[REVIEW]

NEUROSCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS:

Approaches to Consciousness and Thinking
by LAWRENCE GREENMAN, MD

Dr. Greenman is from the VA New Jersey Health Care System, Medical Center, Mental Health and Behavioral Science, Lyons, New Jersey.

ABSTRACT
There exists an enormous
amount of biological and scientific
data in the field of neuroscience,
which are daunting and laborious to
those who are not directly engaged
in these specialized areas. The
intricacies and complexities of the
role of the central nervous system
(CNS) in psychiatric disorders and
human behavior are, of course,
acknowledged. In this article,
observations and speculations of
some prominent workers in the
field of neuroscience are described
with focus on their conclusions,
rather than specific findings as they
pertain to the mind-body
relationship. The mind-brain/body
issue has not been resolved insofar
as clarifying the connections
between CNS activity and thinking
is concerned. Currently, it is useful
to accept the concept of parallelism
between CNS activity and thought.
An argument will be made for the
inclusion of the psychoanalytic
method as an essential component
of the scientific effort to elucidate
consciousness and thinking.

NEUROSCIENCE: SELECTED
HYPOTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Neuroscience embraces different
and usually separate fields of
investigation. Most of the
investigators who labor in their
respective fields only seldom ADDRESS CORRESPONDENCE TO: Lawrence Greenman, MD, 27 Col. Conklin Rd., Stony Point, NY
critique work outside their area of 19080; E-mail: lgreenmanmd@msn.com
expertise. Even if the researchers
disagree to a considerable extent, KEY WORDS: neuroscience; mind-body relationship; parallelism; psychoanalytic method

[APRIL] Psychiatry 2007 51

they tend to be of similar
orientation and bias. Furthermore,
tenets and premises are frequently
derived from shared sources of
inspiration. Research protocols,
after all, are dedicated to keep bias
at the lowest possible level but are
not entirely eliminated. I do not
believe it necessary to be highly
specialized in order to judge the
work and opinions of researchers.
Those of us who have a professional interest in neuroscience should, I
believe, properly judge and critically evaluate the opinions and
hypotheses of researchers.
Those of us who have a
professional interest in
neuroscience should, I believe,
properly judge and critically
evaluate the opinions and
hypotheses of researchers.
Assessment and feedback from
diverse sources will serve to enrich
the common endeavor to
understand the determinants of
human thinking and behavior. To
this end, I will focus on the
conclusions of prominent
researchers in clarifying the
connections between central
nervous system (CNS) activity and
conscious thought. I would like to
state that I am definitely not
attempting to assess the breadth
and scope of respective
researchers’ findings and
hypotheses. Quotations from the
below-selected authors will be
discussed as they bear on
consciousness and thinking.
SELECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
INVESTIGATORS
Edelman. Gerald M. Edelman
dedicated his book, Bright Air,
Brilliant Fire, to the memory of
Charles Darwin and Sigmund
Freud. According to Edelman, it
was Darwin who first recognized
that natural selection had to
account for the emergence of
human consciousness by way of
morphologic evolution. Edelman
states that the path to human
52 Psychiatry 2007 [ A P R I L ]
consciousness lies in the
development of symbols and their
associated meanings, “by the
evolution of new forms of symbolic
memory and neurosystems serving
social communication and
transmission. In its most developed
form, this means the evolutionary
acquisition of the capability for
language.”1 When considering
Edelman’s cohesive hypothesis of
the development of the CNS
leading to functional brain
mappings and higher order,
dynamic global mappings seems
plausible. Edelman argues that the
development of individuals is
constrained by genes and
inheritance. From early on in life, it
is epigenetic as well. Edelman says,
“Neurons extend the branching
processes in many directions. This
branching generates extensive
variability in the connection
patterns of an individual, which
creates an immense, diverse
repertoire of neural circuits. Then,
these neurons strengthen or
weaken their connections
according to their individual
pattern of electrical activity.
Neurons that fire together wire
together. As a result neurons in a
group are more closely connected
with each other than neurons in
other groups.”2 Additionally, in
coordination with behavioral
experience, a process of synaptic
selection occurs within the
repertoire of groups. Changes
occur between groups that are
functional rather than anatomical.
However, the groups of neurons
themselves are anatomically
related to various anatomical areas
of the brain and are disposed into
maps in the brain that connect and
overlap. A process of “reentry”
correlates that synchronization of
the activity neural groups in
different maps. Reentry involves
bidirectional, reciprocal signaling
between map regions of the brain
which mutually influence each
other across multiple parallel paths
whose information is not pre-
specified. It is the main mechanism
of integration. Global mapping
activities in the cortices of the
brain in conjunction with lower
brain centers represent a mapping
of various types of maps. For
example, the frontal cortices with
their connection with the limbic
system, including the
hippocampus, establish relations
with emotional areas of the brain.
This connection is, perhaps, a link
between emotional centers and
brain centers or higher thought
processes and the capacity to form
concepts. The formatting of
concepts is a product of the brain
categorizing its own activities via
memory processes and perceptions
both internal and external.
Edelman’s writing integrates
perceptual categorization, memory,
and learning with “qualia.” The
latter, Edelman states, “constitute
the collection of personal or
subjective experiences, feelings
and sensations that accompany
awareness.”1 He appreciates and
describes the interaction of the
unconscious on the conscious mind
and gives an accounting of the
development of “concept” thinking.
Edelman’s conclusions are
forthright. “At a certain practical
point… attempts to reduce
psychology to neuroscience must
fail. Given that the pursuit of
thought as a skill depends on social
and cultural interaction,
convention, and logic, as well as on
metaphor, purely biological
methods as they presently exist are
insufficient. In part, this is because
thought at its highest level is
recursive and symbolic. Because
we are each idiosyncratic sources
of semantic interpretation, and
because inter-subjective
communication is essential for
thought (whether with real or
imaginary interlocutor), we must
use and study these capacities in
their own right.”1 Edelman offers
no protocol or method to pursue
the alluded-to capacities.
Damasio. Antonio R. Damasio
presents a number of interesting
hypotheses.
Somatic marker hypothesis.
The somatic marker hypothesis
consists of bodily sensations that
are juxtapositioned to the brain’s
capacity to image events and
thereby modify the way the brain
processes eventual future behavior.
Somatic markers are derived from
visceral and non-visceral body
sensations. The body feelings (gut
feelings) function as automated
somatic signals when an individual
is confronted with a problem that
may have a negative or positive
outcome. Somatic markers
probably influence the efficiency of
the decision-making process. “They
are acquired by experience, under
control of an internal preference
system and under the influence of
an external set of circumstances,
which include not only entities and
Damasio states, “At each moment the state of the self is constructed
from the ground up, it is an evanescent reference state so continuously
and consistently reconstructed that the owner never knows that it is
events with which the organism
must act, but also social
conventions and ethical rules.”3
Neural self. The “neural self” is
based on early body signals in
evolution and development that
helped form a basic concept of self;
this basic concept provided the
ground reference for whatever else
happened to the organism.3 It
includes current body states that
are incorporated continuously and
promptly become past states. The
continuous reactivation of
representations of key events in an
individual’s autobiography forms a
notion of identity that can be
reconstructed repeatedly in
conjunction with activation of
categorical memories that define an
individual. The neural self consists
of significant events of an
individual’s autobiography and
body signals, which encompass
past and present background body
and emotional states. “At each
moment the state of the self is
constructed from the ground up, it
is an evanescent reference state so
continuously and consistently
reconstructed that the owner never
knows it is being remade.”3
Conversion zones. In
considering the relationship
between images and the brain,
Damasio posits an image space in
which all types of sensory types
occur and a dispositional space in
which dispositional memories can
be reconstructed in recall. Damasio
proposes that dispositions are held
in a neuron ensemble called
conversion zones. “To the partition
of cognitions between an image
space and a dispositional space,
then, corresponds a partition of the
brain into 1) neural-pattern maps,
activated in the early sensory
cortices, the so-called limbic
being remade.”
cortices, and some subcortical
nuclei, and 2) conversion zones,
located in the higher-order cortices
and in some subcortical nuclei.4
Conversion zones are hypothesized
to consist of a functional third-
party neuron ensemble, which
represents cortical and subcortical
regions of the brain involved in the
act of perceiving and responding to
brain images and external objects.
Damasio draws a comparison
between his views on the neural
basis of consciousness with those
of Edelman, namely, the
recognition of a biological self
imbued with values/feelings and
emotions, not unlike Edelman’s
described “qualia.”3
Damasio states some conclusions
in regard to the mind-body
problem: “The conscious mind and
its constituent properties are real
entities, not illusions, and must be
investigated as the personal,
private, subjective experiences
they are.”4 Damasio does not,
however, go on to suggest how the
conscious mind must be
investigated, although he seems to
acknowledge the inability of
neuroscience to do it. Similarly, he
states, “I maintain two levels of
description, one for the mind, and
one for the brain. This separation is
a simple matter of intellectual
hygiene and, once again, is not the
result of dualism. By keeping
separate levels of description, I am
not suggesting that there are
separate substances, one mental
and the other biological. I am
simply recognizing the mind as a
high level of biological process,
which requires and deserves its
own description because of the
private nature of its appearance
and because that appearance is the
fundamental reality we wish to
explain.”4 Damasio, therefore,
concedes that the mind “requires
and deserves its own description,”
but fails to elaborate on a way to
do it.
Palley. Regina Palley, a
psychiatrist and psychoanalyst,
states that the bridge between the
neuroscience of emotion and
psychoanalysis is that both center
on unconscious mechanisms.
Neuroscience asserts that emotion
is processed independently of
[APRIL] Psychiatry 2007 53
conscious awareness; not in the
dynamic unconscious of Freud but
in a biological unconscious
governed by the rules and
constraints of neural circuitry and
neuropsychology. Like
psychoanalysis, neuroscience
asserts that conscious feelings are
but the tip of the iceberg. Truly
meaningful information is often
under the surface. For
neuroscience, the physiological,
behavioral, and technological (e.g.
PET scan, MRI) findings are the
manifest content of brain circuitry. 5
She believes that neuroscience
findings reveal that non-verbal
communication of emotion, as is
well illustrated by attachment
(mother-infant feedback loop in
which mother and infant regulate
each other),5 regulates minds and
bodies between individuals.5
Palley concludes that
neuroscientific theory and
treatment can only be provisional
and tentative.5 In the final chapter
of her book, she addresses the
subject of consciousness with a
review of several workers in the
field, including those
neuroscientists referred to in this
article.5 Her discussions, however,
do not seem to reach the level of
elucidating complex emotional
processes or the open-ended
process of thinking. She states, “I
want to clarify that the emphasis
here is that mental phenomena are
derived from biological activity.
There is no intention to equate the
According to Kaplan-Solms, “...neuropsychology provides a conceptual
bridge between psychological and neurological science.”
mental with the biological.”5 Nor
does Palley suggest how the mental
phenomenon derived from
biological activity should be
explored via a technique, which
would attempt to further elucidate
human thinking and behavior.
Kaplan-Solms. Karen Kaplan-
Solms and her husband, Mark,
provide a unique contribution to
neuroscience by way of core related
patient-specific brain lesions with
54 Psychiatry 2007 [APRIL]
the psychoanalytic exploration and
treatment of those same patients.
As the authors point out, Freud,
during his studies with Charcot in
Paris, shifted from the German
School of Neurology to the French
School of Neurology. The former’s
aim was to develop anatomical and
physiological theory to explain the
mechanisms of clinical phenomena
while the latter emphasized the
identification, classification, and
description of them.6 Freud,
henceforth, “investigated the
internal psychological structure of
the syndrome and explained it by
reference to a functional system
that he pictured as being
dynamically represented between
the elements of the brain.”6
According to Solms, dynamic
neuropsychology as developed by
the Russian psychologist, Alexander
Romanovich Luria, provides a
method by which psychoanalysis
can be rejoined with neuroscience
in a way that is compatible with
Freud’s basic assumptions.6 Solms
argues that neuropsychology
provides a conceptual bridge
between psychological and
neurological science. Kaplan-
Solms’s investigations involving
Luria’s method of dynamic
localization and syndrome analysis
are convincingly illustrated in
coordination with the
psychoanalysis of their patients.
The meaning of dynamic
localization is that not only is the
disturbed neurological site itself
identified, but the component parts
of the neurological apparatus that
support it are as well. It involves a
detailed psychological analysis of
the structure of the disturbance
associated with the disturbance of
psychological functions underlying
the manifest symptom.6
Once one has studied, by this
method, the full series of different
ways in which a complex
psychological faculty breaks down
with damage to different parts of
the brain, one will have discovered
its dynamic neurological
representation by identifying which
parts of the brain contribute and in
what way they contribute to the
complex functional system
underlying that faculty. In so doing,
one will not have localized that
faculty in any one part of the brain,
but will have identified the various
components between which, by
dynamic interaction, the
physiological processes
representing that psychological
faculty are produced.6
At the time of publication,
Kaplan-Solms reported on 12 cases
described in the book and relied as
well on observations of 23
additional cases with damage in
other parts of the brain. The
authors concluded, however,
“Nevertheless, many gaps in our
analytic data remain. We have
attempted to fill these gaps—as an
interim measure—with reasonable
inferences drawn from existing
neuropsychological and
psychoanalytical knowledge. It goes
without saying that all of these
inferences must be treated as
highly tentative.”6
I have two general comments to
make about the important work
being done by Kaplan-Solms. First,
application of the psychoanalytic
method with patients with focal
brain lesions is inevitably
constricted by neurological deficit
and its corresponding effect on
patients’ emotional and mental
activity as well as by attentive focus
on their somatic concerns.
Secondly, the authors state, “We do
not doubt that the future will bring
enumerable advances in our
knowledge, but the basic structure
and fundamental working principles
of these unconscious mental events
are now known to us.”6 If one
accepts psychoanalysis as a science
as the authors do, it justifies pursuit
of development and modification in
its own right. The premise for
independent psychoanalytic
exploration is based on the concept
of parallelism.
Edelman states, “Our present
understanding of the neural basis of
consciousness support the
conclusion that an awful lot goes on
in the brain every time we have a
thought, most of it in parallel and of
awe-inspiring complexity and
richness of association. A good deal
of it is information having a
Einstein stated, “A theory is more impressive, the greater the simplicity
of its premises, the more kinds of things it relates, and the more
extended the area of its applicability.”
complexity that is far beyond the
capabilities of present-day
computers.”2 A conceptual
framework is needed, therefore, in
order to continue and broaden
investigations into the mind-body
problem.
On reflection, the concluding
remarks of Edelman, Damasio, and
Palley concede the limitations of
neuroscience to understand the
emotional and higher thinking
processes of the mind. Kaplan-
Solms on the other hand, combines
more or less static CNS lesions with
psychoanalytic exploration of
thinking in an effort to establish
connections between the two.
Nonetheless, Kaplan-Solms
conducts the psychoanalysis on
subjects independently of the
known CNS pathology. That is,
psychoanalytic technique remains
independent, and observations are
derived from the individual’s
psychological development and life
experiences. I would argue,
therefore, that the investigations of
neuroscience and psychoanalysis
are more in parallel rather than an
extension of one to the other. This
being the case, the concept of
parallelism as previously put
forward continues to have working
relevance.
PARALLELISM
John Hughling Jackson, Sigmund
Freud, Oliver Sacks, and others
support the concept of parallelism.
The aforementioned authors make
a clear distinction between
neurobiological activity and the
higher biological processes
associated with thinking. My own
notion, moreover, is that the line of
parallelism, which is determinate, is
represented by the mind/thinking
line. Hyman described the
neurobiology of addictions, which
he believes might serve as a model
for the neurological plasticity of the
brain in connection with emotional
pleasure factors. His model involves
the transcription of ribonucleic acid
(RNA) over a period of several
months.7 In contrast, obviously,
thought processes involved in
making new concepts and mental
connections can occur in a flash of
insight. Moreover, neuroscientists
have referred to the human mind’s
capacity to use past and present
information accessible in the CNS
to plan for and adapt to the
possible future. It would follow,
therefore, genetic changes aside,
that the mind is the cutting edge
for human biological adaptation to
external circumstances.
Up to this point, emphasis was
given to the neuroscientific parallel
line of theory and research of
mental activity, especially
consciousness and thinking. I
would now like to shift to the
parallel line of psychoanalytic
theory and research into mental
activity and a theory of the mind.
Albert Einstein, in his
autobiography, defined his criteria
for a serviceable theory: “A theory
is more impressive, the greater the
simplicity of its premises, the more
kinds of things it relates, and the
more extended the area of its
applicability.”8 A workable theory,
therefore, encompasses and
accounts for the widest range of
human behavior, normal and
abnormal.
THE STRUCTURAL THEORY
In his individual lifetime, from a
single couch, over a period of about
50 years, Sigmund Freud was able
to evolve a theory of the human
mind that remains pertinent today.
This is an accomplishment that
exceeds the total contributions of
all of the affiliated subdisciplines of
neuroscience put together. Martin
cited Barondes as rating Sigmund
Freud as the sixth most influential
scientist in the history of science.9 I
believe that Freud’s structural
theory fits Einstein’s criteria for a
valid theory. The id, ego, and super
ego are functional concepts of the
mental apparatus, which copes with
the biologically based libidinal and
aggressive drives in unconscious
and conscious dimensions.
Application of the structure theory
has accounted for the widest range
of human phenomena
encompassing feelings, conflict of
emotions, and the thinking
processes intertwined with them.
Freud himself had no problem with
modifying his own theories. When it
became apparent that mental
defense mechanisms had an
unconscious component, Freud
gave up the topical theory of the
mind (unconscious, preconscious,
conscious). He abandoned it and
eventually replaced it with the
structural theory.
CURRENT PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY
Post-Freudian classical
psychoanalysts using the
[APRIL] Psychiatry 2007 55
psychoanalytic method of free
association have evolved different
concepts such as, “conflict and
compromise formation” and have
moved from the tripartite
structural theory to simply
referring to one’s mind. Brenner
states, “Throughout the course of
life people’s minds strive to achieve
pleasurable gratification of the
sexual and aggressive wishes in
question, and at the same time, to
avoid the associated unpleasure
Every thought, plan, fantasy,
action, and so on is a compromise
between these two imperatives,
and every thought, plan, fantasy,
and action must be understood as
such. Mental activity forevermore
is governed by simultaneous
opposing efforts to gain pleasure
and to avoid unpleasure in
connection with the sexual and
aggressive wishes that are so
clearly identifiable at about three
years of age…Compromise
formation has thus become the rule
The psychoanalytic method of free association has been historically
productive for the understanding of human thinking and behavior.
in mental life.”10 The point I want
to emphasize is that the
psychoanalytic method of free
association is characterized by
ongoing evolvement.
THINKING
The functional process of
thinking was described by Einstein.
“What precisely is thinking?” When
on the reception of sense
impressions, memory of such
pictures form sequences, each
member of such pictures form
sequences, each member of which
calls forth another, this too is not
yet ‘thinking.’ When, however, a
certain picture turns up in many
sequences, then precisely by such
return it becomes an organizing
element for such sequences in that
it connects sequences in
themselves unrelated to each
other. I think the transition from
free association of dreaming to
56 Psychiatry 2007 [APRIL]
thinking is characterized by the
more or less pre-eminent role
played by the concept. It is by no
means necessary that a concept be
tied to a sensorily recognizable and
reproducible sign (word), but when
this is the case, then thinking
becomes capable of being
communicated. I have no doubt
that our thinking goes on for the
most part without use of signs
(words) and beyond that to a
considerable degree
unconsciously.”8 Although Einstein
was discussing conscious thinking,
he was clearly cognizant of the
unconscious determinants of the
thinking process and stated that he
was thereby able to recognize the
failure of the axiom of the absolute
character of time, or that
simultaneity was rooted in the
unconscious. Einstein was referring
to an astronomical context
whereby what one sees is not
happening at the time one sees it.
He stated that this recognition led
him to his special theory of
relativity and subsequently to the
general theory of relativity.8
RESEARCH APPROACHES TO
THINKING
Neuroscience embraces different
and usually separate major fields of
investigation. The neuroscientists
whose contributions to the body-
mind issue described in the early
part of this article frequently
referred and related their own
findings to the contributions of
Freud. None of them, however,
consider psychoanalysis as the
research technique that produced
Freud’s contributions to the
understanding of mental activity
and human behavior. Kaplan-Solms
cited Freud’s statement, “What
distinguishes psychoanalysis as a
science is not the material which it
handles but the technique with
which it works.”6
Psychoanalysis is much more
than a treatment modality. It is a
technique that remains the most
powerful available instrument to
explore the mind that is, after all,
housed in the body. I would argue,
therefore, that psychoanalytic
research warrants research support
given to other fields of
investigation subsumed under the
heading of neuroscience. Freud, in
his paper on the revision of dream
theory, commented that the extent
of the acceptance of his theory of
dreams gave him “little cause for
satisfaction even by the many
psychiatrists and psychotherapists
who warm their pot of soup at our
fire (incidentally without being
grateful for our hospitality).”11 In
an analogous way, today’s biological
psychiatrists and neuroscientists at
least warm their hands at that fire.
Biological psychiatry is dominant
today but in the not so distant past
a substantial number of
psychoanalysts were in academic
psychiatry and were involved in the
training of residents. Many
psychoanalytic institutes today still
have affiliations with departments
of psychiatry of medical schools.
The cost of paying for
psychoanalytic research is
relatively small because of the
simplicity of its venue that is
basically unburdened with high-
cost technology, although the latter
may be used to a minor extent. The
psychoanalytic method of free
association has been historically
productive for the understanding of
human thinking and behavior.
Integration of the psychoanalytic
method into neuroscience has the
potential to synergize
neuroscientific projects.
SUMMARY
Neuroscience has contributed
theories of neurological
development rooted in evolutionary

TAKE-HOME POINTS
• Neuroscience (NS)
embraces separate major
fields of investigation
• NS has not clarified the
connections between central
nervous system (CNS)
activity and thinking.
• The concept of parallelism
has research implications
for mind-body issues.
• The line of parallelism,
which is determinate for
thinking, is represented by
the mind/thinking line rather
than the NS/biological line.
• Integration of the
psychoanalytic method into
NS research projects
warrants support.
principles of human survival and
propagation of the species. It has
put forth theories of the roles
played by feeling and emotions in
the emergence of consciousness
and thinking in terms of parallel
neural circuitry. In regard to
thinking and human behavior,
however, psychoanalysis via the
psychoanalytic method has
developed the more comprehensive
theory based on biological drives.
As neuroscientists point out, many
correlations between the theories
of neuroscience and psychoanalysis
have been validated. Nonetheless,
research into mind-body issues
currently might be best served by
adopting the concept of parallelism
whereby psychoanalytic research
can independently continue to
explore and elaborate on theories
of emotions and thinking—
conscious and unconscious. These
are the biologically derived mental
attributes which will shape the
future of humankind.
REFERENCES
1. Edelman GM. Bright Air,
Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of
the Mind. New York, NY: Basic
Books, 1992.
2. Edelman GM, Tonini G. A
Universe of Consciousness: How
Matter Becomes Imagination.
New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.
3. Damasio AR. Descartes’ Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain. New York, NY: G.
P. Putnam,1994.
4. Damasio AR. The Feeling of
What Happens: Body and
Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness. New York, NY:
Harcourt Brace, 1999.
5. Pally R. Emotional processing. In:
Tuckett D, Williams P (eds). In:
The Mind-Brain Relationship.
New York, NY: Karnac Books,
2000:74.
6. Kaplan-Solms K, Solms M.
Clinical Studies in
Neuropsychoanalysis:
Introduction to a Depth
Neuropsychology. London:
Karnac Books, 2000.
7. Hyman SE, Nestler EJ. Initiation
and adaptation: A paradigm for
understanding psychotropic drug
reaction. Am J Psychiatry
1996;153(2):151–62.
8. Einstein A, Schlipp P.
Autobiographical Notes. Peru,
IL: Open Court Publishing Co.,
1991.
9. Martin J. The integration of
neurology, psychiatry, and
neuroscience. Am J Psychiatry
2002;5:695–704.
10. Brenner C. Conflict, compromise
formation, and the structural
theory. Psychoanal Q
2002;71:407–8.
11. Freud S. Revision of the theory of
dreams. In: Strachy J (ed). The
Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud. London: The
Hogarth Press, 1957:8 (originally
published in 1917).
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