Digest, yellow pape, for submission on Jan.

8:

in re disqualification of haron meling;

n re cunana 94 phil 534;

in re atty. edillon AM 1928;

catu v. rellosa;

in re petition for leave to assume practice of law dacanay;

venson v peleo;

foster v agtang.

mike A. Fermin vs. Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, A.C. No. 6560, September 16, 2019

[B.M. NO. 1154 : June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been
rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.

In the Petition , Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,
namely:Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary
to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an
indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Courts Resolution2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because
retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez.Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose
from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated.Moreover, Meling denies the charges
and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations
are ludicrous.He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor.In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character.Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case.What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the
penalty of criminal law.Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.5 ςrνll

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable.Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever
may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.As held by the Court in
Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt
of court.6 ςrνll

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in
the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7 ςrνll

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations.This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9 ςrνll

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.Despite
the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be
unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked.In Alawi v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney
by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar.The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity.The
Courtdeclared that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Sharia courts.While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an attorney.The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.12 ςrνll
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official
to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity.Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and
constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit
and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling
as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia
Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MIKE A. FERMIN, Complainant, A.C. No. 6560 - versus - Present: PERALTA, J., Chairperson, LEONEN, REYES, A., JR.,
HERNANDO, and INTING, JJ. Promulgated: ATTY. LINTANG H. BEDOL, Respondent. September 16, 2019 x---------------
--------------------------------------- ~\ ci_\>C~i'.1--------------x RESOLUTION PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mike A. Fermin against
respondent Atty. Lintang H. Bedol for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
averred that one of his opponents and defeated candidate for the mayoralty post of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, Bai
Susan Samad, filed with the COMELEC en bane a petition to declare a failure of election in Precinct No. 25A/26A of
Barangay Guiawa, and the subsequent holding of a special election, which was docketed as Case No. 04-403; and
that the COMELEC issued its Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring a failure of election and the holding of the
special election on July 28, 2004. However, before the issuance of the COMELEC Resolution, the respondent, in his
capacity as the Provincial Election Supervisor III of Maguindanao, had already issued a Notice 1 dated July 23, 2004
to all candidates, which included him, political parties and registered voters of Barangay Guiawa, Rollo, p. 12.
Resolution - 2 - A.C. No. 6560 Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, informing them of the scheduled special election for
Barangay Guiawa on July 28, 2004; that he issued another notice2 informing the candidates and political parties of
a conference on July 25, 2004 to be held in his office; and that on July 26, 2004, he again issued a notice3 that the
canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak Maguindanao. Complainant alleged that respondent, without basis
in law and in fact, issued the above-mentioned premature notices of special election which highlighted his shameless
disregard of the truth and brazen disrespect for the rule of law which is his foremost duty as a member of the Bar;
and that those false and illegal notices showed his dishonest ways and predilection to wrongdoings and his natural
susceptibility to the culture of corruption and deception which renders him totally unfit to remain as an honorable
member of the Bar.4 Complainant prays for respondent's disbarment to protect future clients from falling prey to
his corrupt and evil deeds. 5 In his Comment,6 respondent argued that the notice dated July 23, 2004 was to apprise,
alert and notify all candidates concerned that, in a short period of time, a special election would be conducted on
July 28, 2004; that election personnel in the province cannot afford to have only a day before election to notify the
parties and to prepare for the election the next day.
As to the conference held, it was done to do away with violation of the Fair Elections Act and the parties' duties
respecting the special election. He claimed that all the cases filed by complainant against him with the COMELEC
were dismissed on the ground of complete absence of cause of actions. The Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision within 90 days from receipt of
the record. 7 After due proceedings, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J .E. Reyes of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (
CED-IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation8 dated February 2, 2009, finding respondent guilty of violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: 6 CANON l - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Id.
at 13. Id. at 14. Id. at 5. Id. at 7. Id. at 19-24. Resolution dated April 18, 2005, id. at 27. Rollo, pp. 121-129. r1I
Resolution - 3 - A.C. No. 6560 and recommended that he be penalized with reprimand, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.9 In so ruling, the Commissioner found that respondent
started issuing notices of special election and invitation to prepare for the special election even before the COMELEC
had issued its Resolution on the need for a special election which was highly irregular if not totally wrong. In
Resolution No. XIX-2010-313 10 dated April 16, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner, thus: RESOLVED
to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent's issuance of Notice of Special Election even before the Comelec had decided
on the need for one, is highly irregular and in violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Lintang H. Bedol is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year. Both parties did not file any
motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution 11 dated February 9, 2011, the Court took note of the IBP's Resolution
and required respondent to inform the Court when he started serving his suspension, within five (5) days from
notice. As respondent failed to comply, we reiterated our Resolution dated February 9, 2011. 12 However, per
Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, respondent has yet to comply with the
Resolution. 13 We concur with the findings and conclusions of the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable in this case. 10 11 Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, 14 provides: Section 4. Postponement,
Failure of Election and 8i1Jecial Elections. - The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of
special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Id. at 129. Id. at 120. Id. at 130-131. 12 Per
Resolution dated August 28, 2013; id. at 135. 13 Rollo, p. 136. 14 An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other Purposes. Resolution
- 4 - A.C. No. 6560 Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en bane by a majority vote of its
members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on
the day of the election. Based on the foregoing provision of law, the declaration of failure of election and the calling
of special elections shall be decided by the majority vote of the members of the COMELEC en bane. In this case, the
COMELEC en bane issued a Resolution dated July 27, 2004 declaring the failure of election and the holding of a
special election on July 28, 2004. However, prior to the issuance of the said Resolution, respondent, as the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, had already issued the following, to wit: Notice dated July 23, 2004 of the
special election to be done on July 28, 2004; Invitation dated July 25, 2004 for conference at his office in Cotabato
City; and Notice dated July 26, 2004 informing that the canvassing of votes shall be held in Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao. Respondent's act of issuing those notices ahead of the issuance of the COMELEC en bane Resolution
calling for a special election was not in compliance with the procedures under the law and the COMELEC rules. In so
doing, he breached his duty to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities, thus, violating
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws
and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary thereto. 15 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his
character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public. 16 As servants of the law
and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law.
They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. 17 This, in fact, is what a lawyer's obligation
to promote respect for law and legal processes entails. Moreso, a lawyer who is occupying a public office. 18 Lawyers
in public office, such as respondent who was then a Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, are expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair 15 16 Jimenezv. Atty. Francisco, 749 Phil. 551,565 (2014). Id. 17 See Re: Report on the Financial Audit
Conducted on the Books ofAccounts o.f Atty. Raquel G Kho, Clerk of Court IV, Regional Trial Court, Oras, Eastern
Samar, A.M. No. P-06-2177, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 25, 28-29, citing See Agpalo, Comments on the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct 18 (2001 ed.). /~Y./ 18 Id. at 29. & . Resolution - 5 - A.C.
No. 6560 dealing. 19 A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.20 Respondent's claim that he issued those notices as
there was no more time to prepare for the special elections has no basis in law. To stress, the notices were issued
even prior to the COMELEC Resolution for the holding of a special election. Members of the Bar are reminded that
their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.21 Respondent is
expected to promote respect for the law and legal processes. WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the
Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, dated April 16, 2010. Accordingly, Atty.
Lintang H. Bedol is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. Respondent's suspension from
the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt. He is DIRECTED to immediately INFORM the Court
that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasijudicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country;
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal record as a lawyer. SO ORDERED

.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from
its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;
he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity
of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which
the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar
is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of
a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree
of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through
Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated
on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi
est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines
is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him
to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference
and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which
he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest
in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is
a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said:
"The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the
proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself
or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because
they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where,
as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very
burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Ba

[A.C. NO. 5738 : February 19, 2008]

WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth
C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate
the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. 5 When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because
of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, 6 claiming that respondent committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to
the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any
of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required
the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however,
he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper
and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: 8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. 10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened
while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he
was not covered by that provision.

Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials
and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; andcralawlibrary

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to
the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In
other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session
hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least
once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve
full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have
procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The
Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity
of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this
resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail
of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003),
petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before
the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to
resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership
in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission
to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the
Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is
both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote
the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance
of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and
payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any
of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to
the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of
the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral
and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys
and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This
means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of
the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore,
a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the
conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake
his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dated March
23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the
suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a complaint2, dated
May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the
order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order 5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on
November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there
was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the
documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in
the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and
her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from
December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem
regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their
discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which
they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem
referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty
(60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed
to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she
had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case
for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received
from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent
cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of
the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil
Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one who
notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely
replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the
complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale
were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of contention
in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her
that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.” 16 Complainant obliged the request and gave
respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00, purportedly
to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition
but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt, 17 stating that “it is understood
that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November
2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the
case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the
amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent, complainant
learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case with the court.
She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the
order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed
by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration
Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that
the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him that
the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant
discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on
respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month. 19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him a
letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted
with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her
the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since
March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial
fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received
P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred
that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in
visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry
about its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the
said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in
the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel
accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent denied having
asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her
that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it
was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said
that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past. Respondent
saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the
handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit,
complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim,
respondent demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts in her
possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was
employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation
of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as
“no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June 20,
2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for
estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical
impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the recommendation
of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of
P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been issued. 26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent
was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent’s
violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule
15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties.
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether
it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” 27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private
capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more
than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the
extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same
amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of
credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent
should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the
matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with
the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.” 28 Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant
but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses.
His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the
intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent
displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation expenses”
allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself
signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded
and received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is
tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding
a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only
an abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession
and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to
public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the
image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.
The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any
liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent
proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client
to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his
duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated
Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of
his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of
urgency or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere
in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the
exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality
of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of
requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency,
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts
and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. 32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be
found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality
that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.” 33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered
by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent
from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which
he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized
the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract,
and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that
the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations
of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of
respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of
the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of
prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the
very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close
dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and client is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An
attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once
this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.” 34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR. 35 For the practice
of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of
sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the
trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months
recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent.
The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence
and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less than the
penalty of disbarment. 38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private
capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant
if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern
of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on
other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed
directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum
of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance
of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.” 40 In administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in
contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing the balance
of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as
representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the
judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable
act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be
ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations,
respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small
claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.” 43 The
Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by “purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the
complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

In re: Albino Cunanan, G.R. No. L-6784. March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with
the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average
of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid?

Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function
and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon,
it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972,
popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."
(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per
cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured
in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953
without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven
of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-
one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
 seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168,
classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions
for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of
them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest
marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have
filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, —
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who
have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time
by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member
in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of
the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in
the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the
legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests.
The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally
during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the
resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from
the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half
a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061),
of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of
the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They
shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one
years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall
be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with
the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission
of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition
to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference
it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken
of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily
 implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of
a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the
legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals
said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but
to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required
by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and
as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could
have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose
that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only
rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes
and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply
prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please
note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations
be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function
and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated
by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably
judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted
to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the
power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act
purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of
legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far
as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is
acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose
of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs
to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its
respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis.,
567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed
rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the
courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the
courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
 Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English
speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our
Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688,
had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the
courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial
power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a
sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute
its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this
traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps
the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of
government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the
judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose
should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and
unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must
make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which
the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars
persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the
legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law
is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as
our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as
members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan,
48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the
court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that
State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members
of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of
 enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470,
471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed
in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in
its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those
not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-
law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by
virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to
be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination
of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their
admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors,
and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers
of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the
court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only
officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature;
and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing
his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp.
650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a
judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 906.
 Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.
— A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province
of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of
the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,
compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps
shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per
cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is
not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is
the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by
this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The
power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the
place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean
that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals
to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the
practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill
up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty
objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to
the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points
to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of
Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the
bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act
providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby
amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of
Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court
of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney
for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the
prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus
falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of
 our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the
applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these
Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion,
he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right
to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme
Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of
the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act
which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that
this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the
legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No.
136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the
Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or
of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular
emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute
have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had
been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time
when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment
to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications
of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of
the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the
necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he
has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence
of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the
consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule,
provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him
 by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to
do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp.
48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely
to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of
being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that
year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and
had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies
after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others,
a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law
schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in
relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment,
so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the
bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school
or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules".
— In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this
court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any
law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the
student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a
law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining
board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named
therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the
constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should
be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it
could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to
practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates
certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has
some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People,
 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup.
Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an
enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must
have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first,
to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into
two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in
a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in
the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between
the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school,
but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-
sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law
resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well
as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while
those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years
before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to
the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested.
The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to
reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe
ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be
exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or
profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex,
and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources
of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest,
or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their
prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any
more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities.
Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the
part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because
of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The
 State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W.
468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute
him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select
from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or
thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's
Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest
upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be
based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must
be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest
on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the
situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and
natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law
is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made
to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a
general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated
by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it
is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to
1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per
cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were
all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that
was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not
propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the
Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify
them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954
and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted
to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct
are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is
doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In
other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What
was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such
duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of
this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different,
seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal
defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of
article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious
that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of
Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods
or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution
or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore,
void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and
who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the
aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity
to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates,
without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them.
In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts
subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall
consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative
of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts
which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared.
The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have
voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5
per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether
they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may
set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty.
Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan,
members.
Number of candidates 206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 12
73'S 6
72'S 6
Number of candidates who passed 85
Number of candidates who failed 121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 18
Percentage of success (per cent) 41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent) 58.74
Passing grade (per cent) 72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who
was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates 481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 19
(72 per cent and above 73 per cent ---
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed 249
Number of candidates who failed 228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 43
Percentage of success (per cent) 52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent) 47.80
Passing grade (per cent) 72
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty.
Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon.
Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates 749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 43
70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per cent 1
69 per cent 40
68 per cent 2
Number of candidates who passed 409
Number of candidates who failed 340
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972
Percentage of success (per cent) 54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent) 45.41
Passing grade (per cent) 69
(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the
bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario
Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile,
Members.
Number of candidates 899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 64
71's 29
70's 35
Number of candidates who passed 490
Number of candidates who failed 409
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 11
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.60
Passing grade (per cent) 70
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique
Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon.
Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates 1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 55
Number of candidates who passed 686
Number of candidates who failed 532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 164
Percentage of success (per cent) 56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent) 43.72
Passing grade (per cent) 74
 (by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio
Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno,
Members.
Number of candidates 1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised 38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed 432
Number of candidates who failed 894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 26
Percentage of success (per cent) 32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent) 67.86
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty.
Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates 2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 112
Number of candidates who passed 1,189
Number of candidates who failed 879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 196
Percentage of success (per cent) 57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent) 42.51
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon.
Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates 2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 163
Number of candidates who passed 1,705
Number of candidates who failed 1,033
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 426
Percentage of success (per cent) 62.27
 Percentage of failure (per cent) 37.73
Passing grade (per cent) 75
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz,
Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates 2,555
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) 100
Number of candidates who passed 1,570
Number of candidates who failed 986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 284
Percentage of success (per cent) 61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent) 38.96
Passing grade (per cent) 75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took
the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied
(MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4
MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45
MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85
1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L. 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
12. Apolinario, Miguel S. 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
16. Balintona, Bernardo 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
18. Bandala, Anacleto A. 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
19. Bandon, Alawadin L. 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35
20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5
21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5
22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T. 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85
23. Canda, Benjamin S. 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55
24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9
25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8
26. Cerezo, Gregorio O. 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4
27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95
28. Claudo, Conrado O. 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4
29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4
31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15
32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1
33. Enriquez, Agustin P. 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
35. Fernandez, Macario J. 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
36. Gallardo, Amando C. 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
43. Gonzales, Amado P. 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70
50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3
51. Layumas, Vicente L. 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3
52. Leyson, Amancio F. 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15
53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75
54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15
55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4
56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75
57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71
58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7
59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55
60. Manoleto, Proceso D. 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95
61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71
63. Mercado, Arsenio N. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95
64. Miranda, Benjamin G. 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55
65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
1948
66. Orosco, Casimiro P. 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
70. Pañganiban, Jose V. 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C. 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B. 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I. 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P. 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D. 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8
84. Samano, Fortunato A. 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3
87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25
88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25
89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T. 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65
94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A. 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
100. Foronda, Clarencio J. 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
101. Hechanova, Vicente 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
MRD-102. Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
MRD-104. Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
105. Ungson, Fernando S. 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
1951
106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35
MRD-110. Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6
111. Antiola, Anastacio R. 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05
112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1
113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85
114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8
MRD-115. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25
116. Barinaga, Jeremias L. 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2
MRD-117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25
MRD-118. Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25
MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95
121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75
122. Cabilao, Leonardo S. 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25
123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4
124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
125. Calilung, Soledad C. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD-126. Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
130. Castillo, Antonio del 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
MRD-131. Castillo, Dominador Ad. 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
MRD-132. Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
133. Casuga, Bienvenido B. 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
134. Cabangbang, Santiago B. 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
136. Dacanay, Eufemio P. 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
137. Deysolong, Felisberto 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
MRD-138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N. 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
139. Espinosa, Domingo L. 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
MRD-140. Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25
141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75
142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35
143. Gandioco, Salvador G. 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1
144. Gastardo, Crispin B. 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9
145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55
146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5
147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6
MRD-148. Homeres, Praxedes P. 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35
149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9
150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7
MRD-151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85
152. Inandan, Fortunato C. 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5
153. Jimenez, Florencio C. 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05
154. Kintanar, Woodrow M. 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95
155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55
156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
157. Llenos, Francisco U. 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
158. Leon, Marcelo D. de 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
MRD-161. Magsino, Encarnacion 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
MRD-162. Maligaya, Demetrio M. 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05
MRD-165. Marcial, Meynardo R. 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
MRD-167. Monterroyo, Catalina S. 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
MRD-168. Montero, Leodegario C. 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
169. Monzon, Candido T. 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
170. Natividad, Alberto M. 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
MRD-171. Navallo, Capistrano C. 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5
MRD-173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75
174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5
MRD-175. Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95
176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95
177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3
MRD-179. Redor, Francisco K. 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70
MRD-180. Regis, Deogracias A. 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35
181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9
MRD-182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15
183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2
185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35
186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85
187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73
188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5
189. Santa Ana, Candido T. 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7
191. Santos, Valeriano V. 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1
192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
195. Tapayan, Domingo A. 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
MRD-196. Tiausas, Miguel V. 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
201. Villagonzalo, Job R. 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
1952
203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
MRP-204. Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
MRP-205. Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
MRP-206. Abellera, Geronimo F. 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
MRP-207. Abenojar, Agapito N. 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
MRP-210. Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag. 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8
MRP-213. Abinguna, Agapito C. 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65
214. Adove, Nehemias C. 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4
216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65
217. Andrada, Mariano L. 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73.
MRP-218. Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75
219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7
MRP-220. Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4
MRP-221. Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3
MRP-222. Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75
223. Añonuevo, Ramos B. 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7
225. Arteche, Filomeno D. 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8
MRP-226. Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2
MRP-227. Azucena, Ceferino D. 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95
228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3
MRP-230. Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73
231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65
232. Barilea, Dominador Z. 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5
MRP-233. Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D. 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7
235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2
236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
MRP-239. Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
MRP-240. Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
MRP-241. Beltran, Gervasio M. 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
MRP-242. Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
MRP-243. Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
MRP-244. Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
MRP-245. Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
MRP-246. Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
247. Buenafe, Avelina R. 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
248. Bueno, Anastacio F. 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
249. Borres, Maximino L. 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
MRP-250. Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
MRP-251. Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5
MRP-252. Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
253. Cabreros, Paulino N. 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
254. Calayag, Florentino R. 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP-255. Calzada, Cesar de la 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7
MRP-257. Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8
259. Canda, Benjamin S. 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95
260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65
262. Capitulo, Alejandro P. 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2
MRP-263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15
MRP-264. Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9
MRP-265. Campanilla, Mariano B. 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65
MRP-266. Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25
267. Cardoso, Angelita G. 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8
268. Cartagena, Herminio R. 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65
MRP-269. Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V. 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2
271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35
272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75
273. Colorado, Alfonso R. 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6
274. Chavez, Doroteo M. 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1
275. Chavez, Honorato A. 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65
MRP-276. Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85
277. Cortez, Armando R. 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
278. Crisostomo, Jesus L. 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
MRP-279. Cornejo, Crisanto R. 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
MRP-280. Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
MRP-281. Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
282. Cunanan, Salvador F. 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
283. Cimafranca, Agustin B. 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
MRP-285. Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85
MRP-286. Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
MRP-288. Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
289. Delgado, Vicente N. 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
MRP-290. Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP-292. Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65
MRP-293. Dipasupil, Claudio R. 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9
MRP-294. Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35
MRP-295. Domingo, Dominador T. 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2
296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05
MRP-297. Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP-302. Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2
MRP-303. Encarnacion, Alfonso B. 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1
305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7
MRP-306. Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05
MRP-307. Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
310. Familara, Raymundo Z. 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85
311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
MRP-313. Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
MRP-314. Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
MRP-315. Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B. 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
MRP-317. Fuente, Jose S. de la 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S. 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
MRP-319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15
323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B. 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85
MRP-325. Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85
326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4
327. Galman, Patrocinio G. 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15
328. Gamalinda, Carlos S. 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55
329. Gamboa, Antonio G. 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95
330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25
MRP-331. Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8
MRP-332. Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R. 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5
334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9
335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85
MRP-336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V. 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35
MRP-337. Gonzales, Rafael C. 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
MRP-338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
339. Grageda, Jose M. A. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
MRP-341. Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
342. Guzman, Salvador B. 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
343. Guzman, Salvador T. de 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
344. Habelito, Geronimo E. 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
345. Hedriana, Naterno G. 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
346. Hernandez, Quintin B. 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
1952
347. Homeres, Agustin R. 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
MRP-350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M. 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
MRP-351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
MRP-352. Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75
MRP-354. Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05
355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4
MRP-356. Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7
357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55
359. Leones, Constante B. 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73
362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP-364. Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95
MRP-365. Macasaet, Tomas S. 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5
366. Magbiray, Godofredo V. 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05
367. Majarais, Rodolfo P. 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85
MRP-368. Makabenta, Eduardo 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3
MRP-369. Malapit, Justiniano S. 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
370. Maloles, Iluminado M. 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
373. Marasigan, Napoleon 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75
MRP-374. Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
MRP-375. Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
MRP-376. Masancay, Amando E. 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
MRP-377. Mati-ong, Ignacio T. 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35
MRP-379. Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
MRP-380. Miculob, Eugenio P. 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr., 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP-382. Monponbanua, Antonio D. 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
MRP-383. Montero, Leodegario C. 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
384. Morada, Servillano S. 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73
MRP-386. Mosquera, Estanislao L. 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75
388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15
MRP-389. Nadela, Geredion T. 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15
MRP-390. Nazareno, Romeo P. 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05
391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9
MRP-392. Noguera, Raymundo 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15
MRP-393. Nodado, Domiciano R. 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35
MRP-395. Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7
397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
MRP-400. Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
MRP-403. Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP-405. Paderna, Perfecto D. 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
MRP-409. Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
MRP-410. Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
MRP-411. Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
MRP-413. Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
MRP-415. Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
MRP-416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C. 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25
419. Pestaño, Melquiades 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15
421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55
422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP-423. Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8
424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05
425. Quetulio, Josefina D. 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP-426. Quipanes, Melchor V. 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
MRP-427. Quietson, Bayani R. 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85
428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55
429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65
MRP-430. Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25
MRP-431. Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25
MRP-432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45
MRP-433. Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4
MRP-434. Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35
436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
438. Reyes, Francisco M. 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
MRP-440. Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A. 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
448. Rosario, Restituto F. del 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP-449. Sabelino, Conrado S. 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95
450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6
451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1
452. Samaniego, Jesus B. 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6
MRP-453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95
MRP-454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q. 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95
455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8
456. Santillan, Juanito Ll. 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25
MRP-457. Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7
MRP-458. Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75
MRP-459. Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8
MRP-460. Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3
461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1
MRP-462. Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5
463. Songco, Felicisimo G. 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35
464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7
465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9
MRP-466. Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05
467. Tabaque, Benjamin R. 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95
MRP-469. Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15
MRP-472. Tiongson, Federico T. 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45
MRP-473. Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
MRP-475. Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
MRP-476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
MRP-477. Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
MRP-479. Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6
480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
481. Umayam, Juanito C. 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
MRP-482. Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55
483. Valino, Francisco M. 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7
484. Varela, Dominador M. 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85
485. Vega, Macairog L. de 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D. 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85
487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05
MRP-488. Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65
489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
MRP-490. Verzosa, Federico B. 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7
MRP-491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V. 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2
MRP-492. Villanueva, Cecilio C. 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95
493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75
MRP-494. Villaseñor, Leonidas F. 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15
495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65
496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85
MRP-497. Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1
MRP-498. Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65
499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95
500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous
examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and
averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials
MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5
1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75
1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15
1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3
1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85
5. Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65
1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25
1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3
7. Luna, Lucito A.
1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55
1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
8. Maraña, Arsenio s.
1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35
1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8
1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
10. Peña, Jesus S.
1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2
1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4
1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75
1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65
1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05
1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
13. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35
1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75
1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65
1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85
1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
 1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
18. Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for
reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates
separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic
act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67
9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C. 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R. 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71
23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. De 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G. 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B. 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95
35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M. 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73
37. Nodado, Domiciano R. 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66
39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05
8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q. 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35
11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3
12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71
14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952) 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05
16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
25. Santos, Constantino P. 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who
have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar
examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since
1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law
to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to
sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal
Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful
candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a
rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general
average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average
of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of
July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even
those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due
credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this
Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar
candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need
not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination
prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed
the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the
firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers
only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year
in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening
between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the
Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is
more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects
at the time of admission to the practice of law.

xxx xxx xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any
application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70
per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite
their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor
of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to
the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of
the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general
passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase
of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on
the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its
officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court
to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal
profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely
a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in
accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed.
The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for
that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to
grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions
such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each
House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It
reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those
who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to
74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all
parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard
75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy
of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if
not improved from those years preceding the last world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well
as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the
practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation.
This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing
what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already
accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered,
or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which
Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is
very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability,
attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different
rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared
for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute
must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as
narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public
purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a
wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision
by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
 This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of
correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the
comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that,
with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned
dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which
it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No.
974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the
Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers
are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of
the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is
exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only
this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the
exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine
when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent
in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to
mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates
for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation
of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those
taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while
those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because
it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently
to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average
of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition
to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration,
were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as
the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from
69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but
said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the
later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study
of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission
fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by
the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to
the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained
a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and
failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt
had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and
the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII,
section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to
the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to
the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power.
In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have
the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by
flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when
they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the
law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer
have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had
always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly
situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness
must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can
fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely
for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor
of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable
and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4,
1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would
then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass
all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect
amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August
1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we
are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this
Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the
1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed
to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators,
loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to
a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.
Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers
are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of
the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is
exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only
this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the
exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine
when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the
congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent
in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to
mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates
for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation
of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those
taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while
those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of
Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because
it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently
to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average
of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates
had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition
to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration,
were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as
the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from
69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but
said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys,
presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent,
retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an
unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the
later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study
of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission
fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by
the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to
the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained
a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent
examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and
failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a
hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were
invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt
had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and
the matter" involved "a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII,
section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice,
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little
intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to
the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its
approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to
the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power.
In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have
the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by
flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the
practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when
they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and
equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the
law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer
have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had
always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly
situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness
must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can
fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative
Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the
Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely
for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor
of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable
and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4,
1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would
then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the
Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass
all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect
amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August
1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we
are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this
Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the
1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed
to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to
assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators,
loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who
elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary
or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to
a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

MARIFE A. VENZON, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. AMADOR B. PELEO III, Respondent, EN BANC A.C. No. 9354
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655 Present: BERSAMIN,* Chief Justice CARPIO, PERALTA, PERLAS-BERNABE, LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, CAGUIOA, REYES, A., JR., GESMUNDO, ** REYES, J., JR. HERNANDO, CARANDANG, LAZARO-JAVIER,
INTING, ZALAMEDA, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2019 x-------------------------------------------------------------- DECISION
PERCURIAM: The Case Respondent Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is charged with violation of Rule • On Official Leave. ••
On Official Leave. Decision 2 A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Section 3(D) of Republic Act 9262 (RA 9262) or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of2004 for his alleged refusal to provide child support to his son, a minor. The
Complaint-Affidavit In her Complaint-Affidavit dated December 1, 2011, Marife Venzon essentially alleged:
Sometime in 1996, respondent frequented San Jose, Occidental Mindoro to attend to the cases of his former
townmates in Cavite. 1 On May 6, 1996, she met respondent whom she engaged to handle her petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with her husband. In no time, she got close to respondent as he really exerted
effort to earn her trust.2 By the time the judicial decree3 of annulment of her marriage came out, they were already
in a serious relationship. On April 17, 1998, she gave birth to respondent's son.4 In the beginning and up until 2003,
respondent responsibly acted as a family man. Sometime in 1997, he purchased a two-storey apartment in
Sampaloc, Manila. He leased it out but reserved a space at the ground floor. It was converted into a bedroom where
she and their son stayed whenever she had their son checked-up at the UST Hospital. 5 In 1999, they jointly
purchased a residential lot in Facoma, Brgy. Labangan, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro where they built a house for
her and their son. 6 During the succeeding years, however, respondent no longer visited them as frequently as
before. Then he stopped giving them financial support and even ignored her pleas to give it back to them. 7 On
December 7, 2006, respondent drew an undertaking captioned "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay ng Ari-Arian at Sustento,
"8 viz: Dapat mabatid ng lahat: Ako, Amador B. Peleo III, Pilipino, nasa hustong gulang at may tirahan sa Pob. 3, Gen.
E. Aguinaldo, Cavite, ay nagsabi ng mga sumusunod: Na ako ay nagmamay-ari ng mga sumusunod: 1. Lupa at bahay
na naroroon sa Facoma, Labangan, San Jose, 0cc. J 1 Rollo, p. 1. 2 Id. 3 Id. at 7-9. 4 Id. at 2. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 2-3. 8
Id. at 20. Decision 3 A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] Mindoro; 2. Isang apartment sa Maynila sa 850
Don Quijote St., Sampaloc, Manila. Na ang mga nabanggit na ari-arian ay kusang loob kong ibinibigay kay Nifio
Amador Venzon Peleo III, anak ko kay Marife A. Venzon ng San Jose Occidental, Mindoro; Na aking ding bibigyan ng
suporta buwan-buwan panggastos and nasabi kong anak at susuportahan ko rin ang pag-aaral niya hanggang sa
makatapos ng kolehiyo. Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda ko ang aking pangalan ngayon December 7, 06 dito
sa San Jose, 0cc. Mindoro. Conforme: Marife A.Venzon (Sgd.) Amador B. Peleo III XXX But respondent did not fulfill
his undertaking and continued to ignore her pleas for support. She was, thus, constrained to seek assistance from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). IBP NCLA-Senior Deputy Atty. Dante Mercado wrote 9 respondent urging
him to at least provide his child's basic needs so he may avoid liability for economic abuse under RA 9262. During
their meeting at the IBP office, she and respondent jointly drew a Kasunduan, 10 viz: 9 Rollo, p. 21. 10 Id. at 22-24.
Dapat mabatid ng lahat: Ang kasunduan ito ay ginawa at pinagtibay nina: AMADOR B. PELEO III, Pilipino, naninirahan
sa Gen. Aguinaldo, Cavite at siyang tatawagin Unang Panig; at MARIFE VENZON, Pilipino, naninirahan sa San Jose,
0cc. Mindoro at siyang tatawagin na Ikalawang Panig: PINAGKASUNDUAN 1. Ang Unang Panig ay hahatian (50:50) si
Nifio Amador V. Peleo sa renta sa bahay na naroroon sa 850 Don Quijote St., Sampaloc, Manila; 2. Sina Nifio Amador
Peleo at kanyang ina na si Marife Venzon lamang ay binibigyan ko ng pahintulot na siyang I Decision 4 A.C. No. 9354
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] tumira sa isang maliit sa kuarto sa silong ng apartment; 3. Ang 900 metro kuadrado
lupa na naroroon sa Bo. Labangan, San Jose, 0cc. Mindoro at galing kay Teodolfo Talactac ay ibinibigay ko kay Nifio
Amador V. Peleo ang ganap na pagmamay-ari; 4. Bibigyan ko si Nifio Amador V. Peleo ng karampatan kaparte kung
mabenta ang nasabing apartment. Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito ay inilagda namin ang aming pangalan ngayon Hunyo
28, 2011 dito sa Pasig City. (Sgd. Marife Venzon) Ikalawang Panig (Sgd.) Amador Peleo III Unang Panig But again
respondent did not honor his undertaking. She recalled that right after they met at the IBP office, she received
respondent's text: "Wala ka ni katiting na karapatan para ipaayos ang bvarto. Kung ano ang ayos niyan ngayon ay
hindi mo ito pwedeng baguhin o galawin at hindi kita pinahihintulutan na ayusin, baguhin, maglagay ng anumang
improvement diyan sa bvarto otherwise you will be criminally liable, kuha mo at alisin mo na rin diyan ang sabi mong
gamit mo." On September 30, 2011, she sent copy of the "Kasunduan" to Eusebia Jacob, a tenant in respondent's
apartment. The "Kasunduan" informed Eusebia Jacob that half of the monthly rent on the apartment would go to
her. She learned, however, that respondent's sister, Romana Peleo Bellostrino was already collecting the rent. Aside
from his deliberate refusal to provide support for their son, she knew of respondent's propensity for dishonesty,
unethical conduct, and immorality, viz: 1. In filling up the blank spaces on his son's Certificate of Live Birth, he
indicated that they got married on May 1, 1996 in Manila when in truth they never got married. In fact, they only
met for the first time on May 6, 1996. 2. Respondent was legally married to Erlinda Sierra when he intimately got
involved with her. He remained a married man before, during, and after he sired a son with her. He led her to believe
he was determined to sever his marital ties with his wife by filing a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. As it tuned out, he never actually meant it to be. He never prosecuted the case until it got dismissed for
failure to prosecute, thus: ORDER It appearing that this case has been pending since July 31, 1998 J without petitioner
exerting any effort to prosecute this case. Decision 5 A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] ACCORDINGLY,
and pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court, this case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
so ORDERED. 11 3. He had been having illicit affairs with many other women, e.g. - a seamstress from Bacoor, Cavite,
a housemaid from Calintaan, Occidental Mindoro, and another woman from Capiz with whom he fathered a child
named Amadora. 4. He fraudulently secured a Senior Citizen (SC) card although he was only forty five (45) years old.
He unabashedly availed of the twenty percent (20%) discount privilege on plane tickets for his out- of-town court
hearings. Respondent's Comment In his Comment12 dated June 8, 2012, respondent denied that he was not giving
child support. He claimed that from 2009 until 2011, complainant had been receiving the monthly apartment rent
of P12,000.00. On October 2011, in lieu of the cash allowance she was demanding, he gave her a 900- square meter
property within a subdivision in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. As for complainant's other accusations, he basically
riposted: 1. He filled out his son's birth certificate indicating that he and complainant got married on a certain date
and place because he did not want his son to be humiliated or called "putok sa buho." 2. He did not intend to deceive
complainant when he filed the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his first wife. The reason why
he failed to prosecute the case was a purely personal matter. 3. He secured a Senior Citizen card solely to avail of
the discount privileges granted to cardholders. By Resolution 13 dated August 1, 2012, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision within ninety
(90) days. The scheduled preliminary conference was dispensed with following several cancellations. The parties
were required instead to file their verified position papers. Only complainant complied. Report and
Recommendation of the Committee on Bar Discipline- IBP / (CBD-IBP) 11 Order dated September 13, 1999; id at 19.
12 Rollo, pp. 33-34. 13 Id. at 35. Decision 6 A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] In its Report and
Recommendation 14 dated December 19, 2013, the CBD-IBP, through Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera found
respondent liable for gross immorality and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR for Lawyers. Respondent was found to
have failed to live up to the exacting standards of the legal profession by having sexual relation with a woman other
than his wife, aggravated by his utter refusal to give support to the child he fathered with his paramour. The CBD-
IBP recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors Under Resolution No. XXI-2014-812, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the
CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation pertaining to respondent's liability for gross immorality. As for the penalty,
it held that respondent should be disbarred, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and considering Respondent's act of gross
immorality, and his falsification of public documents to feign his marriage to Complainant and acquire a Senior
Citizen Card with intent to use it and avail of the 20% discount, Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is hereby DISBARRED and
his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Ruling We adopt the factual findings, legal conclusions, and penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent is charged with violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, 15 forbidding lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful
conduct. The specific acts he allegedly committed are as follows: 1. Maintaining a sexual relation with complainant
when his marriage with his spouse had not been terminated. 2. Maintaining several other faithless relations with
other women while in permanent relations with his spouse and complainant. 3. Misusing the legal process of filing
a petition for nullity of marriage to convince complainant that he was truly determined to end his marriage with !
his wife. 14 Id. at 120-122. 15 Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Decision 7 ' A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] 4. Falsifying entries in his son's birth certificate.
5. Failing to give child support. 6. Seriously disrespecting the authority and dignity of the IBP when he disregarded
an agreement brokered by the IBP between him and complainant. 7. Deceiving the government and private
businesses by availing of the Senior Citizens' card to which he was not entitled. Clearly, we are not deciding
respondent's professional fitness on the basis of a single and one-off private event in his life. As a rule, we do not
interfere with the privacy right to make decisions on who a lawyer would want to pair himself or herself with. It is
the lawyer's decision to make. As stated in a Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August
4, 2003: Clearly, "immorality" as a category of offense for the dismissal of a public servant or a judicial employee
should not be construed as any violation of moral prescriptions. Otherwise, this tack would only embroil this Court
in the eternal debate on divergent moral theories and systems. For a public servant, the pivotal question in
determining administrative culpability ought to be whether the challenged conduct was ultimately prejudicial to
public service. We cannot snoop into bedrooms and peer under bed covers without running afoul of every person's
constitutionally protected individuality. Quite interestingly, in American jurisprudence, conduct affecting one's
personal character has been excluded from the ambit of actionable behavior. It stressed: "But conduct amounting
to mere irregularity or merely affecting one's character as a private individual is not usually covered by the term
'ma/conduct'." It is more than a matter of sympathy; it is a clear does of justice indeed to conclude that respondent
did not fail to live up to her ethical obligations; in conscience and in law, this Court should be the last, and never, to
cast the stone and stamp the badge of infamy upon her legitimate desire for personal security and safety that in
reality has bothered no one, least of all, our own judicial institution. What we have here is the confluence of
respondent's acts which already spill beyond what happens inside the privacy of one's intimate space. For
respondent's acts here do not just concern him as a private individual. They have crossed the line between what
essentially belongs to an individual's right to privacy on one hand, and a pattern of conduct symptomatic of a clear
disregard for the rights of others by misapplying his knowledge of the law and his profession as a lawyer, on the
other. This is the nexus that makes us act. We are taking objective action because respondent's pattern of conduct
has already impacted on his professional fitness and status as a member of the Bar. / Consider: Decision .. 8 A.C. No.
9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] First. Respondent maintained sexual relation with complainant and several
other faithless contemporaneous relations while his marriage with his lawful spouse was still subsisting. He was not
just in love and lonely and in good faith to establish another solid foundation for a life-long partnership when he
paired with complainant. He made complainant just one of his flings. His pattern of faithlessness, especially his
indiscriminate liaisons, with emphasis on the fact that complainant was his vulnerable client when he first pursued
her --- is a clear and present danger to the profession where utmost fiduciary obligations must be observed. The
victims here are the spouse and the institution of marriage. In the following cases, respondent lawyers were ordered
disbarred for engaging in illicit relations with women, albeit, they were still lawfully married to their respective
spouses: In Guevarra v. Ea/a, 16 respondent was found guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 17 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Ecraela v. Pangalangan, 19
respondent was also found guilty of gross immorality and of violating Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution,
and Canon 1, Rule 1.01,2 ° Canon 7, Rule 7.03,21 and Canon 10, Rule 10.0122 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Dantes v. Dantes, 23 respondent was held guilty of, and ordered disbarred for, grossly immoral
conduct. Finally, in Bustamante v. Alejandro, 24 respondent was held liable for gross immorality. 16 555 Phil. 713
(2007). 17 CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. XXX XXX XXX 18 CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. XXX XXX XXX Rule 7.03
- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. 19 769 Phil. I, 20(2015).
20 Id. 21 Id. 22 CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice. 23 482 Phil. 64 (2004). 24 467 Phil. 139 (2004). XXX XXX XXX ! Decision 9 A.C. No. 9354
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] Second. Respondent misused the legal process by filing a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage without any serious intention to prosecute it. He clearly did it only as a ploy to convince
complainant that he was truly decided to end his marriage with his lawful wife. His excuse that his failure to
prosecute was a "purely personal matter" is flimsy. In any event, if truly he did not use the same as a mere ploy to
serve an illicit purpose, he should have formally withdrawn it. As it was, however, he just left it there to clog the
already clogged docket of the court and waited till it was dismissed. Lawyers are ordained to avoid casual resort to
judicial processes for their personal gain. As officers of the court, they ought to foster respect for court procedures
and processes and be the frontline of defense against those who wittingly and willingly misuse and/or abuse them.
Court processes are, and should forever be, available only for the redress of genuine grievances and should not be
used to suit the whims of unscrupulous individuals. By his actions, respondent undeniably misused and abused the
court processes to suit his whims. Respondent is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz: CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT XXX Rule
10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Third.
Respondent falsified the place and date of marriage entries in the birth certificate of his son. Falsification is a crime.
Falsification of a public document aggravates this crime. That he did so to give the impression to the public that his
son is of legitimate status is foisting a fraud on both the public and his son. This act shows that he is not only prone
to committing a crime, something that should already impact on his fitness to remain as a lawyer, but is also a serial
fraudster. Time and again, lawyers have been reminded of the oath they took, upon admission to the legal
profession, to do no falsehood. This solemn promise does not and will never waver. No amount of justification will
suffice to excuse a lawyer from any act of falsification. As held in Apolinar-Petilo v. Atty. Maramot: 25 The respondent
cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke good faith and good
intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest in his professional
actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard J 25 A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018, citing 451 Phil. 155, 161-162
(2003). Decision 10 A.C. No. 9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] were clear and unambiguous. In Young v.
Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for attorneys, thus: A lawyer
must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth. 24 Fourth. Respondent has repeatedly failed to give child support to his son, a minor. This is contrary to law.
Under the Family Code26 he as a parent is obliged to support and provide everything indispensable for his son's
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation. 27 Too, he has the duty to
instruct his children according to right precepts and good example and to give them love, companionship, and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 28 Respondent failed in this respect. Not only has he evaded
his duty to support his son and deprived him of the love and affection he deserves from him as his father, he has
also displayed an abusive and rude behavior toward his son's mother. He has, therefore, shown himself to be truly
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Fifth. Respondent seriously disrespected the IBP's authority and
dignity when he disregarded an agreement brokered by the IBP between him and complainant. He defied the
undertaking which he voluntarily made before an officer of the IBP. His lack of respect for the authority of the IBP
constitutes disrespect for this Court as well. For the IBP is integrated by the Supreme Court to assist in the
administration of justice, elevate the standards of the legal profession, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibilities more effectively. 29 Canon 7 of the CPR mandates: Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. 26 Art. 195. Subject to
the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceding article: The spouses; Legitimate ascendants and descendants; Parents and their legitimate
children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
27 Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 28 See Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353
Phil. 643, 660-661 (1998). 29 Sec. 2 Art. 1, By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. I Decision 1-1' A.C. No.
9354 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3655] Sixth. Respondent has been deceiving the government and private businesses
by continuously availing of the Senior Citizens' discount when he is not legally entitled thereto. He admitted that he
applied for, and was issued, a Senior Citizen card. He has been using it to enjoy twenty percent (20%) discount on
specific goods and services. This he did by misrepresenting himself as sixty (60) years old when in truth, he was only
then forty-five ( 45). This is plain dishonesty and fraud, again, a transgression of his series of transgressions of his
lawyer's oath to do no falsehood. His temerity in claiming he did it ''for discount purposes only30 " shows an
unscrupulous disregard and disrespect of the law which as a lawyer he ought to have been the first to uphold. It runs
afoul of his duty to promote the dignity of the legal profession and preserve the confidence of the public in lawyers.
By these six ( 6) counts of unlawful, immoral, dishonest, or deceitful conduct, respondent has lost his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar. He is ordered disbarred. Indeed, public confidence in law and lawyers may be
eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Hence, every lawyer is duty bound to act
and comport himself or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.31 Respondent's conduct does not help in that regard, but worse, directly encourages people to entertain
themselves with jokes about lawyers and the legal profession as the butt of their unflattering jokes. WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is found GUILTY of GROSS UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST and DECEITFUL CONDUCT
in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is ORDERED DISBARRED from the
practice of law, his name, STRICKEN OUT the Roll of Attorneys. Let copy of this Decision be: (1) entered into the
personal records of Atty. Amador B. Peleo III with the Office of the Bar Confidant; (2) furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (3) circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance. This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED. ( on official leave) LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Chief Justice 3 ° Comment on Complaint Affidavit, rollo, pp. 33-34. 31 See Alex Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D.
Unto, 426 Phil. 531, 540-541 (2002) ( citations
a