G.R No.

188078 March 15, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January
2010.1

The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress’ reliance on
the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City’s
population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s population indicators
as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report2) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’
Water District, dated 31 July 2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 4) which Congress allegedly used
in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.

We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in
enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial
review power,5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their
compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at
least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire
into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation.
Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the
exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the
ground that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to
preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render it political instead of
judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of
constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the
existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in
accord with the precepts of the Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has no power "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the
COMELEC’s theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and
non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless
the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.7

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City’s compliance
with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the "projected population of
the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell
short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections
and estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population
estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s
population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City’s
population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does
not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures the
Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the
projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1

Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water
District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them
qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report
merely contains preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual
population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos City’s population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City’s claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that
come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement." 8 This unbecoming attack
by the government’s chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the government’s census authority has no place in our judicial
system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the
regularity in the performance of its functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its ambit certifications from a public
utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water district’s so-called population census to the
level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally
gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are
not in the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to handle, collate
and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng
Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes
to conduct population census are local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior
approval of the NSCB and

under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing. 9

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population figures, 10 the COMELEC unwittingly
highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135’s stringent standards ensuring reliability of
population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the legislative
function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to
convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda’s certificate. 11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt
standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. 12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed
to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city’s population for purposes of creating
its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component city.13 Congress itself
confirms the wisdom and relevance of EO 135’s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the
population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local government units in
enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000
population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election
to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by
RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan
isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each
legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the
OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because
Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus
maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district
fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum
mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is
DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.

SO ORDERED.

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to
a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population.
Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to
a representative, but not so for a province.

GR. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

Juanito Mariano, Jr., petitioners vs. The Commission on Election, respondents
PUNO, J,:

FACTS:
The case involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. Of the petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr. is the only one residing
in Makati while the others reside in Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Section 2
of R.A No.7854 that it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution in relation to Section 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code
which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions; Section 51
of R.A No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the “three-consecutive term’ limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution; and Section 52 of R.A. No.7854 for (a) it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE:
WON there is enough merit in the petitioners assailing some section of R.A. No. 7854is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No, because the petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries. Sec. 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Sec. 2 stated that
the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality. The petitioners did not meet the requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue; (2) the question of the constitutionality must be raised by the proper party, petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not the proper parties; (3) the question of the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Also the population of
Makati (450,000) may increase its legislative for it met the minimum requirements of 250,000. Finally, the court does not find merit
in the petitioners’ contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the
title of the bill.

MONTEJO v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118702. March 16, 1995

FACTS:

Biliran, which is located in the third district of Leyte, was converted into a regular province. As a consequence, eight (8)
municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the Third
District to five (5) municipalities. To remedy the resulting in equ ality in th e distrib ution of inhabitan ts, voters and
mu nicipalities in th e provin ce of Leyte, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 w here, among
others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth
District to the Third District of Leyte.

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No.
2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of
representation.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district

Held:
Respondent COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it
denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance
only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power
to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district. Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008.

7/13/2010

Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:

Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its
total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
 On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to
“clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under
MMA Act 201.

Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27
February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

(B) On the merits –

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.

II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the
first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).

Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional
or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local
Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
 However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or
more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a
national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local
legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body,
created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

In view of certiorari and mandamus

The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality
of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines
whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be
included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of
the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the
other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise —
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a
special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the
maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in
Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a
regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that “each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave
Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.
 Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of
2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states
that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Imelda R. Marcos vs. COMELEC, et. al.

248 SCRA 300, 64 SCAD 358

Petitioner: Imelda Romualdez- Marcos Respondents: Cirilo Roy Montejo; Commission on Elections Ponente: Kapunan, J:

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez- Marcos filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative on the First Congressional
District of Leyte. Stated in her COC that she has stayed in the said place for seven (7) months. Subsequently, the respondent Cirilo
Montejo who had also filed COC for the same position and the incumbent Representative of the said Congressional District filed a
petition for the cancellation and disqualification of Marcos’s candidacy, on the ground of failure to meet the constitutional requisite
of one year residency. The COMELEC then granted the petition of Montejo to disqualify Marcos on the election holding that the
latter had already abandoned Tacloban, Leyte as her place of Domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila. Also,
they alleged that Imelda Marcos lost her domicile of origin when she married and lived with her husband former President
Ferdinand Marcos in Ilocos Norte and San Juan Manila. Marcos then filed amended for her COC modifying seven months to “since
childhood” asserting that the seven months she wrote was just an honest misinterpretation, however the amendment was denied
because the said amendment was filed out of time.

Apparently, in an en banc resolution, Marcos’s was declared as the winner and was qualified to run and allowed her proclamation as
the Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte by the COMELEC. In another resolution which was release on that
same day, it ordered that in the event that Marcos obtained the highest number of votes, the proclamation should be suspended
due to her issue in residency. Marcos then went to the Supreme Court to appeal her case.

ISSUE: For the purpose of Civil Law-

1. Whether or not Imelda Romualdez Marcos is deemed to have abandoned her domicile origin?

HELD:

The Court carefully made a distinction between residence and domicile for election purposes. It clearly stated that, an individual
does not lose his domicile even if she lived and maintained residence in different places. Being a resident of different places plays a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes and that it is just a mere physical presence on the place. Article 50 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that for the exercise of civil rights and fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural
person is the place of his habitual residence. The court took the concept of domicile to mean as an individual’s permanent home or a
place to which he intends to return.

Residence in the Civil law us a material fact referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. Residency is acquired by living in
a place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place.

Domicile of origin is not easily lost, to effect abandonment of the domicile of origin one must demonstrate:
 1. Actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place and establishing a new place of residence;
3. Acts which corresponds to the purpose

In the absence of the enumerated criteria the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.

Therefore, the court declared that the petitioner did not lose her domicile of origin and that she possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run as the Representative of First District of Leyte.

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his
statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his
oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001,
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as
what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the
time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus
rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s
qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully
justified.