Tugas Konsep Teknologi

Abed Nego

201725001

Resume Framing The Problem

IN 1977, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY and Health Administration (OSHA) issued an

emergency temporary standard requiring that the level of air exposure to benzene in the workplace
not exceed 1 part per million (ppm). This was a departure
from the then current standard of 10 ppm. OSHA wanted to make this change permanent because
of a recent report to the National Institutes of Health of links between leukemia deaths and
exposure to benzene. Because of evidence that benzene is carcinogenic, OSHA advocated
changing the standard to the lowest level that can be easily monitored (1 ppm).

Frequently, important facts are not known, thereby making it difficult to resolve
disagreement. Some of the facts we may want to have at our disposal relate to something that has
already happened (e.g., what caused the accident). But we also want to
know what consequences are likely to result from the various options before us, and
there can be much uncertainty about this. Thus, it is important to distinguish not
only between relevant and irrelevant facts but also between known facts and unknown facts. Here,
the number of unknown facts is less important than the degree
of their relevance or importance. Even a single unknown relevant fact might make
a crucial difference to what should be done. In any case, we have a special responsibility to seek
answers to unanswered factual questions.

So far, we have emphasized that when engaging in ethical reflection, it is important

to get as clear as we can about both the relevant facts and the basic meanings of key
concepts. However, even when we are reasonably clear about what our concepts
mean, disagreement about their applications in particular cases can also arise. If
those who disagree are operating from different factual premises, there might well
be disagreement about whether certain concepts apply in particular circumstances.
For example, a disagreement about bribery might pivot around the question of
whether an offer of a free weekend at an exclusive golf resort in exchange for a vendor’s business
was actually made. It might be agreed that if such an offer were made,
this would be an attempt to bribe. However, whether or not such an offer was actually made may
be at issue. If the issue is only over whether or not a certain offer was made, the possible
ways of resolving it may be readily apparent. If there were no witnesses and neither
party is willing to admit that the offer was made, the issue may remain unresolved for
others, but at least we can say, ‘‘Look, either the offer was made or it wasn’t—there’s
a fact of the matter.’’

There is another kind of application issue, one that rests on a common feature of
concepts. Attempts to specify the meanings of terms ahead of time can never anticipate all of the
cases to which they do and do not apply. No matter how precisely we
attempt to define a concept, it will always remain insufficiently specified so that some
of its applications to particular circumstances will remain problematic.

One way of dealing with these problems is to change or modify our definitions of
crucial concepts in the face of experience. Sometimes an experience may not appear
to exemplify the concept as we have defined it, but we believe it should count as an
instance of the concept anyway. In such a case, the experience prompts us to modify
the definition. When this happens in analyzing a case, it is a good idea to revisit the
initial depiction of the case and reassess the relevant facts and ethical considerations
before attempting its final resolution.

To some it may appear that, at least as we have characterized it so far, common morality is
too loosely structured. Everyone can agree that, other things being equal, we
should keep our promises, be truthful, not harm others, and so on. But all too frequently, other
things are not equal. Sometimes keeping a promise will harm someone, as will telling the truth.
What do we do then? Are there any principles that might frame our thinking in ways that can help
us resolve such conflicts? There is a basic concept that is especially important to keep in mind in
answering these questions.

This is the idea of universalizability: Whatever is right (or wrong) in

one situation is right (or wrong) in any relevantly similar situation.9 Although this
does not by itself specify what is right or wrong, it requires us to be consistent in
our thinking. For example, in considering whether or not it would be morally acceptable to falsify
data in a particular project, a scientist or engineer needs to think about
not just this particular situation but all situations relevantly like it. Falsifying data is,
essentially, a form of lying or cheating. When we broaden our focus to consider what
kind of act is involved, the question of whether it is all right to falsify data is bound to
appear quite different than when thinking only about the immediate situation.

How are we to determine what counts as the greater good? One approach that has
some appeal from an engineering perspective is cost–benefit analysis: The course of
action that produces the greatest benefit relative to cost is the one that should be
chosen. Sometimes this is a relatively straightforward matter. However, making
this sort of determination can present several difficulties. We consider three here.
First, in order to know what we should do from the utilitarian perspective, we must
know which course of action will produce the most good in both the short and the
long term. Unfortunately, this knowledge is sometimes not available at the time decisions must be
made. For example, we do not yet know whether permitting advertising
and competitive pricing for professional services will lead to some of the problems suggested by
those who oppose it. Therefore, we cannot say for sure whether these are
good practices from a utilitarian perspective. Sometimes all we can do is try a certain
course of action and see what happens. This may be risky in some circumstances.
Second, the utilitarian aim is to make choices that promise to bring about the
greatest amount of good. We refer to the population over which the good is maximized as the
audience. The problem is determining the scope of this audience. Ideally,
it might be thought, the audience should include all human beings, or at least all
human beings who might be affected by the action to be evaluated. Perhaps the audience should
even include all beings capable of experiencing pleasure or pain. But
then it becomes virtually impossible to calculate which actions actually produce the
most good for so large an audience. If we limit the audience so that it includes
only our country, our company, or our community, then we face the criticism that
others have been arbitrarily excluded. Therefore, in practice, those with utilitarian
sympathies need to develop acceptable ways of delimiting their range of responsibility.
A third difficulty with the utilitarian standard is that it seems sometimes to favor
the greater aggregate good at the expense of a vulnerable minority. Imagine the following: A plant
discharges a pollutant into the local river, where it is ingested by fish.
If humans eat the fish, they experience significant health problems. Eliminating the
pollutant will be so expensive that the plant will become, at best, only marginally
profitable. Allowing the discharge to continue will save jobs and enhance the overall
economic viability of the community. The pollutant will adversely affect only a relatively small
proportion of the population—the most economically deprived members
of the community who fish in the river and then eat the fish.

Finally, cost–benefit analysis might seem to justify many practices in the past that
we have good reason to believe were morally wrong. In the 19th century, many
people opposed child labor laws, arguing that they would lead to economic inefficiencies. They
pointed out, for example, that tunnels and shafts in coal mines were
too small to accommodate adults. Many arguments in favor of slavery were also
based on considerations of economic efficiency. When our society finally decided
to eliminate child labor and slavery, it was not simply because they became economically
inefficient but also because they came to be considered unjust.