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Nuisance
McCloskey v. Coast Co., 160 Fed. 794
Whitenack v. R. Co., 57 Fed. 901
The Brinton, 66 Fed. 71
The acts of those in charged of Brinton were not done with the purpose of abating a
nuisance.
Frost v. R. Co., 51 Atl. 806
Sloggy v. Dilworth, 36 N.W. 451
The defendants are not liable in this action by reason of any act of their testator.
There is no proof that the defendant’s personal representatives has taken
possession, or that they were cognizant of the condition of the premises, or the
danger likely to arise from the continuance of the ditches.
State v. Ehrlick, 64 S.E. 935
The complainant does not allege any detriment to the community other than the
immorality or unlawfulness of a gaming house such that mere immorality is not
enough to give a right to injunction. The preliminary injunction is therefore dissolved.
Debs case, 158 U.S. 564
Mountain Copper Co. v. U.S., 142 Fed. 625
Remedy is not injunction but for Mountain Copper to pay just compensation. The only
proper decree is to allow the complainants a reference for the ascertainment of
damages, and that the injunction must be denied to them.
Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 36 L. Ed. 537
Donation
Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, 375 SCRA 556
The prohibition to alienate or encumber the property extends even to the donor,
Comerciante, and no reservation to retain the right to alienate was ever made. That
the property remained in the possession and enjoyment of Comerciante is of no
consequence since the donation contemplated transfer of naked title but retained
beneficial ownership.
Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan, 383 SCRA 6
The donations were mortis causa, for the conclusively establishes the donor's
intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the
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donee only after the former's death. The deeds therein did not contain any clear
provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor's
death.
Ganuelas v. Cawed, 401 SCRA 447
The donation is a donation mortis causa. The provisions of the deed of donation are
obviously indicative of a donation. The donation being such, it is void since it did not
comply with the formalities of a will under Article 728.
Valencia v. Locquiao, 412 SCRA 600
Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 402 SCRA 501
The deed of donation, on its face, appears to bear all the essential requisites of a
valid donation inter vivos. With Teresa de Leon as the donor and Rosendo Florencio
as the donee, the deed of donation appears to have been notarized by Notary Public
Tirso Manguiat. On this premise, Florencio, and after his death, his heirs, acquired
ownership over the property although Certificate of Title No. T-44349 under the name
of Teresa de Leon had not yet been cancelled.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether the
petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the
respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased registered owner of the property,
Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.
Shopper’s Paradise Realty, et al. v. Roque, 419 SCRA 93
Calicdan v. Cendeňa, 422 SCRA 272
Heirs of Florencio v. Heirs of de Leon, 425 SCRA 447
Ocampo v. Ocampo, 427 SCRA 545
Joaquino v. Reyes, 434 SCRA 260
Sumipat v. Banga, 436 SCRA 521
Morento-Lentfer v. Wolff, 441 SCRA 584
A donation of money equivalent to P 3, 297, 800 as well as its acceptance should be
in writing. It was not. Hence, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the
formal requisites required by law.
DECS v. del Rosario, 449 SCRA 299
Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 452 SCRA 162

The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners, the late
Manuel G. Abello8 , Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz,
each gave P882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without
any material consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. The
patrimony of the four petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator
Edgardo Angara�s patrimony correspondingly increased by P3,530,645.249 . There
was intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi was present since each of the
petitioners gave their contributions without any consideration.
Petitioners� contribution of money without any material consideration evinces animus
donandi. The fact that their purpose for donating was to aid in the election of the
donee does not negate the presence of donative intent
C. J. Yulo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, et al., 454 SCRA 279
Santos v. Alana, 467 SCRA 176
Dolar v. Municipality of Dumangas, 475 SCRA 458
Republic v. Silim, 356 SCRA 1
The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the
donee be communicated to the donor. The condition for the donation was not in any
way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for
the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a scholl.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 598
The donation is not considered binding upon private respondents who did not
participate in said deed or had no actual knowledge thereof.
Vda. de Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 758
The petitioners should have instituted the action for reconveyance within 10 years
from the time the condition in the Deed of Donation was violated, which in this case
was in 1946. As found by the CA, the cause of action of the petitioners has already
prescribed, having instituted the action for reconveyance only in 1970, or 24 years
after the condition was violated.
Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is
void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
Quilala v. Alcantara, 371 SCRA 311
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The donation was valid. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary
public is of no moment. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly se forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
Republic v. de Guzman, 326 SCRA 90
The two deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen had no legal force and effect so that
the ownership of the subject property remained with her. The repudiation being of no
effect whatsoever the property should revert to their private owner, Helen, who is
qualified to own property through hereditary succession being an American citizen.
Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 552
The petitioners were held as the absolute owners of the properties which the
respondents seek to partition. The donation may not be revoked as the ground stated
by the herein respondents, i.e., that Leoncia did not intend such donation as Anatalia
was the one who had more dependents, is not one of the grounds to revoke a
donation.
Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 105
The Court ruled in favor of Mercedes. The granting clause shows that Diego donated
the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation
inter vivos. However, the records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any
action to revoke the donation in accordance with Art. 769 of the Civil Code;
consequently, the supposed revocation has no legal effect.
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637
The sale to Natividad by their parents was without consideration to avoid payment
inheritance taxes and is therefore void for being simulated. At most, there was only
an implied trust in favor of Natividad which is subject of collation.
Central Philippine University. v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the
land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this
condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to
comply with the condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be
fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its
absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed
of donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action
of private respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation.
Yam v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 1

Yam is liable for the payment of the penalties and service charges on their loan. It is
undisputed than the alleged agreement to condone P266,196.88 of the second IGLF
loan was not reduced in writing.
Noceda v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 504
It was established that Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by
Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo, thus
Noceda’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without the latter’s
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the
property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the
donor. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation. Noceda
failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it
was possible for Directo to institute an action for revocation of her donation.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 347
The donation in favor of Enrique is null and void for the purported object thereof did
not exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to Maxima
(Article 1409). Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique to Dominium is
also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest
and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique did not present
any CT upon which it relied.
Imperial v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 393
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case.
The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725
Since Lim’s indebtedness to petitioners was incurred a year after the execution of the
Deed of Donation, the first requirement for accion pauliana was not met.
Lagazo v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 18
It was a simple donation. The donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
Lazaro as a donee. The payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
The payments also appear to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney
given to Lagazo. However, the deed of donation does not show any indication that
Lagazo accepted. Even the grant of transfer to Lagazo’s name of the award of the
subject lot by the City of Manila was of no effect since it was based on a non-
accepted donation.
Sicad v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 183
It was a donation mortis causa. The ostensible donees did not get possession of the
property donated. They did not acquire any right to the fruits thereof, or any right of
dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire any right to
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dispose of the property, this would only accrue to them only after 10 years from
Montinola’s death.
Quijada v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 695
The sale was valid because Trinidad retained an inchoate interest on the lots by
virtue of the automatic reversion clause in the deed of donation.
Heirs of Salamat v. Tamayo, 298 SCRA 313
Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340
Palang and Agapay's marriage is void. The Supreme Court held that considering her
age, Agapay was unlikely able to contribute P3250 that she claims she earned from
her store, for the purchase of the San Felipe property. Further, the fact that Palang
and his first wife Vallesterol, compromised to separate their property upon donation to
Hermenia is without effect. A juridical separation of property can only be done in
court. Hence, the money paid for the property undoubtedly belongs to the 1 st
marriage, and due to this, so does the land.
As for the Binalonan property, the testimony of the notary who prepared the deed of
conveyance stated that Palang paid for the property, but instructed that it be
registered in Agapay's name, in effect a donation. As this was made in adultery or
concubinage, the donation is void. Moreover, as Agapay and Palang were living as
common law partners, Article 87 of the Family Code stipulates that donation cannot
be done between them.
Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601
The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in
1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties
and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even
granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his
father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case,
acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 647
Waiver is valid because what was waived was a known and existing interest, their
hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of their
father.
Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 391
Although Helen Doria’s title was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the
rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any knowledge or
participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the
certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its face sans any annotation or notice
of private respondent’s adverse claims.

City of Angeles v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 90
The contention of petitioners that the donation should be unconditional because it is
mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that the donation the open
space for parks and playgrounds should be unconditional. There is nothing in PD 957
or 1216 that prohibits placing conditions on the donation, with regard to the land to be
obligatorily donated.
Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 181
Petitioner cannot claim nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the
consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as basis for the assertion of a right
on which they had slept for so long.
Carlos v. Castillo, 23 Phil. 364
Manalo v. de Mesa, 29 Phil. 495
Di Siok Jian v. Sy Lioc Suy, 43 Phil. 562
Liguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-11240, 18 December 1957
The conveyance was clearly predicated upon an illicit causa. Salvador was not
moved exclusively by the desire to benefit Conchita, but also to secure her cohabiting
with him so that he could gratify his sexual impulses.
Salvador could not donate the entirely of the litigated property, to the prejudice of his
wife, Maria, because the property was conjugal in character and the right of the
husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law.
Conchita Liguez is entitled to so much of the donated property as may be found, upon
proper liquidation, not to prejudice the widow, Maria Lopez in the conjugal partnership
with Salvador or the legitimes of the forced heirs of the latter.
Cagaoan v. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554
The plaintiff Eugenio Cagaoan having first taken possession in good faith must
therefore be considered to have a better right to the land in question.
Gonzales v. Gonzales, 35 Phil. 150
Osorio, 41 Phil. 531
Nagrampa v. Nagrampa, G.R. No. L-15434, 31 October 1960
The deed of donation was undoubtedly inter vivos. It was captioned "onerous
donation inter vivos." It contemplated immediate transfer of ownership. There was no
mention of death, the donees "hereby received" the donation, and it provided for
registration of the instrument (which donated real property) in the land records. It was
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not in the form of a will, since there were no three witnesses and no attestation
clause.1
Baretto v. City of Manila, 7 Phil. 416
Acunin v. Asis, 46 O.G. 4980
Franco v. Tutaan, 50 O.G. 4317
Siain Enterprises, Inc. v. F.F. Cruz, 500 SCRA 406
For being part of the pubic domain, ownership of the area could not be acquired by
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada, 505 SCRA 828
The prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action has not yet commenced to run
when plaintiff was in actual or physical possession of the property when he filed his
complaint.
Feliciano v. Zaldivar, 503 SCRA 182
Herbon v. Palad, 495 SCRA 544
The specific shares of the parties cannot be resolved in this case since it is not clear
from the records whether all of Gonzalo's children from his first marriage were alive at
the time of his death. An action for partition is the proper forum to determine the
particular portions properly pertaining to petitioners and respondents, as well as the
accounting of the profits or income received by petitioners from the use of the land
Heirs of Cabal v. Cabal, 497 SCRA 301
Secretary, et al. v. Heirs of Dulay, 480 SCRA 452
Since such failure to comply with the condition of utilizing the property for school
purposes became manifest sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another
property for the construction of the school building, the four-year prescriptive period
did not commence on such date. Petitioner was given more than enough time to
comply with the condition, and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage.
It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was
burdened with the obligation to utilize the land donated for school purposes. The
subject donation fixed no period within which the donee can comply with the condition
of donation. As such, resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary.
Espino v. Vicente, 492 SCRA 330
The due execution of the Pagkakaloob suffered from infirmities which derogate from
the presumption of regularity that notarization attaches to it. Further, Marcelina
testified that she never appeared before Cresenciano C. Santiago who allegedly
notarized the Pagkakaloob.

Moreover, even at the time of the filing of the application by respondent Emma
Vicente for the issuance of a free patent over the subject property, the person
occupying the same was Emerenciana Espino. Ireneo Guballa, a Public Land
Inspector/Investigator of the CENRO, and a disinterested third party, testified that
Emerenciana and Marcelina were the occupants of the property prior to and at the
time that he conducted the ocular inspection on the premises
Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, 506 SCRA 56
In this factual setting, respondents could have filed an action for reconveyance to
recover their shares in Lot No. 3880. However, instead of instituting such a suit,
respondents were able to convince Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, to
execute a Deed of Quitclaim restoring to them their shares. Therefore, it is clear that
the quitclaim is not a donation for the three (3) Reyeses––Victorino, Luis, and
Jovito––who merely acknowledged the ownership of and the better right over the said
lot by the heirs of Victoriana and Telesfora Reyes. Having acquired title over the
property in 1954 to the exclusion of respondents Agalas and Manabans, through the
Deed of Quitclaim executed in 1972, the three (3) Reyeses merely acknowledged the
legal rights of respondents over their shares in the said lot. In fine, the Deed of
Quitclaim, not being a donation, no formal acceptance is needed from the Agalas and
Manabans.
Republic v. Carrasco, 510 SCRA 150
In his Deed of Waiver dated December 16, 1991, Mingao merely claimed ownership
of the land and that he is waiving his right and interest thereon in favor of the
respondent. The waiver cannot even be considered a donation because it does not
comply with the formalities required in order for a donation of an immovable to be
valid pursuant to Article 749 of the Civil Code 16 because respondent's acceptance
thereof is lacking
Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 494 SCRA 547
Irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property, he has to
pass private respondent's subdivision. Thus we agree that petitioner may be granted
a temporary easement. This temporary easement in the original writ differs from the
permanent easement of right of way now being tried in the main case.
Avila v. Barabat, 485 SCRA 8
By their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the property was
sold to respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by
partition. With that, petitioners� right to redeem any part of the property from any of
their former co-owners was already extinguished.
AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle, etc., 506 SCRA 625
An action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by
the blowers of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, is
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one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money.
Parayno v. Javellana, 495 SCRA 85
A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of
persons or property.
Republic v. Jacob, 495 SCRA 529
Heirs of Lasam v. Umengan, 510 SCRA 496
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the conveyances made by the
children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as
their pro indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA justifiably held that these
conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of sale presented by
respondent, coupled with the fact that she has been in possession of the subject lot
since 1955, establish that respondent has a better right to possess the same as
against petitioners whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapay�s last will and
testament which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect and
under which no right can be claimed by petitioners. Significantly, the probative value
of the other evidence relied upon by petitioners to support their claim, which was the
affidavit of Heliodoro Turingan, was not passed upon by the MTCC and the RTC.
Their respective decisions did not even mention the same.
Patricio v. Dario, 507 SCRA 438
Heirs of Diaz v. Virata, 498 SCRA 141
Albon v. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141
Tamayo v. Huang, 480 SCRA 156
The contract not having been cancelled in accordance with law, it has remained valid
and subsisting. It was, therefore, within petitioner’s right to maintain his option to
await the completion of the development of and introduction of improvements in the
subdivision and thereafter, upon full payment of the purchase price, without interest,
compel respondents to execute a deed of absolute sale.
Zamora Realty, et al. v. O.P., 506 SCRA 591
Sia v. People, 504 SCRA 507
Petitioners are required to register the Contracts to Sell in favor of respondent Lee,
and their failure to do so is a violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957.
Ugale v. Gorospe, 501 SCRA 376
Borbajo v. Hidden View, et al., 510 SCRA 243
 PROPERTY DOCTRINES COMPILATION

As long as the titles are not annulled, Borbajo remains registered a co-owner and
therefore her right to use the road lots subsists. Likewise, with Borbajo as a
registered co-owner of the road lots, it is utterly pointless to discuss whether she is
entitled to the easement of right of way. Borbajo, being a registered co-owner of the
three (3) road lots, is entitled to the injunctive relief

Guanga v. dela Cruz, 485 SCRA 80

Gayoso v. Twenty-Two Realty, et al., 495 SCRA 295

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 PROPERTY DOCTRINES COMPILATION

Quevada v. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 233

The prescriptive period to file an action for ejectment is suspended while the case is
pending before the barangay authorities.

dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 103

A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure which
allows immediate execution of the judgment unless the defendant perfects an appeal
in the RTC and complies with the requirements to stay execution, all of which are
nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of
possession.

Moralidad v. Pernes, 497 SCRA 532

The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases
for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in
usufruct.

By express provision of the law, the usufructuaries do not have the right to
reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property. If the
rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might
improve the owner out of his property.

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