Transcendentalism is based on intersubjectivity and the view that

individuals can discover their true self (the '1') by a process of transcendental reflection. When human
beings achieve this they can
then understand the other as 'another I' or an alter ego. The bestknown
proponent of this view is Husser! (1962). Other philosophers
such as Heidegger (1962) and Sartre (1958) are sometimes associated
with the views of Husser! (Theunissen, 1984), but they did
reject many of his ideas. For example, Heidegger did not believe
that individuals can use the process of totally 'bracketing' life
experiences to gain access to the intersubjective true self, as did
Husser!' The perspectives of Husser! and those of Heidegger are
basically analogous except for their differing views on bracketing.
Sartre, although influenced by Husser! and, most profoundly, by
Heidegger, was an existentialist. His existentialism is depicted in his
book Being and Nothingness (1958). The book's central theme
contests the conflict that exists between objective things and human
consciousness. Sartre's view was that humans are free in their
actions, they can determine their own destiny and that not to
acknowledge this is a dishonesty to self or, as he saw it, 'bad faith'.
Broadly speaking, transcendentalism views human beings and
identity by internal intersubjective processes. It should be pointed
out, however, that the distinction between transcendentalism and
dialogicalism is not clear-cut. For example, the views of Sartre
(1958) could be seen as spanning both perspectives. In his view,
'being' exists as an immediate presence - others help me find my
true self - but self-determination also has a place. Immediacy in
relationship interactions is also central to dialogicalism. Sartre
further asserted that we can be dehumanised or objectified through
materials. As will be explored below, this is quite similar to
dialogicalism.