PART II
Let a
2.) DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO HIS PROFESSION
A. DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA, Respondent.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in
the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from
the practice of law for fifteen years.
The antecedent facts that led to Mejia's disbarment are as follows.
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the
following administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes
on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I;
andcralawlibrary
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and
expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property
in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:
a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his
favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant's affidavit dates October 4, 1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); andcralawlibrary
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios
Pastor, in Bernardo's favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan
obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check
with others known also to be insufficiently funded.1
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision PER CURIAM, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges
against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment,
and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
copy of this Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidant's Office, and notice thereof furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all
the Courts concerned of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On
July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present Petition for Review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a
plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.2
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the
applicant's reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The
Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.3
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession.chanrobles virtual law
library Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejia's name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At
the age of seventy-one, he is begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he
has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to
his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social
writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on
Miracle of Heart and Mind."
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with
the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age
of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not
the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation
of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted
long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows
how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties,
such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F.
Mejia is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig
(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of
marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal
wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage
on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy
of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been
annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on
the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file
his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for
disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was
filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion,
he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that
Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also
explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when he visited his
brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent
further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his
law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent
suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He
added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱ 2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a
sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons;
thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then
prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a
copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to
file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative
complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy
Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of
the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by
respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the
Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court.
She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the
complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No.
3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003
despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621,
with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of
respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing
address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005
to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005,
for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7,
2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱ 1,000.00 payable to the court, or
a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to
COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon.18
In aResolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for
non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with
the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because
neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address cannot be found or
located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be
enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported
that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd.,
Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an
Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared
respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of
Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed
to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent
Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges
against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C.
Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with
Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001
by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into
a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage
apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the
first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting.
By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to
establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing
evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against
the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment
on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has
issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only
those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions
directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any
answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on
the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have
escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this
Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly
tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and
complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite
earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere excuse of
failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared.
In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in
order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot
countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We
have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the
Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of
the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders
of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He
is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of
grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in
the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016
SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.
VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants
Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia
(respondent) for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.
The Facts
In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter2 dated
February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening
but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants
to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings3 that were attached to the
demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent
should be held administratively liable therefor.
In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified
complaint. However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered6 to furnish the Court the
complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's directive;
thus, the Court resolved,7 among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory conference/hearing.8chanrobleslaw
Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings.
Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and
"RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that
respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.12chanrobleslaw
The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint.
Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as
well as to file his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful
orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend
to file any comment and in the process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP
recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court.13chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending respondent
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations of the verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the CPR provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for
them to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their
character. It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum
checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law
enforcement offices revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or
'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA' responded to our search being
involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations. Other record
check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure in the meantime
and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for them arise, [sic]
All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the
appropriate entities, for the necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the
newly-enacted law known as the "Credit Information Systems Act of 2008."
x xxx
II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed
as they proved to be "worthless and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22
(Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.
III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs.
Arcilla, taking advantage of her helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and
serious damage, you are also criminally liable under ART. 318, OTHER DECEITS.
RPC.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of
criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have
yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and
immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that
several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have
besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.
At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the
mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain
uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
ifules of Court."18chanrobleslaw
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum.19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. 20 In this
regard, all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.21 Thus, respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an
officer of the court.
Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L.
Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier22 where respondent-lawyer was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper language in
his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not commensurate
to respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for one (1) month
from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding
Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, Respondents.
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990
decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that
time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique
Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around
but was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in
the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to
appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,1 the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion
seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262?
(2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it
appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in
his residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his
arrest should forthwith be issued?"2cräläwvirtualibräry
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and
the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion
seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for
clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such
arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario
the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del
Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty.
del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the
succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial
courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he
shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not
allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The
trial courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to
be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No.
4262, but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to
defend himself.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of the offense.3 He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him,
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. 4 Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession
nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is
a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10)
years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SETASIDE. All accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at
the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out
of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful
purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San
Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report
Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows: pertinent parts of which read thus:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious
appearing in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized person
to do so we believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes
with attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his complaint
government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.
against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by
calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal
court in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent
court employee and has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so
appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita,
would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his
Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for
supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.
illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case
CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as
No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for
present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted
forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the
defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is
Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because
he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the following entries
Order and Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil in his daily time record:
Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal
because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.) 1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;

After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint: 2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District 3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1
Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial hour;
Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements,
to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which
absence has also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the 4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any
pertinent provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not 5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for
defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
the absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of justice by the
Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-original of a pleading
submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his
entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in
Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.) his office although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on
December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the
respondent appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his daily time
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and
answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for
record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao
explanation for this irregularity. Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

xxx xxx xxx Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the Office of
the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it
paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio
appear that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when
City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."2 However,
as a matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed
versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to
that respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent
Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge
is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit that he is
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended,
a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared
again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta.
the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears
Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject
matter.
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply
supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for the May 5,
the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing
2005 parking incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same
as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil
date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit
service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein that he was
regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address
present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel,
at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit
without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore,
regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously
adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.
referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without
permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting the mistake in the preparation of
from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel
the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he
under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation
considerations other than pure love of justice.
and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing
lawyer.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a
more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for
separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or
having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty.
investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
Aquino’s secretary.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been
filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,
by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
vs.
punished for indirect contempt:
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.

xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and
acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront
to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and
no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.11
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to project
himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting
of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the result of
inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the
cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the party was guilty of some
overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client;12 appearing before court hearings as an
attorney;13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar;14 or deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney
through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.15
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his
lack of intent to illegally practice law.
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to misrepresent
himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and circumspect
in his future actions.
SO ORDERED.
B. ) DUTY OF COURTESY TOWARDS FELLOW LAWYERS
[A.C. NO. 6567 : April 16, 2008]
JOSE C. SABERON, Complainant, v. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG, Respondent.
In a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon
(complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using
abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition2 against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the bank)
and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for
cancellation of the bank's registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank's and/or
Bonpin's refusal to return various checks and land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his
(complainant's) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with
Affirmative Defenses3 to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein
complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for
financial gain'
x x x x.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder5 to complainant's Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be "totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft of any factual or
legal basis," complainant filed the present complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his
constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting
corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his (complainant's) wife in
behalf of "her children" had been paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the
collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and "her
children" who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment6 to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was "nothing
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper" in the way he used the word "blackmail" to characterize the suit
against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or
abetting the infliction of damages upon the other party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005,7 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,8 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa held that the word "blackmail" connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person accused
thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to
characterize that person's act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor
his case on the legal merits of his client's claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client's cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to
the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 159 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were "unnecessary and irrelevant to
the case," respondent went "overboard and crossed the line" of professional conduct. In view thereof, he
recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of
law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,10 the IBP Board of Governors disapproved the
recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language was used, he
was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that
because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant's indignation for which he
asked the latter's and this Court's clemency.
In his Reply,13 complainant counters that respondent's Comment reveals the latter's propensity to
deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondent's claim that the administrative complaint was a
"harassing act," deducible from the "fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered
x x x against the same rural bank and its owner," is bereft of factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal cases he
and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him
for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent's entreaty for clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records of the case to this
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
Court.11
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition filed on
March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B12 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor's Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for violating
the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
"reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based."
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to be
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of
or behavior before the Courts.
suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits, manifests
an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral turpitude.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.14
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint against
him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed
the Answer objected to by complainant. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.15 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.16
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which he
had backed up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife
against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or initiatory pleading. and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged.17 In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.18
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious imputations of
wrongdoing against his clients - the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin
for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino. It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a
court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,19 thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound
servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics.20
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the
Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be
promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of
the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.
the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are
not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has reached the judgment
Respecting respondent's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were through the process of legal reasoning.24
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not
With regard to complainant's plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.21
disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should
be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been charges.25
considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.22 The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous
character as to merit respondent's disbarment. In light of respondent's apologies, the Court finds it best to
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than
defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the grave, misconduct.
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject
matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and
WHEREFORE, complainant's petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is
impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not
found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a
be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however,
stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it
may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x.23
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the
record of respondent.
Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the ascription
of 'blackmail' in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to
the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin's alleged alien citizenship and majority SO ORDERED.
stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses
without need of the further allegation that the Petition was "another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain." Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled
for. More so, considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases
against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances. CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a "Notice of Resolution"
was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on
January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in which it: For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency 1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled Factual Background
case for lack of merit.
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on
Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
Board of Governors' decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts;
same is based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides: maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.
We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be
imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two
(2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the
orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save
him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the
orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for
his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly
treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and
since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional
legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10;
Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and
Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP
imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s compassion
and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the same time,
questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his
updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once
again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than
three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or
illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue
as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the
Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church,
Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its
purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance and
remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no longer
misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and
implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he
has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at
all times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and
the legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012,
and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality. 16 On July 18, 2014, the
respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency 17 reiterating his apologies to the Court. He
stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most
frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing
dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of
law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a
regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made
license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved
whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere
to deny the petition for lack of merit.
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his
disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition,
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy 4 asking he submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N. Que certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family
(complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral are dedicated parishioners.
conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another
individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free
The Court's Ruling
himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own
doing.
We deny the present appeal.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as
a matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an
active involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ,
Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as
Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were
inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had
continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the
Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to
1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to
have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial
clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long
expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on
his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After
his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing
civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character reformation.He professed that
during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ,
Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had
served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a
lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of
St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his
conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty.
Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him
sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that
Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat
he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and
social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the
Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions
since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred
lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of
three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In
that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated
pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering
the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian
and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the
testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members
of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and
more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to
enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which the
Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as
an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are
not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years
is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We
believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his
guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to
make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof
satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is
again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent
had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we
stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is
to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of
sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent
can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing,
and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the IBP's Commission
on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3)
use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.
In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his
notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on
March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial
registers.7
Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law
firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved her
husband and her parents-in-law.
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint
for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the
Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the
prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests.9
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative
complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental
incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate,
offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002
partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and
falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer
who actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it
appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar.
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously
use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his
clients and accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries
in his notarial registers.
Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her
counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real
counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza,
one of ZMZ's partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing
conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.17 After this,
both parties were required to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice
Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.
He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a
notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only
one active notarial register at any given time."19
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence presented on
this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial
extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed Atty.
Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not
personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is
equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the
investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting
interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that
Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from the evidence before
suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and insulting language.23 us.

The IBP Board of Governors' Findings b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the evidence on several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been irregularly
record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the numbered and entered:
recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
notary public.24
Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also
denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26 Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005

Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005

The Court's Ruling
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly Affidavit of Two Disinterested
4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
confirms them. Persons

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties identified. Petition for Issuance of
4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
Owner's Duplicate copy
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules
Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
a. Usurpation of a notarial office
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and
receipt of his notarial commission. Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same
Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any
and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's given time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers
typewritten name. is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information.
However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this document
never appeared in his notarial register and was never included in his notarial report for
the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it
appear that he was the one who notarized it.
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a
lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2,
2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll
number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission,
prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness
to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have
notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar admission,
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register
and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in
place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by
assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer
the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public
interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address
and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of
notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several active
notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of his clients
requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers
and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office is not merely an
income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His flagrant
violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable
negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former
law firm's client.
The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ.
Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is
not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the
annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's
relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's
Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted
to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly,
the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his
services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty.
Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he was
still their counsel in the annulment of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the
representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional
dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a
"notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following
demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing
counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in
particular, where the taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence
and poor performance as a prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that
the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her
mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35 (emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words — a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive
personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings,
must be dignified.37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is
found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and,
abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He
is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED
 IBP Report and Recommendation

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed
by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement
is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely cause
the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP
Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on
the part of Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers,
was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by
third persons.

The Facts In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to be
more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration 17 which was however denied in a
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint2 for damages against his
Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.
own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together with other
defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data:
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10,
2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he The Issue Before the Court
should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the
second.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against
Orlando.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for
grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a copy of the complaint, he
discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from The Court's Ruling
retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees,
saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his
The petition is partly meritorious.
unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once,
that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and
of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando
morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts, their
even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not
integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in
lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, 8 both of
which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint charging
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of
respondent as well as the award of damages. Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
In hisdefense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in
default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
good faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary opposing counsel.

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty, Orlando
was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by
"texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
 lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of
the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of
insulting language to describe the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor
of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy
Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that
Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against
his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the
crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes,
an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial
decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions
such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers
are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them,
whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely
relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more
circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as
candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his
client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure
to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed
against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for
the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the
records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that
the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is
the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate
to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on
behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of
Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She
further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such claim, complainant
presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No.
1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the
occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the
Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran,
Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his
clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the
[Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his
dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of
Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution,
and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any government office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him.
Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for
quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon
Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No.
B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not
furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable
to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent
countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become
moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had
not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were
no objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an
affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no
objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20
February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All
these submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B.
Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent
described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man
x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive
language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing
and character as an officer of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that
respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all
the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for
using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado
Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's
counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and
Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in
violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of
his dismissal as a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's
recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B.
De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion" 10 and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man
died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth
designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of
this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must
refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties
in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is
no such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead,
what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's
brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x
x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on
18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file
action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on
18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint
in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the
subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate
to file action was issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he
filed a certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free
patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the
title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a
copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion
to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an
examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this
administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such
fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured
OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official
records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of
donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church.
Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants
in the lot owned by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the
notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and
affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other
hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations,
without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017,
860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant
conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between
respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge
should be filed against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of
Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for
partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of
which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted
the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and
received compensation therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to
the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court."
He further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge) posed no objection
to his petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between
permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not
absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does
not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office.
Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for
clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such
positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office
imposed upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her
law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court
directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension
or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to
file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the
civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his
pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as
accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct,
the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
C. ) DUTY TO BE FAIR TO FELLOW LAWYERS
A. C. No. 10449 (Francisco Binay-an, et al. vs. Atty. Atanacio D. Addog).
D. ) DUTY TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism,
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of
the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint,
Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not
his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004,
Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public
Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to
the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed
by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo
were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo.
Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty.
Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the
law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed
as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed
by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The
conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were
submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were
also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October
2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm
composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence
and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the
notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find
out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide efficacious control of court
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have
known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder
failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule
9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as
it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants
dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did
reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo
19 September 2007. simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to
affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not
administratively liable.
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
OF LAW.
We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is future shall be dealt with more severely.
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as
is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
their information and guidance.
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. SO ORDERED.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.
A.C. No. 8103 December 3, 2014

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL,
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal
BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant,
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may
vs.
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further,
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2)
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2013 Resolution 1 or the IBP Board of Governors which
responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was
a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation,
save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner xxx and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering the
Respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty, Atty. Renato C. Bagay's Notarial
Commission is hereby immediately REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years.
It appears from the records that this case stemmed from the letter,2 dated June 11, 2008, submitted by
Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Atty. Angeles, Jr.),the Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M.
Escalada, Jr. (Executive Judge), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty.
Renato C. Bagay (respondent), for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008. The notarized documents were as follows:
1. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato Macalinao and Loida C. Macalinao and Trisha
Katrina Macalinao, notarized on April 3, 2008;
2. Deed of Donation executed by and between Renato S. Sese and Sandy Margaret L. Sese, notarized on
March 25, 2008;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina A. Castro married to Eduardo Samson and
Thelma Medina and Gina Medina notarized on April 3, 2008;
4. Deed of Absolute Sale executedby Rowena Berja, notarized on March 17, 2008;
5. Deed of Donation executed by and between Crispulo Rodriguez and Luisa Rodriguez Jorgensen,
notarized on April 8, 2008;
6. Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights executed by the wife and sons of Rodrigo Dy
Jongco, notarized March 19, 2008;
7. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Rolando and Nelia Francisco and Violeta
Hernandez, notarized on April 3, 2008;
8. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Josefina Baluyot and Carmelita Padlan, notarized on
April 3, 2008;
9. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Gregorio Limcumpao and Simeona Limcumpao, notarized on March
27, 2008;
10. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Sps. Eusebio and Libertad Bacricio and Carlos
Tamayo married to Teresa Tamayo notarized on March 18, 2008;
11. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad S. Consengco and Sps. Gilvert and Johanna
Gervacio, notarized March 18, 2008;
12. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between the Rural Bank of Pilar and Mila Gatdula, notarized on
April 2, 2008;
13. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Natividad Cosengco and Sps. Jay and Helen Zulueta,
notarized on March 18, 2008;
14. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Cipriano and Salvacion Violago, notarized on April 1, 2008;
15. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sahara Management and Development Corporation, notarized on
March 26, 2008;
16. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Danilo Arellano, Luzviminda Ramos and Sps.
Fernando and Agnes Silva, notarized on March 18, 2008;
17. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Vicente Banzon married to Elizabeth Banzon and Sps.
Dommel and Crystal Lima, notarized on April 2, 2008; and
18. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Marilyn T. Casupanan and Dominador M. Manalansan
notarized on March 14, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the Provincial Treasurer who had
information that they were notarized while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and
Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the persons who caused the documents to
be notarized which showed a common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents
himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents cameout of the office already
signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay
departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The copy of the
Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also attached to the letter.3
The Executive Judge referred the matter to the IBP, Bataan Chapter, and the latter endorsed the same to
the IBP National Office for appropriate action. The latter endorsed it to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD).
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal) required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to formalize the
complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating, among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter
was not intended to be a formal complaint but rather "a report on, and endorsement of, public documents
by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country,"4 and that any advice on how to consider or treat the
documents concerned would be welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
appropriate action.5
This Court, in its Resolution,6 dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr.,
dated September 30,2008, and require respondent to comment on the said letter. In his comment,7 dated
27 March 2009, respondent claimed that he was not aware that those were documents notarized using his
name while he was out of the country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were
done by his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said secretary notarized the
documents without realizing the import of the notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for
his lapses and averred that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his office.
The Court then referred the case tothe IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. When the case
was called for mandatory conference on September 16, 2009, only respondent appeared. Atty. Angeles
filed a manifestation reiterating his original position and requesting that his attendance be excused. 8 The
mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were directed to file their respective position
papers. Only respondent submitted a position paper,9 to which he added that for 21 years that he had been
practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish on record dutifully minding the rules of
the law profession and notarial practice.
The Report and Recommendation10 of Atty. Felimon C. Abelita III (Atty. Abelita III)as Investigating
Commissioner found that the letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated June11, 2008, was not verified, that most
of the attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the comment of respondent was likewise
not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however, observed that respondent’s signature on his comment appeared to
be strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents which he admitted were
notarized in his absence by his office secretary.He admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office secretary who was not aware of
the import of the act. Thus, by his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing
an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records especially pertaining to his
notarial documents without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by
the Rules on Notarial Practice.
Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his notarial duty which gave his office
secretary the opportunity to abuse his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s commission as notary public and
his disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said recommendation in its Resolution, 11 dated
September 28, 2013.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration12 of the said resolution of the IBP. He contended that by
admitting and owning up to what had happened, but without any wrongful intention, he should be
merited with leniency. Moreover, he claimed that he only committed simple negligence which did not
warrant such harsh penalty.
On May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of respondent stating:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XX-2013-85 dated September 28, 2013 is hereby affirmed.13
On August 1, 2014, the Director for Bar Discipline endorsed the May 4, 2014 Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors to the Office of the Chief Justice for appropriate action.
The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of
respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Respondent admitted in his commentand motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were
notarized under his notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly
constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a "Notary Public" refers to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to
perform the official acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his
secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he
employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial
seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to
notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court
and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy
excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what
his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary
public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. 14 He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has
been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only
infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible
violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized
person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this
Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only
damaged those directly affected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary
public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.15 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent
to the doing of any.16 Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or
indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to
sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his
office open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his
secretary to notarize documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office while he was
away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their
documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization
of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose
documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It
is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we
have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary
public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act
must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.17
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notaries pub! ic must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of pub! ic instruments would be undermined. 18
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take lightly
complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in our legal system hang in the balance.
WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with
MODIFICATION.1âwphi1 Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public,
the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be
dealt with even more severely.
The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Renato C.
Bagay's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.SO ORDERED.