CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO. v. PEDRO GIMENEZ, GR No.

L-17931, 1963-02-28
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95,
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign... exchange transactions. To supplement the circular,
the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times
in November and December 1959, petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues,
used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers-bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde-which are the main raw materials in the... production
of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33.765.42. In May,
1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as
margin fee therefor.
Issues:
whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.
Ruling:
it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure... passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., I; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing of... the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or... curative legislation, not by judicial decree."
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
Principles:

Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95,
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign... exchange transactions. To supplement the circular,
the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times
in November and December 1959, petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues,
used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers-bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde-which are the main raw materials in the... production
of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33.765.42. In May,
1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as
margin fee therefor.
the Auditor of the Bank refused to... pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that
the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No.
2069. On appeal taken... by petitioner, fie Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the
Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues:
whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid
margin fee.
Ruling:
"urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from,
"urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as "urea formaldehyde", Petitioner contends, however, that the bill... approved, in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that
the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea", and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea and formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof.
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead
of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure...
passed by Congress and approved by the President
If there has been any mistake in the printing of... the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or... curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
Principles:
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (italic ours) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank have erred in holding otherwise.
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation
product from definite proportions of urea and formaldeyhe under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water... solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes' a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture
of plywood.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided
that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed
by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule,
the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law
must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not
defined and no distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

 Astorga vs. Villegas
on 7:00 AM in Case Digests, Political Law
0
G.R. No. L-23475, April 30, 1974

o Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the Chief Executive, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
o Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential
o When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer,
and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be
consulted.

FACTS:

House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives and
then sent to the Senate for reading. During discussion at the Senate, Senator Tolentino and
Senator Roxas recommended amendments thereto. Despite the fact that it was the Tolentino
amendment that was approved and the Roxas amendment not even appearing in the journal,
when Senate sent its certification of amendment to the House, only the Roxas amendment
was included, not the Tolentino amendment. Nevertheless, the House approved the same.
Printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Reps, the
Speaker, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President, and sent to the President of
the Philippines who thereby approved the same. The Bill thus was passed as RA 4065.
However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate President and the Chief Executive
withdrew their signatures.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not RA 4065 was passed into law

o Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill

RULING:

Rationale of the Enrolled Bill Theory

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty
of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a
statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.

Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by
the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to
the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential.

When courts may turn to the journal

Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled
bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly
enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of
this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved
by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed
a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan
and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of the House of
Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also
provides that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to
the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a
natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of representatives,
the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, unless otherwise
proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the
members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

1. PEOPLE V. CARLOS, 78 Phil 535

KEYWORD: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
People ( Plaintiff Appellee) vs. Apolonio Carlos (defendant appellant)
Decided: June 30, 1947
FACTS: The appellant Apolonio Carlos was found guilty of treason by the People’s
Court, sentence to reclusion perpetua (lifetime/permanent imprisonment) and to
pay a fine of P 7000.
The lower court wsa able to find one day of July or August 1944 at around 2 or 3 in
the morning a truck pulled up in front of a house in Constancia St., Sampaloc Manila
where a certain Martin Mateo lived. Carlos together with Japanese military alighted
together broke into Martin Mateo’s house then later to Fermin Javier’s house. Martin
mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier were captured by biding hands, they were
put inside the truck and were brought to Fort Santiago, tortured and released after
6 days.
Reason: they refused to talk about the whereabouts of Marcelino Mateo, a guerrilla
that was able to escape the Japanese Fermin Javier on the other hand was also
arrested because he was a suspected/ confirmed by Carlos as a guerrilla.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: MERE QUESTION OF THE LAW.
- why PCA is unconstitutional: 4 errors
1. The lower Court cannot convicted of treason because there is a settled principle
in international law when a territory is under the governance of an enemy, all
political laws of the previous government are suspended. Thus our laws at that time
have no binding effect because crime of treason is a political complexion. Likewise
Philippine laws are inconsistent and suspended, without force and effect. Allegiance
(legal obligation) distinguishable from loyalty. Thus, decision should be reversed
because the law that created it is unconstitutional.
-law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force therefore making it
unconstitutional
-PCA contains provisions entirely foreign to the subject matter
-Second provision: retaining the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (it should
try and decide cases against threats to national security)
-Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution
1. PCA deprives persons similarly situated of equal protection of the laws
2. Political offenders accused by PC are denied of preliminary investigation
while others are entitled to.
3. PO accused by PC have a limited right to appeal while the accused
charged by courts of first instance have an absolute right to appeal.
4. Appeals involving person who held public office under Phil. Exec. Comm
and Phil. Rep or any branch are to be heard and decided by a substantially
different SC thus lacking uniformity in rulings over the same subject
matter.
5. provision change the existing rules of Court on the subject of bail
6. Art 125 of RPC: Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authority (shall be allowed upon request to communicate confer
any time with his attorney or counsel)
ISSUE: Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
1. PC is a special court with restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an
emergency and national security, operate on limited period only imposed by
economic necessity and other factors of public policy. Main concern is the trial and
disposition of the cases over 6000 held by US military to be turned over to
Commonwealth government.
2. In view of the great numbers of offenders with limited time, amount of labor will
take time if all of which are allowed to have P.I considering there’s an urgency in
disposing the cases. P.I is n9t a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution.
3. PC is a collegiate court while CFI is of single judge. Appeal is not constitutional
but a statutory right. Admitted fact already saves court the provision of being
objected from being unconstitutional.
4. No merit on contention since it is beyond the subject of constitutional guarantee.
-The disqualification of some or majority of SC to the PC and their substitution by
people from CA, not a new court in the eyes of the law.
-A court possesses a separate personality from the men who compose them
-lack of uniformity: constitution does not ensure uniformity of judicial decisions
neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.
5. granting bail to political offenders detained by US army and released to the
commonwealth but not to other political offenders
6. suspended to those political detainees
CRIME: treason Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the
Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands
or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine
not to exceed P20,000 pesos.
RECLUSION TEMPORAL: Max- 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day to 20 years
Medium: 14 yrs, 8 mos and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months
Minimum: 12 yrs, 1 day to 14 yrs and 8 months
DECISION: SC AFFIRMED DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT

Wise & Co., Inc. v. Meer GR NO: 48231 (1947)

FACTS:
That during the year 1937, plaintiffs, except Mr. E.M.G. Strickland (who, as husband
of the plaintiff Mrs. E.M.G. Strickland, is only a nominal party herein), were
stockholders of Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd., a foreign corporation duly authorized
to do business in the Philippines.

That on May 27, 1937, the Board of Directors of Manila Wine Merchants, Ltd.,
(hereinafter referred to as the Hongkong Company), recommended to the
stockholders of the company that they adopt the resolutions necessary to enable
the company to sell its business and assets to Manila Wine Merchants, Inc., a
Philippine corporation formed on May 27, 1937, (hereinafter referred to as the
Manila Company), for the sum of P400,000;

HK Company made a distribution of its earnings for the year 1937 to its stockholders
(Dividends declared and paid on June 8, 1937). HK Company paid Philippine income
tax on the entire earnings from which the said distributions were paid.

After the June 8 distribution, HK Company had :

P74, 182 – surplus resulting from the active conduct of business
P270, 116 – total increased surplus as a result of the sale of the business and assets

The stockholders by proper resolution directed that the company be voluntarily

liquidated and its capital distributed among the stockholders; that the stockholders
at such meeting appointed a liquidator duly paid off the remaining debts of the
Hongkong Company and distributed its capital among the stockholders including
plaintiffs; that the liquidator duly filed his accounting on January 12, 1938, and in
accordance with the provisions of Hongkong Law, the Hongkong Company was duly
dissolved at the expiration of three moths from that date.

That plaintiffs duly filed Philippine income tax returns. That defendant subsequently
made the deficiency assessments. That said plaintiffs duly paid the said amounts
demanded by defendant under written protest, which was overruled in due course;
that the plaintiffs have since July 1, 1939 requested from defendant a refund of the
said amounts which defendant has refused and still refuses to refund.
CONTENTIONS:
CIR-The amounts received by Wise & Co et al from the HK Company were liquidating
dividends (thus, subject to normal tax)

Wise & Co et al say- The amounts were ordinary dividends

ISSUES:
a)W/N the amounts received by Wise & Co et al from the HK Company on which the
taxes were assessed were ordinary dividends or liquidating
dividends (LIQUIDATING DIVIDENDS)

b)W/N such liquidating dividends are taxable income (YES)

RATIO:
a)The amounts received by the stockholders were liquidating dividends
•The parties agreed in the deed of sale that the sale and transfer shall take effect
as of June 1, 1937. Thus, the distribution of assets to the stockholders made after
that date must have been considered by them as liquidating dividends.

•The said distributions were NOT in the ordinary course of business and with intent
to maintain the corporation as a going concern (in which case they would be ordinary
dividends) BUT they were made after the liquidated of the business had been
decided upon, which makes them payments for the surrender and relinquishment of
the stockholder’s interest in the corporation, or liquidating dividends.

•Ordinary connotation of liquidating dividend involves the distribution of assets by

a corporation to its stockholders upon dissolution.

•Wise & Co et al (stockholders) say: It was only on August 19, 1937, that the HK
Company took the first corporate steps towards liquidation.

•SC: It was expressly stipulated in the formal deed of sale (see underlined portion
in facts) that the sale or transfer shall take effect on June 1, 1937. After that date,
and until completion of the transfer, the HK Company continued to run the business
in trust for the new owner, the Manila Company.
•The determining element is whether the distribution was in the ordinary course of
business and with intent to maintain the corporation as a going concern, or after
deciding to quit with intent to liquidate the business.
•The fact that the distributions were called ‘dividends’ and were made, in part, from
earnings and profits, and that some of them were made before liquidation or
dissolution proceedings were commenced, is NOT controlling.

Liquidating dividend v Ordinary dividend

• The distinction between a distribution in liquidation and an ordinary

dividend is factual; the result in each case depending on the particular circumstances
of the case and the intent of the parties.
• If the distribution is in the nature of a recurring return on stock it is an
ordinary dividend.
• However, if the corporation is really winding up its business or
recapitalizing and narrowing its activities, the distribution may properly be treated
as in complete or partial liquidation and as payment by the corporation to the
stockholder for his stock. The corporation is, in the latter instances, wiping out all
parts of the stockholders' interest in the company . . .. “

b) Such liquidating dividends are taxable income

•Income tax law states that: “Where a corporation, partnership, association, joint-
account, or insurance company distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation or
dissolution, the gain realized or loss sustained by the stockholder, whether individual
or corporation, is a taxable income or a deductible loss as the case may be.”

•Amounts distributed in the liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as payments

in exchange for the stock or share, and any gain or profit realized thereby shall be
taxed to the distributee as other gains or profits.

•The stockholders received the distributions in question in exchange for the

surrender and relinquishment by them of their stock in the HK Company which was
dissolved and in process of complete liquidation.

•That money in the hands of the corporation formed a part of its income and was
properly taxable to it under the Income Tax Law.

•When the corporation was dissolved and in process of complete liquidation and its
shareholders surrendered their stock to it and it paid the sums in question to them
in exchange, a transaction took place.

•The shareholder who received the consideration for the stock earned that much
money as income of his own, which again was properly taxable to him under the
Income Tax Law.

The profits earned by the stockholders are income from Philippine sources, and thus
subject to Philippine tax

Stockholders say: the profit realized by them does not constitute income from
Philippine sources and is not subject to Philippine taxes since all steps in the carrying
out of this so-called sale took place outside the Philippines

SC:
•The HK Company was at the time of the sale of its business in the Philippines, and
the Manila Company was a domestic corporation domiciled and doing business also
in the Philippines.
•The HK Company was incorporated for the purpose of carrying on business in the
Philippines which is the business of wine, beer, and spirit merchants and the other
objects set out in its memorandum of association.

•Hence, its earnings, profits, and assets, including those from whose proceeds the
distributions in question were made, the major part of which consisted in the
purchase price of thebusiness, had been earned and acquired in the Philippines.

•As such, it is clear that said distributions were income "from Philippine sources."

Judgment affirmed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: For the foregoing consideration, the judgment appealed

from will be affirmed with the costs of both instances against the appellants. So
ordered.

Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration: SC affirms its earlier ruling.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and

laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if
it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to

inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.