A.M. No.

RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998

ATTY. ANTONIO T. GUERRERO, complainant,

vs.
HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998

GEORGE CARLOS, complainant,

vs.
HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint1 addressed to this Court through the Court Administrator, dated March 8, 1990, Atty.
Antonio Guerrero charges Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Sub-Province of Biliran,
Leyte, Branch 16, with serious misconduct, ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for issuing an Order2 dated December 11, 1987 declaring the
complainant and one George Carlos guilty of direct contempt.

In a separate verified complaint, involving exactly the same incident, George Carlos also charges Judge Adriano
Villamor with substantially the same offenses.3

By resolution dated February 5, 1991, this Court referred to Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia of the Court of
Appeals the complaint of Atty. Guerrero, docketed as Administrative Matter (A.M.) RTJ 90-483, for investigation,
report and recommendation. This was followed by another resolution,4 pursuant to which the records of the case
relating to Carlos' complaint, docketed, as A.M. RTJ-90-617, were forwarded to said investigator for consolidation
with A.M. RTJ 90-483.

The said administrative matters have now to be resolved in view of respondent's pending claims, for gratuity granted
by this Court per its Resolution dated April 12, 1994, which reads as follows:

A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. vs. Judge Adriano Villamor, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Leyte) and A.M. No. RTJ-90-606 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, JR. vs. Judge Adriano
Villamor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte). — Acting on the plea for mercy and
compassion, dated February 2, 1994, filed by counsel for respondent judge, and it appearing that the
Court in its per curiam resolution, dated February 7, 1992, amended the dispositive portion of its
decision, dated October 4, 1991, by allowing Judge Villamor to enjoy all vacation and sick leave
benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service and in the resolution of May
11, 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent for having been filed late,
and although the Court will not condone the wrongdoings of any member of the bench, neither will it
negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy Service in the government, more so, if
this will greatly benefit the last days of their remaining life, the Court Resolved to GRANT former
Judge Adriano Villamor a gratuity equivalent to 25% of his retirement benefits. The payment of this
benefit, however, shall be subject to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements.
This ruling is pro hac vice and is not a precedent for other cases.

As gleamed from the report by the Investigating Justice, the antecedent facts of the present consolidated cases are
as follows:

Sometime in November 1968, one Gloria Pascubillo filed a complaint against George Carlos for quieting of title.
Docketed as Civil Case No. B-0168 in the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, the case ended in a compromise
agreement approved by the court whereby Carlos agreed to deliver possession of the property in question to
Pascubillo who, in turn, undertook to pay the former the sum of P5,000.00 as purchase price. For some reason or
another, the judgment by compromise remained dormant for five (5) years.

On November 23, 1977, Gloria Naval, nee Pascubillo, filed before the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, Civil
Case No. B-0398 against Carlos for revival and enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. B-0168. In turn,
Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Naval and her
helpers. These criminal cases, like Civil Case No. B-0398, were raffled to the sala of Judge Villamor.

Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-0398, Judge Villamor had the criminal cases archived, noting in his
Orders 5 of January 4, 1984 that both sets of cases have for their subject the same parcel of land.

Eventually, Judge Villamor rendered judgment in Civil Case No. B-0398, declaring Naval to be the lawful
owner/possessor of the land being disputed, and ordering Carlos to vacate the same.

Forthwith, Carlos moved to reactivate the archived aforecited criminal cases. Acting on the motion of the accused,
Judge Villamor dismissed the cases. As he observed in his dismissal order dated December 5, 1986, Naval and her
helpers cannot be held liable for qualified theft for gathering coconuts on a piece of land of which Naval is the
owner. 6

Meanwhile, Carlos appealed the decision in Civil Case No. B-0398. During the pendency of the appeal, Judge
Villamor issued an order granting execution which Carlos, in due time, challenged through a petition
for certiorari before this Court. The case was certified to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
12011. In its Decision dated October 7, 1987, amending its earlier decision of July 24, 1987, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the order of immediate execution issued by Judge Villamor. Later, this Court, in G.R. No.
81826, resolved to deny the petition for review filed by Carlos for failure to show that the Appellate Court committed
reversible error in sustaining the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal. 7

On July 28, 1987, Carlos filed with this Court an administrative case against Judge Villamor, docketed as A.M. RTJ
87-105 charging the latter with having issued an illegal order and unjust decision principally in the aforementioned
criminal cases and in Civil Case No. B-0398. In its En Banc Resolution dated November 21, 1988, as reiterated in
another resolution of January 26, 1989, this Court dismissed the said administrative case for being premature but
"without prejudice to refiling should the Supreme Court decision later in G.R. 81826 warrants its refiling."8

Dissatisfied with the outcome of his administrative case, Carlos, through Atty. Antonio Guerrero, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor. In his complaint, docketed as CEB-
6478, and raffled to Branch 21 presided by then Judge Juanito Bernad, Carlos alleged that Judge Villamor
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five criminal cases against Naval and her co-
accused.

The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served on Judge Villamor on December 10, 1987. The following
day, instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order
declaring Carlos and his lawyer, Antonio Guerrero guilty of direct contempt for "degrading the respect and dignity of
the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court,"9 In full, the contempt order
reads:

ORDER OF CONTEMPT OF COURT

It is indeed unfortunate and regrettable that George Carlos and his counsel, Atty. Antonio T.
Guerrero have brushed aside the warning of this Court not to mistake its maximum tolerance as
weakness. Once again, they have defiled this Court with abusive, offensive and disrespectful
language in their complaint for Damages, Civil Case CEB 6478, RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City
against the herein presiding judge for dismissing the aforementioned cases on December 5, 1986.

Neither George Carlos, the private prosecutor or public prosecutor questioned the said dismissal in
the proper forum. It was only on December 3, 1987 that George Carlos and his counsel Atty. Antonio
T. Guerrero when they filed civil case CEB 6478 peremptorily labelled the dismissal as "unjust
decision."
 And in their complaint they alleged:

Par. 12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993
for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection — without any moral
or legal basis — a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal
was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the
reach of criminal and civil liability — all because the defendant Hon. Adriano R.
Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these
circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion from
bias, . . .

Par. 14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of
defendant Honorable Judge — not only shocking, but appalling — in giving the
plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and
mortifying and moral damages therefor would warrant on this kind of reprehensible
behavior . . . .

Par. 15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should
also visit upon him . . . for reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and
contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated
and spitefully scorned.

The foregoing specially chosen language by George Carlos and Atty. Guerrero is what Dean Pound
aptly termed as "Epithetical Jurisprudence". And to paraphrase then Chief Justice Bengzon
inLagumbay v. Comelec (16 SCRA 175) the employment of intemperate language serves no
purpose but to detract the force of the argument. That is to put as its mildest a well-deserved
reproach to such propensity. A member of the bar who has given vent to such expressions of ill will,
not to say malevolence, betrays gross disrespect not only to the adverse party, but also to this
Tribunal (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1).

These epithets undermines (sic) the dignity of the court. It (sic) affronts its majesty and puts (sic) it in
disrepute and disrespect. Not only are they unfounded and unsubstantiated. They constitute direct
contempt or contempt in facie curiae summarily punishable without hearing.

The Court finds George Carlos and Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Direct Contempt of Court and sentences both to an imprisonment of five (5) days and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos.

xxx xxx xxx

Carlos and Atty. Guerrero afterwards went to this Court on a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary
injunction against Judge Villamor. On November 13, 1989, this Court, in G.R. No. 82238-42, promulgated a decision
annulling the contempt order 10.

On March 8, 1990, Atty. Guerrero filed this instant case. Eight months later, Carlos followed with his complaint.

Complainant Atty. Guerrero, joined for the most part by complainant Carlos, alleged that the respondent judge
issued the contempt order (a) as an incident of Criminal Case Nos. N-989 to N-993 which have long been
terminated, (b) without informing them of the charge, (c) without a hearing, or at least a show cause order to
determine whether their alleged contemptuous utterances constitute direct or indirect contempt, and (d) without
following the prescription of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on contempt. Complainant Atty. Guerrero adds that the
supporting cases cited by the respondent in his order — referring to Lagumbay vs. COMELEC 11 and Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel 12 are contextually not at all in point. Thus, it is contended that respondent is
ignorant of the law and/or has knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. It is also contended that respondent stands
liable for serious misconduct for adjudging complainants guilty of direct contempt despite their non-presence in
court. 13
In his comment, respondent submits that the various reverses encountered by the complainants before his court and
the appellate courts impelled them to institute their complaint as a measure of harassment. 14 He, however, anchors
his defense on the following terse line: What happened was an error in judgment. 15 In connection with this main
posture, respondent submitted a Manifestation of Supervening Supreme Court Decision 16, attaching therewith a
copy of the decision promulgated on November 13, 1991 by this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge
Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo LI. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio
Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 17. In the decision, this Court said:

Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct contempt (G.R. Nos.
82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was
rendered maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a
previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was
sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abbarientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1,
1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered an error of judgment
for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.

A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in
rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).

Investigating Justice Garcia recommends the dismissal of the complaints against respondent judge. This Court
agrees with this recommendation.

With regard to the charge of malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, or misconduct, complainants have not
established a prima-facie case against respondent judge. After a careful examination of the records of this case, the
Court concurs with the findings of the investigating Justice that the acts or omission allegedly constituting any of
these offenses have either not been spelled out with definite specificity, or the causal connection between the given
act/omission and the resulting offense/s not logically demonstrated.

The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an unjust judgment, deserve consideration, since the
direct contempt order of the respondent judge, under the attending circumstances it was issued, appears to be
clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent, but
filed in another court presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles away from where respondent holds
court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18

Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in

another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior
in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not
immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be
erroneous. 19Otherwise, perhaps no judge, however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to
retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record. 20

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established
that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like
motive. 21 Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment — one which is
contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence — when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or
some other similar motive. In fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both offenses. 22

Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge
acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any
said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.
From the record before us we agree with the finding of the investigating Justice that respondent, in issuing his
erroneous contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse to do an injustice. To be sure, complainants
have not presented evidence or offered logical arguments tending to show that bad faith accompanied the issuance
of the contempt order. It ought to be remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has
the onus of proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged that burden of proof sufficiently.

Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of respondent's actuation, it could only refer to the strained
relationship existing between him and complainants brought about by the cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos
encountered in respondent's sala, on one hand, and the filing by complainant Carlos, through Atty. Guerrero, of the
damage suit against respondent, on the other. 23 The text of the contempt order, however, yields no indication that
respondent, in mistakenly citing complainants for direct contempt, was prevailed upon by personal animosity or by a
desire to exact revenge. On the contrary, respondent stressed in his order that he observed "maximum tolerance" in
dealing with complainants, previous legal skirmishes notwithstanding.

The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a hearing nor informed them beforehand of the charges
relative to the contempt incident cannot, without more, be indicative of bad faith or malice. For, respondent labored
under the impression, mistaken as it turned out to be, that complainants committed an act constituting direct
contempt summarily punishable. 24 Assuming, as respondent did assume, that complainants did indeed commit an
act punishable by direct contempt, then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.

Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the long-terminated criminal cases as the vehicle for his
contempt order formed a part of his error. Bad faith, however, cannot be inferred from this particular error, per se.

Incidentally, the invocation in the contempt order of the cases Lagumbay and Cloribel is not at all misplaced as
complainants now urge. To be sure, respondent cited these cases not so much to support the propriety of the
contempt order as to accentuate the pernicious effect of the use of intemperate language in pleadings on the orderly
administration of justice.

In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary
action. The decision of this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge
Bernardo Ll. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G.
Aleonar 25 concedes as much. In the decision, this Court held:

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered as error of judgment
for, which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents [herein
complainants].

While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only of exemption from criminal or civil liability, there is no
reason not to include from its reach administrative liability as well. After all, this Court had occasion to rule that:

[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing
of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26

Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith. 27

In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to support the proposition that the respondent judge, in
issuing his controversial contempt order, acted in bad faith or with ill-will or malice as to justify holding him liable for
an error in judgment.

WHEREFORE, herein administrative complaints against Judge Adriano Villamor are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and
LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:

In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the
petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility considering:

. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the petition as borne out
by the following statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and
the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has "failed to sufficiently show
that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
questioned judgment". . .

which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his use of intemperate
language in the petition, as exemplified by his characterization of the decision of the respondent
Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in
plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious
character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the
decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused
— with that confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up
amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent
Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until March 5, 1974
when his Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; — in one scale of the balance,
a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City
Hall of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire, and dignified
"mien"; and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a
scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for the duration
of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a
"liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."

In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:

If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is because he is
in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget,
that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber" (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten
manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p.
13 top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is
indeed cross-eyed — particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed,
it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of
amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this
Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the
undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt with administratively or
otherwise.

and prays:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable
Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning the undersigned into a martyr to his principles.

Yet, he added the following:

WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE (Constitution,

Preamble, 66 word).

It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively
for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious
insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to
sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to
justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not
offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling
obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he
volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber,"
"rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."

Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he impliedly
admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar,"
"thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases
enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their
intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he
miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and phrase to his petition.

We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all read the
petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and
exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or
ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating or
promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of "encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to
which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).

In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the respondent judge
which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily
demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of
possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show
that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to
and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the
judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads as follows:

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.

This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to
the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:
 By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any
valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t
is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to conduct
that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to
the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And,
he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed
by error, fettered by fallibility.

Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board
vs. Cloribel(31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice." [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the
dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration in the administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity
of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]).

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is
his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen (31
SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judge, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).

"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, or no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of
an able and upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216).

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
 a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA
316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration justice. There is no antimony between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the
people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In
re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive,
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando,
158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs.
Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation
against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the
respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given
what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he
considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary
to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When
such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words
in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething
sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends
up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th
word), "nothing more can extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional
Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more money.
APOLONIO CABANSAG, plaintiff,
vs.
GEMINIANA MARIA FERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants.
APOLONIO CABANSAG, ROBERTO V. MERRERA and RUFINO V. MERRERA, respondents-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T.
Quiazon, Jr., appellee.
Merrera and Merrera for appellants.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a contempt proceeding which arose in Civil Case No. 9564 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
wherein Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V. Merrera were found guilty and sentenced the first to pay a
fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with the warning that a repetition of the of offense will next time be heavily
dealt with.

Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the
ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. Defendants filed their answer on January 31, 1947
and a motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947 and a motion of plaintiff's counsel, set the case for hearing on July 30,
1947. The meeting was postponed to August 8, 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was
postponed to August 25, 1947. Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages
which was answered by defendants, another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was
set for on March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties
approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these incidents and the court set the case for hearing
on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to December 10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was
received and the next hearing was scheduled for January 24,1949 when again only a part of the evidence was
received and the case was continued to October 4, 1949.

On October 4, 1949, the court, presided over by Judge Villamor upon petition of both parties, ordered the
stenographers who took down the notes during the previous hearings to transcribe them within 15 days upon
payment of their fees, and the hearing was postponed until the transcript of said notes had been submitted.
Notwithstanding the failure of the stenographers to transcribe their notes, the hearing was set for March 17, 1950.
Two more postponements followed for March 23, 1950 and March 27, 1950. On August 9, 1950, August 23, 1950,
September 26, 1950 and November 29, 1950, hearings were had but the case was only partly tried to be postponed
again to January 30, 1951 and February 19, 1951. Partial hearings were held on February 20, 1951, March 12, 1951
and June 6,1951. These hearings were followed by three more postponements and on August 15, 1951, the case
was partially heard. After this partial hearing, the trial was continued on March 6, 1952 only to be postponed to May
27, 1952. No hearing took place on said date and the case was set for continuation on December 9, 1952 when the
court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued an order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who
took down the notes to transcribe their respective notes and that the case would be set for hearing after the
submission of the transcript. From December 9, 1952 to August 12, 1954, no further step was taken either by the
court or any of the contending parties in the case. .

On December 30, 1953, President Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order No. I creating the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which was later superseded by Executive Order 19
promulgated on March 17, 1954. And on August 12, 1954 Apolonio Cabansag, apparently irked and disappointed by
the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice
and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads:

We, poor people of the Philippines are very grateful for the creation of your Office. Unlike in the old days,
poor people are not heard, but now the PCAC is the sword of Damocles ready to smite bureaucratic
aristocracy. Poor people can now rely on PCAC to help them.

Undaunted, the undersigned begs to request the help of the PCAC in the interest of public service, as
President Magsaysay has in mind to create the said PACC, to have his old case stated above be terminated
once and for all. The undersigned has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a
tactical lawyer. The said case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the
transcript of the records has not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic
 notes. The new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The
stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in another courts. It seems that the undersigned will be
deprived indefinitely of his right of possession over the land he owns. He has no other recourse than to ask
the help of the ever willing PCAC to help him solve his predicament at an early date.

Now then, Mr. Chief, the undersigned relies on you to do your utmost best to bring justice to its final
destination. My confidence reposes in you. Thanks.

Most confidently yours,

(Sgd.) APOLONIO CABANSAG

Plaintiff

Upon the receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice indorsed it to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to transcribe their notes in Civil Case No. 9564.
The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on August 27, 1954, referred the matter to Judge Jesus P. Morfe
before whom the case was then informing him that the two stenographers concerned, Miss Iluminada Abello and
Juan Gaspar, have already been assigned elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of
Justice informing him that under provisions of Act No. 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said
stenographers are not obliged to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are not
poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription free of charge, aside from the fact that said stenographers were
no longer under his jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on September 1, 1954, Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion before Judge
Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in
his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the careful
maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty.
Fernandez be in turn declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading.
Acting on these charges and counter- charges, on September 14, 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but
ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending
the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the people.
Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle the respect due the
court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is no single
contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of
the court; and that if there was any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges
who previously intervened in the case.

In connection with this answer, the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera' also submitted
a written manifestation stating that the sending of the letter to their client to the PCAC was through their knowledge
and consent because they believed that there was nothing wrong in doing so. And it appearing that said attorneys
had a hand in the writing and remittance of the letter to the PCAC, Judge Morfe on, on September 29, 1954, issued
another order requiring also said attorneys to show cause why they should not likewise be held for contempt for
having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

Anent the charge for contempt preferred by Judge Morfe against Apolonio Cabansag, several incidents took place
touching on the right of the Special Counsel of the Department of Justice to appear as counsel for Cabansag, which
were however settled when the court allowed said Special Counsel to appear as amicus curiae in his official
capacity. In addition to this Special Counsel, other members of the local bar were likewise allowed to appear for
respondents in view of the importance of the issues involved. After due hearing, where the counsel of respondents
were allowed to argue and submit memoranda, the decision finding respondents guilty of contempt and sentencing
them to pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Respondents in due time appealed to this Court.

The issues involved in this appeal appear well stated in the decision of the trial Court. They are: (a) Did the writing in
the letter in question to the PCAC tend directly or indirectly to put the lower court into disrepute or belittle, degrade
or embarrass it in its administration of justice?; and (b) Did writing of said letter tend to draw the intervention of the
PCAC in the instant case which will have the effect of undermining the court's judicial independence?
We agree that the trial court that courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity without
which their administration of justice is bound to falter or fail (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil., 778; Borromeo vs.
Mariano, 41 Phil., 322). This is the preservative power to punish for contempt (Rule 64, Rules of Court; Villavicencio
vs. Lukban, supra). This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of self-preservation (Slade Perkins
vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271). In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications which
tends to impair the impartiality of its decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the court will not
hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected. For, "as important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary" (In re
Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil., 801).The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil., 724).

The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this power in the instant
case?

The lower court tells us that it has because in its opinion the act of respondents to put it belittle or degrade or
embarrass it in its administration of justice, and so it punished them for contempt to protect its judicial
independence. But appellants believe otherwise, for they contend that in sending the letter in question to the PCAC,
they did nothing but to exercise their right to petition the government for redress of their grievance as guaranteed by
our constitution (section 1, paragraph 8, Article III).

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." The First
Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgement by Congress. But mention
does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,-
principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.
(Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, p. 419.).

We are therefore confronted with a clash of two fundamental rights which lie at the bottom of our democratic
institutions-the independence of the judiciary the right to petition the government for redress of grievance. How to
balance and reconcile the exercise of these rights is the problem posed in the case before us.

. . . A free press is not to be judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over
the other; both are indispensable to a free society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free
press. (Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U.S. 354-356)

Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to
draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These
are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in a number of
cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and unfair administration of
justice." This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and
present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice.

This rule had its origin in Schenck vs. U. S. (249) U. S. 47), promulgated in 1919, and ever since it has afforded a
practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression was put in issue.1 In one of said cases, the United States Supreme Court has made the significant
suggestion that this rule "is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression
where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the
right of privacy" Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88).
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States said
"Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial
proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be
denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the
orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the
published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and press." (Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi)

No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for contempt in relation to the freedom of speech
and press. We quote; "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for
contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him
unpopular or to belittle him. . . . The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a
judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must
constitute an imminent not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S.
367, syllabi)

And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free
speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that
"freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases." (Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328 U. S. 331).

The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs. U.
S., supra).

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted
determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins.
There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech
and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are
not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
(Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.).

It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured
by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. . . . Reasonably limited, it was
said by story in the passage cited this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such
limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic.

xxx xxx xxx

And, for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances endangering the foundations of
organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as
a constitutional state. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 . . . And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a given utterance
cannot be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from every
such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark, may kindle a fire that,
smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said that the
state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures
necessary to protect the public peace and safety it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has
enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption
of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the
public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd, supra, p. 35 (136 N. E.
505), it was aptly said: Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine until there
is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the state were compelled to wait
until the apprehended danger became certain, than its right to protect itself would come into being
simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor
courts for the enforcement of the law." Gitlow va. New York, supra.)

The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a fair administration
of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules
mentioned above?

Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by appellant Cabansag to the PCAC which has given rise to the
present contempt proceedings, we would at once see that it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and
much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was
compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his case.
This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his
feeling when he said that he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical
lawyer"; that the case which had long been pending could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the
records has not as yet, been transcribed by the stenographer who took the stenographic notes", and that the new
Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances,
one would see that if they ever criticize, "the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical
maneuvers" has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to
the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes.

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt
charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of
the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it
would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act
alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration
of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the
administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress
of a legitimate grievance.

The fact is that even the trial court itself has at the beginning entertained such impression when it found that the
criticism was directed not against the court but against the counsel of the opposite party, and that only on second
thought did it change its mind when it developed that the act of Cabansag was prompted by the advice of his
lawyers. Nor can it be contended that the latter is groundless or one motivated by malice. The circumstances borne
by the record which preceded the sending of that letter show that there was an apparent cause for grievance.

Thus, the record shows that on January 13, 1947, or more than 8 years ago, appellant Cabansag filed with the lower
court a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them from a portion of land covered by a
torrens title. On October 4, 1949, or two years thereafter, the court, Judge Villamor presiding, issued an order
requiring the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe them within 15 days upon payment of their
corresponding fees. On December 9, 1952, or almost 3 years thereafter, the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding,
issued a similar order requiring the stenographers to transcribe their notes and decreeing that the case be set for
hearing after said notes had been transcribed. No further step was taken from his last date either by the by the court
or by the opposing parties. Meanwhile, the stenographers were given assignment elsewhere, and when this matter
brought to the attention of the court by its own clerk of court, said court in an indorsement sent to the Secretary of
Justice expressed its inability to take action in view of the fact that the stenographers were no longer under its
jurisdiction. And in said indorsement nothing was said about its readiness to continue the trial even in the absence
of the transcript of the notes.

Under such a state of affairs, appellant Cabansag cannot certainly be blamed for entertaining the belief that the only
way by which he could obtain redress of his grievance is to address his letter to the PCAC which after all is the
office created by the late President to receive and hear all complaints against officials and employees of the
government to facilitate which the assistance and cooperation of all the executive departments were enjoined
(Executive Order No. 1, as amended by Executive Order No. 19). And one of the departments that come under the
control of the President is the Department of Justice which under the law has administrative supervision over courts
of first instance.(Section 83, Revised Administrative Code) The PCAC is part of the Office of the President. It can,
therefore, be said that the letter of Cabansag though sent to the PCAC is intended for the Department of Justice
where it properly belongs. Consequently, the sending of that letter may be considered as one sent to the
Department of Justice and as such cannot constitute undue publication that would place him beyond the mantle of
protection of our constitution.

. . . under the presidential type of government which we adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by paragraph, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena vs. The Secretary
of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451, 463.)

We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the incident of Cabansag's co-appellants, Attys.
Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera. While the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering that, being
a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective
mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants. Being learned in the law and
officers of the court, they should have acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid
undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty
as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and clamor. Had
they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the unpleasant incident that had arisen.
However, the record is bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their
actuation. But they should be warned, as we now do, that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would
render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.