RUSSIA GAINS MILITARY POWER

RUSSIA DISADVANTAGE
Thesis: The thesis of this disadvantage is that decreasing arms sales from the US will cause Russia to fill the gap, allowing Russia to build up its military. In the
present system, Russia’s economy is weak because its arms sales market is limited. However, the plan, by decreasing arms sales from the United States, opens up an
opportunity for Russia to capture arms sales markets abroad. This will bring in more revenue to Russia, which will be diverted to its military. This increase in military
power risks war with the United States. Note that this disadvantage has an interesting argument about how it turns the affirmative case, as the decrease in arms sales by
the affirmative only results in more dangerous arms sales by Russia, making the harms of arms sales worse.
I. THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN WILL LEAD TO MORE RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.

A. ECONOMIC GROWTH IS SLOWING IN RUSSIA NOW
REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://in.reuters.com/article/russia-economy-
idINKCN1RU1SW
Economic growth in Russia slowed in the first quarter of 2019, data showed on Thursday, bringing into focus an
unexpected positive revision of real disposable incomes dynamics. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed “as
expected” to 0.8 percent in year-on-year terms in the first quarter from 2.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2018, the economy
ministry said, confirming market concerns. Questions about the durability of economic growth in Russia arose after data
showed that the pace of GDP expansion had unexpectedly climbed to a six-year high in 2018. That also brought concerns
about the reliability of Russia’s data. In March alone, GDP grew by 0.6 percent compared with a year ago after expanding by
1.4 percent in February, the data showed. “The big picture is that Russian GDP growth weakened markedly
over the first quarter as a whole,” Capital Economics research firm said in a note. “The pace of expansion
is likely to remain soft over the coming quarters, although the consensus view on growth this year is probably too
pessimistic.”
B. WHEN THE US WON’T SELL ARMS TO A COUNTRY, THAT COUNTRY TURNS

TO RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.
Anna Borshchevskaya, (Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute), Dec. 20, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/
Russia’s arms—generally speaking—are well made, sometimes on par with the US, and well suited for the region’s
needs. These platforms and armaments are also more affordable than Western weaponry. The US simply will not sell weapons
to certain countries, which, therefore, turn to Moscow. Politically, Russian arms come with few strings attached
and thus are a great choice when a country wants to diversify away from the West, or at least signal such an
intent. Moscow has made inroads with traditional clients such as Iran, Syria and Egypt, but also diversified toward countries
closer to the West, such as the Arab Gulf states, Morocco and Turkey. Russia’s overall influence in the region is
growing in the context of Western retreat. The Russian defense sector has problems, but also demonstrated
improvements, learning and flexibility. Undoubtedly, Russia’s arms sales to the MENA region will continue to present a
challenge for American interests in this region in the coming years.
C. ARMS EXPORTS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RUSSIA’S ECONOMY.

Richard Connolly & Cecilie Sendstad, (co-director of the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the
University of Birmingham & Norwegian Defence Research Establishment), Mar. 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications /research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-connolly-
sendstad.pdf
Russia is clearly a global leader in the production and export of weaponry, and arms exports play
an important role in the functioning and performance of its economy. This section examines the role of
armaments exports in the Russian economy – including their size and development relative to other export categories, trends
in domestic versus external arms demand, and the challenges to the industry’s future competitiveness.
D. RUSSIA IS MODERNIZING ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL—BUT FUNDING
SHORTAGES ARE HOLDING BACK THE EFFORT.
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Oct. 2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/
Russia is currently in the process of modernizing and recapitalizing its entire arsenal of strategic
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In February 2011, Vladimir Popovkin, Russia's First Deputy Minister of
Defense, announced that Moscow would spend about $70 billion on Russia's strategic nuclear forces between 2011 and 2020.
[31] Due to the recent downturn in Russia's economy, however, some analysts expect its modernization
plan to face shortfalls in funding. [32] This modernization involves the development of several new systems, all of
which Russia indicates it is designing to counter the deployment of a U.S./NATO missile defense architecture in Europe or
elsewhere.
E. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION RISKS A NUCLEAR WAR.

Steven Pifer, (senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institute), Feb. 5, 2016.
Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/pay-attention-america-russia-is-upgrading-its-military/
Of particular concern is Russia’s apparent focus on low-yield nuclear weapons—which one official
has referred to as a “nuclear scalpel”—coupled with its nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine. That doctrine envisages
escalating to de-escalate, that is, using low-yield nuclear weapons as a means to terminate a conventional
conflict on terms favorable to the Kremlin. Russia’s unclassified national security strategy says that nuclear weapons
would be used only in the event of an attack with weapons of mass destruction on Russia or one of its allies, or in the event
of an attack on Russia with conventional forces in which the fate of the state is at stake. The “de-escalation” doctrine, Putin’s
references to nuclear weapons in his public statements and the broad modernization of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear forces
suggest that the classified strategy could envisage use of those weapons in wider circumstances. That risks lowering the
nuclear threshold. And once a nuclear weapon—any nuclear weapon—is used, the possibility of
catastrophic escalation would increase dramatically.
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS TO THE DISADVANTAGE ARE INADEQUATE.
A. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH IS WEAK NOW.
1. Russian economic growth will slow now.
FITCH SOLUTIONS, Apr. 16, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.fitchsolutions.com/country-risk-
sovereigns/economics/russias-economy-slow-2019-followed-modest-2020-rebound-16-04-2019
At Fitch Solutions, we expect Russian economic growth will ease in 2019, in-line with moderating domestic and foreign
demand, with real GDP growth slowing to 1.5%, compared to 2.3% in 2018.
2. Russia’s economy is weak now.
INTELLINEWS, Apr. 10, 2019. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from https://www.intellinews.com/russia-s-strong-32bn-1q19-
current-account-surplus-is-actually-a-sign-of-economic-weakness-159406/
While a rise in overall current account numbers is usually seen as a sign of strength in an economy, in Russia’s case it
actually reflects quite the opposite – an existing economic weakness, especially on the domestic front, which is manifest in
the falling import numbers.
B. THE US SELLS THE MOST ARMS NOW.
1. The US dominates the global arms market and its lead is expanding.
Shimon Arad, (Institute for National Security Studies), Sept. 28, 2018. Retrieved May 2, 2019 from
https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/trumps-arms-exports-policy-debunking-key-assumptions/
The United States dominates the growing global arms market and according to data gathered by the authoritative
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), its lead is expanding. The United States accounted for 34 percent
of total arms exports between 2013 and 2017, ranking it significantly higher than its main competitors Russia (22 percent),
France (6.7 percent), Germany (5.8 percent), China (5.7 percent), and Britain (4.8 percent). In FY 2018, the value of signed
arms deals continued to increase, reaching over $46 billion, exceeding the $41 billion figure of FY 2017.
2. The US sells six times more arms than Russia.
Jason Lemon, (Writer for Newsweek), U.S. ARMS SALES NEARLY SIX TIMES HIGHER THAN CLOSEST
COMPETITOR RUSSIA, Dec 10, 2018. Retrieved Apr 13, 2019 from https://www.newsweek.com/us-arms-sales-nearly-
six-times-higher-closest-competitor-russia-1252079
The United States continues to dominate the international arms trade, dwarfing its nearest competitor, Russia, by $184.9
billion. In 2017, Russian weapons manufacturers sold about $37.7 billion worth of arms, compared to $222.6 billion in sales
by American producers, according to an annual report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
released Monday. The amount of weapons sales from U.S. companies is just shy of six times higher than those of Russia.
3. The US leads the worlds arms market.
William D. Hartung, (director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy), THE AMERICAN
CONSERVATIVE, July 26, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 24, 2019 from https://www.the
americanconservative.com/articles/theres-no-business-like-the-weapons-business/
The numbers should stagger anyone. According to the latest figures available from the Congressional Research Service,
the United States was credited with more than half the value of all global arms transfer agreements in 2014, the most recent
year for which full statistics are available. At 14 percent, the world’s second largest supplier, Russia, lagged far behind.
Washington’s “leadership” in this field has never truly been challenged. The U.S. share has fluctuated between one-third and
one-half of the global market for the past two decades, peaking at an almost monopolistic 70 percent of all weapons sold in
2011. And the gold rush continues. Vice Admiral Joe Rixey, who heads the Pentagon’s arms sales agency, euphemistically
known as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, estimates that arms deals facilitated by the Pentagon topped $46 billion
in 2015, and are on track to hit $40 billion in 2016.
4. The US is the world’s number one arms exporter.
Terrence Guay, (clinical professor of International Business at Pennsylvania State University), Mar. 27, 2015. Retrieved
Apr. 24, 2019 from https://www.fastcompany.com/3044351/us-russia-china-dominate-global-weapons-market
One of the features of the 21st century, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, has been the increasing number of
rankings in which the United States is no longer number one. Title of top arms exporter, however, is not one of them–at least
not yet–with the U.S. maintaining its number one spot almost every year since the Cold War ended.
5. The US exports substantially more arms than competitors.
Jonathan D. Caverley, (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research Scientist,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT
HOME, Apr. 6, 2018. Retrieved Apr. 13, 2019 from https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-policy-
security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/
By any estimate, the United States already dominates this industry. The State Department’s own estimates for 2015
credit the United States with a whopping 80 percent of the financial value of all global arms deliveries from 2013 to 2017.
The most authoritative source of data, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, gives the United States a more
conservative, but still commanding, lead of 34 percent of arms deliveries (measured according to an index of military, rather
than financial, value) for the same time period. Russia comes in at second place with 22 percent, with the next four leading
states scrapping for 5 to 7 percent each.
6. America is selling a massive amount of arms now.
B.Z. Khasru, (editor of The Capital Express in New York), INSIDE SOURCES, Nov. 15, 2017. Retrieved May 3, 2019
from https://www.insidesources.com/trump-pushed-arms-sales-asia/
America’s arms sales initiative, managed by the White House National Security Council, is part of Trump’s plan to
make the United States more competitive in international trade when its allies shop for fighter jets, warships, missile defenses
and other military outfit in an intensely competitive market. Trump said at a news conference in Tokyo last week that he
expected Japan to buy “massive amounts” of U.S. arms, while stressing his concern about America’s trade deficit with the
world’s third-largest economy. He made a similar statement in South Korea.
C. RUSSIAN ARMS SALES ARE DECREASING NOW
1. Russian arms sales are falling now.
John Grady, (former director of communications for the Association of the United States Army), Apr. 17, 2017. Retrieved
May 6, 2019 from https://news.usni.org/2017/04/17/russia-arms-slow-moscow-focus-now-domestic-modernization
For example, using Russia’s own figures, he said, “arms sales are flat” since about 2011, but using American and
Swedish figures, sales are falling. Other reasons for flat or falling sales besides China’s and India’s own defense industry
build-up and domestic demand are the collapse of the Libyan regime of Muammar Qaddafi and Venezuela’s economy. The
fall-off in energy prices affected the buying power of other countries such as Algeria, Iraq and Syria.
2. Russian arms exports are decreasing.
Pieter D. Wezeman et al. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS, 2018, Mar 2019. Retrieved Apr 13, 2019 from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-
03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf
Russian exports of major arms decreased by 17 per cent between 2009–13 and 2014–18. The fall was partly due to
general reductions in Indian and Venezuelan arms imports—two countries that have been among the main recipients of
Russian arms exports in previous years. Although India remained the chief recipient of Russian arms in 2014–18, Russian
arms exports to India fell by 42 per cent between 2014–18 and 2009–13. Arms exports to Venezuela, which was the fifth
largest recipient of Russian arms in 2009–13, decreased by 96 per cent between the two periods.
D. RUSSIA IS BEHIND THE US IN ARMS EXPORTS
sendstad.pdf
According to data from SIPRI, Russia accounted for nearly 21 per cent of global arms sales in 2016,16 ranking behind
only the US by material scale of exports. Russia’s prominence in global arms markets is not a new development. Between
2000 and 2016, the country was responsible for an annual average of 25 per cent of global exports (see Figure 1). In some
years, most recently in 2013, the value of Russia’s arms exports even surpassed that of the US’s. While countries like China,
Germany, France and the UK are also significant arms exporters, they remain well behind Russia and the US in terms of the
volume of arms exported. This makes armaments exports one of the few areas of manufacturing in which Russia can be
considered a world leader. Moreover, this strong performance looks set to continue, with export orders of $45–50 billion
reported to be on the books.17
E. A DECREASE IN US ARMS SALES CAUSES INCREASED RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
1. When the US won’t sell weapons to a nation, Russia will fill in the void.
When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not
sell weapons to many of Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally
speaking, often more robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the
US in terms of quality and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor. For instance, Moscow is quite good at
building anti-aircraft missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessons-learned from the Kosovo Air War. The
American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they
engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are
unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense
technology. Some Russian missiles have as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. [xiv] In addition,
the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to
deliver after a contract is signed.
2. Russian companies look to take over markets with their defense industry.
Russia’s economy remains over-reliant on raw materials and natural resources, but the defense industry is one
technology-intensive sector where Russia holds an international leadership position. Domestically, Russia’s defense industry
is a major source of employment. Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his emphasis on modernizing the armed forces,
especially the navy, on May 7, 2012, on the same day as he took office as president for a third time.[vi] Internationally, the
Russian defense industry is a source of important revenue. Thus, Putin lamented in February 2012 about Iraq and countries
undergoing the Arab Spring, “Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial markets and
are being deprived of large commercial contracts.”[vii] As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding
Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands
this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite
sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”[viii]
3. Russia will compete with the United States over arms sales markets.
Yet, arms sales entail far more to the Kremlin than mere financial gains. They are also Moscow’s tactical foreign policy
tool for wielding political influence and changing power balance dynamics. Indeed, in July 2012, Putin said that arms exports
are “an effective instrument for advancing [Moscow’s] national interests, both political and economic.”[ix] In December
2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia’s arms sales are the most important element of Moscow’s
relations with other countries.[x] And Moscow’s chief goal—regime survival, which it hopes to achieve through reduction
of Western influence—runs counter to Western interests and values. Thus, in the MENA region, Moscow courts virtually
everyone, and competes with the West whenever an opportunity arises. Arms exports are a major component of these efforts.
4. A reduction in US military equipment will cause Russia to fill in the gap with arms sales.
Alexandra Kuimova, (Research Assistant, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute) April, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.euromesco.net/publication/russias-arms-
exports-to-the-mena-region-trends-and-drivers/
After a military coup removed the country’s first democratically-elected leader in 2013, the US administration decided
to cut its substantial military aid to Egypt and to delay planned deliveries of military equipment including F-16 combat
aircraft. The souring of relations between Egypt and the US was a driving factor for strengthening the relationship between
Egypt and Russia. Russia was quick to confirm its willingness to sell Egypt weapons and consequently there have been
significant increases in Russian arms transfers to Egypt.
5. Russia is willing to sell arms that are the equivalent to Western analogues.
sendstad.pdf
Not only is Russia exporting a large volume of armaments across an increasingly wide range of product categories, it
is also willing to sell the most technologically advanced equipment that in some cases is equivalent in capabilities to Western
analogues, and that in other cases surpasses them. For instance, Russia has either agreed to sell, or is considering selling, the
Su-35, an advanced 4++ generation fighter, to China and Indonesia; the extremely capable S-400 air-defence missile system
to India; the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile system to Armenia; and Project 636M (Varshavyanka-class) diesel-
electric attack submarines to Indonesia. It has also agreed to lease nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) to India.
6. Russia will exploit tensions between the US and other countries to increase arms sales.
sendstad.pdf
Fourth, Russia is likely to continue to be seen as a reliable source of weapons for countries that do not enjoy warm
relations with the US. This means that a wider range of countries are potential markets for Russian exporters, in contrast with
the situation facing some of their Western competitors. Russian armaments producers have the opportunity to exploit the
tensions that exist between the US and countries such as Iran, China or Syria, and also those that may emerge in countries
that traditionally source their weapons from the US, such as Turkey, Egypt or the Philippines.
7. The US competes with other countries in military equipment sales.
John Grady, (former director of communications for the Association of the United States Army), Aug. 8, 2018. Retrieved
May 3, 2019 from https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence
“What has changed” most in the international marketplace “is the United States is not alone” in offering quality military
equipment, Keith Webster, president of the defense and aerospace export council at the United States Chamber of Commerce,
said. He said the United States is not only competing with the Russians and the Chinese, but also with its allies such as the
French, Koreans and Israelis. Thirty years ago, “we had a very strong corner on the market,” and only serious competition
from the Kremlin. Now the “consequence of denial” in a potential arms transfer over American concerns about how the
system will be used or a nation’s change in behavior, as was the case with Pakistan when it pursued its nuclear weapons
program, have much greater consequences domestically. Likewise, it becomes more complicated when a potential partner,
such as India, buys sophisticated aircraft from France, as New Delhi did, and may do with an air defense system from Russia.
8. US reluctance to sell arms opens the door for Russian arms sales.
Clayton Thomas, (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Oct. 11, 2017.
Retrieved May 3, 2019 from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf
U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs, or drones), has periodically opened opportunities for other suppliers like Russia. Top military officials from the two
nations had a meeting in Moscow in April 2017 at which Saudi Arabia, according to a Russian government account, provided
a list of possible arms procurement requests. That was followed by a state visit by King Salman to Moscow in October 2017,
the first ever by a Saudi monarch, during which Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to a number of arms procurements, including
S400 missile defenses. China has also contemplated greater arms sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert
ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, King Salman and President Xi
Jinping signed a series of agreements worth $60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in the kingdom that
will manufacture military UAVs for Saudi Arabia’s expanding drone fleet. Canada signed a $15 billion deal for armored
vehicles with Riyadh in 2014.52
9. Egypt proves—other nations will fill in the gap if the US decreases arms sales.
As part of this support, Egypt has consistently been one of the world’s highest recipients of FMF, which it uses
exclusively to purchase U.S. weapons. But political turmoil in Egypt since 2011 and repressive measures that the government
of President Abdel Fattah al Sisi has taken against domestic opponents after Sisi overthrew the elected government in 2013
have contributed to tension between the United States and Egypt, complicating bilateral relations. Within this context, Egypt’s
government has sought sources of major defense systems beyond the United States. From 2008 to 2011, fully 76% of Egyptian
arms acquisitions came from the United States; that figure dropped to 49% from 2012 to 2015, as Western European (30%)
and Russian (13%) suppliers stepped in to fill the gap. Most of Egypt’s military assets (including both its air fleet and many
of its tanks) are divided between higher-end American equipment and older Eastern European systems. Although
diversification may lessen Egypt’s dependence on any one supplier to some extent, it also raises the level of complexity Egypt
faces in maintaining diverse weapons systems and juggling multiple supplier relationships. Some specific recent transactions
illustrate apparent Egyptian attempts to diversify in the aftermath of the Obama Administration’s reaction to the 2013 military
intervention. In February 2014, Egypt signed a $3 billion weapons deal with Russia. Two months later, the United States
went through with a sale of Apache helicopters that had been frozen because of the 2013 military intervention and its
aftermath, although the Obama Administration continued to withhold delivery of more than a dozen F-16s. That delay ended
in March 2015, and the F-16s arrived in Egypt in November of that year. Meanwhile, Egypt has strengthened its relationship
with European suppliers, especially France, despite European uneasiness regarding Sisi’s post-2013 crackdown against
dissent. Egypt and France concluded a $5.2 billion deal for 24 Rafale fighter jets in February 2015, and seven months later,
Egypt agreed to buy two Mistral helicopter carriers for more than $1 billion.42 The two countries signed another agreement,
worth more than $1 billion, in April 2016 for additional ships, fighter jets, and a military satellite communication system.43
10. Arms buyers will seek out alternative suppliers.
This report focuses on recent arms sales, primarily from the United States, to seven Middle Eastern states: Israel, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Turkey, and Qatar. These states, some of the region’s largest arms
purchasers, have taken a range of approaches as they assess various means of pursuing influence and security in an unstable
region. Some appear to be increasing their commitment to the United States as their primary security guarantor, while others
may be interested both in building up their own domestic arms production capabilities and in seeking out alternative suppliers.
When considering domestic or non-U.S. procurement, these states may focus on indications of U.S. military or political
commitment to the region or U.S. willingness to share technology relative to other potential suppliers. Still others may
incorporate aspects of various approaches as they consider how arms purchases from the United States or others fit into their
broader foreign and defense policies.
11. Nations are looking to diversify their arms purchases—they won’t just rely on the US.
Moreover, as noted above, some of Washington’s major clients, such as the Gulf states and India have a deliberate
policy of diversifying their arms imports. A streamlined U.S. approach to arms exports makes little difference to deliberate
arms diversification strategies adopted by client countries. At its core, a policy of diversification is designed to increase
leverage on the United States, to retain freedom of action, and to hedge against possible negative U.S. regional policies and
to push up the quality of the capabilities being offered. Therefore, easing U.S. defense export regulations or reducing
surcharge rates will not necessarily make much difference to the choices that these countries will make regarding the purchase
of American versus non-American-made weapon systems.
12. Other nations will fill in for US arms.
A second trend is the deliberate policy of client states to diversify their arms purchases. The Arab Sunni states, for
example, have in the last couple of years spent tens of billions of dollars on European or Russian arms rather than on U.S.-
made weapon systems. Even a country like Egypt, which has received nearly $80 billion in military and economic aid over
the past 30 years, has tapped from its reserves and loans from Gulf states and from suppliers in order to purchase at least $13
billion worth of arms since 2013 from France, Russia, and Germany rather than from the United States. The new CAT policy
aims to encourage allies and partners to buy U.S.-made arms, including by increasing competitiveness by dropping surcharges
on products and lowering the costs of transportation.
13. States view Russia as an alternative supplier of arms.
A small number of actors provide most of the external supply of weapons to the Middle East. By every measure, the
United States has been the single largest seller of arms to the region for over two decades (before which it contended with
the Soviet Union for supremacy in this regard; see Figure 1), a reflection of both the technological superiority of its arms as
well as its active role in the region. The United States appears to be trying to maintain that influence amid conflicting domestic
and foreign policy imperatives.30 Many Middle Eastern states view Russia either as a genuine alternative supplier or as a
second option whose presence might increase regional buyers’ leverage with U.S. officials and exporters. Indeed, several
examples below demonstrate this dynamic.
14. Russian and Chinese defense companies are competing with the US for the military sales market.
John Grady, (former director of communications for the Association of the United States Army), Aug. 8, 2018. Retrieved
May 3, 2019 from https://news.usni.org/2018/08/08/panel-expansion-u-s-arms-sales-tool-expand-american-influence
The administration’s goal in streamlining the process for American defense contractors to grow their sales
internationally and bringing in unmanned aerial systems is a race for global influence that goes well beyond the marketplace,
government and industry association panelists agreed on Wednesday. “Who’s going to make the rules for the next 50 years”
for international behavior, Dak Hardwick, assistant vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries
Association, said. Hardwick and others specially cited the growing Chinese interest in overseas military sales and Russia’s
success of selling air missile defense systems to Turkey and possibly India. Neither has the strict rules governing the sales or
how these systems would be used after purchase the U.S. does.
F. DECREASED ARMS SALES TO AFRICA WILL CAUSE A TRADE OFF WITH RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.
1. Moscow is looking at the African continent for sales of military hardware.
Speaking at Russia’s annual Valdai conference in October 2016, President Putin said Africa “cannot be on the periphery
of international relations.”[xlviii] Indeed, Moscow is looking at the entire African continent, whose demand for military
hardware is growing as GDP rises. In the context of Western sanctions and the Kremlin’s desire to boost Russia’s global
power status, reduce Western influence, and make money to keep the Russian government afloat, Putin has already made
strides in much of Africa that are impossible to ignore.[xlix] North Africa is a major part of his calculus. According to Russian
sources, in 2016 Moscow delivered over $1.5 billion in arms to Algeria and $37 million to Egypt.[l]
2. Africa is a potential growth market for Russian arms sales.
sendstad.pdf
Nevertheless, Russian exporters appear keen to strengthen their position, with officials from Rosoboroneksport
describing Africa as a ‘growth market’. Russian suppliers appear to be prepared to tailor their approach to the African market
by focusing on the provision of either older equipment or of service and repair facilities. Regardless of whether the region
grows in commercial importance, Russia’s importance as a supplier of armaments there means that it could exploit any
political capital that might be gained from this position by seeking to acquire basing rights for its armed forces, or by
supporting its energy and mining firms in gaining rights to exploit African natural resources. However, Russia is not the only
country to be making such efforts on the continent. It faces stiff competition from China, which has been a growing source
of arms and has provided increasing support to African countries in the development of their natural resources.
G. CONDITIONING ARMS SALES WILL CAUSE A TRADE-OFF WITH RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.
1. Egypt proves—conditioning arms sales leads to Russian fill-in
Western suppliers sometimes limit or cease to sell weapons to countries for political or humanitarian reasons.
Alternatively, Russian arms sales come either without or with far fewer conditions about the domestic affairs of the (potential)
weapon recipients. For example, the US, Egypt’s long-standing ally, froze arms deliveries and military assistance to Egypt
after the 2013 military coup removed the first democratically-elected civilian-led government. In contrast, the military coup
did not negatively impact Russian-Egyptian relations and, as their relations improved, Russian arms sales to Egypt increased.
Russia’s willingness to provide weapons without attached political conditions makes them an attractive option for some
MENA countries.
2. Conditioning arms sales will cause nations to turn to Russia for arms.
Moscow also does not burden arms sales with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In
addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical
Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus, countries turn to Moscow when they wish
to signal to Washington that they have other options if they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions. At the same time,
some Arab states are genuinely interested in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several
GCC states bought Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the
America, invests effort across the MENA region to sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could
never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option: Moscow does not have to replace the US.
Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages
including quicker delivery and better negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made
major inroads during the Putin era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and
elsewhere in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.
H. EGYPTIAN ARMS SALES WILL TRADE-OFF WITH RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.
Regardless of whether or not Egypt is indeed the buyer in question, Russian-Egyptian military cooperation is visibly
growing. The two countries held their first joint naval drills in June 2015, and other military exercises in October 2016. In
September 2017, Cairo finalized negotiations with Moscow to build Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, approximately two
years after inking a preliminary agreement in February 2015. According to later reports in spring 2016, Moscow will lend
Egypt $25 billion for construction. In this context, it is worth recalling that Cairo used to be Washington’s partner on energy
cooperation as part of the George W. Bush administration’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). President Barack
Obama, however, effectively scrapped parts of GNEP in June 2009 and showed little interest in expanding an energy
partnership with Egypt. This episode provided a gap for Putin to move in.
I. IRAQ IS LOOKING TO BUY RUSSIAN ARMS.
Russia’s presence in Iraq is relatively small but important. In 2012, the Kremlin signed a $4 billion arms deal with the
Iraqi government—one of the larger arms deals of Putin’s tenure. This agreement places Russia as the second largest arms
supplier to Iraq after the United States. Reportedly, Moscow began deliveries in October 2013, after a delay due to internal
corruption claims in the Iraqi parliament. The same month Putin identified Iraq as an important Middle East partner and
announced Russia’s readiness, in this context, to help Iraq, including through “military-technical” cooperation.
J. DECREASED SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST WILL CAUSE RUSSIA FILL-IN.
1. Declining US arms sales to the Middle East will cause Russia to fill in the vacuum.
Nonetheless, there is no denying that Putin is making great strides overall in the MENA region since May 2000, and
more recently in the defense sector as part of Russia’s tactic to use weapons sales to garner closer relations with Arab states
at the expense of the US and Europe. Moscow’s military reform efforts since 2008 have clearly paid off, and arms sales have
been an effective tactical tool in Moscow’s foreign policy arsenal. In dollar terms at least, Russian arms sales to the Middle
East continue to increase every year. In addition, the advantages Russian arms offer to this region continue to outweigh the
disadvantages, both practically and politically. Russia’s overall economic trajectory is on a slow and long-term path of
deterioration, but still nowhere near a collapse. As a July 2016 NATO Defense College report points out, the West should
not confuse Russia’s weakness with fragility. Even if Moscow boasts more than it achieves in reality, the Kremlin has been
playing a diminishing hand very well. While most US defense experts believe Russia will be unable to produce much next-
generation weaponry, Moscow is making significant strides with its existing technology. Russian arms are sufficient for most
of Moscow’s clients—particularly those who cannot afford top-of-the-line American technology. In the context of US retreat
from the region, Moscow has stepped into a vacuum where the Kremlin’s efforts generate a multiplier effect of real power.
As long as US leadership is absent from the region, Russia’s arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa will remain a
serious problem for American interests.
2. Middle Eastern nations will turn to Russia to diversify their sources of arms supply.
Russia is the second largest exporter of major arms in the world. In 2009-2018, Russia was the second largest arms
supplier to the MENA region. The country accounted for 18% of the total volume of arms imports by MENA states, following
the US (44%), the world’s leading exporter of arms. In recent years, Russia has further expanded its arms transfers to MENA
seeking to reestablish its influence in the region. To MENA countries, acquiring arms from Russia is advantageous. It allows
them to diversify their sources of arms supply and thereby become less dependent on Western suppliers. Consequently, this
has enabled Russia to compete with other established arms suppliers such as the US and France.
3. Arms exports are a key part of Russia’s cooperation strategy with the Middle East.
Arms exports have traditionally been a core element of Russia’s cooperation strategy with MENA countries. The
MENA region is the second most important and growing foreign market for Russian arms sales after Asia and Oceania.
Russian deliveries to the MENA region increased by 125% between 1999-2008 and 2009-2018. Since 1999, the most recent
5-year period (2014-18) accounted for 37% of all Russia’s exports to the MENA region. In 2014-18 Russia’s arms exports
to the MENA region increased by 16% compared to 2009-2013. In the past 10 years (2009-2018) Russia delivered arms to
14 countries in the region, which accounted for 26% of the total volume of Russia’s arms exports, while in 1999-2008 it was
14%.
4. New opportunities for Russian arms sales may emerge in the Middle East.
sendstad.pdf
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the second-most important region for Russia’s arms exports, and
accounted for 17.8 per cent of the total between 2000 and 2016. This market comprises traditional customers such as Iraq
(1.4 per cent of exports), Syria (1.4 per cent), Egypt (1.4 per cent) and Yemen (1.2 per cent), as well as newer markets such
as Algeria (9.1 per cent), Iran (2 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (0.7 per cent). However, competition in the
region is much more intense than in Asia, with Russia responsible for a relatively modest 18.3 per cent of all arms sales in
2000–16. As illustrated in Figure 8, Russia is dominant in Algeria, Iran, Syria and Yemen, and the rapidly shifting geopolitical
environment in the region means that new opportunities may emerge.
5. Many Middle Eastern states view Russia as an alternate supplier.
Clayton Thomas, (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), Oct. 11, 2017. Retrieved May 13, 2019 from
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf
A small number of actors provide most of the external supply of weapons to the Middle East. By every measure, the
United States has been the single largest seller of arms to the region for over two decades (before which it contended with
the Soviet Union for supremacy in this regard, a reflection of both the technological superiority of its arms as well as its active
role in the region. The United States appears to be trying to maintain that influence amid conflicting domestic and foreign
policy imperatives. Many Middle Eastern states view Russia either as a genuine alternative supplier or as a second option
whose presence might increase regional buyers’ leverage with U.S. officials and exporters. Indeed, several examples below
demonstrate this dynamic.
K. THE PERSIAN GULF WILL FILL IN WITH RUSSIAN WEAPONS.
The West traditionally dominates the Gulf arms market, but the Kremlin has always courted this region. For Moscow, it
is important to compete with the West. And as an added benefit, Gulf customers are wealthy and can pay full price for Russian
weaponry, unlike clients such as Egypt. Indeed, the UAE has been among major buyers of Russian arms in the 1990s and
early 2000s.
L. QATAR WILL FILL IN WITH RUSSIAN WEAPONS.
Reportedly, Qatar is also talking to Russia about purchasing S-400s, and here the discussion appears more realistic. In
October 2017, Moscow and Doha signed a military and technical cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, according to
TASS, and the Qatari government apparently expressed interest in purchasing the S-400s.
M. SAUDI ARABIA WILL FILL IN WITH RUSSIAN ARMS.
1. Saudi Arabia is interested in buying Russian arms.
In October 2017, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud became the first ever Saudi monarch to visit Russia. The
fact that the visit occurred shows how much influence Putin has achieved in the Middle East. Upon the meeting’s conclusion,
Salman and Putin signed a packet of documents on energy, trade and defense, and they agreed to several billion dollars’ worth
of joint investment. Reportedly, Saudi Arabia also decided to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system, making it, after
Turkey, the second American ally to do so.
2. Decreased dependence on Western arms sales causes Saudi Arabia to turn to Russian arms.
During a meeting in Moscow in October 2017, Russia and Saudi Arabia reached a preliminary agreement for the
potential acquisition of Russian weapons. The agreement included S-400 air defence systems and possible transfer of
technologies for the local production of Russian weapons including Cornet-EM anti-tank missile systems and TOS1A
multiple rocket launcher systems. Some Russian experts believe that Saudi Arabia may also be interested in Russian aviation
and aircraft production, in particular in the Su30SM, Su-35S and Su-34 combat aircraft that were tested during operations in
Syria. However, to date, no orders have been placed. In theory, if Saudi Arabia aspires to reduce its dependence on Western
suppliers, Russian weapons would represent a viable and important alternative. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has made significant
efforts to expand its domestic defence industry. Therefore, it is interested in building indigenous capacities with regards to
the production of military systems and technologies, which Russia is ready and willing to share.
3. US reluctance to sell arms to Saudi Arabia allows Russia to fill the void.
Clayton Thomas, (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs), Oct. 11, 2017. Retrieved May 13, 2019 from
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf
U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs, or drones), has periodically opened opportunities for other suppliers like Russia. Top military officials from the two
nations had a meeting in Moscow in April 2017 at which Saudi Arabia, according to a Russian government account, provided
a list of possible arms procurement requests. That was followed by a state visit by King Salman to Moscow in October 2017,
the first ever by a Saudi monarch, during which Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to a number of arms procurements, including
S400 missile defenses. China has also contemplated greater arms sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert
ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, King Salman and President Xi
Jinping signed a series of agreements worth $60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in the kingdom that
will manufacture military UAVs for Saudi Arabia’s expanding drone fleet. Canada signed a $15 billion deal for armored
vehicles with Riyadh in 2014.
4. Saudi Arabia would shift to Russia if arms were cut off—this causes the entire Gulf region to follow suit.
Oleg Svet, (former consultant for the Defense Department), NATIONAL INTEREST, Sept. 26, 2016. Retrieved May 13,
2019 from https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-congress-supports-saudi-arms-sales-17840
If Senators Paul and Murphy would have succeeded in their measure, Riyadh would almost certainly have gone to
another large military supplier, possibly Russia. Saudi and other GCC officials fear that Iran, which is not only ideologically
and theologically diametrically opposed to the Kingdom, but also has a population and territory several times the size of
Saudi Arabia, poses an existential threat. The uncomfortable truth is that Yemen is a proxy war in the Saudi-Iranian
competition. Riyadh feels that it must win in Yemen against the Houthi rebels (who the Saudis are convinced are sponsored
by Iran), and the only way to win is through military power. Saudi Arabia does not have an indigenous military industry to
support the war; it has to find military suppliers to sustain its war effort. Had the sale been blocked and Saudi Arabia shifted
to Russia, China, or other suppliers for military purchases, other Gulf States would have followed suit, putting in jeopardy an
additional tens of billions of dollars in sales by American multinational companies and thousands of highly-skilled
manufacturing jobs. Going forward, when considering whether to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia, therefore, Congress
should not only worry about the particular sale in question. It should also consider the wider negative implications that a
suspension would have on tens of thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs all across America, tens of billions of dollars
in revenues for U.S. companies, and the wider defense industry.
N. TURKEY WILL FILL IN WITH RUSSIAN ARMS.
In the early 2000s the Kremlin began expanding areas of cooperation with Turkey, a NATO member, and these
included modest arms contracts. But in September 2017, in the context of deteriorating relations with the West, Turkey signed
what many called a landmark $2.5 billion deal, Ankara’s first major arms agreement with Russia, to purchase the S-400
missile system. The deal raises several questions. First, the Russian system is not compatible with NATO systems. Second,
it is unclear how Turkey intends to use the S-400. Some question whether the deal will go through at all, but the fact of the
matter is, the signing alone is significant. It shows how much influence Putin has gained with the NATO ally, who for years
now has increasingly turned away from Western democratic values. Nor should analysts dismiss the possibility that the deal
will go through either, as Turkey is falling deeper into Moscow’s sphere of influence.
O. THE UAE WILL FILL IN WITH RUSSIAN WEAPONS.
Russia’s relations with this region deteriorated significantly during the Syrian conflict, with Russians and Arabs
generally lining up on opposite sides. Despite this, interest in Russian arms among Arab states remains. In February 2017,
the UAE signed a letter of intent to purchase the Sukhoi Su-35, as mentioned above. Only China currently buys these jets
from Russia. The Emirates has also purchased ground weapons from Russia, such as BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles and
Pantsir S1 air-defense systems. In February 2017, the UAE also signed $1.9 billion worth of military contracts, which
reportedly includes 5,000 anti-armor missiles, in addition to training and logistic support. The country also started talks with
Rostec about the development of a fifth-generation MiG-29 aircraft variant; though experts are skeptical, the UAE can co-
produce. Very few countries can produce a fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Theoretically, Russia can, but it only recently
began production of fourth-generation Su-34s developed in the 1980s.
P. THE UAE PROVES—OTHER NATIONS WILL GO TO RUSSIA IF US ARMS SALES DECREASE.
UAE U.S. arms are central to the UAE’s growing military capabilities; major sales from the United States include the
purchase of 80 F-16s in 2000 and an additional 30 in 2014.68 Moreover, the UAE’s purchase of the THAAD missile defense
system, initially proposed in 2008 and approved in late 2011, represented the first sale of the system abroad. However, like
its close ally Saudi Arabia, the UAE appears to be attempting to both diversify its sources of arms imports and build up
domestic production capacity, partly in response to concerns about U.S. policy. The UAE has long had a reported interest in
purchasing F-35s. However, concerns about Israeli security, codified in laws mandating the preservation of Israel’s military
advantage (see “Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”), have been cited in some reports as a reason for the United States’
not selling F-35s to the Emiratis, at least for several years after Israel receives its own F-35s. As a result, the Emiratis have
evidently been looking elsewhere, specifically Russia, for advanced combat aircraft. Media reporting indicates that the two
nations signed an agreement in the spring of 2017 to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet, along with a separate purchase by
the UAE of Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. It is unclear whether the UAE actually intends to implement the agreement or is
more interested in gaining U.S. concessions on F-35s or other possible transactions due to U.S. concerns regarding Russia-
UAE arms dealings. In addition, after being rebuffed in its attempts to purchase armed drones from the United States; the
UAE reportedly purchased Chinese surveillance drones and outfitted them with targeting systems. Arms sales observers say
such actions are not uncommon.
Q. OTHER NATIONS ARE WILLING TO BUY RUSSIAN WEAPONS.
Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian civil war in 2015 led the country to reaffirm its status as an important
player in the MENA region. Foremost, it presented an opportunity for Russia to test its military hardware in an armed conflict
environment, as well as to develop its tactics and procedures for using its weapons. In terms of arms trade, the demonstration
of Russian military technologies and capabilities during the Syrian civil war may have attracted interest from potential foreign
buyers and provided possibilities for Russia to enter new markets.
R. ARMS SALES ARE KEY TO RUSSIA’S ECONOMY
1. Arms sales are key to the Russian economy.
Arms sales play an important role in Russia’s economy. Although the Russian arms industry is dwarfed by Russia’s
energy resources sector, in terms of manufactured goods, arms production is significant in Russia’s economy. Growing
international and domestic demand for weapons makes Russia’s arms industry a strategically important sector through which
Russia can further integrate into the global economy.
2. Arms exports play an important role in Russia’s economy.
sendstad.pdf
Arms exports play an important role in Russia’s economy, accounting for a large proportion of manufactured and
technology-intensive exports. This makes the armaments industry one of the leading sectors through which Russia is
integrated with the global economy. Exports are not as important to the armaments industry as they were in the 1990s, but
they help keep production lines in service and preserve a full spectrum of capabilities.
3. Arms sales are a major source of financial gain for Russia.
Russia is the world’s top arms exporter, second only to the United States. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region has emerged in recent years as Moscow’s second most important arms market after Asia. Moscow has made great
strides in this region since Vladimir Putin came to power, and especially in recent years, after it embarked on major military
reform following August 2008. Arms sales matter to the Kremlin because they are a major source of financial gain, but these
arms sales are also a tactical foreign policy instrument for wielding influence.
4. Russian defense spending is declining now because arms sales have not increased.
Michael Kofman, (Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute), DEFENSE NEWS, May 3, 2019. Retrieved May 6,
2019 from https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/05/03/russian-defense-spending-is-much-larger-and-
more-sustainable-than-it-seems/
Rather than consume the government budget, Russian defense spending is slowly declining as a share of GDP, which
is in part what makes it sustainable well into the 2020s or perhaps 2030s. Moscow is cognizant of the runaway defense
spending that led to the Soviet Union’s demise, at a time of economic decline. The reasons for the spending plateau include
a conscious decision by the state to sequester defense spending so as to prioritize national welfare and the simple fact that the
Russian military had already procured a tremendous amount of equipment during the first five years of modernization
spending. Russian arms exports have also held steady at about $15 billion per year on top of domestic procurement.
5. Arms deals can be worth up to 10 billion dollars.
In November 2016, Putin began discussing a $10 billion arms deal with Tehran.[xxviii] And in August 2017,
Germany’s Die Welt reported that Tehran was transferring weapons to Russia via Syria for maintenance, which violated
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.[xxix] Meanwhile, the Tartus naval base, at least theoretically, provides
Moscow with another opportunity to arm Iranian proxy Hezbollah indirectly through Syria if it chooses to do so.
6. Arms exports are a valuable source of money when commodity prices go down.
sendstad.pdf
Perhaps an even better way to gauge the importance of armaments exports is to compare annual sales with revenues
from different sub-sectors of the natural resources industry. As Figure 13 shows, in the period 2005–15 as a whole arms
accounted for a larger share of Russia’s exports than did each individual non-hydrocarbon natural resource sector. However,
as Figure 14 illustrates, Russia’s exports of hydrocarbons (oil, gas and coal) dwarf those in all other categories, including
arms. Arms exports have also tended to hold up during the downturn in commodity prices, which explains why their share of
total exports rose so sharply in 2015.
S. ARMS SALES ALLOW RUSSIA TO CAPTURE ARMS MARKETS.
1. Arms sales allow Russia to capture arms markets.
Arms exports are a tool in the framework of Russia’s broader economic and foreign policy. For example, Russia used
arms deals as one of the key elements of its debt relief policy. In 2006 Russia wrote off Algeria’s debt worth USD4.7 billion.
At the same time, Algeria signed a number of significant contracts for the acquisition of Russian arms. Thus, Russia has
further strengthened its dominant position in the Algerian arms market. In addition, by increasing arms trade with Algeria,
Russia has further expanded its influence in other areas such as agriculture and energy.
2. Russia is actively seeking to strengthen its position in new markets.
sendstad.pdf
Russia is the world’s second-largest arms exporter after the US, and is seeking to strengthen its position in new markets.
Only the US possesses the same ability to be competitive across a wide range of weapons systems. Russia’s large portfolio
of orders suggests that it will occupy an important market position in the years to come, and that it is likely to continue to be
seen as a reliable source of weapons for countries that do not enjoy warm relations with the US.
3. Russian arms sales allow them to penetrate markets.
sendstad.pdf
Efforts to penetrate markets recently dominated by US and European suppliers have also begun to bear fruit. In 2014,
Russia agreed a multi-billion-dollar deal to supply attack helicopters and MiG29 fighter aircraft to Egypt. This was important
because Egypt has relied on the US for arms since the late 1970s. Russia has also supplied attack helicopters and air-defence
systems to Iraq, and there is speculation that the latter will purchase fighter aircraft in the future. There have even been
rumours that Russia might be able to carve out a position in Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest buyer of weaponry, although
this is a market traditionally dominated by US and European suppliers, reflecting Riyadh’s close political relationships with
the US and European governments. However, Russia’s support for President Bashar al-Assad in Syria may complicate its
efforts to forge closer arms ties with countries like Saudi Arabia that are actively supporting his opponents.
4. Russia seeks to gain market position with sales of arms.
sendstad.pdf
Russia continues to occupy a global position of strength in an industry of immense strategic importance. It can be
considered a superpower in the global arms trade, exporting a wide range of sophisticated weapons systems to a growing
number of countries around the world. Only the US is able to offer the same full spectrum of armaments to its customers.
Russia is the dominant supplier of weapons systems to at least one country in each of the regions examined here. This has the
potential to strengthen its political, economic and military influence in those countries. Russia is also seeking to strengthen
its position in new markets, and its large portfolio of orders suggests that it will continue to occupy an important global
position in the years to come.
T. ECONOMIC GROWTH IS KEY TO RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION.
1. Positive economic growth in Russia will be channeled to the military.
Zhang Wenru, (from National University of Defense Technology), Feb. 25, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-02/25/content_9433922.htm
Influenced by both domestic and international factors, the five priorities for development proposed by Russia are
important measures to accelerate the modernization of its armed forces. Domestically, the three-stage Russian military
development starting in 2008 has been greatly hindered by the economic crisis and Western sanctions. In view of this, the
focus and highlight of Russia’s military construction in 2019 are to speed up the upgrading of weapons and equipment and
to commission new weapons in order to achieve the 70% share of modernized equipment to the total in Russia military by
2020. The positive economic growth in 2018 has also created favorable condition to support Russia’s defense budget increase
and procurement.
2. Poor economy prevents modernization of the Russian military.
Richard Sokolsky, (Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Mar. 13, 2017.
Retrieved May 5, 2019 from https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-military-balance-implications-for-
european-security-pub-68222
It seems unlikely that Russia will, in the foreseeable future, achieve the goal of a fully professional military; for the next
several years, Russia will continue to rely largely on conscripts rather than contract personnel and on legacy Soviet weapons
systems. In particular, it looks improbable that the Kremlin will meet the goal of its State Armaments Program of replacing
70 percent of its armored vehicles with more modern equipment by 2020. A stagnant economy over the next several years
and flat or declining defense expenditures, which have just been announced, are likely to delay this date. Thus, despite recent
improvements in Russian military capabilities, its armed forces are not as well trained as some of their NATO counterparts
and lag behind many in both the quantity and quality of their military equipment.
3. Russia’s military modernization is its highest budgetary priority.
Julian Cooper, (Professor of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, UK), GLOBAL
AFFAIRS, Feb. 13, 2016. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Military-Face-of-Militant-
Russia--17979
It was the brief war with Georgia in the following year that finally convinced Russia’s political and military leaders
that reform and re-equipment of the armed forces could no longer be delayed. The new defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov,
pushed through a far-reaching, much needed, but controversial, set of reforms. As the global financial-economic crisis took
hold, the government approved a ten-year forecast envisaging an average rate of growth of 6 percent. It was on this basis that
a highly ambitious state program of armament to 2020 was drawn up and signed into action by President Medvedev on the
last day of 2010. It called for funding of 20.7 trillion rubles ($680 billion at the exchange rate of the day) on new and
modernized weapons and other military hardware, plus research and development for their creation. Since 2011,
notwithstanding many difficulties, the implementation of this program has been granted the highest priority. Driven by
increased spending on the procurement of new armaments, military expenditure has grown rapidly. By 2014 the share of
national defense in GDP had reached almost 3.5 percent. But there is military spending (according to the standard NATO and
SIPRI definition) in other chapters of the budget. Total expenditure on the military reached 4.5 percent of GDP in 2014 and
in 2015 will probably approach 5.5 percent, making Russia one of approximately ten countries of the world devoting more
than 5 percent of GDP to defense. This is against the background of a troubled economy with a declining rate of growth.
While the implementation of the armaments program has encountered difficulties, there is no doubt that it has served to
enhance Russia’s military capability to a quite significant degree. A key target of the armaments program is the achievement
of a 30 percent share of modern weapons by the end of 2014; this will be exceeded to a modest degree, although the definition
of ‘modern’ is highly opaque.
4. Russia’s weakening economy undermines its military modernization.
Russia--17979
Strengthening and revitalizing Russia’s military capability is not a cheap policy option, especially at a time when the
country’s economic performance is faltering. Under the impact of declining prices for oil and gas, a depreciating currency,
inflation, high interest rates, a declining rate of investment and underlying structural problems, not adequately addressed by
the government over a number of years, GDP is declining and may do so for another two-three years before a recovery begins.
The economy has also been experiencing difficulties arising from Western sanctions and the counter-sanctions banning
agricultural imports from sanctioning countries. Budget revenues have been squeezed and expenditure cuts have become
unavoidable. At the time of writing budget plans for 2016 were still unclear, but the preliminary indications from the Ministry
of Finance are that military spending will be pegged or even reduced, leading to a reduced GDP share of expenditure on
national defense, perhaps back to the 3.5 percent of 2014, compared with a peak of 4.3 percent in 2015. Of course, it cannot
be ruled out that the military and defense industry will lobby successfully for more money. However, there is another
consideration. It was originally the intention to approve a new armaments program to the year 2025 before the end of 2015.
Uncertain economic prospects have led to a decision to postpone its start from 2016 to 2018. This probably means that over
the next two years efforts will focus on urgent matters unresolved in the first five years of the program to 2020. These tasks
require more time, not necessarily increased funding. Once completed, the fundamental re-equipment of the country’s armed
forces will be on track for its successful completion.
5. Weak economy undermines Russia’s military modernization effort.
Torie Rose DeGhett, (staff writer), Mar. 23, 2016. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/vb8xqm/russias-military-modernization-is-working-but-the-moneys-running-out
But military modernization is expensive, and Russia's economy is not doing well. When the Kremlin first announced
its plans in 2011, that 20 trillion rubles was equal to about 700 billion US dollars. In 2016, the ruble is worth far less; 20
trillion amounts to fewer than 300 billion dollars. The then-and-now comparison is prime evidence of the challenges for
Russia in continuing its ambitious programs while the economy is in a deep recession. "What modernization to 70 percent
means is quite flexible," Kofman said. "That's not an objective statement. That's a statement of goal. It can be redefined." A
prolonged recession might actually help the Kremlin's plans in one area, increasing the number of professional soldiers
compared to conscripts. Military service is a much more appealing option in times of economic hardship. But on the whole,
a tanking economy is bad news when what is needed the most is hugely expensive, new high-tech hardware.
6. Russian military modernization is expensive.
Torie Rose DeGhett, (staff writer), Mar. 23, 2016. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from
https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/vb8xqm/russias-military-modernization-is-working-but-the-moneys-running-out
The next steps for rearmament are likely much harder than the ones Russia has already taken. The path forward for
Russian military modernization will be expensive and difficult. However, the successes of the Syria campaign demonstrates
how much it has already accomplished. As Kofman said, comparing the Russian military performance in 2008 with the
campaign in Syria is "night and day."
7. Budgetary constraints threaten Russia’s military modernization program.
Alexander Golts & Michael Kofman, (former visiting fellow at Stanford, & Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), June 2016. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from http://globalinterests.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Russias-Military-Center-on-Global-Interests-2016.pdf
The two chief threats to Russia's modernization program are budgetary constraints, largely caused by the steep fall in
oil prices and Western sanctions following its war with Ukraine. Russia's defense budget has increased in recent years and
reached a peak in 2015 of 3.3 trillion rubles, or 4.2 percent of GDP. Due to the economic crisis and sanctions, such spending
levels cannot be sustained in real terms, with the MoD budget witnessing a contraction of likely close to 10 percent, much of
it in the state armament program responsible for procurement of new weapons. Meanwhile, severing defense cooperation
with Ukraine has dealt a body blow for at least five years to anything dependent on Ukrainian engines, which unfortunately
for Russia is most military helicopters, both new frigate classes, some existing ship classes, and heavy air lift. Similarly,
being cut off from Western chips and circuitry boards has sent Russia searching in the Asia-Pacific region for advanced
electronics manufacturers.
8. Fiscal constraints will prevent military modernization now.
How long this operational tempo can be sustained is uncertain, as financial constraints will ultimately force Russia to
choose between the quality and readiness of the force, or procurement of new and modernized equipment. It is safest to
describe the Russian military as a force still in transition, with new units being formed, reorganized, and reorganized again
in an ongoing quest to balance competing internal equities, service interests, and warfighting needs.
9. Economic woes cause Russia to cut its military modernization.
Alexei Lossan, (staff writer), Nov. 1, 2016. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/11/01/russia-
slashes-military-spending-as-revenues-shrink_644019
The protracted slump in oil prices mean the government is no longer able to finance its reform of the defense industry
at previous levels. As the economy continues to struggle under the weight of low oil prices and sanctions, Russian authorities
have decided to cut defense spending by 1,000 billion rubles ($15.89 billion), or by approximately 30 percent.
10. Budget deficits cause defense cuts in Russia.
Alexei Lossan, (staff writer), Nov. 1, 2016. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/11/01/russia-
slashes-military-spending-as-revenues-shrink_644019
It is not only in defense that spending cuts are imminent: Practically all items in the draft budget will be reduced, but
it is defense that will see the biggest cuts. “The only exception is a sharp rise in the 2017 spending on social policy, which
has to do with the presidential election cycle: Before elections butter is far more important than guns,” says Alexei Kalachev.
At the same time, starting from 2017, spending on servicing sovereign debt will see a scheduled boost. By that time, the
repository of Russia’s oil-generated superprofits, the Reserve Fund, will be fully exhausted from covering the budget deficit,
after which the main source of plugging the budget hole will be increased borrowing.
11. Weak budgets prevent Russian military modernization.
A weak budget prevented the Russian military from conducting much modernization between 1991 and 2005. That
could prove to be a crucial factor again. Faced with low oil prices and Western economic sanctions, the Russian economy
contracted by nearly 4 percent in 2015. Most analysts expect it to contract further in 2016. The government budget for 2016
assumed an oil price of $50 per barrel. In January, the price closed at about $34 per barrel, after dipping to almost $28 per
barrel. Russian ministries were told to cut budget expenditures by 10 percent, though it is not clear if this applies to the
military. If the oil price remains soft, the defense budget may not escape unscathed. Alexey Kudrin, finance minister during
Putin’s first two terms as president, recently said that defense spending cuts “cannot be avoided,” though they might be
postponed a short while. That could hinder the military’s modernization effort.
U. ARMS SALES BOLSTER RUSSIA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY.
1. Arms exports keep Russia’s defense industry afloat.
sendstad.pdf
Despite over 25 years of transformation, Russia’s economy remains overwhelmingly reliant on the export of natural
resources. However, while many manufacturing industries either diminished or disappeared entirely after the end of central
planning, Russia remains a world leader in the production and export of armaments, as it was during the Soviet period. This
makes the industry – though much smaller than the strategically vital energy resources sector – important for several
economic, social and political reasons. Defence-industrial production is one of only a few technology-intensive economic
sectors in which Russia can be considered a world leader. President Vladimir Putin has affirmed the potential of defence-
industrial activity to ‘serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in [Russia’s] economy’. However, there has not
always been sufficient domestic demand to keep these engines running. In the 1990s, when defence procurement was
drastically reduced, arms exports kept many enterprises afloat. Even today, after five years of rapid growth in Russian defence
spending, export markets remain important to Russian firms. These markets are not only a source of current income, but also
a potential source of future sales to compensate for the anticipated decline in domestic demand over the next few years.
2. Russia’s defense industrial base can produce large volumes of arms for sale.
sendstad.pdf
This full spectrum of capabilities reflects the strength of Russia’s defence-industrial base, which despite more than a
decade of chronic underfunding after 1990 remains able to produce large volumes of robust and capable equipment. Because
of the legacy of hyper-militarization during the Soviet era, long-standing security concerns and heightened threat perception,
the maintenance of an independent defence-industrial base has historically been a priority for Russia. This looks set to
continue, as efforts are under way to reduce dependence on imported components in the manufacture of final weapons
systems.
V. RUSSIA IS MODERNIZING MULTIPLE ELEMENTS OF ITS MILITARY.
1. Russia is modernizing all aspects of the Russian military.
Russia is in the midst of a major modernization of its armed forces. This has been driven by Vladimir Putin’s ambition
to restore Russia’s hard power and supported by the revenues that flowed into the Kremlin’s coffers between 2004 and 2014,
when the price of oil was high. The modernization programs encompass all parts of the Russian military, including strategic
nuclear, nonstrategic nuclear and conventional forces.
2. Russia is modernizing multiple elements of its military.
Russia has been purchasing hardware ranging from strategic nuclear forces, submarines and ships, to combat aviation,
tactical aviation, and a host of land warfare systems. In recent announcements it is alleged that the level of modernized
equipment in the force has increased from 30 to 47 percent, and will reach 50 percent by the end of 2016. Of course, the
values attached to these figures are almost metaphysical. What does the term “modernized” mean? How is this quality
defined? While modernization is in a general sense an improvement to the technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon
systems, and equipment, there is no absolute standard to be met and success can be met relative to previous standards. It is
unclear that there is any specific standard by which Russian officials will ultimately declare the force as having attained the
goal of 70 percent modernization.
W. ARMS SALES KEY TO RUSSIA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRY.
1. Arms exports are key to Russia’s defense-industrial complex.
sendstad.pdf
Armaments exports play an important role in the Russian economy. They account for a small but significant share of
total exports, and for a substantial share of manufactured exports. This makes the industry one of the leading sectors through
which Russia is integrated with the global economy. Arms exports continue to play an important role in providing demand
for goods and services produced by the defence-industrial complex in Russia. Exports are not as important to the defence-
industrial complex as they were in the 1990s, but they continue to help keep production lines in service, and thus help preserve
the full spectrum of defence-industrial production capabilities. This might become even more important in the future if, as
planned, defence expenditure is further reduced from its current elevated level. If the scheduled reduction in spending is
indeed sustained, international arms sales would help offset reduced domestic demand.
2. Exports help the Russian defense industry survive budget cuts.
sendstad.pdf
As well as accounting for a growing share of exports, production for sale abroad is important to the maintenance of
Russia’s fundamental capacity to produce armaments. During the Soviet period, exports accounted for 3–12 per cent of annual
arms production, according to different estimates. Figure 15 shows how the size of arms exports and production for the annual
state defence order has evolved over the past decade and a half. At the turn of the century, exports were worth more than
twice the state defence order, a tendency that characterized the 1990s when exports helped many producers to survive as the
government slashed defence spending. This helped maintain employment and production lines across the industry. However,
rapid economic growth from 1999 helped boost government finances, eventually leading to a sustained increase in the volume
of the state defence order from 2005 onwards.
III. A MODERNIZED RUSSIAN MILITARY IS DISASTROUS.
A. RUSSIA WILL SEEK TO MODERNIZE ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL.
1. Russia’s first modernization priority is its nuclear arsenal.
Internationally, the world security situation has been severe since the Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2013, and relations
between Russia and the West have remained tense. The United States' unilateral withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has greatly impacted the international strategic stability. Furthermore, the hybrid warfare, cyber
warfare and information warfare in Syrian military operations have also brought new requirements for Russian combat
ideology and equipment development. Russian President Putin has clearly pointed out, “Russia must put the development of
digital technology equipment, artificial intelligence, drones and robot systems on its agenda in terms of Russian military
construction.” Comprehensively modernizing the armed forces is the only way for Russia to effectively deal with new military
threats and win modern wars. Contents - Five priorities in development Firstly, Russia will focus on the development of
nuclear and aerospace defense forces, with a view to improving its strategic deterrence. Russia will continue to strengthen its
“triad” strategic nuclear power comprising the land-based, sea-based and space-based forces. In terms of land-based nuclear
forces, Russia will upgrade its active intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and realize the replacement of the Yars
missile system deployed. For sea-based nuclear forces, the first Borey-A-class strategic nuclear submarine Prince Vladimir,
equipped with Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), will be commissioned to Russian naval fleets. For
space-based nuclear forces, the Russian Aerospace Forces will upgrade the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS long-range bombers
carrying strategic missiles. For air defense and anti-missile forces, apart from the continuous deployment of the S-400 air
defense missile system, the Russian military will also step up the development of the S-500 air defense missile system. By
2019, two regiments of the Russian Aerospace Forces will be equipped with S-400 air defense missile systems, while the S-
500 air defense missile system is scheduled to be commissioned by 2020.
2. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces.
Russia is modernizing the three legs of its strategic triad. It is procuring eight Borei-class ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs), and is halfway through a ten-year program to build four hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is also updating its Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, and officials have
reportedly considered reopening the Blackjack production line.
3. The heart of Russia’s military modernization program is nuclear modernization, but lack of funds constrains it---this risks
a nuclear war with the West.
Malcom Davis, (senior analyst at Australian Strategic Policy Institute), REAL CLEAR DEFENSE, Jan. 18, 2017.
Retrieved May 5, 2019 from https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/01/18/
russia_military_modernisation_and_lowering_the_nuclear_threshold_110652.html
Russia faces real challenges in sustaining its military modernisation efforts, given low oil prices, Western sanctions
and the cost of operations in Ukraine and Syria. Despite that, Moscow looks set to continue the program. At its heart is nuclear
weapons modernisation. Russia’s most recent military doctrine, released in 2014, continues to emphasise the primacy of
nuclear weapons in Russian defence policy, stating: ‘Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in the case of an aggression against her with
conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.’ Three developments suggest a willingness by
Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks in a manner that lowers the threshold of nuclear war. First,
the concept of preventative de-escalation is important. A recent IISS analysis explained de-escalation in which limited nuclear
war could be used to: ‘…de-escalate and terminate combat actions on terms acceptable to Russia through the threat of
inflicting unacceptable damage upon the enemy. Such limited nuclear use may deter both nuclear and conventional
aggression.’ Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s coercive power
against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis—for example, in the Baltics. And third, the Russians
are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signalling that suggests Russia continues to see such
weapons as a means of national strength. Russia has undertaken sabre rattling through simulated nuclear strikes in large-scale
exercises and aggressive probing of NATO airspace with nuclear-capable bombers. It has demonstrated the dual-role Kalibr
NK sea-launched cruise missile in deadly strikes against Syria, and deployed dual-role Iskander short-range ballistic missiles
into Kaliningrad in a manner that was highly threatening to NATO. That has been backed by public statements which
reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and even explicit nuclear threats to NATO states, notably Denmark. Russian
nuclear forces are being swiftly upgraded with the focus on ICBM modernisation, based on introducing the SS-27 ‘Yars’
road-mobile missile, and from 2018 the silo-based RS-28 ‘Sarmat’ heavy ICBM. Yars and Sarmat replace much of Russia’s
aging Soviet strategic rocket forces with significantly more capable delivery systems. Russia’s Navy is transitioning to
modern Sineva and Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles, on the modern Borei class SSBNs, while the Russian Air Force is
restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber that eventually will be
complemented by the ‘PAK-DA’ advanced bomber sometime in the 2020s. The strategic nuclear force modernisation is
important but it’s the integration of Russia’s conventional pre-nuclear forces with its large ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’
that’s of greatest significance. That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during Hybrid
Warfare, in a way that makes the risk of a crisis with Russia much more dangerous. Russia is increasingly focusing on the
use of its nuclear forces to enhance its ability to undertake military adventurism at the conventional level in a manner that’s
highly threatening to NATO. However the reliance on nuclear signalling, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces
and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’, increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis that could lead to an escalation
through the nuclear threshold.
B. RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION RISKS A WAR AGAINST NATO.
1. Military modernization by Russia causes an arms build-up by NATO—risking conflict.
Russia’s bellicose rhetoric and provocative behavior have prompted long-overdue increases in NATO defense spending
and more robust efforts by the alliance to bolster its deterrence and defense capabilities on its eastern flank. At its last summit,
NATO heads of state agreed to forward deploy more capable and credible defenses to the territory of NATO’s most vulnerable
members. These are necessary and positive contributions that, by reducing Russian confidence in a quick victory, lower the
odds of a NATO-Russia conflict. But they are not panaceas. The military buildup of both alliance and Russian forces in the
east reflects the assumption on both sides that it will produce greater security. Instead, the action-reaction dynamic risks
generating less, not more, security on both sides. Whether NATO muscle-flexing will provoke or deter Russian adventurism
is uncertain, given the scope for misjudging the perceptions and risk-reward calculus of the Kremlin. Based on Russia’s recent
behavior in the Baltics—specifically Putin’s willingness to engage in tit-for-tat responses with NATO forces over incidents
of harassment and provocative military maneuvers—Putin is unlikely to back down and change his provocative behavior in
the face of NATO’s military moves. The alliance therefore needs to further supplement the military measures taken to deter
and defend against Russian military adventurism with other measures to shore up NATO’s defenses on the eastern flank
while reducing the risk of war with Russia. Steps that merit further consideration include the following.
2. Russia is willing to use nuclear weapons in a conflict against NATO.
From the West’s perspective, Russia’s aggressive behavior on its western border over the past two years has validated
this darker view of the Russian threat. Russian intelligence operatives abducted an Estonian intelligence officer from Estonian
territory in 2014. Russian aircraft have conducted frequent intrusions into the air space of NATO countries and harassed U.S.
and NATO ships and aircraft operating in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Russian forces have staged unannounced (“snap”)
exercises simulating the use of nuclear weapons in an invasion of the Baltic region. The Russian military has deployed
additional missile and air defense assets and, most recently, nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad. There has been
a significant increase in Russian cyber operations against Estonia and, within the past few months, the United States. Russian
officials, including Putin, have threatened nuclear strikes against NATO countries that have missile defense installations
within their territory. Russia’s recent deployment of a nuclear-armed cruise missile that threatens NATO forces and
facilities—in violation of the U.S.-Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—underscores Moscow’s intent
to undermine alliance cohesion.
3. Russia’s military modernization effort increases its threat to NATO.
Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the military balance between NATO and Russia, after years of
inattention, has again become the focus of intense concern and even alarm in some Western quarters. From NATO’s vantage
point, Russia poses a serious military threat to its eastern flank—and to Euro-Atlantic security more broadly—for three
reasons. First, a military reform and modernization program launched in 2008, combined with significant increases in defense
spending over the past several years, has improved the capabilities of Russia’s armed forces.
4. Russian military modernization risks a bloody fight against NATO.
Jonathan Marcus, (diplomatic correspondent), June 29, 2017. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40428132
"The direct military challenge from Russia, and confirmation of Russia's willingness to use military force against its
neighbours," he argues, "with few exceptions, hasn't translated into European countries taking a serious interest in defending
themselves." He adds that the failure of many Nato allies to meet even symbolic commitments, like the pledge to spend 2%
of GDP on defence, let alone urgent real measures like regenerating the capacity for high-intensity warfare to match Russia's
developing capabilities, "speaks of an unwillingness to recognise politically inconvenient reality". That reality, according to
Michael Kofman, is nothing short of a transformation of the Russian military. "Reform, modernisation and the combat
experience gleaned from Ukraine and Syria will have lasting effects on the Russian armed forces," he told me. "Russia," he
says, "retains the ability to deploy decisive force anywhere on its borders, overpowering any former Soviet republic. In terms
of its strategic nuclear arsenal, Russia is not only a peer to the United States, but actually ahead in modernisation and
investment in non-strategic nuclear weapons. "Meanwhile Russia's conventional forces are now capable of imposing high
costs on even a technologically superior adversary such as Nato in a high-end conflict - i.e. a fight would be quite bloody for
both sides."
5. NATO must maintain a strong deterrent against Russian forces or risk a nuclear war.
NATO should devote more resources to conventional territorial defense. The alliance has overall qualitative and
quantitative advantages, but it must resource its conventional capabilities to maintain its edge. It needs a concept and force
structure to deal with a crisis in the Baltics, where the Russian military has regional superiority. It also needs to ensure that
NATO aircraft could operate successfully in a more contested air defense environment, given Russia’s deployments of
advanced surface-to-air missile systems. This is not just about NATO forces, but about doctrine, and having the operational
concepts to contend with new Russian capabilities. To the extent that the alliance maintains a strong conventional deterrent
and defense posture, it will reduce the likelihood of a conventional clash—and of a situation in which Russia might consider
using its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
C. A NATO WAR IS LIKELY
1. Russia is willing to use force against NATO.
Second, in the past decade, Russia has demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to use force as an instrument of its
foreign policy, as well as an improved capacity to project military power beyond its immediate post-Soviet periphery. Third,
the Kremlin has been conducting a far more aggressive, anti-Western foreign policy, significantly ratcheting up provocative
military maneuvers near NATO members’ borders with Russia, intimating nuclear threats, and deploying nuclear-capable
missiles in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. As a result, there is a growing perception in the West that Russia has
reemerged as a revanchist, neo-imperialist, expansionist, and hostile power bent on dismantling the post–Cold War European
security system and dividing the continent into spheres of influence.
2. There is a growing risk of an accidental confrontation between Russia and NATO.
Michael Birnbaum, (Brussels bureau chief for The Washington Post), WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 12, 2015. Retrieved
May 5, 2019 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/12/3-maps-that-show-the-military-
concerns-for-both-russia-and-nato/
The Russian military exercises in March spanned the nation’s vast territory – from the high north, far above the Arctic
Circle, all the way to territories near Japan. Massive NATO drills a few months later pulled thousands of troops across Europe.
After decades of post-Cold War calm, Europe is again becoming a region of high military drama – and according to some
experts, a place with a growing risk of accidental confrontation. Russian soldiers woke in early March to unannounced, snap
exercises that eventually grew to encompass more than 80,000 service members. Above the Barents Sea, strategic bombers
practiced attacks. Near the Latvian border, airborne troops performed landings as attack helicopters and artillery gave them
cover. In the Baltic Sea, the Russian Navy practiced with missiles. The training was on such a large scale that it could only
have been practicing for what would happen during a war with the U.S.-led NATO defense alliance, according to the
European Leadership Network, which on Wednesday published a report looking at the increased military exercises on both
sides of the Russia-West divide.
3. There is a great risk of an accidental confrontation between NATO & Russia.
Michael Birnbaum, (Brussels bureau chief for The Washington Post), WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 12, 2015. Retrieved
May 5, 2019 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/12/3-maps-that-show-the-military-
concerns-for-both-russia-and-nato/
NATO has also been practicing in eastern Europe, though on a smaller scale. Its Allied Shield exercises in June brought
together 15,000 service members from 19 member nations and three partners, and it has stepped up exercises in reaction to
Russian threats as a way, NATO leaders say, of deterring Kremlin aggression. But with communications links between the
two sides frayed, intentions can quickly be misread, raising the risk of accidental confrontation, the European Leadership
Network argues. And with tensions at their highest since the Cold War – but without Cold-War-era lifelines for
communication – there is a greater chance for unpleasant surprises. Already, there have been near-misses with Russian
military aircraft getting dangerously close to civilian jetliners above the Baltic Sea.
4. Russia has an imperialist attitude—the risk of war with NATO is high.
Elbridge Colby & Jonathan Solomon, (Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security & senior systems and
technology analyst at Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc.), Apr. 20, 2016. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from
https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/for-peace-with-russia-prepare-for-war-in-europe-nato-and-conventional-deterrence/
The dangerous and irresponsible sea-skimming flyovers by Su-24 attack aircraft of the U.S. Navy destroyer USS
Donald Cook operating in international waters in the Baltic Sea a few days ago, followed by a Russian aircraft’s hazardous
flyby of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace just a few days later, are a reminder that, while many hope
for a relaxation of tensions with Moscow, that is likely to be wishful thinking. Whether we want it or not, relations between
the United States and its NATO allies on the one side and Russia on the other are likely to remain distrustful and tense. More
to the point, they are likely to remain shadowed by the possibility of crisis and even conflict. Moscow’s willingness to conduct
brazen violations of international rules, its revanchist attitude towards elements of its former empire, its resurgent military
power, and its sense of deepened alienation from the West all point towards the persisting potential for a standoff with the
Atlantic alliance.
D. MILITARY MODERNIZATION RISKS A WAR AGAINST THE BALTICS.
1. Strong Russian armed forces risk a war against the Baltics that will escalate.
Note, however, that a political decision by Putin to start a deliberate, premeditated war against one of the Baltic states
or Poland would likely lean heavily on the Russian general staff’s judgments—rather than the West’s estimates—about the
capacity of the Russian armed forces for achieving a rapid and decisive conventional victory over NATO forces and deterring
NATO’s use of nuclear weapons. Such judgments would involve more than a technical or operational assessment of the
balance of forces and would take into account a broader range of factors. In the judgment of most Western experts, Moscow
might be reasonably confident that it could achieve its political and military objectives in a coup de main strategy. Under this
operational concept, Russian forces would strike quickly to seize a strip of territory on NATO’s eastern flank after achieving
a significant element of strategic surprise and then issue threats to use nuclear weapons to deter a NATO counterresponse. If
Russia successfully executed such an operation, it would present NATO with an excruciating dilemma: accept the Russian
fait accompli, which would destroy the alliance, or mobilize for a massive counteroffensive, which would cause great
destruction on Baltic territory and raise the risk of a nuclear war with Russia.
2. A Baltics war goes nuclear.
Loren B. Thompson, (former Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University), July 20, 2016.
Retrieved May 6, 2019 from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-
likely-17044
However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing.
And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States
has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because
NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S.
security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal
name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United
States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic
weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of
U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-
range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear
weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of
American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied
forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades
to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-
strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations. While
nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect
that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First, both Washington
and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the
three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for
devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a
short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression
could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it
commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the
three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary
assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states
combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland. Third, there is a
disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain
in a future war.
3. War in the Baltics risks all-out war with NATO.
Russian actions in Ukraine are indicative of how seriously the Kremlin views NATO and its security guarantees to its
members. Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine were calculated steps to prevent Ukraine from
advancing toward NATO membership and escaping Russia’s sphere of influence—a development that would have marked a
major strategic setback for Russia and an embarrassment for Putin, considering the Kremlin’s view of Ukraine as an essential
buffer against a hostile and expansionist NATO. Moreover, it would be hard for Moscow to replicate the favorable
circumstances in the Baltic region that Russia enjoyed in Crimea. Large Russian forces were already on the peninsula prior
to the crisis and were operating from a well-established infrastructure. Further, as many observers have pointed out, the
Crimea operation was carried out mainly by Russia’s elite special forces units and therefore was not a true reflection of the
overall state of Russian ground forces.30 Simply put, the Baltic states are already in NATO. An outright military assault on
them would risk an all-out war with NATO.
4. The Baltics are the next target for the Russian military.
Todd South, (Pulitzer finalist), MILITARY TIMES, Sept. 13, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2017/09/13/whats-putin-up-to-the-russian-military-buildup-on-europes-border-raises-
tension/
Though North Korean nuclear threats have dominated the news for months, the slow burn of Russian territory grabs in
eastern Europe, coupled with NATO criticism from President Donald Trump, create a scenario that could erupt at exactly the
wrong time — when the United States is distracted and unprepared. European allies near the Russian border have ramped up
military spending and re-instituted conscription as Russia rises. These exercises cast “the shadow of the Russian Bear” over
a region that has memories of Russian domination, Hodges said. Nearly every recent paper, report and think-tank analysis
has focused likely future Russian aggression in the Baltics as the next logical step in an effort to recapture lost Soviet
territories and antagonize NATO states. Retired U.S. Army Gen. Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the Army, said
nearly every recent Russian military exercise has focused on the Baltics. “They’re practicing a war against the U.S. and
NATO — that’s what they’re doing,” Keane said.
5. The Baltics are a key target of the Russian military.
tension/
Russia is gaining strength. Retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and
current Fletcher School dean at Tufts University, said he saw a Europe on edge when he took command in 2009. Russia
intended to increase its military capability, reorganize and modernize its land forces, rebuild its navy, and use “this newer,
stronger military to push on the non-NATO states around Russia, the so-called ‘near abroad,’ ” Stavridis said. The Belarus
Digest has reported that Russia has been “grooming coalitions and unions” in Belarus, and Russia exerts political, diplomatic
and economic pressure on the tiny nation of less than 10 million people. Belarus borders Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, near
the Baltic Sea and between Russia and its satellite territory Kaliningrad. The Baltics fit the criteria for past Russian
intervention — near the Russian border, contain Russian-speaking people, formerly part of the Russian empire. About a
quarter of Estonia and Latvia consider themselves ethnic Russians.
E. RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION RISKS A WAR BY MISCALCULATION.
1. Russian military modernization risks a war by accident or miscalculation.
The new standoff between NATO and Russia may become the new normal, but the relationship is unlikely to be stable
and is rife with possibilities for miscalculation. The more NATO and Russia escalate and counterescalate with military
responses that the other sees as hostile, the greater the chance of a conflict due to an accident, miscalculation, or military
incident that spins out of control. The West and Russia may or may not be locked into a new Cold War in Europe, but their
adversarial relationship could lead toward greater confrontation and possible conflict unless they can agree on more effective
communication and risk-reduction measures and on rules of the road for peacetime military operations. Both sides need to
borrow a page or two from the U.S.- Russian Cold War playbook to prevent their cool war in Europe from becoming hot.
2. War by miscalculation with Russia risks escalation to nuclear use.
NATO and Russian officials responsible for the security of their countries must, of necessity, base policies, plans,
programs, postures, and resource commitments on estimates of the other side’s military capabilities. And because the margin
for error on national security is small with countries possessing thousands of nuclear weapons, these judgments are almost
always driven by worst-case assumptions of the adversary’s intentions, which are often subject to misunderstanding,
misinterpretation, and misperceptions.
F. RUSSIA WILL USE HYBRID WARFARE AGAINST NATO.
1. Russia will use hybrid warfare tactics against NATO.
Thus, whether Russia’s hybrid warfare doctrine, concepts, and tools are traditional or revolutionary is largely irrelevant.
What matters for NATO policymakers and planners is whether Moscow has the incentives and opportunities to use nonkinetic
means of warfare to sow discord within Baltic countries, undermine public support in the Baltic states for their governments,
create a pretext for Russian military intervention, and arouse public sympathy and support for Russian views and aims. As
one expert—who has debunked the theory that Russia has developed a new model of hybrid warfare—has observed, “The
Russian armed forces historically avoid entering into conflict without careful and thorough preparation of the battlefield . . .
and making tangible efforts to shape it according to the requirements of the mission.”80 There is little question that
information and cyber operations have become a priority for the Kremlin, driven by the leadership’s fears that Russia is
lagging behind the United States in these technologies.81 Prudence therefore dictates that the Baltic states, NATO, and the
EU take measured and appropriate steps to counteract Russia’s potential use of these tools, especially because the Kremlin is
likely to prefer hybrid warfare over a direct conventional attack or to employ both options simultaneously in any operations
against the Baltic states. (ellipsis in original)
2. Hybrid warfare will escalate to an all-out war with NATO.
Joe Pappalardo, (contributing editor at Popular Mechanics), POPULAR MECHANICS, July 13, 2018. Retrieved May 6,
2019 from https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a22140482/nato-russia-hybrid-warfare-start-a-war/
When Vladimir Putin schemed to annex the Crimean peninsula, he didn’t launch an “invasion.” Instead, Russia relied
on techniques including phony media reports, special forces and and proxy fighters (dubbed “little green men”), and
cyberattacks. This kind of hybrid warfare gave Putin just enough plausible deniability about what was clearly happening —
Russia seizing territory that belonged to another nation. Following that success elements of Russian hybrid warfare have
begun appearing in Syria and the Eastern Ukraine, as well as U.S. and European elections. The leadership of NATO watched
the hybrid war with dismay. What would they do if Russia used these same aggressive techniques against a member? This
week they supplied an answer: the organization would treat hybrid war like an actual attack. On Thursday, the North Atlantic
Treaty Alliance stated that such hybrid warfare acts aimed at member state could trigger Article 5, the provision that requires
all treaty members to come to the aid of any member who is attacked (it has been invoked only once, after the September 11,
2001, attacks on the United States). Now hybrid war is to be treated on the same level as traditional attacks.
G. A WAR WITH RUSSIA GOES NUCLEAR.
1. A war with Russia risks a nuclear conflict.
David Shlapak & Michael Johnson, (senior international research analyst at RAND Corporation & senior defense research
analyst at RAND Corporation), Apr. 21, 2016. Retrieved May 5, 2019 from
https://warontherocks.com/2016/04/outnumbered-outranged-and-outgunned-how-russia-defeats-nato/
It seems unlikely that Vladimir Putin intends to turn his guns on NATO any time soon. However, the consequences
should he decide to do so are severe. Probably the best outcome — if the phrase has any meaning in this context — would be
something like a new Cold War, with all the implications that bears. A war with Russia would be fraught with escalatory
potential from the moment the first shot was fired; and generations born outside the shadow of nuclear Armageddon would
suddenly be reintroduced to fears thought long dead and buried.
2. Russia is willing to use nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict.
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Oct. 2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/
Russian concerns about its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO were reignited in 1999 following NATO
intervention in the war in Kosovo. Less than a year later Moscow issued a new National Security Concept in January 2000
followed shortly thereafter by a new Military Doctrine in April. [58] After several adjustments over the next few years,
Russian nuclear doctrine stabilized in the form of a "White Paper" issued in 2003, which provides considerably more detail
on the missions assigned to Russian strategic forces. The most significant difference between the 2000 doctrine and the one
from 1993 was its formal expansion of the nuclear mission from deterrence against not only a nuclear attack, but also against
a large-scale conventional attack. In addition, it envisioned the use of nuclear weapons to "de-escalate" a limited, regional
conflict in the event deterrence failed. In other words, Russia might conduct a targeted nuclear strike to convince an adversary
that further aggression is not worthwhile. Despite an expansion of the nuclear mission, official documents suggest that
reliance on nuclear weapons was seen as a temporary "fix" until Russia sufficiently modernized and strengthened its
conventional forces.
H. MODERNIZATION INCREASES TROOP EFFECTIVENESS
Thirdly, Russia plans to increase its military training to improve the troops’ combat capabilities. With the goal of
highlighting the actual combat effects and improving the actual combat skills of the military, the Russian military will
strengthen the actual combat training. As the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu once said, the Russian military has
recruited well-trained professionals, and almost all commanders at the brigade and regiment levels have actual combat
experience. In 2019, the Russian military intends to plan and conduct a total of 18,500 war games and trainings, including
the strategic exercise “Tsentr-2019” and the strategic nuclear power exercise “Global Thunder”, as well as the Russia-Belarus
joint exercise “Union Shield-2019”.
I. A WAR WITH RUSSIA IS THE GREATEST THREAT TO HUMANITY.
1. Only a US-Russian nuclear war causes human extinction.
Sebastian Farquhar et al, 2017 ((Project Manager at Future of Humanity Institute), Jan. 23, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2019
from https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons.
However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s
population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation. The aftermath could be
much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would
absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter.
According to one model, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C,
making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand,
but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange
on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with
stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed. Some models suggest that even a
small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion
people at risk of starvation, though this estimate might be pessimistic. Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright
human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten
civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global
climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a
better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely
estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large
confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.
However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict
between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems
unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.
2. Russia is the greatest threat to national security.
tension/
Top leaders do not mince words when speaking of Russia. “Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security,”
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford said during recent congressional testimony.
J. RUSSIAN MILITARIZATION RISKS AN ARCTIC WAR
1. Russia is militarizing the Arctic.
Russia--17979
The turn is not only to the East, for some time it has also been towards the North. The Arctic has increasingly become
a focus of efforts to enhance Russia’s military capability. This is evidently a long-term commitment. As global warming
makes the northern route increasingly navigable and hydrocarbons extraction moves northward, Russia seems determined to
defend its perceived territorial interests in the expectation that national rivalries in the region will become more acute. A new
Sever northern joint command has been established, air bases are being built or upgraded, air defense capabilities enhanced,
and the Arctic figures prominently in Russia’s recently updated maritime doctrine.
2. Arctic militarization risks war that escalates to a global conflict.
Bahauddin Foizee, (International affairs analyst & columnist), 2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.tremr.com/bahauddinfoizee/cold-yet-beautiful-arctic-might-become-target-of-war-machines
Russia has already moved to restore a Soviet-era military base and other military outposts in the Arctic. In December
2014, Russia established the Arctic Joint Strategic Command in order to protect Russian interests in the Arctic region and the
Russian Northern Fleet has become the new Command’s main striking force. Questions arose about the establishment of a
Strategic Command, which is usually reserved for wartime, instead of establishing a core Military District. Later, in early
2015, Russia exercised military patrols in the Arctic from its Northern Fleet, involving thousands of servicemen with several
surface ships, submarines and aircraft. Interestingly, Russia is currently planning to jointly explore for oil in Russia’s Arctic
fields with China, which is increasingly becoming a strong military power and an economic giant. Through such a move,
Russia is trying to make sure that Russia has a rising military and economic power like China involved in its stake in the
Arctic region so that cooperation favors Russia at the time of escalation of any military conflict. Such militarization of the
region is likely to increase with almost all the Arctic countries working toward increasing their military deployments and
exercises in the region. Unfortunately, there appears little hope for the opportunity for any diplomatic resolution (or political
agreement) regarding the disputes. It can be presumed that without diplomatic resolutions, the current non-hostile disputes
over the Arctic could result in confrontations. It seems our globe does not lack reasons to engage in chaos. The two world
wars began as European conflicts, only to turn gradually into world wars. Likewise, if the disputes over the control of Arctic
resources are not resolved quickly, they could turn into a larger military conflict that would not just involve the Arctic
countries, but would also drag a larger part of the world into this conflict. Any such larger military conflict could mean the
cold, yet beautiful, Arctic region could become the target of war machines – destroying the environment and the stability of
the region and the globe.
K. RUSSIAN MODERNIZATION RISKS A WAR WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY.
1. Russian modernization is investing heavily in Artificial Intelligence.
Frank A. Rose, (senior fellow for security and strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution), Oct. 23,
2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/23/as-russia-and-china-
improve-their-conventional-military-capabilities-should-the-us-rethink-its-assumptions-on-extended-nuclear-deterrence/
And Russia and China are investing heavily in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, cyber, and
hypersonics. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that whoever becomes the world leader in the artificial
intelligence sphere will “become ruler of the world.”
2. Artificial intelligence risks the extinction of the human race.
Kai KupferschmidtJan, (correspondent for Science magazine), SCIENCE, Jan. 11, 2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/01/could-science-destroy-world-these-scholars-want-save-us-modern-day-
frankenstein
Philosopher Nick Bostrom believes it's entirely possible that artificial intelligence (AI) could lead to the extinction of
Homo sapiens. In his 2014 bestseller Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Bostrom paints a dark scenario in which
researchers create a machine capable of steadily improving itself. At some point, it learns to make money from online
transactions and begins purchasing goods and services in the real world. Using mail-ordered DNA, it builds simple
nanosystems that in turn create more complex systems, giving it ever more power to shape the world. Now suppose the AI
suspects that humans might interfere with its plans, writes Bostrom, who's at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom.
It could decide to build tiny weapons and distribute them around the world covertly. "At a pre-set time, nanofactories
producing nerve gas or target-seeking mosquito-like robots might then burgeon forth simultaneously from every square meter
of the globe." For Bostrom and a number of other scientists and philosophers, such scenarios are more than science fiction.
They're studying which technological advances pose "existential risks" that could wipe out humanity or at least end
civilization as we know it—and what could be done to stop them. "Think of what we're trying to do as providing a scientific
red team for the things that could threaten our species," says philosopher Huw Price, who heads the Centre for the Study of
Existential Risk (CSER) here at the University of Cambridge.
L. RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION RISKS WAR WITH ASATS
1. Russian military modernization is pursuing ASAT weapons.
Russia and China are also devoting significant resources to develop disruptive technologies like offensive cyber and
anti-satellite weapons, which are designed to exploit perceived gaps and vulnerabilities in U.S. defenses. As Director of
National Intelligence Daniel Coats testified before the Senate Select Committee in February 2018: “Both Russia and China
continue to pursue anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness…Military
reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to
integrate attacks against space systems and services.”
2. ASATs risk a space war that rivals a nuclear war in its impact.
Omar Lamrani, (master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna), NATIONAL INTEREST. May 18, 2016.
Retrieved May 6, 2019 from https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-
16248?page=0%2C1
Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies
is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in place. In the race between
shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially
denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial war. The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition
in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for
communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs
may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space
would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the
world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of
nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in
a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. While the United States and other nations are taking measures to
better prepare for a potential war in space, their emphasis will likely remain on deterrence. This is an important notion to
understand, not only for potential U.S. enemies but also for the United States itself. For instance, it is conceivable that
technological advancements in the coming decades could allow the United States to recover militarily from a space clash
more quickly than the ever-more space dependent China or Russia. In such a scenario, the costs that a space war would have
for the world as a whole might be enough to dissuade Washington from launching its own space attack.
M. RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION RISKS CYBER WARFARE
1. Russian modernization includes offense cyber operations.
Enhance the resiliency of critical infrastructure. As the U.S. intelligence community has noted, Russia and China are
developing asymmetric capabilities like offensive cyber and anti-satellite systems which are designed to negate U.S.
advantages in information technology-enabled warfare. As a result, the United States and its allies must enhance the resiliency
of their critical infrastructure.
2. Cyber warfare risks a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.
David Krieger, (nuclear age peace foundation), March 21, 2017. Retrieved May 6, 2019 from
https://www.wagingpeace.org/hacking-nuclear-weapons-systems/
The possibility of cyber warfare is one of the best possible arguments for U.S. leadership to negotiate the abolition of
nuclear weapons before they abolish us. Later this month, some 130 countries will be meeting at the United Nations in New
York to draft a new treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. Sadly, and dangerously, the U.S. and the other P-5
nuclear weapons states have chosen not to participate in these negotiations. They seem to prefer the false security and political
advantages of possessing their nuclear arsenals to ridding the world of the dangers posed by these arsenals. Being hacked is
only one of many serious dangers. There are also the ongoing threats of nuclear warfare initiated by accident, miscalculation,
intention or insanity.
N. RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION DESTROYS US HEGEMONY.
1. Russian arms sales undermine US military power projection.
Daniel Gouré, (PhD, Senior Vice President with the Lexington Institute), Oct. 4, 2018. Retrieved May 3, 2019 from
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-essays/winning-future-wars-modernization-and-21st-century-defense
Regional challengers like North Korea and Iran are investing in such asymmetric military capabilities as ballistic
missiles, advanced air defense systems, and even nuclear weapons. Both nation-states and non-state terrorist groups are able
to access advanced military equipment provided not only by Russia and China, but by Western countries as well. Iran has
received advanced air defense systems from Russia and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles from China. Capabilities once
viewed as restricted to peer competitors are increasingly within the arsenals of local adversaries and terrorist groups. The
Army’s latest operating concept describes the challenge in stark terms: As new military technologies are more easily
transferred, potential threats emulate U.S. military capabilities to counter U.S. power projection and limit U.S. freedom of
action. These capabilities include precision-guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles that target traditional U.S. strengths
in the air and maritime domains. Hostile nation-states may attempt to overwhelm defense systems and impose a high cost on
the U.S. to intervene in a contingency or crisis. State and non-state actors apply technology to disrupt U.S. advantages in
communications, long-range precision fires and surveillance.
2. US hegemony is critical to solve great power conflicts.
Robert Kagan, (senior fellow at the Brookings Institution), WASHINGTON POST, June 14, 2018. Retrieved May 6, 2019
from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/donald-trumps-america-the-rogue-superpower/2018/06/14/c01bb540-6ff7-
11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_story.html?utm_term=.799dd0b33707
At the core of that order was a grand bargain. To ensure the global peace that Americans sought after being pulled into
two world wars, the United States became the main provider of security in Europe and East Asia. In Europe, the U.S. security
guarantee made European integration possible and provided political, economic and psychological safeguards against a return
to the continent’s destructive past. In East Asia, the American guarantee ended the cycle of conflict that had embroiled Japan
and China and their neighbors in almost constant warfare since the late 19th century. The security bargain had an economic
dimension. The allies could spend less on defense and more on strengthening their economies and social welfare systems.
This, too, was in line with American goals. The United States wanted allied economies to be strong, to counter extremism on
both the left and right, and to prevent the arms races and geopolitical competitions that had led to past wars. The United States
would not insist on winning every economic contest or every trade deal. The perception by the other powers that they had a
reasonably fair chance to succeed economically and sometimes even to surpass the United States — as Japan, Germany and
other nations did at various times — was part of the glue that held the order together. This bargain was the foundation of a
liberal world order that benefited all participants, including the United States. But it left the United States’ allies vulnerable,
and they remain vulnerable today. They count on the American security guarantee and on access to the United States’ vast
market — its prosperous consumers, financial institutions and innovative entrepreneurs. In the past, U.S. presidents were
unwilling to exploit this leverage. They believed the United States had a stake in upholding the liberal world order, even if it
meant abiding by or paying lip service to international rules and institutions to provide reassurance. The alternative was a
return to the great-power clashes of the past from which the United States could never hope to remain uninvolved. To avoid
a world of war and chaos, the United States was, up to a point, willing to play Gulliver tied down by the Lilliputians’ ropes,
in the interest of reassuring and binding the democratic community together. Europeans and others may have found the United
States selfish and overbearing, too eager to use force and too willing to pursue its goals unilaterally, but even President George
W. Bush’s America cared about them, if only because Americans had learned through painful experience that they had no
choice but to care.
3. Arms sales bolster Russian hegemony.
sendstad.pdf
Second, armaments exports can serve as a useful instrument of foreign policy. By supporting the formation of linkages
with politically aligned states, the Soviet Union used arms sales to expand its spheres of influence and create a more
favourable political and strategic situation. For the Soviet Union, ‘[p]olitical goals were the dominant factor when the decision
to export conventional arms was taken’. Arms exports today help Russia achieve a wide range of national security objectives,
including supporting its image as a global power, maintaining an independent foreign policy, expanding its influence in the
regions to which it is able to export arms, and initiating and strengthening defence relations.
4. Arms exports bolster Russian hegemonic influence.
sendstad.pdf
Indeed, it is this final point that deserves greater attention by researchers in the future. If, as Keith Krause has argued,
arms exports serve as an important tool wielded by states in pursuit of other foreign policy objectives, then it is plausible that
Russia’s strong position in the global arms market might be expected to boost the country’s position in international affairs
more widely. In addition to the economic motives behind arms sales, Krause suggests that arms exports can help states both
in the pursuit of victory in war and in the broader pursuit of power in the international arena. Both motives appear to lie
behind Russian arms exports in a number of cases.
5. Russian arms exports bolster Russian influence with other nations.
sendstad.pdf
In 2012, President Putin stated that arms exports were ‘an effective instrument for advancing [Russia’s] national
interests, both political and economic’. In 2013, the deputy prime minister for the defence industry, Dmitry Rogozin, stated
in even balder terms that the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation – the agency leading arms sales abroad –
was ‘the country’s second foreign policy agency’ and that its objective in selling arms was so that Russia could ‘gain or
increase [its] influence’ in other countries. Emphasizing the role of good political relations in facilitating arms sales, he added
that Russia only sells weapons to ‘friends and partners’. If one of the consequences of arms exports is increased political
influence abroad, then Russia’s performance in this strategic industry is of geopolitical, as well as economic, significance for
the country.
6. Sales of weapons allow Russia to cultivate new relationships with other nations.
sendstad.pdf
Russia’s overall strength as an arms exporter is based on sales to a growing number of countries in different regions of
the world. In the late 1990s, its arms sales were overwhelmingly concentrated in China and India. This caused some concern
in Russia that exports would diminish sharply if either country were able to produce domestic analogues of Russian products,
or if other countries were able to supplant Russian products. However, efforts to cultivate new relationships across the world,
often involving the marketing of advanced weaponry, have proven successful.
7. Arms sales exports increase Russia’s geopolitical power.
sendstad.pdf
When looking at the role arms exports play in supporting the exporter’s pursuit of geopolitical power, Krause states
that the sale of weaponry can help to: provide access to and influence over leaders and elites in recipient states in pursuit of
foreign policy objectives; symbolize commitment to the recipient’s security or stability against internal or external threats;
create or maintain a regional balance of power; create or maintain a regional presence; and provide access to scarce, expensive
or strategic resources. It is likely that at least some of these motives are present in Russia’s sales to countries all over the
world.
8. Russian arms sales expand Russian influence to new regions of the world.
sendstad.pdf
Moreover, the zeal shown by Russian firms in expanding arms exports to countries beyond their traditional client base
– such as to Saudi Arabia, Turkey or the Philippines – is surely as much to do with the possibility of weakening ties between
those countries and their traditional allies in the West. It is in this respect that Russia’s future performance as an arms exporter
might have truly strategic significance. If Russia is able to expand its influence beyond its traditional markets, we should
expect to see Russia’s broader political influence in those regions rise. In this sense, the motives underlying the strenuous
Russian efforts to expand arms exports might well go beyond simple commercial concerns or a desire to place the defence-
industrial complex at the centre of efforts to modernize the Russian economy.

RUSSIA GAINS MILITARY POWER

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RUSSIA DISADVANTAGE

I. THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN WILL LEAD TO MORE RUSSIAN ARMS SALES.

B. WHEN THE US WON’T SELL ARMS TO A COUNTRY, THAT COUNTRY TURNS

C. ARMS EXPORTS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN RUSSIA’S ECONOMY.

E. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION RISKS A NUCLEAR WAR.

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