Noah Star 30 Cards

455353525.
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No TK for US—destabilizes international norms against killing leaders—ensures proliferation

Bynam 06—(Do Targeted Killings Work, Daniel Bynum, Professor at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Foreign Affairs,
2006)
Yet because targeted killings are not widely accepted as a legitimate instrument of state, the United States risks
diminishing its status as an upholder of the rule of law if it embraces them. The killings also raise normative problems.
There is a general rule in foreign policy against the elimination of world leaders, and this norm has served the United States
well. Neither the U.S. government nor the Israeli one, for that matter, would want targeted killings to become a widely
used instrument, since this would make its own citizens and o⁄cials more vulnerable. Cuba, for example, could define exiles
living in Miami as terrorists, as could Syria Lebanese leaders calling for an end to Syrian dominance of their country. The
idea that such figures could be eliminated as terrorists may seem absurd on its face. But one need only remember the
Chilean government’s killing of Orlando Letelier, a former o⁄cial in Salvador Allende’s government, with a car bomb in
Washington, D.C., in 1976 to realize that the policy could pose a real danger. That no commonly accepted international
definition of terrorism exists makes it even harder to establish generally accepted rules about when targeted killings are
permissible.
US can’t maintain the intelligence structure required for successful TK—Al Qaeda and other groups are
constantly moving—rapid fire capabilities are key to success—subsumes their internal warrants
2006)
There are also more practical reasons why the United States should be wary of targeted killings. Because of profound
diaerences between the Israeli and U.S. cases, were Washington to broadly adopt this particular Israeli policy, it would find
it ineaective and ultimately unsustainable. One crucial distinction between the two countries lies in the nature and the
location of their enemies. Israel faces Palestinian terrorists operating from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—mere miles
from Israel proper and territory that Israel has controlled oa and on since 1967. The United States, in contrast, faces a far
more diause and global threat. Al Qaeda and a⁄liated jihadists now operate throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Europe. It would be impossible for the United States to maintain a vast intelligence presence, not to mention a rapid-strike
capability, in all or even a few of these places.
International condemnation nullifies any tactical success of US TK policy—cooperation is key to counter

terror.
2006)
It is true that the governments of some countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen, do not exercise full
control over their territory or lack the capacity or the will to arrest important suspects. In such areas, targeted killings
should be an option since there is no “sovereignty” to violate. But even there the United States must consider the goodwill
of its allies more than Israel does. International condemnation of U.S. actions directly aaects U.S. counterterrorism eaorts,
since much of Washington’s “war on terrorism” is waged with or in cooperation with other countries’ police and security
services. The capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammad (one of the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks) involved the intense
cooperation of the security services of Germany, Pakistan, and Switzerland. A decision by Germany, Malaysia, Morocco, or
other states with a major jihadist presence to stop actively cooperating with Washington could be devastating. Israel may
not care what other countries think; in this eaort, at least, the United States has to.
Successful US TK policy requires transparent and clear legal framework for use—key to rapid fire
capability and mitigates international qualms
2006)
Even more important, Washington needs to develop clear, transparent, and legitimate procedures for deciding when
targeted killings are appropriate. The lack of such procedures has bedeviled U.S. counterterrorism efforts for years, in two
quite different ways. During the Clinton administration, there were repeated attempts to strike at bin Laden, but few of
these efforts ever got off the ground, and the ones that did obviously failed to succeed. A combination of limited remote-
strike capabilities, fragmentary intelligence, and caution in authorizing such operations led to agonizing missed
opportunities. After 9/11, the Bush administration abandoned such caution, abolishing many long-standing limits on U.S.
action and authorizing a range of more aggressive measures, such as secret prisons, domestic surveillance without court
authorization, the holding of captured terrorists as enemy combatants, and the rendition of suspects to third countries for
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455353525.doc Lexington 2010 2
interrogation. But these measures have provoked an international outcry and have caused some Americans to question the
legitimacy of their government’s counterterrorism policy. Unless the procedures for authorizing targeted killings are made
clear, the United States risks moving either too slowly when it decides to act (thereby allowing the target to escape) or too
quickly (bypassing appropriate deliberation or the careful vetting of intelligence). A public educated about the need for
distasteful measures would be more likely to tolerate them, even if mistakes are made in their implementation. Unless the
procedures are made transparent, in other words, they are unlikely to garner the legitimacy necessary to make them sustain-
able. This is an area where the United States, and particularly the Bush administration, would do well to study the Israeli
experience carefully. A key reason that most Israeli counterterrorism policies have enjoyed sustained popular support is that
they have been subjected to public debate. Without such a debate, a policy can be held hostage to perfection. If policies
are not endorsed beforehand by the public and the political opposition, they will provoke intense contro- versy when abuses
and mistakes occur—as they inevitably will.
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan—targets enemies of the state

Mayer 09—(Jane Mayer, The Political Scene, The New Yorker, 2009)
The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military's version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an extension
of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror suspects around the world, including in countries where
U.S. troops are not based. It was initiated by the Bush Administration and, according to Juan Zarate, a counterterrorism
adviser in the Bush White House, Obama has left in place virtually all the key personnel. The program is classified as
covert, and the intelligence agency declines to provide any information to the public about where it operates, how it selects
targets, who is in charge, or how many people have been killed. Nevertheless, reports of fatal air strikes in Pakistan emerge
every few days. Such stories are often secondhand and difficult to confirm, as the Pakistani government and the military
have tried to wall off the tribal areas from journalists. But, even if a precise account is elusive, the outlines are clear: the
C.I.A. has joined the Pakistani intelligence service in an aggressive campaign to eradicate local and foreign militants, who
have taken refuge in some of the most inaccessible parts of the country.
Drones strikes are key to broader Afghanistan withdrawal

With public disenchantment mounting over the U.S. troop deployment in Afghanistan, and the Obama Administration
divided over whether to escalate the American military presence there, many in Washington support an even greater
reliance on Predator strikes. In this view, the U.S., rather than trying to stabilize Afghanistan by waging a counter-
insurgency operation against Taliban forces, should focus purely on counterterrorism, and use the latest technology to
surgically eliminate Al Qaeda leaders and their allies. In September, the conservative pundit George Will published an
influential column in the Washington Post, "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan," arguing that "America should do only what
can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, air strikes and small, potent Special Forces units,
concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters." Vice-President Joseph Biden
reportedly holds a similar view.
Predator Drone program has pushed Al Qaeda to the brink

The Predator program is described by many in the intelligence world as America's single most effective weapon against Al
Qaeda. In May, Leon Panetta, the C.LA.'s director, referred to the Predator program as "the only game in town" in an
unguarded moment after a public lecture. Counterterrorism officials credit drones with having killed more than a dozen
senior Al Qaeda leaders and their allies in the past year, eliminating more than half of the C.I.A.'s twenty most wanted "high
value" targets. In addition to Baitullah Mehsud, the list includes Nazimuddin Zalalov, a former lieutenant of Osama bin
Laden; Ilyas Kashmiri, Al Qaeda's chief of paramilitary operations in Pakistan; Saad bin Laden, Osama's eldest son; Abu
Sulayman al-Jazairi, an Algerian Al Qaeda planner who is believed to have helped train operatives for attacks in Europe and
the United States; and Osama al-Kini and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Al Qaeda operatives who are thought to have
played central roles in the 1998 bombings of American embassies in East Africa. Juan Zarate, the Bush counterterrorism
adviser, believes that "Al Qaeda is on its heels" partly because "so many bigwigs" have been killed by drones. Though he
acknowledges that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the group's top leaders, remain at large, he estimates that no
more than fifty members of Al Qaeda's senior leadership still exist, along with two to three hundred senior members outside
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the terror organization's "inner core." Zarate and other supporters of the Predator program argue that it has had positive
ripple effects. Surviving militants are forced to operate far more cautiously, which diverts their energy from planning new
attacks. And there is evidence that the drone strikes, which depend on local informants for targeting information, have
caused debilitating suspicion and discord within the ranks. Four Europeans who were captured last December after trying to
join Al Qaeda in Pakistan described a life of constant fear and distrust among the militants, whose obsession with drone
strikes had led them to communicate only with elaborate secrecy and to leave their squalid hideouts only at night. As the
Times has reported, militants have been so unnerved by the drone program that they have released a video showing the
execution of accused informants. Pakistanis have also been gripped by rumors that paid C.I.A. informants have been
planting tiny silicon-chip homing devices for the drones in the tribal areas.
CIA has a methodology for targeted killing just classified.

Though the C.I.A:s methodology remains unknown, the Pentagon has created elaborate formulas to help the military make
such lethal calculations. A top military expert, who declined to be named, spoke of the military's system, saying, "There's a
whole taxonomy of targets." Some people are approved for killing on sight. For others, additional permission is needed. A
target's location enters the equation, too. If a school, hospital, or mosque is within the likely blast radius of a missile, that,
too, is weighed by a computer algorithm before a lethal strike is authorized. According to the recent Senate Foreign
Relations Committee report, the U.S. military places no name on its targeting list until there are "two verifiable human
sources" and "substantial additional evidence" that the person is an enemy.
Drone strikes create anti-American sentiment

After such attacks, the Taliban, attempting to stir up anti-American sentiment in the region, routinely claims, falsely, that
the victims are all innocent civilians. In several Pakistani cities, large protests have been held to decry the drone program.
And, in the past year, perpetrators of terrorist bombings in Pakistan have begun presenting their acts as "revenge for the
drone attacks." In recent weeks, a rash of bloody assaults on Pakistani government strongholds has raised the spectre that
formerly unaligned militant groups have joined together against the Zardari Administration. David Kilcullen, a counter-
insurgency warfare expert who has advised General David Petraeus in Iraq, has said that the propaganda costs of drone
attacks have been disastrously high. Militants have used the drone strikes to denounce the Zardari government -- a shaky
and unpopular regime -- as little more than an American puppet. A study that Kilcullen co-wrote for the Center for New
American Security, a think tank, argues, "Every one of these dead non-combatants represents an alienated family, a new
revenge feud, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have
increased." His co-writer, Andrew Exum, a former Army Ranger who has advised General Stanley McChrystal in
Afghanistan, told me, "Neither Kilcullen nor I is a fundamentalist -- we're not saying drones are not part of the strategy. But
we are saying that right now they are part of the problem. If we use tactics that are killing people's brothers and sons, not to
mention their sisters and wives, we can work at cross-purposes with insuring that the tribal population doesn't side with the
militants. Using the Predator is a tactic, not a strategy."
Drones strikes are key to counter terrorism in Yemen

Plaw 08—(The Legality of Targeted Killnig as an Instrument of War: The Case of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, Avery Plaw,
PolySci, Department, UMass Dartmouth, 2008)
On 3 November 2002 a CIA-controlled Predator unmanned aerial vehicle appeared over a car speeding along an isolated
highway 100 miles east of Sanaa, the capital of Yemen. The Predator launched a laser-guided hellfire missile which struck
the target and exploded, leaving only charred remains. American and Yemeni officials claimed that the cars’ occupants had
been six members of al-Qaeda, including Qaed Salim Sinan al- Harethi, one of the terrorists the CIA believed to be
responsible for the bombing of the US destroyer Cole in 2000. Based only on the carbonized remains, forensics specialists
were unable to confirm the identity of the victims. (Calhoun 2003: 209-10) Despite the difficulties with identification, Paul
D. Wolfowitz, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense praised the venture as “a very successful tactical operation,” and
indicated that such operations would be a key element in America’s arsenal in fighting the new war on terrorism. (BBC
News 2002) In fact, American officials now acknowledge having carried out at least 19 successful targeting operations in
the war on terror.
al-Harethi kill proves permissibility—targeted killing was the only to avoid further damage
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Still, defenders of the US operation may point out that even if al-Harethi did not pose an instantaneous danger at the
moment that he was targeted, there appears to be some evidence that he may nonetheless have posed an imminent danger to
others in the near future. Although official records are not available to the public, a number of commentators have reported
the traces of explosives were found in the wreckage of the SUV. If this is so, then there may be reason to believe that al-
Harethi was in an advanced stage of planning or even carrying out a terrorist attack. A case may also be made that he was
attempting to flee Yemeni jurisdiction. Either or both of these circumstances could be offered as a rationale for the use of
lethal force.
Targeting al-Harethi likely prevented further attacks—proper use of self defense

The first question that needs to be answered is whether continued attacks could reasonably be expected. There is a strong
case that the answer is “yes”, especially if the plausible charge that he had been personally involved in the attack on the
USS Cole is accepted. Al-Harethi would then have shown his willingness and capacity to participate directly in armed
terrorist attacks. He also appears to have remained an active al-Qaeda leader. The organization continued to promise further
attacks. Al-Harethi had also resisted arrest with lethal consequences and become a fugitive from the law in Yemen. He was
located traveling with known terrorists and al-Qaeda members, and, if reports from the scene are accurate, in possession of
explosives. While all of this evidence iscircumstantial, together it strongly suggests that a further attack could reasonably be
expected. The next question (the second concerned with necessity) is whether there were “alternative means for putting an
end to the operations of the armed bands or terrorists”? Following the failure to successfully arrest al-Harethi with 20
casualties, and despite the deployment of extensive force, it was reasonable conclude that arrest was not a plausible option -
except perhaps under highly favorable circumstances. In the absence of such circumstances, it was reasonable, at least in
the context of self-defense, to resort to the use of force.
Targeted killing is biopolitical—surveillance networks that calculate the risk of life and death
Laruen Wilcox, Political Theory Colloquium, 2009
In discourse of precision warfare, the deaths of civilians occupy a substantial, if not crucial, role. The sparing of civilian
lives is given as a key rationale (second only to protecting the lives of servicemen and women) for the development and use
of precision munitions. In this way, precision warfare is a key component of the entry of biopolitical rationality into the
sphere of war. Foucault considers biopower to be the power “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the
realm of explicit calculation and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life,” (Foucault 1978, 143).
Precision bombing, as part of the liberal way of war, may be said to operate as part of the network of biopower through
surveillance and precision targeting on behalf of war ostensibly fought for humanitarian reasons. Along with discipline,
biopower constitutes one of the “two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (the other
being discipline) (Foucault 1978, 139). Biopower concerns the supervision and intervention regarding the biological
processes of birth, mortality, health, and life expectancy. Liberal, high-tech wars embody biopolitical warfare, through
which the logic and practice of precision bombing are emblematic. The very nature of precision bombing is of calculated
risk, of circular error probabilities, that the bomb will hit its target. Throughout the twentieth century, different technologies
have allowed the CEP to decrease. Death is rendered calculable—that is, the destruction of the target. Death for civilians is
also understood in this framework of risk and probability. As one proponent writes, “[Precision munitions] should be our
weapon of choice because it is the most discriminate, prudent and risk-free weapon in our arsenal,” (Melinger 2001).
Targeted killing embodies an ethic that allows us to ignore the humanity of life and death and instead
rule murder accidental
Precision bombing is a discourse that is performative of a moral order which allows for the deaths of some as ‘accidents’ at
the hands of bombers and planners who are seemingly omnipotent. Judith Butler writes, “the limits of constructivism are
exposed at those boundaries of bodily life where abjected or delegitimized bodies fail to ‘count’ as bodies,” (Butler 1993,
15). If noted at all, the deaths of civilians are ‘accidental,’ and they remain unseen, their deaths ungrievable and uncounted
as a means of official policy. These people are the abject bodies that reveal the workings of power and the current political
order. Rather than an effect of the distance between bomber and victim, the killability of the victims can be read as a result
of social/material intra-actions. A reading of precision bombing given the framework for theorizing bodies that I’ve
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articulated above as cultural and material, socially produced and productive/resistance as well marked by difference, tells a
different story about bodies and precision bombing than the usual narrative. Rather than allowing for the deaths of some
bodies in order to spare the lives of others, this chapter describes the multiple bodies produced by material/discursive
practices that theorize bodies as produce in relation to one another as well as technologies and discursive practices. In this
theorization, we see the violent practices of precision-bombing as performatively constituting bodies marked by race, and
‘killability’ as well as omniscience and god-like qualities. These figures are not prior to the practices of precision-bombing,
but exist in relation to one other as the result of the intra-action between discursive practices and the materiality of bodies
and technology.
Targeted killing is the evolution of the constant desire for perfect war—continuing its use will only
further violence as wwe find ways to minimize loss and risk while desensitizing our humanity
Foucault’s critique of power/knowledge is also particularly relevant in terms of precision bombing. That bodies are made
intelligible through knowledgeable discourses focuses our attention on the ways in which the knowledge that is used in
bombing is produced. The aspiration for total sight, total destructive capability for the entire globe is not limited to the
specifics of precision weapons systems, but is a defining component to the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. The
RMA is a discourse in which information is central to warfare, as “the new metaphysic of power” in warfare (Dillon and
Reid 2001, 59). The creation, control, and transfer of information are crucial components of the liberal war machine.
Proponents of the RMA proclaim knowledge as the foundation of American military supremacy. (Nye and Owens 1996).
“Total Information Awareness,” is the goal of the Information Awareness Office, a DARPA program formerly symbolized
by an all-seeing eye casting its laser-like gaze over the entire planet. The motto is, fittingly, ‘scientia est potentia,’ or
‘knowledge is power’. Ostensibly de-funded in 2003, its key projects have been funded under other programs. This is but
one example of the goal of a global ‘panopticon’ in order to ensure military superiority. This omniscient power is
productive of a division of the world between those with the super-human visual capabilities and the objects of that
knowledge, produced as potential terrorists under the disciplining gaze.
Precision warfare is also characterized by risk-aversion in both the means of fighting and reasons for war. While precision
warfare involves constant calculation of risks to both soldiers and civilians, it should be noted that ‘risk’ as prevalent
concern is not a concept that is essential and unavoidable. Kessler and Werner note, “risk is not a ‘thing’ independent of
human practices or social relations. It is not a property of an objectively given reality, nor is it a psychological law. Rather,
risk names the boundary of both what is known and unknown and the particular war in which the ‘unknown’ is made
known,” (Kessler and Werner 2008). Risks are a product of specific discourses of threat and danger on one hand, and
technologies of control on the other.
Drone strikes in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen are key to the US overall counterterrorism strategy
Anderson 09—(Predators Over Pakistan, 2009, Kenneth Anderson, Visiting Fellow at Hoover Task Force of National Security and
Law)
The aggressive expansion of the Predator targeted killing program is the Obama administration’s one unambiguous
innovation in the war against terrorists. The adaptation of UAV surveillance craft into missile platforms took place as an
improvisation in 2002 under the Bush administration—but its embrace as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism
operations belongs to Obama. It is not the whole of it—the Obama administration has expanded joint operations with
Pakistan and Yemen, and launched commando operations in Somalia against terrorists. But of all the ways it has undertaken
to strike directly against terrorists, this administration owns the Predator drone strategy. It argued for it, expanded it, and
used it, in the words of the president’s State of the Union address, to “take the fight to al Qaeda.” As al Qaeda, its affiliates,
and other transnational jihadists seek shelter in lightly governed places such as Yemen or Somalia, the Obama
administration says the United States will follow them and deny them safe haven. Speak- ing at West Point, the president
obliquely referred to so- called targeted killings—we will have to be “nimble and precise” in the use of military power, he
said, adding that “high-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we have stepped up the pressure on al
Qaeda worldwide.” The Predator drone strategy is a rare example of something that has gone really, really well for the
Obama administration. Counterterrorism “on offense” has done better, ironically, under an administration that hoped it
could just play counterterrorism on defense—wind down wars, wish away the threat as a bad dream from the Bush years,
hope the whole business would fade away so it could focus on health care. Yet for all that, the Obama administration,
through Predator strikes, is taking the fight to the enemy. And, let’s face it, in dealing with terrorist groups in ungoverned
places in the world, we have few good options besides UAVs. Drones permit the United States to go directly after terrorists,
rather than having to fight through whole countries to reach them. Maybe that’s not enough to win. Maybe “light-footprint”
counterterrorism via drones turns out to be just the latest chimera in the perennial effort to find a way to win a war through
strategic airpower. Yet even in a serious counterinsurgency on ground, drones will still be important as a means of
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attacking terrorists while clearing and holding territory. The upshot? As long as we engage in counterterrorism, drones will
be a critical part of our offense.
When a non-state actor attacks a state it triggers the right to self defense—international law proves
Paust 10—(Jordan J Paust, Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 2010, Journal of
Transnational Law & Policy, 2010)
The vast majority of writers agree that an armed attack by a non-state actor on a state, its embassies, its military, or other
nationals abroad can trigger the right of self-defense addressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, even if selective
respon- [*239] sive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a foreign country. 3 Article 51 of the Charter
expressly affirms the right of a [*240] [*241] state to respond defensively "if an armed attack occurs," 4 and nothing in
the language of Article 51 restricts the right to engage in self-defense actions to circumstances of armed attacks by a "state."
5 Moreover, nothing in the language of the Charter requires a conclusion lacking in common sense that a state being
attacked can only defend itself within its own borders. General patterns of practice over time and general patterns of legal
expectation concerning the propriety of self-defense confirm these recognitions.
The US doesn’t need consent to engage in targeted killing drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan—
international law proves
Nothing in the language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or in customary international law reflected therein or in
pre-Charter practice noted in Part I requires consent of the state from which a non-state actor armed attack is emanating and
on whose territory a self-defense action takes place against the non- state actor. In fact, with respect to permissible
measures of self-defense under Article 51, a form of consent of each member of the United Nations already exists in
advance by treaty. In contrast, consent generally would be required for ordinary law enforcement measures, 33 but selective
use of armed force in self-defense is not [*250] simplistically "law enforcement" whether the measures of self-defense are
used in time of war or relative peace. For these reasons, with respect to U.S. use of drones in Pakistan to target al Qaeda
and Taliban leaders and fighters, it is clear that the U.S. would not need the express consent of Pakistan to carry out self-
defense targeting. 34 It is also clear that the U.S. has the right to use drones in Pakistan under Article 51 of the Charter in
self-defense to protect U.S. troops from a continual process of al Qaeda and Taliban attacks 35 on U.S. military personnel
and others in Afghanistan that have emanated or been directed partly from [*251] territory in Pakistan for several years
during a continuing international armed conflict and when al Qaeda and Taliban fighters move back and forth across the
porous border that neither country effectively controls. Some might claim that Article 51 self-defense measures in response
to attacks that involve "armed cross-border incursions" by "militant groups" that "remain active along a border for a
considerable period of time" and cause continued death and destruction do not create a right of self-defense 36 and that,
absent consent, self-defense measures involving significant force may only be used on the territory of a state that is
responsible for an armed attack on the defending state. 37
Targeted Killing doesn’t trigger a state of war

Additionally, it is error to assume that a state of war necessarily exists between a state and non-state actor whenever a state
that has been subjected to an armed attack by a non-state actor responds against the non-state actor with military force,
since the minimal level of war or armed conflict under international law involves an armed conflict not of an international
character or an [*260] insurgency 52 and some non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, do not meet the test for insurgent status.
53 Moreover, the United States does not have to be at war with al Qaeda in order to target their members in self-defense.
No one argues that self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter can only be engaged in during war. 54 For these reasons,
Article 51 self-defense actions provide a paradigm that is potentially different than either a mere law enforcement or war
paradigm, and it is understood that military force can be used in self-defense when measures are reasonably necessary and
proportionate. The Charter-based "inherent right" of self-defense in case of an armed attack by a non-state actor and the
self- defense paradigm are also partly outside the state-to-state use of force paradigm requiring attribution to a state of non-
state actor attacks [*261] before a responding state can target the military forces of the other state as opposed to targeting
merely the non-state actors.
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Targeted Killing doesn’t violate the human right to life

Additionally, it is error to assume that a state of war necessarily exists between a state and non-state actor whenever a state
that has been subjected to an armed attack by a non-state actor responds against the non-state actor with military force,
since the minimal level of war or armed conflict under international law involves an armed conflict not of an international
character or an [*260] insurgency 52 and some non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, do not meet the test for insurgent
status. 53 Moreover, the United States does not have to be at war with al Qaeda in order to target their members in self-
defense. No one argues that self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter can only be engaged in during war. 54 For these
reasons, Article 51 self-defense actions provide a paradigm that is potentially different than either a mere law enforcement
or war paradigm, and it is understood that military force can be used in self-defense when measures are reasonably
necessary and proportionate. The Charter-based "inherent right" of self-defense in case of an armed attack by a non-state
actor and the self- defense paradigm are also partly outside the state-to-state use of force paradigm requiring attribution to a
state of non-state actor attacks [*261] before a responding state can target the military forces of the other state as opposed
to targeting merely the non-state actors.
Accurate determinations of collateral damage from targeted killing are impossible

In view of this well-known admonition, if al Qaeda and Taliban fighters purposely intermix with civilians who take no
active part in hostilities in an effort to shield themselves, they are violating [*277] the prohibition of use of human shields
and resultant deaths of civilians can be their responsibility if targetings of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are otherwise
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Nonetheless, Article 51(8) affirms that "[a]ny violation of these prohibitions
shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and
civilians." 106 Were some of the civilian deaths attributable to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters intermixing with civilians in
order to shield themselves? Were some of the civilians even "voluntary shields?" 107 If so, were target selections and actual
targetings in such circumstances adequately attentive to principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality? A mere
listing of the number of civilian deaths during a given time period does not allow full consideration whether some
"civilians" were taking a direct and active part in hostilities, whether some were intermixed with al Qaeda and Taliban
fighters who used them as shields, 108 and whether other features of context were relevant with respect to application of
principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality.
Targeted Killing is permissible when used against non-state actors for self-defense
As this article affirms, self-defense can be permissible against non-state actor armed attacks, and measures of self-defense
can occur in the territory of another state without special consent of the other state or imputation of the armed attacks to that
state as long as the measures of self-defense are directed against the non- state actors. Additionally, when directed merely
against the non-state actors, responsive force is not engaged in against the foreign state as such or as an attack "on" or
"against" its territory. Responsive measures of self-defense in a foreign state would not necessarily create a state of war
between the responding state and the foreign state, or between the responding state and the non-state actors; and whether or
not an armed conflict exists to which the laws of war apply would be tested under normal criteria with respect to the
existence of an international or non-international armed conflict. It is understandable, therefore, that a self- defense
paradigm can be different than a war paradigm, and both are dif- [*280] ferent than a mere law enforcement paradigm.
During a lawful self-defense response, targeted killings and the capture of non- state actor fighters and others who are
directly and actively engaged in non-state actor armed attacks can be permissible no matter where such forms of direct
participation occur. Human rights law applies in all social contexts, but whether a particular person has protection can
depend on whether that person is within the jurisdiction or "effective control" of a responding state. When a person is
protected, the general human right to life is a right to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life and does not provide a
guarantee that would not otherwise result from the application of a higher standard of protection through use of general
principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality that are applicable during war or in the context of self-defense
outside of war. When engaging in permissible self- defense targetings, a state must comply with such general principles
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7
whether or not an armed conflict exists.
Drone strikes are key to stop al-Qaeda

Simon and Stevenson 9 (Steven Simon - Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at CFR; Jonathan, Stevenson-
Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College; Survival, Volume 51, Issue 5 October 2009)
Accordingly, Washington might continue its current policy of eliminating al-Qaeda's leadership through targeted killing.
Although it is a controversial policy, the Obama administration's position in the freighted domestic policy debate on the
nature of counter-terrorism is entirely consistent with it. Despite its declared post-11 September national security policy,
which acknowledged roles for both law enforcement and military force in combating terrorism, in practice the Bush
administration gave short shrift to law enforcement and strongly favoured military measures. Obama, both during the
presidential campaign and after assuming office, decried what he and others viewed as the excessive militarisation of
counter-terrorism in practice, and endorsed a more fluid, open-minded and pragmatic approach. While he would prefer to
fight transnational terrorists with law-enforcement tools, he understood that that could not always be done effectively. In
particular, he realised that the United States could not, practically speaking, dispatch FBI special agents to Pakistan's
anarchical tribal areas and other ungoverned spaces in an unmarked Ford Crown Victoria to arrest al-Qaeda suspects and
bring them back to federal district court in Washington for trial, so measures like targeted killing from drones were needed.
Thus, Obama continued and in fact ramped up the targetedkilling policy when he became president. The new president
confirmed his instrumental view of counter-terrorism in an impassioned but grounded May 2009 speech, in which he stated
for the record that the counter-terrorism tool chosen should fit the particular circumstances. Though he nodded clearly to
the preferred status of the lawenforcement approach in focusing on closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and
ending the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, he also argued more generally for 'strategically applying our
power' as well as our principles, and doing so 'pragmatically'. The president further noted that 'absolutists' on the 'national
security' and the 'law enforcement' side of the counter-terrorism debate were both wrong, and endorsed a middle course of
'common sense'.12 One key implication of the speech was that re-orientating American counter-terrorism policy away from
the use of military force would render Islamist militancy more containable by demonstrating US restraint and emphasising
American respect for the rule of law. The other, though, was that military force remained indispensable in certain
circumstances. It does appear that targeted killing, while only an operational tool and not a strategic solution in itself, can
help manage a terrorist threat.13 Open-source information indicates that the recent US campaign in Pakistan, in particular,
has been effective. Over the past 18 months or so, the United States has used two related types of unmanned aerial vehicles,
the Predator and the faster, higheraltitude Reaper, which is capable of carrying two Hellfire anti-tank missiles and
precision-guided bombs, to attack individuals and safe houses, eliminating about a dozen key al-Qaeda operatives and
dozens more other militants. There were 36 such attacks in 2008 and about 20 in the first eight months of 2009. As of the
end of August 2009, they had eliminated Abu Jihad al-Masri, al-Qaeda's intelligence chief; Khalid Habib, head of its
Pakistan operations and fourth in the chain of command overall; Abu Khabab al-Masri, the group's ranking explosives
expert; and Abu Laith al-Libi, al-Qaeda's commander in Afghanistan. One of the missiles killed Pakistan Taliban leader
Baitullah Mehsud in August.14 The success of the air-strikes has resulted from improved technical and human intelligence
on al-Qaeda operations in the border area. The logic of the strategy is to make it increasingly difficult for al-Qaeda to
repopulate its command structure, and US officials believe the programme has produced the broadest and deepest impact on
al-Qaeda senior leadership in several years. Continued success could yield the practical neutralisation of al-Qaeda in
Pakistan. Bureaucratically, the Obama administration has already set the table for adopting this strategy: for FY 2010, it has
requested $79.7m for Hellfire missiles and $489.4m for 24 Reapers, nearly doubling the 2009 number
Drones are key to fight insurgency

AFP 2010 (Hasbanullah Khan, staff writer, “US drone strike kills 11 militants in Pakistan”,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5itkGEuTypV0dIZ8trtmL2R58h1iA)
A fresh surge in US missile strikes has killed 75 militants since September 3 in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt, which
Washington has branded a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous spot on Earth. On Tuesday, 11 militants
were killed in a drone attack on the village of Bushnarai in Shawal district, a known stronghold of Taliban warlord Hafiz
Gul Bahadur which is populated by Arab fighters. Another four militants were killed that day in Qutabkhel village south of
Miranshah when US drones fired missiles on militant vehicles, officials said. With Pakistan struggling to cope with
devastating floods that have hit 21 million people in the country's worst humanitarian disaster, Islamist militant violence
has picked up in recent weeks with a wave of major bombings. The Taliban last week threatened Pakistani security forces
with more suicide attacks to avenge US missile strikes, which have become a key tactic in the US-led fight to reverse the
Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.
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Drone criticisms are flawed, only ev produced by Taliban

Fair 10 (C. Christine Fair assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign
Service, MAY 28, 2010, “Drone wars: The Obama administration won't tell the truth about America's new favorite weapon -- but that
doesn't mean its critics are right”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/28/drone_wars)
During his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2009, David Kilcullen, a former
counterinsurgency advisor to Centcom commander Gen. David Petraeus, said it was time for the United States to "call off
the drones." Later that month, Kilcullen and Andrew M. Exum, who served as an Army Ranger in Iraq and Afghanistan
from 2002 to 2004, published a provocative editorial in the New York Times, titled "Death From Above: Outrage from
Below," in which they estimated that over the "past three years" drones had killed just 14 "terrorist leaders" at the price of
some 700 civilian lives. "This is 50 civilians for every militant killed," they wrote, "a hit rate of 2 percent." Their
conclusion? Drone strikes produce more terrorists than they eliminate-an assertion that has become an article of faith
among drone-strike opponents. It would be a damning argument -- if the data weren't simply bogus. The only publicly
available civilian casualty figures for drone strikes in Pakistan come from their targets: the Pakistani Taliban, which report
the alleged numbers to the Pakistani press, which dutifully publishes the fiction. No one has independently verified the
Taliban's reports -- journalists cannot travel to FATA to confirm the deaths, and the CIA will not even acknowledge the
drone program exists, much less discuss its results. But high-level Pakistani officials have conceded to me that very few
civilians have been killed by drones and their innocence is often debatable. U.S. officials who are knowledgeable of the
program report similar findings. In fact, since January 1 there has not been one confirmed civilian casualty from drone
strikes in FATA.
Drones are key to de-escalate conflicts and solve terror

Anderson 10 (Kenneth, Visiting Fellow on the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law and Professor of Law at American
University, “Predators over Pakistan,” The Weekly Standard Vol. 15, No. 24, 3/8/10, accessed 6/25/10,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/predators-over-pakistan, SSD)
Targeting terrorists and militants with Predator drone strikes is one campaign promise President Obama has kept to the
letter. Missiles fired from remote-piloted “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) at al Qaeda and Taliban leadership steadily
and sharply increased over the course of 2009. Senior U.S. military and intelligence officials have called them one of the
most effective tactics available to strike directly at al Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, CIA director Leon Panetta says that
drones are “the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership.” There is every
reason to believe him. In January 2010 alone, a dozen strikes were launched just in the Pakistani tribal region of Waziristan.
With the beginning of the promised offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Predator attacks have likewise surged
against targets in Pakistan, concurrent with moves by Pakistani intelligence to detain Taliban leaders, and also concurrent
with the extensive use of UAVs on the battlefield in the Afghan offensive (primarily as an urban surveillance tool but also
for missile strikes). Obama promised that his administration would go after al Qaeda and Taliban in their refuges in
Pakistan—with or without the permission of the Pakistani government, he pointedly said—and so he has done. The
aggressive expansion of the Predator targeted killing program is the Obama administration’s one unambiguous innovation
in the war against terrorists. The adaptation of UAV surveillance craft into missile platforms took place as an improvisation
in 2002 under the Bush administration—but its embrace as the centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism operations belongs to
Obama. It is not the whole of it—the Obama administration has expanded joint operations with Pakistan and Yemen, and
launched commando operations in Somalia against terrorists. But of all the ways it has undertaken to strike directly against
terrorists, this administration owns the Predator drone strategy. It argued for it, expanded it, and used it, in the words of the
president’s State of the Union address, to “take the fight to al Qaeda.” As al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other transnational
jihadists seek shelter in lightly governed places such as Yemen or Somalia, the Obama administration says the United States
will follow them and deny them safe haven. Speaking at West Point, the president obliquely referred to so-called targeted
killings—we will have to be “nimble and precise” in the use of military power, he said, adding that “high-ranking al Qaeda
and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we have stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide.” The Predator drone
strategy is a rare example of something that has gone really, really well for the Obama administration. Counterterrorism “on
offense” has done better, ironically, under an administration that hoped it could just play counterterrorism on defense—
wind down wars, wish away the threat as a bad dream from the Bush years, hope the whole business would fade away so it
could focus on health care. Yet for all that, the Obama administration, through Predator strikes, is taking the fight to the
enemy. And, let’s face it, in dealing with terrorist groups in ungoverned places in the world, we have few good options
besides UAVs. Drones permit the United States to go directly after terrorists, rather than having to fight through whole
countries to reach them. Maybe that’s not enough to win. Maybe “light-footprint” counterterrorism via drones turns out to
be just the latest chimera in the perennial effort to find a way to win a war through strategic airpower. Yet even in a serious
counterinsurgency on the ground, drones will still be important as a means of attacking terrorists while clearing and holding
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territory. The upshot? As long as we engage in counterterrorism, drones will be a critical part of our offense.
Targeted Killing is key to stop terrorist attacks

Solis 7 (Gary, a U.S. Military Academy professor of law (retired), and an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law
Center; TARGETED KILLING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT; Naval War College Review, 2007)
Killing senior terrorists, expert bomb makers, and those who provide philosophical guidance for terrorists may spare
countless noncombatant victims while, at the same time, forgoing risk to friendly combatant forces. A successful targeted
killing removes a dangerous enemy from the battlefield and deprives the foe of his leadership, guidance, and experience.
The targeted killing of terrorist leaders leaves subordinates confused and in disarray, however temporarily. Successors will
feel trepidation, knowing they too may be in the enemy’s sights. Targeted killing unbalances terrorist organizations, making
them concerned with protecting their own membership and diverting them from their goals.
Pakistan cooperates and endorses US drone targeted killing

Bruno 10 (Greg Bruno, Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations, July 19, 2010, U.S. Drone Activities in Pakistan,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22659/us_drone_activities_in_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type
%2Fbackgrounder)
In March 2009, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry declared the strikes "a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty" that are
"counterproductive." But as Kronstadt notes, officials from both countries may have reached a quiet understanding in the
fall of 2008; at least three Predators that can be operated by the CIA are reportedly deployed to a secret Pakistani airbase,
he writes. "It used to be that we'd see statements going all the way to the level of outrage," Kronstadt said in an interview
with CFR.org. "We're simply not seeing that anymore." One reason may be the rising tide of militancy in Pakistan's tribal
regions. Long seen as a strategic asset of Islamabad's intelligence service, groups like the Pakistan Taliban have been
targeting Pakistani cities. Even a majority of residents of the tribal regions have come to accept drone strikes as a necessary
evil in the war against Taliban militancy, according to one poll conducted in early 2009. That may explain why Pakistan
appears to be helping supply human targeting intelligence to the United States, and why Pakistani agents are "increasingly
involved in target selection and strike coordination," according to Reuters. Pakistan, meanwhile, has also requested direct
control (Sunday Times) of UAVs over Pakistani territory. The country's military leaders are said to desire armed drones for
their own use, but the U.S. Department of Defense has agreed to sell Pakistan unarmed Shadow UAVs for reconnaissance
missions only.
Targeted killing is growing as a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism instrument

Alex S. Wilner, Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency
Mullah Dadullah’s elimination illustrates an important yet relatively under-explored feature of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency. Over the past decade, targeted killings have become a tactic of preeminent choice for combating violent,
non-state organizations. While the elimination of major leaders (like Dadullah, Al Qaeda’s Abu Laith al-Libi, Al Qaeda in
Iraq’s (AQI) Abu Musab Zarqawi, Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, the Shabaab’s Aden Ayro, Chechnyan Shamil Basayev, or
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- bia’s (FARC) Raul Reyes) is reported widely, the tactic is being utilized far
more often and far more widely than is generally appreciated. Open sources suggest that since 2006 over 200 targeted
strikes have taken place in Afghanistan. Another 80 were launched against Pakistan’s lawless North-Western region in 2008
alone, while dozens of strikes have been carried out against Al Qaeda elements in Somalia, Iraq, and Yemen since 2002. 9
Russian forces have eliminated the leaders of violent, non-state organizations in Chechnya and Qatar; Turkey launched
precision strikes against Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leaders in Northern Iraq; and Israel, perhaps more than most, has
long relied on the tactic to counter Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and other organizations over
the past decade. For the most part, those targeted have not been high-ranking leaders but operators, facilitators,
bombmakers, recruiters, commanders, and other mid-level organizers.
Targeted Killing’s international legality remains suspect

Notwithstanding their increasing prevalence in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the legality of targeted killings
remains uncertain. On the surface, international law prohibits their use. The 1974 UN Convention on the Prevention and
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Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protracted Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, bans attacks on state
leaders, representatives, and officials, arguing that such acts “create a serious threat to the maintenance of normal
international relations . . . necessary for cooperation.” 21 The idea is to ensure that even states at war retain the diplomatic
ability to negotiate with one another. 22 Gal Luft explains further that targeted killings are also considered an “infringe- ment
on the sovereignty” of states because they involve the “imposition of extrajudicial punishment” on non-citizens. 23 In July
2001, in response to Israel’s unrelenting campaign of targeted strikes in Gaza and the West Bank, former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan called Israel’s action an affront to “international law, in particular human rights law, but also to general
principles of law.”24 Even after 9/11, a UN report, published in the wake of a 2002 U.S. Predator drone strike in Yemen that
killed Abu Ali al-Harithi—Al Qaeda’s mastermind behind the 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing and the 2002 suicide attack on the
Lim- burg, a French oil tanker—called the American strike “truly disturbing” labeling it “a clear case of extrajudicial
killing” and an “alarming precedent.”
The infrastructure of terrorist organizations renders them especially vulnerable to leadership loss—
makes targeted killing UNIQUELY effective.
The literature on targeted killings suggests that their use diminishes the coercive and operational capability of violent, non-
state groups in a number of ways.36 The constant removal of leadership leaves an organization in general disarray—
replacement takes time and command and control mechanisms are weakened as a result. 37 Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime
minister at the height of the Al Aqsa Intifada, explained his country’s use of targeted killing as such: “the goal . . . is to
place the terrorists in varying situations every day and to ‘unbalance’ them so that they will be busy protecting
themselves.”38 By removing particular individuals that fill critical positions within organizations and forcing others to seek
refuge, a group’s ability to coordinate acts of violence is substantially disrupted. In the meantime, communication between
leaders and operators breaks down, complicating both short-term tactical planning and long-term strategic planning. For
smaller terrorist groups and cells, where leadership, knowledge, and power are centralized, eliminations can have the
dramatic effect of completely destroying a specific threat. Groups with particularly charismatic leaders are especially prone
to decapitating strikes.39 Both assumptions rest on the notion that terrorist organizations depend on the work of a few key
individuals. Isaac Ben-Israel and colleagues note, for instance, that the number of “key activists in the Hamas,”—those that
are actively “engaged in preparing an act of terror”—number in the low hundreds. A state only needs “to neutralize 20– 30
percent of them,” they suggest, “for the organization’s ‘production’ of acts of terror to drop significantly.” 40 The argument
suggests that terrorism is a process that requires a “production line” of activity—from scouting targets to preparing bombers
—if coordinated acts of violence are to take place. 41 All along this process, individuals play important roles, fulfilling
particular jobs and functions. As such, violent, non-state groups are perhaps best thought of as coercive systems, dependent
on the interaction of a variety of semi-autonomous parts and processes. 42 Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins reiterate: “the
terrorist problem occurs in a rich context with many interacting entities and processes.” 43 While eliminating particular
individuals with functional roles will not wholly eradicate the threat of terrorism, the selective removal of central players
does restrict the terrorism process and degrades an organization’s overall capability to plan, coordinate, and carryout acts of
violence.
The threat of TK itself is sufficient to disrupt terrorist activity—forces leadership into hiding distrupting
channels of communication
The very threat of coercion forces leaders to worry about their safety, hinders their freedom of movement, and requires that
they spend time and resources in avoiding their own death rather than planning the death of others. In a 2004 letter to bin
Laden, AQI’s al-Zarqawi stresses this persistent dilemma. “What is preventing us from making a general call to arms,” he
protests, “is the fact that the country of Iraq has no mountains in which to seek refuge, or forest in which to hide. Our
presence is apparent and our movement is out in the open. Eyes are everywhere.” 44 Leaders in hiding face the related
problem of motivating and leading their followers; championing a cause from the frontline is far more effective than doing
so from the safety of a bunker or villa in a neighboring region. Likewise, by eliminating skilled facilitators, organizations
become de-professionalized. Finding individuals that are able and willing to replace eliminated bomb makers and tactical
planners, for instance, takes time, notwithstanding the fact that not just any substitute will do. Few individuals have the skill
sets needed to design and build effective bombs that do not prematurely detonate or the leadership characteristics required
to successfully manage a military organization. While reports suggest that many of today’s top terrorist leaders are highly
educated individuals, holding graduate, legal, and medical degrees, this does not necessarily translate into solid military and
strategic know-how. Furthermore, attracting and recruiting the right people to a life of violent hardship that invariable
comes with joining a terrorist organization can be difficult. Even in the case of suicide bombings, it is not enough to simply
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equip and send out a great many operatives on suicide missions—the individuals need to have the intellect and training to
know where to go, who to target, how and when to detonate their bombs, and what to do in case of mishap. 45 They must
also be trained not to renege on their decision to die and to know, too, never to get caught. In fact, there is very real danger
in sending out poorly trained or intellectually unstable suicide operatives. “Dud bombers”—those that fail in their attempt
to detonate their explosives—get caught and can crack under interrogation, causing irreparable damage to their group, cell,
or operator.
Targeted killing deters—paralyzes current and future leaders via fear of death—leaders aren’t martyrs
The literature on targeted killings suggests that they effect the motivation of individuals involved in perpetrating acts of
violence and organizing terrorism.63 The reason rests primarily on the psychological consequences of being targeted; fear
can be paralyzing. As Brad Roberts posits, “the leaders of al Qaeda ... are inspired by martyrdom—but not their own.”64
They may dispatch suicide bombers to their death, but few leaders volunteer their own services. Their desire to live can be
exploited. A string of successful targeted killings—especially when they involve inventive measures like booby-trapped
cars, exploding cell phones and phone booths, or guided missiles—can lead to despair among surviving leaders. No place is
safe for long. The consequence, Luft argues, is that “those next in line for succession take a long time to step into their
predecessors’ shoes. They know that by choosing to take the lead, they Successful targeted eliminations further remind
terrorists of the long arm of the state’s coercive abilities and of the very real power asymmetries that exist. They also
reiterate that death and capture is often sudden and unanticipated. Both can help lower a group’s morale. Living as a
fugitive can also lead to a severance of ties with friends and loved ones. Indeed, in an age of sophisticated SIGINT, contact
with family can prove lethal, as Dadullah’s experience shows. E-mail correspondence and phone conversations can be
intercepted, informing security officials as to the location of wanted individuals. Finally, life on the run, while appealing for
some, can get tiring. Fatigue can set in and with that, a change in motivation and behavior.add their names to [a] target list,
where life is Hobbsian: nasty, brutish, and short.”65 Over time, widespread anguish can influence not only active members
of the group, but more generally, how well the group itself can attract and retain new members and followers. Targeted
killings may be enough to deter some individuals from joining a movement altogether.
Targeted killing has reduced the Taliban suicide bombing— primary form of attack
‘With these Taliban preferences in mind, the aggregate data on overall levels of violence reveal a number of expected
findings. After the targeted killings, for instance, suicide bombings dropped by over 30 percent, from a total of 43 before, to
29 after, the targeted eliminations. This is in keeping with the degree of difficulty, amount of time and expertise, and level
of leadership that is required to coordinate effective suicide bombings. It is also plausible that the decrease in suicide
attacks spurred a rise in less-sophisticated forms of violence, with IEDs increasing by 6 percent and SA/R attacks by
roughly 15 percent following the four targeted attacks.76 As leaders and facilitators were eliminated, the Taliban began
using less-sophisticated forms of violence that required less energy, expertise, and time to organize effectively. This shift
resonates with elements outlined in the literature on targeted killings: as organizations succumb to the effects of a protracted
campaign of elimination, their overall ability to operate at a high level of sophistication decreases and the selection and use
of less formidable forms of violence increases.
TK reduced the effectiveness of the remaining attacks

Overall levels of violence, however, are only a minor part of the analysis. The data also reveal changes in Taliban
professionalism following the targeted killings. For the two most sophisticated forms of violence (IEDs and suicide
attacks), the aggregate data suggest a decrease in professionalism and an increase in failure rates. After the eliminations,
IED failure rates rose precipitously from 20 to roughly 35 percent. This is a considerable change in proficiency. Suicide
bombing success rates also dropped (by a less impressive though no less important five percentage points) following the
strikes. Both are theoretically expected findings (Figure 3). Finally, the data also suggest that the targeted killings
influenced the selection of targets. For instance, in terms of known target selection for suicide bombers, the aggregate data
reveal that following the eliminations, soft targets were more often selected (as a percentage of all target selection) after the
leadership strikes (Figure 4). As leaders where killed, remaining forces selected less formidable targets to attack, like
Afghan government officials, civil-society actors, and off-duty police commanders, rather than hardened, military actors.
TK is a crucial part of the US counterterror strategy in Afghanistan

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n Afghanistan, targeted killings are considered the coercive half of a two-pronged strategy. As ISAF spokesperson for
Kandahar David Marsh reveals, “there’s a mixture going on of bringing out the less committed [Taliban]” with various
amnesty, development, and make- work programs, “and getting rid of . . . the tier one” leaders.84 The strategy is supported
by the Government of Afghanistan, whose spokesperson General Mohammad Zahir Azimi reiterates that “we can’t kill all
the Taliban.” “What’s best,” Azimi asserts, “is to get rid of the Taliban leadership and reconcile the rest of them who are just
ordinary people that have joined the Taliban under certain situations.”85 This study offers a comparative evaluation of the
coercive half of this broader strategy. In the analysis, a number of patterns become evident that informs the literature on
targeted killings and helps shed some light on the feasibility of applying deterrence by punishment to counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency.
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455353525.

doc Lexington 2010 1

No TK for US—destabilizes international norms against killing leaders—ensures proliferation

International condemnation nullifies any tactical success of US TK policy—cooperation is key to counter

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Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan—targets enemies of the state

Drones strikes are key to broader Afghanistan withdrawal

Predator Drone program has pushed Al Qaeda to the brink

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CIA has a methodology for targeted killing just classified.

Drone strikes create anti-American sentiment

Drones strikes are key to counter terrorism in Yemen

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Targeting al-Harethi likely prevented further attacks—proper use of self defense

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Targeted Killing doesn’t trigger a state of war

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Targeted Killing doesn’t violate the human right to life

Accurate determinations of collateral damage from targeted killing are impossible

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whether or not an armed conflict exists.

Drone strikes are key to stop al-Qaeda

Drones are key to fight insurgency

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Drone criticisms are flawed, only ev produced by Taliban

Drones are key to de-escalate conflicts and solve terror

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Targeted Killing is key to stop terrorist attacks

Pakistan cooperates and endorses US drone targeted killing

Targeted killing is growing as a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism instrument

Targeted Killing’s international legality remains suspect

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TK reduced the effectiveness of the remaining attacks

TK is a crucial part of the US counterterror strategy in Afghanistan

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