Case 2:19-cv-10452-AB-MAA Document 13 Filed 01/13/20 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:234

1 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP

Crystal Nix-Hines (Bar No. 248073)
2 crystalnixhones@quinnemanuel.com
Jeanine Zalduendo (Bar No. 243374)
3 jeaninezalduendo@quinnemanuel.com
Becca Davis (Bar No. 322765)
4 beccadavis@quinnemanuel.com
865 S. Figueroa St., 10th Floor
5 Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 443-3000
6 Facsimile: (213) 443-3100
7 Attorneys for Defendant Netflix, Inc.
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MONIQUE HICKS, an individual, Case No. 2:19-cv-10452-AB-MAA
12 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION OF DEFENDANT
13 v. NETFLIX, INC. TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S
14 NETFLIX, INC., a Delaware COMPLAINT
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,
15 inclusive, Judge: Hon. André Birotte Jr.
16 Hearing: February 28, 2020
Defendants. Time: 10:00 a.m.
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Place: Courtroom 7B
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Case No. 2:19-cv-10452-AB-MAA
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
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1 TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE

2 ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
3 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 28, 2020, at 10:00 am, or as soon
4 thereafter as the matter may be heard before the Honorable André Birotte in
5 Courtroom 7B of the United States District Court for the Central District of
6 California, 350 W. 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, Defendant Netflix,
7 Inc. will and hereby does move pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
8 Procedure for an order striking the following portions of the Complaint of Plaintiff
9 Monique Hicks:
10 1. Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 1, 13-18, 26-29, 30-33, and 35-
11 40 because they are immaterial to Plaintiff’s legal claims and impertinent.
12 2. Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 26-29, and 30-33 because they
13 are scandalous and prejudicial.
14 This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the Memorandum
15 of Points and Authorities, all materials incorporated into or on which this Motion
16 relies, and any and all materials the Court deems proper.
17 This motion is made following the pre-filing conference of counsel pursuant
18 to L.R. 7-3 which took place on December 17, 2019.
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20 DATED: January 13, 2020 Respectfully submitted,
21 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN LLP
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23 By /s/ Crystal Nix-Hines
Crystal Nix-Hines
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Attorneys for Defendant Netflix, Inc.
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1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 The gravamen of Plaintiff’s lawsuit is that she received an offer to produce a
3 one-hour comedy special for the Netflix streaming service that was, according to
4 Plaintiff, so low, as compared to what other men and women (including other
5 African-Americans) have been offered to produce comedy specials that it
6 constituted racial and gender discrimination in violation of federal and California
7 law.
8 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains page after page of inflammatory allegations
9 concerning events that have no bearing on any of her claims and, for that reason,
10 should be stricken, specifically, allegations about: (1) a 2017 incident in which a
11 former Netflix corporate executive purportedly used a racial slur (and was fired as a
12 result); (2) allegations that an actor made racist statements in 2012 while on the set
13 of a program that a third-party produced, and Netflix distributed on its service; (3)
14 an undated incident between two current and former Netflix executives regarding
15 the expensing of certain costs; (4) the purported pay disparity between a male and
16 female actor on The Crown, which a third-party produced and Netflix distributed on
17 its service; and (5) general data from around the country tending to show the
18 existence of a “pay gap” between African-American women and other persons.
19 Unless stricken, these allegations would unnecessarily expand the scope (and
20 thus the cost) of this lawsuit by requiring discovery into matters that have no bearing
21 on Plaintiff’s claims. And if the case were to be tried, these allegations would
22 distract and confuse the jury and unfairly prejudice Defendant. This Court should
23 grant Defendant’s motion and strike each of these allegations from the Complaint.1
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The Complaint also includes inaccurate allegations about, among other things, the
26 racial and gender composition of Defendant’s senior management team and Board
of Directors. See., e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 20-23. Although these allegations are as equally
27 irrelevant, they are so easily disproven that any incremental discovery would be
28 minimal.

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1 II. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE COMPLAINT’S

2 IMPERTINENT, IMMATERIAL, AND SCANDALOUS MATTER
3 “[T]he function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time
4 and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those
5 issues prior to trial.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993),
6 rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (internal
7 quotations marks omitted). Although “[m]otions to strike are generally regarded
8 with disfavor[,]” Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1162 (C.D.
9 Cal. 2010), a party may move to strike any “insufficient defense or any redundant,
10 immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). See also
11 Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rule
12 12(f) authorizes court to strike “insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
13 impertinent, or scandalous matter”). A motion to strike “is well-taken where it is
14 clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject
15 matter of the litigation.” Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1037
16 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (internal quotations marks omitted).
17 Rule 12(f) recognizes several types of material that are to be stricken, three of
18 which are relevant here:
19  Immaterial matter “is that which has no essential or important
20 relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.”
21 Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527 (internal quotations marks omitted).
22 “A statement of unnecessary particulars in connection with and
23 descriptive of a material matter may be stricken as ‘immaterial’” and
24 “[s]uperfluous historical allegations are properly subject to a motion to
25 strike.” Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Cal. 2005)
26 (citations omitted).
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1  Impertinent allegations that are “neither responsive nor relevant to the

2 issues involved in the action and which could not be put in issue or
3 given in evidence between the parties.” Id. (citations omitted).
4  Scandalous matters “that unnecessarily reflect [] on the moral character
5 of an individual or state [] anything in repulsive language that detracts
6 from the dignity of the court, and include [] allegations that cast a
7 cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person.” Consumer
8 Solutions REO, LLC v. Hillery, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Cal.
9 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
10 A. The Court Should Strike Paragraphs 26-29 Because They Are
11 Immaterial, Impertinent, and Scandalous.
12 Paragraphs 26-29 concern an incident, nearly two years ago, involving the use
13 of a racial slur during an internal meeting, unrelated to television productions, by
14 someone who worked in Netflix’s corporate communications group. The employee
15 was fired, which Plaintiff acknowledges. See Compl. ¶ 28. Plaintiff does not allege
16 that this incident has anything to do with her claims—she does not claim that the
17 employee had any involvement in the negotiation for Plaintiff to produce a comedy
18 special for the Netflix streaming service, nor does Plaintiff assert that she in any
19 way was harmed by the employee’s conduct. These allegations should therefore be
20 stricken as immaterial and impertinent. See Mireskandari v. Daily Mail and Gen.
21 Tr. PLC, 2013 WL 12129642, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013) (“[b]ecause plaintiff
22 does not allege a cause of action based on this purported conduct, the allegations are
23 immaterial and impertinent.”).
24 The Court should also strike these allegations as “scandalous,” as that term is
25 used in Rule 12(f). Allegations are “‘scandalous’ if the matter is unrelated to the
26 controversy or is unduly prejudicial.” Shinde v. Nithyananda Found., 2013 WL
27 1953707, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2013)(striking allegations of sexual misconduct
28 as unsupported character attacks in fraud case); see also Alvarado–Morales v.

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1 Digital Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that scandalous
2 matter includes statements that impugn the character of defendants, and that are
3 superfluous descriptions rather than substantive elements, such as references to
4 concentrations camps, torture, brainwash, etc. in the context of a voluntary incentive
5 resignation plan); Armed Forces Bank, N.A. v. FSG-4, LLC, 2011 WL 5513186 (D.
6 Nev. Nov. 10, 2011) (“‘Scandalous’ generally refers to any allegation that
7 unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in
8 repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court”) (internal citation
9 removed). Paragraphs 26-29 are wholly unrelated to Plaintiff’s claims and exist
10 solely to prejudice the Court, and any eventual jury, against the Defendant and
11 should be stricken. See Survivor Prods. LLC v. Fox Broad. Co., 2001 WL
12 35829267, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2001) (striking allegations as scandalous that
13 described defendant’s work in pejorative terms, such as a “rip-off” of the plaintiff’s
14 program, as allowing them to remain in the complaint “gives the appearance that
15 such [matters] are legally relevant to the dispute”).
16 B. The Court Should Strike Paragraphs 30–33 on the Grounds That
17 They Are Irrelevant, Impertinent, and Scandalous.
18 Paragraphs 30-33 consist of innuendo concerning actor Kevin Spacey, who
19 had no connection to any of Netflix’s dealings with Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that
20 Mr. Spacey used racially-charged language in 2012 about persons providing security
21 services on the set of the series House Of Cards. Plaintiff does not allege that Mr.
22 Spacey’s alleged conduct in 2012 had anything to do with the negotiations more
23 than 5 years later for her to produce a comedy special for Netflix’s service, which
24 forms the basis of her Complaint. These allegations are thus included for no reason
25 other than to “impugn[] the character” of Defendant, and should therefore be
26 stricken as irrelevant, impertinent, and scandalous. Alvarado–Morales, 843 F.2d at
27 618. Allowing these paragraphs to remain in the Complaint would “lend[] artificial
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1 credence” to them and give “the appearance that such [matters] are legally relevant
2 to the dispute.” Survivor, 2001 WL 35829267, at *4.
3 C. The Court Should Strike Paragraphs 35-36 on the Grounds That
4 They Are Irrelevant and Impertinent.
5 Paragraphs 35-36 pertain to an undated incident between Netflix’s current
6 CEO, Reed Hastings, and former Chief Talent Officer, Tawni Nazario-Cranz,
7 regarding the alleged expensing of certain beauty treatments for her corporate team
8 members. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Hastings asked Ms. Nazario-Cranz to publicly
9 explain the reason for these expenditures and that Ms. Nazario-Cranz left Netflix at
10 some point thereafter. These allegations do not pertain in any way to Plaintiff or her
11 claims and should thus be stricken as immaterial and impertinent. See
12 Mireskandari, 2013 WL 12129642, at *5 (striking allegations of blackmail when
13 plaintiff did not allege “a cause of action based on this purported conduct”).
14 D. The Court Should Strike Paragraphs 37-40 on the Grounds That
15 They Are Irrelevant and Impertinent.
16 In Paragraphs 37 through 40, Plaintiff alleges that the lead actress in the series
17 The Crown was paid less than her male counterpart because of a purported
18 “discriminatory culture” at Netflix, and then concedes that the difference was
19 rectified Compl. ¶ 38 and caused Netflix to review its compensation practices.
20 Compl. ¶ 39. The compensation paid to the lead actors on The Crown, an ongoing
21 dramatic series, has no bearing on, or relation to, the fee offered to Plaintiff to
22 produce a one-hour comedy special for Netflix’s streaming service. Plaintiff thus
23 fails to “sufficiently connect” these allegations to the present action, and the
24 allegations should therefore be stricken. See Reiter’s Beer Distribs., Inc. v.
25 Christian Schmidt Brewing Co., 657 F. Supp. 136, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding
26 that “information which has no bearing on the issues in dispute and which is
27 prejudicial to [defendant]” should be stricken as immaterial and irrelevant to the
28 complaint’s allegations); see also Fantasy, Inc., 984 F.2d at 1527–28 (upholding the

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1 striking of immaterial allegations in a counterclaim where the cross-complainant

2 devoted seven pages of factual allegations that were irrelevant to the counterclaim).
3 E. The Court Should Strike Paragraphs 1 and 13–18 Because They
4 Consist of Only General and Historical Information, as Opposed to
5 Information About the Parties.
6 Paragraphs 1 and 13–18 allege historical pay differences across the country
7 between persons of different races and genders. E.g., Compl. ¶ 1(“Black women
8 earn only sixty-one cents ($.61) for every one dollar ($1.00) that a white male
9 earns.”); id. ¶ 18 (“In recent years, pay equity concerns (both gender and
10 gender/race) have blossomed in many industries from entertainment, to sports, to
11 Wall Street, with the birth of the #timesup movement.”). Plaintiff does not tie any
12 of these allegations to the negotiations at issue in her Complaint, and these
13 allegations should therefore be stricken. See, e.g., Reiter’s Beer Distributors, 657 F.
14 Supp. at 144 (striking allegations regarding the “history of litigation in the beer
15 industry in general, and the history of [defendant’s] litigation in particular,” as
16 irrelevant and prejudicial to the defendant); Tildwell v. Cty. of Kern, 2017 WL
17 68146, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (striking in wrongful death action relating to
18 the plaintiffs’ father’s death while in custody, allegations of statistics purporting to
19 show that a large number of people have died while in custody in the U.S., where
20 even if the plaintiffs were to “prove there are a disproportionate number of people
21 who die in jails across the country, [it would] not advance a determination that any
22 of the defendants acted improperly in this case.”).
23 F. Defendant Will Suffer Undo Prejudice If These Paragraphs Are
24 Not Stricken.
25 There can be no doubt that Defendant would be prejudiced if these allegations
26 are not stricken. The possibility that issues will be “unnecessarily complicated or
27 that superfluous pleadings will cause the trier of fact to draw unwarranted inferences
28 at trial is the type of prejudice that is sufficient to support the granting of a motion to

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1 strike.” California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F.
2 Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Mayfield v. Cty. of Merced, 2014 WL
3 5823028, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (striking as immaterial and prejudicial
4 allegations that implied defendant admitted it was an employer under FEHA).
5 The allegations in paragraphs 1, 13-18, 26-29, 30-33, and 35-40 are irrelevant
6 to Plaintiff’s claims. If not stricken, these allegations: (1) would require substantial
7 discovery, which would be expensive and time-consuming; (2) would paint an
8 inflammatory picture of Defendant as a consistent bad actor (even if for unrelated
9 and unsubstantiated claims) in violation of FRE 404; and (3) would consume and
10 waste the jury’s time. Indeed, the confusion caused by unrelated past purported
11 wrongdoing is precisely the type of prejudice courts seek to avoid with motions to
12 strike. See Merritt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2019 WL 1951608, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
13 Mar. 15, 2019) (striking allegations of past lawsuits and settlements unrelated to
14 Plaintiff that could “serve to inflame prejudice against Wells Fargo by insinuating
15 that if others have accused Wells Fargo of wrongdoing, then Plaintiffs’ allegations
16 must be true.”).
17 III. CONCLUSION
18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Defendant’s motion to
19 strike.
20 DATED: January 13, 2020 Respectfully submitted,
21 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN LLP
22
23 By /s/ Crystal Nix-Hines
Crystal Nix-Hines
24
Attorneys for Defendant Netflix, Inc.
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