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Predicate constants
– We will assume that predicate constants, abbreviated with capital
letters, P, Q, R, and so on, identify sets of individuals for which the
predicate holds. Thus a one-place predicate like be standing will pick out
the set of individuals who are standing in the situation described. This
can be described in a set theory notation as either {x | … } or {x: … },
both of which can be read as “the set of all x such that …” So a notation
like {x: x is standing in v} can be read as “the set of individuals who are
standing in situation v.”
– Two-place predicates identify a set of ordered pairs: two individuals in a
given order. Thus the predicate punch will pick out an ordered pair
where the first punches the second in v represented in set theory terms
as: {<x, y>: x punches y in v}. Similarly a three-place predicate like hand
to will be represented as
{<x, y, z>: x hands y to z in v}.
– One major problem is that there are some common types of quantifiers
which cannot be modeled in this standard form of the predicate
calculus; for example the English quantifier most.
It is impossible to establish most on a par with the universal quantifier
∀ and existential quantifier ∃, using the logical connectives ∧ and →.
a. Most students read a book.
b. Most x(S(x) ∧ R(x, b)) “Most things are students and read books,”
(impossible)
– c. Most x(S(x) → R(x, b)) “Most things are such that if they are
– students they read a book.” (impossible)
10.8 Intensionality
10.8.1 Introduction
– Natural languages largely communicate interpretations between
speakers and hearers. For example languages contain a whole range of
verbs which describe different mental states. Instead of a flat statement
S, we can say in English for example:
a. Frank knows that S. b. Frank believes that S.
c. Frank doubts that S. d. Frank regrets that S.
e. Frank suspects that S. f. Frank hopes that S. etc
In these sentences we have a set of propositional attitudes, the choice of
which reflects a difference between certainty and degrees of lack of
certainty.
– In another terminology, sentences which reveal this interpretative or
cognitive behavior are said to be intensional and the property is called
intensionality. These terms are applied whenever linguistic behavior
reveals a relation between an agent and a thought.
– The classical cases are the verbs of propositional attitudes, which in one
terminology are said to form opaque contexts. The term opaque
figuratively describes the fact that the truth or falsity of the subordinate
clause seems to be independent of the truth or falsity of the whole
sentences. We need access to the content of the subject's belief, an extra
level of sense, or in a more recent terminology, intension.
– The challenge for formal semantics is to develop the semantic model to
reflect the interpretation and calculation that is so central to
language.
– Formal devices in certain areas, modality, tense, aspect and verbs of
propositional attitude, where intensionality seems most clearly exhibited
in natural languages
– Epistemic modality, concerns the resources available to the speaker to
express judgment of fact versus possibility. For example,
Allan's scale of modality
a. I know that p. b. I am absolutely certain that p.
c. I am almost certain that p. d. I believe that p.
e. I am pretty certain that p. f. I think that p.
g. I think/believe that p is probable.
h. I think/believe that perhaps p. i. Possibly p.
j. I suppose it is possible that p. k. It is not impossible that p.
l. It is not necessarily impossible that p. m. It is unlikely that p.
n. It is very unlikely that p. o. It is almost impossible that p.
p. It is impossible that p. q. It is not the case that p.
– r. It is absolutely certain that not-p.
– Deontic modality, the second type of modality, allows the expression of
obligation and permission, often in terms of morality and law.
– Deontic modality, has been treated in a similar way: as a projection
from the world as it is to the world as it should be under some moral or
legal code, that is, as the speaker entertaining an idealized world.
Deontic modal operators have been suggested for logic, including
Oφ “obligatorily that φ” “true in all morally or legally ideal worlds”
and Pφ “permitted that φ.” “true in some morally or legally ideal
worlds.”
– All languages allow speakers a range of positions in both of these
aspects. Some of these choices of degree of commitment to the truth of
p derive from the meaning of verbs like believe, know, and so on; others
from negation or from adjectives and adverbs like possible and possibly.
The use of different intonation patterns can add further distinctions.
– Modal logics were developed in response to these facts.
– The simplest approach employs a two-fold division of epistemic
modality into fact versus possibility, or “situation as is” versus “situation
as may be.” One way of discussing this distinction between the actual
and the nonactual is to talk of possible worlds. This notion has been
important in formal semantics to see truth as being relativized to
possible situations, or possible worlds.
– To reflect this, logicians introduce two logical operators
◊ “it is possible that” and □ “it is necessary that.” These can be put in
front of any formula of the predicate logic, that is:
◊φ = it is possible that φ □φ = it is necessary that φ
– The semantic definition:
– □ means “true in all possible worlds” (i.e. No alternatives are
envisaged by the speaker) and
◊ means “true in some possible worlds” (i.e. the speaker does
envisage alternative scenarios).
– Relativizing truth to possible worlds. The formal implications of
this is that truth must be relativized not to one situation but to one
among a series of possible situations (worlds), including the actual
situation (world). This means that our model must be expanded to
include this multiplicity of situations, that is now M = {W, U, F} where,
as before, U = the domain of individuals in a situation, F is the
denotation assignment function, and the new element W is a set of
possible worlds.