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SHANDONG UNIVERSITY

山东大学
School of Political Science and Public Administration

MASTERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TERM PAPER

How the Ukrainian Crisis Exposed the EU’s Weakness

Presented By

Bright Mhango (M2013071)

Presented To
Dr. Huang Dong (黄栋)

(European Politics)
February 2015
How the Ukrainian Crisis Exposed the EU’s Weakness
The European Union (EU) is a politico-economic union of 28 member states it
operates through a system of supranational institutions and intergovernmental
negotiated decisions by the member states. The institutions are: the European
Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the
Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the Court
of Auditors, and the European Parliament. The EU is considered a rational
player in international relations and it has its own foreign policy.

But as Ginsberg 2001 (class notes) puts it, ‘it is because foreign policy is widely
associated with nation states that the EU is overlooked as an international
political actor by many who study international relations,’ p.12

As a body, it meets various crises such as the Kosovo War in 1999. For its
military needs, the EU usually banks on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) forces, as it did in toppling the Libyan regime under Gaddafi. Apart
from NATO, the EU has a de facto standby army… after the Kosovo War in
1999, the EU made strides to ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions
by NATO.’ As a result, the result was initiatives such as the Helsinki Headline
Goal a military capability target set for 2003 during the December 1999
Helsinki European Council meeting with the aim of developing a future
European Rapid Reaction Force and the EU Battlegroups initiative which can
quickly deploy military personnel if needed1. But as Paul says, ‘The EU states
have never felt the need to make the organization into a powerful military
alliance. They already have NATO to undertake that task2.’

The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 set up the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
which it said "might in time lead to a common defence". But that is not coming

1 New force behind EU foreign policy BBC News – 15 March 2007

2 Wilkinson, Paul. International Relations. Oxford University Press. p. 100


into fruition soon and these initiatives are seen as slowly moving in that
direction.

It has deployed peacekeeping missions to Africa, Middle East and West Asia 3. It
is almost like a state, the EU is currently negotiating trade agreements with the
United States

Despite being all that a state should be and more, the EU is still unable to
effectively move past some foreign policy hurdles. The Ukrainian Crisis, which
was sparked by the EU is an example of the weak EU foreign policy. This
paper argues that the EU, due primarily to its structure, makes it vulnerable in
times of crisis such as the Ukrainian Crisis. The paper suggests that the EU can
become a better player, and a stronger one by becoming more like the United
States, with member states’ maintaining sovereignty over many issues but with
a united and centralized foreign policy and security front.

EU foreign policy background

Many scholars, such as the realist Robert Kagan (2003) argue that the EU
follows a Kantian Liberal model in contrast to the United States which pursues
a Hobbesian Realist model. Kagan says the Europeans do not have the will and
capacity to acquire the military capabilities that the US has and as such cling to
Kantian international law.

The realist paradigm assumes an anarchic international state system, a


conception of political units as independent sovereign states, and the primacy of
military power. The EU does not easily fit into this mould as it is not a unitary
sovereign body. The EU is not all Kant, as much as it puts a lot of faith in
bodies such at the UN, WTO and ICC, some European nations are eager to
ignore the UN as they did when they went to war with Serbia over Kosovo in
1999.
3 Council of the European Union (April 2003)."Overview of the missions and operations of the European
Union". Europa web portal. Retrieved 16 February 2015.
But as Sebastian Rosato states “The European Community is best understood as
an attempt by . . . France and Germany . . . to balance against the Soviet Union
and one another.” (p733) This means that at the heart of the EU is geopolitics
and realism but as Moravcsik writes in confirmation saying over six decades,
economic interest dominated European integration, with geopolitics playing a
secondary role4. It is this lack of focus on geopolitics that is coming to haunt the
EU now.

As Robert Kagan (2003: 1) sees it the EU looks at the world as ‘moving beyond
power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational
negotiation and entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative
prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace.’

Morgan (2005) also says that the democratic peace theory which says that
democracies are unlikely to war with each other stems for the reinterpreting of
Kant’s Perpetual Peace. He also says that the democratic peace theory is at the
heart of European Foreign Policy. (p.201) He argues that despite the EU not
being enthusiastic about spreading democracy to other nations like the US is,
their demand that nations be properly democratic before they join the EU is an
indicator that the EU is at par with the US in terms of commitment to
democracy.

Part of European dormancy would stem from the fact that the Europeans have
always rode on the back of the United States which has played a major role in
trying to balance out communist nations, but as Morgan argues, the Europeans
are now exposed now that the US having defeated the communist nations, is
now focusing on some other areas such as the Middle East. Which not only
leaves the EU prone to dogs like Russia but also inflames the Muslims inside
Europe who might harm Europeans because to some fanatics, the EU and the
4 Andrew Moravcsik (2013) Did Power Politics Cause European Integration? Realist Theory Meets Qualitative
Methods, Security Studies, 22:4, 773-790, DOI: http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/integration.pdf
US are one. The EU, cannot for example use significant NATO force without
the agreement of the United States.

Morgan also argues that the EU nations never abandoned their geopolitical
goals and their support for multilateral organisations is just an attempt to further
their interests without causing alarm. He gave an example of the United States
which supported the creation of bodies such as the UN to ultimately further its
goals without causing panic in the international order.

Many scholars have countered Kegan’s realism by arguing that Europe has
alternative and equally important forms of power, such as economic power,
civilian power, and the power of influence or goodwill (Haseler, 2004;
Moravcsik, 2002; Reid, 2004; Rifkin, 2004).

The EU, as Morgan agrees should do more to become a unitary state. The US
has been where the EU is now, since its establishment in 1777, the US had
statutes that gave each member state sovereignty.

And this internal sovereignty, writes Morgan (2005), meant that: ‘the
Confederacy could neither protect itself effectively from its foreign enemies,
nor enter into binding agreements with foreign allies. While the US Constitution
went some way to remedying this problem, the Constitution did not establish
anything resembling a unitary sovereign state. The United States thus remained
at the mercy of European powers like France and Britain.’ (p.205)

To become a superpower, as some EU fans desire, the Europeans must


centralise their political might and charge ahead as one body and in Morgan’s
words: ‘If neoclassical realists are correct, the EU can only become a
superpower by following in the path of other superpowers and forming itself
into a unitary sovereign superstate,’ and he adds, cheekily, ‘the alternative is for
Europe to remain dependent for its security on the United States.’
To solve the crisis in Ukraine, with a defiant Putin fuelling the flames from the
East, the EU needs more than Kant or the UN or sanctions or more generally,
liberal ideas…Russia is a realist nation, it can only understand the language of
hard power and similar deterrence.
For Morgan (2005) a better model would be that of the United States of
America, “which combines a political system that is highly centralised in some
areas (foreign and military affairs, revenue raising, and immigration) and highly
decentralised in others (education, police forces, and medical care). There is no
reason why a unitary sovereign Europe cannot introduce a similar political
system of government,” (P.206)

Ukrainian Crisis background

The European Union spent years trying to perfect an association agreement with
Ukraine and then suddenly in 2013 the Ukrainian president announced that he
would not sign the deal (Spiegel, 2014). In November of 2013 tens of thousands
of Ukrainians who had been hoping to get even closer to Europe stormed the
streets and public squares in Ukraine to voice anger over what they called lack
of accountability of the ruling elite and bowing to Russian pressure. (BBC,
2014).

Mearsheimer points to the West as the architects of the crisis in Ukraine, writing
on Foreign Affairs, he argued that the West’s ‘triple package of policies --
NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion -- added fuel to a
fire waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych
rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and
decided to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead.’

Mearsheimer argues that elites in the United States and Europe have been
blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of
international politics saying those leaders tend to ‘believe that the logic of
realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be
kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law,
economic interdependence, and democracy… but this grand scheme went awry
in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states
that ignore it do so at their own peril.’

The launching of The European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, to the EU


citizens is a simple tool to strengthen cooperation and to spread Western values.
The drafters of the policy seem to be oblivious what engaging Ukraine in such
treaties would entail and the current crisis is the result of that negligence.

As this paper is tendered in, in February of 2015, the demonstrations in Ukraine


brewed into a full scale civil war with those sympathetic to Russia, mainly from
the east of Ukraine vowing to break away from Ukraine. The war has displaced
about a million people and claimed over 5000 people. For some, the intent by
Europe to expand eastward has created one of the biggest issues for European
foreign policy since the Cold War.

For its part, the EU had negotiated a nearly 1,000-page treaty, but officials in
Brussels hadn't paid close enough attention to the realities of those power
politics. Even in Berlin, officials for too long didn't take Russian concerns --
about the encroachment of NATO and the EU into Eastern Europe -- seriously
enough. The idea that Moscow might be prepared to use force to prevent a
further expansion of the Western sphere of influence didn't seem to register with
anyone.

In the Ukrainian case, Europe is faced with a realist Russia under Putin. Despite
the many rounds of sanctions that Europe has lambasted Russia with, Russia is
not toning down its defiance in what Mearsheimer believes to be one of those
instances where nations are willing to absorb just to protect their core interests.
Russia also maintains an advantage on Europe, which has to rely on Russian
energy to stay warm and to grease the economy. The Russian Federation
supplies a significant volume of fossil fuels and is the largest exporter of oil and
natural gas to the European Union. In 2007, the European Union imported from
Russia 185 million tonnes of crude oil, which accounted for 32.6% of total oil
import, and 100.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent of natural gas, which
accounted 38.7% of total gas import5. In any case where Russia can switch off
the energy supply, Europe can suffers huge economic and human losses.

It is not just energy, Russia also buys most of the European agricultural output,
and this has already been demonstrated with Russia banning the importation of
some of Europe’s products.

Europe came to this by believing too much in interdependence as a way out of


conflict. Liberal Kantian ideals fooled the Europeans, they did not stop to have
alternatives and to see the world as a cruel one where selfishness is virtue. Now
the Russian president can safely call the shots on Ukraine a nation that is
supposed to be independent.

If Europe was like the United States, with its own army and cognizant of the
realpolitik of international relations, Russia would not be bullying Europe as it
is doing.

There are now reports that Russia is floating submarines and violating EU
airspace on an almost daily basis6, Russia cannot do this with the US or China,
its neighbour.

5 "Energy Dialogue EU–Russia. The Tenth Progress Report." (PDF). European Commission. November 2009.
pp. 4–6. Retrieved 24 January 2010.

6 Birnbaum, M (2014) NATO says Russian jets, bombers circle Europe in unusual incidents retrieved from:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-says-russian-jets-bombers-circle-europe-in-unusual-
incidents/2014/10/29/6098d964-5f97-11e4-827b-2d813561bdfd_story.html
The biggest hurdle in Europe’s foreign policy, as Morgan (2005) also noted, is a
fragmented Europe and an electorate with different values. The people heading
Europe have no clout in important matters. The European leaders are sceptical
of a centralised Europe and the anti-EU movement is fast picking up speed on
the ground.

But as Hedley Bull warned in 1982, the EU cannot go anywhere by being a


civilian power, as described by Francois Duchene or a normative power as
proposed by Ian Manners. The EU needs to be a force, a military force replete
with nuclear deterrents and a force ready to deploy at a moment’s notice.

As Stelios Stavridis also argues, the EU can still be a civilian or normative


power but it also needs to have military power in tow. And in his words it is
because ‘it is only by wielding military power that civilian ends can be pursued.
Force can be necessary to promote human rights and democratic principles, and
the EU should not hesitate to use it for those purposes.7’

In summary, the EU, a body obsessed with Kantian modules and liberal intent,
has been since its formations and until now, trying to ignore the significance of
looking at the world in realist terms. Whether because the internal rivalry
between the big EU powers makes it hard to make a properly united front or
simply because of over-reliance on the United States for security…whatever the
reasons, the EU finds itself vulnerable to an aggressive Russia, an uninterested
US and a hoard of crises creeping over its wars. The crises include the growing
Islamic extremism, trade issues and an increasingly hostile Russia.

The EU finds itself in 2015, with a lot of money, influence and civilian
capabilities but crises like the one ongoing in Ukraine expose the weak soft
underbelly of EU foreign policy. Anyone with a sharp twig can poke at it and
the result will only be huge talk and little action and with Russia able to absorb
7 Class notes, Lecture number 8, Civilian Power VS Military Power

Karen Smith 2005 – Slide number 33.


the rhetoric and sanctions and with an advantage of being the guarantor of EU
energy security and also buyer of EU goods, the EU is left with no options and
once more has to rely on the US to do its dirty work.

Realists past and present have urged the EU to never ignore the realism that
once made Europe fierce. The solution is for the EU to be like the United
States, to maintain the sovereignty of the individual members but to have a
united security front to deal with issues like the one it faces now in Ukraine and
embodied in the nation of Russia.

Bibliography

"Energy Dialogue EU–Russia. The Tenth Progress Report." (PDF). European


Commission. November 2009. pp. 4–6. Retrieved 17 February 2015.

Andrew Moravcsik (2013) Did Power Politics Cause European Integration?


Realist Theory Meets Qualitative Methods, Security Studies, 22:4, 773-790,
DOI: http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/integration.pdf. Retrieved 17
February 2015

BBC (2014) Ukraine Profile http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-


18010123. Retrieved 17 February 2015

Birnbaum, M (2014) NATO says Russian jets, bombers circle Europe in


unusual incidents retrieved from:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-says-russian-jets-bombers-
circle-europe-in-unusual-incidents/2014/10/29/6098d964-5f97-11e4-827b-
2d813561bdfd_story.html . Retrieved 17 February 2015

Council of the European Union (April 2003)."Overview of the missions and


operations of the European Union". Europa web portal. Retrieved 16 February
2015.

Mearsheimer, J (2014) Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The
Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin retrieved from
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-
ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault on 18/02/15

Morgan, G. (2005). 'Realism and European Political Integration: The


Lessons of the United States', Journal of European Political Science, 4/2: 199-
208 retrieved from
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic207175.files/Realism_EI.pdf.
Retrieved 16 February 2015

New force behind EU foreign policy BBC News – 15 March 2007. Retrieved 16
February 2015

Spiegel (2014) Summit of Failure: How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/war-in-ukraine-a-result-of-
misunderstandings-between-europe-and-russia-a-1004706.html. Retrieved 16
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Wilkinson, Paul. International Relations. Oxford University Press. p. 100.

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