24 Phil.

309

[ G.R. No. 7859, February 12, 1913 ]

VICTORIA SEOANE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE

OF EDUARDO FARGAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CATALINA
FRANCO, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANUEL
FRANCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the right of action upon
the mortgage debt which was the basis of the claim presented against the
plaintiffs estate had prescribed.

The mortgage in question was executed on the 13th of October, 1884, to

secure the payment of the sum of P4,876.01, the mortgagor agreeing to pay
the sum "little by little," The claim appears to have been presented to the
plaintiff's intestate on the 8th of August, 1911. Nothing has been paid either
of principal or of interest.

We are of the opinion that this case falls within the provisions of article
1128 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

"1128. When the obligation does not fix a term, but it can be inferred from
its nature and circumstance that there was an intention of granting it to the
debtor, the courts shall fix the duration of such a term.

"The courts shall also fix the duration of a term when it may have been left
at the will of the debtor."
The obligation in question seems to leave the duration of the period for the
payment thereof to the will of the debtor. It appears also that it was the
intention of the instrument to give the debtor time within which to pay the
obligation. In such cases this court has held, on several occasions, that the
obligation is not due and payable until an action has been commenced by
the mortgagee against the mortgagor for the purpose of having the court fix
the date on and after which the instrument shall be payable and the date of
maturity is fixed in pursuance thereof. The case of Eleizegui vs. The
Manila Lawn Tennis Club (2 Phil Rep., 309), in which the opinion was
written by the Chief Justice of the court, is the leading case upon the
subject. In that case the question was over the duration of a lease
concerning "a piece of land for a fixed consideration and to endure at the
will of the lessee." In discussing the question the court said (p. 310):

"With respect to the term of the lease the present question has arisen. In its
discussion three theories have been presented: One which makes the
duration depend upon the will of the lessor, who, upon one month's notice
given to the 'lessee, may terminate the lease so stipulated; another which,
on the contrary, makes it dependent upon the will of the lessee, as
stipulated; and the third, in accordance with which the right is reserved to
the court to fix the duration of the term."
The clause on which the case turns is as follows (p. 312):

"Mr. Williamson, or whoever may succeed him as secretary of the club, may
terminate this lease whenever desired without other formality than that of
giving a month's notice. The owners of the land undertake to maintain the
club as tenant as long as the latter shall see fit."
Considering the case the court said (p. 314):

"The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of
obligations. In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has
supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the 'duration of the
term when it has been left to the will of the debtor and provides that in this
case the term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every
contract, as laid down by the authorities, there is always a creditor who is
entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the
obligation to perform the undertaking. In bilateral contracts the
contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this
contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights
enumerated in article 1554, and is the debtor with respect to the obligations
imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which performance of
the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor.
This term it is which must be fixed by the courts,

"The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is
that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this
period, and not the unlawful detainer action which has been brought-an
action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty
of the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain the latter action it is
sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract, whether
conventional or legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted in the
former action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and
conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking
element of a time at which the lease is to expire."
The case of Barretto vs. The City of Manila (7 Phil. Rep., 416) dealt with a
case where the terms of a donation did not fix the time of the performance
of the condition placed upon the donation, and the court held that the
period must be determined by the court in a proper action in accordance
with article 1128 of the Civil Code, saying (p. 420):

"The contract having fixed no period in which the condition should be

fulfilled, the provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code are applicable and it
is the duty of the court to fix a suitable time for its fulfillment. Eleizegui vs.
The Manila Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil. Rep., 309' (11 Phil. Rep., 624.[1])
In the case of Levy Hermanos vs. Paterno (18 Phil. Rep., 353) the court said
(p. 355):

"The defendant having bound himself to pay his debt to the plaintiffs
in partial payments, as set forth in the note in question, it is seen that the
obligation is one of payment by installments, since its fulfillment cannot be
required immediately nor does its existence depend upon the happening of
any particular event. But, though the obligation is one of payment by
installments, nevertheless no fixed day was specified for its fulfillment, so
that the period for payment is undetermined or was not fixed by the parties
when they executed the contract. Besides, it is evident that the term for
payment was granted for the exclusive benefit of the defendant and for his
own convenience, as by the language of the document, the plaintiffs gained
nothing by the fact that the debt was not immediately demandable. Nor was
any interest stipulated on the debt during the time that it should remain
unpaid by the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, and in whatever
manner this case be considered, it is unquestionable that it falls within the
provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code. * * *

"The obligation being manifestly defective with regard to the duration of

the period granted to the debtor, that is, to the defendant, that defect must
be cured by the courts through judicial decision which shall determine the
said duration, under the power expressly granted them for such purpose by
the legal provisions just above transcribed.

"The trial court, therefore, acted in accordance with the law in exercising
the said power in the present case, by fixing the duration of the period on
the basis that the payment of the debt should be made at the rate of P200 a
month; and we see no abuse of judicial discretion in fixing such a rate,
considering the importance of the obligation and the absence of any
stipulation of interest in favor of the creditors."
From these decisions it is clear that the instrument sued upon in the case at
bar is one which leaves the period of payment at the will of the mortgagor.
Such being the case, an action should have been brought for the purpose of
having the court set a date on which the instrument should become due and
payable. Until such action was prosecuted no suit could be brought for the
recovery of the amount named in the instrument. It is, therefore, clear that
this action is premature. The instrument has been sued upon before it is
due. The action must accordingly be dismissed.

Ordinarily, when an action of this sort is dismissed the plaintiff may at once
begin his action for the purpose of fixing a date upon which the instrument
shall become due. From the undisputed facts in this case and from the facts
and conditions that very probably cannot be charged hereafter, it is our
present opinion that such action is itself prescribed. Section 38 of the Code
of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

"SEC. 38. To what this chapter does not apply. This chapter shall not apply
to actions already commenced, or to cases wherein the right of action has
already accrued; but the statutes in force when the action or right of action
accrued shall be applicable to such cases according to the subject of the
action and without regard to the form; nor shall this chapter apply in the
case of a continuing and subsisting trust, nor to an action by the vendee of
real property in possession thereof to obtain the conveyance of it: Provided,
nevertheless, That all rights of action which have already accrued, except
those named in the last preceding paragraph, must be vindicated by the
commencement of an action or proceeding to enforce the same within ten
years after this Act comes into effect."
This section evidently covers all rights of action of whatever kind or nature,
except those which have special limitations and are referred to in
subsequent sections. A right of action to fix a day for the determination of
the time of payment is included within the terms of this section. The
mortgage in question having left the period of payment to the will of the
mortgagor, an action could have been maintained by the mortgagee at any
time after its execution for the naming of a date on which the instrument
must be paid in full. That right of action accrued as soon as the instrument
was executed. Such action, therefore, falls within the provisions of section
38, and not having been, commenced within the ten years next following
the 1st day of October, 1901, such action cannot, under the facts as they now
appear, be maintained.

While the expression of an opinion as to the prescription of the action to fix

a date for the maturity of the obligation in question is unnecessary for a
complete resolution of the case before us, still we do not hesitate to express
that opinion for the reasons which we have heretofore given in one or two
other cases, particularly that of Lichauco vs. Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12).
That case went off upon the finding of the court that the action could not be
maintained by the plaintiff, Lichauco, on behalf of his brothers and sisters
and upon that finding the complaint was dismissed. While the merits in
that case were not necessarily before us, we nevertheless took up the facts
as they appeared and expressed our opinion of what the result of the case
would be upon the merits if it subsequently came before us upon the same
facts. In that case we said (p. 17):

"We believe, however, that, for the information of the parties interested in
the subject matter of this action and to the end that unnecessary litigation
may be avoided, the opinion of the court should be given upon the facts
presented in this case. Knowing what our opinion is upon these facts it is
probable that the heirs will not care to pursue the litigation further unless,
which is somewhat unlikely, they are able to present new facts. We,
therefore, proceed to a consideration of the case upon the merits as
presented by the record."
The judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 43429. October 24, 1938.]

BENITO GONZALES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLORENTINO DE JOSE, Defendant-

Appellant.

Felino Villasin, for Appellant.

Eusebio Orense, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PROMISSORY NOTES WITHOUT PERIOD; ACTION TO FIX PERIOD; PRESCRIPTION. —

The two promissory notes are governed by article 1128 of the Civil Code because under
the terms thereof the plaintiff intended to grant the defendant a period within which to
pay his debts. As the promissory notes do not fix this period, it is for the court to fix the
same. (Eleizegui v. Manila Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil., 309; Barretto v. City of Manila, 7
Phil., 416; Floriano v. Delgado, 11 Phil., 154; Levy Hermanos v. Paterno, 18 Phil., 353.)
The action to ask the court to fix the period has already prescribed in accordance with
section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. this period of prescription is ten years,
which has already elapsed from the execution of the promissory notes until the filing of
the action on June 1, 1934. The action which should be brought in accordance with
article 1128 is different from the action for the recovery of the amount of the notes,
although the effects of both are the same, being, like other civil actions, subject to the
rules of prescription.

DECISION

IMPERIAL, J.:

This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the amount of
two promissory notes worded as follows: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"I promise to pay Mr. Benito Gonzalez the sum of four hundred three pesos and fifty-
five centavos (P403.55) as soon as possible.

Anterior P71.10

474.65

Sept. 12, 1922 300.00

———

Balance 174.65
"Manila, June 22, 1922.

(Sgd.) "FLORENTINO DE JOSE

"Quezon Nueva Ecija"

"I promise to pay Mr. Benito Gonzales the sum of the three hundred and seventy-three
pesos and thirty centavos (P373.30) as soon as possible.

"In Manila, this 13th day of September, 1922.

(Sgd.) "FLORENTINO DE JOSE"

Defendant appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering
him to pay the plaintiff the sum of P547.95 within thirty days from the date of
notification of said decision, plus the costs.

In his answer the defendant interposed the special defenses that the complaint is
uncertain inasmuch as it does not specify when the indebtedness was incurred or when
it was demandable, and that, granting that the plaintiff has any cause of action, the
same has prescribed in accordance with law. Resolving the defense of prescription, the
trial court held that the action for recovery of the amount of the two promissory notes
has not prescribed in accordance with article 1128 of the Civil Code, which provides: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"ART. 1128. If the obligation does not specify a term, but it is to be inferred from its
nature and circumstances that it was intended to grant the debtor time for its
performance, the period of the term shall be fixed by the court.

"The court shall also fix the duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the
debtor."cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

It is practically admitted by the parties that the obligations arising from the two
promissory notes should be governed by said article, inasmuch as it was the intention
of the plaintiff, evidenced by the terms of the said notes, to grant the debtor a period
within which to pay the debts. The four errors assigned by the defendant turn on the
applicability of article 1128 and on the prescription of the action brought by the
plaintiff. The defendant contends that article 1113 of the Civil Code should be applied
inasmuch as the obligations derived from the promissory notes were demandable from
the time of their execution, and adds that even supposing that article 1128 is
applicable, the action to ask the court to fix the period had already prescribed in
accordance with section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

We hold that the promissory notes are governed by article 1128 because under the
terms thereof the plaintiff intended to grant the defendant a period within which to pay
his debts. As the promissory notes do not fix this period, it is for the court to fix the
same. (Eleizegui v. manila Lawn Tennis Club, 2 Phil., 309; Barretto v. city of Manila, 7
Phil., 416; Floriano v. Delgado, 11 Phil., 154; Levy Hermanos v. Paterno, 18 Phil., 353.)
The action to ask the court to fix the period has already prescribed in accordance with
section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. This period of prescription is ten years,
which has already elapsed from the execution of the promissory notes until the filing of
the action on June 1, 1934. The action which should be brought in accordance with
article 1128 is different from the action for the recovery of the amount of the notes,
although the effects of both are the same, being, like the civil actions, subject to the
rules of prescription.

The action brought by the plaintiff having already prescribed, the appealed decision
should be reversed and the defendant absolved from the complaint, without special
pronouncement as to the costs in both instances. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
84 Phil. 206

[ G.R. No. L-1525, July 27, 1949 ]

MODESTO SORIANO, PETITIONER, VS. CAROLINA ABALOS,

MERCEDES ABALOS, ENCARNACION ABALOS, PABLO MANUEL, ON
HIS BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN AD-LITEM OF ROMULO AND
FLORENCIO, BOTH SURNAMED MANUEL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

MORAN, C.J.:
This is an appeal by eertiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The
facts are as follows:
On March 17, 1938, respondents Juliana Abalos and Carolina Abalos sold
the parcel of land described in the complaint to Felipe Maneclang and
Modesto Soriano at the price of P750, with option to repurchase the same
"at anytime they have the money." Offer to repurchase was made in
December, 1941, which could not be carried out because of the war. Felipe
Maneclang, in the meantime, ceded all his rights to petitioner Modesto
Soriano, and in May 1944, offer to repurchase was again made, but
Modesto Soriano rejected the offer. Wherefore, vendors consigned the price
of P750 with the court and filed a complaint for repurchase.
Juliana Abalos died and was substituted in this case by her heirs Romulo
and Florencio, surnamed Manuel. It turned out that the property did not
belong to the vendors Carolina and Juliana Abalos alone, but also to their
sisters, the Intervenors and respondents Mercedes and Encarnacion
Abalos. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment
ordering Modesto Soriano to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor, not
only of Carolina Abalos and the heirs of Juliana Abalos, but also of the
Intervenors Mercedes and Encarnacion Abalos; authorizing Modesto
Soriano to collect and receive as price for the reconveyance the sum of P750
consigned with the court; and sentencing Modesto Soriano to pay the
respondents the sum of P3,200 as the value of the fruits of the land in 1944
obtained by Modesto Soriano. This Judgment was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Modesto Soriano now maintains in this Court that respondents
no longer had any right to repurchase the property because, there being no
express agreement as to the time within which the repurchase could be
made, that time should be, under the first paragraph, article 1508 of the
Civil Code, four years, which in this case expired on March 17, 1942.
The stipulation, however, is that the vendors may repurchase the property
"at any time they have the money." There is, therefore, a time expressly
stipulated, which is "any time." It being, however, an unlimited or
indefinite time, under the second paragraph of article 1508 of the Civil
Code, it cannot exceed ten years. This is the ruling laid down in the cases of
Heirs of Jumero vs. Lizares, 17 Phil., 112; Bandong vs. Austria, 31 Phil., 479;
and Gonzaga vs. Go, No. 47061. (40 Off. Gaz. [7th Supp.], 71).
In the first case, heirs of Jumero vs. Lizares, 17 Phil., 112, Chief Justice
Arellano said: "* * * even admitting that it was stipulated that the right to
repurchase or redeem should last for an indefinite time, such period is
restricted to ten years, under paragraph 2 of article 1508 of the Civil Code, *
* *" (p. 120). In the case of Bandong vs. Austria, 31 Phil., 479, the vendors
were given the right to repurchase "in the month of March of any year after
the date of the contract." In other words, the vendors were given the right
to repurchase again at anytime or any year. And this Court held that the
repurchase could be made within a period of not more than ten years. And
in the case of Gonzaga vs. Go, G. R. No. 47061, the vendors were given the
right to repurchase "en cualquier tiempo devolviendo la cantidad de P250 y
los gastos que ocasione el contrato." And this Court held that "en cualquier
tiempo" meant not more than ten years.
We conclude, therefore, that in the instant case, the vendors had ten years
within which to repurchase the property and that period did not expire
until March 17, 1948. The offer to repurchase was made in May 1944.
It is also maintained by petitioner that the damages awarded to
respondents were based erroneously on a value equal with that of Japanese
war notes as were due in December, 1944. We believe that this contention is
well taken. Petitioner is not liable to pay now in Philippine currency the
same number of pesos in Japanese war notes to which he was sentenced on
December 1944. He is liable only to pay the equivalent which may be
determined by means of the Ballentine scale of values, as held in Hilado vs.
De la Costa, G. R. No. L-150. According to that scale the value of Japanese
Military Notes in relation to the peso in Philippine currency on December 1,
1944, was 90 to 1. Consequently, instead of the sum of P3,200, petitioner
should be sentenced to pay yearly P35.55 as damages beginning May 1944
until the property is finally delivered to respondents.
For all the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
the only modification that the petitioner is sentenced to pay respondents,
counting from May 1944 until the property Is delivered to respondents, as
damages, the amount of P35.55 yearly, plus costs, If the price consigned in
court was destroyed, petitioner must bear the loss.
Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C. J.:
Mr. Justice Pablo voted for this decision.

CONCURRING
PERFECTO, J.:
We concur in this decision, with the statement that the so-called Ballantine
system has the force and effect of law. The veto of the President of the
United States to the corresponding act of our Congress has absolutely no
effect, because the subject matter of the law in question is not among those
which, under the Independence Act, are subject to the approval of the
President of the United States of America.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-5515. February 1, 1911.]

LEVY HERMANOS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PEDRO A. PATERNO, Defendant-

Appellant.

Aguedo Velarde, for Appellant.

Enrique N. Barretto, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. DEBTS AND DEBTORS; OBLIGATION WITHOUT TERM, OR AT WILL OF DEBTOR. — In

cases where it is intended to grant a period for the fulfillment of an obligation, the
duration of which is not stipulated, or where the term has been left to the will of the
debtor, the courts are authorized to fix the term. (Art. 1128, Civil Code.)

2. ID.; DEBT PAYABLE IN INSTALLMENTS; RATE OF PAYMENT. — When a debt of over

P5,000 is payable in installments, the amount of the partial minor payments not being
fixed, the fact that the debtor made certain minor payments from time to time, of
differing amounts, some of which were accepted by the creditor, is not sufficient to
show an acceptance of such rate of payment, and the court may, considering all the
circumstances, fix a reasonable rate.

DECISION

MAPA, J.:

The defendant, on March 28, 1906, executed in favor of the plaintiffs the following
document: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

"Vale for the sum of P6,177.35 in favor of Messrs. Levy Brothers, as the balance of my
account with them to date, payable in partial payments." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The defendant made several partial payments and later claimed the right to establish,
as a fixed rate for future payments, the installment of P30 a month. The plaintiffs,
disagreeing with such a claim, brought suit against the defendant and asked that the
latter be sentenced to pay them the sum of P5,862.35, the unpaid balance, or that a
period be specified within which he should pay the same, in case the court should deem
such manner of payment more equitable. Moreover, the plaintiffs demand in their
complaint the sum of P355, which they claim the defendant owes them upon a debt
than that specified in the document in question.
The defendant alleged in his answer, and as a principal defense, that the debt
contracted by him had not yet matured; that this was shown by the terms of the
instrument itself, inasmuch as it appears therein stipulated that the payment of the
debt shall be made in installments; and that, in conformity with this stipulation, on
various dates, prior to the filing of the complaint, he had made several partial payments
aggregating the sum of P315, and subsequently deposited and still continued to deposit
with the clerk of the court, at the plaintiffs’ disposal, the sum of P30 a month, which
deposits he had so made since the month of March, 1908, in view of the fact that the
plaintiffs had refused to receive such money as partial payments.

During the trial it was agreed by the parties that the sum which the defendant owed the
plaintiffs on March 28, 1906, the date of the aforementioned document, was P5,317.35.

In view of the evidence adduced at the trial, the court found that a monthly payment of
P200 would be a reasonable compliance with the agreement to pay the debt in
installments, and, in consequence of such finding, sentenced the defendant to pay to
the plaintiffs the sum of P5,317.35 and ordered him to make payment thereof at the
rate of P200 a month, on or before the 15th of each month, commencing with the 15th
of April, 1909. Against this judgment the defendant appealed.

The defendant having bound himself to pay his debt to the plaintiffs in partial
payments, as set forth in the note in question, it is seen that the obligation is one of
payment by installments, since its fulfillment can not be required immediately nor does
its existence depend upon the happening of any particular event. But, though the
obligation is one of payment by installments, nevertheless no fixed day was specified
for its fulfillment, so that the period for payment is undetermined or was not fixed by
the parties when they executed the contract. Besides, it is evident that the term for
payment was granted for the exclusive benefit of the defendant and for his own
convenience, as by the language of the document, the plaintiffs gained nothing by the
fact that the debt was not immediately demandable. Nor was any interest stipulated on
the debt during the time that it should remain unpaid by the defendant. For the
foregoing reasons, and in whatever manner this case be considered, it is
unquestionable that it falls within the provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code which
is as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"Should the obligation not fix a period, but it can be inferred from its nature and
circumstances that there was an intention to grant it to the debtor, the courts shall fix
the duration of the same.

"The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it may have been left to the
will of the debtor.

The obligation being manifestly defective with regard to the duration of the period
granted to the debtor, that is to the defendant, that defect must be cured by the courts
through judicial decision which shall determine the said duration, under the power
expressly granted them for such purpose by the legal provisions just above transcribed.

The trial court, therefore, acted in accordance with the law in exercising the said power
in the present case, by fixing the duration of the period on the basis that the payment
of the debt should be made at the rate of P200 a month; and we see no abuse of
judicial discretion in fixing such a rate, considering the importance of the obligation and
the absence of any stipulation of interest in favor of the creditors.

The appellant, grounding his argument on the fact of his having made three partial
payments, in three different months, at the rate of P30 each, maintains that he can not
be compelled to pay a greater amount monthly, for the reason, he says, that such
payments, made and accepted without controversy between the parties, were a
fulfillment and an explanation which, by their mutual accord, became agreed upon by
them, of the words "in partial payments," contained in the document in question. This
claim is in all respects untenable. The appellant made several other payments of
different sums (of P25, P50, and P100), and even hypothetically admitting his
arguments, there could be no reason for saying that the sum of P30 a month was
agreed upon, and not the amounts just above-mentioned, or any of them, as the
regular rate for the partial payments of the debt, since all the sums mentioned were
received, without any protest whatever, by the plaintiffs. The very diversity of the
amounts of the various payments made by the defendant clearly shows that there was
no agreement, either express or implied, that such payments were to be effected at the
rate of exactly P30 a month. The mere fact of the plaintiffs having accepted and
received the said payments, is not and can not in any manner be considered as an
expression or proof of such an agreement, especially because, as the plaintiffs manager
stated in his testimony, "on seeing that Mr. Paterno insisted on paying only P30 a
month we refused to accept it." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The amount due by the defendant on March 28, 1906, was that of P5,317.35, according
to agreement of the parties during the trial. The evidence clearly shows that the
defendant paid on account of the said debt the following sums: June 6, 1906, P100;
September 4, 1906, P50; January 8, 1907, P25; April 1, 1907, P50; August 3, 1907,
P30; September 3, 1907, P30; and October 3, 1907, P30; which amounts aggregate
the sum of P315. This sum should be deducted from the said debt and the balance,
P5,002.35, remaining against the defendant, is the amount which he should be
sentenced, as we hereby sentence him, to pay to the plaintiffs, and not that of
P5,317.35, set forth in the judgment appealed from.

With this sole modification, we affirm the said judgment, without express finding as to
the costs of this instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.