Failure Mode Effects Analysis of a Pressure Tank

System

1. PRE-ANALYSIS
For this FMEA, a pressure tank system will be analysed. The schematic of the system is 1.1 Operation of System Level 3
shown in Figure 1.
Before system operation starts, it is in its dormant mode. The tank is empty, the Switch 1 Relay K1 Relay K2 Motor Pump
contacts of Switch S1, Relay K1 and Relay K2 are open, and the contacts of Pressure
switch PRS 1 and Pressure switch PRS 2 are closed. Pressure
Tank
Switch PRS 1
Switch S1 is depressed momentarily to start operation of the system, which energises
Relay K1 and in turn energises Relay K2. Relay K2 completes and energises the Pump Pressure
motor circuit and start the pressurisation of the tank. Switch PRS 2
1.4 Failure Modes
1.2 Hierarchical breakdown
System failure modes:
Level 1 Pressure tank
system 1. Tank is not pressurised
2. Tank is pressurised beyond desired pressure value
2 Safety Shut-
Level 2 1 Switch down 3 Pump control
Mechanism
Component failure modes:

The system contains: Relay K1: De-energised

2.1 Pressure 3.2 Pressure
Level 3 1.1 Switch 1 1.2 Relay K1 3.1 Relay K2
1. Switch S1 – used to start operation of the system
switch PRS2 switch PRS1 Relya K2: De-energised, Contacts fail open, contacts fail closed
2. Pressure switch PRS1 – used to detect when tank is empty 1.5 Assumptions
1.3 Functional Block Diagram
3. Pressure switch PRS2 – used to shut down system when pressure in tank exceeds a 1. Only one failure will occur at one time
critical value Level 2
2. Failures occur when system operation start
4. Relay K1 – Relay the signal to the pump motor and PRS 1 circuit Switch Pump control Safety Shut-down Mechanism
3. Failure rates are not considered in this analysis
5. Relay K2 – Relay the signal to the pump motor circuit

2. FMEA TABLE
Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Effect Failure Detection Method Compensating Provisions System Outcome
Local System
3 – Relay K1 To energise K2 De-energised The PRS 1 and pump System does not start An observer will notice that the None System does not start operation when S1 is depressed,
motor circuit is not operation pump motor does not start therefore tank remains empty
energised
6 – Relay K2 Energise pump motor De-energised The pump motor circuit is Pump motor does not An observer will notice that the None Pressure tank is not pressurised and remains empty
not energised start, no flow to the pump motor does not start
pressure tank
7 – Relay K2 Energise pump motor Contacts fail closed Pump motor is constantly Pressure tank is over An observer will notice flow to PRS2 contacts open when The pressure tank is pressurised to the critical pressure
energised pressurised the outlet valve and the opening pressure is above a critical value value of PRS 2, which may be the user desired value.
of the contacts of PRS 2 and removes power from K2 However, system requires a manual restart
8 – Relay K2 Energise pump motor Contacts fail open Pump motor stays de- Pump motor does not An observer will notice that the None Pressure tank is not pressurised and remains empty
energised start, no flow to the pump motor does not start
pressure tank

3. ANALYSIS
3.1 Reliability critical components 3.2 Recommendations
1. Relay K1 The analysis shows that failures analysed above would not be dangerous to the system itself or people/properties around
it. However, it reveals that it lacks failure detection methods and compensating provisions when failures occur.
Relay K1 is a reliability critical component as its failure results in the tank not being pressurised, which is a critical failure of the
3.2.1 Failure Detection Methods 3.2.2 Compensating Provisions
system
1. LED bulbs 1. Redundancy
2. Relay K2
Add to each components to indicate that it is at its working state Implement redundant components that replaces the function of
Relay K2 is a reliability critical component as one or more of its failure modes result in the system’s critical failure the original component when it fails
2. Pressure gauge and Pressure relief valve
added to the tank to alert the operator when pressure rises
References
above a critical value
American Society for Quality. 2018. Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA). http://asq.org/learn-about-quality/process-analysis-tools/overview/fmea.html.
Dunnett, Dr S J. 2018. TTA200 Coursework. Loughborough University.