Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO,

ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V.
MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them
from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.

As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose
M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino
G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC
Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and
Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the
pertinent portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties
thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the
 replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay,
Rizal;

That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on
February 8,1987;

That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day,
February 9. 1987.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.

Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on
March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973
Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned. 1

Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the
designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on
February 25, 1987.

Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping
with the dictates of justice.

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
 SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied
by petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays
to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, 3 and limits
the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the
same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6)
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this
Petition. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51%
shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC.
The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an
international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23, 1995
(reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of
Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or
other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel. . . .
 b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following
conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian
firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First
Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the
full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely
a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions
under which business may be done."9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in
its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the
events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under
the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked
is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had
lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching
bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could
still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to
submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did
not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands
and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has
been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of
a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is
a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by
the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command
the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of
government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed
are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle
and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.14 This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as
they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of

the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to qualified
Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it
clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?

THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to

remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as
against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay
down conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications
on the setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (emphasis supplied by
respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of
powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be
used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional
provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision
is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The
argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19

Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely statements of
principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity
of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values
of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the constitutional provisions on social justice and
human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of
general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the
promotion of total human liberation and development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows
that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms
of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa
loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists
in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to out rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our intelligence in
arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse
for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration
of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese
together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the
hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the
hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-
president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo

amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL
OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we

have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do
we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino.

What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
 MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or
entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read
again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled
entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to

please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND

CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified

and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given
a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —
 MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE
STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-
called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant
of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was
still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic concerns.
It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who
can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino
citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate
preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the
former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected
as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines
so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise
in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall
management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not
self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear
constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning
is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the
Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure to
enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal standards
for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding
the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive
would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive
is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government
operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS
which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this
fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function;" (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when
the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling
51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without
doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements
of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3)
branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed
among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest
bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are
not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions
of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be,
impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being
violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform
with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And
if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither
be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given
factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed
to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since
petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale
only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the
constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have
the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had
matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid
did the latter have a cause of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been
finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there
is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines
and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This
Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty
of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not
the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far
from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference
for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter
could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for
that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic
in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to
economic progress and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the
Court's First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner,
certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again
demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in
contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or
attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the
laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair
and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses,
regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay
even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the
Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic
policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with
sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism,
the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of foreign
investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in
the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer
to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their
official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a
part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical
landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this
epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever
manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What
advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila
Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved
and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino?
This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And
this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of
the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00
per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
 FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee
Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of
Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint
or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
(First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent
House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide
and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body,
has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of
the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment
complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD

1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose,
the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to
perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified
complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S.
Congress where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

GONZALES VS COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed three resolutions which aim to:
• Increase the number of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 members (First Resolution).
• Call a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution (Second Resolution).
• Permit Senators and Congressmen to be members of the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their
seats (Third Resolution).

Subsequently, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4913, which took effect on June 17, 1967. RA 4913 is an Act
submitting to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Congress in
the First and Third Resolutions.

Petitioner Gonzales, as taxpayer, voter and citizen, and allegedly in representation thru class suit of all citizens
of this country, filed this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from
implementing Republic Act 4913 assailing said law as unconstitutional.

Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, non-profit and non-partisan corporation, assails the constitutionality not
only of Republic Act 4913 but also of First and Third Resolutions.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 4913 is constitutional – YES.

2. Whether the submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines violate the spirit of the
Constitution – NO.

RATIO:

1. RA 4913 is constitutional.

The measures undertaken by RA 4913 to inform the populace about the amendments are sufficient under the
Constitution. The Constitution does not forbid the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except
under certain conditions.

2. The submission of the amendments to the people of the Philippines do not violate the spirit of the
Constitution.

People may not be really interested on how the representatives are apportioned among the provinces of the
Philippines as per First Resolution. Those who are interested to know the full details may enlighten themselves
by reading copies of the amendments readily available in the polling places. On the matter of Third Resolution,
the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that it permits
Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of
delegates to the Convention.

NOTE: The majority voted that the Resolutions and RA 4913 were unconstitutional but they did not reach
specific number of votes to invalidate these congressional acts under the 1935 Constitution, which is two-thirds
of the Supreme Court.

Imbong vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

RAUL M. GONZALES vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar
Facts:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132
by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional
amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance
with the Revised Election Code. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention
“shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House of
Representatives,” 1 “and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution.” 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied
in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I
of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
Issue:
1. Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention;
2. Whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
Decision:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore,
specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
Ratio:
– Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for
the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
– Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such
apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more
representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of
delegates I other provinces with more population.
– Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling
elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
– Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity
since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This
provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Fernando “ I find it difficult to reconcile the decision reached insofar as the aforesaid ban on political
parties and civic, professional and other organizations is concerned with the explicit provision that the freedom
to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. 2 The right of an
individual to join others of a like persuasion to pursue common objectives and to engage in activities is
embraced within if not actually encouraged by the regime of liberty ordained by the Constitution. This
particular freedom has an indigenous cast, its origin being traceable to the Malolos Constitution.

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions 1proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine
Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing
as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not
the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, such an
approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but nothing else. It is in fact self defeating, for if such were
indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold and apply
that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are
the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For
reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.

The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13
respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment on
the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly argued on March 26 by
petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent data in
amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for decision.

It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It
served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into
force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for
instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the
fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial
review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors
Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may
not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an
affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit
of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court
has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely
two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may
be cited. 13

2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how
it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the
number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission. As
was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by
unconstitutionality.

(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the
1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall
have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof." 14One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the
Article on Amendments. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and
Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its
authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions
now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the
question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In Occena v.
Commission on Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was
involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio
in that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution extending
the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy
(70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it
cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendment." 17

(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character
that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of
the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote
from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to
dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments
to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based
on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the
people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the
new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no
argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the
entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 19 There is here
the adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent body
can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed to deviate from such a principle not only
sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for
proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their favor. The
language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would
be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body
applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is
not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in
this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover,
even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was
obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved
by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and
the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged
infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of
such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained
that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the
way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus
within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for
the people being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of
Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the judiciary, the
proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as
well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Tolentino V COMELEC

G.R No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:

The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in
its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution
No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC
"resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the
senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1
and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.

HELD:

NO.

All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has
to form a harmonious whole.

In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them
cannot comply with this requirement.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
PABLO C. SANIDAD AND PABLITO C. SANIDAD VS HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS & HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
G.R. NO. L-44640
OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 to call for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 through the so-called Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”). Its primary
purpose is to resolve the issues of martial law (as to its existence and length of effectivity).

On September 22, the president issued another proclamation (P.D. 1033) to specify the questions that are to be
asked during the referendum on October 16. The first question is whether or not the citizen wants martial law to
continue, and the second one asks for the approval on several proposed amendments to the existing Constitution.
The COMELEC was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the national referendum in October 16.

Father and son, Pablo and Pablito Sanidad filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, and to declare without force
and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution.

Another petitioner, Vicente Guzman filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction, asserting that the power to
propose amendments or revisions of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred to the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Another set of petitioners, Raul Gonzales and Alfredo Salapantan sought to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. They assert that the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution and a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.

The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite
a nullity. To lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year
olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those
citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.

The Solicitor General contends that petitioners have no standing to sue, and that the issue raised is political in
nature – and thus it cannot be reviewed by the court. The Solicitor General also asserts that at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-
plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: WON the issue poses a justiciable question (specifically on the constitutionality of PDs 991 and 1033).

HELD: YES. 7 Justices of the Court held that the issue is a justiciable question, while only 3 maintained it was
of political nature and thus not justiciable.

The Court did not agree with the Solicitor General’s contention that the issue is a political one. This is because
the 1973 Constitution expressly provided that the power to propose amendments to the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition.
After that transition period, and when the regular National Assembly is in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly. The normal course has not
been followed.

Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the president undertook
the proposal of amendments through Presidential Decree 1033 and in effect, through a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the irregularity of the amendment procedure raises a contestable issue.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, et al .

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to
continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which
resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists
of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various
negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority
and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation
with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining
to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory
of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and
authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as
―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the
MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order
No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing
of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right
to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to
the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy
of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information
on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public
affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity
of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle,
it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters
of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions
involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the
absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these
freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as
a species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the
duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is
manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further
enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s
participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensivepeace process is that it ―should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be
defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one
community. Included as a component of the comprehensivepeace process is consensus-building
and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in
the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O.
No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues
with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace
process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential
Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners
and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of
the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on
peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda,
as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-
AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to
the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present
ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would
be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD,
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this
concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in
paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the
last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government.

3. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative
relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-
AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal
context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term
―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure
the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the
continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental
protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall
Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status
of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed,
the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does
it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of
the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM
during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically
part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned
municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion
in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD
is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
 associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine
territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between
the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect.
The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way
that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, (G)

G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

FACTS:

 December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative.
 Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order directing Delfin
to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the notice of hearing in
three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense and setting the case for hearing on 12
December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
 December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
 December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative,
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided
for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
 December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents conducting a signature drive
for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
 January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They argue therein that R.A
No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to propose amendments to the
constitution.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
 No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
 First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest
an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to
amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."
 Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements
as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
 Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
 Lambino vs COMELEC

 G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

 FACTS:

 On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

 The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

 The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

 On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

 The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

 ISSUES:
 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

 HELD:

 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

 Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

 Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

 The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.”

 The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.

 These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

 There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.

 The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006.

 2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

 The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.