PHIL JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PRADO ENBANC

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege of the Judiciary but not on other
offices of the government, such as: the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines;
the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers.

However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is based on the valid classification in
accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary department will be affected with it but
also other offices like Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office;
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; etc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.

1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment
of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the
title of the said law.

2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill
No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition,
violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The
journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming
courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall
"be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and
is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily
for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for
the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection clause.

In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.

The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege.

EDWIN B. JAVELLANA vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS,
SECRETARY

[G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992] GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Doctrine
 By serving as counsel for the complaining employees in an action against the City Government, Javellana
violated the prohibition of a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such
practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Facts
 This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his
profession while employed in the Government.
 Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental.
 City Engineer Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana for engaging private practice without
securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government.
o Javellana appeared in an illegal dismissal complaint filed against him as city engineer.
o Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases

 Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law.
 Secretary Santos allowed Javellana to continue his practice of law provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with his official functions.
 Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly that DLG
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the SC has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.
 Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents.
 Five months later, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Sec 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
 Javellana filed a petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Sec 90
of the Local Government Code be declared unconstitutional and null void because
o the SC has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
 o They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only
sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while
dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted.

won dilg committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
 Complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are
necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust.
 The complaint for illegal dismissal against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which Javellana is a councilman.
 Judgment against Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as
counsel for the complaining employees in an action against the City Government, Javellana violated the
prohibition of a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the government.

won sec 90 of the lgc and dlg Memo circ 90-81 violates art 8, sec 5 of the constitution.

 Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the SC's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice
of law.
 The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for
public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

won sec 90 of the lgc is discriminatory. no.

 Sec 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation.
 Sec 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools expect during session hours."
 If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the
practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

Petition is DENIED.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 78164)

Facts:

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center
for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the
Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a
uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into
medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987.
The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:

Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the
accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional.

Held:

No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its
basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to
medical schools.

The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated by the
continued implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52 series 1985. One
of the provision is Article 14, Section 1 which states “The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for
any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to
all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.”

Also, the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the mind of the Court, is a valid
exercise of the Police Power of the State. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of
the sovereign to secure and promote important interest and needs -- in other words, the public order -- of the general
community. An important component of that public order is health and physical safety and well being of the population,
the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.

The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long
ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of
the regulatory authority of the state.

Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical schools do not
constitute unconstitutional imposition.

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

Sison vs Ancheta
GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984

Facts: Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg 135 amended the Tax Code and petitioner Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer,
alleges that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising
from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual
taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in
character. It therefore violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well asof the
rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution
while also violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.
Held: The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds no support in
the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property from abuse of
power. Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not suffice and there must be a factual foundation
of such unconsitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable - this requirement is met when the tax operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found." Also, :the rule of uniformity does not
call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly unattainable." When the problem of classification
became of issue, the Court said: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation..." As provided by this Court, where "the differentation" complained of
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and
is therefore uniform."

DEPED V SAN DIEGO

CRUZ, J.:

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive
failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

But first the facts.

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology.
The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it
again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged
the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds
raised were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a
medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the
 one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the pratice of
medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also
well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That
upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other
things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining,
high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today
of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical
College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably, in other countries with far more developed
educational resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to
even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is
the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those
who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was that it
upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the
regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.5

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is
true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated
or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a lawyer may
prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber,
but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has demonstrated
promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate this career may be for
others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that
"every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.6

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those
who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all the more
reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are
not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the
people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that
of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.

There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution:
one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify
in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a
probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.

In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be
outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and
engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we
are a nation of misfits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.