SECTION 3 liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband.
During the search, police
457 Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014
(Vargas)
FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012, Act No. 10175.The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the
government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the
Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and
access to information. In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a
temporary restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues
ISSUE: Whether the Act violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom
of expression and access to information
RULING: The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
for the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several sections of the law
define relevant cyber-crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize
violators. Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of
the Act as unconstitutional. Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited
commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise,
sell, or offer for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or
when the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, or “when the following conditions are present: (aa) The
commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does
not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce
the recipients to read the message.”
458 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 437 (1967)
FACTS: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the
phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the
outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the
conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal
transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal,
Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence
against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical
intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.
ISSUE: whether the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone?
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection
for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary
to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"
wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan
introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.
459 Riley v. California, June 25, 2014
FACTS: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On
August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The
shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police
pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags.
Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be
impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search
to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against
located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had
his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos
and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the
phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the
shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include
shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic
firearm.
Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had
been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified
to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and
why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts
and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, Division 1, affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a
search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches?
RULING: Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The
Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes
of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search
of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and
police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by
disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The
Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private
information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an
arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the
phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person."
Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be
permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search
would be reasonable.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an
arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving
evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's
conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws
that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can
be reasonably searched following an arrest.
CASE 463
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: Factors to Determine Violation of the Right to Privacy
Syhunliong v. Rivera (GR No. 200148, June 4, 2014)
FACTS: Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development Corporation while
Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was hired in September 2002. 3
years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be
effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF
until March of the same year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to
Jennifer Lumapas, who succeeded her. Sometime in April 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to
request for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas
informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was
still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. Rivera sent the following
text message to one of BANFF's official cellular phones held by Lumapas: “I am expecting
that. Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay ko. I don't deserve this
because I did my job when I was still there. God bless xxx…” Rivera filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid
salaries. Pending the resolution of the case, Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint
for libel, the origin of the instant petition. The CA dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of
Criminal Case on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication.
RULING: Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order
the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the text message which
Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith on
any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which he has a
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty. In order to prove that a
statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article
354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least,
had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CA's declaration that
Rivera's text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since
she "was speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest and not out of intent to
injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, there was no unnecessary publicity of the
message beyond that of conveying it to the party concerned.
MAIN POINT: The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made
in good faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
duty.
CASE 464
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: Anti-Wiretapping Law
Ramirez v. CA (248 SCRA 590)
FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent
filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200. Petitioner filed
a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, particularly a violation of RA. 4200. The RTC granted the Motion. From the
RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s
order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of RA. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of
the party is a violation of RA. 4200.
RULING: Yes, Section 1 of RA. 4200 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or detectaphone or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The
provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the
parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder.
MAIN POINT: The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications.

CASE 465
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: Anti-Wiretapping Law
Navarro v. CA (GR 121087, August 26, 1999)
FACTS: Navarro was charged with homicide with the RTC. The trial court convicted him
of the crime charged. The court admitted in evidence the record tape allegedly containing
the heated exchange between Navarro and the deceased Lingan in the police station. The
exchange in the voice recording was confirmed by the testimony of Jalbuena, one who took
the recording and witness for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether the tape is admissible in evidence under RA 4200.
RULING: Yes. RA 4200 prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications. Since the exchange between petitioner and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
MAIN POINT: The Anti-Wiretapping Law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications. Thus, a tape recording of an altercation or verbal
exchange between a policeman and a radio reporter at a police station is admissible in
evidence.
CASE NO. 469– Tan
Article III, Sec.3: Not Covered
Lee vs. Ilagan
Facts: P/Supt Neri Ilagan and Dr. Joy Lee were common-law partners. Sometime in July
2011, Ilagan went to Lee’s condominium and left thereafter to go to his office. Upon arrival,
he noticed that his digital camera was missing, and it was found out that he left it at Lee’s
condo. She then confronted him about a sex video in the camera between Ilagan and
another woman. Ilagan violently demanded the camera back and when Lee refused, he
slammed her head against the wall. Lee then filed a case of Anti-Violence Against Women
and Children against Ilagan. However, Ilagan filed for a writ of habeas data claiming that
Lee would eventually mass produce it in the net and on the streets of Quiapo. She claims
she would not do such and only kept it for evidence in the first case.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is valid?
Ruling: No. Ilagan failed to establish there exists a nexus between the right to privacy and
the right to life, liberty, or security. Courts cannot speculate versions of possible
transgressions. A failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible. Further, Lee has sufficiently shown intent that she would only use it as evidence
in criminal and administrative cases, not for unlawful ends of public consumption.
Main Point: The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the
1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
CASE NO. 470– Tan
Article III, Sec.3: Not Covered
Gamboa vs. Chan
Facts: Mayor Marynette Gamboa of Dingcas, Ilocos Norte, alleged that the PNP conducted
a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone
who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,
who is tasked to investigate the existence of PAGs and to eliminate them. She was then in
the enumeration of individuals in the report. Contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is valid?
Ruling: No. The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected
from intrusion or constraint. However, the right to privacy is not absolute. The right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right
to privacy of ordinary transactions. The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, there is
no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose
Main Point: The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
CASE NO. 471– Tan
Article III, Sec.3: Exclusionary Rule
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Atty. Tito Pintor was scheduled for a settlement talk with Leonardo Paconico. The latter
was charged for direct assault against the former’s client Montebor. Before the talk,
Paconico requested that his legal counsel, Edgardo Gaanan, come to his office and secretly
listen to their phone conversation through a telephone extension line. The talk happened
and Pintor asked for grease money in the amount of Php 8,000 for purpose of withdrawing
his earlier complaint. Thereafter, Gaanan filed a case for robbery/extortion against Pintor.
But Pintor files another case against the 2 of them for Anti-Wire Tapping Law due to them
recording him without his consent. He claims his right to privacy was grossly violated.
Issue: Whether the telephone extension line is part of the Anti-Tapping Law?
Ruling: No. The phrase “any other device or arrangement” in the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
does not cover an extension line. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words. The acts of the 2 cannot be considered as tapping
because its functions for ordinary office use were upheld. Neither was his right to privacy
violated because what Gaanan did was not different from that letting any person to hear
through his handset. Paconico was acquitted in the appellate court and Gaanan was
acquitted by the SC.
Main Point: A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of
the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as
in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
CASE NO. 472
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA (235 SCRA 111)
FACTS: On 2 May 1990, private respondent filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment
of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after
presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence exhibits. Among the exhibits
offered by private respondent were 3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment
to private respondent’s oral offer of evidence; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of
private respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was
denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the CA assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. The CA dismissed the said
petition. From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether “Tape Recordings” obtain in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as
evidence in court
RULING: No. RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Sec 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known
as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described.
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, RTC and CA failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting
in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject
tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
MAIN POINT: Anti-Wire Tapping Law – Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone
conversations not admissible in evidence.
CASE NO. 473
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
Zulueta v. CA (253 SCRA 699)
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On
March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in
the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check,
diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
RULING: Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence
to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if
there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom
of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to
do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
MAIN POINT: Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only
exception in the constitution is if there is a lawful order by the court or when public safety
or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.
CASE NO. 474
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3
Ople v. Torres (293 SCRA 141)
FACTS: The petitioner seek the attention of the court to prevent the shrinking of the right
to privacy, Petitioner prays that the court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
“Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and
two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether the implementation of AO No. 308 violates the Rights to Privacy
enshrined in the constitution.
RULING: Yes, A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right
to be let alone.” The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The
potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government
which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the
danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier
against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., “the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record
of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the
society will have lost its benign capacity to forget.” 89 Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents
still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution
for flattery.
MAIN POINT: Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by the
Court to strict scrutiny. AO 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy.
475. SALVADOR
Waterous Drug Corp v. NLRC
Section 3. Exclusionary Rule
Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corporation. Catolica entered
into a sales transaction with YSP and was alleged to have overcharged the prices of the
Voren tablets and solely profited from the transaction. Therefore, she was dismissed
outright by the management of Waterous which she then contended as illegal dismissal.
However, NLRC found that petitioner’s evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00
drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the Catolico
opened the envelope.
Issue: Whether the act of the employee in opening the envelope addressed to Catolico was
a violation of her privacy to communication and correspondence.
Ruling: YES, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to the immunity of one's person from interference government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government. The evidence being rendered inadmissible on the ground that
it was a violation of privacy on the part of Catolico, therefore, cannot be used as a legal basis
for complainant's dismissal.
Main point: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec 3, Art III)
476. SALVADOR
People v. Marti
Section 3. Exclusionary Rule
Facts: Marti contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained
in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy
of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence. However, the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person Job Reyes, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Issue: Whether the evidence obtained is admissible given that it has been obtained by a
private person acting in his private capacity.
Ruling: YES, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in
aid thereof, is not search.
Main point: The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers
to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government; it cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.
Exclusionary rule - declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective
search and seizure warrant.
477. SALVADOR
People v. Aruta
Section 3. Exclusionary Rule
Facts: Aruta was arrested and charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Having
ascertained that was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag,
the latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash Katutak.” The team confiscated the
bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature.
The defense filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure
of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
Issue: Whether the evidence obtained through the warrantless search and seizure valid.
Ruling: NO, since the court ruled that such search made by the NARCOM agents weren’t
included as those that qualify a valid warrantless arrest the evidence obtained therefrom shall
not be admissible as evidence for any purpose in any proceedings.
Main point: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec 3, Art III)
CASE NO. 481 – SABTALUH
SEC. 4 – FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
NEAR VS. MINNESOTA {238 US 697}
FACTS: In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard
Guilford alleged that the police chief, the mayor, a prosecutor, and grand jury members were
neglecting their duties to prosecute known criminal activity. The anti-Semitic newspaper
suggested that these authority figures were colluding with Jewish gangs. The prosecutor,
Floyd Olson, sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that
it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory.
The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent
injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the permanent injunction againts the Saturday Press is valid.
RULING: No, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was
unconstitutional, the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not
the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a
prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. The Court established as a
constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government
could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the
communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In
some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets,
the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.
MAIN POINT: Except when the publication is obscene, would jeopardize national
security in wartime, or threatens to incite violence and/or the overthrow the government,
the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even
though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other
proceeding.
CASE NO. 482 – SABTALUH
SEC. 4 - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
FREEDMAN VS. MARYLAND 380 US 51
FACTS: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being
exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted
morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process.
Ronald Freedman exhibit the film "Revenge at Daybreak" at Baltimore theatre without first
submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors as required by the law. Freedman
challenged the law as unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maryland law is constitutional
RULING: No. The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision
reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected
expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory
provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court
established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition
of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is
unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid
determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."
MAIN POINT: The Maryland law does not contain any judicial participation in
determination to prohibit a film. It unduly suppressed protected rights thus unconstitutional
CASE NO. 483 – SABTALUH
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
NEW YORK TIMES CO VS. UNITED STATES
FACTS: Defense Secretary Robert McNamara commissioned a comprehensive analysis of
American involvement in Vietnam War. When completed in 1968, the project comprised 47
volumes containing more than 7,000 pages. He furnished 15 copies. In 1971 Daniel
Ellsberg, who had worked on the project, secretly made copies of the documents and passed
them to reporters for the New York Times. After several months of review, the Times
began to publish these so-called “Pentagon Papers.” After its first few publication, then
President Nixon filed before the court a restraining order barring further publication of the
papers citing national security. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order, the
Times appealed to the Supreme Court for violating the rights under the First Amendment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Circuit Court of Appeals erred in its decision barring
the further publication of the Pentagon Papers.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the U.S. government carries a heavy burden
to justify the need to infringe upon the rights protected under the First Amendment, a
burden it failed to meet in this case. Therefore, the New York Times and the Washington
Post were protected by the First Amendment and were allowed to publish the contents of
the classified study. The vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Furthermore, the exemption in the
case of Near v. Minnesota was not established. Justice Stewart explicated that if the
disclosure would cause a direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to the U.S. or to U.S.
citizens, then the outcome may be different in the future.
MAIN POINT: Any form of prior restraints bear a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity and the Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint.
484 REYES
Section 4, Article III
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute (PPI) assails the constitutionality of RA 7716 or the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law on the ground that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”
ISSUE: Whether removing the exemption of the press from VAT pursuant to RA 7716
violates the freedom of the press.
RULING: No. The VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of
a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden
the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: The press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what
the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or
target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate
against the press on the basis of the content of the publication and RA 7716 is none of
these.
485 REYES
Section 4, Article III
Alexander vs. US
FACTS: Ferris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that
distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court
in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his
businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000. Alexander
appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material
amounted to “prior restraint'” on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and
therefore violated his First Amendment rights.
ISSUE: Whether property forfeiture as punishment for the distribution of obscene
materials constitutes a “prior restraint” on speech in violation of the First Amendment.
RULING: No. The forfeiture here is a permissible criminal punishment, not a prior
restraint on speech. The distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments is
solidly grounded in this Court's cases. The term “prior restraint” describes orders forbidding
certain communications that are issued before the communications occur. In this case, the
order imposes no legal impediment to petitioner's ability to engage in any expressive activity;
it just prevents him from financing those activities with assets derived from his prior
racketeering offenses. RICO is oblivious to the expressive or non-expressive nature of the
assets forfeited. Alexander’s assets were forfeited because they were directly related to past
racketeering violations, and thus they differ from material seized or restrained on suspicion
of being obscene without a prior judicial obscenity determination.
In relation to Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: The first prohibition of the
constitutional provision is a prohibition of prior restraint. Prior restraint means official
government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. In the case at bar, Alexander was engaging in the business of
“adult entertainment” for more than 30 years, selling pornographic magazines and sexual
paraphernalia, showing sexually explicit movies, and eventually selling and renting
videotapes of the same nature. The property forfeiture ordered by the court was valid
because the items were seized as punishment, not as a prior restraint on speech.
486 REYES
Section 4, Article III
INC vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), a duly organized religious organization, has a
television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in 1992, INC submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The
Board classified the series as “X” or not for public viewing on the ground that they “offend
and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.” INC
claims that the Board committed grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit
the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them.
ISSUE: Whether the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
INC’s religious program.
RULING: Yes. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for "attacking" other religions, especially the Catholic Church. These so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech. The
respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
MAIN POINT: It is deeply entrenched in our fundamental law is its hostility against all
prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge
this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down.
487. Musa
SWS v. COMELEC, GR 147571, May 5, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social
research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys. SWS brought this
action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing §5.4 of RA.
No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides Surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim
that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the
1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without
causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile
voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media
from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election.
Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access
to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC restriction on survey during the Election period constitute a violation
of the Freedom of Expression.
RULING:
Yes, the court hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest
sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
As prior restraint, the rule is presumed to be invalid. The power of the COMELEC over
media franchises is limited to ensuring “equal opportunity, time, space and right to reply” as
well as to reasonable rates of charges for the use of media facilities for “public information
and forums among candidates.”
MP: Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and
the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, ‘any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity…. The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal of the
normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
488. Musa
Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS:
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station DZMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor
President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference
in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc
recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in
both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact
disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the
compact discs was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went
public, claiming possession of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez
ordered the NBI to investigate media organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible
violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that
airing the Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers
of the broadcasters group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a
joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom On 21 June 2005, petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the “acts, issuances,
and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following grounds:
(1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution,
and (2) the NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing
the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the respondents (NTC) abridge freedom of speech and of the
press.
RULING:
Yes. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a
combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine, which limits speech
once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the
danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, a standard when courts balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and (c) the clear and present danger rule
which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger
that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent.
It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. However, respondents’ evidence
falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of
the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the
integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public
two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version.
Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act
is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
The need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free
press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has
no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that
the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.
MP:
The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the
enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of
expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of
unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of
these categories of unprotected expression.
489. Musa
Newsounds Broadcasting v. Dy, GR 170270 and 179411, April 2, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio
broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan
Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station,
management office, and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that
the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as
well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully
operate smoothly thereafter. In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of
mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue
zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers
showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the
court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the court denied the action. In the
meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to petitioners
a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial. In 2003,
petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR
Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the
same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR
Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the
provision of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the
pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the
grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run
again until June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the
issuance of mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of the operation based on zoning ordinance is valid.
RULING:
No. It violates freedom of speech. Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-
based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech.43 Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than
content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of
expression.44 Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to
speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.45
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station,
as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station
or business enterprise within the LGU.
MP:
There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that
governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than
governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior.
490.LIM
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN GR 155282, January 17, 2005
Main Point: The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2)
newsreels.
Facts : On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-
tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted
by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable
them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps,
customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade
of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the
episode. The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr.
Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Acting on the letter-
complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB
Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents (1) did not submit "The
Inside Story" to petitioner for its review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission,
thus, violating Section 74 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter
III and Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations respondents explained
that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-
political editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents
Issue : Whether the “inside story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom
of expression and of the press
Ruling : No. Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no
declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the
press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason,
there is no justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story" which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of
the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
491.LIM
Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Estrada Trial,AM No.01-4-03-SC
Main Point: Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to
him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the
constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could
only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the
court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will
also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of
justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due
process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.
Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to
information of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the
accused.
Ruling: No. The right of the accused prevails. The petition is denied. The courts
recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the
public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
An audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan
is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions…xxx (no live footage, only live broadcasting of recording)
492.LIM
Soriano v. Laguardia, GR 164785, April 29, 2009
Main Point: Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of
speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when
the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.
FACTS: In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as hose of the program
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed towards private
respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo and a host of the program
Ang Tamang Daan:
“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol
ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi
ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong
ito.”
Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On 16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued
an order preventively suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d)
of PD 1986. Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson
Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his motion
followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension
order. On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension from
the program Ang Dating Daan.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and expression.
Ruling: No. The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech.
The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against
publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in
libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to
the freedom of expression. The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not
grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments
must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.
A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
493. The Diocese of Bacolod v. Comelec, GR No. 205728, 747 SCRA 1, Jan 21,
2015
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law”
referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-
RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to
their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising
“Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.” Respondents
conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not
of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.
ISSUES: Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.
Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral
regulation.
HELD: FIRST ISSUE: No.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of
a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even
assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to
expression. Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch
or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions
of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not
fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
Second ISSUE: No.
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their
position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all
of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
THIRD ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys
a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the
other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the
tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
FOURTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers
to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.
 The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin
content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court
has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when
the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting
of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin
in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s
constitutional rights.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations
are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the
government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . .
to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals
whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.”
494. GMA Network, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time
violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth
coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason
for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut
basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based
time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed
of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of
the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message
through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.
495. Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015
Facts: Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a government-owned and
controlled corporation in Davao City Represented by its General Manager Engr. Rodora
Gamboa (GM Gamboa)
Private respondents Aranjuez et al., are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuno
sa Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several
administrative cases due to acts committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD
such as wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the
designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees' grievances.
The said grievances was due to the non-payment of their Collective Negotiation Agreement
(CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD's privatization.
The inscriptions stated "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!"
During the anniversary, aside from wearing shirts with the inscriptions inside the premises
of the DCWD office during the office hours. Also, one of the members of the Board of
Directors of NAMADACWAR Gregorio Cagula, with help of some of its members,
attached similar inscriptions and posters of employees' grievances to a post in the motor
pool area, an area not among the official designated places.
As a consequence of their action, GM Gamboa sent a Memorandum addressed to the
officers and members of NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain for the attire that
they wore during the said event.
NAMADACWAD collectively responded that they were only required to wear any sports
attire during the event and they just added the inscriptions containing the said grievances.
Also, they manifested that it is their constitutional right of free speech and freedom of
expression.
DCWD found a prima facie case against the respondents, GM Gamboa filed formal
administrative charges against the respondents.
After the given opportunity to explain through several hearings, the officers and members of
the NAMADACWAD was found guilty as charged with penalties ranging from suspension
to dismissal from service.
The respondents appeal before the CSC bringing up the violations to their constitutional
rights to assemble and petitioner for redress of grievances.
CSC partly granted the appeal and held that the collective act of respondents in wearing t-
shirts with grievance inscriptions during office hours was not within the abit of the
definition of prohibited mass action punishment since there was no intent to cause work
stoppage. However, CSC ruled that Cagula's act of posting of grievances outside the
designated areas was a clear violation. The said act was agreed and conspired by the other
officers of NAMADACWAD which makes them liable and be reprimanded.
CA affirmed the CSC decision in toto.
Issue: WON government employees' constitutional right to freedom of speech may be
regulated.
Held: Yes, though the Court finds no merit in ruling a suspension or dismissal to those
who violated the rules governing the posting of posters with grievances only within the
designated places, the court affirmed that they violated the said rule and must be
reprimanded. CSC issued MC No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the government
employees to air their grievances balanced by the delivery of services to the public which
should not be prejudiced. MC No. 33 sets down rules governing the posting of posters and
other similar materials within the premises of government agencies as follows:
1. All head of agencies are hereby directed to provide specific spaces within their
respective premises, preferably near the bundy clock, at the canteen or places normally
frequented by employees, where employees' unions/associations could post their posters.
2. x x x.
3. The hanging of posters and streamers shall only be allowed in the designated areas.
4. No poster, placard, streamer or other similar materials containing abusive, vulgar,
defamatory or libelous language shall be allowed.
Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of DCWD issued an office
memorandum designating the bulletin board at the motor-pool area below the Office of the
Purchasing Division and the side of the office building beside the guard house where the
bundy clock is located as the designated areas for posting of grievances. Clearly, the DCWD
Office Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a reasonable rule issued
by the heads of the agencies in order to regulate posting of grievances of the employees.
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a
different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not
tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise
enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts
public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are
some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a
contract for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility to ensure that citizens are not
deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.
CASE NO. 496
Art. III, Sec. 4.
1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-Utak) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020
MAINPOINT: A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under
well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free
speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1.The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2.It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3.The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4.The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
FACTS:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would
implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions of the
Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during the
campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the premises
of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the prohibition
as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
ISSUE: Whether Resolution 9615 is a violation against the right to free speech.
RULING:
Yes. Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to
freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners
of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign
material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty
of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an
election offense.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary
to a stated governmental interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act, the prohibition on posting
of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for
therein. Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that
would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of
the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
CASE NO. 497
Art. III, Sec. 4.
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015
MAINPOINT: It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting
matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.
FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics,
demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which
features news- worthy items of information including election surveys. Petitioners brought
this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Sec. 5.4
of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states
that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at
the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as
publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand,
states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14,2001
ISSUE: Whether the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit
polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional.
RULING: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category
of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
CASE NO. 497
Art. III, Sec. 4.
People v. Perez – 45 Phil. 599
MAINPOINT: Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in the
presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of
Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do
with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted
thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.
ISSUE: Whether the remarks is protected by the constitutional freedom of speech and
whether Art. 256 of RPC is a violation against this right.
RULING: No. In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited
rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up
the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government.
All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be
characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
No. It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to
penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless
the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted
authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Case No. 499– Cruz
Sec. 4 – Subsequent Punishment
Espiritu v. General Lim
GR 85727, October 3, 1991
Main Point: For purposes of arrest, the law tilts in favor of authority.
Facts: Espiritu, in a gathering of drivers and sympathizers at the corner of Valencia St. and
Magsaysay Boulevard, said, among others: “Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang
Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory
ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating
pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na.” Later, at a conference at the National
Press Club, he called for a nationwide strike. He was arrested without a warrant, for inciting
to sedition.
ISSUE: Was the arrest valid?
RULING: Yes. People may differ as to the criminal character of the speech, which at any
rate will be decided in court. But for the purposes of arrest, not conviction, there was
sufficient ground for the officer to believe that Espiritu was in the act of committing a
crime. For purposes of arrest, the law tilts in favor of authority. This is an allowable
subsequent punishment of expression because the speech of Espiritu creates a dangerous
tendency, which the state has the right to prevent. There’s a rational connection between the
speech and the evil apprehended.
Case No. 500 – Cruz
Sec. 4 – Subsequent Punishment
Dennis v. US
341 US 494
Main Point: Clear and present danger test (question of proximity and degree): In each case,
the courts must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justified
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”
Facts: The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or
willfully advocate the overthrowing of any government in the United States by force or to
attempt to commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought
up on charges under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize
as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the
overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly
advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. It was clear from the record that the
leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a revolution when the opportunity came.
The Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The
constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged.
Issue: Was the statute invalid by its own terms because is a form of restraint.
Ruling: No. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson). We
must apply the “clear and present danger” test. Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of
the Government by force is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to
limit speech. Obviously, “clear and present danger” does not mean the government may not
act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of being executed.
On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the
formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined
members subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the
inflammable nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the
touch and go nature of our relations with other countries with whom the Petitioners were
ideologically aligned. Thus, the convictions of the Petitioners were justified.
Case No. 501 – Cruz
Sec. 4 – Subsequent Punishment
Gonzales v. COMELEC
27 SCRA 835
Main Point: Balancing of interest test: in determining the validity of the law, free speech as
a social value must be weighed against the political process as a social value.
Facts: RA 4880, which prohibited the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity, was challenged on constitutional
grounds (free speech, expression, assembly, association). There was the further allegation
that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters
of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by
and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that
the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the
absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of
petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Tañada, as amicus curiae, elucidated that
Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech
and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the
clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for
national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess
of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police
power of the state.
Issue: Whether RA 4880 was a form of subsequent punishment
Ruling: Yes. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to
a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the
actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country.
502- CHUA SECTION 4
EASTERN BROADCASTING V. DANS, JR.
FACTS: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. It was
alleged that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. The petitioner also raised
the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general
charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift
towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared
towards public affairs.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of speech
RULING: The case has become moot and academic when the president of the company
withdraw his petition. He sold it to a pastrana who is also no longer interested in the said
case.
However the SC issues the following guidelines, All forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression
clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent
MAIN POINT: All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print
media.
503. CHUA
Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. V. Judge Capulong
FACTS: Petitioner Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for the commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer Lope V.
Juban who suggested that they consult with the appropriate government agencies and also
with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in
the events proposed to be filmed.
Private respondent Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the
use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any
member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the
production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference
whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to him or any member of
his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them.
Private respondent filed a Complaint with application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing
the movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that petitioners' production
of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over his objection, constitutes
an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are
exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s right to freedom of expression superseded the right of
privacy of the respondent
RULING: Yes, In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted
by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into
by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the
limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern."
MAIN POINT : The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation to freedom of expression. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom
of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test". The principle "requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given
situation or type of situation"
504 CHUA
KELLEY V. JOHNSON
FACTS: A county regulation limiting the length of county policemen's hair. Respondent
sought the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, not as an ordinary citizen, but as a law
enforcement employee of the county, a subdivision of the State, and this distinction is one
of considerable significance since a State has wider latitude and notably different interests in
imposing restrictive regulations on its employees than it does in regulating the citizenry at
large.
ISSUE: Whether the right of the respondent to freedom of expression was violated
RULING: The regulation challenged here did not violate any right guaranteed respondent
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
MAIN POINT: The overwhelming majority of state and local police of the present day
are uniformed. This fact itself testifies to the recognition by those who direct those
operations, and by the people of the States and localities who directly or indirectly choose
such persons, that similarity in appearance of police officers is desirable. This choice may be
based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the members of the public,
or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police
force itself. Either one is a sufficiently rational justification for regulations so as to defeat
respondent's claim based on the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
505. Brandenburg V Ohio - Baird
FACTS; Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in Ohio, allowed a television station
to broadcast the KKK rally he was a part of. During the rally, Brandenburg gave a speech
targeting the government and people of color. Because of an Ohio statute that criminalized
syndicalism, Brandenburg was fined and sentenced to one to ten years in prison.After filing
an appeal and being dismissed by the lower courts, the case then reached the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE; Whether the Ohio statute was a violation of Brandenburg's First Amendment rights
of free spech and assembly
RULING; No, the Court held that hate speech is protected under the First
Amendment as long as it does not provoke violence.The Court's Per Curiam opinion
held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-
pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting
or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action."
The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while
ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless
action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of
the Constitution
506. Miriam College Foundation V CA - Baird
FACTS; The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school
paper."Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young
readers," and devoid of all moral values."1 This was now some members of the Miriam
College community allegedly described the contents Miriam College's school paper (Chi-
Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho).Prior to the disciplinary sanction
to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the complaints
against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to
the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction
over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the
defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before
the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.
ISSUE; Whether the punishment imposed is violative of the right of students to free speech
RULING; No, the right of students to free speech is not absolute. The right must always be
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. While the campus
journalism act provides that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on
the basis of articles he/she has written, the same should not infringe on the schools
right to discipline its students. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:(1) Who
may teach,(2) What may be taught,(3) How it shall be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted
to study.Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary,
if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.
507. Sanidad V Comelec - Baird
FACTS; This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press.In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day
before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their
views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the
government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all
sides of the issue.Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec
to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods.
ISSUE; Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution no. 2167 is constitutional?
RULING; No, it is void and unconstitutional. While the limitation does not absolutely
bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify
such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.Plebiscite issues are matters of
public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in
a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised.
508. Sanidad V Comelec - Baird
FACTS; This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of expression and of the press.In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein
petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the
"OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER assailed the constitutionality of
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day
before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues.Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their
views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the
government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all
sides of the issue.Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec
to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods.
ISSUE; Whether Section 19 of Comelec Resolution no. 2167 is constitutional?
RULING; No, it is void and unconstitutional. While the limitation does not absolutely
bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify
such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.Plebiscite issues are matters of
public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely
and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in
a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised.
CASE NO. 511– Tan
Article III, Sec.4: Speech and Electoral Process
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC
Facts: The COMELEC passed a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls in the 1998
presidential elections. Respondent acquired information that ABS-CBN had prepared a
project with PR groups to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and make an exit
survey for positions of the President and Vice-President. Respondent argued that such
project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey and pose a clear and
present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process
Issue: Whether the prohibition of speech was valid?
Ruling: No. The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass
media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, they
cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible
elections. Quite the contrary, exit poll properly conducted and publicized can be vital tools
in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Lastly, it did not pass the clear and
present danger test because the evils envisioned are merely speculative.
Main Point: The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic
government. It is a preferred right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive
economic or other liberties.
CASE NO. 512– Tan
Article III, Sec.4: Speech and Electoral Process
Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC
Facts: SWS wishes to conduct election surveys throughout the period of the elections both
at the national and local levels and release the results thereof. They assail that sec. 5.4 of the
Fair Elections act to be unconstitutional. It states that surveys affecting national candidates
shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published 7 days before an election. COMELEC argues that it prevents the
manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous
surveys just before the election. It further contends that (1) it debases the electoral process
due to manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply, and (2) the impairment
of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration.
Issue: Whether the prohibition of speech was valid?
Ruling: No. It lays prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the
prescribed periods. Due to the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
The government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint, which it did not surpassed. Therefore, sec. 5.4 of the Fair Elections Act is
declared unconstitutional.
Main Point: In prior restraint of expression, the presumption is that it is invalid. The
government must provide justification for the enforcement of such restraint because the
right to speech is a preferred right.
CASE NO. 513– Tan
Article III, Sec.4: Speech and Electoral Process
Penera vs. COMELEC
Facts: Rosalinda Penera and Edgar Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica,
Agusan Del Norte during the 2007 elections. Andanar filed for the disqualification of Penera
and other members of her political party as winners because they unlawfully engaged in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the
campaign period. Petitioner argues that this was false. They argued that a motorcade was
indeed conducted but no person made any speech, not even any of the candidates. Instead,
there was only marching music in the background and a grand standing for the purpose of
raising awareness for the election, itself. They also contend that this was normal practice
after persons filed their COCs.
Issue: Whether the speech was valid?
Ruling: No. The conduct of a motorcade a procession or parade of automobiles, or other
motor vehicles is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity. Unmistakably,
motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to promote the election of candidates.
This is prohibited under the Omnibus Election Code.
Note: Dissenting Opinion on Freedom of Expression: Acts committed by a person who has filed a certificate
of candidacy prior to the date when she becomes a “candidate,” even if constituting election campaigning or
partisan political activities, such acts are within the realm of a citizen’s protected freedom of expression.
Main Point: Election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period are prohibited for those who will be candidates in
the upcoming elections.
CASE 514 - OCENA
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Rubin v. Coors Brewing (131 L. Ed. 2d 532)
FACTS: Coors Brewing Co. applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an
approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal
Alcohol Administration Act’s prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or
advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s
protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to
prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing
on the basis of the potency of their alcohol. The district court found in favor of Coors, but
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the
case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol
content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent
strength wars.
ISSUE: Does the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s prohibition of displaying alcohol
content on beer labels violate the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech?
RULING: YES. The Court held that for the government to regulate commercial speech,
the government must have a substantial interest that the regulation directly affects. In this
case, the interest the government intended to protect by banning the display of alcohol
content on beer labels was to limit the “strength wars” of competing beer companies, which
could lead to greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this interest was not
substantial enough, since there was no reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content
on beer labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation also does not directly
advance the suppression of strength wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA
directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held the regulation was more extensive than
necessary, since there were available and effective alternatives that would not violate the
First Amendment. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring opinion emphasizing the
regulation is unconstitutionality of the regulation because it did not increase consumer
awareness, but instead blinded the public to the truth of the alcohol content.
MAIN POINT: Even if the case could be made that there was a direct connection between
the regulation and the government interest, the regulation would fail because there were
alternatives that regulated speech less extensively that could accomplish the same thing.
While the regulation bans the disclosure of alcohol content on beer labels, it allows the exact
opposite in the case of wines and spirits. If combating strength wars were the goal, we
would assume that Congress would regulate disclosure of alcohol content for the strongest
beverages as well as for the weakest ones.
CASE 515 - OCENA
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network (123 L. Ed. 2d 99)
FACTS: Cincinnati decided to revoke permits allowing the Discovery Network to distribute
advertisements from 38 news racks on city property because of an ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of commercial handbills on public property. The enforcement of the ordinance
removed only 62 of the approximately 1,500 news racks in the city, but Cincinnati claimed
that it served the significant public interests of safety and aesthetics. The far more numerous
newspaper racks were not affected. Discovery Networks and Harmon Publishing challenged
the legality of the ordinance under the First Amendment.
ISSUE: Whether Cincinnati’s restrictions on the distribution of commercial flyers in news
racks violated the First Amendment.
RULING: YES. Despite the undisputed fact that flyers were commercial advertisements,
the Court refused to diminish their free speech protections. Court has ruled that commercial
speech is less central to the First Amendment. Courts have historically applied a lower
standard to commercial speech, as in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (1978), limiting
direct lawyer solicitations of clients. The Court has justified this by asserting that commercial
speech is more durable or that it is less central to the First Amendment than political speech.
How much lower has often been far less clear. The Court had established a test for
protections granted commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission (1980). It determined that in order for lawful commercial speech to be restricted,
the government must have a substantial interest advanced by the restriction, and it must not
be a more extensive restriction than necessary to meet that interest. In Board of Trustees of
State University of New York v. Fox (1989), the Court also asserted that there must be a
reasonable fit between the desired ends and the means chosen. Court said Cincinnati did not
have substantial interest for the ordinance. Applying these tests in Discovery Network, the
Court rejected the Cincinnati ordinance, noting that the removal of a small number of news
racks did little to advance the city’s interests in safety and aesthetics. In short, it was not a
reasonable fit.
MAIN POINT: Even an incremental improvement of safety and aesthetics from the
removal of news racks at issue should be sufficient to meet these tests. Commercial speech
remains a lower category of protected speech, but this decision indicates that governments
cannot ban or restrict it without a reasonable justification.
CASE 516 - OCENA
ARTICLE III, SECTION 3: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York (447 US 557)
FACTS: The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving
energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use.
The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising,
which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New
York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Did the PSC's ban on advertising violate the freedom of speech protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments?
RULING: Yes. The Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the
New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Justice Lewis Powell cited the
protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth
in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New
York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation
would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional
advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court sets forth a four-part test for determining when commercial speech may
or may not be regulated by states. The test states that: (1) the commercial speech must not
be misleading or involve illegal activity; (2) the government interest advanced by the
regulation must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the asserted
government interest; and (4) the government regulation must not be more extensive than is
necessary to serve the government interest at stake.
MAIN POINT: It determined that in order for lawful commercial speech to be restricted,
the government must have a substantial interest advanced by the restriction, and it must not
be a more extensive restriction than necessary to meet that interest.
517. SALVADOR
Section 4, Commercial Speech
Pharmaceutical v. Secretary of Health
Facts: Pharmaceutical filed this petition seeking to nullify Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No.
51, Otherwise Known as The “Milk Code,” Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not
valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President
Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. The World Health Assembly adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.
Issue: Whether the banning the advertisement on breast milk substitutes is a violation of
the right to speech.
Ruling: Yes, the advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes falls within the ambit
of the term commercial speech, a separate category of speech which is not accorded the
same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. An absolute ban on advertising is
unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of
promoting the health of infants and young children.
Main point: The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within
the ambit of the term commercial speech—that is, speech that proposes an economic
transaction—a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of
protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.
518. SALVADOR
Section 4, Commercial Speech
City of Laduc v. Gilleo
Facts: An ordinance of petitioner City of Ladue bans all residential signs but those falling
within one of ten exemptions, for the principal purpose of minimizing the visual clutter
associated with such signs. Respondent Gilleo filed this action, alleging that the ordinance
violated her right to free speech by prohibiting her from displaying a sign stating, "For Peace
in the Gulf," from her home. The District Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the ordinance was a "content based" regulation,
and that Ladue's substantial interests in enacting it were not sufficiently compelling to
support such a restriction.
Issue: Whether the ordinance was a violation of Gileo's right to speech.
Ruling: Yes, the ordinance violates a Ladue resident's right to free speech. City of Ladue’s
principle interest in minimizing the visual clutter associated with signs is valid, but not
compelling. A resident’s self-interest in maintaining property values vastly lowers the danger
of visual clutter that concerns the city. Although prohibitions foreclosing entire media may
be free of content or viewpoint discrimination, they eliminate a common means of speaking
and ultimately suppress too much speech. The Petitioner argues that there are alternative
channels for communication such as letters, handbills, flyers and newspaper advertisements.
However, these are not adequate substitutes for the important medium of speech that has
been closed off. A respect for individual liberty in the home has always been a part of our
culture. Displaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a distinct message from
placing a sign elsewhere or by conveying the message through other means. Furthermore,
residential signs may be more cost-effective for the speaker.
Main point: It is unconstitutional to prohibit property owners from displaying political
signs at their residences. Commercial speech is communication which no more than
proposes a commercial transaction.
519. SALVADOR
Section 4, Commercial Speech
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
Facts: Petitioners seek reconsideration of the Court’s February 18, 2014 Decision that
declared invalid and unconstitutional certain provisions of Republic Act 10125 or the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and upheld the validity of the others. Petitioner
Bloggers and Netizens for Democracy insist that Section 6 cannot stand in the absence of a
definition of the term “information and communication technology.” The Court had ample
opportunity to consider the proposition that Section 6 violates the equal protection clause
via the parties’ pleadings, oral arguments, and memoranda. But, as the Decision stressed, the
power to fix the penalties for violations of penal laws, like the cybercrime law, exclusively
belongs to Congress. Thus, section 6 of the cybercrime law merely makes the commission of
existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance that raises by one degree the
penalties corresponding to such crimes. This is not at all arbitrary since a substantial
distinction exists between crimes committed through the use of ICT and similar crimes
committed using conventional means.
Issue: Whether Section 4 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act is valid and not violative of the
freedom of speech.
Ruling: Yes, Section 4(c)(3) is valid because it seeks to regulate a potentially harmful
conduct. Such harmful conduct may interfere with a user’s enjoyment of his e-mail and
consequently of his legitimate exercise of his fundamental rights that e-mail facilitates. The
questioned provision is not burdensome to commercial speech at all since the law does not
prohibit the sending of unsolicited e-mail per se. Thus, the constitutional guarantee against
prior restraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of “actual
malice,” and the legal protection afforded by “privilege communications” all ensure that
protected speech remains to be protected and guarded. As long as the expression or speech
falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the rights of
the people are protected.
Main point: Commercial speech should be protected even if it does not enjoy the same
level of protection as other categories of free speech and expression. Libel, like obscenity,
belongs to those forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and
are considered outside the realm of protected freedom.
Salinas- 520. Policarpio v. Manila Times
Main Point: To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be
not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments
or remarks.
Facts: Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO Nat’l Commission. As such, she had
filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission, & caused
the latter to be separated from the service. Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were
referred for investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for
alleged malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa through falsification of
public documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing
two defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in Saturday and in the Daily Mirror
which are as follows: Saturday Mirror (Aug 11, 1956): “WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED
PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUDS Unesco Official Head Accused on
Supplies, Funds Use by Colleague” Daily Mirror (Aug 13, 1956): “PALACE OPENS
INVESTIGATION OF RAPS AGAINST POLICARPIO Alba Probes Administrative
Phase of Fraud Charges Against Unesco Woman Official; Fiscal Sets Prelim Quiz of
Criminal Suit on Aug 22” The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges against Policarpio
for having malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of
supposed official expenses. It was said that Policarpio used several sheets of government
stencils for her private and personal use. The other charge refers to the supposed
reimbursements she had made for a trip to Quezon and Pangasinan. Reyes’ complaint
alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses for use of her car when she had
actually made the trip aboard an army plane. Policarpio was said to be absent from the
Bayambang conference for which she also sought a refund of expenses. CFI dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven that defendants had acted
maliciously in publishing the articles, although portions thereof were inaccurate or false
Issue: Whether Manila Times had acted maliciously in publishing the aforementioned
articles.
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in
determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational
manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the
public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official
and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a
publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair,
and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks.
Salinas- 521. Lopez v. CA
Main Point: Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also cannot claim any
talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
Facts: On January 1956, it appears that a Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle that
Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US
Airforce planes which forwarded such message to Manila. An American Army plane
dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which contained, among
other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in
Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island
since Christmas of 1955. Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately
deployed to the babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who
discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a
“hoax” à the same word to be used by the newspapers who covered the same.
On January 13, 1956, This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton
devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it
brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick,
only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and clothing being scarce. Again on
January 29, 1956, The same magazine in the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz
as “a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story
about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to
civilization.” à Called it “Hoax of the year”. In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were
published but both photos were of a different person of the same name Fidel G. Cruz
former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. On January 27, 1957,
Manila Chronicle published statements correcting their misprint and explained that
confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline
Issue: Whether the error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax
of the year” constituted violation of freedom of the press.
Ruling: No. The court ruled full discussion of public affairs is necessary for the
maintenance of good governance. The court stated that the press should have the legal right
to have and express their opinions on legal questions. However, the same must be done in
good faith. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon freedom of the press. The
court also ruled, Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez that press should be given leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy. In the case of libel however, these said talismanic immunity from given by
the constitution does not apply.
Salinas - 522. NY Times v. Sullivan
Main Point: Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Facts: The Petitioner newspaper published a full-page ad that alleged the Rev. Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s (King) arrest for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy
King’s efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. The Respondent,
the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black
ministers who were listed as endorsers of the advertisement. The Respondent claimed that
the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. The advertisement
included statements, some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed against
students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil
rights movement. The Respondent claimed the statements referred to him because his duties
included supervision of the police department. Under Alabama law, the Respondent did not
have to prove that he had been harmed. Also, a defense claiming that the advertisement was
truthful was unavailable since the advertisement contained factual errors. The jury found for
the Respondent, awarding a $500,000 judgment. The State Supreme Court affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Alabama’s libel law, by not requiring the Respondent to prove that
the speech in question was motivated by actual malice, unconstitutionally infringe on the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech and freedom of press protections.
Ruling: Yes. The court ruled that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct
of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that
they are false or in reckless disregard to truth or falsity). Specifically, the rule of law applied
by the Alabama courts was constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the Petitioner the
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that were guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct.
CASE NO. 523 – SABTALUH
OBSCENITY AS A PROTECTED SPEECH
ROSENBLOOM V. METROMEDIA
FACTS: George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police
arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local
news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words
“allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters
called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut
distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges. Rosenbloom
then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard,
which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did
not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false
standard applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not knowingly and recklessly false standard shall apllied in this case.
RULING: Yes, The Supreme Court held that the knowingly and recklessly false standard
applied because the story was a matter of public concern. It did not matter that Rosenbloom
was a private citizen. The Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support the
damages award under the proper constitutional standard.
MAINPOINT: The First Amendment gives the news media a privilege to report and
comment upon the official actions of public servants in full detail, without sparing from
public view the reputation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected by any official
action.
CASE NO. 524 - SABTALUH
OBSCENITY AS A PROTECTED SPEECH
GERTS V. ROBERT WLECH – 418 US 323
FACTS: The family of a man who was killed by a Chicago police officer, Richard Nuccio,
enlisted lawyer Elmer Gertz to bring a wrongful death claim against Nuccio after his
conviction for second-degree murder. An article in a magazine called American Opinion, the
John Birch Society accused the Petitioner of being a “Leninist” and a “Communist-fronter”
because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. American
Opinion also suggested that Gertz had been involved in criminal activity. Gertz filed a
defamation claim against the publication's owner. However, Respondent contends that New
York Times standard applied which requires plaintiff to establish actual malice to
successfully bring a defamation suit and gertz is a public figure thus they are not liable.
Plaintiff contends that the New York standard rule does not apply to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the New York standard rule also applies to private individual.
RULING: No. the Court concluded that the New York times (actual-malice standard) did
not apply in cases of defamation against private individuals. Because private individuals have
less effective opportunities for rebuttal than do public officials and public figures, they are
more vulnerable to injury from defamation. Thus, state interest in compensating injury to
the reputation of private individuals is greater than for public officials and public figures,
and States may constitutionally allow private individuals to recover damages for defamation
on the basis of any standard of care except liability without fault.
MAINPOINT: actual-malice standard applied only to defamation cases involving public
figures and officials, not private people.
CASE NO. 525 – SABTALUH
OBSCENITY AS A PROTECTED SPEECH
HUSTLER V. MAGAZINE
FACTS: A parody ad in Hustler Magazine, which was known for mature and explicit
content, featured a fake interview with fundamentalist Protestant minister Jerry Falwell. The
magazine based the parody on a Campari advertising campaign that consisted of alleged
interviews with celebrities in which they talked about their first time drinking Campari, while
using wordplays and double entendres to suggest that they were talking about the first time
that they had sex. In Hustler's parody ad, the fake Falwell talked about having sex with his
mother in an outhouse. The magazine was careful to include a disclaimer at the bottom of
the page to remind readers that it was a parody, and it also listed the ad as "fiction" in its
table of contents. Falwell filed a diversity action against petitioners, to recover damages
for, inter alia, libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication
of the parody.
ISSUE: Whether or not obscene parody is protected by the first amendment.
RULING: Yes. In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public
interest and concern, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and
public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody at issue without
showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made
with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard as to whether or not it was true. The majority acknowledged that permitting broad
First Amendment protections may lead to speech that is offensive or hurtful in its criticism
of public figures. However, those protections remain in effect unless the speech is both false
and made with actual malice. In other words, it must satisfy both the standard applied under
state law and the standard in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan if the target is a public figure.
MAINPOINT: The First Amendment protects parodies of celebrities or other public
figures, even if they are aimed to cause distress to their targets.
526 REYES
Section 4, Article III: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
In re: Jurado A.M. No. 90-5-2373
FACTS: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile et al were charged by the State with Rebellion
complexed with Murder in contravention of the Hernandez doctrine which states that
Rebellion absorbs Murder and that the crime of Rebellion under the Revised Penal Code
constitutes one single crime hence there is no reason to complex it with other crimes. While
the Supreme Court was deliberating their decision regarding the case, the Manila Standard
published an article by Atty. Emil Jurado stating that “Rebellion complex does not exist -
SC” and that “State back to square one in cases v. Enrile et al.” His article claimed that the
SC had reaffirmed the Hernandez doctrine by a 14-1 vote according to “sources in the SC.”
He had a follow up article in his opinion column labeled “Scoop!” and the next day he
published another article that stated that the SC was expected to promulgate a decision
within the day or the next day. He divulged information, such as the revised vote of 14-0,
claiming that Associate Justice Leo Medialdea had inhibited himself, and that the decision
would be penned by Associate Justice Narvasa. Headlines and news continued until
Tuesday, however, the articles changed abruptly when the new articles showed that the SC
was “still deliberating” on the issue. On that same day, the SC issued a resolution branding
as false the news reports and claimed that no decision had been signed as of the date, and
required Atty. Jurado to respond within 5 days why he should not be dealt with
administratively. Atty. Jurado claimed freedom of the press and justified the article on
the people’s right to know about decisions.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Jurado can invoke protection from freedom of speech.
RULING: No. Publication regarding judicial action in a pending case, which tends to
impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is
punishable as contempt. Atty. Jurado could not hide behind the shield of freedom of the
press and of information. His article published comments on a non-existent decision and
obstructed the proper functioning of the Supreme Court. The premature revelation placed
the court in an unfavorable light as an inept and incompetent guardian of its own
confidential proceedings. In order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of the verdicts, or otherwise
obstruct the administration of justice, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to exercise the
power to punish for contempt
MAIN POINT: Publication regarding judicial action in a pending case, which tends to
impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is
punishable as contempt.
527 REYES
Section 4, Article III: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
In re: Jurado A.M. No. 93-2-037
FACTS: Emiliano Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation
(Manila Standard), had been writing about alleged irregularities in the judiciary over several
months. The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this
Court in the controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. where the Court ruled in favor of PLDT. In relation to the case, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and two other newspapers published a report of the purported
affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics, who was
commissioned by ETPI to examine and analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation
to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr.
Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. He
then concluded that the Gutierrez decision “looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the
PLDT's counsel.” This spawned more public discussion and comment about the judiciary
and the Supreme Court itself, calling for the impeachment of justices and resignation of
judges. They were even coined, “Hoodlums in Robes.” Jurado subsequently wrote in his
column an item entitled “Who will judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices,
their spouses and children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in
Hong Kong some time last year; that luxurious hotel accommodations and all other
expenses were paid by a public utility firm; and that the trip was arranged by the travel
agency patronized by this public utility firm.
ISSUE: Whether Jurado can invoke protection from freedom of the speech.
RULING: No. It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person
are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the
Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the
publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent
lies. Freedom of expression, the right of speech and of the press is, to be sure, among the
most zealously protected rights in the Constitution. But every person exercising it is, as the
Civil Code stresses, obliged “to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.” The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
broadcast lies or half-truths — this would not be “to observe honesty and good faith;” it
may not be used to insult others; destroy their name or reputation or bring them into
disrepute. This would not be “to act with justice” or “give everyone his due.”
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the
name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function.
526 REYES
Section 4, Article III: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
Vasquez vs. CA G.R. No. 118971
FACTS: Petitioner Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. He and some 37
families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General
Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime
Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials, petitioner and his
companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound
concerning their complaint. The next day, a news article was published containing such
statements from the petitioner imputing that Olmedo, through connivance with the NHA
officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was involved in illegal
activities such as attempted murder, gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a complaint for
libel alleging that the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
ISSUE: Whether Vasquez can invoke protection from freedom of the speech.
RULING: Yes. In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other
residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but
engaging in the performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is discharged
faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent. The recognition of this right
and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement placing on him
the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for justifiable ends.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not
only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, it would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from
performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech
and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As
Justice Brandeis has said, “public discussion is a political duty” and the “greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people.”
532.LIM
Fermin vs People – Libel as unprotected speech
Main Point: …was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
which includes the verb “publicar.” Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only
the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the
person who prints or publishes it.
Facts: Cristinelle Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip
Tabloid. The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable
for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading her conviction in
an estafa case herein the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases
to confront there. This was said to be due to them, especially Annabelle’s, using fellow
Filipinos’ money and failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of the
cookware they were selling.
On complaint of spouses, two (2) criminal information for libel were filed against the
accused before the RTC. The RTC found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel. Aggrieved,
petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA which affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.
Issue: Whether both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based on the
libelous article written by Fermin.
Ruling: Yes. … proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending
article is not required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or
proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this
case. It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the “publisher,” as shown by the
editorial box of Gossip Tabloid but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she herself
admitted on the witness stand. Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of
articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the
release of the libelous article fails to persuade.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of Fermin for libel should be upheld.
CA erred in acquitting Tugas, he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC cannot reinstate the
ruling of the trial court convicting Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, SC would run
afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
533. LIM
Policarpio vs Manila Times – Obscenity as Unprotected speech
Main Point: Newspapers presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal. But, to
enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not only true, but,
also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or remarks
Facts: Atty. Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of the local UNESCO National
Commission pressed charges and caused the dismissal of Herminia Reyes. Reyes in a
retaliatory measure, charged Policarpio through the special investigator of the Office of the
President, with malversation of public funds and estafa through falsification of public
documents. The Saturday Mirror the published the two news articles highlighting the
charges of Policarpio.
The articles featured inconsistencies and inaccuracies: 1)The news article reports and charges
were filed by the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission; the truth is Reyes filed the
case; 2) the news article reports of an investigation, while there was none; 3) the news article
would seem to project that Policarpio did steal a large amount of money; truth is that the
amount involved is only 54Pesos. The Publishers allege that the inaccuracies are immaterial.
Issue: Whether the articles are protected speech?
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the
plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament
than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report
of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L.
POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" — is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly,
the defamatory imputations contained in said article are "presumed to be
malicious". We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major
inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had
filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It, likewise, indicated the
number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or clarification
does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although
it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52). For this reason, we feel that
the interest of justice and of all parties concerned would be served if the defendants
indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way of moral damages, and P2,000, as
attorney's fees
534.LIM
Lopez vs CA – Obscenity as unprotected speech
Main Point: Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim
any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitations
Fact: January 1956 – Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle à Fidel Cruz, sanitary
inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which
forwarded such message to Manila An American Army plane dropped emergency
sustenance kits on the beach of the island which contained, among other things, a two way
radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were
living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of 1955.
Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro.
They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the
story about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a “hoax” à the same word to be used by the
newspapers who covered the same. January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila
Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the
story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that place,
with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and clothing
being scarce.
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazineà in the "January News Quiz" made reference to
Cruz as “a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story
about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to
civilization.” à Called it “Hoax of the year” In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were
published but both photos were of a different person of the same name à Fidel G. Cruz
former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. January 27, 1957 à
published statements correcting their misprint and explained that confusion and error
happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th issue’s deadline. Cruz sued herein petitioners
for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral,
1k attorney’s fees) CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case
Issue: Whether petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel
Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax of the year” and guilty liable
Ruling: Yes. Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face
by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or
opinion is irrelevant.
"Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third
person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the
article are imputed to such person." in this case à 3rd person was Cruz and his picture being
published beside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
CASE NO. 538
Art. III, Sec. 4. D.Libel as Unprotected Speech
Hustler v. Magazine – 485 US 46
MAINPOINT: A public figure may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on published speech without showing that the publication contains
a false statement of fact made with “actual malice,” i.e., “knowledge that the statement was
false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
FACTS:
An issue of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur
that contained the name and picture of respondent Jerry Falwell and was entitled “Jerry
Fawell talks about his first time.” The parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that
included interviews with various celebrities about their “first times” trying Campari, playing
on the sexual double entendre of “first times.” In the fake ad featuring Falwell, he states
that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous encounter with his mother in an
outhouse. Small print at the bottom of the ad and the magazine’s table of contents stated
that the ad was a parody and not to be taken seriously. After a trial, the district court granted
a directed verdict for Hustler on Falwell’s invasion of privacy claim. The jury found against
Falwell on the libel claim, but ruled for him on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Hustler.
ISSUE: Whethert the First Amendment protect speech intended to inflict emotional
distress on about that public figure.
RULING: Yes. The First Amendment is especially protective of speech on matters of
public interest and concern—“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.” Robust political debate is bound to produce
speech critical of public figures. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan established that a public
figure may hold a speaker liable for damage to reputation caused by publication of a
defamatory falsehood only if the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” False statements of fact are valueless,
but inevitable in free debate, so a strict liability rule would have an unwanted chilling effect.
The standard should be no different for claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress—to hold otherwise using a subjective standard like “outrageousness” would chill
the speech of political cartoonists and satirists, which has historically played a prominent
role in public and political debate. The Court accepted the jury’s finding that the ad here
could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about Falwell present election
laws that would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence,
one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied.
CASE NO. 539
Art. III, Sec. 4. D.Libel as Unprotected Speech
In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373, 4 LR 19 Aug’09
MAINPOINT: Publication regarding judicial action in a pending case, which tends to
impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is
punishable as contempt.
FACTS: Senator JPE at al. were charged by the State with Rebellion complexed with
murder, in contravention of the Hernandez doctrine which states that Rebellion absorbs
murder. While the SC was deliberating their decision regarding the case, the Manila Standard
published an article by Atty. Emil Jurado stating that “Rebellion complex does not exist SC”
and that “State back to square one in cases v. Enrile et al.” His article claimed that the SC
had reaffirmed the Hernandez doctrine by a 14-1 vote according to “sources in the SC”. He
had a follow up article in his opinion column labeled “Scoop!” and the next day, he
published another article that stated that the SC was expected to promulgate a decision
within the day or the next day. He divulged information, such as the revised vote of14-0
(claiming that Assoc. Justice Leo Medialdea had inhibited himself) and that the decision
would be penned by Assoc. Justice Narvasa. SC issued a resolution branding as false the
news reports and claimed that no decision had been signed as of the date, and required
Atty.Jurado to respond within 5 days why he should not be dealt with administratively. Atty.
Jurado claimed freedom of the press and justified the article on the people’s right to know
about decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the report and comments in question are protected by freedom of
the press and right of the people to know information on matters of a public concern.
RULING:
No. As held in US. v. Sullens, freedom of the press and administration of justice are both
equally sacred and neither should be violated by the other. The court held in that case that
inorder to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of the verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the
court will not hesitate to exercise the power to punish for contempt. In re Lozano and
Quevedo, a case wherein there was false reporting of a closed- door investigation of a judge
of first instance, it was held that it is an interference with the work of the courts to publish
any matters with their policy requires should be kept private. Atty. Jurado could not hide
behind the shield of freedom of the press and of information. His article published
comments on a non-existent decision and obstructed the proper functioning of the SC. The
premature revelation placed the court in an unfavourable light as an inept and incompetent
guardian of its own confidential proceedings. Respondent did not act in good faith. Being a
source of legal news for his readers, the court ruled that they could not punish him as a
newspaperman without punishing him as amember of the bar.
CASE NO. 540
Art. III, Sec. 4. Libel as Unprotected Speech
In Re Jurado – 243 SCRA 299
MAINPOINT: Protection of the right of individual persons to private reputations is also a
matter of public interest and must be reckoned with as a factor in identifying and laying
down the norms concerning the exercise of press freedom and free speech.
FACTS: Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993) among others.
What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who
will judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices, their spouses and children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious
hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that
the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm. The seed of
the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court in the so-called
“controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was
sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority. The Chief Justice issued an administrative
order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the
judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations
in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter
dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted
upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Jurado are true.
ISSUE: Whether Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published
writings.
RULING: NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection. In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw
intelligence or reports he received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover,
some of his reports were completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further
verification.
Case No. 541– Cruz
Libel as Unprotected Speech
Vasquez v. CA
GR 118971 Sept. 15, 1999
Main Point: A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of
official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations
would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all,
infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Facts: Petitioner and some 37 families from his area went to see the National Housing
Authority (NHA) regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman. After their
meeting with NHA, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper
reporters concerning their complaint. The next day, the following exerpts of the news article
appeared in the newspaper. In the article, published were supposed allegations by Vasquez
against the Chairman. Based on the newspaper article, the public official filed a complaint
for libel against petitioner alleging that the latter’s statements cast aspersions on him and
damaged his reputation.
Issue: Whether or not the actual malice standard in New York Times versus Sullivan is to
be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.
Ruling: Yes. Even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it
relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with actual malice — that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by
petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
Libel was used as a form of harassment. Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically
motivated in making the charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant filed
this case to harass petitioner. It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the
publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the
periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and,
"curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the
newspaper.
Case No. 542 – Cruz
Libel as Unprotected Speech
Borjal v CA
GR. 126466 Jan. 14, 1999
Main Point: The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the
press. It must, therefore, sui generis, be protective of public opinion, which closely adheres
to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-determination and
eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of self-expression which
makes its appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political
culture
Facts: Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc and was among the regular writers
who run the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written in Jaywalker, which
called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.This was around the time
the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was organized. Its
objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation
policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around
Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such,
he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the conference.
The Jaywalker contained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the
conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a
case of libel against Borjal.
Issue: Whether the articles constituted privileged communication.
Ruling: Yes. The Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354,
but this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under
Article 354 of the RPC is not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged. The conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a
public figure. The rule is that discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable,
but it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest
criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel
judgments.
Case No. 543 – Cruz
Libel as Unprotected Speech
Vicario v CA
GR 124491 June 1, 1999
Main Point: The law presumes that malice is present in every defamatory imputation;
Exemption is a qualifiedly privileged communication. Such character, which is a
matter of defense, may be lost by positive proof of express malice on the part of the
accused. Once it is established that the article is of a privileged character, the onus of
proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the
offender was prompted by malice or ill will. When this is accomplished the defense of
privilege becomes unavailing.
Facts: Petitioner was charged with libel for allegedly distributing and circulating
photocopies of a Philippine Daily Inquirer issue which contained an article about a judge
who pocketed a bond. Private complainant judge alleged that petitioner's act greatly
prejudiced his reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great distress. Petitioner
disclaimed responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous article, at the same time
asserting that the libel suit against him was ill-motivated for he had filed a criminal charge
for graft and corruption against private complainant judge before the Ombudsman and an
administrative complaint for dishonesty with the Supreme Court, both due to the latter's
unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's cash bond.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of libel
Ruling: No. There was nothing defamatory in the news item. This much was found by the
trial court itself, noting that the published article was merely a factual report about the filing
by the Ombudsman of the charge of corruption against the judge with the Sandiganbayan.
Of course, it does not necessarily mean that if the news article complained of is not libelous
because it is a privileged matter, he who repeats the publication is likewise free from
accountability for the re-utterance. We recognize that a person's liability for libel does not
necessarily proceed from the fact that he was the original publisher of the discreditable act.
The maker of a libelous republication or repetition, although not liable for the results of the
primary publication, is liable for the consequences of a subsequent publication which he
makes or participates in making so long as the elements of libel are satisfied. But in every
case malice must be present, something which has not been shown in the case at bar.
544. Pader v. People – 325 SCRA 117
FACTS: Atty. Escolango was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house
at Morong, Bataan when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted "putang ina mo Atty.
Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!" The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that
time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections
Escolango filed with the MTC a complaint against petitioner for grave oral
defamation. After due trial, petitioner was convicted of grave oral defamation. RTC and CA
affirm the decision.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation
RULING: The petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation, the trial court failed to
appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the time
he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what
Atty. Escolango did when petitioner’s father died. In which case, the oral defamation was
not of serious or insulting nature.
MAIN POINT: In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability
that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time.
545. Fermin v. People, GR 157643, March 28, 2008
FACTS: The accused Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid print and circulate in the headline
and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID
"mas malaking halaga ang nadispalko nila sa states, may mga naiwan ding asunto doon si
annabelle"
"imposibleng nasa amerika ngayon si Annabelle rama dahil sa kalat din ang asunto nila
du’n, bukod pa sa napakaraming pinoy na humahanting sa kanila mas malaking problema ang kailangan
niyang harapin sa states dahil sa perang nadispalko nila, naghahanap lang ng sakit ng katawan si
annabelle kung sa states nga niya maiisipang pumunta ngayon para lang takasan niya si ligaya santos at
ang sintensiya sa kanya"
When in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false and
untrue but were publicly made for no other purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA
GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from justice and a swindler,
thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and
prejudice of the said victim.
ISSUE: Whether the questioned article is protected by the mantle of the freedom of the
press and is within the realm of fair and honest comment.
RULING: If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures,
the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered
public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including
gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled
license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious
comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
MAIN POINT: Petitioner can’t take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against
public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on
matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech.
546. Navarro v. Villegas – 31 SCRA 73
FACTS: "In Case G.R. No. L-31687 (Navarro v. Villegas), the Court, after considering the
pleadings and arguments of the parties, issued the following Resolution:
Without prejudice to a more extended opinion and taking into account the following
considerations:
That respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner;
That as stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75, respondent Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in
order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing
to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order;
That respondent Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for
peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they
would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community
and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the
demonstration sought to be held this afternoon;
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do
not warrant the Court’s disbelieving respondent Mayor’s appraisal that a public rally at Plaza
Miranda, as compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and
more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even
bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no
means of preventing such disorders;
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the
community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and
employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation
disrupted, to the general detriment of the public;
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered
society;
That petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of
respondent Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally;
The Court resolved to DENY the writ prayed for and to dismiss the petition.
(full txt)
547. PBM Employees v. PBM – 51 SCRA 189 -BAIRD
FACTS; The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc. Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the
first shift as well as those in the regular 2nd and 3rd shifts and that they informed the
respondent Company of their demonstration. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty.
C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence particularly , the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed. The demonstration pushed through whereby 8 leaders of the
petitioner Union were dismissed. The respondent Court of Industrial Relations,concluded
that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining
agreement hereby upholding the dismissal of these leaders. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE; Whether the dismissal was proper
RULING; No, the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to
his full and complete fulfillment. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; While the Bill of Rights also
protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society. Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. Management has shown not only lack of
good-will, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient
for the firm to conserve its income than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. It was pure and
implement selfishness, if not greed.
548. JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing – 125 SCRA 553 – BAIRD
FACTS; Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983
from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of
the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of
public property, a short program would be held. There was likewise an assurance in the
petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the
necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." It was denied by
the mayor saying that there are police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the
advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." To be more
specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations
where a large number of people is expected to attend and Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of 500
feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.
ISSUE; Whether such permit must be issued
RULING; Yes, to justify such a limitation there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives
may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough. Second, there was no showing,
that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it
could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. The validity of his denial of the permit
sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional
application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly presents
itself.
PCIB v. Philnabank Employees, 105 SCRA 314 – BAIRD
FACTS; "On April 3, 1967, defendant Philnabank Employees' Association, a labor
organization composed of the rank and file employees of the Philippine National Bank,
declared a strike. During the said strike, which lasted up to the following day, members of
the paraded and displayed placards in front of the PNB building. One of which contained
the following words: "PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNB-NIDC?" It is
an admitted fact that PCIB stands for plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
while PNB refers to Philippine National Bank, and NIDC stands for National Investment
Development Corporation, a subsidiary of the PNB. Plaintiff considered the above
"defamatory and libelous per se for at the very least [it] amounts to an "act tending to cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a juridical person." 2 The allegation of its being libelous
was denied by defendants on the ground that such placards "containing the alleged writing
were displayed during the strike on April 3 and April 4,1967 as a fair, legal labor strategy
denouncing the lack of business foresight, incompetence, mismanagement, arbitrary and
despotic acts of the Management. They then were sued for libel.
ISSUE; Whether the case for libel will prosper
RULING; No, peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the
Constitution. labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response, then the decision
reached by the lower court becomes even more acceptable. It is a fact of industrial life, both
in the Philippines as in the United States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor
and management, it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous
and polite. The guarantee of free speech protects the strikers.
CASE 556 - OCENA
ARTICLE II, SECTION 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
In Re Valmonte (296 SCRA)
FACTS: Petitioner applied for a permit to hold a rally in from of the Justice Hall to protest
the delay in the disposition of the cases of his clients. The mayor refused to issue the permit
on the ground that it was prohibited by the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated July 7,
1998, which prohibited rallies within two hundred meters of any court building. Petitioners
argued that the Resolution amended the Public Assembly Act in violation of the separation
of powers.
RULING: The existence of the Public Assembly Act does not preclude the Supreme Court
from promulgating rules regulating the conduct of demonstration in the vicinity of courts to
assure the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice as mandate by the
Constitution. (In re Valmonte, 296 SCRA xi)
(Wala talaga ako mahanap  eto lang nahanap ko. Sorry huhu)
CASE 557 - OCENA
ARTICLE II, SECTION 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
In Re Petition to Annul En banc resolution (AM. 98-7-02-SC)
Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control their proceedings in
order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice and the constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and complementing further the Per Curiam
Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez,
et al., dated September 30, 1987, the Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy
and procedural guidelines, regarding the conduct of demonstrations, pickets, rallies and
other similar gatherings in the vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme
Court and all other courts:
1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their freedom of
expression and assembly. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values. These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to use
the streets for communication of views on national questions must be balanced
with the need of our courts for an atmosphere that will enable them to dispense
justice free from bias and unnecessary pressure. The courts would not exist and
survive to protect the people's most revered rights if they were unable to
preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the institution
from all forms of distracting, degrading and prejudicial influences that threaten
the fair and orderly administration of justice.
2. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are
enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent
to, in front of, or within a radius of 200 meters from, the outer boundary
of the Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other
building that houses at least 1 court sala. Such activities unquestionably
interrupt and hamper the working condition in the salas, offices and
chambers of the courts.
3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must keep all public
thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the smooth flow of vehicular and
pedestrian traffic. At no time should ingress to and egress from the premises of
the courts and the offices of the courts and the offices of the justices, judges,
and court officials and employees be obstructed.
4. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are prohibited from
camping out on the streets, sidewalks or pavement adjacent to, in front of, or
within a radius of 200 meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court
Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least 1 court
sala. No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets' quarters, and other similar
makeshift structures shall be established in said areas.
5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to properly apprise
their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice
when engaged in demonstrations, pickets, rallies and similar activities. As
officers of the court, they must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to
insulate the courts from all forms of influence that may adversely affect judicial
impartiality and violate a party's right to due process.
6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court. Members
of the Bar violating this resolution may, in addition, be subject to the
administrative sanctions of fine, imprisonment, suspension from the practice of
law or disbarment as circumstances may warrant. The Clerk of Court is
directed to forthwith cause publication of these Guidelines in 2 newspapers of
general circulation. The Guidelines shall take effect upon the expiration of 15
days after such publication. The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all
lower courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the PNP, and all agencies of
local governments in charge of issuing permits to hold demonstrations, rallies,
pickets and similar activities, around the vicinity of courts of justice with copies
of this Resolution.
MAIN POINT: The validity of the resolution was upheld on the basis of the power of the
Court to promulgate rules for the protection of rights.
CASE 558
ARTICLE II, SECTION 5: NON ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Aglipay v. Ruiz (64 Phil 201)
FACTS: Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by
the Philippine Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular
sect or church.
ISSUE: Whether the issuing and selling of such commemorative stamps violate the non-
establishment clause.
RULING: NO. The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favour a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were
not issued and sold for the benefit of Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to that Church. The only purpose is issuing and selling the
stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists in this country. To
reiterate, our court has allowed the issuance of religious commemorative stamps as giving
merely incidental benefits to religion. Petition is denied.
MAIN POINT: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere
religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instilLs
into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated.
568 REYES
Section 5. Article III: Non-Establishment Clause
Manosca vs. CA 252 SCRA 412
FACTS: Petitioners Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the National Historical Institute to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, it passed a resolution declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a
complaint for expropriation.
Petitioners question the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of Felix Manalo’s
birthplace has become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit.
ISSUE: Whether this violates the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.
RULING: No. The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo for the purpose of
preserving it as a historical landmark was upheld as for public use under the broadened
definition of public use. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than
to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Moreover, the non-
establishment objection was answered by the argument that whatever benefits the adherents
of Iglesia would reap would only be incidental to the public historical purpose.
569 REYES
Section 5. Article III: Non-Establishment Clause
Islamic Da’wah vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 153888
FACTS: Petitioner Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines is a non-governmental
organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
communities. They are accredited to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food
and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. Petitioner alleges that,
on account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal food
producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the
Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and issuance of halal
certifications.
On the other hand, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs
(OMA) to oversee its implementation granting it exclusive authority to issue halal certificates
and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of EO
46.
ISSUE: Whether EO 46 violates the non-establishment clause of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes. OMA was created to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the
mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and
institutions. It deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a “national cultural community” and not as a religious group. Thus, the State
must make sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the
non-establishment clause and free exercise of religion under Section 5, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive
power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of
the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
MAIN POINT: The certification of food as halal, that is, suitable for consumption by
Muslims according to their religious belief, is a religious exercise. Hence, it may not be
performed by a government agency like the Office on Muslim Affairs.
570 REYES
Section 5. Article III: Non-Establishment Clause
Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz 453 SCRA 123
FACTS: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC).
Respondents de la Cruz and Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the
same church. Petitioners clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but
Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr.
Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity
between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp.
Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to
another parish. The hostility worsened when Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be
celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When
Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from
pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese
of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt, but Taruc proceeded to hold
the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.
Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled or excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Taruc questions before this Court the legality of the order of
expulsion or excommunication.
ISSUE: Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion or
excommunication of members of a religious institution.
RULING: No. The expulsion or excommunication of members of a religious institution or
organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons,
of said institution or organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for
the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
In a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority
is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of
an ecclesiastical nature.
610 REYES
Section 7, Article III: In General; Access to Court Records, etc.
Bantay Republic Act vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 177271
FACTS: Petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms
(UP-LR) assail the various COMELEC resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng
Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. Petitioners seek to
compel the COMELEC to publicize or disclose the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. The COMELEC refused to do so.
ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the COMELEC to reveal the names of the nominees for
party-list seats violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
RULING: Yes. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups
subject of their respective petitions. It has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the
names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. It has been
repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment hence the need for voters to be
informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in
a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of the COMELEC.
MAIN POINT: The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest
are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as
fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and
protect that right.
611 REYES
Section 7, Article III: In General; Access to Court Records, etc.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. 170 SCRA 256
FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte a letter requesting access to the
list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure
a clean loan of P2M each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. He also requested acess to the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. They premised these requests
on the constitutional provision on the right to information.
The Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied stating that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are entitled to the documents sought by virtue of their
constitutional right to information.
RULING: Yes. The people’s right to information accorded by our Constitution is not
absolute. It is limited to “matters of public concern”, and is further “subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.”
In the case at bar, the information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports
that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to
secure “clean” loans from the GSIS is a matter of public interest and concern. The GSIS is a
trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a
public character. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest
and concern.
612 REYES
Section 7, Article III: In General; Access to Court Records, etc.
Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato 203 SCRA 515
FACTS: Petitioner Aquino-Sarmiento, a member of respondent Movie and Television
Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be
allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the
individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on
the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on
the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior
clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the
records sought to be examined. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent
Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film,
their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience
votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of
respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member
concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's)
consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to information was violated.
RULING: Yes. We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of
respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the
individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of
access to public records. There is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is
an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity
and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of
public duties. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to
be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions.
To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of
protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the
members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are
neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore,
public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the
discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official
records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access
to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the
board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.