9 (a)

No.

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being
of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate interests." Thus, "in cases
in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children’s well-being.
(Spark vs. Quezon City)

(b)

No.

The Curfew ordinances merely restrict, and not infringe the minors’ fundamental rights,
which, under the law, are not absolute.

Grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically, on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution
itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health;
and (2) are provided by law.

10 (a)

Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present:

(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first

A first jeopardy attaches only

(a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and
(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent

(b)

D’s Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double
jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial. Double jeopardy may attach when the
proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial.

In the present case, the order of dismissal which has attained finality, although made at
the instance of the accused and with his express consent, was based on a violation of his
right to speedy trial. Thus, it falls under the exceptions wherein double jeopardy will
attach.