HON. ARMAND FABELLA, ET. AL. VS THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 110379, NOVEMBER 28, 1997

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to
all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates.

The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing
allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-
appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part
in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations.

At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under preventive
suspension.

On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with
fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from
rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.

They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged
that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines
for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their innocence
instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to prove the charges
against the teachers.

On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON private respondents were denied due process of law

HELD: Yes.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights. (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights. (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers'
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers'
organization and a supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers'
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in
any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA 4670, because "all the teachers
who were members of the various committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary
Teachers Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation" and are deemed to be
the representatives of a teachers' organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers' organizations does
not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to
indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee.
Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers
appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in said committee.

MARTIN S. EMIN VS CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON

G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional
to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field
Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were
photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers.

Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful
authenticity. He called the Head Civil Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be
authentic, the signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials
of the processors of said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded
five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850
eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991.
The appointment papers of the same nature subsequently submitted to the Field Office were
likewise forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.

Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil
service eligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they
submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII
by the CSC Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never issued to
anyone.

Two separate investigations were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office
No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates
were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The
teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their
certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and gave their sworn
statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of
eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case,
petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.

During the hearing, the six teachers cited in the charge sheet were presented as witnesses for
the prosecution.

Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz as the persons who facilitated
their applications for R.A. 6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas’ and
Delgado’s testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the
fake certificates of eligibility.

On June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report to the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission. The CSC found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of
petitioner.

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the commission.

Petitioner avers that: 1) as a teacher, original jurisdiction over the administrative case against
him is lodged with a committee and not with the CSC, as provided for by Republic Act 4670
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teacher. 2) he was not allowed cross-
examination. 3) he was denied the right to due process when the CSC Regional Office, according
to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was accorded his right to due process

HELD: Yes. Petitioner avers that as a teacher, original jurisdiction over the administrative case
against him is lodged with a committee and not with the CSC, as provided for by Republic Act
4670 otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School Teacher.

Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the coverage of the term "teachers" are limited
to: (1) public school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities; and (2)
school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees under the
category of "medical and dental personnel".

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words following an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned. Too, the enumeration of persons excluded from the coverage of the
term "teachers" is restricted, limited and exclusive to the two groups as abovementioned. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction
be extended to other matters. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. Had Congress intended to
exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so
by clear and concise language.

As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating Committee that should have
investigated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by
Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of
Procedure.
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no
longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is
now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.

Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had afforded petitioner
sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself against charges of participation in faking
civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before
the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him to the
extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its proceedings was willful and
voluntary.

As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any
objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is
rendered against them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for
the first time in his amended petition for review before the CA. He did not raise this matter in his
Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he was "open to further
investigation by the CSC to bring light to the matter" and by further praying for "any remedy or
judgment which under the premises are just and equitable." It is an undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Equally unmeritorious is petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process. He avers that
he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.

Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-examination as most of the submissions were
written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely
because no cross-examination took place. The rule is well established that due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only filed his
Counter-Affidavit during the preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to Dismiss. He also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Commission. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Neither is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that he was denied the right to due process when
the CSC Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and
executioner. He laments that Director Buenaflor who formally filed the charge nominally was also
the hearing officer, and that prosecutor Atty. Anabelle Rosell was also the one who submitted
the recommendation to the CSC for the dismissal of petitioner. Recall, however, that it was
ultimately the Civil Service Chairman who promulgated the decision. The report submitted by
Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely
recommendatory in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such procedure is not
unusual in an administrative proceeding.1âwphi1

Petitioner claims that there was no valid case to dismiss him as Director Elmer Bartolata was not
presented to ascertain the alleged forged signature contained in the questioned certificates of
eligibility. The Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission made a finding on this fact of
forgery. It is not this Court’s function now to evaluate factual questions all over again. This is
particularly true in this case, where the Commission and the appellate court agree on the facts.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the affidavit of Teodorico Cruz35 should have been admitted as
newly discovered evidence. Petitioner raised this issue for the first time on appeal, when he filed
his Motion for New Trial and to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence before the CA. For a particular
piece of evidence to be regarded as "newly discovered" for purposes of a new trial, it is essential
that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence
before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The OSG36 observed that despite
the knowledge of the importance of Mr. Cruz’s testimony on the matter, petitioner did not ask
for a subpoena duces tecum to obtain said "newly discovered evidence." Neither did petitioner,
on his own, secure said affidavit or testimony during the proceedings to support his cause. We
note too, that the said affidavit attempts to exonerate the petitioner and Cruz and points to
someone else ("Jing") as the culprit, leaving the impression that the idea of the affidavit was a
mere afterthought, a last ditch effort to clear petitioner’s name. Thus, we are not persuaded by
petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence, for it appears to us as a dilatory contrivance for
petitioner’s benefit.

MELECIO ALCALA VS JOVENCIO VILLAR

G.R. NO. 156063, NOVEMBER 18, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School,
Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty.

Complainants alleged that on August 18-22, 1997, they attended a mass training/seminar at the
Consolacion National High School, Consolacion, Cebu. Respondent asked them to submit their
respective Certificates of Appearance for the preparation of the vouchers for the refund of their
expenses during the said training/seminar. Thereafter, they received from respondent refunds.

Upon verification with the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) Division Office,
complainants discovered that each of them were issued checks in the amount of P312.00 as
reimbursement, and that respondent received the same by forging their signature.

Complainants further alleged that sometime in November 1997, Melecio Alcala, Diosdada
Borinaga, Helen Lendio, and Rolando Torceno received from respondent P1,500.00 each
representing Loyalty Benefits. They learned, however, from the DECS Division Office that they
were entitled to receive P2,000.00 each.

Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that he was in fact authorized by the complainants to
claim and encash their checks at the E and E Lending Investors where most of them have
existing loans. He contended that their school is located in the rural area where no banks are
operating, such that it has been the practice of teachers to authorize the principal to claim,
receive and encash the checks in their behalf. He explained that complainants did not receive
the entire amount of P312.00 because they authorized the E and E Lending Investors to deduct
certain amounts from their checks as payment for their respective loans. As for the Loyalty
Benefits, respondent alleged that complainants received the entire amount due them and that he
deducted nothing therefrom. He asserted that the real reason behind the filing of the complaint
was to force him to resign so that one of the complainants could apply for his post.

On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of
dishonesty and dismissing him from service.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the latter was without jurisdiction over administrative
complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the governing law is Republic Act No.
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic Act No.
6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative complaints against public
school teachers

HELD: Yes. Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries
except over officials who may be removed by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative proceedings
involving public school teachers.

Likewise, in Emin v. De Leon,15 the Court ruled that although under Presidential Decree No. 807
(Civil Service Law), the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
whether performing governmental or proprietary function, the Civil Service Commission does not
have original jurisdiction over an administrative case against a public school teacher. It was
stressed therein that jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged
with the Investigating Committee created pursuant to Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, now being
implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the
DECS Rules of Procedure.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the proceedings
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu
proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised the same. This rule, however, is not
absolute.

In the same vein, respondent in this case should be barred under the principle of estoppel by
laches from assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should
have resolved the appeal on its merits, considering that respondent’s right to procedural due
process was properly observed.

GILDA G. CRUZ AND ZENAIDA C. PAITIM VS THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 144464, November 27, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: On September 9, 1994, the Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), received
a letter from a private individual, Carmelita B. Esteban, claiming that, during the examinations
for non-professional in the career civil service, given by the Civil Service Commission, on July
30, 1989 in Quezon City, Zenaida C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan,
falsely pretending to be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the said office, took the
examinations for the latter. Carmelita Esteban requested the CSC to investigate the matter,
appending to said letter, pictures purporting to be those of Gilda Cruz and Zenaida Paitim.
On September 20, 1994, Erlinda A. Rosas, Director IV of the Commission, issued a Memorandum
to Eliseo Gatchalian, the Director of the Management Information Office of the Commission,
requesting the latter to furnish her with the picture seat plan of the room where Gilda G. Cruz
was during the said examination, to ascertain the veracity of the letter-complaint. Eliseo S.
Gatchalian did furnish Erlinda Rosas with certified true copies of the picture seat plans of the
rooms where Gilda G. Cruz was assigned not only in the 1989 but also in the 1987 and 1988
career service (sub-professional) examinations. On November 8, 1994, Erlinda Rosas thereby
wrote a Memorandum to Civil Service Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, dated November 8,
1994, declaring that based on the record, she found a prima facie case against Zenaida Paitim
and Gilda G. Cruz.

On the basis of said memorandum, a fact finding investigation was conducted. On March 31,
1995, a "Formal Charge" for "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service" signed by Bella Amilhasan, Director IV of the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. 3 was filed against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim, with the Civil Service
Commission, docketed as Administrative Case No. D3-9S-052.

The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material
averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that
if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the
Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same
time.

On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation"
finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government
service.

Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative case.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to due process was violet where respondent CSC
acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time, against
petitioners.

HELD: No. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the
petitioners in the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the
direct control and supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government
employees over whom the Civil Service Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the
petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether they were indeed guilty of
dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office.

Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides that
the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to the
examinations, as it reads:

Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and
employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities."

Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted
as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners
is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions
of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3,
Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987 which states:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of
the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions,
orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings
shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an
impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings.
Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on
the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by
the CSC.

It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie
case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. They
submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not,
therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. We do not find reversible error with the decision
of the Court of Appeals in upholding the CSC Resolution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION VS EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC. AND BAYAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.
G.R. No. 147210, January 15, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: On December 29, 1992, International Communications Corporation (now Bayan

Telecommunications, Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate
and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA). The application was docketed as NTC Case No. 92-486.

Shortly thereafter, or on January 22, 1993, the NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 4-1-93
directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective
applications before the Commission on or before February 15, 1993, and deferring the
acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders.

In December 1993, there were no more available frequencies and Bayantel’s application was
archived.

On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and
set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000.

Respondent Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case No. 92-486 an
Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application.

On May 3, 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to
operate CMTS service.
Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition. seeking the
annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a
provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and
Memorandum Circular No. 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication
entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS, which was granted.

Bayantel filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. The NTC, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), also filed its own motion for reconsideration.

On February 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution denying all of the
motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit.

Subsequently, Bayantel also filed its petition for review assigning the error that. THE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE NTC VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION PERTAINING TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the fundamental right of Extelcom to due process when it
was not afforded the opportunity to question the motion for the revival of the application.

HELD: No. The Court of Appeals ruled that there was a violation of the fundamental right of
Extelcom to due process when it was not afforded the opportunity to question the motion for the
revival of the application. However, it must be noted that said Order referred to a simple revival
of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case No. 92-426. At this stage, it cannot be said
that Extelcom's right to procedural due process was prejudiced. It will still have the opportunity
to be heard during the full-blown adversarial hearings that will follow. In fact, the records show
that the NTC has scheduled several hearing dates for this purpose, at which all interested parties
shall be allowed to register their opposition. We have ruled that there is no denial of due process
where full-blown adversarial proceedings are conducted before an administrative body.34 With
Extelcom having fully participated in the proceedings, and indeed, given the opportunity to file
its opposition to the application, there was clearly no denial of its right to due process.

In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (166 SCRA 316 [1988]), we held that the right to be heard does
not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court. A party may also be heard
through his pleadings. where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments
or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. As reiterated in National
Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998), the essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side. Hence, in Navarro III vs. Damaso (246 SCRA 260 [1995]),
we held that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all instances essential.
Plainly, petitioner was not denied due process.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS JOSE J. LUCAS

G.R. NO. 127838 JANUARY 21, 1999
PARDO, J.

FACTS: On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural
Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the office of the
Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the
same agency, for misconduct.

Raquel described the incident in the following manner:

While standing before a mirror, near the office door of Jose J. Lucas, Raquel noticed a chair at
her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas
bent to reach for his shoe. At that moment she felt Mr. Lucas' hand touching her thigh and
running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and
admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she
hit Mr. Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying "lumabas ka na at huwag na huwag ka
nang papasok dito kahit kailan" A verbal exchange then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed
Raquel by the arm and shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door.

Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the office, grabbed her the second time
while she attempted to regain her posture after being pushed the first time. . . . while doing all
this, Mr. Lucas shouted at the affiant, saying, "labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan".

On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a summons requiring respondent to
answer the complaint, not to file a motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June
17, 1992, respondent Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant head, BOPI,
denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that
what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he reached for his shoes
and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his
hand got in contact with Linatok's leg.

On May 31, 1993, after a formal investigation by the BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution
finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for
one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation.

In due time, respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On July 7,
1994, the CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing
on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the
CSC denied the motion.

Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of
the BOPI, DA.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that "a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is
that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the instant case however, Lucas came to know
of the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution
dismissing him from the service.

Petitioner anchors its position on the view that "the formal charge against a respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what
is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense.

ISSUE: WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct

HELD: As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC
distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service
Commission, we held that "in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest, which is obviously lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as
he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by
convicting him of grave misconduct.

We sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that
a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person cannot be
convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.

The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. Nos. 90933-61, May 29, 1997
ROMERO, J.

FACTS: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), as owner of the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Unit No. I (PNPP-I), entered into an agreement with private respondents Westinghouse
International Projects Company (Westinghouse) as principal contractor and Power Contractors
Inc. (PCI) as sub-contractor for the construction of the power plant in Morong, Bataan.

Pursuant to respondent PCI's sub-contract with co-respondent Westinghouse, over six thousand
workers were hired on various dates to undertake the civil works for the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant (BNPP), as the PNPP-I has become more commonly known. After the completion of certain
phases of work at the power plant, the services of private respondent workers were terminated.
The dismissed employees did not receive any separation pay.

As a consequence, between 1982 and 1985, twenty-seven cases for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of benefits were filed before the Labor Arbiter against respondent PCI. These cases,
which involved more than six thousand workers who are private respondents herein, were
eventually consolidated.

On May 28, 1985, during the pendency of the cases before the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioner
National Power Corporation, respondents Westinghouse International Projects Company and
Power Contractors, Inc. executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which provided for
the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the labor case.

They agreed that NAPOCOR, through Westinghouse shall indemnify/reimburse and save the
subcontractor from and against any and all liability arising from the aforesaid claims for
separation/termination pay of the employees.

On September 11, 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the
cases as counsel for petitioner. During the proceedings, however, Atty. Restituto O. Mallo
represented petitioner under the designation "Counsel for the Respondents, Special Attorney-
OSG"

NAPOCOR, Westinghouse and PCI were held liable by the Labor Arbiter. A copy of the decision
was served on petitioner through the deputized special attorney who received the same on
January 18, 1989. The OSG was not served with a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Petitioner contends that since its lawyer, the OSG, was never served a copy of the Labor
Arbiter's decision, its right to due process was violated. Next, it claims that its appeal was
seasonably filed and should have been given due course by public respondent Commission.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process when the OSG was not served a copy of the
said decision

HELD: The first issue raised by petitioner revolves around the service of the Labor Arbiter's
decision on the special attorney and not on the OSG.

Petitioner alleges that it was denied due process because its counsel, the OSG, was not served a
copy of the said decision. It thus claims that the period to appeal did not commence to run
because the decision was never served on the OSG. Hence, petitioner's appeal memoranda filed
by the special attorney on February 22, 1989 and by the OSG on July 17, 1989 were filed
seasonably.

The fact that the Solicitor General deputized a lawyer from NAPOCOR to be a special attorney of
the OSG is of no moment, according to petitioner, since said lawyer appeared only as
representative of the Solicitor General and not of petitioner. The appearance of said special
attorney in proceedings before the Labor Arbiter did not divest the OSG of control over the case
and did not make the special attorney petitioner's counsel of record.

It is indisputable that service of the decision should be made on counsel for petitioner, for the
Revised Rules of the NLRC mandate that where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service of notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall
be made on such counsel or authorized representative.

Pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Office of the Solicitor General represents the government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities. Headed by the Solicitor General, the "principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government," the OSG possesses the unequivocal mandate to appear for the Government in
legal proceedings. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall
also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. Under number 8 of the same
section, the OSG is empowered to "deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in
cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and
control over such legal officers with respect to such cases."

The fact that the OSG is petitioner's counsel is unchallenged, the former having entered its
appearance on September 15, 1986. The lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorney-
OSG" is a mere representative of the OSG and the latter retains supervision and control over the
deputized lawyer. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel for the National Power
Corporation, and as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of
orders, notices and decisions. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide
whether or not an appeal should be made.

As a consequence, copies of orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as
agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received
by the latter. We have likewise consistently held that the proper basis for computing the
reglementary period to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision had attained
finality is service on the OSG. In the present controversy, only the special attorney was served
with a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Since service of said decision was never made
on the OSG, the period to appeal the decision to the NLRC did not commence to run. Hence, the
appeal memorandum filed by the OSG on July 17, 1989 was not filed belatedly.

Although jurisprudence regarding mandatory service of orders and decision on the OSG and not
merely to its deputized special attorneys, pertain to court cases involving land registration and
naturalization, the same rule should be observed in cases before the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. The underlying justification for compelling service of pleadings, orders, notices and
decisions on the OSG as principal counsel is one and the same. As the lawyer for the
government or the government corporation involved, the OSG is entitled to the service of said
pleadings and decisions, whether the case is before the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency
such as respondent commission. Needless to say, a uniform rule for all cases handled by the
OSG simplifies procedure, prevents confusion and thus facilitates the orderly administration of
justice.

From the foregoing, we conclude that service of the Labor Arbiter's decision on the deputized
special attorney is insufficient and not valid and binding on the Solicitor General, who was
himself entitled to such service. The period to appeal an adverse decision should be reckoned
from the date the OSG, and not the deputized lawyer, received a copy of the decision. Since
service was not made on the OSG, the period to file an appeal was suspended and did not
commence to run. The appeal memorandum, having been filed on July 17, 1989, it was filed on
time and should have been entertained by the NLRC. Consequently, respondent Commission
committed grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated its decision on October 6, 1989
dismissing petitioner's appeal for having been filed late.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT

CORP., PICK& SHOVEL, INC., ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. (JOINT VENTURE)
G.R. NO. 146478; JULY 30, 2004

FACTS: