Disarmament and International Security 
Committee  
 
Agenda: Capacity Building and 
Counterterrorism: The Case of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan  
 
Chair: Manan Mehta 
Co-Chair: Yash Jain 
 
Table of Contents  
 
Letter from the Director 2 
History of the Committee 3 
History of the Problem 8  
● Afghanistan- A story of statelessness 13 
Relevant UN action 38 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 41 
Proposed solutions 42 
Questions a Resolution must answer 44 
Bloc positions 45 
Suggestions for further research 49 
Closing remarks 50 
Bibliography 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR 
Dear Delegates, 
I am thrilled to welcome all of you to Fountainhead School Model United Nations 2018. For 
the first committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament and International Security 
Committee (DISEC)! My name is Manan Mehta I am originally from Mumbai now living in 
Surat itself. I am currently in the final year of IB and am I law aspirant. 
I have participated in Model UN from my 8th grade, I have not only delegated in several 
MUN’s but I have also organised three of them and last year was the Secretary General of 
FSMUN 2017. I have been part of the MUN community for a while now. I prefer to not only 
chair in DISEC but it is always my first preference as a delegate as well. 
My history background certainly drove my interest in our topic area, “Capacity Building and 
Counterterrorism: The Case of Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Our topic speaks to the viability 
of the nation state, the role of international bodies in maintaining peace and security, and 
the security issues engendered by decolonisation. The stakes are high and the issues are 
complex and contentious, but I have every confidence that you are up to the challenge. I 
encourage you to research well and to think carefully about your individual countries’ 
policies. To that end, please do not hesitate to reach out to me at any point before the 
conference with any questions and to introduce yourself—I would love to hear from you! 
Best Wishes, 
Manan Mehta 
Director, Disarmament and International Security Council 
mananmehta04@gmail.com 
 
History of the Committee 
When the United Nations Charter was ratified on 24 October 1945, it established the UN 
General Assembly as forum for “cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.” 
1 
The General Assembly is composed of all 193 UN member states, all of which 
share equal voting rights, and a handful of non-voting observer states, including the Holy 
See and Palestine. Unlike the UN Security Council, which passes binding, directly 
actionable resolutions, the General Assembly passes unbinding resolutions recommending 
or advising action and is considered the “deliberative, policymaking, and representative 
organ of the United Nations.” 
2 
Under the Charter, the General Assembly’s duties include 
reviewing and assisting UN Security Council actions, appointing the UN Secretary General 
and non-permanent members of the Security Council, approving the UN budget, and 
acting as the principal forum for international political cooperation. 
3 
The General 
Assembly convenes at the UN Headquarters in New York for “regular” sessions every 
September, and “emergency” sessions ordered by the Secretary General or voted on by 
the Security Council. 
4 
The Disarmament and International Security Committee is the first committee of the 
General Assembly, and manages “disarmament and international security matters within 
the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the 
United Nations, the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international 
peace and security... [and the] principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
Armaments.” 
 
5 
DISEC focuses on issues related to global security, in its many shapes and forms, and drafts 
procedural guidelines for disarmament. DISEC also works alongside the 
other five organs of the General Assembly, particularly the Special, Political and 
Decolonisation Committee, to provide a global perspective on more localised threats to 
international peace and security. 
DISEC often functions alongside the UN Disarmament Commission, established in 1978 
as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. The UNDC publishes annual advisory 
reports related on disarmament and weapons proliferation. 
6 
The Geneva-based 
Conference of Disarmament (CD), founded in 1979, plays a complementary role to DISEC, 
acting as a multilateral disarmament- negotiating forum for the international community. 
The CD was directly responsible for principal nuclear non-proliferation treaties of the later 
twentieth century, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC). Along with the CD, DISEC has played a critical role in facilitating major 
twentieth and twenty-first century international security treaties and overseeing the 
implementation of disarmament protocols, in its advisory role to the Security Council. 
7 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Failing states represent one of the largest threats to international peace and security. The 
Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine’s “Fragile States Index,” which ranks and 
categorizes states based on their degrees of legitimacy, categorizes failing states as “high 
alert” states: states that have altogether failed are considered “very high alert.” 
8 
Failing 
states are flashpoints of instability, underdevelopment, human rights violation, and poor 
governance. States are deemed to be in the process of “failing” when a state’s central 
government begins to lose its “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory,” which German sociologist Max Weber described as the defining 
characteristic of a 
The 2015 Fragile States Index. (Source: The Fund for Peace) 
modern nation state in his 1918 lecture, “Politics on Vocation.” 
9 
Failed and failing states tend to fall under two categories. First, the term “failed” or “failing” 
state can denote a geographic space with boundaries that is recognized as a nation, with a 
govvernment in shambles. This term may also suggest highly coercive apparatus that is 
either ill equipped to handle the needs of a population or one that systematically fails to 
provide basic public services. 
10 
Due to a failure of adequate governance, failed and failing 
states often serve as incubators for international terrorist groups. Lack of a stable and 
legitimate central government authority allows them to become transshipment points for 
illicit drugs, weapons and human trafficking. 
11 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, both designated “high alert,” fragile states by the Fund for 
Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, are quintessential failing states that rose to the 
forefront of international foreign policy following the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in 
the United States. 
12 
In the wake of 11 September, issues revolving failed and failing states 
became intrinsically entwined with international security, transcending their heretofore 
largely humanitarian dimension. 
Former U.S. President George W. Bush, in the United States’ 2002 National Security 
Strategy, famously articulated that the United States and international community at large 
was “threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones.” 
13 
Although most international policy makers would argue failed and failing states have 
always posed a tremendous and immediate challenge to international peace and security, 
the terrorist groups harbored in part by the Afghan and Pakistani governments reoriented 
international efforts, both aid and security based, towards preventing state failure. 
Between the 11 September attacks and December 2014, NATO operated in Afghanistan, 
under multiple mandates as an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to prevent 
the country from serving as a safe- haven for al-Qaeda, the terror group behind the 
attacks. 
14 
Promptly following its initial mandate in 2001, NATO forces led by the United 
States toppled a pro-Pakistan and pro-Taliban regime in Kabul, replacing it with an anti- 
Taliban, anti- Pakistan government headed by President Hamid Karzai. 
15 
This 
exacerbated existing tensions between Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, as conflict 
spilled across the states’ shared, porous boundary, called the “Durand Line.” The Taliban, 
an Islamic fundamentalist group that had ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, 
regrouped in Pakistan, where its central leadership began mounting an insurgency against 
the Western- backed government in Kabul. 
16 
Cross-border conflict between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, the legitimacy of the Afghan state, competing interests amongst ethnic 
groups, and dispersed, often local and tribal-based government characterize state failure 
in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, wedged between Afghanistan and India, also wrestles with questions of state 
legitimacy and trans-border conflict. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
Pakistan’s foremost intelligence agency, is known to support and coordinate Islamist 
militant group activity, particularly against India. Perhaps the most notorious of these 
groups is Lashar-e-Toyeba, which orchestrated the 2008 Mumbai hotel bombings. 
 
17 
A recognized nuclear state, Pakistan has provided nuclear technology to rogue Iran and 
North Korea. 
18 
Since its founding in 1947 as an Islamic Republic, Pakistan has been 
forced to negotiate its own international identity, geographic space, and the threats posed 
by often belligerent neighbors, India and Afghanistan. Questions of how to define 
“Pakistan,” as a distinct entity from India, continue to directly affect Pakistani security and 
undermine the legitimacy of its government. This perhaps inherent and founding instability 
threatens international security, and provides a key staging ground for strategies aimed at 
preventing state failure. 
DISEC will take a two-fold approach to the complex geopolitical issues surrounding 
security and statehood in Afghanistan and Pakistan. First, we will consider the 
identification mechanisms, conflict de-escalation, and post-conflict state- building and 
disarmament strategies that have proven effective in failed and failing states at large. 
Second, and most importantly, we will examine Afghanistan and Pakistan as flashpoints of 
state failure in Central and South Asia. We will consider how mechanisms and strategies 
can prevent further instability, look towards measures 
for strengthening the Durand Line, and support capacity building, counter-terrorism 
initiatives and security sector reform within their respective governments. 

 
 
 
History of the Problem 
A History of Aid and Causes of State Failure 
The international community’s role in actively aiding the development of and supporting 
governance in lesser-developed nation states (including failing states) coincided with the 
founding of the United Nations and beginning of the Cold War, post-WWII. Rooted in the 
United Nations’ establishment was the notion that international cooperation, including and 
perhaps especially in aiding the development processes of lesser-developed countries, 
was a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of peace. The first order of business in 
the aftermath of WWII was supporting physical reconstruction in Europe: repairing or 
rebuilding roads, bridges, power stations, and ports that underpinned national economic 
production and international trade. 
19 
This attempted cooperative world order fractured 
fairly quickly, however, as the world divided into the first, second, and third worlds. The 
United States, by means of the Marshall Plan (spearheaded by then Secretary of State 
George Marshall), provided direct financial aid to support European economic recovery, 
and also provided military assistance to Greece and Turkey. 
20 
Although the UN coordinated humanitarian provisions and assistance, historians tend to attribute 
European economic recovery and rebuilding to the U.S. Marshall Plan grants. 
As tensions began to reach a head between the capitalist United States and communist 
Soviet Union, the Marshall Plan was as much political—directed at containing the spread 
of communism— as it was aimed at spurring development and reenergizing European 
cities and industries. The end of WWII led to the decline and prompt collapse of the 
imperial system: the British Empire, which, in 1922, held sway over one fifth of the world’s 
population, began, under new leadership, to support rapid decolonization. Great Britain, 
Japan, and the majority of Western Europe, in part thanks to the Marshall Plan, were 
assumed under the industrial-capitalist first world, with the United States as its global 
superpower. The second world was the socialist/communist world first forged by Vladimir 
Lenin and Joseph Stalin in the wake of WWI, which supported one-party rule by 
communist parties and central planning of production. The first and second worlds, 
internally integrated, were economically and politically cut off from each other. The third 
world, today a blanket term designated to poor and developing countries, consisted of the 
increasingly large number of postcolonial, non-aligned countries. Under the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the third world attempted political and economic autonomy, to varying degrees 
of success. Throughout the Cold War, members of the first and second worlds (most 
notably the United States and Soviet Union) engaged in proxy warfare in third-world 
countries to attempt to expand their spheres of influence and contain the spread of their 
respective rival ideology. 
21 
Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute of Columbia University, describes in his The 
End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, how the second and third world 
eventually collapsed under debilitating foreign debt, as both international communism and 
 
22 economic isolation proved economically infeasible. 
To a large degree, Sachs’s 
contention underlines why the third world has lagged behind economically: an insistence 
on autonomy and non-alignment excluded post-colonial countries from reaping the 
benefits of technological advancement, medical and scientific discoveries, and diplomatic 
and political ties with the industrial first world. This largely economic argument explains 
why many former third-world countries failed or began failing as a result of humanitarian 
catastrophes that their nascent or ineffectual governments were ill-equipped to handle: 
widespread disease and pandemics, natural disasters, including agricultural failure and 
famine, draught, and tsunamis, and geographic isolation. 
What Sachs’s wide-sweeping argument makes somewhat less clear is how hasty 
decolonization and difficult and at-times impossible transitions from empire/colony to 
nation state complicated the process of establishing effective governance in newly 
decolonized states, and sharpened the fault lines of ethnic and religious sectarianism. The 
nonaligned movement propelled India’s rise in economic and diplomatic influence, allowing 
it to situate itself as the world’s largest democracy. That said, it also created an opening for 
populist, corrupt dictators, such as Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (then Zaire), Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Idi Amin in Uganda, each of which 
are now “very high alert” failed states. 
 
23 
Decolonisation in the multi-ethnic Arab world, 
previously structured as British and French “mandates” after WWII, and before then, part 
of the innately multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, framed to support British and French regional 
interests, also led to the rise of authoritarian one- party rule in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, 
nominal “republics.” 
24 
Sectarian violence, power vacuums left by the toppling of 
authoritarian rulers, and corrupt governance led to Syria, Iraq, and Libya’s decline into state 
failure. Failing and failed states’ tendency to act as support systems and breeding 
grounds terrorist groups, and general propensity for civil war and sectarian violence, ought 
not be divorced from an underlying economic insecurity in these states. These countries’ 
low performance in economic indices should be traced back to the social and political 
conditions that led to hasty, haphazard decolonisation. 
 
Afghanistan:A Story of Statelessness 
With Persia to its west and the Indian subcontinent to its east, the area that comprises 
modern Afghanistan has always stood between great empires. At times, Afghanistan 
constituted part of larger Persia, at others, particularly under the second-century Kushan 
dynasty, it linked more closely to northwestern India. Largely 
tribal and structured around local, unofficial governance, “Afghanistan” as a coherent entity 
never truly existed until defined by the British as the geographic space west of their 
colonial holdings in India and east of Persia. 
25 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Nadir Shah, 
considered by some historians the founder of the modern geographic concept of 
“Afghanistan,” established a “tribal assembly” in Kandahar after crossing over from India 
 
26 (modern-day Pakistan). 
The tribal structure laid out by Nadir Shah collapsed in 1818 
when Dost Mohammed Khan, leader of the Afghan Barakzai tribe, conquered Kabul. After 
establishing the Berakzai name across “Central Asia,” appointing himself Amir of 
Afghanistan in 1837. 
27 
Foreign powers were quick to recognise Dost Mohammed as a leader and influential figure 
in Central Asia. An ascendant Russian Empire, looking to secure a trading link to India and 
expand its influence in Central Asia, sent an envoy to establish friendly relations with the 
Amir. The British became preoccupied with perceived Russian “encroachment” on their 
colonial holdings in India, particularly surrounding the Hindu Kush Mountains that 
separated India’s western front from Afghanistan. Afghanistan, hardly an autonomous 
territory and still largely governed by loose, tribal allegiances, became a staging ground for 
a geopolitical game between Britain and Russia. 
This period of British and Russian geo-politicking in Afghanistan included two Anglo- 
Afghan wars, and came to be referred to as “The Great Game.” Coined by British 
Intelligence Officer Arthur Connelly, the term “The Great Game” implies a contradiction 
within the Anglo-Russian struggle for mastery in Central Asia. Whereas “game” trivialises 
British efforts in the Afghan wars, “great” suggests them to have been momentous, and to 
have required significant intellectual, strategic, and military investment. In 1839, fearing 
Russian expansionism, the British directed an army based in Lahore (in modern-day 
Pakistan) to cross the Hindu-Kush mountains and take Kabul to replace Dost Mohammed 
with a pro- British Amir. The British faced incredibly trying conditions and guerilla warfare, 
which perhaps embodies the government and military structure of Afghanistan. After 
Russia brokered a deal with Dost Mohammed Khan, the British surrendered defeat. In 
1878, as Russian expansionism reached an all-time high, and the British once again 
attempted to force regime change in Kabul, this time successfully. 
28 
The Anglo-Afghan wars, which, by the conclusion of the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 
1879, allowed the British to install a pro-British Amir and use Afghanistan as a buffer state 
for India, effectively established a legacy of instability in Afghanistan that persists almost 
two decades into the twenty- first century. The British and Russians practiced 
Britain’s Punch Magazine satirically depicts British and Russian destabilizing aggression in 
Afghanistan during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. (Source: Wikipedia) 
regime change in Afghanistan, installing puppet Amirs, favorable to their respective 
interests. The legitimacy of Dost Mohammaed Khan’s status as an official “governor” of 
Afghanistan was tenable at best, and The Great Game effectively shattered any attempt at 
structuring Afghan autonomy. Tribal structures and systems remained the norm on a local 
level, whereas official “central” governments tended to reflect the interests of foreign 
imperial powers, largely removed from the interests and day-to-day realities of the Afghan 
people. The idea of “Afghanistan” and of a collective “Afghan people” was also, here, largely 
imagined understandings of the geographic region between Persia and India, just out of both 
Russia’s and Britain’s sphere of influence. Since well before the nineteenth century, Afghanistan 
has not in reality ever been the coherent, cohesive, and centralized entity that the term “nation 
state” implies. 

29 
Following the Anglo-Afghan wars, Britain maintained a significant degree of influence in 
Afghanistan, aiding a distant relative of the old- ruling Amir, Abdurrahman, as he attempted 
to ward off his cousins and become Amir. Through the end of World War I, Afghanistan, 
ruled by Abdurrahman’s family and offspring, maintained a policy of strict neutrality. The 
British, disgruntled by Afghan neutrality and by their inability to effectively mobilize the 
population of Afghanistan, attempted intervention in 1919. After a month of fighting, 
Amanullah Khan, grandson of Abdurrahman, signed a vague and somewhat inconclusive 
peace treaty, in which Britain acknowledged Afghanistan as an independent nation. A 
fifteen-year period of coups and governmental instability ensued, further revealing an 
enduring rift between the game-like volatility and illegitimacy of the Afghan central 
government and the on-the-ground realities in Afghanistan. 
 
30 
Between 1933 and 1978, 
Zahir Shar ruled as King of Afghanistan. Shar and his brother-in-law, Daud Khan, who 
ruled as Prime Minister after orchestrating a military coup to remove Shar in 1977, were 
staunch proponents of the Non-Aligned movement. In 1964, Shar drafted a constitution for 
Afghanistan, nominally rendering it a “constitutional monarchy.” 
31 
Despite its autocratic 
nature, Shar’s regime presided over a period of relative stability in Afghanistan. Khan’s 
assumption of power set into motion a stretch of further instability that undermined 
Afghanistan’s even nominal standing as an autonomous nation state. 
This semblance of stability and structure collapsed in 1979, when the Soviet Army invaded 
Afghanistan and propped up a communist government, headed by Babrak Karmal. This 
prompted the United States, allied with Pakistan, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, to support 
the mujahedeen, or rogue guerilla fighters commanded by tribal leaders and tied to radical 
Islamist parties, in their enduring struggle against the Afghan central government. 
32 
The 
mujahedeen were based in the rural mountainous regions between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, the same regions that had earlier played a central role during the Anglo- 
Afghan wars. The mujahedeen encompassed a variety of tribal and ethnic groups—its 
members spoke different languages and followed different customs—but unified under the 
umbrella of Islamism. Rather than attempt jihad on a global scale, a practice that in 
abstract has been adopted by various modern terrorist groups, and is often misattributed 
to the mujahedeen, the group framed a very specific and contained nationalist struggle 
within the lens of jihad (which literally translates to “struggle” or “strive” 
33 
). 
34 
 
Afghan anti-Soviet mujahideen, including a deserted captain in the Afghan army, pose 
near Heart, Afghanistan, in February 1980. (Source: The Atlantic) 
The mujahideen were directly harboured and funded by the Pakistani government through 
the ISI, which had its own interests at stake in maintaining Non-Alignment and opposing 
the Soviet-installed communist government (which favoured India). Whereas the Soviets 
portrayed the mujahideen as violent outlaws, the Reagan Administration heralded them as 
“freedom fighters.” 
35 
An umbrella branch for a variety of 
Islamist militant groups, the mujahideen included Osama Bin Laden and other future 
leaders of al-Qaeda. 
36 
By 1988, the United States, Soviet Union, and Pakistan signed 
peace accords ending the first war in Afghanistan, yet the mujahideen continued their 
armed resistance against the Afghan government, at this point headed by the communist 
Mohammed Najibullah. 
37 
In 1993, various factions grouped collectively under the 
mujahideen agreed to form a government, appointing Burhanuddin Rabbani president. 
38 
Yet infighting and lawlessness threatened Rabbani’s legitimacy, even after the mujahideen 
officially captured Kabul as the Cold War drew to a close. Throughout the 1990s, the 
various militant groups under the mujahideen fractured under the pressure of underlying 
ethnic and tribal divisions. Afghanistan became, once again, characterised by vicious 
infighting and general lawlessness. 
From this rubble emerged the Taliban (or “Students of Islamic Knowledge Movement”), a 
puritanical, fundamentalist Islamist group led by former mujahideen commander 
Mohammad Omar. 
 
39 
Beginning in 1994, the Taliban overran and seized control over most 
of Afghanistan, including Kabul in 1996. The Taliban, largely composed of ethnic majority 
Pashtuns engaged in tactics of ethnic cleansing and persecution, targeting minority Tajiks, 
Baluchis, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. 
40 
After seizing Kabul, the Taliban introduced a hardline 
perversion of Islam within the country, banning women from work and 
imposing“Islamic”punishment: stoning to death and amputation. By 1997, the Taliban 
controlled two-thirds of territory in Afghanistan, and was officially recognised by Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia as the country’s legitimate rulers. 
41 
The Northern Alliance, a loosely 
associated group of former mujahedeen that opposed Taliban rule, was a largely 
ineffective opposition force to the group until 2001, when the NATO actively aided their 
efforts to unseat the Taliban. 
Just as the Taliban secured control over a majority of Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden, a 
former mujahedeen member, began mobilising what would become al-Qaeda, a terrorist 
network spread across Afghanistan and Pakistan that began its operations by 
orchestrating a series of terror attacks on US foreign embassies and, ultimately planned 
and carried out the 9/11 attacks on US soil. Whereas the Taliban focused its operations on 
gaining ground within Afghanistan, al-Qaeda operated under a similarly extreme and 
violent ideology, but expanded its frontiers abroad. 
42 
These non-state organisations took tremendous advantage of an underlying fragility, 
sectarianism, and statelessness in Afghanistan, which had persisted since the early Common Era. 

Pakistan: From Imagined Community to Failing State 

Unlike Afghanistan, “Pakistan” as a theory was clear and fairly coherent, although the 
process of transitioning from imagined community to independent nation state engendered 
tremendous violence, displacement, and newly enflamed religious tensions. From 1858 to 
1947, the United Kingdom, under the British crown, exercised direct rule over the Indian 
subcontinent, including the area that makes up present-day Pakistan. Anticolonial 
nationalism began mounting in India in the late nineteenth century with the founding of the 
secular Indian National Congress party (INC) in 1885, and intensified throughout the early 
twentieth century. The INC, intended to give a voice to the Indian people within British rule, 
became India’s principal forum for debate surrounding the future of the sub-continent, 
political and economic reform, and the rights of natives. Led by Jawaharlal Nehru, and 
guided by teachings and rhetoric of Mohandas Gandhi, it became the locus of anticolonial 
nationalism. 
43 
The Muslim League (or “All-Muslim League”) emerged in 1906 as an 
alternative party to the INC that focused on ensuring equal representation for Indian 
Muslims, disgruntled by what it perceived as limited representation for Muslims in 
Congress. Equal representation soon became separate representation, and the Muslim 
League over time shifted towards a policy that demanded a separate Muslim state. 
44 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah – the founding father of Pakistan – was long an active member of 
the INC. Over time, however, the mounting political realities within the INC that lead to the 
rise of Jawaharlal Nehru, later India’s first Prime Minister, as party President resulted in 
Jinnah’s increased isolation within the party. Along with his growing conviction that the INC 
could not adequately represent the Muslim minority, this isolation lead Jinnah to leave the 
INC and assume a leadership role within the Muslim League. The Muslim League, led by 
Jinnah, went on to successfully advocate for a separate Muslim state, establishing the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 16 August 1947. 
45 
The Partition of British India into modern-day India and Pakistan displaced fifteen million 
people and killed more than a million, and contributes to Pakistan’s current state of fragility. 
(Source: The New Yorker) 
The process of establishing the state of Pakistan, independent from India, however was far 
more messy and haphazard in reality than it had been in theory. The Muslim League was 
based out of Lucknow, in the Indian state of Utter Pradesh, which housed India’s largest 
Muslim population. Yet when Britain agreed to terms of decolonisation and accepted the 
Muslim League’s plan for a separate Muslim state, it structured partition around the 
northwestern Indian state of Punjab. Utter Pradesh, located in central India, could not 
feasibly become a separate state. Although Western Punjab was predominantly Muslim, 
Punjab was known for its religious plurality. 
Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs had, for centuries, co-existed in harmony: the state’s culture, 
politics, and economy were all based around religious co-dependence. The British largely 
disregarded this historical unity. Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims traditionally worked in 
different, yet interdependent industries, perceiving themselves more as Punjabis than as 
Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims, and opposing the separatist tendencies of both the Muslim 
League and the Congress party. 
46 
By the end of WWII, a war-weary Britain faced a frayed economy, mounting anti-colonial 
nationalism and a declining British imperial morale: the newly ruling Labour Party began 
supporting a policy of rapid decolonisation. The Boundary Commission, led by British 
lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, theorised decolonisation and partition of India in just over a month. 
47 
Prioritising efficiency over long-term efficacy, Britain and the Commission demonstrated 
an acute lack of grassroots knowledge of India. Carving out two distinct geographic 
regions in Punjab in a purely empirical, demographic majority-focused manner destabilised 
the region, forcing neighbours apart, as interdependent, albeit different lives transitioned to 
enmity. The Partition of India and Pakistan led to mass migration, displacement, violence, 
and disrupted the Punjabi economy. 
The haphazard nature of partition and the founding of Pakistan sowed the seeds of its 
subsequent political instability. A number of key characteristics of a failing state defined 
Pakistan immediately post-partition. Pakistanis, united under a common religion, shared 
little other in terms of historical ties. As Ernst Renan famously articulated in his 1882 “What 
is a Nation?” ethnicity and religion define a nation far less than the presence of a collective 
people with a shared history of suffering and commitment to a shared future. 
48 
It could 
certainly be argued— and frequently was argued by Pakistani leadership— that Renan’s 
definition of a nation applied to Pakistan. Yet the state was divided into regions that 
practiced different customs, and felt differing 
degrees of allegiance to the Pakistani government, complicating its standing as a stable 
nation state. The region of Pakistan that used to be Western Punjab, and is home to 
Pakistan’s (and previously Punjab’s) cultural capital, Lahore, is in many ways culturally 
Indian: Hindu and Sikh (and many Indian Muslim) Punjabis, many of whom relocated to 
Delhi, share the same ethnic background and essential cultural customs as Pakistanis 
living in Lahore. 
49 
A map of Afghanistan and Pakistan, depicting the Federally Administered Tribal Regions, 
Baluchistan, and Punjab. The Durand Line is drawn in red. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org) 
Western Pakistan is an entirely different phenomenon. To the north is the semi- 
autonomous Federally Administered Trial Areas (FATA), a mountainous region inhabited by 
various tribal groups that never formed part of British India. FATA has historically acted 
outside of the auspices of the Pakistani central government, and exhibits the same 
features of lawlessness and lack of governmental structure as Afghanistan. As the border 
separating the FATA region of Pakistan falls along a porous section of the Durand Line, 
some of gone so far to argue that FATA ought to be considered more part of Afghanistan 
than Pakistan. 
50 
The Pakistani military and government has long been unable to penetrate the FATA, where 
non- state actors, such as the Taliban, have historically taken root. FATA is predominantly 
composed of Pashtuns, the ethnic majority of Afghanistan, but is divided into seven tribal 
agencies and six frontier regions. Historically, FATA has been 
a breeding ground for insurgencies against the Pakistani government. Due to an absence 
of central governance, resource distribution in FATA is complex and imbalanced, which, 
coupled with water and resource scarcity, has long constituted a human rights crisis 
51 
To the south is Baluchistan, where Baluchistan nationalists have fought insurgencies and 
engaged in guerrilla warfare against the governments of Pakistan and Iran since 1947. 
Just as the Pashtun majority in FATA has its historical roots in Afghanistan, the Baluchis 
have cooperated with militant groups to aid their nationalist endeavours. Baluchistan 
suffers from inadequate infrastructure, limited transportation and links to other regions of 
Pakistan, and violent schisms between insurgents, civilians, and the Pakistani military. 
52 
Although it is resource-rich, this has contributed to inter-group fighting and lawlessness, 
rather than promote stability and development. 
53 
These areas of limited governance in 
Western Pakistan threatened its standing as a legitimate and effective nation-state at the 
onset. 
In the immediate aftermath of partition, Pakistan faced a threat to its government’s 
legitimacy in the first Indo-Pakistani War, fought over the disputed state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Amidst the turmoil and mass migration that marked the months following the 
1947 partition, India and Pakistan fought their first war over Jammu and Kashmir. Hindu 
ruler of the former princely state, Maharaja Hari, delayed his decision to accede to either 
India or Pakistan, which angered the state’s Muslim majority to rebellion. When he 
ultimately signed an Instrument of Accession treaty ceding the state to Indian control, he 
propelled the onset of the first Indo-Pakistani war. 
54 
Whereas India accused Pakistan of 
aggressively invading Indian territory, Pakistan contended that the conflict over Kashmir 
was an outgrowth of the Hindu-Muslim violence that plagued the pre-partition years. 
In 1948, the UN Security Council passed a resolution imposing an immediate ceasefire, 
calling Pakistan to withdraw all military personnel from Kashmir, but authorising India to 
maintain a limited military presence. The Resolution supported Kashmiri self-determination, 
determining that “the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in 
accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and 
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.” 

55 
The ceasefire came into effect in December 1948, yet 
Pakistan did not withdraw its military forces, nor did the Kashmiri authority organise a 
plebiscite. 
56 
The First Indo-Pakistani war innately complicated political transition in Pakistan. Whereas 
India, under Prime Minister Nehru, became a parliamentary democracy with largely 
functional institutions and checks and balances, a corrupt political elite born out of the 
Muslim League governed in Pakistan. 
57 
The war, enduring disagreement over the official 
language, the role of Islam, provincial representation, and the distribution of power 
between the center and the provinces, delayed the constitution-drafting process. 
Pakistan’s experiment with democracy was short-lived, however, as General Mohammad 
Ayub Khan orchestrated a military coup in 1958, ruling as an autocrat until 1971. This 
authoritarian rule and absence of an effective constitution severely exacerbated center- 
periphery tensions. This era of military rule also saw East Pakistan secede and become 
modern-day 
Bangladesh. 
58 
In 1973, General Yahya Khan, Mohammad Ayub’s successor, handed over 
power to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Prime Minister to-be Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. 
Bhutto oversaw the drafting of a constitution that established a nominally democratic 
central government, which ruled, largely effectively, over the areas of Pakistan that were 
formally Punjab. It was the constitution, however, that granted enormous concessions to 
Baluchistan and FATA. The PPP governed Pakistan until 1977, when Pakistan came under 
military rule yet again and the 1973 constitution was suspended. 
59 
General Zia ul-Haq 
assumed power, and attempted to mobilise popular resentment with the ruling government 
to initiate reforms aimed at Islamization. 
60 
The First War in Afghanistan granted Zia international support. By the late 1980s, however, 
immense corruption and economic crises pressured the government to call a special 
election. Democracy proved just as difficult as authoritarianism, as widespread 
governmental and institutional corruption, a penchant for disregarding and redrafting the 
initial 1973 constitution, and persistent centre- periphery tensions threatened the Pakistani 
central government’s semblance of power and control. This lack of effective constitution 
and institutional structure in government, combined with lawlessness in Western Pakistan, 
sowed the seeds of Pakistan’s modern state failure. 
Current Situation 
The international community’s approaches to failed and failing states shifted drastically in 
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on U.S. soil. Prior to the 9/11 
attacks, policymakers tended to group capacity building in failing states within its broader 
international development goals, articulated in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Thus, any UN-led or otherwise international action tended to focus on the 
humanitarian consequences of an inadequate or ineffective government. After 9/11, the 
international community recognised failed and failing states as potentially detrimental 
threats to international security, and tied counter-terrorism efforts to capacity building in 
these states. Just as U.S. President George W. Bush articulated that the United States 
and international community at large was “threatened less by conquering states than by 
failing ones,” 
61 
think-tanks and counter-terrorism organisations across the globe compiled 
strategies for building state-capacity: strengthening borders, establishing institutions, 
undertaking comprehensive security sector reform, and securing food and natural 
resources. 
62 
A revamped U.S. National Security Strategy focused not only on Afghanistan, which was 
identified as breeding ground of al-Qaeda and had long been considered a quintessential 
failed state, but also on failed and failing states more broadly. Think tanks expanded the 
U.S. National Security Paper to incorporate more complete causes of state failure, 
expanding the United States’ effort to an international level. The Brookings Institution, a 
public policy think tank based out of Washington D.C., analysed the potentially limited 
nature of the U.S. National Security Strategy. Susan Rice articulated that “Despite the 
important focus on failed and failing states in the President’s NSS, neither the Strategy 
itself nor existing Administration policies or programs offer sufficient vision, tools or 
resources to confront effectively the threats these states pose.” 
63 
In a broad sense, thus, 
the international community since 9/11 has had to consider failing states— most centrally 
Afghanistan and Pakistan— in an unprecedented international security context. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan post-9/11: Counterterrorism and Faltering Security 
NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF. (Source: NATO) 
The Taliban ruled in Afghanistan through 2001, under the leadership of cleric and anti- 
Soviet resistance veteran Mullah Omar, deemed “commander of the faithful.” Ethnic 
divisions and opposition to Taliban rule persisted, however, particularly among Afghan 
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns. These three groups became key partners of the United 
States and its allies in NATO post- 9/11, which, through forming the “Northern Alliance,” 
ousted the Taliban. 
64 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1267, which established the “al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee,” which linked the two groups as terrorist entities and imposed sanctions on 
arm shipments, travel, and funding. 
65 
The Taliban provided sanctuary for al-Qaeda’s 
terrorist operations: under its leader, Osama bin Laden, and supported by the Taliban, al- 
Qaeda expanded its network throughout Afghanistan and western Pakistan, extending to 
Peshawar, along Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. 
66 
The process of 
ousting the Taliban, the first stage of the U.S. and NATO- led military campaign in 
Afghanistan, lasted two months following 9/11. The second phase of the Afghanistan War 
involved a more robust military effort and strategy: the United States endeavored to defeat 
the Taliban militarily and rebuild core institutions of the Afghan state, uniting the disparate 
ethnic and militant groups within its borders by means of counterinsurgency. 
67 
After the 
collapse of the Taliban, Bin Laden and al- Qaeda leadership escaped to a cave complex 
southeast of Kabul: it was later discovered that they were also provided save-haven in 
Pakistan. 
68 
After the fall of the Taliban in Kabul in 2001, the UN invited major Afghan factions, 
predominantly the Northern Alliance, to a diplomatic conference that resulted in the 
establishment of an Afghan interim government, which installed Hamid Karzai as its 
administrative head. 
69 
In 2003, NATO took up the mantel of the state- building component 
 
of the War in Afghanistan, commanding the UN-mandated International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF worked to enable Afghan institutions and security 
apparatuses, to ensure it become strong enough to dispel and disable terrorist forces (as 
opposed to being overrun by them). Gradually, NATO helped build the Afghan national 
security forces to an extent that they took over responsibility for maintaining security in 
Afghanistan. 
NATO’s initial mandate expired in December 2014, and a new mission, called “Resolute 
Support,” began in January 2015 to train, advise, 
and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. Through NATO’s state-building 
missions, the international community has also lent financial support as part of a broader 
commitment to Afghanistan. 
70 
International support for Afghanistan, and a continued 
counterinsurgency military presence in the country, has certainly worked to build state 
capacity and security forces in a country that has never boasted either. Yet underlying 
ethnic divisions and a lack of unified concept of “Afghanistan” threatens Afghanistan’s 
future as a sovereign and coherent nation state. Despite the ISAF’s programs, the United 
States has been putting off troop withdrawal in Afghanistan because of the weak and 
tenuous nature of the Afghan state that remains susceptible to terrorist infiltration. 
 
The onset of the War in Afghanistan certainly affected Pakistan, testing the legitimacy of its 
government and its commitment to fending off terrorist organisations. After the 2001 
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States offered Pakistan an ultimatum: it could either 
reverse its support for the Taliban and become an ally in the U.S.- led War on Terror or it 
could be considered an aggressor and, thus, a target in that campaign. Pakistan decided 
to join on the side of the United States and Northern Alliance, yet the installed Karzai 
government tended to favour Indian interests over Pakistani interests, causing Pakistan to 
shirk its responsibilities as a partner in the War on Terror. Pakistan began once again to 
support the Afghan Taliban, as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) began harbouring anti- 
NATO and anti-Afghanistan jihadists. 
71 
This did not win the Pakistani government the 
support of all Islamist militant factions in Afghanistan, however, as disparate militant 
groups in Central and South Asia coalesced into the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 
known also as the Pakistani Taliban. 
72 
The TTP operates out of Pakistan’s tribal areas 
and is not only anti-NATO, but also anti-Pakistan. It aids its Afghan counterparts, al-Qaeda 
and the Afghan Taliban, and spread its influence across the mountainous tribal regions of 
Western Pakistan that includes FATA. TTP actively targets Pakistani security and 
intelligence forces, and is thought to have been responsible for the assassination of former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. 
73 
Parallel to the TTP is Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based out of Pakistan that 
experts say receives direct intelligence aid and funding from the ISI. During the 1990s, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba gained global prominence as an international terror group for its targeting 
of Hindus in the disputed North Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. By the early 2000s, 
 
Lashkar-e-Taiba expanded it terror programs to include directly targeting sites in India, as 
when it was responsible for an attack on the Red Fort in Delhi in 2002. 
74 
Lakshar- e-Taiba 
is perhaps best known for orchestrating the devastating 2008 Mumbai hotel bombings, 
which killed 164 people (of international origin). 
75 
The ISI is thus itself susceptible to terror 
group infiltration and has demonstrated an acute willingness to support terrorist 
organizations in order to buttress Pakistan’s geostrategic interests. The international 
community long pressured the ISI about Osama Bin Laden’s whereabouts: NATO states in 
particular have been vocally skeptical about ISI’s legitimacy in dealings with al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban, finding it difficult to believe the ISI was not aware that Bin Laden had been 
living in Pakistan. 
76 
Members of the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, which is harbored by Pakistan’s ISI. (Source: 
CNN) 
18 Disarmament and International Security Committee Diminishing Borders:The Durand 
Line 
The porous border dividing Afghanistan and Pakistan contributes substantially to both 
states’ fragility and is the direct result of imperial meddling and hasty decolonisation. The 
Durand Line was drawn in 1893, delineating the boundary between British colonial India 
and the tribal lands of Central Asia (now Afghanistan). The late 1800s were marked by an 
increased attempt on the part of the Afghans to assert territorial sovereignty: the Durand 
line allowed the British to expand the frontiers of their sphere of influence westward, as it 
cut through parts of the tribal lands that were not officially administered by the British 
crown in India. 
77 
Pashtun tribes occupied the majority of this land to the north, and the 
Baluchi tribes, the majority of the land to the south. The act of creating an artificial border 
divided the semi- autonomous Pashtunistan and Baluchistan in half and deprived 
Afghanistan of its former access to the Arabian Sea. 
When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, it inherited these territories that had 
typically formed part of the Central Asian tribal lands that would become Afghanistan, east 
of the Durand Line. Afghanistan was the only UN member state to vote against Pakistan’s 
membership bid to the United Nations. Aside from severely souring Afghanistan-Pakistan 
relations, the Durand Line put into question the legitimacy of a sovereign Afghan state and 
made governance in Western Pakistan challenging to the point of impossible at the outset. 
Afghanistan became land-locked; its lack of effective trade routes and national resource 
scarcity exacerbated sectarian infighting and territorial disunity. Because it divides largely 
ungoverned tribal areas, the Durand Line is also porous: it is ideal for transshipment of 
illegal weapons, and for individuals, particularly from terrorist organizations. Despite the 
international community’s best intentions to aid in the foundation of a stable Afghanistan, 
Pakistan has repeatedly used the Durand Line’s porosity to subvert the Afghan 
government by aiding jihadist activity across the border. 
 
 
A New Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan? 
Donald Trump’s ascendance to the U.S. presidency in November 2016 has shifted the 
ideological perspective of the key actor currently involved in Afghanistan. His perspectives, 
at odds with those of the Obama administration, have increasingly de-emphasized security 
building and instead frequently involved derisive and divisive rhetoric and subsequent 
decision-making. The Brookings Institute, writing critically about the path forward in 
Afghanistan, assessed that “President Trump’s overall decision on U.S. policy towards 
Afghanistan—to stay in the country with a somewhat enlarged military capacity—is to a 
large extent correct. However, his de-emphasis on Afghan governance and political issues 
is deeply misguided and could be a fatal flaw in the strategy.” 
80 
Due to the absence of an 
integrated international strategy on security-building and governance in Afghanistan, U.S. 
policy fluctuations have a disproportional influence on the makeup of programs therein. 
Just as the United States’s approach to the conflict has shifted under President Trump, 
non-state actors have contributed to deteriorating security. The Haqqani network and 
Islamic State boast ties to the dysfunctional government. The Afghan political situation 
remains highly precarious, and without a sustained international military presence, 
outbreak of a full-blown civil war is likely, as is the expansion of existing terrorist safe 
 
havens. President Trump has also exhorted to Pakistan that it immediately end support for 
anti-Afghan terrorist and military groups, yet it is unlikely to heed these demands. This also 
reflects the U.S. government’s January 2018 decision to freeze aid to Pakistan citing the 
country as a “safe haven for terrorists.” 
81 
In general, this approach has largely scrapped 
previous policies prioritizing development as a means of building security and state 
capacity. It has demonstrated an increased willingness to employ force (through strikes), 
and a distrust of existing diplomatic channels. During the Obama administration, American 
military presence in Afghanistan was heavily reliant on Pakistani consent. 
82 
This shifting approach has come as the international community has witnessed a 
deterioration of regional security. Pakistan has continued to augment Afghanistan’s 
violence and instability by providing weapons, intelligence and protection to the Taliban 
and Haqqani network. 
83 
Pakistan continues to fear a strong Afghan government too 
closely aligned with India. In Afghanistan, the National Unity Government headed by 
President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, has been slow and sporadic in 
enacting promised reforms. 
84 
ISIS and Taliban forces have begun to clash, revealing 
conflict spillover and informal network building to the west as well as the east. Both are 
responsible for immense civilian casualties, with numbers in the several hundreds between 
October and November 2017. The Security Council convened to discuss the status of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which expired on 17 March 2018. At the 
meeting, the delegations from Russia and Kazakhstan emphasised the importance of 
regional organisations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, in addressing the situation in Afghanistan. 
 
Relevant UN Action 
Since the international community recognised failed and failing states as immediate 
threats to global security, the United Nations has sponsored a variety of programs for 
building and bolstering state capacity in priority regions. Instrumental in carrying out these 
programs are UN peacekeeping troops. Particularly following 9/11, the UNSC authorized a 
number of existing peacekeeping operations to negotiate and aid the peace and capacity- 
building processes in host nations. 
86 
The UN began considering whether regions 
particularly vulnerable to insecurity necessitated more robust peacekeeping efforts that 
worked to build and restore institutions of government. 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
A Chinese Battalion of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, which 
is mandated to administer DDR. (Source: United Nations) 
In failed and failing states undergoing civil war or persistent trans-border militant conflict, 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has adopted a strategy known as 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR). DDR works to end conflict by 
reintegrating combatants within society. DDR generally operates alongside institution- 
building operations to ensure long- term stability by preventing conflict from breaking out 
 
after initial resolution, and allow former militants to contribute productively to building civil 
society. In theory and often in practice, DDR alleviates the cleavages, intergroup tensions, 
and social pressures that would otherwise breed insurgency. The UN, operating alongside 
NATO and through the UN Development Program (UNDP), has implemented DDR in 
Afghanistan, through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghan Demobilisation 
and Reintegration Commission. 
87 
A long-term component of DDR is guaranteeing national institutions are properly equipped 
to carry out the post-conflict reintegration process themselves. The pre-existence of 
government institutions determines the degree to which DDR is administered by local 
authorities, as opposed to the UN or other international bodies. 
88 
In 2006, the UN drafted 
the Integrated DDR Standards 
(IDDRS), a detailed technical framework for implementing DDR. Since 2006, the UN has 
mandated a number of missions aimed specifically at ensuring post-conflict stability 
through DDR. Outside of Afghanistan, the UN has administered DDR in Burundi, 
Myanmar, Sudan and South Sudan, Haiti, and Timor-Leste, to varying degrees of success. 
89 
Security Sector Reform and Judicial Reform 
 
Crucial to ensuring effective post-conflict stability is Security Sector Reform (SSR), which 
the UN has implemented alongside DDR. The UN defines the security sector as “a broad 
term used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the 
management, provision, and oversight of security in a country.” 
90 
In practice, the security 
sector has referred to national intelligence gathering organizations, national security 
councils, defense (including national militaries), civilian police forces and law enforcement 
agencies, and other informal individuals and authorities that oversee security. 
91 
A weak or 
non-existent security sector—characteristic of most fragile states—grants combatants and 
non-state actors disproportionate political and economic power. SSR strengthens 
governmental and civilian law enforcement and the military, restoring civilian confidence in 
national institutions. It works to ensure that previously informal security forces are 
professionalized, sometimes nationalized, and work to oversee other post-conflict 
initiatives, including DDR. 
Sometimes considered a component of SSR, judicial reform is also a critical component of 
state capacity building. Judicial reform works to establish or rebuild an independent and 
impartial judiciary that may act as a check on other institutions, particularly those included 
in the security sector. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in particular 
has tied judicial reform to improving livelihoods for civilians in fragile states: alongside 
working to restore confidence in institutions, a strong judiciary protects civilians against the 
dangers 
of a corrupt, weak, or non-existent government. A legitimate and independent judiciary 
system works independently of executive branches of government, and arbitrates on 
human rights related issues, and disputes within and between other government 
institutions. 
 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
The UN has played a significant role in overseeing capacity building and security- 
maintenance programs in Afghanistan since the onset of the War in Afghanistan in 2001; it 
has more indirectly intervened in Pakistan during the First, Second, and Third Indo- 
Pakistani wars. In 1965, at the end of the Second Indo-Pakistani war, the UNSC passed a 
series of resolutions urging a ceasefire, following suit in 1971 during the Third Indo- 
Pakistani War. 
92 
These resolutions did not specifically look towards building Pakistani 
state- capacity (India’s government boasted stronger institutions and greater viability), but 
that was considered a pre-condition for peace in South Asia. 
93 
Because the USSR vetoed 
UNSC action in the aftermath of its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the UN played a 
minimal role in Afghanistan in overseeing peace-building and state-building programs, and 
remained largely removed from the political turmoil that ensued and propelled the Taliban 
to power. Although it coordinated humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan throughout the first 
War in Afghanistan and its aftermath, the UNSC only directly addressed the prolonged 
conflict in Afghanistan when it condemned the Taliban’s actions in 1999. 
94 
 
Since the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the UNSC oversaw the NATO- 
mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which supported the Afghan 
transitional government. The ISAF was intended to oversee the transitional government 
and assist in capacity building until it was capable of exercising legitimate authority. Until 
then, the ISAF was tasked with maintaining security in Afghanistan and fighting the 
Islamists that threatened the efficacy of the transitional government. 
95 
The Resolute 
Support Mission in Afghanistan, deployed by NATO and authorised by the UN, has been 
the most significant capacity-building force in Afghanistan since 2014. 

Proposed Solutions 
This committee’s task will be two-fold. We will first consider the United Nations’ existing 
state- building and security-maintaining strategies and think about how and when those 
mechanisms ought to be implemented in fragile states. This requires an understanding of 
fragile states in a broad sense. Resolutions must address how to identify a failed or failing 
state, what characteristics are typical of varying degrees of state failure, and how the UN 
or other international bodies have responded to failed states in the past. Although a 
significant amount of prior UN action in failed states has addressed the humanitarian 
elements of state failure—food insecurity, widespread disease, lack of physical security for 
civilians—we will focus on the international security threat posed by failed states and 
consider effective tools for building state capacity from a security perspective. Much of this 
includes considering overarching counter-terrorism strategies, and analyzing how lack of 
an effective governmental structure and proliferation of terrorist groups often go hand-in- 
hand. Any successful counter-terrorism strategy will consider the social, economic, and 
political circumstances that give rise to radical ideologies and that propel non-state terrorist 
groups to pseudo-state status. 
 
The second focus of our committee, and the most significant, will be applying broader 
state- building and security-maintenance strategies to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Ultimately, you will consider how the lack of effective governance in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan threatens regional security. This requires a deep understanding of the 
historical and current political situations in the two countries, and of the geopolitical forces 
at play in Central and South Asia. Any successful resolution will point towards a post- 
NATO future in Afghanistan. A weak Afghanistan has already created a power vacuum and 
breeding ground for terrorists, and many across the international community fear that as 
NATO’s latest mandate expires, Afghanistan will lack the effective mechanisms to 
effectively guarantee its citizens’ security. Thus, any effective resolution will establish the 
guidelines for a new mission in Afghanistan, perhaps one that is smaller in scale and 
engages regional actors with a shared interest in containing and defeating terrorist groups. 
This type of proposal would have to build off of overarching state-building and post-conflict 
strategies, and would require the consent of the current Afghan government. Resolutions 
will also have to provide a roadmap for future relations between the official Afghan 
government and the Taliban. Some may even consider a power-sharing agreement with 
the Taliban that de-emphasizes and dilutes their radical terror activity, and refocuses the 
group towards legitimate political activity. This second possibility would likely involve a 
mediator, and consider the terms for a peace agreement between the Afghan government, 
the Taliban, and other pro-Taliban belligerents within Afghanistan. Through using capacity- 
building mechanisms, you will also have to consider the long-term threat to Afghan 
autonomy posed by competing ethnic groups, and consider how a potentially re-negotiated 
border policy with Pakistan would ameliorate tensions and improve regional security. 
Understanding the origins of the Durand Line, and the security threat it poses in its current 
incarnation, is also essential. 
 
A successful resolution will also consider mechanisms for improving state capacity in 
Pakistan, including by removing and targeting pro- terror elements within the ISI and its 
larger security apparatus. This will be a particularly challenging task, as it requires an 
additional understanding of India-Pakistan relations that have propelled the Pakistani 
government to support terror activity. Highlighting and effectively exploiting the fact that the 
weakness of the Pakistani government inhibits its development and regional influence 
22 Disarmament and International Security Committee will be essential to forcing any 
change in its governmental structure and efficacy. 

Questions a Resolution Must Answer 

• To what extent should DDR and SSR be regulated by the UN and international bodies 
instead of national governments? What would an effective timeline for these post- 
conflict reconstruction strategies be? How should they be implemented? 
• How should the international community balance social, economic, and political factors 
as it looks to bolster state capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan? 
• What actions should the Pakistani government take to remove terrorist elements from 
the ISI and its security apparatus? What should SSR look like in Pakistan? 
• How can the international community ensure that a drawback of NATO troops in 
Afghanistan does not destabilize the region and create a vacuum for terrorist groups? 
• How should the international community account for individual nations backing out of 
previous development-based commitments in the region, and willingness to spur 
geopolitical tensions between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India? 
 
• How can the Afghan and Pakistani governments strengthen their jurisdiction over the 
semi- autonomous tribal regions? What role should the international community play in 
securing the Durand Line? 

Bloc Positions 
Building state-capacity in fragile states, particularly through security-building in Central and 
South Asia, is an incredibly complicated topic that touches on questions of development, 
post- imperialism, the legitimacy of nation states, and the proliferation of terrorist groups 
and other non- state actors. It is important to acknowledge that not all fragile states will 
perceive state-building efforts carried out by international bodies in the same way, and that 
states fail for different reasons. These blocs are thus by no means stagnant entities: the 
current state of geopolitics between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, for instance, should 
not be taken as a constant, and ought not deter each of these countries from working 
together to bolster regional security. Likewise, other failed states (in the Middle East and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, namely), should not feel compelled to ideologically oppose NATO 
members or Central and South Asian countries. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Countries within NATO will be the most ardent supporters of state-capacity building 
programs, particularly in regions prone to the proliferation of terrorist groups. Countries 
within NATO were the most supportive of past-interventions in failed states, both for 
humanitarian and political purposes. NATO will support a continued, yet limited, presence 
in Afghanistan, and the United States, in particular, would favor a strategy that gradually 
 
delegates security-maintenance to the national government. NATO members will defend 
the efficacy of their post-9/11 strategy in Afghanistan, which combined a boots-on-the- 
ground military intervention led by the United States with SSR and development initiatives. 
NATO will also focus particularly on mechanisms for counter-terrorism within both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and deter other members of the international community from 
supporting existing terrorist groups. NATO will favor intervention aimed at building state- 
capacity so long as no harm is exacted on its members in the process. This likely means 
that, going forward, members of NATO, and especially the United States, would be eager 
to drawback the number of ground forces in Afghanistan. NATO would also support a more 
activist approach to FATA and Baluchistan in Pakistan that ties those regions more closely 
to the security situation in Afghanistan. 
Central Asia and Afghanistan 
Most of Central Asia remains acutely aware of the security threat posed by a continued 
weak Afghan government, and thus supports any and all state capacity building and 
counter-terrorism efforts led by the UN and NATO. These states dreaded the end of ISAF 
in Afghanistan, and staunchly oppose the Taliban and other radical Islamist groups that 
have taken advantage of weak security in Afghanistan. It is also in the interest of the 
current Afghan government to support capacity building, expand its jurisdiction, and expel 
the influence of terrorist groups within its borders. 
Pakistan 
 
Pakistan would likely support international efforts to expel a jihadi presence within the ISI 
and Pakistani military, even though they operate largely independently of the remainder of 
the Pakistani government. Although it seeks to expand its influence into Afghanistan, a 
weakened central government in Afghanistan would allow it to exert greater jurisdiction 
there, the official Pakistani government is threatened by its security agency and military’s 
ties to radical groups, including the Taliban. The Pakistani government would be less open 
to direct UN involvement in its own government: traditional capacity-building strategies that 
may be effective in Afghanistan would unlikely be well received by Pakistan. 
India 
India’s position is defined almost entirely by its regional strategic interests— it is the only 
functional democratic state and developing economy, and is self-interestedly concerned 
with the state of regional security. India staunchly opposes the Islamist factions in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are generally anti-India, as well as the ISI’s ties to terror 
groups that have orchestrated attacks within India. It thus supports any counter-terrorism, 
post-conflict rebuilding, and security sector reform aimed at expelling the influence of 
these groups. 
Pro-Sovereignty Countries 
Traditionally anti-Western countries (namely Russia, China, and Iran) resent Western 
influence in developing countries, particularly in the Eastern Hemisphere (which Russia 
has viewed as its staging ground since the nineteenth century). These states are heavily 
pro-sovereignty and generally oppose international intervention led by a Western bloc, for 
state-building purposes or otherwise. That being said, this traditional pro-sovereignty 
stance does not always extend in instances where persistent state fragility breeds or 
 
supports terrorist groups. Russia, China, and Iran (the latter of which shares a significant 
border with Afghanistan), are wary of the influence of non-state actors in Central and 
South Asia that threaten their national security. For instance, just as ISAF began the 
process of withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2014, Russia and China announced their 
respective commitments to Afghanistan in ground troops. 
96 
Thus, although these 
countries would not traditionally support intervention in failing states (and opposed prior 
interventions on the part of Western bloc countries), this policy does not extend to 
Afghanistan and Western Pakistan for security regions. 
Developing Countries 
An amorphous “developing countries” bloc includes other fragile and failed states and 
former non-aligned Third World countries that typically lack the resources to lead 
intervention themselves. Rather than constitute a coherent bloc or represent a contentious 
policy position, these countries’ perspectives are subject to change. Many fragile and 
failing states have experienced the after-effects of excessive foreign involvement in their 
political affairs, and would thus oppose excessive intervention. At the same time, many of 
these states stand to benefit from the international community and UN expanding its 
commitment to state-building, counter-terrorism, and post- conflicting rehabilitation 
programs in fragile states. 
This bloc would thus oppose traditional unilateral intervention in fragile states, including 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but would largely support expanding SSR, DDR, and other 
capacity building programs on a case-by-case basis. Many of these states, especially 
those who are wary of international meddling in local or regional affairs will support local 
ownership of state-building procedures: that is, they would rather post- conflict rebuilding 
programs be led by on-the- ground actors as opposed to external ones. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Capacity building in failing states and security in Central and South Asia touches upon 
issues of development, nation-building, foreign intervention, and post-colonialism. The 
issues are complicated, and require both a general understanding of state failure, and a 
more deep, detailed understanding of the historical circumstances that gave rise to fragility 
and faltering security in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I encourage you to acquaint yourself 
with the perspectives of prominent development economics, especially Jeffrey Sachs and 
Paul Collier. Both Collier and Sachs, in The Bottom Billion and The End of Poverty 
respectively, devote a significant amount of time to assessing the links between conflict 
and development, and the especially complicated questions posed by long- term failed 
states. Each of these will help provide a broad perspective on state failure. The Fund for 
Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine’s “Fragile States Index” also provides important 
broad, contextual reference material: Foreign Policy also writes in- depth analyses of 
trends in the FSI and more country-specific solutions-based information. 
I strongly recommend you devote the brunt of your research to analysing peace-building 
and state-building work already conducted by the UN and its subsidiaries, which can be 
found at the UN website, and to deepening your understanding of security and statehood 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Helpful for understanding the foundation of Pakistani 
statehood is Yasmin Khan’s The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan. NATO 
also publishes a series of reports and briefings on its programs in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, which are incredibly important for understanding the state of NATO 
operations in Afghanistan and the broader nature of security and counterterrorism in the 
region. The Council on Foreign Relations has also published detailed reports on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially post-9/11, which can be useful for solutions- based 
 
research. More generally, reports published by NGOs and UN subsidiary bodies, 
particularly the UNDP, can provide helpful solutions-based resources. 
Best-prepared delegates will boast both a broad and deep understanding of the issue, 
and, most importantly, will approach the topic from a solutions-based perspective. Reports 
and analyses published by the UN, NGOs, and think tanks such as the Council on Foreign 
Relations and Brookings Institute, and will be most helpful for solutions-based research. 

Closing Remarks 
Congratulations on completing the background guide! You have officially accomplished the 
first, critical component of your research for committee. I hope you now have a solid 
understanding of the major issues within our topic area: an historical background, an 
understanding of current perspectives and policy debates, and an awareness of key points 
of contention and relevant international discourse on the issues. Hopefully you are not only 
better equipped to tackle this committee, but more excited to debate and cooperate with 
your peers at FSMUN 2017. 
I would like to reiterate that reading this guide should be the first step in a much larger 
research process. This guide provides a fairly detailed overview of both topics, but is by no 
means comprehensive. I suggest you conduct further research to deepen your 
understanding of the topics, both historical and current affairs research. 
A complex substantive knowledge of the topics will stand you in good stead for committee, 
and for the remainder of your research. Second, it is essential that you develop a deep 
understanding of your countries’ policies. This topic is contentious, and are intended to 
provoke disagreement between different countries. Understanding your countries’ 
 
interests, allies, and needs is critical to feeling prepared in committee. While compromise, 
when it reflects your countries’ interests and policies, is very important, I value being on- 
policy more than what I would call “egregious compromise.” The General Assembly is built 
around the notion of “one nation, one vote,” which means every single country’s 
perspective is valued and contributes to debate. Ultimately, your goal should be to form 
part of a larger coalition of countries who represent similar platforms as you. Working as 
part of a team will not dilute, but rather magnify your voices and ensure your perspectives 
are debated in committee. 
On a more personal note, I could hardly be more excited to direct this committee. I am not 
only excited to see you discuss these topics, but to witness the personal impact FSMUN 
2018 India will inevitably have on you. At DISEC, you should not only represent your 
assigned country, but yourself: share your personal story, get to know people from across 
the world and all walks of life, and learn from them substantively. That itself is the process 
of diplomacy. Enjoy the research process, identify sub-areas you feel a particular 
connection to, make that known in committee, and come up with a debate strategy that 
plays to your individual skill set. 
Please do not hesitate for a second to reach out to me. I am here to help, and truly want 
make your trip to Hyderabad as enjoyable and meaningful as possible. You can email me 
at mananmehta04@gmail.com with any questions about research, the background guide, 
committee in general, UN4MUN, or to introduce yourself to me, and I will respond. No 
question is too minor and insignificant. I would genuinely love to hear from you. 
I cannot wait to meet you all in August, and best of luck with preparations! 
Best Wishes, 
Manan Mehta 
 
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45 Ibid. 
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65 Council on Foreign Relations, “War in Afghanistan,” http://www.cfr.org/Afghanistan/ 
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66 Ibid. 
67 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Afghanistan War: 2001- 2014,” 
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68 CFR, “War in Afghanistan.” 
 
69 Ibid. 
70 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Afghanistan,” 14 June 2016, http:// 
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71 BBC News, “Pakistan’s Shadowy Secret Service, the ISI,” BBC, 3 May 2011, http:// 
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72 Carlotta Gall and Delcan Walsh, “How the Pakistani Taliban Became a Deadly 
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73 Ibid. 
74 Jayshree Bajoria, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, 14 
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75CNNLibrary,“MumbaiTerrorAttacksFastFacts,”CNN, 4 November 2015, http:// 
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82 Ibid. 83 “President Trump’s Afghanistan Policy: Hopes and 
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84Ibid. 
85  “Security  Council  Report:  December  2017  Monthly  Forecast  on  Afghanistan,” 
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86 Louise Fréchette, “UN Peacekeeping: 20 Years of Reform,” Center for International 
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88 Ibid. 
89 Stephanie Hanson, “DDR in Africa and Beyond,” Council on Foreign Relations, 16 
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91 Ibid. 
92 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, “Resolutions of the 
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93 Ibid. 
94 Security Council Report, “UN Documents for Afghanistan,” http:// 
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95 NATO, “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan: 2001-2014,” 1 September 2015, http:// 
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•