SAMEER AGENCY v.

CABILES A statute or provision which was declared

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.”

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a
one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain
Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that “she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and
passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted
NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s
decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her
repatriation, and attorney’s fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the
unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.
The Court said that they are aware that the
clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in
Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic
Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light
of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it
is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause,
this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General have failed to show any compelling change in
the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the
three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No.
10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional
for violating the equal protection clause and substantive
due process.
OSEA V. MALAYA ISSUE:

FACTS: Whether Respondent was merely re-assigned and did

not require the mandatory consultation with the Local
Petitioner filed a protest with the Civil Service
School Board under Sec.99 of RA 7160.
Commission. She averred that she was appointed as
OIC, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of HELD:
Camarines Sur, by then DECS Sec.Ricardo T. Gloria, upon
The afore-quoted portion of Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991
the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of
applies to appointments made by the DECS. This is
Camarines Sur. Despite the recommendation of
because at the time of the enactment of the LGC,
Sec.Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed
schools division superintendents were appointed by the
respondent to the position of Schools Division
DECS to specific divisions or locations.
Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Petitioner averred
that respondent’s appointment was made without prior In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued
consultation with the Provincial School Board, in Memorandum Circular No.21, Series of 1994, placing
violation of Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner the positions of schools division superintendent and
prayed that respondent’s appointment be recalled and assistant schools division superintendent within the
set aside for being null and void. career executive service. Consequently, the power to
appoint persons to career executive service positions
Sec. 99 of RA 7610 provides:
was transferred from the DECS to the President.
“Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. — The
Under the circumstances, the designation of
provincial, city or municipal school board shall:
respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of
xxx xxx xxx. Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her
designation partook of the nature of a reassignment
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her
consult the local school boards on the appointment of
functions as OIC Schools Division Superintendent, to
division superintendents, districtsupervisors, school
Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in
principals, and other school officials.”
Sec. 99 of the LGC of 1991 of prior consultation with the
The CSC dismissed petitioner’s protest complaint. The local school board, does not apply. It only refers to
CSC found that President Ramos appointed respondent appointments made by the DECS. Such is the plain
without any specific division. Thus, respondent meaning of the said law.
performed the functions of Schools Division
Appointment should be distinguished from
Superintendent in Iriga City. On November 3, 1997,
reassignment. An appointment may be defined as the
Sec.Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City.
office. When completed, usually with its confirmation,
In dismissing petitioner’s protest, the CSC held that the appointment results in security of tenure for the
Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991 contemplates a situation person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure.
where the DECS issues the appointments, whereas
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a
respondent’s appointment was made by the President,
movement of an employee from one organizational unit
in the exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the
to another in the same department or agency, which
designation of respondent as Schools Division
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary
Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as
and does not require the issuance of an appointment. In
Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the
the same vein, a designation connotes merely the
nature of reassignments, in which case consultation
imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.
with the local school board was unnecessary.
CANET v. DECENA resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be
implemented without an ordinance allowing the
FACTS:
operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax
Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, ordinances Canet mentioned contain general provisions
Camarines Sur while Julieta Decena was the mayor for the issuance of business permits but do not contain
therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be
was allowed to operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the paid in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled “An activities.
Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and
Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the Municipality
of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any
Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof.” This ordinance
was submitted to Decena for her approval but she
denied it because the said ordinance does not contain
rules and regulations as well as a separability clause.
The council then decided to shelf the ordinance
indefinitely.

Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayor’s permit for the

operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canet’s
application on the ground that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the
authority to give licenses for the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the
regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of
gamecocks is vested in the Sangguniang Bayan.
Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as
there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued Decena
on the ground that he should be given a permit based
on the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a
cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances
which generally provide for the issuance of a mayor’s
permit for the operation of businesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a

permit sans a municipal ordinance which would
empower her to do so.

HELD:

No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor’s permit

would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions
of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
but would also be an undue encroachment on Decena’s
administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998
GARCIA v. CORONA, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Energy, CALTEX PHILIPPINES INC., PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. and PETRON CORP.,
respondents
FACTS:
R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key
provisions intended to promote free competition were
shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically,
this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff differential,
stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power, and
interfere with the free interaction of the market forces.
While R.A. 8180 contained a separability clause, it was
declared unconstitutional in its entirety since the three
(3) offending provisions so permeated the law that they
were so intimately the esse of the law. Thus, the whole
statute had to be invalidated. As a result of the Tatad
decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a
new deregulation law without the offending provisions
of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a
member of Congress, has now brought this petition
seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the
time of full deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing
in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law
the economic theory he espouses, petitioner now asks
us, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo a
violation which he claims Congress has committed. The
assailed Section 19 of R.A. 8479 states in full:
Sec. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. — Full deregulation
of the Industry shall start five (5) months following the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, however, That when
the public interest so requires, the President may
accelerate the start of full deregulation upon the
recommendation of the DOE and the Department of
Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining
and the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable, taking into account relevant trends and
prospects; Provided, further, That the foregoing
provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition
Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline
and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products
and said petroleum products shall be covered by the
automatic pricing mechanism during the said period.
Upon the implementation of full deregulation as
provided herein, the Transition Phase is deemed
terminated and the following laws are repealed: a)
Republic Act No. 6173, as amended; b) Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 172, as amended; c) Letter of
Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984; d) Letter
of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as
amended; e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May
9, 1985; f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and g)
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive
Order No. 137: Provided, however, That in case full
deregulation is started by the President in the exercise
of the authority provided in this Section, the foregoing
laws shall continue to be in force and effect with
respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the
rest of the five (5)-month period. Petitioner contends
that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the
period for the removal of price control on gasoline and
other finished products and for the full deregulation of
the local downstream oil industry, is patently contrary
to public interest and therefore unconstitutional
because within the short span of five months, the
market is still dominated and controlled by an oligopoly
of the three (3) private respondents, namely, Shell,
Caltex and Petron. The objective of the petition is
deceptively simple. It states that if the constitutional
mandate against monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade 2 is to be obeyed, there should be
indefinite and open-ended price controls on gasoline
and other oil products for as long as necessary. This will
allegedly prevent the "Big 3" — Shell, Caltex and Petron
— from pricefixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the
indefinite retention of price controls as "partial
deregulation".
ISSUES:
Are the method and the manner chosen by Government
to accomplish its cherished goal offensive to the
Constitution? Is indefinite price control in the manner
proposed by petitioner the only feasible and legal way
to achieve it?
HELD:
Petition is dismissed. The provisions on tariff
differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory
pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged
monopolistic power and interfered with the free
interaction of the market forces. The most important
part of deregulation is freedom from price control.
Indeed, the free play of market forces through
deregulation and when to implement it represent one
option to solve the problems of the oilconsuming
public. R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was
enacted to implement Article XII, Section 19 of the
Constitution which provides: >The State shall regulate
or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed. This is so because the
Government believes that deregulation will eventually
prevent monopoly. The simplest form of monopoly
exists when there is only one seller or producer of a
product or service for which there are no substitutes. In
its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the joint
acquisition or maintenance by members of a
conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the power to
control and dominate trade and commerce in a
commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a
group, to exclude actual or potential competitors from
the field, accompanied with the intention and purpose
to exercise such power. Where two or three or a few
companies act in concert to control market prices and
resultant profits, the monopoly is called an oligopoly or
cartel. It is a combination in restraint of trade. Our
ruling in Tatad is categorical that the Constitution's
Article XII, Section 19, is antitrust in history and spirit. It
espouses competition. We have stated that only
competition which is fair can release the creative forces
of the market. In his recital of the antecedent
circumstances, petitioner repeats in abbreviated form
the factual findings and conclusions which led the Court
to declare R.A. 8180 unconstitutional. The foreign
oligopoly or cartel formed by respondents Shell, Caltex
and Petron, their indulging in price-fixing and
overpricing, their blockade tactics which effectively
obstructed the entry of genuine competitors, the
dangers posed by the oil cartel to national security and
economic development, and other prevailing
sentiments are stated as axiomatic truths. They are
repeated in capsulized context as the current
background facts of the present petition. The empirical
existence of this deplorable situation was precisely the
reason why Congress enacted the oil deregulation law.
The evils arising from conspiratorial acts of monopoly
are recognized as clear and present. But the
enumeration of the evils by our Tatad decision was not
for the purpose of justifying continued government
control, especially price control. The objective was,
rather, the opposite. The evils were emphasized to
show the need for free competition in a deregulated
industry. And to be sure, the measures to address these
evils are for Congress to determine, but they have to
meet the test of constitutional validity. The Court
respects the legislative finding that deregulation is the
policy answer to the problems. It bears stressing that
R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because
deregulation is unconstitutional. The law was struck
down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly
encouraged the continued existence if not the
proliferation of the constitutionally proscribed evils of
monopoly and restraint of trade. In sharp contrast, the
present petition lacks a factual foundation specifically
highlighting the need to declare the challenged
provision unconstitutional. There is a dearth of relevant,
reliable, and substantial evidence to support
petitioner's theory that price control must continue
even as Government is trying its best to get out of
regulating the oil industry. The facts of the petition are,
in the main, a general dissertation on the evils of
monopoly. Petitioner overlooks the fact that Congress
enacted the deregulation law exactly because of the
monopoly evils he mentions in his petition. Congress
instituted the lifting of price controls in the belief that
free and fair competition was the best remedy against
monopoly power. In other words, petitioner's facts are
also the reasons why Congress lifted price controls and
why the President accelerated the process. The facts
adduced in favor of continued and indefinite price
control are the same facts which supported what
Congress believes is an exercise of wisdom and
discretion when it chose the path of speedy
deregulation and rejected Congressman Garcia's
economic theory. The petition states that it is using the
very thoughts and words of the Court in its Tatad
decision. Those thoughts and words, however, were
directed against the tariff differential, the inventory
requirement, and predatory pricing, not against
deregulation as a policy and not against the lifting of
price controls. Petitioner, therefore, engages in a legal
paradox. He fails to show how there can be
deregulation while retaining government price control.
Deregulation means the lifting of control, governance
and direction through rule or regulation. It means that
the regulated industry is freed from the controls,
guidance, and restrictions to which it used to be
subjected. The use of the word "partial" to qualify
deregulation is sugar-coating. Petitioner is really against
deregulation at this time. GR 47800 December 2, 1940
Calalang vs Williams (Social Justice as the aim of Labor
Laws) Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of of all the people. Held: The promotion of social justice is
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue equalization of social and economic forces by the State
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
of one year from the date of the opening of the means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National the adoption by the Government of measures
Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to calculated to insure economic stability of all the
the Director of Public Works the adoption of the competent elements of society, through the
measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the maintenance of a proper economic and social
provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and through the exercise of powers underlying the existence
control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 of all governments on the timehonored principle of
August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore,
indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
Communications, recommended to the latter the interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
approval of the recommendation made by the society and of the protection that should be equally and
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic our social and economic life, consistent with the
to animaldrawn vehicles be limited to the portion fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,
Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his number."
second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during
the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the
rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in
his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition
for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente
Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue: Whether the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security
LUZ FARMS v. DAR
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for
restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without
jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and
Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under
R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to herein petitioner,
and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.
On June 10,1988, the President of the Philippines approved
R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry
and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p.
80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section
11 of R.A. No. 6657.
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and together with others in
the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
promulgated on January 2,1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated
by the DAR on January 9,1989.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988)
is constitutional.
HELD: If legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of
its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary
to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do, as void? This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the
1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
(reason why it was held as the court did)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent. SO ORDERED.
FACTS: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by
the enforcement of CARP. Luz Farms petitions CARP to be
declared unconstitutional together with a writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining the order. The Court resolved to
deny the petition.
Later, after a motion for reconsideration, the Court granted
the motion regarding the injunction and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda.
Luz Farm: Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or
tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%)
of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry
raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all
over the country who use available space in their residence
for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under
"contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry
raisers.
DAR livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under
Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's
International Dictionary, "Agriculture — the art or science of
cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops,
often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of CARP, insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry, swine in its
coverage.
RULING: The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA ISSUE:

FACTS: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in

form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the
possession of deadly weapon” penalized under
People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by
Presidential Decree No. 9?
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
HELD:
involve one basic question of law.
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands
The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII
charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
and XVIII and CFI of Samar
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Several informations were filed before the
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a
abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of
the designation of the offense by the statute and the
Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
motions to quash the said informations after which the
offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the
respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
the said informations on common ground that the
his defense accordingly.
informations did not allege facts constituting ang
offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an 3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9
essential element of the crime, which is, that the states that the intention of such decree is to penalize
carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the
occasion of, connected with, or related to to like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The
lawlessness or public disorder. preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts
or events which justify the promulgation of the decree
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read
and the stiff sanctions provided.
in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law
and order in the country as well as the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence. The non-
inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be
distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal
possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege
that the purpose of possession of the weapon was
intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of
criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The
petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is
basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or conduct
that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal
also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is
immaterial and that the commission of the act is
voluntary is enough.
CHAN v. KEH
Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated
during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the
Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions
made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation
MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control”
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by
MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all
acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their
authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws.
And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the
interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to
annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of
courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political
judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the
occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not
have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial
processes, which would be in violation of international
law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A
statute ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result
from a particular construction, or great mischief done,
such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to
presume that such construction was not intended by
the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate
international law, therefore what MacArthur said
should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of
any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such
laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from
him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not
become, by being continued as required by the law of
nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature,
“law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course,
the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired
sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as
the said courts and laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until
now, it follows that the same courts may continue
exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending
therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government, until abolished or the laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the
said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the

Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:

1. International law says the acts of a de facto

government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other

governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate
the law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue

hearing the case pending before it.

***3 kinds of de facto government: one established

through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
itself against the will of the rightful government)

through occupation (established and maintained by

military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government
of paramount force)

through insurrection (established as an independent

government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state)
FACTS: The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors'
wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition
Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a
extends to a supervisors' local union applying for
petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter
membership in a national federation the members of
seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of
which include local unions of rank and file employees.
supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines (Pepsi). The
The intent of the law is clear especially where, as in this
petition was granted, but with the explicit statement
case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with
that PCEU was affiliated with Union de Obreros
those employees whom they directly supervise in their
Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file
own bargaining unit.
unions, the PCLU and the PEUP.

Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with the BLR

against PCEU, on the grounds that: (a) the members of In the collective bargaining process, managerial
PCEU were managers and (b) a supervisors' union employees are supposed to be on the side of the
cannot affiliate with a federation whose members employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it
include the rank and file union of the same company. It that its interests are well protected. The employer is not
also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to suspend the assured of such protection if these employees
certification election. themselves are union members. It is the same reason
that impelled this Court to consider the position of
PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as
confidential employees as included in the
amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a local union
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
composed of supervisory employees from being
disqualification of confidential employees were written
affiliated to a federation which has local unions with
in the provision. Said employees may act as spies of
rank-and-file members as affiliates. Furthermore, Book
either party to a collective bargaining agreement.
V, Rule II, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code provides the grounds for cancellation of
the registration certificate of a labor organization, and
the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the
grounds.

However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the PCEU

issued a resolution withdrawing from the UOEF.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated with the rank-

and-file unions.

HELD:

PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation made the case

moot and academic. But for the guidance of others
similarly situated, the Court ruled No.

If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where

supervisors would merge with the rank and file or
where the supervisors' labor organization would
represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors'
union should not be allowed to affiliate with the
national federation of union of rank-and-file employees
where that federation actively participates in union
activity in the company.