Chavez v JBC
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Mendoza, J
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of
selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following
Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees
to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in
the judicial appointment process and called
it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector.” In compliance therewith,
Congress, from the moment of the creation
of the JBC, designated one representative
from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the
JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth
(8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC
was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body,
thereby allocating “a representative of the
National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase,
however, was not modified to aptly jive with
the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission
on July 21, 1986. The respondents also
contend that if the Commissioners were
made aware of the consequence of having a
bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the
corresponding adjustment in the
representation of Congress in the JBC; that
if only one house of Congress gets to be a
member of JBC would deprive the other
house of representation, defeating the
principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the
allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not
render JBC’s purpose of providing balance
nugatory; that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of
review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform
its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, defeats
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. The current practice of JBC in
admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative
of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in
statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned
from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the
singular letter “a” preceding “representative
of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is
indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that
is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit
in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim sine qua non,
where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible
of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which
it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or
phrase must be ascertained from the context
of the body of the statute since a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in
association with other words or phrases and
its meaning may be modified or restricted by
the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the
word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its
generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate
or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit
in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject
constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort
extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless,
even if the Court should proceed to look into
the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended
that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may
not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any
of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each
representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the
Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held
that “Congress,” in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that
an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative
powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in
the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House
of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the
term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating
JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an
active role and equal voice in the selection
of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore,
to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having
more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would “negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government
which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution
mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion
of another member, whether with one whole
vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an
equal voice with other members of the JBC
in recommending appointees to the Judiciary
is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be
countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is
the basic and paramount law to which all
other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of
the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines
must remain steadfast no matter what may
be the tides of time. It cannot be simply
made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the
whims and caprices of the government and
the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of
unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest
of fair play under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1)
member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is
immediately executory.
Civil Service Commission v. Cortes
G.R. No. 200103 April 23, 2014
Abad, J.
FACTS:
Commission En Banc of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR) issued a Resolution
approving the appointment to the position of
Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent
Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio
P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes,
abstained from voting and requested the
CHR to render an opinion on the legality of
the respondent’s appointment.
The CHR Legal Division Chief rendered an
opinion that respondent Cortes’ appointment
is not covered by the rule on nepotism
because the appointing authority, the
Commission En Banc, has a personality
distinct and separate from its members.
CHR Chairperson Quisumbing, however,
sent respondent a letter on the same day
instructing her not to assume her position
because her appointment is not yet
complete.
Later, CSC-NCR Field Office informed
Chairperson Quisumbing that it will conduct
an investigation on the appointment of
respondent Cortes.
Director Cornelio of the CSC-NCR Field
Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing
that the appointment of respondent Cortes is
not valid because it is covered by the rule on
nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-
NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered
an appointing authority with respect to
respondent Cortes despite being a mere
member of the Commission En Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of respondent
Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by
the prohibition against nepotism.
RULING: No.
Nepotism is defined as an appointment
issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
any of the following:
(1) appointing authority;
(2) recommending authority;
(3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4)
person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee.
Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes
is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the
first degree of consanguinity, as in fact
Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner
Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not
be covered by the prohibition:
(1) persons employed in a confidential
capacity;
(2) teachers;
(3) physicians; and
(4) members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
In the present case, however, the
appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in
the CHR does not fall to any of the
exemptions provided by law.
In her defense, respondent Cortes merely
raises the argument that the appointing
authority referred to in Section 59 of the
Administrative Code is the Commission En
Banc and not the individual Commissioners
who compose it.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule
against nepotism is to take out the discretion
of the appointing and recommending
authority on the matter of appointing or
recommending for appointment a relative.
Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is
intended to apply to natural persons. It is
one pernicious evil impeding the civil
service and the efficiency of its personnel.
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the
prohibitive veil on nepotism does not
include appointments made by a group of
individuals acting as a body.
What cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. This principle is elementary
and does not need explanation. Certainly, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can
be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes’
appointment as IO V in the CHR by the
Commission En Banc, where his father is a
member, is covered by the prohibition.
Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from
voting did not cure the nepotistic character
of the appointment because the evil sought
to be avoided by the prohibition still exists.
His mere presence during the deliberation
for the appointment of IO V created an
impression of influence and cast doubt on
the impartiality and neutrality of the
Commission En Banc.
The CSC-NCR Decisioninvalidating the
appointment of respondent Maricelle M.
Cortes for being nepotistic was
REINSTATED.
People vs. Jabinal
GR NO L-30061 February 27, 1974
Antonio, J.
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused
was found to be in possession of a revolver
without the requisite license or permit. He
claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or
permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas
and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the said
firearm. The accused further contended that
in view of his appointments, he was entitled
to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang
and in People vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused
criminally liable for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition on the ground that
the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero*
were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether or not the appellant should be punished for an act which at the time it
be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme was done was held not to be punishable.
Court’s rulings in the cases of Macarandang
and of Lucero.
Ruling: PGBI V COMELEC
The appellant was acquitted. G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010
Decisions of the Supreme Court,
although in themselves not laws, are Brion, J.
nevertheless evidence of what the law
means; this is the reason why Article 8 of
the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial
FACTS:
decisions applying and interpreting the laws
or the constitution shall form part of the Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list
legal system.” The interpretation upon a law
organization, from the roster of registered
by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a
part of the law as of the date the law was national, regional or sectoral parties,
originally passed, since the court’s organizations or coalitions under the party-
construction merely establishes the list system through its resolution, denying
contemporaneous legislative intent that the also the latter’s motion for reconsideration,
law thus construed intends to effectuate. The in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic
settled rule supported by numerous Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known
authorities is a restatement of the legal
as the Party-List System Act, which
maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon the provides:
written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of
Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the Registration. – The COMELEC may motu
jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, proprio or upon verified complaint of any
at the time appellant was found in interested party, remove or cancel, after due
possession of the firearm and when he was notice and hearing, the registration of any
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the national, regional or sectoral party,
doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in
organization or coalition on any of the
1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme
Court is overruled and a different view is following grounds:
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
x x x x
prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
and acted on the faith thereof.
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
Considering that the appellant two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
possessed a firearm pursuant to the the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
prevailing doctrine enunciated in
elections for the constituency in which it has
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
possession of said firearm, the appellant
should be absolved. The appellant may not
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to
get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007
elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to
the resolution citing among others the
misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of
Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the
law in question.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of
judicial precedent applies in this case.
1) No. This case is an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of
its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based
on the principle that once a question of law
has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for
upon a showing that circumstances attendant
in a particular case override the great
benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court
is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did
unnecessary violence to the language of the
law, the intent of the legislature, and to the
rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot
allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous
ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from
[the] ruling case law.
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
Torrres, Jr, J.
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist,
was arrested for committing four counts of
rape and serious illegal detention against
Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in
the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
able to escape from prison. In a civil case
filed against him, the trial court awarded
Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s
fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on
the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing
that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed
this action for declaratory relief in the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act exempted from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process
of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body.
Ruling: NO.The provisions of Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD
No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to
be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of
its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of
Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law
makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her
parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the
enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore
present; and even if it still exists, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to
due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law
may be good when enacted. The law failed
to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing
outright injustice and inequality such as the
case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the
Solicitor General who argued that the
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to
draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency
deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos.
1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such
depositor stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection
of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application
of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the
questioned Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to
a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate
Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.”
___________
NOTES:
– On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and
lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
years old to go with him to his apartment.
Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7,
1989 and was able to rape the child once on
February 4, and three times each day on
February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7,
1989, after policemen and people living
nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was
arrested and detained at the Makati
Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar
Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-
1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK
Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.);
3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877;
5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.)
Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy
Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012,
Velasco, Jr., J.
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
Investment Company (CIC) to administer
the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which,
under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced
from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100
kg. of copra. Charged with the duty of
collecting and administering the Fund was
Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA).
Like COCOFED with which it had a legal
linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions
scattered in different coco levy decrees, had
its share of the coco levy. Per Cojuangco’s
own admission, PCA paid, out of the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
(CCSF), the entire acquisition price for the
72.2% option shares. The list of First United
Bank (FUB) stockholders included
Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with
129,955 shares. It would appear later that,
pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining
Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank,
PCA would cede to him 10% of its
subscriptions to (a) the authorized but
unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase
in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from the
"mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would
receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB)
shares broken down as follows: 14,440
shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10%
(649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between PCA
and Cojuangco can be accorded the status of
a law without publication.
Ruling:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to
above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not
reproduced or attached as an annex to the
same law. It is well-settled that laws must be
published to be valid. In fact, publication is
an indispensable condition for the effectivity
of a law. Tañada v. Tuvera (G.R. No. L-
63915, 1986) said as much: Publication of
the law is indispensable in every case x x x.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear
light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored
rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn. The publication
must be of the full text of the law since the
purpose of publication is to inform the
public of the contents of the law. Mere
referencing the number of the presidential
decree, its title or whereabouts and its
supposed date of effectivity would not
satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section
1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce
the exact terms of the contract in the decree.
Neither was a copy thereof attached to the
decree when published. The SC cannot,
therefore, extend to the said Agreement the
status of a law. Consequently, the Court
joined the Sandiganbayan in its holding that
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be
treated as an ordinary transaction between
agreeing minds to be governed by contract
law under the Civil Code.
City of Davao V RTC
GR No 12783
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a
Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public
bidding of its properties for non-payment of
realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to
the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The
auction was, however, subsequently reset by
virtue of a deadline extension given by
Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants
of Levy and Notices of Levy on three
parcels of land it owned and another Notice
of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or
Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was
whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn
real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be
exempted from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be
deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed
by the LGC
Ruling:
Yes. Reading together sec. 133, 232, and
234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy
of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and LGUs.”
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from
payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including
GOCCs, except as provided in said section,
are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC.
GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily
follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down
requisites for repeal on the laws granting
exemption, Supreme Court found a
fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the
amendatory second paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes
restrictions on the competency of the
Congress to enact future legislation on the
taxability of GSIS. This places an undue
restraint on the plenary power of the
legislature to amend or repeal laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to
preclude or place restrictions on the
amendment or repeal laws. These conditions
imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have
the precise effect of limiting the powers of
Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render

effective the amendatory second paragraph
of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be
giving sanction to a disingenuous means
employed through legislative power to bind
subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode
of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under
sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the
LGC removed the tax-exempt status of
GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of

interpretation of LGC states that “any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by
any LGU pursuant to the provision of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the
person claiming it.”

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was

withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored
by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The
subject real property taxes for the years
1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS
while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus
may be collected by the City of Davao.