SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v.

SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND

ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

Facts:

Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the
settlement of the latter’s estate. On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and
Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated
to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on
August 6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the
properties adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated. When
Pasamba and Formilda passed away, Formilda was succeeded by the spouses
Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the closure of the two lots
alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the
allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able
to buy the lots by auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated.
On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented for
the demolition of structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’ house.
On September 27, 1985, David Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a
TRO for the suspension of the demolition, which was granted, but the houses
have already been demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by
respondents, which was denied by RTC but granted by CA, thus this case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to
respondents.

Ruling:

Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from
the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum
absque injuria — for which the law gives no remedy, saying he is not liable for
damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case.
Petitioner did not heed the TRO suspending the demolition of structures.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his
right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then,
the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. The
petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.
G.R. No. 122796 December 10, 2001

PETROPHIL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DR. AMANDA TERNIDA-CRUZ, JESSIE DE
VERA, MARCIAL MULIG, ANTONIO CUENCA, and RUFINO CUENCA,
respondents.

Facts
Petrophil Corporation, petitioner, entered into contract with private
respondent Dr. Amanda Ternida-Cruz, for hauling and transport any and all
packages and/or bulk products of Petrophil. The contract provided among others,
that Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy,
improper and/or inadequate performance or abandonment. Par 11 of the
contract stipulated that the contract shall be for an indefinite period, provided
that Petrophil may terminate at any time with 30 days prior written notice.
Annexed to the contract was the Penalty Clause which contained calibrated penal
sanctions for infractions that may be committed by Dr. Cruz and/or her
employees.
Petrophil through its operations manager advised Dr. Cruz that Petrophil
was terminating its contract in accordance of Par 11. Dr Cruz appealed to
Petrophil but was denied.
Dr. Cruz filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 87-40930 on the RTC
Manila, seeking Petrophil the nullity of the termination of the contract and
declaring its suspension as unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions.
Other private respondents herein, Jessie de Vera, Marcial Mulig, Antonio and
Rufino Cuenca, all tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed a complaint for
damages against Petrophil Operations Manager Antonio Santos, Pandacan
Terminal Manager Crispino A. de Castro, and Pandacan Terminal
Superintendent Jaime Tamayo.
During the hearing;
 Dr Cruz claimed that the termination of her hauling contract was a
retaliation against her for allegedly sympathizing with the then striking
Petrophil employees and for informing the PNOC president of anomalies
perpetrated by some of its officers and employees.
 Driver Jessie de Vera corroborated these allegations and said that the
termination of Dr. Cruz's contract was intended to silence her. Further, he
testified that before the termination of the contract, Petrophil officials
reduced their hauling trips to make life harder for them so that they would
resign from Dr: Cruz's employ, which in turn would result in the closure of
her business.
 Petitioner denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz's
drivers for their support of her. Additionally, witnesses for Petrophil
testified that on April 25, 1987, there was a strike at the Pandacan terminal
and Dr. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line. They refused to load
petroleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to service
stations in Metro Manila and in the provinces, which in turn resulted in
loss of sales and revenues. Because of Dr. Cruz's refusal to load, the
management terminated the hauling contract.

Issues
Whether petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract,
which would entitle Dr. Cruz to damages.
Ruling
Yes. The termination of contract appeared to be a retaliation or punishment for
her sympathizing to the striking employees. The petitioner did not ask her (Dr.
Cruz) to explain her actions. Even if Petrophil have the right to terminate the
contract, the Petitioner could not act purposely to injure the respondent.
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the
respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr.
Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and ,consequently suffered loss of
income. Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be
directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a
consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be
demanded from the wrongdoer.20The appellate court did not err, given the
circumstances of this case, in awarding damages to respondent-drivers.

Laws Applied

Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the damage done.

Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed
at a specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a
consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be
demanded from the wrongdoer.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A.
JADER, respondent.
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

FACTS:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants’ College of Law from 1984 up

to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988),
he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for
which he was given an incomplete grade . He enrolled for the second
semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed
an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by
Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio
Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination
on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the

candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April
1988, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff
appeared as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of the names
of the candidates there is an annotation stating that the same is a
tentative list.

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies and he was

thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet
of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. He tendered a blow-out that
evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who
wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. He
thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave
of absence without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September
30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
University . Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review
class and was not able to take the bar examination.

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he

suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not
able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s
negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages,
unrealized income, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

RTC’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to
pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the cost of
suit.

CA’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court’s Decision

is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-
appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor
of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral
damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not UE has liability to Romeo Jader, considering that the

proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by
the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the
professor concerned the result of his removal exam.

RULING:

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the

removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted
in good faith.

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting

adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and
be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.

Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform

respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter
into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.

“It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-

appellee University had been informed during the deliberation that
the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing
grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant
of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did they
remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation.
Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that
plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-
appellant’s name in the “tentative” list of candidates for graduation
which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the basis
for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that
plaintiff-appellant’s name was allowed to remain in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able
to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation
day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff-appellant
Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if
defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform
plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to

respondent for the latter’s actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with
the Court of Appeals’ findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma
and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will
not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it
behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in
the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he
brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all
the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the
subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and
submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must
meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and the costs of
the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
Magbanua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all

surenamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the
defendants, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm
lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and asked to
vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to lack of water.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and
ordered the defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the
plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the IAC which the latter
affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the
IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision
because the former believe that as a shared tenants, they are entitled
to be maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their
respective landholdings.

Issue:

WON the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and

exemplary damages.

Held:

The petition is granted and the decision under review is

modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of
moral and exemplary damages by the defendants .

Ratio:

Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the

tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding.
In this case, it shows that the petitioners were denied irrigation water
for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings.
The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and caused prejudiced to
the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil
Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in
Article 21 of the same Code which provides, Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is
contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liable
for the compensation to the latter.
G.R. No. 147597 August 6, 2008

CLARISSA U. MATA, doing business under the firm name BESSANG

PASS SECURITY AGENCY, petitioner,
vs.
ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE, EDDIE E. SANTILLAN, PATRICIO
A. ARMODIA, ALEJANDRO A. ALMADEN and HERMENEGILDO G.
SALDO, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents were former security guards of the Bessang Pass

Security Agency, owned by herein petitioner Clarissa Mata.

The respondents, assisted by their counsel, Atty. Alexander

Agravante, filed a complaint with NLRC for non-payment of
salaries/wages and other benefits. Subsequently, they filed an
affidavit-complaint with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in
Cramp Crame, Quezon City requesting an investigation of the Bessang
Pass Security Agency and cancellation of its license to operate as
security agency for violation of labor laws. Copies of this affidavit-
complaint were likewise sent to different government agencies found
to be clients of the petitioner.

Petitioner instituted an action for damages against the

respondents averring that respondents filed unfounded, baseless
complaints before the NLRC for alleged violation of the labor laws and
with the PNP for cancellation of its license to operate. She further
alleged that by furnishing the government offices copies of these
complaints, the agency's reputation was besmirched, resulting in the
loss of contracts/projects and income.

Petitioner then declared that respondents' deliberate and

concerted campaign of hate and vilification against the Bessang Pass
Security Agency violated the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code, and thus, prayed that the respondents be held jointly and
severally liable to pay her the sum for moral damages and attorney's
fees.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Clarissa Mata. The

CA reversed and set aside the trial court's decision. It dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the acts of respondents violated respondents have violated

Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code and should be held liable for
damages.
HELD:

NO.

It has been held that Article 19, known to contain what is

commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a
panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of this
article is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis is any act
evincing bad faith or intent to injure.

Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos mores and has the

following elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary
to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and (3) is done
with intent to injure. The common element under Articles 19 and 21 is
that the act complained of must be intentional, and attended with
malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
may be invoked. The question of whether or not this principle has
been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21,10 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case.

In the case before us, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the
circumstances do not warrant an award of damages. Thus, the award
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages is quite preposterous. We agree
with the appellate court that in the action of the respondents, there
was no malicious intent to injure petitioner's good name and
reputation. The respondents merely wanted to call the attention of
responsible government agencies in order to secure appropriate action
upon an erring private security agency and obtain redress for their
grievances. So, we reiterate the basic postulate that in the absence of
proof that there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents,
no damages can be awarded.

Such act was consistent with and a rational consequence of

seeking justice through legal means for the alleged abuses defendants-
appellants suffered in the course of their employment with plaintiff-
appellee, which started with the case for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of backwages and benefits earlier filed with the NLRC
Regional Arbitration Branch in Cebu City.
Mita Pardo De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society

Facts:

Petitioner De Tavera filed a complaint alleging that she was duly

appointed as Executive Secretary of respondent society when the past
Board of Directors removed her summarily from her position without
any lawful cause. Respondent averred that under the Code of By-Laws
of the Society, said position is held at the pleasure of the Board of
Directors thus the incumbent has to vacate because her term has
expired. The court ruled in favor of respondent. Reconsideration was
denied and on appeal, the case was submitted to this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was illegally removed from her

position as Executive Secretary in violation of Code of By-Laws of the
society.

Ruling: NO.

Although the minutes of the organizational meeting show that

the Chairman mentioned the need of appointing a “permanent”
Executive Secretary, such statement alone cannot characterize the
appointment of petitioner without a contract of employment definitely
fixing her term because of the specific provision of Section 7.02 of the
Code of By-Laws that: “The Executive Secretary, the Auditor, and all
other officers and employees of the Society shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board of Directors, unless their term of employment
shall have been fixed in their contract of employment.” Besides the
word permanent” could have been used to distinguish the
appointment from acting capacity”.

The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner

informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very
significant. This could have no other implication than that petitioner
held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power.

An appointment held at the pleasure of the appointing power is

in essence temporary in nature. It is co-extensive with the desire of the
Board of Directors. Hence, when the Board opts to replace the
incumbent, technically there is no removal but only an expiration of
term and in an expiration of term, there is no need of prior notice, due
hearing or sufficient grounds before the incumbent can be separated
from office. The protection afforded by Section 7.04 of the Code of By-
Laws on Removal of Officers and Employees, therefore, cannot be
claimed by petitioner.
USC and Satorre v. CA and Lee G.R. No.79237

Facts:

Jennifer Lee was a student of USC. She first enrolled in the

College of Architecture, but has failed 2 subjects. When she
transferred to the College of Commerce, she made good grades. The
university disqualified her from graduating with honors taking into
consideration, as part of the university policy, her failing grades in the
College of Architecture. She filed an action for mandamus with
damages against petitioners in the Cebu RTC, asking that the latter be
compelled to confer upon her the degree of B.S. Commerce, major in
Accounting, cum laude. Petitioners allege that it may not be compelled
to grant graduation honors to students who, according to university
standards, rules, and regulations, do not qualify for such honors.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners may be compelled to grant

graduation honors to Jennifer Lee.

Ruling:

NO. It is an accepted principle that schools given ample

discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors
for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within
the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of
universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic
matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. In this case, the
petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other
interested parties advice on the University policies and rules on
enrollment and academic achievements. A failure in any subject
disqualifies a student from honors. Good moral character and
exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic
achievements. Private respondent should know and is presumed to
know those University policies and is bound to comply therewith.
BARONS MARKETING vs. CA and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC.

Facts:
August 31, 1973, Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of
its dealers of electrical wires and cables effective Sept. 1, 1973. Defendant
was given 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiff’s electrical products.
This credit term started from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products
to defendant.

Barons Marketing purchased, on credit, from Phelps Dodge’s

electrical wires and cables worth P4,102,483.30. Then it was sold to
MERALCO, Barons Marketing being the accredited supplier of the
electrical requirements of the latter.

Barons Marketing only paid P300,000 out of its total purchases

leaving an unsettled amount of P3,802,478.20. Phelps Dodge wrote Barons
Marketing demanding payment of its outstanding obligations to Phelps
Dodge. Barons Marketing responded by requesting if it could be paid
through monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1% interest per month
until fully settled, this request was rejected by Phelps Dodge and demanded
full payment.

Phelps Dodge then filed a complaint before the Pasig Trial Court for
the recovery of P3,802,478.20 with interest and also prayed to be awarded
with attorney’s fee at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded, exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000, the expenses of litigation and the
costs of suit. The court ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the exemplary
damages of P10,000 and recovery of P3,108,000.

Both parties appealed. Phelps Dodge claimed that court should have
awarded the sum of P3,802,478.20. and prayed that the said amount
awarded was a result of a typographical error.

Petitioner claimed that Phelps Dodge’s claim for damages is a result

of creditor’s abuse and failed to prove its cause of action against it.

Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge with the correct

amount but only with the 5% for the Atty’s fee. No costs.

Barons Marketing alleged the Coa erred when it held.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is guilty of abuse of right.

Held:
No, because petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of
private respondent. Petitioners allegation that private respondent was
motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so
that private respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not
supported by the evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.
Andamo vs. IAC digest
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Fernan, C.J.

Doctrine:
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in
Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private Respondent
Corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the
land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioner’s land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioner’s
crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
the petitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.

This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for

destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and
a civil action for damages.

Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for
destruction caused by respondent’s waterpaths and contrivances on
the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows
that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths and

contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a
causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and
the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes
fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
 It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights
of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner
so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although
we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third
person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES INC. vs. CA
GR#125018, April 06, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation and Crispin E. Lat are adjoining
landowners. Lat’s land is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit
trees. REMMAN’s land is devoted to its piggery business and is 1 ½
meters higher in elevation than that of Lat.
REMMAN’s waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and
inundating ¼ of Lat’s plantation. Almost 1 hectare of Lat’s plantation
was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of
which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and
die.
Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased
because of the overflow of the water heavy with manure from
REMMAN’s piggery farm. REMMAN raised the defense that he
adopted measures to contain the waste water coming from its piggery
to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.
HELD:
The ocular inspection showed that the waste water containing
pig manure was indeed continuously flowing from REMMAN‘s piggery
farm to Lat’s plantation. Such overflow went on for a year destroying
several fruit trees on Lat’s plantation.
Art. 637, NCC and Art. 50, Water Code impose a natural
easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally
and without the intervention of man descend from higher states.
However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are those
which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient state to
compensation.
REMMAN was negligent in its maintenance of level waste water
in its lagoons. As such, even assuming that the heavy rains constituted
as an act of God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event
became humanized and thus, petitioner is liable for the ensuing
damages.
CASE: ANDRADE VS. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Andrade, assigned to Araullo High School, Manila as an

English teacher. In 1985, she was not given any teaching load because there
was (1) drastic drop of enrollment; (2) she was declared an excess teacher;
and (3) she ranked lowest in her performance rating. She was transferred to
Ramon Magsaysay High School, but then she decided to go back to Araullo
High School. Upon her return, she found out that her name was already
deleted from the regular monthly payroll and was transferred to a special
voucher list.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent, Wingsing as the head of the

English Department is liable to petitioner for damages based on Art 19.

Held:

No. While Article 19 of the New Civil Code may have been intended as
a declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed
in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g., that where a person
exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties
in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens
himself to civil liability. The elements of abuse of one's rights under the said
Article 19 are the following: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. In this regard, it appeared that the complaint of petitioner
Andrade failed to meet the second and third requirements.

A careful review of the records reveals that the declaration of

petitioner as an excess teacher was not motivated by any personal desire on
the part of respondent Wingsing to cause her undue misery or injury, but
merely the result of the valid exercise of authority. The decrease in the
enrollment for the school year 1985-1986 in the Araullo High School
resulted in a number of teachers being declared as excess teachers.

In exercising his judgment, the evidence reveals that respondent

Wingsing was not at all dictated neither by whim or fancy, nor of spite
against the petitioner but was rather guided by the following factors:
qualification to teach, seniority, teaching performance and attitude towards
the school community.

Petitioner knew about her poor performance rating but she never
questioned it.
ESTERIA F. GARCIANO v. CA, GR No. 96126, 1992-08-10

Facts:

The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in
the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. She applied
for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to
Austria.

The application was recommended for approval by the school

principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's
Board of Directors

Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her

husband, Sotero Garciano (for she was still abroad), informing her of the
decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the
president of the Parent-Teachers Association and... the school faculty, to
terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the
absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school
due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute
for her on a temporary... basis as no one would accept the position without
a written contract

Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz,

signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your
usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . .

effective July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination received
by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of
Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void.

On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the

Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo,
and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and
unjust and illegal dismissal.

The lower court rendered a decision on August 30, 1985, ordering the
defendants jointly and severally to pay her P200,000 as moral damages,
P50,000 as exemplary damages, P32,400 as lost earnings for nine years,
and P10,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's... fees.

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of

Appeals... which on August 30, 1990

Issues:
 They should not have been held liable to plaintiff-appellee for
damages

Ruling:

The defendants (now private respondents) appealed to the Court of

Appeals

Defendants-appellants had no authority to dismiss plaintiff?appellee

and the latter was aware of this. Hence, the letter of termination sent to
her... through her husband (Exhs. C and 1) by defendants-appellants had no
legal effect whatsoever. It did not effectively prevent her from reporting for
work.

Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law,
or morals, good customs or public policy

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's

discontinuance from teaching was her own choice.

Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to recover

damages to injured... persons who are not themselves at fault

The trial court's award of exemplary damages to her was not justified
for she is not entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages (Art.
2234, Civil Code)... the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.