EDU V.

ERICTA
Facts:

Petitioner Romeo Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order no. 2, which took
effect on April 17, 1990, which provides as follows:

"No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered
if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial
glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100
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meters away at night." Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions
the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3
inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped
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area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as to how such
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reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." There is the further requirement that in
addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of
the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of
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the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass,
reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber
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or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red.

"Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to
refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe
suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the
case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than
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ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act
No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue
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rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. It is
likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be
4
imposed.

Respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the
police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a
manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge Ericta
would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner,
now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was
a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both
parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent
Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such
administrative order.

Issue: WON there has been undue delegation of legislative power which as a result such
Administrative Order issued in furtherance of the delegated power is null and void.

Held:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate
its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local
governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under
the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all
its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an
undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation
of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act
No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is
the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and
translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His
Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL

Facts:

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
1
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action,
for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the
contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of
the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities
adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have taken away from the former the
barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of
this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an
existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal
council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said
council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred
persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon
petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new
law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units
of municipalities?"

Issue: WON there has been a valid delegation of legislative power thereby Sec. 68 of Revised Administrative Code is valid.

Held:

1a
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
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delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
2a
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
2b
acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.