 is valid and reasonable.—In
upholding the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, this Court declared that the
limitation provided by the said Circular on permissible extensions of service after reaching the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five has a reasonable relationship with or is germane to
the purpose of civil service laws on retirement. And as reiterated in the said case, the policy
considerations behind the limitation on the maximum extension of service allowable for
compulsory retirees, as summarized in the dissenting opinion of Justice Griño-Aquino in the
case of Cena, were as follows: “x x x extending the service of compulsory retirees longer than
one (1) year would: (1) Give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age (2) Delay the promotion of
the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) Prejudice the chances for employment of
qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various governmental
30
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by ‘extendees’ who have long passed the
mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete
15 years so they may qualify for old age pension.” Thus, the one-year limitation on the
extension of service of a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five imposed under Memorandum Circular No. 27 was held valid and reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine in the case of Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, 244
SCRA 614 (1995), cannot yet be applied to the case of an employee where, at the time his
service was extended, it was the rule in Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179
(1992), that was still in effect.—This is now the problem posed by the instant case. Petitioner’s
appointment and entry into the government service at the age of fifty-nine years has already
been upheld as valid in the case of Toledo vs. CSC where the Court held that a person fifty-
seven years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service. Moreover, as correctly ruled by the
Civil Service Commission under Resolution No. 97-3167, the doctrine in the case of Rabor
cannot yet be applied to the petitioner because at the time petitioner Toledo’s service was
extended, it was the Cena doctrine that was still in effect. And under such doctrine, the head
of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
the extension of service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service.
Same; Same; Same; Where the applicable doctrine is that enunciated in the case of
Cena, the extension of an employee’s service beyond 1992 is at the discretion of the head of
government agency.—Since the applicable doctrine is that enunciated in the case of Cena,
the extension of petitioner’s service beyond 1992 is at the discretion of the COMELEC
Chairman. Thus, the extension of petitioner’s service through COMELEC Resolution No. 93-
2052 on August 26, 1993 was an exercise of such discretion. And the limitation of his extended
service up to October 31, 1998 was well within the discretion granted to the COMELEC
Chairman under the Cena ruling. Hence, the assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 98-2768 is
valid and the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the same
resolution.
Same; Same; Same; The employee’s work performance is also a major factor in
determining whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue his or her service to
complete the 15-year service.—Petitioner avers that his “unsatisfactory” performance rating
may be a cause for the termination of his services but it cannot be a ground to “limit” his
“extended service.” Such contention is untenable. In the case of Cena, it was held that in
resolving the question of whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue his/her
service to complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential factor before an
application under Sec. 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the government office
concerned. In the case of the judiciary, such factors as competence, integrity and dedication
to the public service were considered. Parenthetically, the employee’s work performance is
also a major factor. Since petitioner’s performance rating for three consecutive semesters was
all “unsatisfactory,” it was proper for COMELEC not to extend his service anymore.
 G.R. No. 163295. January 23, 2006.*
FRANCIS G. ONG, petitioner, vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Election Law; Local Government Code; Term of Office; Requisites for the Three-Term
Limit for Elective Local Government Officials to Apply.—For the three-term limit for elective
local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Same; Same; Same; Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente Camarines
Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 constitutes service for the full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions.—There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected
mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving
the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein
controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no
quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and
actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed,
therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term
service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption
of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and
statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive
winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him
less than a duly elected mayor.—It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in
Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that
disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been
promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention
that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was
under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full
term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
31
Same; Same; Same; Substitution of Candidate; A candidate whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party as that of the former.—Not to be overlooked is the Court’s
holding in Miranda vs. Abaya, that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same
political party as that of the former.
G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003.*
ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO
SUNGA, respondents.
Election Law; Jurisdiction; Actions; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; While it has
been held that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications—certain peculiarities in the
present case reveal the fact that its very heart is something which the Supreme Court
considers of paramount interest.—It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held
in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of
the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing
party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days
after the proclamation. On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the
fact that its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This
Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already entertaining some
doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not
be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.—Time and again, this Court has held
that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this
Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities
in favor of what is fair and just. The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be
attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.
Same; Term Limits; Political Dynasties; An examination of the historical background of
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution on term limits reveals that the members of the
Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of
the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power.—As a rule, in
a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will
govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits
the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected. An examination of the historical background of the subject
Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by
Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there
should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. The members, instead,
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be
simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the
expiration of the third consecutive term.
Same; Same; Requisites.—An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running
again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post,
and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Same; Same; Conversion of Local Government Units; Component Cities; Substantial
differences do exist between a municipality and a city; As may be gleaned form the Local
Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to
help assure its economic viability.—Substantial differences do exist between a municipality
and a city. For one, there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these
changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. As may be
gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local government
unit is done mainly to help assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based
on verified indicators.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While a new component city which was converted from a
municipality acquires a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality, this does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the constitutional
provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.—As seen in the
aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of
the City of Digos did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the
Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of the Municipality of
Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new
city officials. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from
that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as
a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the
32
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently,
the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
Same; Same; Political Dynasties; The framers of the Constitution specifically included
an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid
the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction
as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.—This Court reiterates that the framers of
the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Same; The fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible
candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold
office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be
declared elected.—This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a candidate is
later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making
the winning candidate’s election a nullity. In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were
cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for
petitioner Latasa. The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular
election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created which
should be filled by succession.
G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives.—The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for
the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to
democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and
another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.—Indisputably, the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but
also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but
not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo
Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.”
Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is
that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative
district elections.—The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is
that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative
district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative
district elections.
Same; Same; The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.—What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1),
could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no
room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Same; Same; “Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A.
No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
7941 further provides that a “political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
“sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
33
and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and
a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors.—R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations
to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if
they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941
that a national or regional political party must represent a “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Same; Same; Same; The economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those
who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.—
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically “marginalized and underrepresented.”
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging
to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one must “wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are those who
fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list
elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections.—
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress” from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties
should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of
major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies,” will
facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies” as members of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political
parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who
“lack well-defined political constituencies.”—The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow
major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and
to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” The participation of major political
parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system. Such sectoral
wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented.
The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political
party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that “component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-
list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.”
Same; Same; Same; A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona
fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record
of advocacy for such sector.—Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-
list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the
youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.—No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be
34
a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or
have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
G.R. No. 176970. December 8, 2008.*
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Actions; Hierarchy of Courts; Direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition; Recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.—The Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs, a direct invocation of
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an
increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our
exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the “principle of
hierarchy of courts.” More generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment
and Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary
as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other
subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Same; Same; Plebiscite; The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A pronounced distinction between Article VI,
Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and
the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v.
Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the division of the congressional district
formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this
distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The
plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Man-292daluyong in the
course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In
explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan
because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation
of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment
alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where
only a reapportionment took place.
Same; Same; Same; The plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province,
city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be
a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.—These
considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic
nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a
local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement
that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY RAPHAEL P.M. LOTILLA,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), MARGARITO B. TEVES,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), AND ROMULO L. NERI,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM) vs.
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA , December 04, 2018
G.R No. 188078. January 25, 2010.*
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
Election Law; Legislative Districts; The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have
a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”—
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
“a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is whether the
City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the
purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010
35
elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a
legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the
250,000 population.—The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on
demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face
because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made
for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled
to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.
Same; Same; National Statistics Office; National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB);
Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First, certifications
on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by
the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of
every year.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Any population projection forming the basis for the creation
of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) cited Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance
of Certification of Population Sizes), otherwise the population projection would be unreliable
or speculative.—Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG,
representing respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its
Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection, “the population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between
1995-2000.” This projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is
recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of
Certification of Population Sizes), which states: x x x (d) Certification of population size
based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to
fall. The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f)
Certifications of population size based on published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on
projections or estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer.” (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection forming the basis for the
creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why
the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.139
 Same; Same; Same; Same; A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district
representative.—A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative
district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have
a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos
has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before
the 10 May 2010 elections.
QAEDA (?) VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.*
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R.
MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO
LARRAZABAL, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Supreme Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases
raising issues of paramount public importance.—In Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 346 SCRA 485 (2000) and Jaworski v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 419 SCRA 317 (2004), this Court
sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed.—Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court,
there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been
violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.—There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners rely
on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what
they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population
of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
36
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” The provision draws a
plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.—
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation
of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces.
Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to
an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
G.R. No. 222236. May 3, 2016.*
HARLIN C. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A. DAZA, respondents.
Election Law; Election Protests; An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates,
based on the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between
them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold
the office.—An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly
a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral
frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and, therefore, entitled to hold the office.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction; The Constitution no
less, grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.—The Court agrees that the
power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the COMELEC to
declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the
prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election
contests. The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in its totality
as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. Consequently, the
annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET’s constitutional mandate
to determine the validity of the contestee’s title.
Same; Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives, may annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism
or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment.—The power granted to the
HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may annul
election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed
to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is merely exercising its constitutional duty
to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.
Same; Same; Same; The passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 cannot deprive the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) of its incidental power to annul elections
in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the Constitution.—
The passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul
elections in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority conferred by no less than the
Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), the
Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by
the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces
the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and
to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating
to the elections, returns,and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such
legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative
function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise
of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code
(Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Republic Act (RA) No. 7166 was enacted
to empower the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to be most effective in the performance
of its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections.—The COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial function when it decides election contests not otherwise reserved
to other electoral tribunals by the Constitution. The COMELEC, however, does not exercise
37
its quasi-judicial functions when it declares a failure of elections pursuant to R.A. No. 7166.
Rather, the COMELEC performs its administrative function when it exercises such power. R.A.
No. 7166 was enacted to empower the COMELEC to be most effective in the performance of
its sacred duty of ensuring the conduct of honest and free elections. Further, a closer perusal
of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code readily reveals that it is more in line with the
COMELEC’s administrative function of ensuring that elections are free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible, and not its quasi-judicial function to adjudicate election contests. The
said provision reads: Sec. 6. Failure of elections.—If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the
election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not
held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
Same; Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Failure of Elections;
Annulment of Elections; There is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation,
terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative capacity. In contrast, when
electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of
their quasi-judicial functions.—The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral
tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid. First,
the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the
exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the
election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure
of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or
political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who among
the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand,
declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which
were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When
COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. Hence,
there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the COMELEC declares a failure of elections
on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its
administrative capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same
grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.
Same; Same; Failure of Elections; The power to declare a failure of elections should be
exercised with utmost care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt
that the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it
is impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by
violence, intimidation and threats from exercising their franchise.—It must be remembered
that “[t]he power to declare a failure of elections should be exercised with utmost care and
only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt that the disregard of the law had
been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish what
votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that
the great body of the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercising their franchise.” Consequently, a protestant alleging terrorism in an election protest
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the will of the majority has been muted
by violence, intimidation or threats.
Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Annulment of Elections; It is but
expected that annulment of elections be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and
resorted only in exceptional circumstances.—The testimonies of a minute portion of the
registered voters in the said precincts should not be used as a tool to silence the voice of the
majority expressed through their votes during elections. To do so would disenfranchise the
will of the majority and reward a candidate not chosen by the people to be their representative.
With such dire consequences, it is but expected that annulment of elections be judiciously
exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional circumstances.
Moot and Academic; A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.—Daza cannot claim that the issue had been mooted by his
assumption to office because the same is premised on the fact that the HRET had correctly
ruled Daza to be the duly elected representative. A moot and academic case is one that
ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. In the present case, there is still a
justiciable controversy — who between Daza and Abayon was truly chosen by the majority of
voters of the First Legislative District of Northern Samar to be their representative.
G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.*
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION,
COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and
ABONO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.—
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
38
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.
Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
“the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for
party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties,
organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient
number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In
computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in
the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings.
Same; Same; By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.—By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list
seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
G.R. No. 191771. May 6, 2010.*
LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President Manuel A. Roxas II and Secretary
General Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
NACIONALISTA PARTY, represented by its President Manuel B. Villar and
NATIONALIST PEOPLE’S COALITION, allegedly represented by its Chairman Faustino
S. Dy, Jr., respondents.
value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system
whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To
the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of
equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small
measure to transparency and to the election’s credibility. Thus, our focus is on the core issues
that confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that
do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and
concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties
involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in
the coming elections.

Same; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Facial Objection Test; A facial objection is
Judicial Review; The Court has been strict when the issues are solely confined to the
meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are
parties’ private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting the public, but
erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
has viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when grave
excess of jurisdiction.—The respondents next argue that the petition’s cited grounds are mere
public interests are involved; The Court’s liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical
errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and procedural where Court intervention has become imperative.—We have indicated many
jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or
times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the
as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present
nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the
topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed
parties’ private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting the public, but
to case or simply dismiss the petition outright. A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly
have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when grave
and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of
public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and
the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After
procedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we have recognized
due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.
exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the petitions before us, as well
as questions on locus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; “Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with
issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or
absolute lack of authority; There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power
weight as precedents deserve the Court’s attention and active intervention.
or acts without any statutory authority; “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction—in
Same; Election Law; Political Parties; Registration of Political Parties; The registration
other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions
prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
provide constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations; To the public, the
all in contemplation of law.—In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,
proper registration and the Accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party
436 SCRA 123 (2004), the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, gave
representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to
a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
transparency and to the election’s credibility.—We see every reason to be liberal in the present
jurisdiction in relation to errors of law. The Court then said: A writ of certiorari may be issued
case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral
only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as
or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is
dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide—particularly, the on-line real
limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. x x x x “Without
time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is “excess of
through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official
jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. “Grave
election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy;
abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary
party status brings—constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise
terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The

39
is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Election Law; Political Parties; Registration of Political Parties; The registration of a
coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are
substantively distinct from each other—registration is the act that bestows juridical personality
for purposes of our election laws while accreditation relates to the privileged participation that
our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.—The root of the present petition is the
NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the
dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration
of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPC’s registration, it strangely did not rule on the
accreditation aspect of the petition. The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a
dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each
other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election
laws grant to qualified registered parties.
Same; Same; While the registration of political parties is a special proceeding clearly
assigned to a Division for handling under the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules,
no similar clear-cut rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party; Under
the circumstances of the present case where the registration was handled at the en banc,
action at the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ended upon the en banc’s issuance of
the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading, except in election offense
cases.—Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules
regulate the registration of political parties, organizations or coalitions of political parties.
Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8752, Section 1
of which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission
who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition before the
COMELEC was docketed. While the registration of political parties is a special proceeding
clearly assigned to a Division for handling under the COMELEC Rules, no similar clear-cut
rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no
statement on this point, as it is not a matter in issue. Under the circumstances of the present
case where the registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC ended upon
the en banc’s issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the
COMELEC Rules, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading,
except in election offense cases. Any request for accreditation that may be filed is conceptually
a separate matter for the COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed
Resolution resolving the NP-NPC’s application for registration as a coalition, the COMELEC’s
part in the registration process was brought to a close, rendering the Resolution ripe for review
by this Court.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Prohibition; The combination of a
petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the present case is fully
40
justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and
in fact sequentially follow one another; From the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely
no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event—the accreditation—that
according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place, and from the point of view of the
petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the
nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for.—The present petition has openly
stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition
expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to
prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party. The
combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the
present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers
are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted
to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must
first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been
carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. Where the registration is flawed for
having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a
logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the
point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact
to forestall an event—the accreditation—that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon
take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration
made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a past and accomplished act is
prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown
to be completely groundless.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In the absence of any note, explanation or
reason in Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8646 why the deadline only
mentions political parties, the term “political parties” should be understood in its generic sense
that covers political organizations and political coalitions as well.—Admittedly, Resolution No.
8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the “[L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of
political parties,” without mentioning “organizations and coalitions” in the way that the three
entities are separately mentioned under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule
32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646, however, is simply a listing of
electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10, 2010 elections; it is not in any way a
resolution aimed at establishing distinctions among “political parties, organizations, and
coalitions.” In the absence of any note, explanation or reason why the deadline only mentions
political parties, the term “political parties” should be understood in its generic sense that
covers political organizations and political coalitions as well. To rule otherwise is to introduce,
through a COMELEC deadline-setting resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5), Article
IX-C, which was not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules;
Resolution No. 8646 would effectively differentiate between political parties, on the one hand,
and political organizations and coalitions, on the other.
 Same; Same; Same; An examination of Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the
deadline for registration cannot but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) has set.—The en banc’s failure to follow its own rules on deadlines
may, at first blush, be a negligible error that does not affect its jurisdiction (assuming for the
sake of argument that the en banc has the authority to act at the first instance). An
examination of Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot
but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the COMELEC has set.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Where conditions that authorize the exercise of a
general power are wanting, fatal excess of jurisdiction results.—Given the mandatory nature
of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or a
suspension of the deadline in favor of a party in the course of application), the en banc acted
in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond
the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political parties under
mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a
jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfied and was not. Where conditions that
authorize the exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal excess of jurisdiction results.
Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruling in which it did
not even bother to explain why it imposed a deadline applicable only to political parties, but
not to political organizations and coalitions, was patently unreasonable, made as it was
without basis in law, in fact or in reason, and was a grave abuse of discretion that fatally
afflicted the assailed COMELEC Resolution.—Separately from the above consideration, we
view the en banc’s position that the deadline for registration is only for “political parties” and
not for “organizations and coalitions” to be preposterous, given the importance of the
participation of political parties in the election process and the rigid schedules that have to be
observed in order to implement automated elections as efficiently and as harmoniously as
possible. We note that the COMELEC has not even bothered to explain why it imposed a
deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political organizations and coalitions. In
our view, this kind of ruling was patently unreasonable, made as it was without basis
in law, in fact or in reason; and was a grave abuse of discretion that fatally afflicted the
assailed COMELEC Resolution.
Same; Same; Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The Court rejects the position and its
implication that registered political parties are well within their right to coalesce, and that this
coalition, once proven, should already bind the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
rendering registration a mere recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial
formality—the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election to secure the vote for
chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a
political party, organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the
elections and to the benefits that proceed from formal recognition; Registration and the formal
recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution themselves
show, because of the Constitution’s concern about the character of the organizations
officially participating in the elections, which concern among others, serves as a reason why
41
registration is not simply a checklist exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound
discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the COMELEC.—Whether one party would
coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration with another party for
purposes of an electoral exercise, is a matter that the law as a rule does not and cannot
regulate. This is a part of the freedom of choice derived from the freedom of individuals
constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders, as well as from the concepts
of democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution. This is a freedom, too, that
cannot but be related to individuals’ associational rights under the Bill of Rights. We mention
this freedom, as it was apparently the basis for the “operative fact” that the assailed
COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered
political parties are well within their right to coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven,
should already bind the COMELEC, rendering registration a mere recognition of an operative
fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality. We categorically reject this COMELEC position and its
implication; the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election to secure the vote for
chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a
political party, organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the
elections and to the benefits that proceed from formal recognition. Registration and the formal
recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution themselves
show, because of the Constitution’s concern about the character of the organizations officially
participating in the elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological
limitations, and in clear terms bars alien participation and influence in our elections. This
constitutional concern, among others, serves as a reason why registration is not simply a
checklist exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial
adjudication by the COMELEC. Registration must be undertaken, too, under the strict
formalities of the law, including the time limits and deadlines set by the proper authorities.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards
and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose.—We solely rule for now that the en
banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the
registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party
registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion
commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC
should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures
the Constitution and our laws impose.
G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004.*
ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Powers; As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government—executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers.—The COMELEC is an institution created by the
Constitution to govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the electoral process is
clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is mandated to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”
As an independent Constitutional Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of
government—executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. The
administrative powers of the COMELEC, for example, include the power to determine the
number and location of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors, conduct
registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; register political parties,
organization or coalitions, accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission, prosecute election
offenses, and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of any other disciplinary
action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or disregard of its directive,
order or decision. It also has direct control and supervision over all personnel involved in the
conduct of election. Its legislative authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which
the Commission is required to enforce and administer.
The Constitution has also vested it with quasi-judicial powers when it was granted
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials; and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Limitation; Certificate of Candidacy; The Court has ruled that the
Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy.—The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus: Sec. 76. Ministerial
duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.—The Commission, provincial election
supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission
has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The
duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is
ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates,
it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility
of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; It is therefore clear that the law mandates
that the candidate must be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf.—It is therefore clear that the law mandates that
the candidate must be notified of the petition against him and he should be given the
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. This is the essence of due process. Due process
demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal
42
shows substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a
party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that
the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. In a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are required to be
summary, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position papers
together with affidavits, counter-affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu of oral
testimony. When there is a need for clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the
Commission en banc or Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the affiants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not sufficient that the candidate be notified of
the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but
he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the
qualifications for the office he seeks.—The determination whether a material representation
in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is
eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must
be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such
fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s
right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of
the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the
candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that
he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.
G.R. No. 189600. June 29, 2010.*
MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Election Law; Party-List System; A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not
qualified to be a youth sector nominee.—As the law states in unequivocal terms that
a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more
than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees
vying for party-list representative seats.
Same; Same; Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who
changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will not only be eligible for nomination
under the new sectoral affiliation of the change has been effected at least six months before
the elections.—What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political
party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-
sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system.
Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be
eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at
least six months before the elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the
plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is
the index of intention.
Same; Same; A party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of
preference, their qualifications according to law are a different matter.—That private
respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no moment. A
party-list organization’s ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference, their
qualifications according to law are a different matter.
G.R. No. 180050. February 10, 2010.*
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the
President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao
del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new
Province of Dinagat Islands, respondents.
Statutory Construction; If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory
construction like the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive construction.—Courts
determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the law’s four corners.
If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like
the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and
pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive construction.
Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; The Constitution clearly mandates that the
creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.—The Constitution clearly mandates that the
creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Gerrymandering; Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
43
defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories
for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.—“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to
describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation of one legislative district out of
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution
proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as
practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
Same; Election Laws; Plebiscite; Certiorari; Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the
conduct of a plebiscite are actual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a
plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the Commission on
Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct
remedy.
No. L-23326. December 18, 1965.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. RoMERO, SALVADOR
ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PlO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M.
ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA,
petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE
AVILES, respondents.
Constitutional law; Statute involving expenditure of public funds; Personality of
taxpayers to attack its constitutionality.—In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general
rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore.
question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur.
761.)
Same; Republic Act 3836: Increase in emoluments of members of Congress.—
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement benefits for members of Congress which,
in effect, are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of the Act, which was on June 22, 1963.
Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition, in Article VI, Section 14
of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Law violates equal protection clause of the constitution.—The features of
Republic Act 3836 are discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 1.) In the first place, while the said law grants retirement
benefits to Senators and Members of the House of Representatives who art- elective officials,
it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces and the members
of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits
after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers
and employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In the third
place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit
irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836,
because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon
being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years'
salary. Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been
retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth -Act
186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836. Lastly, Republic Act 3836 grants
retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the Government Service Insurance
System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to be
members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.
Same; Same; Title of law not germane to the subject matter.—Under Republic Act No.
3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186,
as amended by Republic Acts Nos, 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System who have rendered at least twenty
years of service regardless of age. This provision is related and germane to the subject of
Commonwealth Act 186. On the other hand. the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No.
3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of
the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for
these officials would relate to subject matter, not germane to Commonwealth Act No. No. 186,
Same; Same; Same; Duty of court to declare void the statute.—The re quirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure, directory to Congress; it is mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to declare void
any statute not conforming to the constitutional provision. (See Walker vs. State, 49 Alabama
329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Volume I, pp. 162164.)
A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.*
ANTERO J. POBRE, complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO,
respondent.
44
Administrative Law; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer
holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.—The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound
by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed
while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.
Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Public Officers; When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.—Lawyers may be disciplined
even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects
their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification for
the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the
reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.
Same; Same; Same; It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her
duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives,
to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts
or other forums outside the congressional hall.—We, however, would be remiss in our duty if
we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate
the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her
duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
[No. L-17144. October 28, 1960]
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR.,
VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOSE J. ROY, FAUSTO
DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE
ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNANDEZ,
,and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as 'members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.
1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF
MEMBERS, NOT ABSOLUTE.—While parliamentary immunity guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct,
members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; FAILURE TO CONFORM TO RULES,
EFFECT OF.—Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR
OF MEMBERS; SEPARATION OF POWERS.—The House of Representatives is
the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The courts will not assume a
jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES
DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR.—The House of Representatives of the United States
has taken the position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitutes
unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took action
against offenders, even after other business had been considered.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS.—While under
the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent
legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
G.R. No. 227757. July 25, 2017.*
45
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE,
REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO, petitioners, vs. SPEAKER
PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, and
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; Mandamus is
defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required
to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled, there
being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—
“Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do
the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other is entitled,
there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 (2013), the Court explained that
the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme
necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be
compelled.
Political Law; Speaker of the House of Representatives; The Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision
also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something
within its sole control.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a
majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and
manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the case
of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756 (1998), which involved a dispute on
the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court
observed that “[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of
the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that ‘[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such], the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
[House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.”
Same; Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, “determine the rules of its proceedings.”
These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’”—Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, “determine
the rules of its proceedings.” These “legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they ‘are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of
the House of Representatives].” Hence, as a general rule, “[t]his Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of
[C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from
prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives].”
Judicial Power; Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”—Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an
exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political
departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it
will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. This stems from the
expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, expressly “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Case law decrees that “[t]he
foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.
Same; By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political
branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be
judicially interfered with.—By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot
be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm
of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Verily, “[i]t
would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek
a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.”
G.R. No. 106971. March 1, 1993.*
46
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners, vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO
ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents. NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Appointments; Rule on Proportional
Representation; Conversion of fractional membership of a political party into a whole
membership amounting to a reduction of the other party's representation in the Commission
on Appointments is a clear violation of the Constitutional mandate requiring membership
therein be based on proportional representation of the political parties.—We find the
respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance
with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together
two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it
will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership
of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
Same; Same; Same; The proportional representatives of each political party in the
Commission on Appointments is based on the actual number of members of each political
party at the time of the election of members therein in recognition of changing political
alignments at the time of its orgarnization.—Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for
purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the
Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each
political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in
the Senate. In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the
LakasNUCD upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in
alignments of membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the
time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Compliance with the rule on proportional representation is held
mandatory and must prevail over Constitutional mandate requiring election of twelve Senators
in the Commission which merely indicates maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution.—We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full
complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on
Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12
Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there
must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the
Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its
membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. x x x This interpretation finds support in the case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, where
this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified
number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in
interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail.
Same; Same; Same; Commission can function even if not fully constituted provided that
it has the required quorum.—Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the
Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the
required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the
Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10)
Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the
Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party
he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members
from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
Same; Same; Same; Judiciary; Power of Judicial Review; No practice or tradition,
established by mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of
practical construction of the fundamental law.—The election of the late Senator Lorenzo
Tañada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the
Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional
provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or
tradition, established by mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a
doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial
confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated
erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the
legislature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Interpretation of question of proportionality within
the realm of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.—Who decides the question of
proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the Commission
on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution
to twelve, but the number of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional
representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation
has been a settled rule—that it belongs to this Court. xxx Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes
a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of
our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the
Supreme Court the role of final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the
fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by
the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction
tyranny by force of numbers.
No. L-28089. October 25, 1967.
47
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional law; Constitutionality of statute; Title and subject matter of statute;
Constitutional limitations.—Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations
upon legislative power. First, Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient
to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof.
Same; Subject of statute to be expressed in the title of bill.—Of relevance here is the
second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does
not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read from
its introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives, where the bill, being of
local application, originated.
Same; Same; Purpose of such constitutional limitation.—The Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully indexed or catalogued, all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices
if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
Same; Same; Test of sufficiency of title.—The test of the sufficiency of a title whether or
not it is misleading; and, while technical accuracy is not essential and the subject need not be
stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is
so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression on indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. In
determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons
interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
Same; Same; Circumstances considered against the constitutionality of statute.—The
baneful effects of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not appraise the
people in the towns of Bulden and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from the towns and province and added to the
adjacent province of Lanao del Sur it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of R.A. 4700.
Same; Same; Title did not reflect transfer of a portion of territory from one province to
another.—Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting
in “the substantial diminution of the territoral limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the
incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and
that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away “need not be
expressed in the title of the law.” This posture—we must say—but emphasizes the error of
constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of
territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important
as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Same; Separation of valid portion of statute from invalid parts; Exception to this rule.—
But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional,
all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.
Municipal corporations; Their twin functions.—Municipal corporations perform twin
functions. Firstly, they serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of
government. Secondly, they act as an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes
and not a subdivision of the State.
Constitutional law; Capacity to file suit challenging constitutionality of statute; Case at
bar.—The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation
creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence
“in accordance with the Constitution” is recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar,
petitioner is a qualified voter. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new
town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in the town different from his
actual residence. Since his constitutional right to vote as citizen of that community is affected
by the statute in question, he may become a suitor to challenge its constitutionality.
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.*
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Taxation; Origin of revenue bills; A bill originating in the
House of Representatives may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole; As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
48
produced and to insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.”—Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was
adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb “shall
originate” is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase
“as on other bills” in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to
be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law—but the revenue bill—which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in
the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be
discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action,
a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of Representatives,” not in any particular
chamber.—The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in
respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-
ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that
the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power which
under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of Represen-tatives.” The exercise of the
treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on
the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers
of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power
by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought
of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving the House Bill up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following
the enacting clause and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same
subject matter.—It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H.
No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did
was merely to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really
no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then
writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit
is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its
own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply means that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House.—Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
Same; Same; Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.—The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions
before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
(ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause
as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and
distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It
would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of securing the
immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the
time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may
well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of
the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face
of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President.
Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening
of Congress in emergency session.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law is subject to judicial
review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard, the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to
insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
49
standard of review.—It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was
invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a “growing
budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country. It is noteworthy that no member
of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the
contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate
accepted the President’s certification. Should such certifi-cation be now reviewed by this
Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up
on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of
the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the factual basis
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, §
18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers
to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; A third version of the bill may result
from the conference committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a
substitute,” the only requirement being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House and Senate bills.—As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a
Conference Committee, it has been explained: Under congressional rules of procedure,
conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at
issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting
new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house
amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting
clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now
altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill . . . . The
result is a third version, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the
only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House
and Senate bills.
Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.—Indeed, this
Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report
an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason
why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an “amendment in the
nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses
of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this
case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is common place in Congress that
conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been
committed to the committee, and if a change is desired in the practice, it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an
internal rule of each house.—To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee
to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is
cited to the effect that “If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these,
the Rules contained in Jefferson’s Manual.” The following is then quoted from the Jefferson’s
Manual: The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed
to them . . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to
a question in issue. Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule
applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson’s Manual is resorted to
only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports
include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This
practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral
argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson’s Manual must be
considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the
practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution
provides that “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bill-Drafting; The use of brackets and capital letters to
indicate changes is a standard practice in bill-drafting; The Supreme Court’s concern is with
the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws, not the enforcement
of internal Rules of Congress since “parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern.”—This observation applies to the other contention
that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the
Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a “detailed and sufficiently
explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure.” The Report used
brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting.
We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of
the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, “parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.” Our concern is with
the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these
requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The three-reading requirement refers only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee
report.—Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for
the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the
purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it
cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in
the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body;
50
that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version
(S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by “taking into consideration” the House bill; that for its
part the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House and
the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a
matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill.
The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is,
in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; An enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.—Whatever doubts there
may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our
cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only
of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or
that certain provisions of a statute had been “smuggled” in the printing of the bill have moved
or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There
is no reason now to depart from this rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the “enrolled bill” rule is not absolute, the
Supreme Court should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill where
allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously”
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared.—No claim is here made that the “enrolled
bill” rule is absolute. In fact in one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate
in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill,
admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared,
we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
“enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
Same; Same; Titles of Bills; The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to
prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it.—The question is whether
this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716,
although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute
amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the
VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the
exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law,
in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that
the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional requirement that
every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its
title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people
of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at
bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because
of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published,
pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title
of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL’s own franchise under
P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.
Same; Same; Same; The trend is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a
manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation.—The
trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts
do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient
if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to
the general subject thus expressed.
Same; Same; Public Utilities; Franchises; The grant of a franchise for the operation of a
public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common
good so requires.—In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends
PAL’s franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from
the VAT PAL’s exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do
under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the
operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when
the common good so requires.
Same; Taxation; Expanded Value Added Tax Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of
Expression; Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic
society, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State.—To be sure, we are
not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The
PPI’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even
with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however,
the press is not immune from general regulation by the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The VAT law would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had
been that granted to the press.—What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption
previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or
sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory
treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media
by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but
we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial
motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its
51
transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment
but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The
withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise
previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base
and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of
discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.
But that is not the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a reasonable basis for the
classification and different treatment between print media and broadcast media.—Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated
differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are
different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the
classification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The Free Exercise of Religion Clause
does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization.—What has been said above also disposes of the
allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation
of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates
freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held
in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause
does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee, one
not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.—In this case, the
fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege
but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax
credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even
as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus
a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Hierarchy of Values; When freedom of the
mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect and when
property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect.—There is basis
for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of
speech, press and religion. The possible “chilling effect” which it may have on the essential
freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of
communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court’s
power of review. There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law
also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to
due process and the equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has
been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: “[W]hen freedom of
the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when
property is imperiled it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect. This dual standard
may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause.”
Same; Same; Same; The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none”
in choosing the subject of taxation.—On the other hand, the CUP’s contention that Congress’
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service
cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against
the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, §
15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy
argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the
subject of taxation.
Same; Same; Same; Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce since
what Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of
taxation.”—Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What
Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of
laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political
inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to “quality education” (Art. XIV, §
1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights.
Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause; Contracts; Not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order.—Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA
that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts
entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that “No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” It is enough to say that the parties
to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the
taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause is not a limitation on the power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption was granted for a valid consideration.—In truth, the
Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power
of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such
52
is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim.
Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be
made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
Same; Judicial Review; Public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are
now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; There must
be before the Court a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to its adjudication
the impact of actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well-grounded.—The
substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form
because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate
private cases; that public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now
cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art.
VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a “special function” of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless
the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed
factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that
decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to
render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect
we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having
done in these cases—to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.
Same; Same; The duty of the Court to exercise its power of judicial review must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy; That the other departments of the
government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground
for exercising the Court’s power.—It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this “duty” to
justify this Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for
adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of “cases,” and nothing
but “cases.” That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave
abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the
essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only
result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon
to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of
the day.
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.*
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ,
REUBEN M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL
TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.―The prevailing rule in
constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states
that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actual case
or controversy is one which ― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.―By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
“involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.” In other
words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual
case or controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for
constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.”
“Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft
as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork
Barrel System.―The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also,
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910
53
for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and
Academic; Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already ― abolished the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because
the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either
by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration
of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues
related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by
respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would
not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said
reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot
precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify
or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law
may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court,
through a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of government.”―The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v.
Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among
others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he political
branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
them in response to the specific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court]
not to impose a solution at this stage.”
Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.―A political question
refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsic
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly,
the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.―It must also be borne in mind that “when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the
executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by
its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a resolution of
these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional
grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government,
within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution
to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea for
judicial restraint.
Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there
is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.” Petitioners
have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and
accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.”
Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the
54
existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter
adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means
“follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non
quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the
effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar,
the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings
in Philconsa and LAMP.
Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which
lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including
its members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and
legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork
Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the
Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,
are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF,
as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second,
there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government; To the legislative
branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the
judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.―The
principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through
the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have
been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive
has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and
independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any
single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of
independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary
or self interest assertions of another or others.
Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive.
Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates
or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where
the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight
function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But
55
it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-
enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption
of executive functions.
Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution; Towards this end, the Supreme Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator
identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment
are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational aspects of
budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the
guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the
same falters altogether.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme
Court hereby declares the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article as well
as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.―The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions
11of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight,
as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of
powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the
Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral
body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally
wield legislative power and no other; Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers
principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution
has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as
a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a)
delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed
to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme
Court observes that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar
as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is lodged in
Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle
of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That
the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what
constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law
of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they
are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article
authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
56
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus,
keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares
the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain
the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional
check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime example of a constitutional check and balance
would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or
tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill
presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall have the
power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The presentment of
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of
item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the
final step in the law-making process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for
approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests
on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions
on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process; It
is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws,
through haste, inadvertence, or design.”―The justification for the President’s item-veto power
rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary
process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any
impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body”;
phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”
Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which
merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple
purposes.―What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for
a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.
Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual
amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be
chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation
law already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-
item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced
with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its
legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises
non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the
appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power
to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating
or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly, allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter before another office of
government ― renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.―The
Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent,
the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation — a matter before another office of
government — renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) and Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the
fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district
the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the Court observes
that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
57
legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets
the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the
Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional
Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original
intent which is “to make equal the unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become
personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole
account of their office.
Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
16provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the
contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of
law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and
purpose stem from the very definition of the word “appropriation,” which means “to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into the
law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution
“does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’”
an appropriation law may — according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be” for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation precisely
because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be
properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely
because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a
system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after
the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the
entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators
which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does
not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes
individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.
 Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that
the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The
Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use
the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject
phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling,
or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3)
reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be
treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such
other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under
the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” under the same provision of law should
nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that
the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,”
remains legally effective
18and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used — as it should be used — only
in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO); Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), as defined by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority
issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a
specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is
subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or
clearance by competent authority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the
fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be “released” under
58
legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a] specific
authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount
during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate
approval or clearance by competent authority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned
that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically
speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds
beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under
certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the
actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to
the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM
representative during the Oral Arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash
Allocation (NCA) has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have
been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
funds which are only covered by obligated Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), and
without any corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the time of this
Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be
treated as funds which have been “released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of
2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding
NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view
of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the
dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be
equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released —
meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds
sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects” pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds
should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain
under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that
until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or
executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect
and should be properly enforced and complied with.―It must be stressed that the Court’s
pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in
effect in view of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts
the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in
the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707
SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary
is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.” “In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence
of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.’ ”
Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System
as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.―The
Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our
history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System
as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight,
post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated
the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power
of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed
procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto
items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may
be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of
purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted
genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by
21law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it
has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
G.R. No. 196418. February 10, 2015.*
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA),
petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
59
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., and COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit; The Constitution has made the
Commission on Audit (COA) “the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over
all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds
and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.”—The COA is endowed with latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures
of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the
purpose for which they had been intended by law. The Constitution has made the COA “the
guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.” Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its
constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds,
particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law.
Constitutional Law; Pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.—It bears reminding that pursuant to Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution, no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Hence, the GAA should be purposeful,deliberate, and precise in its contents and stipulations.
Also, the COA was correct when it held that the provisions of the GAA were not self-executory.
This meant that the execution of the GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure to be
approved by the President, and such approved program of expenditure was the basis for the
release of funds. For that matter, Section 34, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code
(Executive Order No. 292) states that — Section 34. Program of Expenditure.—The Secretary
of Budget shall recommend to the President the year’s program of expenditure for each
agency of the government on the basis of authorized appropriations. The approved
expenditure program shall constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal period,
subject to such policies, rules and regulations as may be approved by the President.
Presidential Decree No. 1597; Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1597 (Further
Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position Classification in the National
Government) states that the authority to approve the grant of allowances, honoraria, and other
fringe benefits to government employees, regardless of whether such endowment is payable
by their respective offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the
President.—Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1597 (Further Rationalizing the System of
Compensation and Position Classification in the National Government) states that the
authority to approve the grant of allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits to
government employees, regardless of whether such endowment is payable by their respective
offices or by other agencies of the Government, is vested in the President. As such, the
precipitous release and payment of the healthcare maintenance allowance benefits without
any authorization from the Office of the President is without basis and should be rightfully
disallowed.
[No. L-3820. July 18, 1950]
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine
Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.
1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY.—The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
1. 2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY.—The Congress of the Philippines has a
wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a
State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is
difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded.
Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.
1. 3.ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WlTNESS FOR
CONTEMPT.—No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either
House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire.
1. 4.ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION.—The materiality of a question that
may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to the subject of
the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
1. 6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.—Where the
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied
upon to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the
contention. Although the legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the
Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that
power.
1. 7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE
ACTION.—Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to approve
60
or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which. is
material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or
possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or imagine
what legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of the legislative
investigation.
1. 8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS
FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION.—There is no
sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the
end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence
of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four
years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a continuing body which
does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the
House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.
1. 9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO
ANSWER.—Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal
to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be
so punishable.
1. 10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is
INCRIMINATORY.—It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general 'Conception of
the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the
court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an. imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
1. 11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of every citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. His
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must
yield to that duty. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each
other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the
former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one of the most sacred that the
citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his
corresponding obligation to respect the life of others.
 G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.*
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY,
and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Legal Standing; Concept of legal standing or locus standi
explained in Tolentino vs COMELEC.—In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004), we
explained that “ ‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x,” thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; In recent cases, Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test.—
Considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has
relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006),
articulates that a “liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity
of laws, regulations and rulings.” The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008),
even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current
policy that “this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.”
Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for being moot
and academic; The exercise by the Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.—The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No.
170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the
decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
61
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither
will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted.
A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in
academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure; The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.—As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.” The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect
to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution;
The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.—Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does not agree.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear
and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.
 Same; Same; Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.—The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic
data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to
be prohibited by the instant petitions.—The Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not
cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the
consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not
be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules governed
it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008.*
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
respondents.
Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation; There is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege; The
presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.—Respondent
Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from
the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed
that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive
privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744 (1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384
SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of
information which the government may withhold from the public,” that there is a “governmental
privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters;” and that “the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by
62
which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions
in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned
in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said
executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.—Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s
Decision reversed the “presumption that inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure” arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has
repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its
entirety. Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances
obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3
of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the
said case reads: From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive
privilege,both in the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending
on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any
recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the
mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy
and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Obviously, the last
sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the “exemption” being
claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue
of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is
one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from
disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege
given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,”
Defined; The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of
something, the concentrated essence of substance; “Non-delegable” means that a power or
duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the
obligor; The fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board,
which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—The fact
that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the
concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable” means that a power
or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with
the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact
that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall
submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing
foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of
“operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity”
was laid down in In re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S.
App. D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The
U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and,
therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to
staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity” to
direct presidential decision-making.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which
test to use—whether the Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational Test—the main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.—In the case at bar, the danger of
expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term “advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a
member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is
far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down
in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64
Fed. R. Evid. Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the
Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test to use, the main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand
proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that
the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational
proximity test is unfounded.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the
reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which
the privilege is meant to protect.—It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive
privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated
November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications
privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which executive
63
privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given
the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot
provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very
thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1 (2006), it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal
department.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three
(3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation,
with more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily
inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and
informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
vague legislative need.—Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with
more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire
into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague
legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done
with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge
constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core
of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her conversations
with a member of her Cabinet.
Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and
Transparency; The constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective
functioning of a democratic government.—There is no debate as to the importance of the
constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public
accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning
of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of
those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And
the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this
Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in
any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute
right—that there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information
covered by executive privilege is a recognized principle in other democratic States.—This
Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of
legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees
from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call
petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so.
Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3)
questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot
be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed
the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other
democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right. Indeed,
the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right
to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the
regulation of the law is unmistakable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.—The right primarily involved
here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of
legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), “the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant
to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress” and “neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power
to exact testimony from government officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress,
not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are
respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information
on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature’s right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and
the public’s right to information.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a
legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of the Committees’ questions can be
sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which
their inquiry as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can only be
overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by
executive privilege.—It must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of
respondent Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes
respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However,
this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is
validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose
of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of
mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance.
64
The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that
the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be
equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so
essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in
crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and
specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual
controversies. Also, the bare standard of “pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied
to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal
and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving
the conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized
existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may
apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the
Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential
communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable
Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the
conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential
communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the
other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all
recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications.
The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of
confidentiality of Presidential communications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications
puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by
demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three
(3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation—for sure, a factual basis
for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislative bodies can come up
with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.—The presumption
in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to
enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the
information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific
reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not
be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly
pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If
respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive
officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from
recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three questions will not
necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They
could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation. For sure,
a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies
can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and
corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the
exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry
is legislative in nature—curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of
Congress.—Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that
respondent Committees’ need for information in the exercise of this function is not as
compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is
because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this
is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered
by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and
not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress
bounds set by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the
potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given
government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the
Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.—The
general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to
make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not
bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither
can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of respondent
Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and
courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of
the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for
prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding
anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate.
Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence
and “punish” those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose
for the sake of exposure.
65
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman
is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine
whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same
holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal
guilt with finality.—It is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have
already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty “to investigate
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The Office of the
Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily
determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The
same holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine
criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and
the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all
persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.
Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of
graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of
information validly covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover
information related to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they have the
constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government.
Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot
be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by
executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and
corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the
petition.
Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to
the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to
apply the law; Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent
court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting
standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law.
Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provides that “technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect
substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules which prohibit leading,
hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few,
do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most
ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper
proceedings by a competent court or body.
Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second
argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring
invitations or subpoenas to contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need for
the inquiry” along with the “usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative
to and in furtherance thereof” is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter
dictum. On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these
requirements. An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked
Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of
Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times.
Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to
function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms
that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to
permissible areas and thus, prevent the “roving commissions” referred to in the U.S.
case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Likewise, witnesses have their
constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to
be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and
documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on
the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry.
Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing
the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance
therewith.—Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this
Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of
Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a
blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have
the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is especially true where what
is involved is the contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to
benefit legislative committees—more than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest
stake in the proper observance of the Rules.—Obviously the deliberation of the respondent
Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being
submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt
order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result,
the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation
of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who
signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the
matter was taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis
supplied) All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’
66
settled expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is
shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not
enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully
deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns
and objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that
respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is
especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that
the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who
has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.
Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as
it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members, but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.—On the nature of the
Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no
debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct
of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of
the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of
the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status. All pending matters
and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even
with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into
the next Congress with the same status.
Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.—Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above
takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of
the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
“(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such
rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two
sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different
rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise
make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was
the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in
the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main
rules regarding effectivity.
Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject
Rules are null and void—only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court
be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation
of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale
for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI
of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.
Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the
interests of these Executive and Legislative branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the
other with official courtesy and respect.—On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the
fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political branches of government. In a free and
democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the
other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the
proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we
preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of
government.
Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of
government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best venue for this noble
undertaking is not in the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and
the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at
the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process
of law.—While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts
to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do
67
not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead
to the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of government
malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is
founded on the constitutional command of transparency and public accountability. The recent
clamor for a “search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe
is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted
power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of
government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on
evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the
test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a
more exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001.*
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA,
DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Political
Question Doctrine; Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue
to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.—To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried
to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds.
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the
principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in
the mills of constitutional law. In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case of Baker v. Carr, viz.: “x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question. Unless one of these formulations, is inextricable from the case at
bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question’s
presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not of ‘political cases.’
” checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of the Supreme Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government.—In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously
confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a
political question. Our leading case is Tañada v. Cuenco, where this Court, through former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer “to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.” To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of
the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not
only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the “thou shalt not’s” of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In
sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the
so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which
empowers this Court in limpid language to “x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; People Power; Revolutionary Governments; It is
familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop.—Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines
and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to support
their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent
Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will
show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of
former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people,
albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people “in
defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended.” It is familiar learning that
the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond
68
judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987
Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency
under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government
while EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President—EDSA I is extra constitutional but EDSA II is intra constitutional, the former
presenting a political question and the latter involving legal questions.—In fine, the legal
distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and
the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President
as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of
EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of speech and of
assembly provides a framework in which the “conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the society.”—The indispensability of the people’s freedom
of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by
Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment;
second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is
essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth,
it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.” In
this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the “conflict
necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society.” In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, this function of free speech and
assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association which emphasized that “the basis of the right of assembly is the
substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all.” In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, this
Court similarly stressed that “. . . it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For
in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.—Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and
not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of
Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that “it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . .” Thus, respondent’s
invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
Public Officers; Presidency; Resignation; Resignation is not a high level legal
abstraction—it is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.—The issue then is
whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January
20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation
is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Totality Test; Whether erstwhile President Estrada resigned has to
be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.—In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon
of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we
hold that petitioner resigned as President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court holds that, the resignation of former President
Estrada cannot be doubted—it was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.—In sum, we hold
that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving
the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him
69
to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is
to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada’s resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.—To say the least, the above letter is
wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss,
nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the
petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court
as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he
issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the
press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot
be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the resignation is the
result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give
any legal significance to petitioner’s letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of
this Decision.
Same; Same; Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); A public
official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign, but if at the time he
resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or
prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him.—Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be
obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official
as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case
against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for
that would be a violation of his constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if
he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public
official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 12 of R.A. No. 3019 contemplates of cases whose
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity
from suit of a sitting President.—There is another reason why petitioners contention should
be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January
20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-
1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed,
the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the
petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from
any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is
debatable, but even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time when then President Estrada resigned because the process
already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the
second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed
indefinitely.—Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise.
The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending
at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of
the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
Presidency; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Political Question
Doctrine; Implicitly clear in the recognition by both houses of Congress of Arroyo as President
is the premise that the inability of former President Estrada is no longer temporary.—What
leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s
claim of inability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review the claim of temporary inability of former President Estrada and thereafter revise the
decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing Arroyo as President is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat—it is a political issue which cannot be
decided by the Supreme Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.—
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
70
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that
this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue “in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government.”
Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr, there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it.” Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s
claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political
in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada cannot successfully claim that he
is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily since
such claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that President Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.—In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by this Court.
Same; Presidential Immunity; Impeachment; Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for former President Estrada to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.—We shall now rule on the
contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court
is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-
sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the
object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation
of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.
Same; Same; Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.—This is in accord with our
ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner
has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as
a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan and related cases are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
Same; Same; By no stretch of the imagination can the crimes of plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.—We now come to the scope of
immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries
the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Same; Same; A critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a
judicial disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when it impedes the search for truth
or impairs the vindication of a right.—Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on
executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege, especially when
it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain
recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven
advisers of President Nixon’s associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice
and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washington’s Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign.
President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to
quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to
judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he
could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme
Court. It concluded that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration
of criminal justice.” In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held
that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only “official acts.” Recently, the
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones where it held that the US President’s immunity from suits for money damages arising
out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
Same; Same; Public Officers; The constitutional polices on accountability of public
officers—of public office being of public trust—will be devalued if the Court sustains the claim
that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his
incumbency.—There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope
of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is
71
that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that “(t)he State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.” It ordained that “(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” It set the rule that “(t)he right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.” It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to “(investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies
will be devalued if we sustain petitioner’s claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
Due Process; Prejudicial Publicity; Words and Phrases; Two (2) Principal Legal and
Philosophical Schools of Thought on Dealing with Unrestrained Publicity of High Profile
Cases; The British school of thought approaches the problem with the presumption that
publicity will prejudice a jury, while the American school of thought assumes a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair
trial.—There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal
with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.
The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury.
Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair
trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused
to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this
issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present
danger, etc.
Same; Same; There is not enough evidence to warrant the Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of former President Estrada by the Ombudsman—the former
President needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof, more
weighty social evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a
bias-free decision.—Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to
warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of
proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the
office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with it’s findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Theory of Derivative Prejudice; The Court can not
adopt former President Estrada’s theory of derivative prejudice, i.e., that the prejudice of the
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates—the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure gives
investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations
albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.—Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by
the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman
flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating
prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they
are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to
change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases which they
believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases
against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is
the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
Constitutional Law; Republicanism; Rule of Law; Rights in a democracy are not decided
by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason, nor are rights necessarily
resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and
should never be the definition of the rule of law.—A word of caution to the “hooting throng.”
The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a
new stage—the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant
justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the
State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which
has been categorized as the “most fundamental of all freedoms.” To be sure, the duty of a
prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to
provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls “the impatient vehemence of the majority.”
Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and
not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If
democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the
right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of
thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man’s progress from the cave to
civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people’s prejudice.
G.R. No. 191618. November 23, 2010.*
72
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondent.
Remedial Law; Constitutional Law; Locus Standi; Parties; On more than one occasion
we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.—On more than one occasion we
have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. The dust has long settled on the test
laid down in Baker v. Carr: “whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
questions.” Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant
is not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional
challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority
over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite
for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review.—Although there are
recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is
unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance
of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of
an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review.
Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Same; Statutory Construction; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while
concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.—Petitioner, a prominent election
lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law
issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1)
the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the
unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson
v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while
concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Same; Words and Phrases; Verba Legis; Verba legis dictates that wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.—
Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice
Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
(1970), instructs: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential
for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced
to a minimum.785
Same; Statutory Construction; Ratio Legis Et Anima; A doubtful provision must be
examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding
the framing of the Constitution.—Where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et
anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution. In following this
guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a
doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied.
Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the
panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.
Same; Same; Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat.—Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat—the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991): It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET); Powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is plenary; Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct
thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it.—Unmistakable from
the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidenti al
election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as
restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado
forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention
by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to
73
resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power
connected thereto.
Constitutional Law; Courts; Supreme Court; The conferment of additional jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.—The conferment
of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome”
task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication. We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant
of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A plain
reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not
contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Senate Electoral Tribunal; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; The different
electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), are constitutional bodies.—Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the
inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning
as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government—
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary—but not separate therefrom.
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a separate and distinct entity
from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.—By the same
token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies—not
unlawfully defies—the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman
and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity
and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
Same; Same; Electoral Contests.—The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power.
Same; Same; The power wielded by Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution.—With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the
exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme
Court.
Same; Same; The Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department,
i.e., the Supreme Court.—We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency
to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that
“[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity.” The vehicle for the exercise of this power,
as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and
constitutional grant of judicial power.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Baseless Petitions.—One final note. Although this Court
has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate a word of caution against the
filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s docket. The petition in the instant case
belongs to that classification.
G.R. No. 83896. Frbeuary 22, 1991.*
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Executive Order No. 284; The Court in
construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied; A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was formed.—A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
74
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well
as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13,
Article VII when other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public
officials or employees from holding other offices or employment.—Moreover, such intent is
underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution
on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, “(N)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7 (2),
Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides “(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.—It
is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the
wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.” In the latter
provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase “in the
Government.” The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-
embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The all-embracing prohibition imposed on the
President and his official family are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat them
as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.—Going further into
Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: “They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-embracing
prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not
similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,
members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.—
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section
7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it allows
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so.—In the light of the construction given to
Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government
and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; De facto officers; During their tenure in the
questioned position, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered.—During their tenure in the questioned positions,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure, officer,
a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the
duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the
public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability
to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by
the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may
therefore be retained by them.
75
G.R. No. 175352. July 15, 2009.*
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI,
petitioners, vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, respondent.
Special Proceedings; Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is generally commenced by the
Government as the proper party plaintiff; An individual may commence such an action if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can
bring the action in his own name.—Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government
as the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an
individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The
person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.
In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.
Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional
Law; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or employee of
the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.—The
President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does
not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not
an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion
that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not
being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold
a government office or employment.
Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-owned
but privately owned.—The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast
majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the
PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and
65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300,
P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of
the PNRC.
PEOPLE VS TULAGAN
No. L-25716. July 28, 1966.
FERNANDO LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Constitutional law; Scope of the power vested in the judicial branch of the government.—
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the government, not
merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or “all” of said power, except,
only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to
“judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate
and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively (Article VI,
Section 11, of the Constitution).
Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Right of defeated candidate to contest election of
President-elect or Vice-President-elect.—Republic Act No. 1793, creating the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate the legal right to contest
judicially the election of the Presidentelect or Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount
of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment
declaring that he, not the candidate proclaimed elected by Congress, is the one elected
President or Vice-President, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume
the duties attached to said office.
Same; Effect of making Justices of the Supreme Court members of Electoral Tribunal.—
By providing that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court”, Republic Act No. 1793 has conferred upon
such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Same; Nature of jurisdiction.—Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or
separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the
Supreme Court, since it is the same Court, although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its. ordinary
functions. The result of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793 may be likened to the fact
that Courts of First Instance perform the f unctions of such ordinary Courts of First Instance,
those of courts of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and
domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court
of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases
which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. In all of these
instances, the court (Court of First Instance or municipal court) is only one, although
the functions may be distinct and, even, separate.
Same; Power to decide contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of public
officers.—The power to be the judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of any public officer is essentially judicial. As such—under the very principle of
separation of powers—it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as
76
the Constitution provides otherwise. This is precisely the reason why said organic law ordains
that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members” (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution). In other words, the
purpose of this provision was to exclude the power to decide such contests relating to
Members of Congress—which by nature is judicial—from the operation of the general grant
of judicial power to “the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by
law”.
Same; Power of Congress distinguished from the power of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.—The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for President and/or
VicePresident, has obtained the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from
and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by
Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers , charged with
the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the election
returns only certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers. (Article VII, Section 2,
Constitution of the Philippines.) Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has
the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election returns have been
irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true results of the elections in the areas
covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose
favor, which Congress has no power to do.
Same; Power of Tribunal to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge
constitutional tenure.—The authority of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to determine
whether or not the protestant has a better right than the President and/or Vice-President to be
declared elected by Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the evidence
introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected President or Vice-
President is the protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had
legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgment thereof.
Same; Effect; Imposition of new duties upon the Supreme Court.—In imposing upon the
Supreme .Court the additional duty of performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached upon the appointing
power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties constitutes, neither the creation of an
office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is constitutional.
G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000*
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as SECRETARY, AND DIRECTOR NILO L.
ROSAS in his capacity as REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND DR,
BIENVENIDO A. ICASIANO, respondents.
 Judicial Review; Prohibition; Presidency; Separation of Powers; Presidential Immunity
from Suit; The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for
prohibition is directed not against the President himself but against his subordinates;
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.—Petitioners theorize
that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. Petitioners’ contention
is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Where an administrative department acts with grave
abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a justification for
the courts to set aside the administrative determination thus reached.—Petitioners’
submission that the petition of private respondent with the Court of Appeals is improper for
failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a “court” conducting a “proceeding”
and for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise
of their judicial or ministerial functions, is barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly
averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that
infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their
questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of
insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order. What is more, where an
administrative department acts with grave abuge of discretion, which is equivalent to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative
determination thus reached.
Administrative Law; Civil Service; Security of Tenure; Transfers and Reassignments; A
reassignment with no definite period or duration is definitely violative of the security of tenure
of a government employee.—The Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST “appears to be indefinite.” The same can be inferred from
the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will “best fit his qualifications and experience” being “an
expert in vocational and technical education.” It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment
is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the
(reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said
Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only
last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite
period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the
security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain: “Security of tenure is a
77
fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service. The mantle of its
protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also to cases of
unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of Education,
Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA
1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138). While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when
the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation.
Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office
of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs.
Lejano, 109 Phil. 116).”
SABIO VS SB 2019 case --
G.R. No. 175210. February 1, 2016.*
MARIO JOSE E. SERENO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (APMP),
petitioner, vs. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND RELATED MATTERS (CTRM) OF THE
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Information; The constitutional guarantee of the right to
information on matters of public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public disclosure in all transactions
involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.—The
constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern enunciated in
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full public
disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making
as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people
of the freedom of expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of
information is necessary, and can be possible only if the people are provided the proper
information on matters that affect them. But the people’s right to information is not absolute.
According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987), the constitutional
guarantee to information “does not open every door to any and all information.” It is limited to
matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public
interest, and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
Same; Same; Mandamus; Two (2) requisites must concur before the right to information
may be compelled by writ of mandamus.—Two requisites must concur before the right to
information may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be
in relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And secondly, it must not be exempt
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
 Same; Same; Whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case to case basis.—As to the
first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may
want to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the
issues “naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.” As such, whether or not the
information sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of
the courts on a case to case basis.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.—The
second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from the
constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence,
closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as
the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384
SCRA 152 (2002), the Court has ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters
acknowledged as “privileged information under the separation of powers,” which include
“Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings.” Likewise exempted from the right to information are “information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused.”
Same; Same; Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally
granted to the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim
of confidentiality.—Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally
granted to the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim
of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation
to disclose information must be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.
In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency concerned that has
the burden of showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public
concern, or that the same is exempted from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee. We
reiterate, therefore, that the burden has been well-discharged herein.
G.R. No. 92008. July 30, 1990.*
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
Political Law; Administrative Law; Appointment and Designation defined.—Appointment
may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who
is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation,
the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable
78
at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
while designation is legislative in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority.—Designation may also be loosely defined as an
appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified
public office, That is the common understanding of the term However, where the person is
merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if so understood as an appointment the designation
of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed; Case at bar;
Reason.— Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner
cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree
clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise
of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the
petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a
subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot accept the fact that the act of the Secretary
as an extension or projection of the personality of the President made irreversible the
petitioner's title to the position in question.—Indeed, even on the assumption that the power
conferred on the President could be validly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept
that the act of the latter, as an extension or "projection" of the personality of the President,
made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question. The petitioner's conclusion
that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is based only on half the
doctrine he vigorously invokes,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acts of Department Heads performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business to be considered valid as acts of the President of the Philippines
must not be disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.—The doctrine presumes the
acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when
"performed and promulgated in the regular course of business." which was true of the
designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such
acts shall be considered valid only if not "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"
as also happened in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce
fall to the ground.—With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce
fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential
prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be
assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or
acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a
different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the petitioner never acquired valid title to
the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority.—The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in
good faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism.
After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation
was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the
composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-
Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the PTA However, such
circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the President
herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule therefore
that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has no right to be
reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
G.R. No. 111243. May 25, 1994.*
JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON.
SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, III, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Quo Warranto; Quo warranto as a special civil
action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled
to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.—The instant petition is
in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and
alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the Bangko
Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special civil action can only
be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a “person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 66,
Sec. 6; Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner who did not aver entitlement to the office cannot bring
the action for quo warranto.—In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held
that the petitioner therein, who did not aver that he was entitled to the office of the City
79
Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the action for quo warranto to oust the
respondent from said office as a mere usurper.
Same; Same; Same; Question of title to an office may not be determined in a suit to
restrain the payment of salary to the person holding office, brought by one not claiming to be
entitled to said office.—Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175 N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was
held that the question of title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo
warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to restrain the payment of salary to the
person holding such office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the one entitled to
occupy the said office.
Same; Same; Same; The action was improvidently brought by the petitioner.—It is
obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the action
would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable
mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery (See
Roosevelt v. Draper, 7 Abb. Pr. 108, 23 N.Y. 218).
Constitutional Law; Judicial Inquiry; Principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of
the case.—Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Hence,
there is no need to resolve the question of whether the disbursement of public funds to pay
the salaries and emoluments of respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the Court
refrains from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to
the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case (Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA
489 [1992]).
Same; Commission on Appointments; Confirmation Powers; Congress cannot by law
expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require appointment
of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution.—However, for the information of all concerned, we call attention to our
decision in Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting,
where we ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government
officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution.
G.R. No. 91636. April 23, 1992.*
PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner, vs. BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission; EDNA BONTO PEREZ,
LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB M. BUAT, DOMINGO H.
ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO, IRENEA E. CENIZA,
LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, RUSTICO L.
DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN, and OSCAR N. ABELLA, in their capacity as
Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission; and GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Appointments; The Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.—Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the “third
groups” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002.*
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and
GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, Finance Services
Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
Courts; Judicial Review; An employee’s personal and substantial injury, if a particular
appointee is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to
raise the constitutional issue regarding the ad interim appointment of said COMELEC
Chairman.—Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to
the Law Department, where she was placed on detail service. Respondents claim that the
reassignment was “pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, and as the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer.” Evidently, respondents anchor
the legality of petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the
COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of
the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is
without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the
Constitution. On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he
assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then petitioner’s reassignment is legal
and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the
constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption of office. Petitioner’s personal and substantial
injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus
standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition.
80
Same; Same; The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same.—Respondents harp on
petitioner’s belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when
the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not
the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at
the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in
the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, “if it is not raised
in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot
be considered on appeal.” Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this
Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent
body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time
when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the
constitutional issue on time.
Same; Same; In keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty to determine whether other
agencies of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not
abused the discretion given them, the Supreme Court may even brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised.—In any event, the issue raised by
petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions
made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in
doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this
Court’s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the
limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may even
brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here the
petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires
the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Appointments; Words and Phrases; An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office—the fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.—An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President
shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis
supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The
fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of
an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately; In
case of an appointment made by the President when Congress is in session, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person
thus named assume office, while with reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect
at once, and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of
time.—The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment,
and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once
assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.
In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the
nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is thus made between the
exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the
President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may
the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments.
It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without
loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the
appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President
in the meantime that Congress is in recess.—The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in
letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in
the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine
jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an ad
interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the
Court stated: “We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive
of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is
temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was
made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU
President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent
status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and
attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission
that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with a temporary
appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim
81
appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them.” (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment becomes complete and
irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and the withdrawal or revocation of
an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the
moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from
office.—An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the
constitutional protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes
complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or
revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee
before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office
which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed
for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes
specified in the Constitution—first, by the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of Congress without the
Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.—An ad interim appointment can be
terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of
his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect,
a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can
complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the
heads of the ad interim appointees.
Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a temporary
or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from
making to the three independent constitutional commissions.—While an ad
interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment
or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure
of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits
the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Elections; Statutory
Construction; To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on
Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office
will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments.—While the Constitution
mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent,” this provision should be harmonized
with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power
to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of
the framers of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Principle of Check and
Balance; An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
longer be extended a new appointment—the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission
on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the
President.—There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final
decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a
refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from
such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the
appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not
because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by
the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the
session of Congress.—An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time
or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required
by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in Section 17 of the Rules
of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows: “Section 17. Unacted
Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or appointments
submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of
the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or
appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission.” (Emphasis
supplied) Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed
appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The jurisprudence under the
1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable
to the present Constitution.—Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where
82
the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present Constitution on ad
interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution
governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present
Constitution. The established practice under the present Constitution is that the President can
renew the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-
recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution
which did not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in
the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim
appointments.—The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A
disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment
because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A
by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear
that any person who has served any term of office as COMELEC member—whether for a full
term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term of
any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to the COMELEC.—The framers of the
Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of office as
COMELEC member—whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three
years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to
the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this manner: “MR. FOZ.
But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the
case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies only
when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where the appointee serves only for
less than seven years, he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying
words “without reappointment” in the case of those appointed, then it is possible that an
interpretation could be made later on their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a
total of seven years. Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even
in the case of those first appointed under the Constitution, no reappointment can be made.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by
inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office—the period
from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term
nor an unexpired term.—However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of
the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the
time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an
unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could
start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the
Commission on Appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “without
reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of
office.—The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person
completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.
To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not subscribe to a
proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.—In the great majority of cases,
the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad
interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer
be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because
most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission on
Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad
interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the present Constitution prohibited
reappointments for two reasons—first, to prevent a second appointment for those who have
been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years, and,
second, to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve
beyond the fixed term of seven years.—The prohibition on reappointment is common to the
three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited
reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who
have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years.
The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve
beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One who has been given an ad interim appointment
as COMELEC Chairman is a de jure officer, and consequently, he has full authority to exercise
all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective; The
Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority, without having to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc, to transfer or
reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service Law.—Petitioner’s posturing
will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman of the
COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and
83
consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad
interim appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of
the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following
power: “Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who
shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission, shall: x x x (4) Make temporary
assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Service Law.” (Emphasis supplied) The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC,
is expressly empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not
required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Transfers; Security of Tenure; Career Executive
Service; One who is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer, nor a holder of a Career
Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of
Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil
Service Commission, does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.—Petitioner’s
appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, 2001,
attached as Annexes “X”, “Y” and “Z” to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her
Director IV position in the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a
Career Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service
Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as
prescribed in the Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service
Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.
In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal, this Court held that: “As
respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her
appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security
of tenure in respect of that position.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer
specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel, the
COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean amending
the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.—The
proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any
transfer or reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to
COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the
Revised Administrative Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested
with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will
logically exercise the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto itself this
power because that will mean amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the
COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Period; COMELEC Resolution No.
3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel, should
carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body.—COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
does not require that every transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the
concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require
such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will
have to approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution utterly
useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect
transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval from
the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
G.R. No. 196231. January 28, 2014.*
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M.
AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE – OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA
TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG, respondents.
Administrative Law; Justiciable Questions; The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman
may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently
with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable — not a political — question.—The issue of
whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable — not a political —
question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on
grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed
limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. In
resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant
concurrent disciplinary authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such
statutory grant violates the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.
Office of the Ombudsman; Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the “protector of the people” against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau.—Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman
is envisioned to be the “protector of the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority
to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant
to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable
it to further realize the vision of the Constitution.
84
Same; Jurisdiction; The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers
include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.—The Ombudsman’s
broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive
officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an “independent” office. Section
5, Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows: Section 5. There is hereby
created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas,
and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed.
Same; Fiscal Autonomy; The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman
and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics — they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they
all enjoy fiscal autonomy.—Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have
been expressly labeled as “independent.” The extent of the independence enjoyed by
these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant
considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case;
and second, consistency of any allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the
principle of checks and balances. Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics — they do
not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution
intended that these “independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that
the absence of “independence” would result in the impairment of their core functions.
Same; Fiscal Autonomy; In Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992), involving the fiscal
autonomy of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court ruled against the interference that the President
may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal
system.—In Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992), involving the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary, we ruled against the interference that the President may bring and maintained that
the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and
the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal system. The Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of
restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative
not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.
 Fiscal Autonomy; Commission on Human Rights (CHR); The Constitution also created
an “independent” Commission on Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of
independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted
to the constitutional commissions.—Notably, the Constitution also created an “independent”
Commission on Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it is
not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional
commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987
Constitution clearly expressed their desire to keep the Commission independent from the
executive branch and other political leaders.
Same; Constitutional Commissions; In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990),
the Supreme Court emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been
characterized under the Constitution as “independent,” are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature.—In Brillantes, Jr. v.
Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which
have been characterized under the Constitution as “independent,” are not under the control
of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court
declared as unconstitutional the President’s act of temporarily appointing the respondent in
that case as Acting Chairman of the Comelec “however well-meaning” it might have been.
Same; Commission on Human Rights (CHR); In Bautista v. Senator Salonga, 172 SCRA
160 (1989), the Supreme Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of
the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary
power of the President.—In Bautista v. Senator Salonga, 172 SCRA 160 (1989), the Court
categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on
Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President: Indeed,
the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created
by the Constitution to be independent — as the Commission on Human Rights — and
vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights,
pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures
therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in
office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the
President. Executive Order No.163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.
Office of the Ombudsman; Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal
by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject
to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.—In more concrete terms, we rule
that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject
to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-
85
granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation
of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must be
equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in
the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines
where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.
Same; The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the
Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein
the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence
of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members.—The statements made by
Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power to remove
and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power
over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is
given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who
can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given
to the public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking
official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be discouraged
from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if
misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be
avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an
Office of the Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
Constitutional Law; Impeachment; The intent of the framers of the Constitution in
providing that “[a]ll other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to
prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment”
to favored public officers.—Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress is
empowered to determine the modes of removal from office of all public officers and employees
except the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “[a]ll other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment” in the
second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more
stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favored public officers. Understandably so,
impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from
office. It is, by its nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a
judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding; the
one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for impeachment; the defined
instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required
for a finding of guilt. All these argue against the extension of this removal mechanism beyond
those mentioned in the Constitution.
Same; Same; The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the
manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that
Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.—The
authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of
removal of all other public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore
the basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution.
Same; Deputy Ombudsman; Special Prosecutor; With only one term allowed under
Section 11, Article XI of the Constitution, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if
removable by the President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the
Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices
independent constitutional bodies.—That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside
dismissals that do not conform to the high standard required in determining whether a Deputy
Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of removal
is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced with the constitutional
principle of independence. The mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their
suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section
12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy
Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to the very
same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried
to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.
Administrative Law; Gross Negligence; Words and Phrases; Gross negligence refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case
of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.—
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable. Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency
since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days.
Deputy Ombudsman; Even if we consider Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
7, series of 1990 to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is
a Deputy Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing
Officer tasked with the initial resolution of the motion.—In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP
86
relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have
acted on Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days: Section 8. Motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds—Whenever allowable, a motion for
reconsideration or reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds: a)
New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed,
and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the same within five (5) days from the date of
submission for resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours] Even if we consider this provision
to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy
Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked
with the initial resolution of the motion.
Office of the Ombudsman; Judicial Notice; We cannot conclusively state, as the Office
of the President (OP) appears to suggest, that Mendoza’s case should have been prioritized
over other similar cases. The Supreme Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady
stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.—The OP’s claims that Gonzales
could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on Mendoza’s motion and apprised
the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless. The Office of
the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous cases that
involve the potential loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot
conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that Mendoza’s case should have been
prioritized over other similar cases. The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady
stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman. This consideration certainly militates
against the OSG’s observation that there was “a grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay” on
the part of Gonzales. Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of “speedy disposition of
cases” before, among others, quasi-judicial bodies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself
a relative concept. Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this objective constitutional
sense. Unfortunately, because of the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in
dismissing Gonzales, the political and, perhaps, “practical” considerations got the better of
what is legal and constitutional.
Same; The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies within his
mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the alleged victim’s father. The
Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed
in any form or manner against any public official or employee of the government.—The OP
also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendoza’s case by having the case
endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis
of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw. The fact that Gonzales had
Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if it were based merely
on the request of the alleged victim’s father. The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and
her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against any public
official or employee of the government. This provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No.
6770, and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as amended.
Same; In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy
Ombudsmen but the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well.—This was the state of the law
at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987 Constitution, an “independent
Office of the Ombudsman” is created. The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, “who shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.” Other than the Ombudsman’s Deputies, the Ombudsman
shall appoint all other officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 13(8),
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman may exercise “such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.” Pursuant to this
constitutional command, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and
structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and the extent of its disciplinary
authority. In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, including in this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy
Ombudsmen but the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law
gave the President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special
Prosecutor, from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of
vacancy in these positions, the law requires that the vacancy be filled within three (3) months
from occurrence.
Same; Special Prosecutor; The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same
qualifications it imposes on the Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies. Their terms
of office, prohibitions and qualifications, rank and salary are likewise the same; In case of
vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting
Ombudsman; the President may designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as
Acting Ombudsman.—The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same
qualifications it imposes on the Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies. Their terms
of office, prohibitions and qualifications, rank and salary are likewise the same. The
requirement on disclosure is imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special
Prosecutor as well. In case of vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President may designate any of the
Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman. The power of the Ombudsman
and his or her deputies to require other government agencies to render assistance to the
Office of the Ombudsman is likewise enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor.
Same; Same; Subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to
the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.—Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the
Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking executive officials. For
87
emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk. Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it
performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment
between the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on
the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her
Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of
the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
Special Prosecutor; Under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the
Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman’s deputies, at least insofar as an
extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of
independence under the Constitution.—In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court was
confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a
subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from
the latter. In debunking that argument, the Court said: Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue
Commissioner Romulo’s statement as authority to advocate that the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under
the Office of the President. x x x In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly
provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, “shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter
may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under this Constitution.” The underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan’s powers
under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may
remove any of the Tanodbayan’s/Special Prosecutor’s powers under P.D. No. 1630 or grant
it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may
“exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by law,” it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor
under the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every
reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman’s deputies, at least
insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the same
grant of independence under the Constitution.