Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Makati

ERICK JOHN ALBERTO y ELENAS

and WINDY SARMIENTO ALBERTO
Accused-Appellant/s

- Versus - CRIM CASE NO. 16-747

FOR: Violation of Section

4(a)4 and 5 of RA No. 10175
(Cybercrime Prevention Act)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

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APPEAL BRIEF FOR

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

Accused-appellants, by the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable

Court respectfully file herein appeal brief, and aver THAT

PREFATORY STATEMENT

An obvious violation and disregard of the right to due process was

committed against the Accused-Appellants in this case.

The Honorable Court in its decision dated on December 18, 2017 found the
Accused-Appellants guilty based on mere allegations not supported by evidence
sufficient to draw a conclusion so as to comply with the ruling of the Court:

The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. When the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the
complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.
 By mere allegations not supported by sufficient evidence, the Accused-
appellants were adjudged guilty of violating Section 4(a)(4) [System Interference]
and Section 4(a)(5) [Misuse of Devices] of Republic Act No. 10175 otherwise
known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Although the prosecution was able to manifest how the system of Smart
Communication, the complainant in this case, was interfered, no evidence was
presented proving that the complained act was indeed done by the accused-
appellants as the complainant failed to provide for an Internet Protocol (IP) address
to identify and locate the particular computer network from which the complained
act was done and that it was indeed done by the accused-appellants.

THE PARTIES

The Accused-Appellants herein are Erick Alberto and his wife Windy
Alberto, where processes and notices from this court may be served at 262 W-10
Dakila Street Batasan Hills, Quezon City, or through the undersigned counsel at
the address indicated below his name; while THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES is
the appelle as represented by the Makati City Prosecutors Office.

TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL

Undersigned counsel for the Accused-appellants received on

_______________the NOTICE TO FILE BRIEF of this Honorable Court dated
_______________, requiring the Defendant/s-Appellant/s to file within thirty (30)
days from notice their/her Appellants’ Brief. Accused-Appellant/s have until
_________________, within which to file said Appellant’s Brief. Hence, this
timely compliance.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Windy Alberto Sarmiento, the wife of the other accused, Erick Alberto
was a post-paid subscriber of Smart Communications, Inc, the private
complainant in this case.

2. Private complainant alleged that Erick and Windy conspired in order to

commit the unlawful taking of Smart’s revenues by interfering with
Smart’s computer system using their registered Smart number in the said
system.

3. No Internet Protocol (IP) address to identify and locate the particular

computer network from which the said act complained of was done and
whether it was indeed done by the accused.

4. The printed pages of the alleged selling in social media posts are mere
computer-generated documents that can be easily fabricated and
 manipulated by the Complainant or by any individual with basic
knowledge of creating and editing documents on a computer system.

5. On 19th December, 2017, this court rendered a Decision against the

accused, the dispositive portion of which states:

“Wherefore, Erick John Alberto and Windy Sarmiento Alberto are

found guilty with moral certainty of violations of Sections 4(a)(4) and 4(a)(5) of
Republic Act No. 10175 otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of
2012.

So ordered”

6. On Decmber 20, 2017, Accused-Appellants timely filed a Notice of

Appeal

Hence this Appeal Brief.

II

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

The trial court committed the following errors:

A. The lower court erred in deciding this case against the accused-appellants
despite the fact that the Prosecution failed to

B. The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of the Plaintiff-
Appellee despite the fact that in the decision of the Court of Appeals , there
was no order for the defendant/s-appellant/s to surrender possession and
ownership of the property to the plaintiffs-appellees.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION

The legal basis from which the plaintiffs seek to revive the judgment of
this case, which is the Deed of Sale dated June 1. 1961 is null and void.

BASED ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE “FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS

TREE”, PLAINTIFFS CANNOT DERIVE A VALID AND REGISTRABLE
TITLE TO THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER FROM THE DEED OF SALE
DATED JUNE 1, 1961 BECAUSE THE SAID DOCUMENTIS NULL AND
VOID.

10. At the outset, it is respectfully pointed out that without any jota of doubt,
the lawful owners of the land subject matter of this case are the defendants-
appellants. This fact was established by the decisions of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) dated June 5, 1999 and the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 25, 2004.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision states:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff:

a. declaring the Deed of Sale dated June 1, 1961, null and void, and

b. Ordering the defendants, represented by Melena Gutierrez-Sumadsad,

to execute the necessary instrument to transfer the lot in question to the plaintiff”

On appeal, the CA promulgated a decision in which the dispositive portion

reads:

“WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed

decision is hereby RESERVED and SET ASIDE. OCT No. P-16227 issued in
favor of Regina is hereby ordered CANCELLED and the Register of Deeds is
ORDERED to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of defendants-
appellants Heirs of Regina Gutierrez.”

In the second paragraph of Page 8 of the CA decision, said court stated:

“We find that the lower court is only partially correct in its conclusions.
We fully agree with the lower court that the contract is void. As we shall
discuss below , there never was a sale because the intention was to constitute a
mortgage. The lower the court, however, is wrong on the issue of when the
action to declare the nullity of the deed can be brought as the laches can
intervene to bar an otherwise imprescriptible right to bring action.”

Based on the two decisions of the RTC and the CA, the most significant fact
established in the subject case is that the title of Plaintiffs (Heirs of Regina
Gutierrez) which they purportedly derived from the Deed of Sale dated June 1,
1961 was NULL AND VOID. And the CA fully agreed with the lower court that
the said deed of sail is void. The CA only opined that the Defendants (through their
mother Corazon Marquina) slept on their rights and thus laches has set in. Hence,
based on the doctrine of a poisonous tree”, the title purportedly derived by the
Plaintiffs in the land subject matter of this case, specifically the NULL AND
VOID Deed of Sale dated June 1, 1961 cannot be the basis for the issuance of a
valid registered title. In other words, what the CA stated was that the title of
Plaintiffs is definitely NULL and VOID: only, the Defendants took too long to
seek relied therefrom, paving the way for laches to set in.
Since, the title derived by the Plaintiffs is NULL and VOID, no right or
interest can be registered by virtue thereof. Moreover, if the Registry of Deeds will
issue another title based on a null and void transaction, the said office will be
exposed to administrative and even criminal sanctions. Furthermore, under existing
property registration laws and rules, there is no provision that the title to
property may be registered based on laches.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS CAN NOT ISSUE TITLE WHICH IS NULL AND
VOID

Section 10 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides:

“Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the
Register of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments
affecting registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or
city wherein such office is situated.

It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument

presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies
with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears
the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly
canceled. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration
thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree.” (Underscoring supplied).

Indubitably, in this case, the Register of Deeds cannot issue a new title
simply because the null and void title OCT P-16227 does not comply with all the
requisites for registration.

Moreover, it is the position of the defendants-appellants that a title which is

NULL AND VOID can never be executed simply because it was not the RD who
issued OCT No. P-16227. It was not an administrative body which issued OCT No.
P-16227. The RD is not authorized to issue a title which is null and void. For the
RD to do so will be ‘ultra vires’. Again, it is reiterated that under Section 10 of
Presidential Decree 1569, the office of the Register of Deeds constitutes a public
repository of records of instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands and
chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is situated, only when
the documents submitted are legal and in order. Here, there is no basis at all for
issuing a new title because the old title (OCT P-16227 is NULL and VOID. It is
humbly posited that the issuance of a new title in lieu of OCT P-16227 can only be
done by filing an application for issuance of a null and void title in a separate and
direct proceeding filed by the applicant heirs of Regina Gutierrez praying that a
competent court order the issuance of a new title thereof. Here, the plainstiffs-
appellees have no judgment to revive because the RD cannot issue a new title
because he is not authorized to issue a title. Unlike in an application for
reconstitution of lost title, the RD can issue a new one based on a lost title. Here,
the RD can not do the same. The RD duty is purely ministerial. As such, he has no
discretion to issue a title, much less, a null and void title.
Under Sections 2 and 3 of PD 1529, titles may be registered either judicially
or administratively. Sections 2 and 3 of said law provides:
 “Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings: jurisdiction of courts.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall
be in rem and shall be based on generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein
and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic
notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.