The Collapse

Chapter 4 – THE COLLAPSE

1. The chronology of events on the day of the collapse was agreed at the 2nd
Experts' Conference and is presented in Annex 1 to the 2nd Joint Statement of
the Experts. A summary of the chronology of events is set out in Appendix A-
25.

4.1 WITNESSES’ ACCOUNTS OF OBSERVATIONS ON DAY OF

COLLAPSE ON 20 APRIL 2004

8.45 am - 9.00 am

2. On 20 April 2004 (day of accident) after 8 am, there were several groups of
workers from Kori Construction and Hiap Shing Construction working within the
vicinity of the retaining walls at Type M3 and Type M2. Kori and Hiap Shing
were sub-contractors of NLCJV responsible for the installation of strutting
system and excavation works respectively.

3. There were two groups of workers from Kori under the charge of Heng Yeow
Pheow (Foreman of Kori, one of the deceased). One group of workers (about
11 persons) was at the excavation base of Type M2 and installing the 10th level
struts for S314 and S315. The excavation work to the 10th level at this area had
been completed. The workers comprised Norinthong Somkhuan, Thawan
Chaliaw, Chalee Wathana, Mankhalakheeree Thawatchai, Khasar Sanya,
Theerakhang Treenet, Kabkaew Suriphon, Chaemsai Naret, Khamphanee
Somphan, Phuringao Narong and Senangkhabut Ekachai. The other group of
workers (about 4 persons) was stationed at the ground surface level (near to
S316). They were to prepare the strutting members (including carrying out light
welding works) for the purpose of installation at the excavation base below. The
workers included Phokhasri Amphon, Khotarat Sokhon, Tiyabut Phataraphon
and Yeo Choo Leng.

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 The Collapse

4. There was another group of workers from Kori under the charge of Chan Mun
Seong (Foreman of Kori). They were at the excavation base of Type M3 near
to S340, preparing for the installation of walers for S340 (south) at the 10th level.
The excavation work to the 10th level at this area had been completed. The
workers included Roslan Bin Abd Majid, Pang Siong Men, Soh Kim Soi and
Leong Yo.

5. There were two groups of workers from Hiap Shing under the charge of Leow
Choon Hock (Site Supervisor of Hiap Shing). One group of workers (2
persons) was carrying out excavation and levelling works near to S317 within
the excavation base of Type M2. The excavator operators were Liew Swee
Peng and Saikaran A/L Subramaniam. The other group of workers (about 4
persons) from Hiap Shing was working within the vicinity of S332 to S335. They
were to bring the excavated material from the excavation base to the ground
surface level using excavators. The excavator at the ground surface level was
operated by Peh Chin Sun, while the excavators within the excavation base
were operated by Lin Koh Ming, Heng Teok Yong and Soh Ling Hoo.

6. Signs of trouble began to emerge in the morning of 20 April 2004 at around 8.45
am. Some Kori workers, who were then preparing to install the 10th level struts
at S339/ S340, heard “thung” sounds coming from within the excavation area.
According to one of the workers, Roslan Bin Abd Majid, the sounds were not
very loud and came from somewhere at the north wall near to strut number
S338. Roslan felt that the sounds, which came at 10 minutes intervals, were
not the usual sounds that he had heard in the tunnel. They sounded like
something had broken. However, he ignored the sounds and continued with his
work along with his co-workers.

9.00 am – 10.00 am

7. At round 9.15 am, NLCJV’s Senior Engineer Andy Wong and Kori Construction
Site Supervisor Nallusamy Ramadoss proceeded to the base of Type M3 area
for an inspection. They went down via the access ladder located at S338
(north).

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 The Collapse

8. When Andy Wong was inspecting the work at the tunnel eye at S338, he heard
two ‘thung’ sounds. He noticed that the top C-channel stiffener for S338 (north)
had buckled inwards slightly. He also realised that the inner flange (away from
the wall) of the waler at S338 (north) had buckled inwards towards the
diaphragm wall and also sagged downwards (see Figure 4.1a). Immediately, he
went to check the welding works of the lacing, stopper and Z-bar of S338. At
that time, the waler at S338 (south) showed no indication of buckling.

9. About 10 minutes later while he was at S337, Andy Wong heard another ‘thung’
sound. He then realised that the waler beam at S335 (south) had buckled (see
Figure 4.1b). The inner flange had sagged further. The S335 (north) waler
flange did not have any sign of buckling.

10. At about 10.00 am, Andy Wong called his superior, NLCJV’s Construction
Manager Liew Teck Boon, to inform him about the situation and told him that
“the waler was ‘gone’ at S335 and S338”. He raised concerns that the situation
was serious and asked Liew to check the strain gauge readings for abnormality.
Liew indicated that the readings were regular at about 3000 kN. There was no
abnormality with the readings. Andy Wong did not know what to do so Liew told
him that they would meet and hold a join inspection on site. Liew in turn
informed NLCJV’s Project Manager Yoshiaki Chikushi about the waler distortion
at Type M3 and told Chikushi that he was going to inspect it. Chikushi told him
to go ahead.

11. Andy Wong also called Balashunmuganathan Suresh Kumar (Geotechnical

Engineer of NLCJV) and asked about the inclinometer readings at Type M3
area. Andy Wong also told him about the “thung” sounds coming from the
strutting system at that area. Suresh Kumar called L&M’s Supervisor
Chakkarapani Balasubramani and found out that the last reading taken from
inclinometer I-104 was on 17 April 2004. There was no reading taken from I-
104 on 18 and 19 April 2004. Suresh Kumar instructed Balasubramani to go
down to the site immediately to take another reading.

12. Meanwhile, frightened and fearing that the strut might give way, Andy Wong
went up immediately to the ground level. Before going up, he told the three Hiap
Shing excavator operators to stop all excavation activities at the Type M3 10th
level. Andy Wong also told Ramadoss to get out but Ramadoss remained

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 Photograph of buckling of walers at S338 (North) 9th Level on morning
Figure 4.1(a)
of 20 April 2004.

Source : E15.3A-Fig 311 and 312

Photograph of buckling of walers at S335 (South) 9th Level on morning

Figure 4.1(b)
of 20 April 2004.
 The Collapse

behind to talk to his Kori workers, who told him that they had heard the sounds
too. Ramadoss told his Kori workers and foreman Chan Mun Seong to stop
their respective work and to proceed immediately to the ground level. They
complied and went up to the ground level. After they had left, Ramadoss
conducted further checks on the strut at the 9th level and called NLCJV’s Deputy
Project Manager Shimizu Tatsuro to inform him that the walers had buckled.
Shimizu told Ramadoss that he would proceed to the site to check the waler
beams.

10.00 am – 11.00 am

13. At the ground level, Andy Wong came out of the excavation and went to the site
container to inform LTA’s site inspector John Tan Lock Yong (one of the
deceased) about his findings. Andy Wong then met Shimizu and told him about
the situation. Shimizu said that Ramadoss had already informed him about it.

14. At about 10.30 am, a site inspection was conducted by Shimizu, Liew Teck
Boon, Andy Wong, Lee Yeng Tat (Site Manager, Kori), Ramadoss and Jimmy
Tan (Project Manager, Hiap Shing). According to Andy Wong, the waler buckling
at the 9th level of S335 (south) then had worsened from his earlier inspection.
The “thung” sounds were also more frequent.

15. When they reached the 9th level, Shimizu and Liew then proceeded to inspect
the waler beams. Andy Wong pointed out to them the two affected struts. He
also pointed out that the waler at S335 (south) had buckled further from his
earlier observation at about 9.30 am. Shimizu observed that the waler beam
attached to S338, which used to be "H-shaped", was slightly deformed with one
vertical side lower than the other. According to Shimizu, he had seen such
similar buckling of walers previously at this worksite about 3 to 4 weeks prior to 20
April 2004. The waler buckling occurred at the retaining wall Type D1 where the
construction of Nicoll Highway (“NCH”) station was in progress (see Figure 4.2).
NLCJV had rectified the problem at NCH station by filling the walers with cement
then. Shimizu felt that the buckling of the waler at S335 (south) was serious but
not serious enough to order the workers to stop work and evacuate.

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 Source : E93

Photograph of buckling of walers at NCH Station at Type D-1 in March

Figure 4.2
2004.
 The Collapse

16. While the supervisors were inspecting the area, more “thung” sounds were
heard. This time the sounds came from the north side waler of S355 or S336.
They noticed that the waler at S335 and S336 of the north wall had also
buckled.

17. After a discussion, Shimizu asked Lee Yeng Tat and Ramadoss to continue
laying the strut at the 10th level. Both Lee and Ramadoss however objected to
his idea. They felt that it was not safe because it would take four to five days for
Kori workers to lay the 10th level struts.

18. Shimizu then decided to use the same approach to the problem as that used for
the buckled waler beams at the NCH worksite. He proposed that Kori workers
fill the top part of all the waler beams at Type M3 with Grade 50 cement and
further reinforce them by placing additional C-channels under the waler beams
that were bent. At the same time, Liew suggested casting a 200 mm thick layer
of lean concrete at the excavation level for the affected area S335 to S340.
This was a much faster method than strut installation because the casting of the
layer of lean concrete would take only about three to four hours. Shimizu agreed
to Liew’s suggestion as previous experience with such pouring of concrete did
stabilise deflections in other areas such as Type L. Andy Wong was to arrange
for workers from Jiang Su Construction to carry out concreting to the 10th level
base. Liew then called Chikushi to tell him what they were doing to rectify the
problem and Chikushi gave his approval to go ahead.

19. Initially, Ramadoss was not agreeable to use Kori workers to fill the waler
beams and had proposed to Liew that the Jiang Su Construction workers be
asked to do the job instead. According to the account given by Lee Yeng Tat,
Liew mentioned to Ramadoss, “Even this you also don’t want to help me”.
Upon hearing that, Ramadoss reluctantly agreed that he would try to get some
workers to help.

20. Andy Wong then gave instructions to level the excavated area between S335
and S340 so as to prepare the whole Type M3 area for the laying of the lean
concrete at the 10th level in the afternoon. Andy Wong also called Kori foreman
Chan Mung Seong through the hand phone to remove the welding tools and
sets from the excavation base of Type M3. Chan accordingly instructed two Kori
workers to go down to the 10th level to remove all the equipment to the surface

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 The Collapse

level by using the crane to hoist them up. Andy Wong and the other supervisors
left the area and went up to the ground level.

11.00 am – 12.00 pm

21. Between 11 am and 12 noon, two groups of workers from Hiap Shing carried out
the ground levelling work at the areas around S333/S334 and around S317 as
instructed. They stopped for lunch at around 12 noon.

22. At the ground level, Andy Wong called LTA’s Project Engineer Ng Joo Tong to
inform him of the situation and the planned contingency measures. According
to Ng, who was then at that time at NCH station base slab level, Andy Wong
told him that the flange of the waler of the south wall strut S335 at the 9th layer
had dented inwards. Andy Wong informed him that they intended to pour
concrete infill to the waler to strengthen it. Ng asked him whether the strut was
still in good condition and Andy Wong replied that the strut looked visually in
good condition. Ng presumed what he meant was that there was no buckling of
strut detected and asked him to proceed with the strengthening works.

23. Andy Wong then went to the container office and told LTA’s Project Engineer
Desmond Koey and John Tan Lock Yong about the situation and the
contingency measures. He also informed them that he had reported the
situation to Ng. Desmond Koey instructed Andy Wong to take the
instrumentation readings and submit them to LTA.

24. Desmond Koey then went back to the LTA site office. When Ng returned to the
LTA site office at about 11.30 am, Desmond Koey asked Ng if Andy Wong had
called him to inform him about the situation at CC2. Ng confirmed that.
According to both Desmond Koey and Ng, LTA’s Senior Project Engineer Siew
Yau Kok was present at the site office and knew about the situation. Siew did
not say anything about it then. According to Siew, he came to know about the
situation only during lunch time at around 12 noon when Ng told him that two of
the waler beams at Type M3 were deformed. Siew said Ng also told him that
some metal noise had been detected at the Type M3 area and the contractors
were carrying out rectification work. Siew decided to find out more after lunch.

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 The Collapse

25. Meanwhile, at around 11.15 am, Chikushi informed NLCJV’s Project

Coordinator / Professional Engineer Paul Broome that some of the walers to the
struts in the CC2 area had buckled and that steps were being taken to
strengthen the walers. According to Paul Broome, he had considered
inspecting the damaged area but was then asked by NLCJV’s Site
Administration Manager Miyahara to assist him to complete an administration
report. Paul Broome also wanted to complete a report on an incident that
occurred the previous night in the Type I area.

26. At about 11.30 am, Liew Teck Boon went to Kori Site Manager Lee Yeng Tat’s
site office and requested him to ask Kori foreman Heng Yeow Pheow to
immediately install the 10th level strut. Lee could not agree to Liew’s idea as he
felt that it was not safe at that time to continue laying the 10th level strut when
the remedy for the 9th level had yet to be carried out. Lee told Liew that “Kori
only earned a bit by laying the strut” and that “it was not worth to risk the lives of
my workers”. After hearing that, according to Lee, Liew left angrily.

27. Liew then approached Heng Yeow Peow and asked him to go down to install
the 10th level strut at the Type M3 area and help to cast concrete on the waler at
the 9th level. Liew’s intention was to further stabilise the Type M3 area through
the installation of the 10th level strut. The initiative was Liew’s own and he did
not tell Chikushi about the improvisation. Heng responded ‘ok, ok’ in Hokkien.

28. Meanwhile, Suresh Kumar and Andy Wong proceeded to the location where
inclinometer I-104 was, and found out that the inclinometer opening was
covered with soil. They promptly cleared the opening to enable the personnel
from L&M to take the measurement.

12.00 pm – 1.00 pm

29. Prior to or during the lunch break at around 12 noon, the other members of the
project team of LTA (including Wong Hon Peng, Siew Yau Kok and Desmond
Koey) were made aware of the buckling of walers and the rectification measures
at the Type M3 area.

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 The Collapse

1.00 pm – 2.00 pm

30. At about 1.00 pm, Liew attended the daily coordination meeting with Andy Wong
and Jimmy Tan. Also present at the meeting were NLCJV’s site foreman Teng
Fong Sin and one “Zhong” and one “Ker” from Jiang Su Construction.
Ramadoss was not present as he was arranging for the concrete casting work
at Type M3. During the meeting, NLCJV’s Assistant Geotechnical Engineer
Arumaithurai Ahilan provided them with the inclinometer readings of I-65 and I-
104. The inclinometer reading at I-104 on 17 April 2004 indicated a reading of
349.81 mm. There was no record of any readings for I-104 on 18 and 19 April
2004. The reading on 20 April 2004 at about 1.00 pm from 1-104 was 440.55
mm. According to Andy Wong, they realised that there was a 90 mm wall
deflection from 17 to 20 April 2004. It also struck them that the reading had
exceeded the revised design level of 359 mm which NLCJV had proposed to
LTA on 19 April 2004.

31. Andy Wong then decided to check the strain gauge reading for strut S335.
According to Andy Wong:

“The reading in the morning at 8am was then normal at about 3000kN. It
was still all right at 10am. By 12noon, the 8th level strut load at S335 had
increased to 3000kN, whereas the 9th level strut load dropped drastically
from 3000kN to more than 1000kN. I do not know the initial load of the
8th level strut. I did a projection of the rate of increase and found that the
rate of increase was about 400kN for every 2 hours. The 8th level was still
below the trigger level. I went to show Mr Liew the new readings and I
was of the opinion that the forces on the struts would hit the design value
by the next day.”

32. After the meeting, Andy Wong proceeded to the LTA site office to tell Ng Joo
Tong about his findings.

33. At about 1 pm, Heng Yeow Pheow brought four Kori workers (Norinthong
Somkhuan, Thawan Chaliaw, Chalee Wathana and Mankhalakheeree
Thawatchai) to the Type M3 area to fill the top sections of walers of the struts

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 The Collapse

with concrete at the 9th level. Shortly after, Ramadoss brought another four Kori
workers to join them. These four workers were Sadaiyan Vijayakumar,
Radhakrishnan Ramesh Kumar, Ganapathi Gurunathan and Thirupathi
Gnanamoorthi. While the workers were filling the walers with concrete, metallic
“thung” sounds could be heard at an interval of about 10 to 20 minutes.

34. According to Chalee Wattana,

“During that time we can hear a loud sound, similar to a gunshot, but the
sound was even louder than a gunshot. The frequency of the sound
occurred about 20 to 30 minutes once. However, we still proceed to pour
wet concrete to the waler cavity.”

35. Norinthong Somkhuan, another Kori worker, said that the sounds became more
frequent and were “very frightening”.

36. A crane, operated by Vadivil s/o Nadeson (one of the deceased), was
stationed at the southern side of Type M3 area to bring buckets of concrete into
the excavation base where Heng Yeow Pheow and his workers were working.

37. Meanwhile, the other Kori workers continued with the strut installation work at
the 10th level of S316 after lunch.

38. There were five workers from NLCJV assigned to pour lean concrete into the
excavation base of Type M3. The workers were Fan Li Jun (Foreman), Liu
Rong Quan (one of the deceased), Wu Hong Lin, Lu Si Xiao and Liu Er Xiao.
They were informed that the cement truck would arrive later at around 3 pm. As
such, they left the Type M3 area and worked in another locality within the
worksite before coming back at around 2.45 pm.

39. Kori workers (Thawan Chaliaw, Mankhalakheeree Thawatchai, Chalee

Watthana, Norinthong Somkhuan, Vijayakumar, Gnanamoorthy, Ramesh
Kumar and G Gurunathan) were at the 9th level near S334 and S335 getting
ready for the concreting walers. Heng Yeow Pheow was supervising them.
Their material evidence is as follows:

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 The Collapse

G Gurunathan

“I noticed that three walers at the 9th level around the area of S337 had
bent inwards.”

T Chaliaw

“I noticed that the waler beam S338, on the wall facing Nicoll Highway,
was twisted. It was very outstanding and you could see it with one look.
…While we were waiting for the cement to arrive, I could hear “thung”
sound coming from the South side of the waler beam S338”

M Thawatchai

“I noticed that the waler beam of either strut numbers S334 or S335 was
deformed.”

40. At around 1.30 pm, the concrete truck arrived. Kori workers then started
concreting the walers along north diaphragm wall commencing from S334
towards S340. A “thung” sound was heard after the first bucket was lowered
down. Subsequently, more “thung” sounds were heard.

41. The concreting works commenced at the south side of S331 and progressed
towards S340. The remedial works however proved ineffectual as the walers
had distorted to the extent that the concrete did not remain where they were
supposed to be and fell off. According to Lee Yeng Tat, he received a call from
Heng Yeow Pheow informing him that “the waler beams were badly distorted
and difficult to pour in the concrete.”

2.00 pm – 3.00 pm

42. During a meeting which commenced at 2 pm, Tomio Ueno (Deputy Project
Director of NLCJV) was informed about the walers buckling and rectification
measures at Type M3 by his Project Manager, Yoshiaki Chikushi.

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 The Collapse

43. Meanwhile, Andy Wong arrived at the LTA site office at around 2.30 pm. There
he told Ng Joo Tong that the strut load at S335 at the 9th level had dropped by
more than 1000kN. Ng then checked through the email message from the real-
time strut monitoring system. There was no alert email message that the trigger
level was reached at S335. After that, Ng and Andy Wong left the office to the
smoking corner of the site office. Shortly after, they were joined by Siew Yau
Kok and Desmond Koey. Desmond asked Andy Wong for the inclinometer
readings. Andy Wong went back to his office to retrieve the results and gave
them to Siew. The inclinometer I-104 showed movement of 90 mm over the last
3 days. As Andy Wong did not have the strain gauge readings with him, the
three went to the G&T room to check the real-time monitoring system.

44. According to Siew, he saw that the strain gauge reading on the 9th level strut
was dropping while that for the 8th level strut was increasing, although it was still
within the trigger level. Siew found that unusual because the contractors had
completed installing the struts at the 9th level at CC2 and were about to install
the 10th level struts after the completion of the excavation. If the readings were
normal, the load on the struts immediately above the excavated level would
increase slightly. This load would be redistributed to all the struts when the 10th
level struts were installed. In this case, the load on the 9th level strut had shown
a reduction instead of an increase.

45. Siew decided to inform LTA’s Project Manager Wong Hon Peng about the
problem. He went to Wong’s office to show him the readings. Siew highlighted
to Wong that there was a sharp drop of strut loads at the 9th level and that all
loads appeared to have been taken up by the 8th level struts. Siew told Wong
that he did not receive any alert notice in the email and further that the 8th level
struts would be able to take the load as they were double struts. He also
briefed Wong on the arrangements made by NLCJV to place lean concrete.
Wong did not question Siew further since Siew was the one who had been
overseeing the construction. He left it to Siew to handle the matter.

46. Siew also called LTA’s Design Manager Joshua Ong to request for an urgent
meeting in the afternoon. The purpose of the meeting was to assess the
situation and review any recommendation from the NLCJV design team to
rectify the problem. Siew also wanted an explanation as to what was actually
happening. The meeting was scheduled to be held at 3.00 pm on the same day.

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 The Collapse

Joshua Ong instructed LTA’s Senior Design Engineer Shirley Sivakumaran to

attend the meeting.

47. At about 2.50 pm, Ng Joo Tong and Andy Wong left for the site to assess the
site condition. When Desmond Koey went to check the strain gauge readings
again, he found that the 9th level strut S335 load had dropped and that the 8th
level strut load had picked up. Immediately, he informed Siew and some other
colleagues. He also called to inform Ng about his findings, by which time Ng
was already at the Type M3 area.

48. Meanwhile, Andy Wong and Ng Joo Tong went into the excavation base of
Type M3 for an inspection. According to Andy Wong, the Kori workers had
completed about 80% of the filling of concrete into the top sections of walers at
the 9th level for the southern side of Type M3. Heng Yeow Pheow, Ramadoss
and the Kori workers were also at the 9th level of the Type M3 area.

49. At around this time, the Kori workers began to sense that the concreting work
might be futile. This was because the walers were so badly buckled that the
concrete was unable to remain in the waler and began to drop off. According to
T. Chaliaw :

“As we were pouring cement for the waler beam of S338, I noticed that
the waler beam (S337) at the South side, tilted to one side and the
cement began to flow out.”

50. Andy Wong also noticed that most of the inner flanges of the walers between
S335 to S340 at the 9th level had buckled and sagged downwards, with some of
them sagged by as much as 20cm. The metallic “thung” sounds had also
become more frequent. He testified as follows:

“This was then that I saw that the strut had sagged down together with
the waler beams. The walers at S335, S336, S337 and S338 south side
had buckled.”

51. According to Norinthong Somkhuan, who was working with Heng Yeow Pheow
on the filling of concrete into the walers at Type M3, the walers at S336 (north)
to S339 (north) have buckled inwards. He said:

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 The Collapse

"I noticed that the waler beams S336 to S339 at the South wall were fine
and not bent. However I noticed that the waler beams at S336 to S339
at the North wall were bent inwards."

52. M Thatwatchai said that he saw “the lacings and bracings on one end at
S336/S337 popping out of their positions.”

53. Ng Joo Tong’s observation was as follows:

“I realized that the walers (a H-shaped piece of steel attaching the strut
to the wall) at the North wall (at S335 and S339, 9th level area) were
deformed. The H-shaped had been unaligned, with the outer flange
(away from wall) sagged downwards.”

3.00 pm – 3.10 pm

54. At 3.00 pm, an urgent meeting was convened at the meeting room in the LTA
site office. Present at the meeting from NLCJV were Chikushi and his Deputy
Project Managers Stephen Ang and Liew Teck Boon. The representatives from
LTA were Wong Hon Peng, Siew Yau Kok, Desmond Koey and Shirley.
Chikushi felt that he could handle the issues to be discussed at the meeting so
he asked Liew to proceed to the site to check on the buckling issue and
contingency works. Liew then left the LTA site office.

55. Wong informed Chikushi of the problem arising from the struts at the Type M3
walls. Chikushi confirmed that he had already made arrangements to cast
concrete on the walers and that the work had in fact started. Chikushi also said
that he had made arrangement to pour lean concrete on the lowest level at this
area. Since the problems had been addressed, Siew left the meeting room
while Wong continued the meeting with Chikushi on other matters.

56. In actual fact, problems were brewing and the temporary works were
approaching the brink of total failure and collapse at the Type M3 area.

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 The Collapse

3.10 pm – 3.30 pm

57. Andy Wong received a call from Chikushi asking him to abandon the casting of
the 9th level walers and proceed instead to pour lean concrete at the excavation
base at the 10th level.

58. Ng Joo Tong however told Andy Wong that they should proceed to cast the 8th
level walers to prevent the struts from failing. Andy Wong told Ng that they
should leave, but Ng said that they would leave when the 8th level started to
buckle.

59. Andy Wong then called out to Heng Yeow Peow to stop the concreting at the 9th
level and to proceed to cast the 8th level waler instead. By this time, the walers
of S339 and S340 at the 9th level had started buckling and soon after, the
walers at S339 and S340 at the 8th level also started to buckle.

60. Heng then called his workers to proceed to the 8th level to carry out concreting
of the waler. One of his workers Chalee Wattana refused and started to walk off.
Earlier, Wattana’s co-workers Chaliaw and Thawatchai had also refused to
carry on with the work and left the site. The Kori workers had been
communicating amongst themselves that the situation was getting from bad to
worst.

3.30 pm – The Collapse

61. When Wattana walked to the 10th strut beam (believed to be S335) at the 9th
level, he saw that the connecting end of the strut beam had given way. Upon
seeing that, he started to run. At this point, he could hear collapsing sound
coming from behind him. The temporary works had collapsed.

62. Wattana kept running until the sound of collapse had stopped. He turned around
and took a look, and saw nothing but dust filling the site. The respite was brief.
After about two minutes, the collapse started again. This time Wattana did not
turn back but kept on running towards the access near the canteen.

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 The Collapse

63. Back at the Type M3 area, Ng had heard a “thung” sound coming from the 8th
level moments before the onset of the collapse. He proceeded to check the 8th
level waler but found no sign of distortion. Soon after that, he heard another
“thung” sound that seemed to be from the 7th level. He did not know what
caused the sounds and from which struts they were coming from. He quickly
shouted to Andy Wong and Heng Yeow Peow to go up to ground level. Andy
Wong ran up the scaffolding access at S330 followed by Ng. They saw Heng
Yeow Peow shouting and gesturing at all his workers to run. Immediately after
that, rows of continuous “thung” sounds were heard from all the levels.

64. When Andy Wong reached the ground level, he heard a very loud collapsing
sound. He saw Ramadoss at the ground level blowing his whistle frantically,
asking everybody to run for their lives. When Andy Wong turned around, he saw
the earth caving inwards from S340 area towards the access. He ran towards
the direction of his main site office, away from the collapsing ground which was
catching up with him. As he turned back, he saw one of the cranes collapsing at
S335 and fire at S330 from the gas pipe located at the south side of the
diaphragm wall. He ran and did not stop till he reached the bus stop along
Nicoll Highway towards the direction of Suntec City.

65. Ng, who was behind Andy Wong, also scurried quickly up to the ground level
through the scaffold access at S330. When he reached the ground level, he saw
the crane behind him sinking into the ground. He did not turn back to look into
the tunnel but ran quickly towards Nicoll Highway direction. As he was running,
he slipped and fell at the S324 area. He dropped his spectacles and one of his
legs slipped inside the landslide area. Ng managed to climb up and continued
running without his glasses away from the cave-in. He jumped over a crack and
ran for some 80 to 100 m out off Gate 9A before reaching a safe area at Nicoll
Highway.

66. Ramadoss who was on the surface near to Strut 330 was taking delivery of an
order for cement moments before the collapse. He gave the following account of
the collapse:

“When I received the delivery order, I heard a loud bang sound coming
from the tunnel. I looked down into the tunnel and was shocked to
see that the 9th level Strut no. 338 or 337 was prodding from the

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 The Collapse

centre. Immediately, I took out my whistle and blew. It was an

emergency measure that all workers in the area, including those inside
the tunnel, had to evacuate from the place. At the same time, the strut
started to collapse one by one towards my location at no. 330. I ran
towards M2 and also blew my whistle. The earth was sinking and there
was gas explosion as I was running away. I ran till M1 area at Strut no
311 and stopped. At that time, the collapse had stopped. Immediately, I
called my supervisor informing him of the incident.”

67. At the time of the collapse, some Kori workers were at the ground level
delivering buckets of cement to the Kori workers at the excavation area below.
Chaiyathet Wisarut, a Kori signalman, fell into the earth when it caved in. He
escaped, fortuitously, to recount his horrific experience:

“I heard a cracking sound from the support beams. I then saw the earth
from both sides of the open tunnel starting to slowly move inwards. I
then signalled the crane operator to hoist up the bucket of cement from
the tunnel. While the buckets were being brought up half up from the
tunnel, I saw the earth starting to cave in. Out of fear, I wanted to run
away from the site. However, I fell into the earth, which was caving
in. As I was in the shallow area, I managed to free myself and ran away
from the construction site. When I looked back after a distance, the
crane was no longer there. I believe that it had been sucked into the
earth. I did not see where the crane operator was or where he went. I
later made my way to the seaside area …”

68. Muenpatcha Wichian, another Kori worker at the ground level, was trapped in
the sinking earth and thought he was going to die:

“Suddenly, the sounds stopped and at the same time, I felt the ground
under me being pushed upwards. At this point I saw that the cable of the
crane had snapped and that the crane boom was falling. I did not see
the crane operator. I shouted at Wisarut to come up. We stood at the
edge of the tunnel for a moment and suddenly we felt the ground below
and around us starting to sink. Wisarut and I wanted to run but we were
unable to do so. I felt trapped and could only step aside to avoid the
gas tanks, lorry and beam that moved towards us. I was frightened

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 The Collapse

and I thought of my family and young child at that time. I thought that I
might die at that point. The movement of the ground lasted only about 5
seconds, then it suddenly stopped. By the time it was over, our bodies
were covered with dirt. When the ground stopped moving, Wisarut and I
had to climb up an inclined wall and thereafter slide down a large pole
where we then ran towards the main road near to the sea.”

69. The operator of the sunken crane, Vadivil s/o Nadeson (“Velu”), was less
fortunate. He was one of the four that perished. According to Phornamdaeng
Thiticha,

“I saw the I-beams of the 1st level at S338 and S339 pop up from the
north wall and drop down from the south wall. At the same time, I felt
and saw the earth trembling and sinking. As I saw the I-beams pop-up
and the earth sinking, I saw that the crane where “Velu” was using was
also sinking into the ground with the earth underneath the crane. While
this was happening, I saw “Velu” jumped out from the crane but I did not
see “Velu” land. Immediately after that, I saw the boom of the crane rise
up to the air.”

70. That was the last time Velu was seen alive.

71. Meanwhile, in the deep excavation area below, Kori workers were so terrified by
the extraordinary calamity unfolding before them that they scrambled for their
lives. One of the workers Ganapathi Gurunathan said that “a lot of things were
falling” as he and two co-workers ran along the support beams on the 9th level
strut. Another worker, Norinthong Somkhuan, was hit and knocked
unconscious by a falling beam. Fortunately, Somkhuan regained
consciousness after some “20 minutes” and escaped alive, despite a near miss
by another falling beam. He gave the following account of his harrowing escape:

“I remembered that I was the last person with Mr Heng at the 9th level.
When I was climbing the staircase, Mr Heng told me to look at the struts
at the 8th level. I saw the struts at the 8th level pop up from the wall.
When I was at the 8th level, Mr Heng was still at the 9th level with his
hands holding on to the staircase. He was about to climb up. That was
the last time that I saw Mr. Heng alive.

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 The Collapse

After that, I heard Mr Heng shouting at me “up” “up”, “up”. I did not see
Mr Heng climb up the staircase when I ran up. When I reached the 4th
or 5th level, a strut hit me from the right of my body to my head. On
being hit, I grabbed onto a metal bar from the staircase and after
that I was unconscious.

I do not know how long I was unconscious. I think it was about 20

minutes. When I opened my eyes, I saw a cloud of dust all over the
place. I could not see clearly what was around me. I waited until the
cloud of dust subsided. I was covered in dust and soil. I saw falling
beams, rocks and cables around me. Suddenly, a waler beam fell and
missed me. I saw a dangling electrical cable near me. I grabbed
onto the cable and used it to climb out of the tunnel through a
crack on the collapsed part of Nicoll Highway.”

72. Thirupachi Gnanmoorthi, another Kori worker involved in casting the walers at
the 9th level, said that “small joints were raining on us from the beams
above” moments before the cave-in. When the wall started to cave in, he ran
up the staircase near to S330. He said that when he reached the 2nd level of
the beam structure,

“I saw the earth around me caving in and the beams had collapsed on
the staircase leading out of the tunnel. Part of the earth was covering the
staircase. I fell onto the ground. A crane, which was parked outside the
tunnel and used to lower the cement container earlier, had also sunk in
due to the cave-in. Luckily, the wire and the hook used to lower the
cement container was dangling below near to where I was. Using the
wire and the hook, I pulled myself out of the tunnel.”

73. Workers at various parts of the excavation area further away from S340 were
alerted to the collapse and similarly ran for safety.

74. Meanwhile, the destructive force of the collapse swept through the ground level,
pulling down two container site offices, three crawler cranes, a truck, a cement
mixer and other equipment on the surface of the worksite. The collapse
propagated from East to West. An eyewitness, Civil Engineer Jeroen Overbeek,

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 The Collapse

witnessed the collapse from his 10th floor office at Golden Mile Tower. He heard
a loud rumble and saw a huge flame blowing across Nicoll Highway from
Golden Mile Complex towards Kallang Basin. When the fire died down, he saw
smoke and dust rising from the excavation site and the retaining wall collapsing.
The struts buckled and the wall panels moved inward from both sides in short
succession. He saw the ground behind the south wall collapse and equipment
falling into the pit. The witness snapped 17 photographs of the first moments of
the collapse from his office window. (see Figure 4.4 to 4.13)

75. At the time of the collapse, many workers were on various parts of the site at
the ground level. Liu Rong Quan, one of the four who died, was with a group of
Chinese workers at a temporary shelter next to a container office at the ground
surface. They were waiting for the arrival of the cement truck. According to his
supervisor Fan Li Jun, he saw the soil collapsing and a lot of workers running
towards Gate 9. The whole place was very chaotic. Fan ran with the crowd.
When he had crossed the road, he looked for his co-workers but could only
locate Wu Hong Lin, Liu Er Xiao and Lu Si Xiao. Liu Rong Quan was nowhere
to be found.

76. NLCJV’s Asst Supervisor Ngwee Nam On last saw LTA’s John Tan Lock Yong
at the Hiap Shing office container. Ngwee had stepped out of the container
when he saw a lot of workers running towards the direction of Suntec City, Gate
9A. When he felt the whole ground shaking, he ran quickly towards Suntec
City. According to Ngwee, John Tan was inside the container sitting at his chair
at that time. That was the last time when Ngwee saw John Tan alive. Ngwee
was not sure whether John Tan managed to come out of the container.

77. Hiap Shing’s lorry driver Wee Lam Keng was in the cabin of his lorry when it
was dragged down by the cave-in. By some remarkable good fortune, Wee
survived. Wee recounted his ordeal as follows:

“I was at the area next to Nicoll Highway after loading my lorry with soil.
As I was about to drive off after collecting my ticket, I heard two loud
explosions. The next moment, I felt the ground under my lorry sinking
and the vehicle sliding forward into a hole in the ground while still in an
upright position. Suddenly, a heavy object dropped onto the roof of
the driver's cabin and kept crushing onto the roof of the driver's

Page 83
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of Nicoll Highway and fire caused by
Figure 4.4
damages to gas service lines.
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of Nicoll Highway and the M3 area
Figure 4.5
of the Temporary Retaining Wall System.
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of M3 area and the cranes and
Figure 4.6
machinery sited on the surface of the excavation.
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of M3 area and the cranes and
Figure 4.7
machinery sited on the surface of the excavation.
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of the M3 area and the sinking of
Figure 4.8
one of the cranes into the excavation.
 The initial moments immediately after the collapse showing the collapsed section of the M3 area and the sinking
Figure 4.9
crane falling deeper into the excavation.
Figure 4.10 A general view of the collapsed area of the Temporary Retaining Wall System
 A general view of the collapsed area of the Temporary Retaining Wall System
Figure 4.11
Figure 4.12 A close up view of the collapsed section of Nicoll Highway adjacent to the M3 area
Figure 4.13 A close up view of the collapsed section of Nicoll Highway adjacent to the M3 area
 The Collapse

cabin gradually. I had to slide to the passenger seat to avoid being

crushed. I was dazed and shocked but managed to climb out of the
lorry through the passenger door. As I climbed out, I realised that the
heavy object that dropped onto the roof of my lorry was a boom of
a crane that had toppled. I climbed onto the boom of the crane and
climb out of the hole. I do not know how high I had climbed, but the
distance was about half a boom length. I managed to reach the surface
level at the edge of the hole that sunk into the ground and ran towards
the road leading to Suntec City.”

3.30 pm – 4.30 pm

78. Along the Nicoll Highway towards the Stadium direction, many vehicles ground
to a halt. Fearing that the road deck at Nicoll Highway might collapse, Ng Joo
Tong shouted to NLCJV’s supervisors to quickly divert the traffic to Java Road.
Shortly after, he saw a LTA staff arriving and asked him to take over the traffic
diversion. Ng, who was in shock, then sat along the roadside and cried.

79. From the bus stop along Nicoll Highway, Andy Wong called ‘999’ to ask for help.
He sat down with Ng and they saw a lot of their colleagues coming towards
them from the accident area. There was also a huge traffic jam at Nicoll
Highway.

80. Senior Staff Sergeant Wong Pang Wai, who was travelling along Raffles
Boulevard at about 3.30 pm, saw smoke coming from the construction site
along Nicoll Highway. He was approached by workers from the site and was
informed that there was an explosion. He immediately went forward to
investigate and observed that part of the Nicoll Highway had caved in. Yellowish
smoke could be seen billowing from the ground and there was smell of gas.
Immediately, he summoned for reinforcements and the Singapore Civil Defence
Force was also activated. The police also received several calls reporting the
incident through the ‘999’ emergency line. At about 3.35 pm, the SCDF Control
Room received an emergency call reporting of ‘explosion and fire’ at Nicoll
Highway and the MRT Circle Line Stage 1 construction site. The SCDF’s DART
Team was activated.

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 The Collapse

81. Back at the LTA site office, Chukushi and Wong Hong Peng were halfway
through their meeting when there was a sudden power failure. Siew Yau Kok
rushed into the meeting room and told them that something had happened at
the site. All of them rushed down to the site.

82. On the way to the scene of accident, Chikushi saw Andy Wong at the Nicoll
Highway bus stop. According to Chikushi, Andy Wong tried to tell him
something but could not speak coherently. It dawned upon Chikushi that
something very serious had happened. When he rushed down to the site, he
saw that the part of Nicoll Highway behind Golden Mile Towers had caved in.
The whole Type M3 site had collapsed and he saw brown gas leaking from
underground in front of Golden Mile Towers. Water was rushing out from the
water pipes underneath Nicoll Highway. Many people had started to gather
around the scene. Chikushi shouted for them to move away as there was
danger. Chikushi also instructed his safety supervisor Mr Neo to evacuate
workers working in other zones and assemble them at the canteen for a
headcount. He instructed his Construction Manager Randy Yeo to call every
utilities department to inform them of the situation. He also asked Danny Lim,
another Construction Manager, to get some workers to divert traffic to Java
Road. After that, Chikushi met his Deputy Project Director Ueno Tomio who
told him to make some arrangement to stop the seawater and drain water from
entering further into the site.

83. Wong Hon Peng met Ng Joo Tong who told him that some people might be
trapped inside the cave-in area. Wong decided to activate the LTA Crisis
Management Group (CMG) and send the Mobile Operation Center (MOC) to the
site.

84. At about 3.45 pm, NLCJV’s Safety Officer Roslee Sustrino conducted a
headcount of all the workers at Nicoll Highway Station Gate No. 4. By 4.30 pm,
it was established that four persons were unaccounted for. The missing persons
were LTA site supervisor John Tan Lock Yong, Kori foreman Heng Yeow
Pheow, crane operator Vadivil s/o Nadeson, and Jiang Su Construction worker
Liu Rong Quan.

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 The Collapse

4.2 REPORTED LOCATIONS OF DECEASED PERSONS AT THE TIME

OF ACCIDENT

85. Prior to the accident, Heng Yeow Pheow (the deceased) was working with his
Kori workers at the excavation base of Type M3. They were filling concrete into
the walers of the struts. Heng Yeow Pheow was last seen by Norinthong
Somkhuan as they were leaving the excavation base of Type M3 via the
scaffold access at S330. Norinthong Somkhuan had climbed up the scaffold
access to the 8th level while Heng Yeow Pheow was still at the 9th level.

86. Heng Yeow Pheow was reported missing after the accident. His body could not
be retrieved from the collapsed area in spite the best efforts made by the
Singapore Civil Defence Force officers. His death certificate was issued on 12
May 2004.

87. Prior to the accident, Tan Lock Yong (the deceased) and Ngwee Nam On
(Foreman of NLCJV) were inside an office container located at the site.
According to Ngwee Nam On, at the time of accident, he saw many workers
running outside as he looked out from the container window. He then went out
of the office container to take a look. That was the last time when Ngwee Nam
On saw Tan Lock Yong alive.

88. According to SGT Ahmad Faizal (SCDF), after the accident, the body of Tan
Lock Yong was found between an office container and a lorry truck at the
southern side of the Type M3 area. The Autopsy Report No. AZ20041105
certified the cause of death as “multiple crush injuries of the chest”.

89. Prior to the accident, Vadivil s/o Nadeson (the deceased) was believed to be
operating a crane stationed at around S335 / S336 (south) of the Type M3 area.
He was lowering buckets of concrete into the excavation base where Heng
Yeow Pheow and his workers were working. Ng Joo Tong testified that he saw
a crane, stationed between S330 and S340 (south), sinking into the cave-in at
the time of accident. The crane was believed to be operated by Vadivil.

90. According to Lieutenant Chew Keng Tok, (Platoon Commander, SCDF), the
body of Vadivil s/o Nadeson was found between an office container and a lorry

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 The Collapse

truck at the southern side of Type M3 area (the same office container and lorry
truck as in the case of Tan Lock Yong). The Autopsy Report No. AZ20041076
certified the cause of death as “asphyxia, drowning in mud, ruptured liver
and fractured pelvis”.

91. Prior to the accident, Liu Rong Quan (the deceased) was resting at a shelter
next to an office container at the ground surface near to Type M3 area (south).
He was with Fan Li Jun, Wu Hong Lin, Lu Si Xiao and Liu Er Xiao. They had
been assigned to pour the lean concrete into the excavation base of Type M3
and were waiting for the arrival of the cement truck at the time of the collapse.

92. According to Staff SGT Jaais Bin Sol (Section Commander, SCDF), the body of
Liu Rong Quan was found at the rear end of a lorry truck (the same truck as in
the case of Tan Lock Yong and Vadivil s/o Nadeson) at the southern side of
Type M3 area. The Autopsy Report No. AZ20041093 certified the cause of
death is “multiple crush injuries”.

93. The reported locations of the deceased persons are shown in Figure 4.3.

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 Body of Vadivil s/o Body of Tan Lock
Nadeson found trapped Yong found trapped at
between the lorry and the right
container undercarriage of lorry

Body of Liu
Rong Quan
found underneath
the rear left axil of
the lorry

Source : MOM

Figure 4.3 Photograph of location of deceased after the collapse.