A Background Guide for the

Disarmament and International

Security Committee

Harvard Model United Nations India

August 15-18, 2019

 Table of Contents

Letter from the Secretary-General................................................................................ 3

Letter from the Director.............................................................................................. 4

Introduction................................................................................................................ 5
History of the Committee........................................................................................... 6

Topic Area: Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks................................................... 7

Statement of the Problem............................................................................................ 7
History of the Problem................................................................................................ 8
Relevant UN Actions.................................................................................................. 9
Framework................................................................................................................ 10
Nacroterrorism.......................................................................................................... 10
Smuggling................................................................................................................. 16
Exploitation of Natural Resources............................................................................. 21
Financial and Military Aid........................................................................................ 25
Points of Contention................................................................................................. 31
Suggestions for Further Research............................................................................... 32

Position Paper Requirements..................................................................................... 33

Closing Remarks....................................................................................................... 33
Endnotes....................................................................................................................34
 Harvard Model United Nations India
A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the ninth session of Harvard Model United Nations India, to be held
at the Hyderabad International Convention Centre from August 15 to August 18.

Over the past eight years, HMUN India has witnessed the participation of over 9,000 high school
Jenna M. Wong
Secretary-General students from over 40 cities across 20 countries. As Under Secretary-General of Committees last year, I
have seen firsthand your passion and dedication to building a better global community. I am thrilled to
welcome you back to Hyderabad for another year of debate, diplomacy, and new friendships. I am also
excited to continue our longstanding partnership with our local host, Worldview Education Services
Kathryn S. Kuhar Pvt. Ltd. Together, we will bring conference to life through sixteen dynamic committees, an exceptional
Director-General array of speakers, and the beloved tradition of vibrant social events such as HMUN India’s Got Talent.

Gabrielle Y. Schultz Whether this will be your first HMUN India or your last, thank you for contributing to what no doubt
Under-Secretary-General will be an unforgettable weekend. HMUN India was founded on the simple belief that Model United
Administration Nations can bring together ambitious and talented students from all walks of life. By participating
in HMUN India, you are joining a truly global family. More than that, we hope that through our
Alec J. Fischthal conference you discover your power to build, grow, heal, and create communities in whatever corner
Under-Secretary-General
of the world you call home. The skills you will gain at HMUN India include the art of diplomacy and
Operations
the value of key skills such as research, public speaking, debate and negotiation. These are skills that the
world needs now more than ever, and we hope that you will put them into action even after our Closing
Anirudh Suresh
Under-Secretary-General Ceremony.
Committees
At the heart of HMUN India are our committees. To help you prepare, our directors worked tirelessly
to prepare the guide that you will find over the following pages. This committee guide will provide you
information about the history, context, events, implications, problems, and solutions that you will be
asked to tackle at HMUN India. In addition, we have a Guide to Delegate Preparation on the website
and a tailored preparation program called RESOLVE that will be released in early May. Each Director
will also be offering an Instagram Question & Answer session over the summer and are accessible via
their committee emails. We also encourage you to do research of your own, learning more about your
country position or individual policies. In particular, we urge you to be strategic about your research.
When it comes to international problem-solving, memorizing statistics on the magnitude of an issue may
be less productive than diving into case studies and evidence-based solutions.

I am so excited for you to join us in Hyderabad. I look forward to seeing your research come to life
through committee debate, working paper, and draft resolutions. Best of luck with your preparation
efforts, and please reach out to me with any questions. I cannot wait to see all of you in August.

Sincerely,

Jenna M. Wong
Secretary-General
59 Shepard Street, Box 205 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019
Cambridge, MA 02138
Voice: 617-398-0772
secgen@hmunindia.org
Fax: 617-588-0285
Email: info@harvardmun.org
www.hmunindia.org
 Harvard Model United Nations India
A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

Dear Delegates,

It is my honor to welcome you to Harvard Model United Nations India 2019! My

name is Michael Shafer and I am excited to meet each and every one of you this
coming August as your Director for the Disarmament and International Security
Committee. My goal is to make sure you all have fun and learn lots at this year’s
Jenna M. Wong
Secretary-General conference!

I grew up in rural Eastern Oregon and am currently a sophomore at Harvard. I study

Government (perfect for a committee discussing terrorism) and focus particularly
Kathryn S. Kuhar on international relations and Middle Eastern politics. Outside of HMUN, I am
Director-General
involved with an organization called America’s Promise Alliance and am a DJ on the
Gabrielle Y. Schultz Harvard Radio Station. I also watch far too much Netflix and annoy my roommates
Under-Secretary-General with bad jokes and terrible singing.
Administration
Disrupting financial terrorist networks is a topic that I am extremely passionate about
Alec J. Fischthal and hope that you all will come to find it as interesting and important as I do. This
Under-Secretary-General
Operations topic has many complexities that I hope to hear explored during debate in committee.
The financial networks of terror organizations should be at the forefront of discussion
Anirudh Suresh now that ISIS and other terror groups are being consistently beaten militarily and yet
Under-Secretary-General
are still able to have a global impact. I am excited to hear the ideas that are proposed
Committees
during committee to disrupt these financial networks and take away the influence of
terror organizations. Terrorism is a subject that I study extensively and cannot wait to
hear new ideas!

I am so excited to be directing this committee in India this year. I believe that you
will all bring new perspectives to this topic shaped by your own understanding and
experience. Terrorism is an issue that has been, is, and will continue to be relevant
virtually everywhere in the world and is an incredibly vast and complex issue that I
believe every delegate can find an aspect that captures their attention.

I hope that this committee is a place where delegates can learn more about a different
aspect of terrorism than is usually discussed on the international scene and a place
where delegates can learn how model UN functions and, by extension, the UN. I
want delegates to push the boundaries and propose radical ideas that the world has
not heard before. I am here as a resource to you while you prepare for committee,
debate, write working papers, and beyond. I am so excited to see you all at conference
and I want to encourage you to reach out to me with any questions or concerns you
might have or to just introduce yourself to me!
59 Shepard Street, Box 205
Cambridge, MA 02138 Sincerely,
Voice: 617-398-0772
Fax: 617-588-0285
Michael J. Shafer
Email: info@harvardmun.org Director, Disarmament and International Security Committee
www.hmunindia.org
disec@hmunindia.org
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 5

Introduction understanding of how leaders that tackle new

issues must be constantly aware of the precedent
The goal of terrorism is to enact political change that will be set by their actions.
through the use, or threat, of violence as is
explained in UNSC Resolution 1566. Within the
past two decades the world has witnessed heinous
acts of terrorism that range from bombings to
the hijacking of airplanes. These events have
forced the global community to come together
to find new ways to defend and fight against
organizations that often times operate on a global
scale. The UN has served as the vehicle for this
global collaboration and from its chambers have
echoed forth numerous resolutions aimed at
combating acts of terror. These resolutions range
from definitions of terrorism to internationally
binding laws regarding the seizure of aircraft. The
past decade saw the rise of the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria and the declaration of a Caliphate
in the Middle East. While the Islamic State rose
to power in the Middle East, their ability to
launch terror attacks on an international scale
became clear with the numerous attacks that were
claimed by the organization. Recently the terror
organization has suffered numerous military
defeats, but the financial self-sufficiency of the
organization allowed and continues to allow them
to operate on a regional and international level.
Terrorism has survived for centuries but the
financial self-sufficiency of terror organizations
allows them to exert a constant threat on a
significantly greater than before. Keeping in mind
the precedent that will be set by the resolutions
that will come out of committee delegates should
identify how the international community can
disrupt terrorist financial networks in order to
weaken the organizations as a whole. Delegates
should come away with a sense of why financial
self-sufficiency is a dangerous evolution of terror
organizations and how international institutions
such as the UN can work to prevent and disrupt
such self-sufficiency. Delegates are expected to
develop new and creative strategies to combat a
continuously evolving enemy. Above all, delegates
should take away from committee a strong
6 Disarmament and International Security Committee

History of the Committee bodies, and has facilitated the creation of major
non-proliferation treaties in the twentieth century
This section was written by Angie Cui ‘20. including the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
The Disarmament and International Security Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Committee (DISEC), established in 1945 Ban Treaty6.
along with the founding of the United Nations,
addresses “all disarmament and international DISEC meets for an annual session, and can be
security matters within the scope of the Charter summoned for special sessions if requested by the
or relating to the powers and functions of any United Nations Security Council or a majority of
other organ of the United Nations1. It is also the UN member-states . Its discussions are broken
7

first committee of the UN General Assembly down into general debate, thematic discussions
(UNGA), the central organ for policymaking and action on proposed draft resolutions, which
and multilateral negotiation whose membership are then voted on by all member-states .
8

is composed of all 193 member-states of the UN

with each state having one vote. The General
Assembly is empowered to discuss and make
recommendations on any issue within the
scope of the UN Charter, including topics of
international peace and security, the establishment
of international law and resolution of inter-state
conflicts. There are currently six main committees
of the General Assembly, in addition to the
standing Credentials Committee and General
Committee that carry out organ improvement
and oversight2.
DISEC deals specifically with issues of disarmament
and threats to the international security regime. It
promotes the “general principles of cooperation
in the maintenance of international peace and
security” as well as “cooperative arrangements and
measures aimed at strengthening stability though
lower levels of armaments.”3 DISEC works and
partners closely with the United Nations Office
for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Disarmament
Commission, and the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, and has discussed
such topics as chemical and nuclear weapon
proliferation, arms control and conventional
weapons4. DISEC also works in tandem with the
Conference on Disarmament (CD), established
during the first Special Session on Disarmament
of the UNGA in 1979 in Geneva as “the single
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of
the international community”5. The CD routinely
reports to DISEC and other General Assembly

Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks
Statement of the Problem
Terrorism is not something that is new to the
world. However, within the last two decades there
has been a large uptick in the media coverage of
global terrorism. This is because within the past
two decades nations around the world have seen
the devastating effects of acts of terror and have
pledged to fight them. Nations have mobilized
armies to fight against ISIS and relinquish their
control over cities such as Mosul and developed
new strategies of war to combat organizations
that do not fight like traditional armies. Terrorism
cannot be completely stopped. There will always
be those in society that are so extreme and fanatic
that they will resort to violence to pursue their
goals.
Those few who are truly extreme and fanatic
will take advantage of their surroundings to
build an organization that pursues political goals
through violence and threats and intimidation.
When there is a power vacuum they step in to
fill it and then use the threat of violence and
economic desperation to force others to carry
out their violent actions. In many areas where
terrorist organizations flourish there is a weak or
nonexistent government and a faltering economic
system that cannot support the population. The
nations of the world can continue to raise army
after army to battle terrorist organizations but as
long as these organizations have financial systems
in place to pay for weapons and ammunition
and can use those funds to coerce people into
becoming fighters then these organizations will
not be defeated. Thus it is imperative that the
United Nations develops a comprehensive set of
strategies to combat and disrupt terrorist financial
networks. If these organizations do not have a
steady supply of funding then they lose one of
their largest recruiting methods, paying their
fighters.
Terror groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Hamas,
Boko Haram, and Hezbollah bring in millions,
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 7
and in the case of Hezbollah over one billion
dollars, a year9. With funding such as this these
organizations are capable of recruiting fighters and
carrying out heinous acts across the globe. They
procure these funds from kidnapping ransoms,
selling illicit narcotics, resource exploitation,
black market smuggling, and other sources that
include donor contributions. Terror organizations
rely on this funding in order to stay operational.
They need cash flow in order to obtain weapons
and vehicles. Some organizations will pay the
families of those who became martyrs as a way to
encourage martyrs to carry out their duty. Funds
are used to bribe government officials. In the case
of ISIS and Hamas funds are used to setup and
maintain a proto-state that carries out some of
the functions of a legitimate government so as to
legitimize the power of the terror organization. If
these sources of funding were to be cut-off then
the ability of these groups to carry out acts of
terror on a global scale, subject populations to
their forcible rule, and recruit fighters would be
severely limited.
This guide will provide you with a history of the
problem and the action that has already been taken
internationally to combat the problem. It will also
give you a framework that will help you to think
about terrorist financial networks in terms of
disrupting them and how your resolutions will set
precedence for future work on the problem. You
will be provided with multiple case studies that
will help you to view the issue from a more global
perspective and will identify the various problems
that should be addressed in the resolutions that
you will propose.
8 Disarmament and International Security Committee
History of the Problem
As was said in the above section, terrorism is
not something that is new to the world. Indeed,
terrorism can be traced back 2,000 years to the
Zealots in Palestine.10 While terrorism has gone
through many changes since then, today’s terrorism
can be seen as highly similar to the terrorism of the
Zealots of the first century. The late 20th century
saw a return to religious terrorism directed against
the state as terror groups attempted to legitimize
themselves by proving that the government did
not have a monopoly on the use of violence in
society as more and more extreme attacks were
carried out under the guise of religion.11 The
21st century has proved to be no different as the
world has watched such acts of religious terrorism
as 9/11 and seen the rise of violent religious
organizations such as the Islamic State. Terrorism
has existed for thousands of years and shows no
signs of disappearing any time soon. The most
recent evolution that terror organizations have
undergone is financial self-sufficiency which
elevates their effectiveness to unprecedented and
terrifying levels. The rest of this section will be
dedicated to exploring the history of financial
networks that have made terror organizations so
much deadlier than ever before.
Terrorism when committed by non-state actors,
traditionally speaking, was carried out by
extremist and fanatic groups such as the Zealots
and the Assassins that are the two earliest examples
of non-state sponsored terrorism.12 Acts of terror
were carried out by true fanatics who chose to
and wanted to commit those acts. Now terror
organizations can utilize their vast funds to recruit
fighters who are less enthused by the cause to carry
out acts of terrorism. What can be referred to as
modern terrorism arose after the Second World
War when groups realized that they could use
acts of terror to garner international attention.13
With the rise of mass media terror organizations
were able to gain the attention of the entire
world through their acts. With the advent of
the Cold War came a renewal of state sponsored
terrorism. However, this state sponsored terrorism
appeared in a form that was different than
previous iterations. The Soviet Union aggressively
sponsored terrorism during the 1960’s and 1970’s
in order to topple governments in unfriendly
regions.14 They provided funding, training, ideas,
and equipment for terror organizations across the
globe. During this time, many terror organizations
procured funding through governments such as
the Soviet Union as long as they could assure the
sponsoring government that the funding would
be used to hurt the enemies of that government.
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring
about a complete end to the renewed period of
state sponsored terrorism as it can still be seen
even today. When such state sponsorships from
both sides of the Cold War began to fade terror
organizations had to find new ways to sustain
what they had built with the funding and support
of foreign governments. During the 1980’s and
1990’s terror organizations branched out into
other criminal activities that had previously been
refrained from in order to avoid soiling their
cause. These activities included kidnapping,
extortion, fraud, resource exploitation, and
drug trafficking.15 In 2002 donations from
charities and individual donors were the largest
source of funding for Al-Qaeda.16 This has since
changed but shows that charities and individual
contributions play a large role in funding terror
organizations. Many terror organizations now
also employ front companies that have legitimate
business that launder and raise money for these
groups.17 The advent of the internet has added
new ways for terror groups to raise and transfer
their funds anonymously.18 ISIS in the mid 2010’s
has become renowned for being a financially self-
sufficient terror organization that raises their funds
through the sale of oil and natural gas, taxation
and extortion, the plundering of captured cities,
smuggling, and other illicit activities19.
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 9

Relevant UN Actions In October of 2001 the Financial Action Task

Force that was established in 1989 was expanded
The UN has passed many resolutions on the so that their purview and recommendations
combatting of terror and defining terrorism. It covered terrorist acts and terrorist organizations.25
wasn’t until the late 1990’s when the financing of The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) drew up
terror was addressed by the UNGA Resolution a total of nine special recommendations that deal
51/210 of 1996 mentions States taking appropriate specifically with how to combat the financing
action to combat terrorism including the financing of acts of terror and terrorist organizations. The
of terrorists and terrorist organizations.20 It wasn’t
recommendations of the FATF are only that,
until 1999 that the GA adopted the International recommendations. Countries are not required
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing to implement the recommendations. The FATF
of Terrorism.21 This Convention gave a definition recommendations also do not address how
for what was to be considered the financing of financial aid or military aid can be used to help
terrorism and called upon States to establish local disrupt terrorist financial networks although
authorities that would monitor and punish those they do provide a guideline on how countries
who funded terrorism. While this was a large step should make sure that non-profit organizations
for the UN in combating the financial networks of are not being taken advantage of or being
terror organizations it was not a perfect resolution.
abused by terrorist organizations. Although,
While it calls on states to implement authorities even this recommendation is vague and merely
and strategies to combat financial networks it does recommends that countries review how adequate
not address how poor nations, that are often times their laws are that regulate the activity of non-
the breeding grounds of terrorist activities, could profit organizations.
afford to implement these strategies. It called on
States to assist each other as much as possible in In 2014 the Security Council passed Resolution
criminal investigations or proceedings but not in 2178 that echoed the calls contained in Resolution
setting up comprehensive counter-measures. 1373.26 This Resolution deals mainly with how
States need to act to prevent foreign terrorist
In the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 terror fighters from leaving their home nations to join
attacks in New York City the United Nations terrorist organizations abroad. There is language
Security Council (UNSC) came together to pass in the Resolution that deals with countering
two resolutions, 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), violent extremism in order to prevent terrorism.27
that called on States to prevent and suppress the This section does not, however,  address how
funding of terror attacks through a variety of financial desperation should be addressed in order
actions that were lined out in the resolutions.2223 to prevent the recruitment of desperate peoples in
These guidelines were more thorough then the poor regions.
1999 Convention passed by the GA. Once again
however these resolutions failed to address how The UN has in the past two decades started
financial assistance could and should be made the battle against terrorist financial networks.
available to impoverished nations to help them to Their work, however, does not address several
implement comprehensive financial regulations. important areas. The UN does not speak on how
Resolution 1373 (2001) does mention the close States can use financial aid to other States to help
ties between terror financing and illicit drug trade ensure a global force against terrorist financial
but offers no further insight into the issue other networks. The area of charitable organizations
than the need to enhance coordination among and their contributions to terror organizations
nations.24 has been left largely untouched by the UN. The
rise of blockchain technology has allowed for
new ways for terror groups to move money that
10 Disarmament and International Security Committee
is not addressed by the UN. Resolutions passed
do not offer suggestions or guidelines for how
military force can be used to disrupt financial
networks. While the UN has made strides in
choking off funding for terror organizations there
are a variety of areas as of yet unaddressed by
the body and the language of some Resolutions
merely notes concern rather than stating solutions
to problems. While the purchasing of oil from
ISIS is explicitly banned in UNSC Resolution
2253 (2015) the purchasing of natural gas in not
explicitly banned.28 UN Resolutions also only
target ISIS and Al-Qaeda explicitly in Resolutions
designed to prevent terror groups from gaining
funds through the selling of natural resources.
The UN has also had problems with getting
member nations to implement the Security
Council’s recommendations and to report back
to committees on their efforts to combat terrorist
financial networks. All of this shows that while
important work has been done, that work is far
from over.
Framework
Within draft resolutions delegates should aim to
break down action that the UN could potentially
take into different categorizations. These could
include financial assistance, military action,
security recommendations, etc. Delegates may
find it easier to conceptualize different approaches
when broken down in this way.
Delegates should be aware that many of the topics
discussed in this guide and many of the topics
that will be discussed in committee had specific
definitions that should be used, unless a different
definition should be offered and accepted during
committee. Many of these definitions will be
explained in the guide when they occur. For now,
delegates should remember that definitions are
very important when it comes to international
law and action. Definitions for terms should
be drawn from available UN definitions unless
explicitly stated otherwise. However, some terms
do not have specific UN definitions and so those
will be explicitly defined for use in committee in
this guide.
Narcoterrorism
Terrorism, while existing since the first century
AD has had to evolve with the times. Terrorist
organizations, at least those that are extremely
effective, are extremely resourceful and flexible.
The advent of cyberterrorism and the utilization
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 11

of social media by terror groups shows just how The first purported use of the term ‘narcoterrorism’
adaptable these organizations are. was in 1982 by the then President of Peru who
used it to describe attacks against the anti-
To understand what narcoterrorism is and why narcotics police force in the country.29 In 1985
combatting it is so important when the end worldwide attention turned to the subject when
goal is to disrupt terrorist financial networks, the infamous Medellin Cartel worked with the
delegates must first understand, separately, the terrorist organization, M-19, to kill 11 Supreme
history of the illicit narcotics trade and terrorism Court judges in Bogota, Colombia.30 In her
and how nations and international organizations 1990 book, Narcoterrorism, Rachel Ehrenfield
combatted each. The pages preceding this have gave an official definition to the term stating that
given a review of the history of terrorism that it is the “use of drug trafficking to advance the
should serve sufficient; however, I would like to objectives of certain governments and terrorist
remind delegates that to be fully prepared for organizations”.31 Since its inception the use of
debate they should conduct their own research the term has become increasingly popular and its
and can start with sources that will be included definition increasingly broad. For the purpose of
later on in this background guide. With this this committee, delegates will rely on Ehrenfield’s
understanding of terrorism, delegates need to definition with the supplementation that
understand how the illicit drug trade became so narcoterrorism can be considered terrorism that
heavily entangled with terrorism. is financed by involvement in illicit drug trade
Narcoterrorism arose in 1980’s Latin America. as well as attempts by illicit drug traffickers to
While there were certainly terror organizations coerce or intimidate governments to further their
that dabbled with the narcotics trade, it was own political agendas. Delegates should keep in
not until this time that terror organizations mind that the UN has no official definition for
truly became involved with what today is called narcoterrorism.
narcoterrorism. Before this time the world had By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s the dangerous
not witnessed terror organizations that were nexus that existed between illicit drug operations
heavily involved in the drug trade. Earlier in and terrorist operations and financing had
the guide it was stated that terror organizations become obvious. The United Nations Office on
refrained from many activities such as kidnapping Drugs and Crime estimates that drug trafficking
and the selling of drugs so as to not soil their brings in more than $400 billion a year.32 With
cause with association of such organized crime this level of revenue, it is easy to see why when
operations. Again, it can be seen that the end of state funding began to become scarce in the
the Cold War kicked off a new wave of evolution 1980’s many terror groups turned to the drug
for terror organizations. State funding dried up as trade in order to keep their revenue levels high. In
state-sponsored terrorism became more and more the 1990’s it became obvious that drug trafficking
frowned upon by the international community, and terrorism had become heavily interrelated and
terror organizations had to find ways to maintain thus the strategies that had dealt with both drug
the level of funding that had allowed for them to trafficking and terrorism separately in the past
have long reaching effects. One of the ways that needed to be reviewed and used complimentary
proved effective at raising large quantities of funds in some cases such as with the FARC in Columbia
was being involved with illicit narcotics whether and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the cases of
it be growing them, creating them, transporting these two terror organizations new strategies
them, or selling them. So how has narcoterrorism that dealt with drug trafficking and terrorism as
arisen and where can its effects clearly be seen? intertwined issues were necessary to combat a
new mutation of both that was stronger and more
well-funded than ever before. For the purposes
12 Disarmament and International Security Committee
of better understanding how narcoterrorism has
evolved from 1980 to the present and the methods
used by both individual states and international
organizations to combat it this guide will discuss
two case studies, the FARC in Columbia and Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan.
While the illicit trafficking of drugs brings in
large amounts of money to fund terror and
insurgency organizations around the world it is
perhaps in Columbia where the effect of these
funds can be most readily seen. One of the most
well-known terror organizations in the world that
has arguably taken the best strategic advantage of
the multibillion-dollar industry that is illicit drug
trafficking is the Armed Revolutionary Forces
of Colombia (FARC). When the term narco-
terrorism was first coined, terrorist organizations in
Colombia such as FARC were tapping into funds
from the illicit drug trade by “taxing” those that
trafficked the product.33 The traffickers would pay
a fee to terror groups such as FARC to protect the
drugs all the way from the time they were grown
until they were processed and sold. However,
during the latter part of the 1990’s FARC began
to transport its own illicit drugs, usually cocaine,
so that they could turn an even greater profit
off of the illegal operations.34 FARC at this time
had moved beyond simply levying taxes on the
producers of drugs and were involved in the early
stages of production and transportation. It was
still the purview of more traditional organized
crime syndicates to handle the distribution and
sale of the illicit narcotics.35 By tapping into the
illicit narcotic trade, namely cocaine, FARC was
able to generate massive amounts of funds and
arms that fueled their terrorist activities.
The merger of drug trafficking and FARC can
almost be seen as inevitable. Terrorism has been
shown to thrive in countries where there is a weak
or failing central state.36 Add to this the fact that
drug trafficking is a transnational problem, much
like terrorism, that destabilizes the governments
of the countries that are heavily involved in the
trafficking, the perfect formula for a partnership
amid chaos forms. The former Executive Director
of the UN International Drug Control Program,
Giorgio Giacomelli, showed the seriousness of
the drug problem when he said that “The drug
phenomena is unique in the number of aspects
of people’s lives which it affects - the health of the
individual, political and economic development,
the safety of the streets and the stability of
the government”.37 Drug trafficking raises an
enormous amount of revenue and destabilizes
governments while terrorism requires large
amounts of funds to be effective across a larger
area and thrives in countries where governments
lack stability so it would seem only logical that
these two areas would at some point converge
into what we now call narcoterrorism.
The joining of terrorist forces with the trade of
narcotics has major consequences. It strengthens
both terrorism and the drug trade without much
tradeoff for either. A look at FARC’s activities
in Colombia before and after they became
heavily involved with drug trafficking easily
proves this point. It is estimated that the FARC
brought in between $100 to $500 million from
its involvement in drug trafficking.38 The effect
of these funds helped the terror organization to
dramatically increase their sphere of influence
in Colombia as can be seen by comparing the
FARC in 1986 and in 1999. In 1986 the FARC
had an estimated 9,000 fighters who worked on
27 different fronts, or semi-autonomous units in
different localities, and then in 1999 it had an
estimated 15,000 combatants on 60 fronts and was
active in 40% of Colombia’s municipalities.39 In
the mid-1990’s the cartel empires that had existed
in the country, the Medellin and Cali cartels,
had fallen and left behind smaller distribution
networks that relied upon the protection and help
from the FARC and other organizations similar
to FARC.40 Between the years of 1995 and 2000
Colombian coca production more than doubled
which made Colombia the world’s foremost coca
producer and gave even greater access to funds to
the FARC.41 By 1998 the Colombian government
“estimated that money from the drug trade was
the single greatest source of income for country’s
terrorist groups… That year, they reportedly

earned a total of US$551 million from drug
links,” and this money is what made it possible
for the FARC to almost double their number of
fighters and more than double their fronts and
control that they exercised on the country.42 The
Colombian government put out a report in 2005
that showed the FARC reaped US$617 million
from the trafficking of cocaine.43 This amount
made them the most well-funded insurgency
group in the world at the time.
By tapping into the vast revenue created by drug
trafficking the FARC were able to become one of
the largest, most well-funded, and most effective
terrorist groups in the world. Today the FARC
are a recognized political party in Colombia that
runs members for Congressional and even the
Presidential elections.44 However, the organization
is still listed as a terrorist organization by the
United States of America.45 It can be argued that
even though the FARC says that is has traded in
its weapons for words they succeeded in their
goals as a terrorist organization. The goal of
terrorism is to affect political change through the
acts or threats of acts of violence. The FARC did
exactly this. For over five decades they fought the
Colombian state and kidnapped and extorted
and killed to get their way. They took over whole
swaths of the country and were able to launch
attacks into the areas that were most strongly held
by the Colombian government. After five decades
of fighting the Colombian government accepted
that they would never be able to defeat the terrorist
organization and so gave them a seat at the table
in exchange for an end to hostilities. While there
have been setbacks and challenges to having that
seat at the table, FARC has nonetheless secured
for their organization a guaranteed political voice
and vote in the Colombian government. Without
the income from being involved with the illicit
narcotics trade the FARC would not have been
able to achieve the prominence and dangerous
influence that they did. The combining of drug
trafficking and terrorism created a terrifyingly
powerful and well financed organization that
strong armed its way into the government over
the loud objection of the citizens that suffered
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 13
at the hands of these terrorists for over 50 years.
The FARC showed the world what could come if
terrorism and drug trafficking joined forces, and
other groups emulated their success. Perhaps the
other terrorist organizations most well-known for
its involvement in drug trafficking are Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Much like Colombia, Afghanistan was and is a
very weak state. In order to understand how
terrorism and drug trafficking have worked
together to have a completely devastating effect
upon the nation of Afghanistan delegates should
have a basic understanding of the history of
Afghanistan since 1996 when the Taliban seized
control of the capital city.46 By 1998 the Taliban
controlled two-thirds of Afghanistan and were
providing a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and
his terror organization Al-Qaeda.47 After seizing
control of the government, the Taliban need a
way to fund their new government. During the
1980’s the harvesting and selling of opium was
used to fund the Afghan warlords’ insurgency
against the Soviet Union.48 Once the Soviet
Union had left Afghanistan the opium was still
being harvested and sold, but who needed the
profits? Herein lay part of the answer as to how
the Taliban would fund their illegitimate terrorist
government in Afghanistan. Taking a leaf out of
the FARC’s book the Taliban began to tax the
production of opium. During the 1990’s when
the Taliban began to tax opium, Afghanistan
produced an estimated 75% of the world’s supply
of opium.49 In 1999, the production of opium
reached an all-time high under the Taliban at
a staggering 4,600 tons of opium produced
in Afghanistan alone.50 Just as could be seen in
14 Disarmament and International Security Committee
Colombia, the trafficking of illicit narcotics in
Afghanistan contributed towards the weakening
and eventual collapse of legitimate government.
During the 1980’s and 1990’s Afghanistan was
locked into a deadly civil war after international
forces had pulled out of the country. The Afghan
government that had been set up was weak and
made weaker so by having to fight a civil war. It
was at this same time of chaos and violence in
Afghanistan that neighboring countries such as
Iraq, Pakistan, and other Central Asia countries
began to crack down on criminal enterprises.
These criminal individuals and enterprises were
then pushed into lawless Afghanistan where the
government was too busy trying to maintain
some semblance of control during the midst of
a civil war to deal with the inflow of criminal
activity from neighboring countries. The UN
Office on Drugs and Crime says in their 2003
report on the opium problem in Afghanistan
that “There is anecdotal evidence of Taliban
involvement in, and encouragement of, the
opium trade as a way to expand their exchequer
at a time when the regime was hurting because of
growing isolation and funding difficulties”, and so
the world is given another example of a terrorist
organization reaching into the trafficking of illicit
narcotics in order to maintain and expand their
funding levels.51 The same report goes on to say
that a weak central government and a civil war
created an atmosphere of chaos that allowed for
illicit drug production to flourish. This opium
production in turn fueled the same civil war and
further weakened the government. The addition
of terrorists, the Taliban, only created for an even
more vicious cycle lawlessness, illicit activity,
and violence.52 Having established themselves as
a quasi-government, how much money was the
Taliban bringing in from the production of opium?
It is verified that during their regime from
1996 to 2001 the Taliban had imposed taxes
upon the producers and traffickers of illicit
narcotics in Afghanistan and it is suspected that
the Taliban also had a more direct involvement
in the trafficking and production of narcotics
that brought in a significantly higher amount
of revenue.53 It is estimated that in 1999 the
Taliban brought in at $40 million in taxes from
the production of opium.54 The Taliban’s taxing
of Afghan drug traffickers not only provided
revenue for the terrorist group but also gave a
sense of legitimacy to these traffickers and kept
the production and trafficking of opium in a
semi-legal state. The taxes collected by the Taliban
are used to purchase arms and finance the terrorist
training and support the operations of other
terrorist groups that operated in the region.55
The opium trade in Afghanistan helped the
Taliban to gain control of the country and keep
control for five years until the United States
toppled the regime shortly after the attacks of
September 11th, 2001. It is interesting to note
that in July of 2000 the Taliban declared a ban on
the production, but not trade, of opium declaring
it to be un-Islamic.56 However, the group was also
promised help from the UN with development
if they banned the production of opium.57 This
ban however, brought in an enormous amount
of funding to the Taliban who had amassed a
stockpile of opium, and now that there was a
highly effective ban in place the value of that
stockpile went through the roof as the price of
opium skyrocketed.58 The ban was rescinded the
next year however, as the political cost of enforcing
the ban became too much for the Taliban to
bear.59 After the Taliban were toppled they once
again turned to the production of opium to help
them fight against the legitimate government of
Afghanistan. The Taliban still use the profits of
opium production and trafficking in the areas that
they exert control over to launch attacks against
and sabotage the Afghani government60. Without
the financial lifeline of the production and
trafficking of opium the Taliban would be much
less effective and the government of Afghanistan
would have a chance at establishing a stable and
effective national government.

The Taliban have continued to exert a large amount
of control over Afghanistan in large part because
of the funding they receive from the production
and trafficking of illicit narcotics. The FARC
forced their way into the Colombian government
by fighting a 52-year war that was funded by their
involvement in illicit narcotics. The FARC only
ceased their involvement with drug trafficking
after they secured for themselves a voice in the
government through violence. The combined
efforts of allied nations that invaded Afghanistan in
2001 could not eradicate the production of opium
or stamp out the Taliban who continue to fight to
this day, funded by drug trafficking. The nexus of
terrorism and drug trafficking has created terrorist
organizations that are more horrifyingly powerful
and effective than ever before. With the examples
of the FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in
Afghanistan serving to show just how dangerous
narcoterrorism is, what has the UN done to
combat this new evolution in terrorist strategies?
The UN has taken action in the form of a variety
of resolutions aimed at combating narcoterrorism.
Before narcoterrorism arose in the 1980’s, the
world, including the UN, was focused on fighting
terrorism, drug trafficking and the growing drug
epidemic. However, the focus was on combating
each as a separate entity. With the narcoterrorism
evolution of the mid-1980’s the world, and the
UN, had to reevaluate their methods and propose
new solutions to a problem that allows terrorist
organizations to bring in millions of dollars of
funding every year. The following paragraph
provides a brief summary of UN actions regarding
narcoterrorism however, it is strongly encouraged
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 15
and recommended that delegates look into these
resolutions more thoroughly to better understand
the existing paradigm and how it can be improved
upon.
Perhaps the largest step taken by the UN to
combat narcoterrorism came in 1997 when the
UN created the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.
As the prevalence of narcoterrorism began to rise
so too did the amount of work the UNODC
did on preventing acts of terror and combating
terrorist financial networks that relied heavily
on the production, taxation, and sale of illicit
narcotics. Each year the UNODC produces the
World Drug Report that explains the level of drug
production and abuse in the world at that time
and also pinpoints the organizations that are the
most heavily involved with drug trafficking in
specific areas.61 The report also outlines actions
that are currently being taken by both national
and international organizations to combat,
among other things, narcoterrorism and give
countries a guideline for how they might try
and tackle similar issues that they are facing. The
UNODC is an invaluable resource in the fight
on narcoterrorism and I encourage all delegates
to spend some time reading recent World Drug
Reports and other information put out by the
Office. In 2001 the Security Council passed
resolution 1373 that expressed concern at the close
relationship between international terrorism and
drug trafficking. The resolution also encouraged
nations to work together so as to be better prepared
for an international response to the issue. In 2014
the Security Council passed resolution 2195 that
urged further cooperation among member states
to combat the linkage between international
terrorism and drug trafficking. The resolution
called upon specific regions to improve their
regional communication and support and called
upon all member states to help the UN buildup
the capacity to respond to and prosecute those who
participated in drug trafficking and international
terrorism. Other than these resolutions there
have been a few support and monitoring teams
that have also been established. There have also
been official addresses that point to the strong
16 Disarmament and International Security Committee

linkage between international terrorism and drug trafficking or terrorist organizations involved in
trafficking. Delegates can see that resolutions drug trafficking, how can the UN ensure that
aimed specifically at narcoterrorism are sparse and another group will not simply fill the hole that is
leave much room for improvement. left; or that, as happened in Colombia, multiple
smaller organizations will take on the same
There are a variety of ways in which the fight responsibilities and fill the hole?
against narcoterrorism is being fought. There are
also conflicting ideas over how it should be fought.
For example, when the United States invaded Smuggling
Afghanistan shortly after the events of September Smuggling has existed and flourished for as long
11th, 2001, often times a blind eye was turned as governments have existed. When governments
to those who produced illicit narcotics focusing began to raise funds by taxing items brought
on actual battles instead.62 However, once the into and taken out of their lands there became
U.S. realized how much terrorist organizations in a market for those who could get items into and
the region were profiting off of that drug trade out of places without being subject to those taxes.
that took a much more hands-on approach to When countries began to control who could cross
the production of illicit narcotics by eradicating their borders there became a market for those who
poppy fields and funding the growth of alternative could get individuals into countries undetected.
crops. The British took a similar approach that In every place, there are wealthy individuals who
was unfortunately crippled by lack of order on want objects and/or people brought in without
the ground in Afghanistan.63 When suggesting attracting the attention of authorities or being
strategies to combat narcoterrorism delegates subject to inspection and taxation. By its very
should be aware of how even the best of plans nature, smuggling is a highly secretive act and
cannot be implemented accurately when there is enterprise whose statistical history is almost
no way to monitor the real-time implementation completely unknown.64 Smugglers do not want
and results of such a plan in the areas it is used in. posterity to know how they operated, exactly
Delegates would be wise to consider the impact of what they were smuggling, and how much they
regional stability and security so as to ensure that made. The concrete statistical information that
the problems of many different countries are not is available comes from those smugglers who
all pushed onto a country that is already struggling have failed to fly under the radar and transport
as in the case of Colombia in the 1980’s. One of what they need to transport without catching the
the most important considerations when drawing attention of government officials. Historically,
up recommendations in resolutions is to ensure those that smuggle try to avoid violence as it is
that the recommendations can be implemented highly noticeable and governments, whose duty
by all member states and, if this is not possible, is to protect their citizens, often times do not
that other member states are called upon to turn a blind eye to acts of violence. Rather than
assist those nations too weak or too poor in the fight, it is much easier and quieter to bribe an
implementation of said recommendations. official to look the other way.65 Thus, smuggling
and corruption often times go hand-in-hand. In
Key Questions places where corruption is rampant, smuggling is
How can the UN direct its member states to only made easier.
implement more comprehensive reforms aimed It only makes sense that terrorists would use
at countering narcoterrorism while still respecting smuggling to their advantage. From smuggling
the sovereignty of the member states? in weapons and supplies to smuggling people,
If countries and international organizations such terrorists often times want and need to operate
as the UN work to bring down specific drug without alerting governing authorities as to

their actions. In order to remain effective terror
organizations must work with those who can
do things quietly. When executing a plan such
organizations care little for secrecy because they
want the world to know what happened, to know
that they were responsible, and to know why they
committed a terrorist attack. But in order for that
attack to happen successfully the government
cannot know when, where, and the capabilities
of the attackers. So, terror organization must
utilize smuggling networks. However, terror
organizations use for smuggling networks extends
far beyond their usefulness
in planning and executing terror attacks.
Terror organizations need smuggling networks for
their ability to transport items of value without
detecting notice. Smuggling networks are vital to
many terror organizations as a source of funding
so that they can continue to effectively recruit
new members and commit grandiose acts of terror
that require a large amount of financing. Large
acts of terror are costly to commit and continued
successful insurgencies cost money. In order to
commit such acts these organizations need a large
amount of funding and for many groups part
of that funding comes from the smuggling of
contraband and people. Within the past few years
there has been largescale media attention devoted
to smuggling and how it provides terrorists with
considerable financing as ISIS smuggles and sells
artifacts that they come to have control over when
they were controlling large swaths of territory at
the height of their military power in 2014. Much
like narcoterrorism though, terror groups do
not have to be directly involved with smuggling
to turn a profit. There are indirect ways to be
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 17
involved with smuggling networks that still give
a financial benefit to terror organizations. A study
of terrorist groups in West and North Africa will
clearly show this. Terror organizations such as Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram
bring in large quantities of monies from both
direct and indirect involvement in smuggling
routes and networks.
Smuggling, as it will concern delegates during this
committee, should draw on definitions set forth by
the UN and legal definitions set forth by sovereign
nations. The UN definition of smuggling is limited
to defining what is considered to be the smuggling
of people which is defined as “procurement, in
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial
or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of
a person into a State Party of which the person
is not a national or a permanent resident”.66 The
UN does not have a recognized definition for the
smuggling of goods. However, there are many
definitions of the smuggling of goods that are
provided by individual states. For example, the
United States’ definition of smuggling essentially
says that it is the clandestine act or attempt to
bring something into the United States without it
being properly registered or inspected.67 Delegates
should be aware of the definitions of smuggling
for the countries that they represent and keep in
mind that the UN has no set definition of the
smuggling of goods.
While the topic of smuggling can be quite broad,
for the purposes of this background guide it will
exclude drug smuggling. The smuggling of illicit
narcotics is often folded into the broad topic
of smuggling even though when discussing the
financing of terrorism, it should be included
under the umbrella of narcoterrorism. Terrorist
financing through the use of smuggling, in this
background guide and in this committee, will
include but not be limited solely to the smuggling
of persons, artifacts, contraband, and other items.
However, the direct smuggling of goods is only
one way in which terrorist organizations bring in
revenue from smuggling. Detzi and Winkleman
have identified four related methods for how terror
18 Disarmament and International Security Committee
organizations obtain revenue, “Direct smuggling
and sale of illicit goods, taxation on trafficking
routes, protection services, and non-aggression
fees”, and so much like narcoterrorism there are
different ways, some direct and others non-direct,
that terrorist organizations can utilize smuggling
to finance their organizations and operations.68 It
is important that while preparing for committee,
debate, and while drafting resolutions delegates
keep in mind that the financing of terrorism must
be viewed through a global lens. While there are
certainly areas of the world where the problem is
more pressing, resolutions should aim to provide
global strategies. For this reason, the background
guide is purposely including case studies that deal
with multiple terror organizations in different
regions of the world. The next few pages will
be devoted to exploring how direct and indirect
involvement in smuggling helps to finance terror
groups in West Africa.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a violent
extremist group that has existed since the 1990’s,
although it has undergone several name changes,
in West Africa.69 Since the late 1990’s they have
operated a highly successful smuggling operation
that helped them to catch the attention of Al
Qaeda. After the events of September 11th, 2001,
the entire world began a tremendous crackdown
on terrorist organizations and their financing
capabilities. The effects of this War on Terrorism
were felt by both Al Qaeda and the Groupe Salafiste
pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), or the
group now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb. By 2006 the leader of the GSPC began
to open a line of communication with Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, two leaders
of Al Qaeda.70 The GSPC was interested in the
name recognition of Al Qaeda that would bring
them recruits and the support of jihadists in
the region while Al Qaeda was interested in the
financial gain that could come from a partnership
with the GSPC and their lucrative involvement
in the highly successful smuggling operation
that they ran.71 In 2007 the GSPC became an
Al Qaeda affiliate group and changed their name
to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).72
This rebranding was more than just a change
in name, it came with a change in the goals of
the terror group as they had to align more with
Al Qaeda and began to focus more on Western
targets.73 United States General Carter Ham who
is the head of U.S. Africa Command has called
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb the best-funded
affiliate that Al Qaeda has.74
While AQIM may not be a terror organization that
yet has the capabilities to launch attacks around
the globe, they have managed to survive in West
Africa for over 20 years. Even after a significant
campaign by the French government in 2013
that killed hundreds of extremist fighters and
severely limited the capabilities of several terror
organizations in the region, including AQIM,
the group still manages to pose a serious threat
to the governments and international missions in
the region. The organization still brings in enough
funding that if a local provides information
helpful in targeting the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali convoys
they will be paid 750 dollars in country where
the minimum wage is 50 dollars.75 With funding
of this level, it is apparent why the group is still
able to hamper international efforts and work
to topple governments in the region even after
20 years of combatting the group. AQIM has
been able to expand the area that they operate
smuggling routes into include Libya, Algeria,
Mali, and Burkina Faso.76 Not only does the terror
organization get involved directly with smuggling
operations but it also gets funding from taxing
those that use their smuggling routes and also are
paid to leave some smuggling operations alone.77
Not only do extremist groups such as AQIM gain
a financial revenue stream from the smuggling
operations that they are involved in, they also use
those smuggling operations to further the violent
acts committed by other extremist groups. Boko
Haram is a terrorist organization that operates out
of Nigeria and gained widespread media attention
when they kidnapped 276 Nigerian school girls
and still holds many captive four years later.78
The organization has also caught the attention of
officials across the world for their ability to smuggle

heavy weapons into Nigeria. These weapons allow
the group to launch more audacious attacks that
further destabilize the government and result in
more casualties. A report by the news organization
Al Jazeera explains a few of the various ways that
such weapons are smuggled past Nigerian borders
and points to AQIM as a major supplier of and
transporter of these weapons to Nigerian borders.79
The smuggling of arms is especially alarming as it
both supplies one terror organization with a profit
and another with the means to launch heinous
and devastating attacks. More than just giving
Boko Haram the ability to engage in more large-
scale missions, the use of such sophisticated and
heavy weaponry that the group has demonstrated
gives the terror organization a sense of legitimacy.
Such capabilities and the use of violence is
supposed to be monopolized by the government.80
When a terror organization is able to wield these
capabilities, and commit acts of violence against
the government then such organization can gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and in the
eyes of other terror organizations. This is a tactic
utilized by both Hamas and ISIS in tackling
governments and establishing their own rule of
law. With this type of legitimacy terror groups
can exert even more pressure on the populace to
join the organization or contribute financially
to the organization. Smuggling has given Boko
Haram access to heavy weaponry, courtesy of
AQIM,  that is furthering their fight against the
Nigerian government. In West Africa, smuggling
has allowed terror organizations to garner
additional funds and pose and even greater threat
to governments. However, West Africa is not the
only place where smuggling is helping to finance
terrorism.
ISIS has become notorious for being the world’s
wealthiest terror organization. As mentioned
previously in this background guide the group
reached the height of its power in 2014 and since
then has continued to suffer military defeats. At its
height, the group was able to control vast swaths
of land in Iraq and Syria and operated a proto-
state in the region as they collected taxes from
people living in areas under their control. Since
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 19
that time the terror organization has lost much of
the land that they once controlled and has also lost
an estimated 80% of their funding from a high of
$81 million a month in revenue in 2015 to an
estimated $16 million a month in 2017.81 Even
with that huge drop ISIS remains one of the best
funded terror organizations that the world has
ever seen. They are being beaten from a Caliphate
back into an insurgency terrorist group that is
incredibly well funded for an insurgency that no
longer has to try and run a proto-state. Much of
the money that ISIS reaps and reaped that did not
come from taxation came from the sale of oil that
was produced from captured oil fields.82 In order
to sale this oil much of it had to be smuggled out
of ISIS-controlled areas. While ISIS’ use of oil to
fund their terror activities will be talked about in
much more detail later in this background guide
it is important to note that much of this oil had
to be smuggled out of ISIS held territory. So while
the extraction of oil did make up one of the largest
components of funding for the terror group,
smuggling had to be utilized in order to deliver
that oil. The smuggling of resources such as oil
is not all that ISIS smuggled. The terror group
became adept at pillaging, selling, and smuggling
antiquities in order to fund their operations.
As was stated earlier in this section, the secretive
nature of smuggling makes it very difficult to put
exact figures on anything. Often times experts
can only say that a large part of an organization’s
funding comes from smuggling but cannot
provide any figures because the information just
is not there. They can extrapolate based upon
how much merchandise has been seized or base
their estimates upon reports from locals but
20 Disarmament and International Security Committee
the estimates are truly a best guess. However,
in the case of ISIS we do have some concrete
numbers on the smuggling of antiquities. The
seizure of flash drives from a safe house just
days before terror group seized the Iraqi city of
Mosul showed detailed financial information
about the group.83 These flash drives showed that
before the group took the city of Mosul and the
estimated $1.5 billion that was looted from the
city, the organization had cash assets of $875
million.84 These same flash drives also showed
that the organization had made $36 million just
from the sale of antiquities in just one region of
Syria.85 These millions were made by plundering
and smuggling these ancient artifacts. When ISIS
began to experience military victories and rapidly
swept through Iraq and Syria conquering land,
they seized the old smuggling routes and by late
2014 were making upwards of $1 million a day
from the war economy.86 The terrorist organization
was involved with trafficking antiquities, oil, and
gold and made money off of every sale.87 ISIS
made millions by operating and levying taxes on
smuggling routes.
While the world may have been able to defeat ISIS
on a traditional battlefield, the organization is
simply returning to its roots as a deadly insurgency.
The money that the organization has stockpiled
from illicit activities such as smuggling is being
invested in Iraq to prepare for the new insurgency
that they will be able to launch with the massive
amounts of funding they are able to procure from
acts such as smuggling.88 The ability of ISIS to
raise such massive amounts of funds is incredibly
alarming and the use of smuggling must be dealt
with by the international community to combat
the financing of their terrorist financial network.
The international community, and specifically
the UN, have worked to combat this source of
terrorist financing. As mentioned earlier the
UN definition of smuggling deals only with the
illicit trafficking of people and does not mention Key Questions
the illicit trafficking of goods. There are many What role does border security play in preventing
UN resolutions and documents that deal with and stopping smuggling?
the smuggling of individuals and how it can be
countered. On the other hand, there are very few
UN documents that deal with smuggling of other
natures. In 2017 the Security Council adopted
resolution 2347 (2017) that condemned the
destruction of and illicit smuggling of antiquities
in response to such actions by ISIS.89 Delegates
should pay special attention to the remarks made by
Vladimir Voronkov, the Under-Secretary-General
of the UN Counter-Terrorism Office when he
said that there was a need for more “cross-border
cooperation and exchange of information, and
for including private and public-sector partners
to promote supply chain integrity and stop the
illicit sale of cultural property”.90 The UNODC
also does work that involves how to counter the
illicit trafficking of people that delegates would
benefit from looking at.
Resolutions drafted by delegates should explore
how smuggling routes can be identified and shut
down. Delegates may also want to, if they are so
inclined, come up with a definition of smuggling.
This could be helpful in regions where the rule of
law is weak and it could be difficult to identify
what is smuggling as is often the case in war-
torn regions. It should also be noted that much
like narcoterrorism, smuggling is something that
transcends borders and affects multiple countries
in the regions where it is a problem such as West
Africa or the Middle East. This means that any
approach to counter this funding source must
utilize the cooperation of all affected nations so
as to ensure that there are no weak links that
allow smuggling networks to survive. It could
be helpful to have resolutions that create new
Offices or Committees that work to ensure that
specific regions have adequate border security
and information sharing networks set up to help
counter smuggling. These are just a few of the
ways that delegates resolutions could work to
counter smuggling.
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 21

How can the UN address smuggling in war- of incredible passion. So, I encourage delegates to
torn areas where it is difficult for legitimate use these subtopics as a basis of debate that can
governments to even function? expand to include others as well. I ask that if a
delegate, after reading this guide, feels strongly
Would imposing stricter punishments for those about a topic not touched on that they send me
who purchase smuggled antiquities help to stop an email explaining what they are considering
smuggling? discussing in committee so that I can be aware
and offer advice on the pursuit of such topics.
Exploitation of Natural Resources With that sidebar, this guide will now turn to a
In the past two sections this background discussion of natural resource exploitation.
guide has explored two ways in which terror To understand how terrorist organizations have
organizations raise funds, involvement in illicit taken advantage of resources delegates should have
narcotics and utilizing smuggling networks. an understanding of the history of the problem in
This section will explore a third method of general. I encourage delegates to independently
raising funds, resource exploitation. Much like delve into the history of resource exploitation
narcoterrorism and smuggling, the exploitation by both state and non-state actors in armed
of resources offers several ways to obtain revenue conflicts and as a way to garner funds. Much
from directly mining or producing the resources of the history of resource exploitation revolves
and then selling them, as in the case of ISIS, to around the weaponization of such resources to
taxing the resources as in the case of the ELN and exacerbate armed conflicts. Historically water
FARC in Colombia.91 This subtopic on resource has been targeted in armed conflicts to ensure
exploitation will examine two terror groups that that enemy controlled lands do not have access
have already been discussed, ISIS and FARC, to clean drinking water in order to weaken armed
and also include insight in the ELN, a terror forces and the population in general. Examples
organization that operated separately from FARC of the weaponization of water range from Julius
in Colombia during the same time frame as the Caesar to present day ISIS combatants.92 Since
more well-known terror organization. This will the industrial revolution and societies increasing
be the final subtopic that discusses ways in which dependability on such energy resources as oil those
terror groups raise funds. The section that follows too have been used by military groups ranging
will attempt to provide a framework for two from World War Two to the armed conflicts in
ways in which the UN might be able to disrupt the Middle East against ISIS.
terror financial networks. This background guide
has highlighted only three ways in which terror Much like the discussion on narcoterrorism, the
organizations raise funds. There are many more discussion on the nexus of terrorism and resource
than have been discussed. Before diving into exploitation will begin in Colombia. Just as the
resource exploitation, I would like to remind FARC branched out into the illicit narcotic
delegates that while I expect debate and resolutions trade in the 1980’s, they also turned towards
to center around the subtopics discussed in this natural resource exploitation as a way to raise
guide, I realize there are other means by which funds. Between the years of 1984 and 1987 the
terror organizations raise funds such as charitable Colombian government and FARC operated
and individual contributions and kidnapping for under a cease-fire agreement which FARC used
ransom. If delegates feel strongly about an issue to expand their influence into resource rich areas
not raised in the background guide, feel free to of the country.93   The FARC were not the only
pursue that issue. It is my opinion that the best militant group in the country that had this idea.
solutions often times arise out of conversations The ELN also became involved with resource
that get slightly off-topic and are led by individuals exploitation to raise funds. It makes sense that
22 Disarmament and International Security Committee
such groups would turn to natural resources in a
country such as Colombia which is considered to
be one of the richest countries in the world when
it comes to natural resources94. Colombia is the
world’s largest producer of emeralds, the largest
producer of gold in the region, and produces
“large quantities of other minerals, such as silver,
platinum, copper, nickel, natural gas, and coal”
all of which were heavily exploited by militant
terrorist organizations such as FARC and ELN.95
The exploitation and extortion of natural
resources by terror groups in resource rich
nations such as Colombia can be a large source
of funding. The UN Development Program
estimated that extortion revenues accounted
for over 30% of Colombian guerilla groups.
Colombia is a nation that produces a large
amount of oil as previously mentioned. The ELN
(National Liberation Army) have a long history
of attacking Colombian oil production sites. The
ELN are a terrorist group that started in 1964
but by the end of that dedicated had been almost
completely eradicated by the Colombian army.96
In the 1980’s the group reemerged as a much
more successful terrorist organization due in large
part of their ability to finance operations and
fighters through their extortion of multinational
oil companies that operated in the northeastern
region of Colombia.97 The ELN is, or was until the
Colombian government made peace agreements,
the main rival to FARC in Colombia in vying
for control or at least influence over the country.
Ultimately the FARC were the more successful
group. Even though, the ELN were able to raise
large sums of funding and exert influence over
a relatively large area in the northeastern part
of the country. The ELN focused their strategy
predominantly on exerting control and influence
over the Colombian oil industry as it was a major
source of funding for the organization. While the
FARC have touched lightly upon the Colombian
oil industry the group that truly exploited it was
the ELN. The funds from exploiting oil and
oil companies that operated in areas that were
strongholds for the ELN helped the group more
than triple in size and reach a far greater sphere
of influence in the country.98 This funding that
has allowed for a greater number of fighters has
prevented the ELN from being stamped out by
the government, as they were at the end of the
1960’s, or the FARC who, after violently clashing
with the group on multiple occasions, formed an
uneasy partnership with the terror organization
when the Colombian government began to make
advances into FARC held areas.99
The ELN’s exploitation of oil and the companies
who produce it in Colombia does more fund their
terrorist insurgency. Companies have less incentive
to produce oil when there is a good chance that
their workers will be killed and their machines
destroyed in the process. If companies do not
have faith in the government to protect them
it allows terror organizations to take advantage
of such companies by demanding a cut of their
profits in exchange for them being left alone.
Terror organizations can make examples out of
companies and workers that do not pay their tax
or fine. These examples of violence against oil
production companies and their oil production
sites does more than coerce other companies
into coughing up funds to avoid the same fate.
Such actions reduce the people’s, businesses’,
and foreign nation’s trust in the Colombian
government as terror groups such as the ELN
and the FARC prove that the government cannot
provide protection to both native and foreign
companies producing oil and the workers that
they hire from local areas or bring from overseas.
Foreign nations, especially those that share a
border with a nation such as Colombia that
was unable to provide adequate protection for
such companies, lose trust as they feel the direct
consequences of a government not strong enough
to maintain order. As Lavaux shows, these attacks
can discredit the Colombian government in the
eyes of such countries as Venezuela as the attacks
“aim to show that the government cannot control
environmental damage to the hydrographic basins
shared with Venezuela, in particular the Catatumbo
River basin, from which the Venezuelan state
of Zulia obtains 60% of its drinkable water”.100
By attacking and exploiting natural resources

such as oil terror organizations simultaneously
turn a large profit and weaken the governments
where they active which starts of vicious cycle of
empowering these terrorist organizations. This
phenomenon can be seen clearly in the history of
Colombia which suffered for over 50 years from
terror organizations that grew more powerful as
the government lost power until a deal had to
be reached between the two entities as discussed
earlier in this guide. While the ELN focused
much of their time and resources on exploiting
oil FARC turned towards the illicit narcotic trade
in Colombia. This was highly successful for the
organization as has been demonstrated. However,
they too exploited Colombia’s natural resources
and by the time the organization reached a peace
deal with the Colombian government the money
it was pulling in from the resource exploitation
was even greater than the amount of funding
they were receiving from their involvement in
narcotics.
Colombia is rich in its natural resources and its
militant groups quickly realized that there was
a profit to be made by involving themselves in
this industry. However, the lucrative amounts
of money being made from narcoterrorism were
far more appealing, that is until the international
community began a serious crackdown on the
trade of narcotics that made it increasingly
difficult for organizations such as the FARC
to continue in this trade without having to
face serious tradeoffs that came in the form of
international sanctions and military action against
the production and transportation of narcotics.
Because of these factors the FARC transitioned
towards the exploitation of natural resources
and, in particular, the exploitation of gold
production in Colombia which, as has already
been mentioned, is the region’s largest producer
of gold. When the nations of the world began
to focus their attention on the drug problem in
Colombia that had far-reaching international
affects the United States in particular contributed
billions of dollars to hamper the production of
cocaine.101 To a large extent the massive amount
of work that went into countering the production
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 23
of cocaine was successful as the number of illicit
narcotics coming out of the country continued
to drop. One of the main strategies used was
to fly planes that released an array of chemicals
designed to make it much more difficult to grow
and cultivate coca plants. These planes began
to fly routinely in the year 2000.102 The result
of it becoming more difficult to cultivate coca
plants and then transport the final product of
cocaine, many of the famers that were once paid
to grow coca plants for the FARC were now paid
to mine gold for the terrorist organization. The
amount of money that the FARC brings in from
mining and taxing the mining of gold rivals the
funds they brought in from their involvement in
illicit narcotics even at its most lucrative point
as the acting mayor of Mocoa in the Putumayo
province said in 2012 that the FARC “here make
about 800m pesos ($450,000) a week from
illegal gold mining”103. The FARC transitioned
away from their involvement in illicit narcotics,
which both was being threatened by international
action and cast a negative light upon the terror
group that wants and needs to have the support
of  the public if they hoped to truly overthrow
the Colombian government and establish their
own regime, and towards the much more safe
and lucrative involvement in the exploitation of
natural resources like gold. The production of and
transportation of gold is by no means illegal and
so the FARC had even managed to find a way to
almost legitimately raise funds.
The guide says almost legitimately because the way
in which the FARC were raising funds through
the mining of gold were still illegal; however, they
were far less risky and did not attract the same
24 Disarmament and International Security Committee

international attention and action as international for their success in exploiting oil from the lands
narcotic trafficking. The exploitation of gold was they have taken over in Iraq and Syria. While
also even more financially beneficial than drug ISIS exploitation of oil will be talked about in far
trafficking as is evidenced by the fact that in just greater detail in the next section it is important
one of the 125 municipalities in Antioquia, a gold- to note here that the exploitation and sale of oil
rich area of Colombia, the FARC are believed to has played a large role in elevating ISIS to the
earn at least $240,000 a month in 2012.104 This wealthiest terror organization that the world has
is the amount the terror organization brought in yet to see. The success of their oil industry sparked
from just one of the 125 municipalities in the international action against the industry that
gold-rich area. The FARC had decades to perfect came in the form of financial countermeasures
how they made money from the illicit drug trade and sanctions and military action. The success
and they transferred these same time-tested of the industry also encouraged the UN to pass
strategies over to how they made money off of resolutions dealing specifically with ISIS and
exploiting gold. Much like how they taxed those their production of oil that would serve delegates
that grew and transported narcotics, the FARC well to read. Delegates should also pay attention
impose taxes on the mines that produce gold in to resolutions that encourage nations to submit
the areas that they control. The organization also names to an international sanction list as a way
taxes the machinery that produces the gold at an to limit some of the group’s funding. Delegates
initial rate of up to $3,000 and another $2,000 could look at how the international community
per month for every piece of heavy machinery.105 has responded to and cut ISIS profits from the
The FARC can also take a percentage of the total sale of oil as a way to get ideas on what actions the
earnings of a mine in exchange for allowing UN could take to prevent non-state actors from
them to operate in peace.106 Many, if not most, taking advantage of natural resources. In drafting
of Colombia’s goldmines were unlicensed during resolutions dealing with resource exploitation
the time the FARC was most aggressively involved delegates should keep in mind UNGA Resolution
with the exploitation of the resource and so this 1803 (XVII) that affirms permanent sovereignty
made them easy targets for the FARC.107 However, of the state over its natural resources to ensure
even the legally operated mines were not safe from that resolutions do not interfere with a state’s
the FARC who used them to launder their money sovereign right to its resources and also as a basis
by having companies lie about the amount of to take action against non-state actors that violate
gold they were actually producing.108 The money this sovereignty by exploiting the said resources.
that the terrorist organization brought in from
exploiting gold made it easy for them to keep
police forces at bay and recruit local peoples to
help them. The exploitation of gold in Colombia
by terror groups such as the FARC show that such
organizations are highly adaptable, being able to
switch from narcotics trade to natural resource
exploitation in the blink of an eye. While the
FARC has since made a peace agreement with the
Colombian government, there are other terrorist
organizations that have taken to natural resource
Oil is the not the only resource that ISIS has
exploitation to raise funds for their illicit activities.
exploited for financial gain. Water is another
Another terror organization that has taken to source of funding for the terrorist group. One of
exploiting natural resources to raise funds is the strategies of ISIS was to cut off water to cities
ISIS. They have gained international attention so that those cities then had to buy water from the
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 25

only supplier in the area, ISIS. In some villages
ISIS was charging residents 7,000 dinar ($6.25)
per cubic foot of water.109 There are other times
when the terror organization completely shuts off
an entire area’s access to water and hold it ransom.
One village in Iraq was told that ISIS would
return access to the water supply if they were
paid a ransom of 4 million dinars or $3,500.110
The ability of a terror organization like ISIS to
hold ransom water sources is a truly terrifying
prospect. Having power over water resources does
more than give a terror organization a financial
profit, it gives them a powerful weapon that can
be used to weaken governments and expand their
influence of control.
effectively, and the government is unable to take
effective action, perhaps financial or military aid
could be given to help stop the illicit exploitation
of natural resources. In Colombia, the police
force was unable to approach the areas where the
FARC were operating their illicit mining activities
because of the superior military power held by the
FARC then the police force. Perhaps if aid could
have been lent to them the government could
have had more of an impact on the FARC’s illicit
activities. Resource exploitation can occur in
many forms from taxes to the operating of mines
and oil wells. The ability of terrorist organizations
to take advantage of natural resources gives them
a large financial benefit. The UN, as of yet, does
not have many resolutions or guidelines on
how to deal with non-state actors who exploit
natural resources and it is time for comprehensive
resolutions that address this issue.

Key Questions
How can the UN keep terrorist organizations
from taken advantage of and exploiting natural
resources for financial gain or direct countries on
strategies that they can adopt to accomplish the
Despite the recent attention that international same goal?
agencies such as the UN have shown towards ISIS
oil industries, the exploitation of natural resources Keeping in mind the permanent sovereignty
by terror organizations is an area that is largely of a state over its natural resources how can
untouched by the UN. There are conventions international measures respect a state’s right to
and resolutions regarding the weaponization of use, develop, tax, and monitor their own natural
such resources as water by state actors. However, resources while still being able to identify non-
the exploitation of natural resources for a state actors that exploit the same natural resources
financial gain by non-state actors such as terrorist for a monetary gain?
organizations is not an area that the UN delves
into. Delegates should be creative in coming up Financial and Military Aid
with potential solutions to this issue. How could The past three sections have been spent discussing
the UN crackdown on non-state actors who are some of the different factors that make up a
illegally imposing taxes on legitimate businesses terrorist organization’s financial network. This
through the use of force and intimidation? It may section will be devoted to showing how the use
be difficult for the UN to intervene in certain of both financial and military aid can be utilized
situations without violating national sovereignty, to disrupt those financial networks. I will be
however when it is international companies being expecting to hear discussion on this topic and
extorted by non-state actors the UN may find a see creative solutions that make use of financial
way to intervene. In areas where the rule of law is and military aid within your draft resolutions.
weak, such as the areas where ISIS operates most
26 Disarmament and International Security Committee

The use of both financial and military aid can millions of dollars. With this in mind it is clear
be extremely important and useful in combating that new tactics need to be used in order to cut
the financial resources of terror organizations. off the financing of groups like ISIS and therefore
Financial aid can be distributed to those countries make them almost completely ineffective. By
that cannot afford to enact comprehensive aggressively making use of tools such as financial
counter-terror measures. As was mentioned in and military to aid nations struggling to throw off
the section discussing narcoterrorism, in the the heavy chains of terrorism the world may well
1980’s and 1990’s many countries that bordered be able to effectively combat extremist groups.
Colombia began a serious crackdown on illicit The testimony of Dr. Matthew Levitt, the director
narcotic activity. Such a crackdown forced many of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
criminal enterprises to find shelter in Colombia, Intelligence at The Washington Institute for
a nation that was too embroiled in turmoil to be Near East Policy, before the United States House
able to devote the same amount of resources to Financial Services Committee on the financing of
cracking down on illicit narcotic activity. Perhaps ISIS provides some insight onto this topic and it
if a greater amount of aid was given to Colombia is recommended that delegates read through the
by an international organization such as the UN full transcript of his testimony and not rely solely
or its member states then the country would on what will be highlighted under this section.
have been able to keep such illicit activity under
control instead of engaging in a 50-year long war. While the use of financial aid to countries directly
Military aid can be just as useful in disrupting affected by terror groups such as Iraq, Mali, Syria,
financial networks as it is in fighting terrorists onand Nigeria may seem to be a reasonable and
the ground. Military aid can be utilized to disrupt even intuitive measure, the use of military aid to
smuggling routes that bring in millions of dollars disrupt financial networks may not seem as logical
for terrorist organizations such as ISIS. In the of a move. However, as Dr. Levitt says groups
past decade, it has become much more difficult like ISIS obtain much of their financing from
for terror groups to keep money in traditional illicit activities and “while military tools would
bank accounts and so cash can be held in reserves. under other circumstances be the last thing one
Targeted strikes can destroy these reserves and might think of as a logical means of combating
make it more difficult for terror groups to purchase crime, the fact is that airstrikes against ISIS have
supplies or pay fighters.111 Financial and military already significantly undermined some of the
aid could be utilized in a variety of ways to disruptgroup’s criminal enterprises and further such
terrorist financial networks, as long as the UN can strikes should continue that trend”.112 Dr. Levitt
agree when and where to use these tools. goes on to say that when the Iraqi government
becomes more stable they could begin the process
With the rise of ISIS, a terror group like none ever of prosecuting ISIS criminal enterprises within
seen before, the importance of dismantling financial the country. Military action can be taken against
networks has become even more important. Even a variety of illicit activities that are a source of
before ISIS established a Caliphate they were a revenue for terrorists.
highly successful and financially independent
terror organization. Now that much of the former Financial aid can be both a useful tool for
Caliphate has been retaken by allied forces ISIS helping those nations that financially unable
no longer has access to the massive amounts to implement counter terrorism measures and
of money that were brought in from taxation. a powerful incentive for nations that have the
However, it is important to remember that even capacity to implement such measures but have
before the group was able to benefit from levying failed to do so thus far. More than being applied
taxes they were financially independent and on a macro-level, financial aid can be put to use
had a budget that registered in the hundreds of on a more micro-level. Such aid can be used to

incentivize farmers to grow crops that are not
used to produce illicit narcotics. Military aid and
action, while useful, can also have detrimental
unintentional consequences such as the loss of
civilian life or it use can make the general populace
much less inclined to side with those nations that
utilize it and generate a feeling of sympathy or
even support for the violent actors the military
aid is being targeted against. This is not to say
that military aid should not be utilized. There is a
time and place for such actions. Financial aid, on
the other hand, often comes without the threat of
such negative consequences. Financial aid, when
used and monitored correctly, can help to make
a populace more appreciative of the nation or
international body distributing that aid, especially
if it occurs on a micro-level and effects the day-
to-day wellbeing of people. Delegate are strongly
encouraged to creatively make use of financial aid
in their draft resolutions on disrupting terrorist
financing networks.
Delegates should be sure to study instances where
financial aid was used towards disrupting terrorist
financial networks to see for themselves what
has worked and what has not. Take for instance
the British attempt to eradicate poppy fields in
Afghanistan in the early 2000’s by offering farmers
subsidies to grow crops other than poppies. Due
to a lack of oversight on the ground the program
only incentivized local warlords to lie to British
officials and pocket their money while still
protecting the poppy fields they said no longer
existed.113 This program did not help to reduce
the growth of poppy fields and merely helped
warlords become wealthier. This shows that any
financial aid program must be closely monitored
to ensure the proper results. The same goes for
financial aid that is given on a more macro-level.
The Security Council has passed many resolutions
encouraging nations to adopt certain counter
terrorism financing measures and many of those
resolutions have already been mentioned in this
background guide. However, there has not been
an offer of any form of assistance to developing
nations who are simultaneously the countries
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 27
where the effects of terrorism are felt the greatest
and the nation’s most likely to be unable to
implement these recommendations due to a lack
of funding, resources, experience, or many other
factors. Nations such as Colombia in the late
1980’s or the Afghanistan of today or Palestine
of Libya that are the breeding grounds for
terrorism most desperately need to successfully
enact such recommendations as laid out by the
Security Council. However, it is often nations
like these that have not adequately implemented
such measures for a variety of reasons that could
include financial ones.
Another reason that could prevent nations from
being able to implement programs and security
measures that are recommended by institutions
such as the UN or entities that are a part of the
UN such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
is a lack of knowledgeable experts. Financial aid to
nations such as this can come in more forms than
simple monetary assistance. Such aid could come
in the form of experts who are lent to nations
to help setup successful programs and security
measures. For example, there was previously no
international agency or international coalition
operating in Africa to counter terrorism and
disrupt terrorist financial networks. These types of
interagency organizations had proved successful
in places such as Europe and the Middle East.114
When there is an international interagency
organization operating to set up security measures
and crackdown on illicit activities such as
smuggling and resource extortion then the cost
of and resources, both human and otherwise,
necessary to set up and maintain these programs
is shared by a wide berth of nations and the
burden does not rest on one country alone. The
United States helped to set up AFRCOM, an
international, interagency organization that has
helped to crackdown on terrorist activities in
Africa.115 By having the inclusion of agencies that
have a long history of fighting terrorism areas
benefit from the expertise gained from those
decades of fighting terrorists and disrupting their
financial networks.
28 Disarmament and International Security Committee
It is often difficult to see the effects that counter-
terror financing programs have. Many argue that
such methods simply are not effective. Michael Levi
discusses this issue in an article he published and
notes that it is hard to show what capabilities terror
organizations may have had before traditional
threat financing programs were used to disrupt
terror financial networks.116 Such traditional
programs focus on stopping terrorist access to and
the transfer of funds through traditional banking
systems and have grown in recent years to include
preventing terror organizations from accessing
or raising funds over the internet.117 Levi argues
that there should be a lower set of expectations
for how well such programs will work for cutting
off terror financing. He goes on to say that such
methods allow for financial intelligence gathering
which helps governments to better realize where
funding is coming from and target individuals for
sanctions and monitoring.118 While Levi brings
up the important point of financial intelligence
gathering through such programs, expectations for
the effects of such programs should not have to be
lowered. These programs would be more effective
and show more results if all nations operated such
programs at the same degree of effectiveness.
Counter-terrorism financing programs are only as
strong and effective as the nation with the weakest
of these programs.
The Financial Action Task Force, as mentioned
earlier in this paper, has published nine
recommendations for countering money
laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF is
composed of 37 nations and continually reexamines
their recommendations on the countering of
terrorist financing.119 However, the FATF does
more than issue these recommendations. One
of the key objectives of the FATF is to identify
those nations that fall short in complying with the
recommendations that are put out. As of February,
of 2018 the FATF had reviewed the standards and
programs of over 80 countries and had declared
65 to pose a threat to the international system by
not having adequate programs for anti-money
laundering and counter-terrorism financing in Of course, there will still be much debate on how
place.120 55 of those 65 countries identified have exactly financial aid monies should be distributed.
since been taken off of that list after remedying
those programs.121 This shows that the public
warning issued by the FATF has proved effective
at getting countries to put in place adequate
programs to prevent and disrupt the financing
of terrorism. There are countries still on that list.
Some countries, such as the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, simply refuse to put such
measures in place, and other countries, such as
Ethiopia, may simply lack the necessary resources
to enact the recommendations put forth by the
FATF. Perhaps a deeper working relationship
between the FATF and the UN could help more
nations become compliant with both FATF and
UN recommendations.
If financial assistance were to be used more
liberally by the UN to help countries enact
successful counter-terrorism financing measures
then surely there would be much debate over who
qualified for such funds, which countries would
be awarded the funds, how the funds would be
monitored, and what exactly the funding would
be used for. A deeper working relationship with
the FATF could help the UN to answer at least
some of these questions. The FATF would identify
the nations that have not yet enacted satisfactory
security measures. The FATF would also be
able to identify which nations failed to enact
such measures even after being publicly listed
as endangering the international community by
not implementing such measures. From there
the UN could determine which nations needed
financial assistance and which nations needed to
face consequences in the form of sanctions for
endangering the international community. The
UN could help the FATF to review the standards
and programs for countries that have not yet been
examined. A closer relationship between the FATF
and UN would be of benefit to the international
community as a whole and help to get worldwide
counter-terrorism financing measures enacted
that would seriously cripple the ability of all terror
organizations to access and transfer funds.

When considering how the UN will use financial
aid in their resolutions delegates should read
Carol Graham’s article “Can Foreign Aid Help
Stop Terrorism?” and pay special attention to
the section that discusses the “do’s and don’ts” of
foreign aid.122 While much of the article focuses
on aid from the point of the United States the
basic principles and ideas that are contained
within are deserving of your attention and might
help you to draft resolutions that answer how and
to who aid should be given and provide a couple
of warnings for who to avoid giving aid to.
Military aid and military use in disrupting
terrorist financial networks is incredibly
important. However, while this method can be
effective at cutting of illicit sources of funding
for terrorist organizations, its use should be
weighed against potential negative fallout from
military involvement. No use of force comes
without risk. Some risks that delegates should
keep in mind when deciding whether or not to
include guidelines for military aid in their draft
resolutions include civilian casualties, the chance
that weapons could be turned against those
supplying them and their allies, and how the use
of force and its consequences will be perceived by
the general populace. These are only a few of the
risks when it comes to using force and delegates
should be aware that there can oftentimes be
unintended consequences. These types of negative
unintended consequences can arise even in well-
planned, multinational coalition uses of force.
One of the most recent examples of the use
of military force to disrupt terrorist financial
networks was the coalition of nations that targeted
ISIS oil depots in air strikes. At the height of
their power and wealth the sale of oil constituted
one of the largest sources of revenue for the
terrorist organization bringing in an estimated
$3.2 million in revenue every day.123 The group
controlled approximately 350 oil wells in Iraq
and an estimated 60% of Syria’s oil fields which
allowed the group to sale an estimated 80,000
barrels of oil a day on the black-market by using
the smuggling routes they took over during their
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 29
conquest of the region.124 Several nations began
to target the oil refineries, production sites, and
smuggling routes in 2014 to disrupt the cash flow
ISIS received from selling the oil on the black-
market. This targeting of oil fields was extremely
effective at disrupting the ability of ISIS to
provide oil both to foreign buyers and internally
in the regions that they controlled which dealt
a blow to the revenue flow.125 By targeting oil
fields and even those individuals in charge of the
large oil operation the terror group was running
their available supply of oil has drastically fallen.
However, even with a campaign as successful on
paper as this, there are still negative consequences.
By destroying the supply of oil that ISIS had
access to the supply of oil available to civilians
that relied on that oil was also destroyed. Armed
groups in Syria noted that ISIS could use this as
propaganda to recruit more fighters by showing
that while they were trying to provide oil to these
citizens the nations of the world destroyed that
oil.126 However, instead of dialing down the level
of attacks the coalition of nations ramped up the
strikes and began to target more above ground
production sites and even the middlemen who
transported the oil, although they were given
warning of incoming attacks.127 An aggressive
campaign against ISIS oil was launched, and to
a large extent it worked. ISIS is still hanging on
to some of its oil but because of the aggressive
campaign against its production and distribution
estimates have placed the groups income from oil
in 2017 to $4 million a month, down 97% since
2014.128  The campaign against ISIS oil has been
highly successful and is a prime example of using
30 Disarmament and International Security Committee

military aid and force to disrupt terrorist financial the money and/or turn public sentiment against
networks. the UN and many of its member states?
While the UN has passed resolutions that relate By what standard will it be decided which nations
to countries receiving or being able to apply for are allocated funds to implement recommended
funding there are no resolutions that relate directly security measures?
to helping nations fund anti-terror financing
programs. Delegates should consider looking into How will aid that is given be monitored and who
times when the UN has set up Trusts from which will oversee the use of funds?
nations have the ability to draw funding. Several
of these have been set up and a similar process
could be followed for giving aid to countries to
implement security measures. Delegates could
also consider creating a new committee entirely,
as is well within the rights and powers conveyed
upon any general assembly, to direct funding
to specific countries. While the UN has not
specifically given out monies to countries in order
to disrupt terrorist financial networks there are
several ways that delegates could propose such an
idea. As for military aid and force, those matters
can be recommended by the General Assembly to
the Security Council for review and their decision
on whether or not the use of force is justified. The
General Assembly can provide its opinion but
the matter should still be recommended to the
Security Council for review.
The use of financial and military aid to disrupt
terrorist financial networks is an important aspect
of successfully stopping terrorism. Delegates
should be creative when it comes to these matters.
Terrorism is constantly evolving and so too
should the world’s answer to it. New ideas are
encouraged and creative ones are applauded. I
strongly urge delegates to think outside of what
has traditionally been done and use military and
especially financial aid in new and creative ways.
I look forward to the debate and draft resolutions
that arise out of the use of financial and military
aid to disrupt terrorist financial networks.

Key Questions
How can the UN creatively use financial and
military aid to disrupt terrorist financial networks
without allowing corruption or misuse to waste

Points of Contention
This section will outline three areas that I believe
will prove to be contentious in committee. In
preparation for committee and debate delegates
should become familiar with how their country
has approached countering and disrupting
terrorist financial networks in the past. Has
a country been highly successful or highly
unsuccessful at disrupting financial networks? Has
a country implemented all of the internationally
recommended security measures for countering
the financing of terrorism? Has a country received
financial aid and if so has it been used adequately
as judged by the international community?
These are a few of the questions that delegates
should be able to answer about their nation. It
is difficult to set out pre-set blocs when national
attitudes and policies vary from one nation
to the next. Therefore, I have outlined three
potential categories nations may fall into where
contention may arise; nations in non-compliance
with international recommendations, nations in
compliance with international recommendations,
and nations traditionally hesitant about giving
out financial aid.
Nations in Non-Compliance with
International Recommendations
There are a multitude of nations that have yet
to enact security measures recommended by the
General Assembly, the Security Council, the
FATF, and other international entities as already
mentioned in this background guide. This bloc
of nations will likely have different opinions
when it comes to disrupting terrorist financial
networks. Delegates should make sure that they
have a thorough understanding of the measures
to combat and disrupt terrorist financial networks
that their countries have put into place. Those
nations that have not enacted any, or have
enacted only a few, security measures will likely be
looking for and supporting resolutions that offer
a financial incentive for nations to implement
security measures. This will be especially true
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 31
of third-world nations that may not have the
financial resources to implement and keep up
such programs. These nations may want to join
forces with other nations of similar status even if it
means compromising on some issues so that their
collective bargaining range is favorably increased.
These nations will also be looking to avoid any
resolutions that impose strict consequences or
punishments on nations who find themselves
in non-compliance with international security
recommendations.
Nations that find themselves in non-compliance
will want to remedy the fact in order to protect
themselves from being home to terrorist
organizations. However, their need to remedy will
be countered by the fact that any government is
slow to change and change costs money. These
nations will be looking for resolutions that offer
them the greatest benefit at the lowest cost.
Nations in Compliance with International
Recommendations
This bloc of nations is most concerned with
getting other nations in compliance with
international recommendations so that their
own security measures are not circumvented
by terrorist organizations taking advantage of
neighboring nations that do not have similar levels
of security measures enacted. These nations will
often be wealthier and less-effected by terrorism
than nations that are in non-compliance. This
bloc will likely favor punishing those nations
who are not yet in compliance with international
recommendations as a way to incentive those
nations to become compliant. This eliminates the
possibility of having to provide financial assistance
to such nations. These nations will be less likely to
support resolutions that give a financial incentive
to those nations that are in non-compliance.
Since these nations are often already less-affected
by terrorism and usually wealthier than those
nations in non-compliance, they have less to lose
if a resolution that strengthens global security
measures does not pass. They can use this to their
32 Disarmament and International Security Committee
advantage to leverage a better deal for themselves
when it comes to providing financial or military
aid to countries that need stronger security
measures put in place. This bloc will seek to keep
their financial and military commitment to a
minimum with the possible exception of providing
assistance to countries that immediately border
them if there is a large enough threat emanating
from within that country’s borders.
Nations Traditionally Hesitant About
Engaging in Financial Aid
This bloc of nations will find themselves
concerned about the possibility of giving out
financial and military aid to nations they may
not support or believe will use the money in an
ineffective or improper way. Delegates should be
aware on their country’s stance on contributing
funds to multilateral aid as well as their country’s
position on the giving of bilateral aid. This bloc
may contain a conglomerate of nations from
different backgrounds and policy positions.
The main concern of these countries will be the
mismanagement of aid. Another concern could
be where the aid is directed, and at times, who it
is directed against. There are terror organizations
that are called terrorists in any nation, however,
there are many more where nations disagree on
the use of the term terrorist. These countries will
be gravely concerned about whether this aid will
be used to target militant groups that may not be
considered terrorists by some nations.
This bloc of nations should pool together their
influence to support a resolution that explicitly
lays out whether aid can be used to directly
target the financial revenue streams of terrorist
organizations and, if it can, which organizations
can be targeted. This bloc may find it in their best
interest to call for the creation of a committee
that determines on a case-by-case basis whether
aid can be used to directly target the ways in
which a terror organization raises funds. This
bloc could be made up of countries that are
both in compliance and not in compliance with
international recommendations.
Suggestions for Further Research
This background guide is not meant to be the
one and only place you go for information, which
is why it is called a guide. While there are many,
many sources that I cite throughout this guide
there are other places that I looked to help me
gather a strong foundation of knowledge on
terrorism. I would recommend that you take the
time to read through the sources that I cite in their
entirety and not just the parts that I pulled from to
develop this guide. I would strongly recommend
that delegates do further research in order to be
prepared for committee. One place that I found
helpful to gather information was the FATF
website and the entirety of the recommendations
that they have published. Other places that I
found useful while writing were the websites of
individual nations that talk about what they have
done to disrupt terrorist financial networks. A
great tool that delegates have available to them
is Google Scholar. I started much of my research
off by simply typing keywords into Google
Scholar such as “terrorist financial networks”,
“narcoterrorism”, “terrorist counter financing
strategies” and other words or phrases that have
to do with terrorist financial networks. Another
place delegates could go to start their own research
is the RAND Corporation website. RAND has a
large collection of academic literature that deals
specifically with terrorist financial networks.
Delegates should also stay up-to-date on current
events as these could become highly relevant to
our topic. I would recommend news sites such as
Al Jazeera, The New York Times, BBC, and CNN.

Position Paper Requirements
This conference requires delegates to adopt a
country’s perspective. This simulation is a key
element of the “international” experience of
Model United Nations since it requires you
to examine problems, perspectives and policy
solutions that you may not personally hold. To
craft a position paper involves confronting your
own personal biases and overcoming them to
create a document outlining the position of the
country you will be representing. Position papers
are the focus of preparation before the conference,
and we ask you to put effort into the research and
writing of these papers.
Your position paper should be one page, single-
spaced, twelve-point Times New Roman font
(approximately 600 words). Your name, country
name, school, committee, and topic area should
be stated in the upper righthand corner. The paper
should involve three paragraphs. These paragraphs
cohere to form a logical procession, and each
paragraph should build analytically on the last.
The first paragraph should focus on a general
background of the topic as it affects your country.
What connection do you have to the topic? The
second paragraph should discuss relevant policies.
Generally speaking, policies may be understood
as any attempt made by a country to secure their
interests in regard to the topic. They are the
mechanisms put in place to realize a specific goal,
and are usually open to negotiation. Finally, the
third paragraph should discuss potential solutions
to key issues. Although this section provides some
flexibility in representing your country’s position,
you must remain mindful of the interests and
policies enumerated in the other sections of
your position paper when advocating for specific
solutions.
These guidelines are meant to focus your research
in the places which will be most productive for
debate. Understanding your position is important
for creating a collective plan. I highly encourage
you to conduct your investigations and learning
with vigor and curiosity.
Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 33
Closing Remarks
Let me thank all of you who have stuck with this
guide to the very end. I hope that it has given you
a basis for how to approach our topic in DISEC.
Remember that this guide, while full of case
studies and important information, should not
serve as your only basis of research for committee.
I encourage you all to do your own outside
research. I hope that what you have read so far
has captured your attention and given you a new
perspective on defeating terrorism. Research your
country and become familiar with how they have
approached this topic. I have every confidence
that come August you will all be ready to present
your own creative ideas on how to disrupt
terrorist financial networks. Do not let yourself
be intimidated by delegates who may have more
experience or seem to have more knowledge than
you do. Every voice is important and every idea
deserves to be heard and you are all capable of
rising to meet this global challenge with new and
realistic ideas.
I am so very excited to meet you all when you
show up for committee in August. This is a topic
that I am deeply passionate about and my hours of
research have only supported the fact that I have
so much more to learn about this issue and I hope
to learn from all of you. Please do reach out and
introduce yourself to me at disec@hmunindia.
org. Whether you simply want to say hi, have a
question or concern, want me to add something
to the blog, or have a good knock-knock joke to
share I want to hear from you. Good luck with
your further research and I will see all of you in
August.
Best,
Michael J. Shafer
34 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Endnotes Updated ed. Oakland, California: University of

ISIS.

California Press, 2016.

1
“Functions and powers of the General Assembly” 13
“Terrorism.” Our World in Data.
United Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web.
14
Lockwood, Nick. “How the Soviet Union Transformed
2
“United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, Terrorism.” The Atlantic, Atlantic
General Assembly.” United Nations. United
Media
Company, 23 Dec. 2011.
Nations,
n.d. Web.
Jenkins, Brain. “The New Age of Terrorism.”  RAND,
15
3
“Functions and powers of the General Assembly” United RAND Corporation, 2006.
Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web.
16
Kaplan, Eben. “Tracking Down Terrorist
4
Geneva, United Nations Office of. “UNOG - Financing.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council
The United Nations Office at Geneva.” Where
on
Foreign Relations, 2006.
Solutions Are Shaped for You | Disarmament | An
Global

Introduction to the Conference. 17

Ibid.

N.p.,
n.d. Web. 18
“Terrorism.” Our World in Data.

5
Ibid. Glaser, Daniel. “The Evolution of Terrorism Financing:
19

Disrupting the Islamic

6
Ibid.
Weapons in the Middle East - The Washington
State.”  Chemical
7
“United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, Institute for Near East Policy, 2016.
General Assembly.” United Nations. United
20
“A/RES/51/210. Measures to Eliminate International
Nations,
n.d. Web. Terrorism.” United Nations, United Nations, 1996.
8
“Functions and powers of the General Assembly” United 21
“International Convention for the Suppression of the
Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web. Financing of Terrorism.” United
9
Zehorai, Itai. “The Richest Terror Organizations in the Nations,
United Nations, 1999.
World.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 29
22
“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368
Jan.
2018. (2001) - United Nations Security Council Counter-
Terrorism Committee.”  United Nations, United Nations,
10
Chaliand, Chaliand, Gérard, and Blin, Arnaud. The
2001.
History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to
23
“United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
Updated ed. Oakland, California: University of
ISIS.

(2001) - United Nations Security Council

California Press, 2016.
Counter-Terrorism
Committee.”  United Nations, United Nations,
11
Juergensmeyer, Mark. “Terror Mandated by God.”
2001.
Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2
24
Ibid.
(1997):
16-23.
25
“Who We Are.” Money Laundering - Financial Action Task
12
Chaliand, Chaliand, Gérard, and Blin, Arnaud. The
Force (FATF).
History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to
 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 35

26
“S/RES/2178 (2014) Security Council Subsidiary Drugs
and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010.
Organs.” United Nations, United Nations,
39
Ibid.
2014.
40
U.S. Department of State Website, “Country Reports on
27
Ibid. Terrorism 2006: Chapter 2 – Western
28
“S/RES/2253 (2015) Security Council Subsidiary Hemisphere
Overview”
Organs.” United Nations, United Nations,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
41

2015.
Human Resource, Statement by Donnie

Safire, William. “On Language; Drug-War Lingo.”  The

29
Marshall before the House on Government Reform, 1st
R.

New York Times, The New York Cong., 107th sess., 2001.
Times,
24 Sept. 1989. 42
Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca.
“The International Nexus Between
“1985 Palace of Justice Siege.” Colombia News | Colombia
30

Reports, 15 Apr. 2017. Drugs

and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010.

Ehrenfeld, R. (1990). Narcoterrorism. New York: Basic

31
Jeremy McDermott, “Colombian Report shows FARC is
43

Books. p. xiii Worlds Richest Insurgent Group,” Jane’s Intelligence Review

Online (September 1, 2005).
32
Ellyatt, Holly. “Global Drugs Trade ‘as Strong as Ever’ as
Fight Fails.” CNBC, CNBC, 13 Aug. 44
“Former Farc Rebels Take Seats in Colombia
Congress.” BBC News, BBC, 21 July 2018.
2013.

45
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”  U.S. Department of
33
Otis, John. “The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug State, U.S. Department of State.
Trade.” The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal
“Afghanistan Profile - Timeline.” BBC News, BBC, 31 Jan.
46
Drug
Trade, 2014, Policy File. 2018.
34
Ibid. 47
Ibid.
35
Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. 48
“Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan.”  The Cornell Roosevelt
“The International Nexus Between Institute Policy Journal, 2012.
Drugs
and Terror: Lessons in Conflict and Diplomacy.” 2010. 49
Ibid.
36
Piazza, James A. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and 50
“The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International
Failing States Promote Transnational Problem.” United Nations Office on
Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 3, 2008, pp.
Terrorism?” International
Drugs
and Crime, 2003.
469–488. JSTOR,
51
Ibid.
JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/29734247.
52
Ibid.
“United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.”  World
37

Drug Report 1997, 1997. 53

“The Taliban, Terrorism, and Drug Trade.”  U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Department of
38
Talbot, Kristie. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca.
“The International Nexus Between State.
2001.
36 Disarmament and International Security Committee

54
Ibid. Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them
68

Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency

55
Ibid.
to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies
Network
56
“The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International in Conflict &Amp;
Problem.” United Nations Office on
Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
Drugs
and Crime, 2003.
69
Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A
57
Ibid. History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18
58
Ibid. Feb.
2016.
59
Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them
70

Problem, its Origins, and Why International Law Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse University
Honors Program Capstone Projects. 850. to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies
Network

in Conflict &Amp;
60
Ibid.
Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
“United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.”  World
61

Drug Report 2018, 2018. 71

Ibid.
62
Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The
Problem, its Origins, and Why
72
Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A
Law Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse
International
History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18
University Honors
Feb.
2016.
Program
Capstone Projects. 850.
73
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
74
Masters, Jonathan, and Zachary Laub. “Al-Qaeda in the
Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them
64
Islamic Maghreb.” Council on
Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency
Foreign
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 2015.
to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies
Network
75
Boeke, Sergei. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb:
in Conflict &Amp;
Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized
Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015, p. 00.
Crime?” Taylor
& Francis, 2016.
65
Ibid.
76
Chattopadhyay, Sudakshina. “AQIM: A
“United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.”  Migrant
66
History.” Georgetown Security Studies Review, 18
Smuggling, United Nations Office on
Feb.
2016.
Drugs
and Crime.
77
Le Sage, Andres. “The Evolving Threat of Al Qaeda in the
67
“18 U.S. Code § 545 - Smuggling Goods into the United Islamic Maghreb.” Strategic Forum
States.” LII / Legal Information
National
Defense University, 2011.
Institute.

Abubakar, Ali Abare. “Three Years Later, Nearly 200

78

Nigerian Schoolgirls Still Missing.” USA

 Harvard Model United Nations India 2019 37

Today,
Gannett Satellite Information Network, 13 Apr. 2017. 92
Rickard, J. Siege of Uxellodunum, Spring-Summer 51
B.C. N.p., n.d. Web.
79
Onuoha, Freedom. “Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s
Arms Smuggling Operations in 93
Rabasa, Angel., et al. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy
of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
Nigeria.” Al
Jazeera, 2013.
Implications
for Regional Stability. Rand, 2001.
80
Juergensmeyer, Mark.  Terror in the Mind of God: The
Global Rise of Religious Violence. 3rd Lavaux, Stéphanie. “Natural Resources and Conflict in
94

Colombia: Complex Dynamics,

ed.,
University of California Press, 2003.
Relationships.”  International Journal, vol. 62, no. 1,
Narrow

“Islamic State Territory Down 60 Percent and Revenue

81
2007, pp. 19–30.
Down 80 Percent on Caliphate’s Third
95
Ibid.
Anniversary,
IHS Markit Says.” IHS Markit, 2017.
96
Rabasa, Angel., et al. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy
82
Al-Khatteeb, Luay, and Eline Gordts. “How ISIS Uses Oil of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
to Fund Terror.” Brookings,
Implications
for Regional Stability. Rand, 2001.
Brookings,
28 July 2016.
97
Ibid.
83
Pringle, Heather. “ISIS Cashing in on Looted Antiquities
to Fuel Iraq Insurgency.” Assyrian 98
Ibid.
International
News Agency, 2014. 99
Alsema, Adriaan. “A 200-Year History Lesson on the
ELN’s 52-Year War with Colombia’s
84
Chulov, Martin. “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed Isis’s
$2bn Jihadist Network.” The State.” Colombia
News | Colombia Reports, 18 Apr. 2018.
Guardian,
Guardian News and Media, 15 June 2014. Lavaux, Stéphanie. “Natural Resources and Conflict in
100

Colombia: Complex Dynamics,

85
Ibid.
Relationships.”  International Journal, vol. 62, no. 1,
Narrow
86
Mansour, Renad, and Hisham al-Hashimi. “ISIS 2007, pp. 19–30.
Inc.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 16 Jan.
101
McDermott, Jeremy. “Gold Overtakes Drugs as Source
2018.
of Colombia Rebel Funds.” BBC
87
Ibid. News,
BBC, 17 June 2012.
88
Ibid. 102
Ibid.
89
“Security Council Hears Calls for ‘All of UN’ Approach to 103
Ibid.
Stop Destruction, Smuggling of
104
Ibid.
Heritage | UN News.” United Nations, United Nations,
Cultural

2017. 105
Ibid.
90
Ibid. “Gold and Guerillas.”  The Economist (Online), 17 Aug.
106

2012, pp. The Economist (Online),

91
“Terrorism, Corruption and and the Criminal
Exploitation of Natural Resources.”  Organization for Aug
17, 2012.
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, Oct. 2017.
38 Disarmament and International Security Committee

107
Ibid. vol.
50, no. 4, 2010, pp. 650–669.
108
McDermott, Jeremy. “Gold Overtakes Drugs as Source 117
Ibid.
of Colombia Rebel Funds.” BBC
118
Ibid.
News,
BBC, 17 June 2012.
119
“Who We Are.”  Money Laundering - Financial Action
“ISIS Cuts Off Water, Electricity, Destroys Churches.”
109
Task Force (FATF).
AINA News. Assyrian International News Agency, 18 June
120
“Topic: High-Risk and Other Monitored
2014. Web.
Jurisdictions.” Money Laundering - Financial
110
Cunningham, Erin. “In Their Latest Outrage, Islamic
Action
Task Force (FATF).
State Fighters Are Using Water as a
121
Ibid.
in Iraq.” The Washington Post. WP Company, 07 Oct.
Weapon

2014. Web. Graham, Carol. “Can Foreign Aid Help Stop Terrorism?
122

Not with Magic Bullets.” The

111
“Islamic State: Up to $800m of Funds ‘Destroyed by
Strikes’.” BBC News, BBC, 26 Apr. Brookings
Review, vol. 20, no. 3, 2002, pp. 28–32.
2016.
“The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fromer-
123

Wexler Fellow and Director, the

“The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Fromer-
112

Wexler Fellow and Director, the Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Dr.
Stein

Matthew Levitt, Prepared

Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Dr.
Stein

Matthew Levitt, Prepared Before the House Financial Services Committee

Testimony

Hearing on Terrorist
Before the House Financial Services Committee
Testimony

Hearing on Terrorist and the Islamic State, as Released by the

Financing

Committee.” SEC Wire, 13 Nov.

and the Islamic State, as Released by the
Financing

Committee.” SEC Wire, 13 Nov. 2014,

pp. SEC Wire, Nov 13, 2014.
2014,
pp. SEC Wire, Nov 13, 2014. 124
Ibid.
113
Fantigrossi, Steven, “Afghan Narcoterrorism: The Reed, Matthew. “Blowing Up the Islamic State’s Oil
125

Problem, its Origins, and Why International Law Company.” Foreign Policy, Foreign
Enforcement Should Fight It” (2015). Syracuse University
Honors Program Capstone Projects. 850. Policy,
26 Oct. 2016.

Detzi, Daniel, and Steven Winkleman. “Hitting Them

114 Lister, Charles. “Cutting off ISIS’ Cash Flow.” Brookings,
126

Where It Hurts: A Joint Interagency Brookings, 29 July 2016.

to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa.” Studies

Network Reed, Matthew. “Blowing Up the Islamic State’s Oil
127

in Conflict &Amp; Company.” Foreign Policy, Foreign

Terrorism,
vol. 39, no. 3, 2015. Policy,
26 Oct. 2016.

115
Ibid. Zehori, Itai. “Is ISIS Bankrupt?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine,
128

12 Aug. 2017.
116
Levi, Michael. “Combating the Financing of
Terrorism.” The British Journal of Criminology,