D.
DUTY OF FIDELITY client was the lawful owner of the property, respondent issued the ejectment letters, which were
VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA,
CELEDONIO ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO vs. ATTY. ANGELITO
VILLARIN
Before this Court is a consolidated administrative complaint against herein respondent, Angelita Villarin, for
allegedly harassing complainants through the demand letters he sent to them.
The facts are as follows: The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision
against the subdivision's owner and developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto Bassig.
In the final adjudication of that case on 11 October 2000, the HLURB ordered the respondents therein to
accept the payments of the buyers under the old purchase price. These buyers included some of the
complainants in the instant case, to wit: Florentina Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo
Villamin.
The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer Certificates
of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the
property.
Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and executory.
Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.1 It was at this point that respondent Villarin entered his
special appearance to represent Purence Realty.2 Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the
Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution3 for being null and void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due
to the improper service of summons on his client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB.4
On 4 December 2003, respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.5 In all of these letters, he
demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty within five days from
receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action against them.
True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Trinidad,6 Lander,7 Casubuan8 and Mendoza.9 Aggrieved, the four
complainants filed an administrative case against respondent.10 A month after, Alojado, Villamin and
Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent.11
As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)12 and affirmed by its Board of
Governors,13 complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that the demand letters sent by
Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that the letters also
contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the subdivision lots.
Considering that these two actions were related, Villarin moved for the consolidation of the administrative
cases, and his motion was granted by the IBP commissioner.14
In his PositionPaper,15 Villarin denied the allegations of harassment and claimed that no malice attended the
sending of the demand letters. He narrated that when he inquired at the HLURB, he was informed that his
client did not receive a summons pertinent to the Complaint for specific damages. With this information, he
formed the conclusion that the HLURB Decision was void and not binding on Purence Realty. Since his
indispensable in an action for unlawful detainer. Moreover, he insisted that the addressees of the letters
were different from the complainants who had filed the case with the HLURB.
Hence, the pertinent issue in this consolidated case is whether respondent should be administratively
sanctioned for sending the demand letters despite a final and executory HLURB Decision directing, not the
ejectment of complainants, but the payment of the purchase price of the lots by the subdivision buyers.
Prefatorily, this Court affirms the factual finding of the IBP16 that of complainants herein, only Florentina
Lander, Celedonio Alojado, Aurea Tolentino and Rosendo Villamin were listed as the subdivision lot buyers
who were parties to the HLURB case; and that Verleen Trinidad, Wally Casubuan and Minerva Mendoza
were non-parties who could not claim any right pursuant to the Decision in that case.
Proceeding to the contested demand letters, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP board of governors
that the issuance thereof was not malicious.17 According to its Report,18 respondent counsel merely acted on
his legal theory that the HLURB Decision was not binding on his client, since it had not received the
summons. Espousing the belief that the proceedings in the HLURB were void, Villarin pursued the issuance
of demand letters as a prelude to the ejectment case he would later on file to protect the property rights of
his client.
As the lawyer of Purence Realty, respondent is expected to champion the cause of his client with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.19 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense20 – including the institution of an ejectment case – that is recognized by our
property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, we held that in the full discharge of their duties to the client,
lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease the general public.21
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform their
duty to the client within the bounds of law.22 They should only make such defense only when they believe it
to be honestly debatable under the law.23 In this case, respondent’s act of issuing demand letters, moved by
the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to
vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment.24 Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or
chicanery prohibited by the Code,25just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
Even so, respondent cannot be considered free of error. The factual findings of the IBP board of governors
reveal that in his demand letter, he brazenly typified one of the complainants, Florentina Lander, as an illegal
occupant. However, this description is the exact opposite of the truth, since the final and executory HLURB
Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer who had a right to complete her payments in
order to occupy her property. Respondent is very much aware of this ruling when he filed an Omnibus
Motion to set aside the HLURB Decision and the appurtenant Writ of Execution.
Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the HLURB Decision, he thus
advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. What he
does is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and
offer in evidence any document that they know is false.26
Considering the present circumstances, we agree with the 14 May 2011 Resolution of the IBP board of
governors that the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning is appropriate. Notably, no motion for
reconsideration27 was filed by either of the parties. Thus, by virtue of the rules for disbarment of attorneys,
the case is deemed terminated.28 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin
1
is REPRIMANDED with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely. SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES NICASIO DONELITA SAN PEDRO vs. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA
For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro (complainants)
against Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza (respondent).1 This case involves a determination of whether respondent
violated his duty to hold in trust all moneys and properties of the client; his duty to account for all funds and
property collected or received for or from the client; and his duty to deliver the funds and property of the
client when due or upon demand under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts are summarized as follows: On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the services
of respondent to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants.2 Complainants then gave respondent a check for ₱68,250.00 for the payment of transfer
taxes.3 They also gave respondent a check for ₱13,800.00 for respondent’s professional fee.4
Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants’ repeated follow-ups.5
Several letters were sent by respondent explaining the delay in the transfer of title.6 However, respondent
still failed to produce the title.
Complainants subsequently referred the case to the barangay.7 Respondent refused to return the amount
complainants gave for the transfer taxes.8 Complainants were then issued a certificate to file action.9 They
also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money intended for the transfer taxes.10 Respondent still did
not return the money.
On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants. He promised to settle the transfer of the
land title.11However, respondent reneged on this promise.12 Complainants were then forced to obtain a loan
from Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company to secure the transfer of the title to the
property in their names.13
Respondent contested the allegations of complainants. According to him, it was complainants who caused
the three-year delay in the transfer of title to complainants’ names. Complainants were not able to furnish
respondent several important documents: (a) original copy of the deed of extrajudicial petition; (b) affidavit of
publication with the clippings of the published item in a newspaper of general circulation; and (c) a barangay
certificate from the barangay where the property is located as required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.14
In addition, respondent argued that complainants paid him the measly sum of ₱13,800.00 despite all the
work he did for them, including facilitating the sale of the property. These involved "being-pulled from the
office four or five times to discuss . . . the details of the transaction [with the sellers]; going twice to the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna[,] Branch 24, to expedite the . . . issuance of a [n]ew owner’s duplicate
copy of the title; going twice to the office of the Register of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna to make verification
and submit the court [o]rder; [and facilitating the] preparation and notarization of the Deed of Absolute
Sale."15
Respondent also claimed that retention of the money is justified owing to his receivables from complainants
for the services he rendered in various cases:
1) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas, for Forcible
Entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 2004 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Santa Rosa, Laguna.
This case was dismissed by the Honorable Court for alleged lack of jurisdiction, the issue of
possession being intertwined with that of ownership;
2) In the case of Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro versus Severo Basbas for Accion
Publiciana docketed as Civil Case No. B-5386 raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna[,] Branch 25;
3) In Civil Case No. B-4503 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro et
al., for nullity of title, [r]econveyance with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
directed specifically to herein complainant. This case was assigned to the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna[.] Respondent, for and in behalf of herein complainant, submitted an
[a]nswer and [o]pposition to the prayer for issuance of the injunction, which was favorably acted
upon. Consequently[,] the case was dismissed by the Court[;]
4) In Civil Case No. B-688 entitled Basbas versus Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro et
al., for [r]e-partition and [r]econveyance, which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna, Branch 24[;] [and]
5) Likewise, respondent represented herein complainant in [an] ESTAFA case they [filed]
against Greg Ramos and Benjamin Corsino, which case, as per reliable source, was
discontinued by complainant after the civil aspect of the same was amicably
settled.16 Respondent further alleged that complainants challenged him to prove his worth as a
lawyer by doing away with the requirements and expediting the cancellation of the Marcaidas’
title.17
The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.18 The parties were then called to a mandatory conference before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.19 They were required to submit their position papers.20 Respondent did not
submit his position paper.21
On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador B. Hababag, submitted his findings and
recommendation. The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16, Rules
16.0122 and 16.0323 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner found that both checks issued to respondent were encashed despite
respondent’s failure to facilitate the release of the title in the name of complainants.24 Complainants had to
obtain a loan to facilitate the transfer of title in their names.25
Moreover, respondent admitted his liability in his letters to complainants.26 Complainant Nicasio San Pedro’s
affidavit of desistance is immaterial.27
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the disciplinary action of "censure and warning," hence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the disciplinary sanction of
CENSURE and WARNING be given the respondent with the admonition that he be extremely careful of his
acts to forego severe penalty in the future.28
In the Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It held:
2
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent’s violation of Canon 16, [Rule]
16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he failed to effect the transfer of
property despite encashment of the two checks, Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months and Ordered to Returnthe amount of Sixty Eight Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty (₱68,250.00) Pesos to complainants within thirty days from receipt of notice.29 (Emphasis, italics, and
underscoring in the original)
On November 14, 2008, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration.30 The IBP Board of Governors
denied respondent’s motion in the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason
to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399 dated August 14, 2008
is hereby AFFIRMED.31 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
On December 11, 2013, this court resolved to note the following: (a) Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-399
dated August 14, 2008 of the IBP Board of Governors; (b) Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June
22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors;and (c) IBP’s letter dated October 7, 2013 transmitting the
documents pertaining to the case.32
In the manifestation and motion dated October 25,2013, respondent requested for a formal hearing,
reasoning that he "wants to exercise his right to confront his accusers [to] cross[-]examine them and that of
their witness."33 The manifestation and motion was denied by this court in the resolution dated September
22, 2014.34
The main issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his clients.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this case, this court resolves to adopt and
approve the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-839 dated June 22, 2013 of the IBP Board of Governors.
It has been said that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards
oflegal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal
profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."35
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a
criminal prosecution.
A lawyer’s duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is clear:
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from the client[,] [thus] . . . [w]hen a lawyer collects or
receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he
does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either
to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
[The lawyer’s] failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.36(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of property to complainants’
name.1âwphi1 He continuously assured complainants that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three
(3) years and several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the task given to him
and even refused to return the money. Complainants’ alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to
effect the transfer does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s assertion of a valid lawyer’s lien is also untenable. A valid retaining lien has the following
elements:
An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-
client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied
claim for attorney’s fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account
between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come
into the attorney’s possession in the course of his employment.37
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He did not present evidence as to an
unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants remains
unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees, lawyers cannot validly retain their
client’s funds or properties.38
3
Furthermore, assuming that respondent had proven all the requisites for a valid retaining lien, he cannot On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12 Atty. Margallo
appropriate for himself his client's funds without the proper accounting and notice to the client. The rule is advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.13
that when there is "a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer . . . the
lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees .... "39
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.14 On
December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s Brief. Ramirez notified Atty.
We also note that despite complainant Nicasio San Pedro's affidavit of desistance dated March 14, 2008, Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.15
both complainants signed their comment to respondent's motion for reconsideration and prayed that the
motion be dismissed for lack of merit.40
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo
informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.16
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months. He is also ordered to RETURN to complainants the amount of ₱68,250.00 with 6% legal interest
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there was still no
from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to this
word from the Court of Appeals.17
court proof of payment of the amount within 10 days from payment. Let a copy of this resolution be entered
in respondent Atty. Isagani A. Mendoza's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be
served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied.18 She told him that
the courts in the land. SO ORDERED. the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father,
which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since
the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant vs. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO
had already lapsed.20

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their clients.
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13,
Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without need for reminders. The
2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.21
privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the
case as if it were their own. The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be
disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
acquaintance. The professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance Codeof Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had agreed to take
by counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono. on the case for free, save for travel expense of ₱1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had
candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case.23 She
denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal, terminating the case
land subject of the controversy.
of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it appear that the case was dismissed on
the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of
candor to her client. Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had
begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for document signing on
January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had
This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules
been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals
of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
was due to losing her client’s number because her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and
accidentally erased all her contacts.26
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated capacity to conduct
Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5 The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty.
Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties then
appeared and were directed to submit their position papers.29 Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva
In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern warning that her next
the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo’s services
infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.30 This was based on his two key findings.
as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v. Ramirez." 7 The case was
First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming that
initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8
Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to protect the interest
of her client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a friend Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.32
of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on the condition that she
be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees.10 It was also agreed upon that
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo ₱1,000.00 per court appearance.11
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors

4
resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on July 16, 2013.34 In the Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s
Motion for Reconsideration and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for
two (2) years.35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the Rules of
Court.36She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe considering that she had
been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first
time a Complaint was filed against her.37 Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for
Reconsideration previously filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s
Petition for Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty.
Margallo filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This court’s ruling: The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and confidence."41 Lawyers are
expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They
commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high
degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying
client or an indigent litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03
- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his absence in
a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for resolution. This was
aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals,
thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions amounted
to gross negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the
required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.. . . .
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing
and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such
negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the
lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable
but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case and left
him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the
merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the
requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal
is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an
admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is contrary to
what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their authority or
power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry
between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must attend
to that may not be known by the principal.
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney client relationship. Lawyers are
expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their relevance in relation
to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client. It
can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their
jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that
receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer
and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true
that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is
only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and accountability
of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late.
Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or
negligence. Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it
is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross
negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months.
In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which
resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence,
suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-
trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In
Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons
17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a
period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
5
Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in court to protect his
legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her
alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must
actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.46 Under the
current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional
powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is
worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers.
This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a current need in
the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard
for its members' conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of
candor is reprehensible.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND
AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This
decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE vs. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated May 9, 2006 filed by complainant Eduardo A.
Maglente (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty. Delfin R.
Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), praying that the latter be directed to return the amount of P48,000he.00 that
received from the former.
The Facts: Complainant, as President of "Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated''
(Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in order to
determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan.2 In connection therewith,
he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be
instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment executed by respondent himself.3 Despite the
payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money
given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court.4 Thus, complainant asked for the return of
the money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more money.5 Complainant
further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut
up because it was not his money in the first place.6 Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint
seeking the return of the full amount he had paid to respondent.
In his defense,7 respondent denied spending complainant’s money, explaining that he had already prepared
the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately
relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed. While waiting, however,
the instant administrative case was filed against him.8
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated October 3, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and accordingly,
recommended that he be: (a) meted with the penalty of Censure, with a warning that a repetition of the same
will be met with a stiffer penalty; and (b) directed to account for or return the amount of 48,000.00 to
complainant.10
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly received the amount of 48,000.00 from
complainant, which was intended to answer for the filing fees of a case he was supposed to file for
the Samahan, but which he failed to do so.11 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that
had respondent prepared the complaint and performed research works, as he claimed, then he could have
kept a reasonable amount for his effort under the doctrine of quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he could not
present any proof in this respect.12
In a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty from Censure to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. Aggrieved, respondent moved for
reconsideration14 which was, however, denied in a Resolution15 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP,
except as to the penalty to be imposed upon respondent.1âwphi1
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the CPR,17 which reads:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
[therewith] shall render him liable.1âwphi1
In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of 48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees.
Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that
the money he received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund the amount of 48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz.:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
6
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. x x
xx
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render
an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client.18 A lawyer’s failure to
return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is
indicative of his lack of integrity,19 as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession
commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment,20 and hence, must be
disciplined accordingly.
Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty to be
imposed.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same
time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted out the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his
client and to return the money given to him by the latter.22 Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,23 the same
penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal service to his client as well as to return the
money he received for such purpose.24 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate that
respondent be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of 48,000.00 to
complainant. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should
only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it
must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature–
for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate
and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."25 Since the aforesaid amount
was intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to the lawyer- client relationship between
complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.26
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Delfin R. Agcaoili, Jr. (respondent), is found GUILTY of violating Rules
16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon
his receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Eduardo A. Maglente the amount of
48,000.00 he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to
comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.SO ORDERED.
RE: DECISION DATED AUGUST 19, 2008, 3RD DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
79904 [HON. DIONISIO DONATO T. GARCIANO, ET AL. V. HON. PATERNO G. TIAMSON, ETC., ET
AL.] v. ATTY. JOSE DE G. FERRER
This administrative complaint1 originated from the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated August 19, 2008, which
summarily dismissed the Petition for Certiorari with prejudice and found petitioners3 in CA-G.R. SP No.
79904, as well as their counsel, Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer), guilty of direct contempt of
court.4 They were further imposed a fine of P2,000.00.5 The Court of Appeals then ordered that a copy of its
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and appropriate disciplinary
action against Atty. Ferrer, respondent in the present case.6
On July 27, 2001, Dionisio Donato T. Garciano (Garciano), then Mayor of Baras, Rizal, sought to appoint
Rolando Pilapil Lacayan (Lacayan) as Sangguniang Bayan Secretary, replacing Nolasco Vallestero
(Vallestero).7 The appointment was opposed by Wilfredo Robles (Robles), then Vice Mayor of Baras, Rizal.
He said that the position is not vacant and that it is the vice mayor, not the mayor, who has the authority8 to
appoint the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.
Garciano insisted and removed Vallestero's name from the payroll.9 Vallestero sued Garciano before the
Sandiganbayan.10 Vallestero, Robles, and other Sangguniang Bayan members also filed a "complaint for
mandamus and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction"11 against Garciano and other municipal
officials12 (Garciano, et al.) before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They sought for the payment of
their respective salaries.13
On June 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court14 ordered Garciano, et al. to release the funds and pay
Vallestero's salaries and other benefits.15 Garciano, et al. did not heed the Regional Trial Court's
order;16hence, they were found liable for indirect contempt.17
Appealing the trial court's ruling, Garciano, et al., through their counsel, Atty. Ferrer, filed a Petition for
Certiorari (First Petition) on October 9, 2003 before the Court of Appeals.18 This was raffled to the Eleventh
Division19 and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752.20
On October 16, 2003, Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed another Petition for Certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order21 (Second Petition)
before the Court of Appeals. This was raffled to the Third Division22 and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79904.23
On the same day, Garciano, et al. filed before the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Withdraw Petition Under Rule 17 Section 124 of the Revised Rules of Court.25 They allegedly
moved to withdraw the First Petition to avail themselves of other remedies, especially since a comment had
not yet been filed.26
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals Third Division27 issued a temporary restraining order, effective for
60 days and conditioned upon the posting of a bond amounting to P100,000.00.28
Meanwhile, in its Resolution dated October 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division granted
Garciano, et al.'s Motion to withdraw the First Petition.29
In their Reply to the Comment on the Second Petition, Garciano, et al. admitted filing the First Petition
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79752, which was similar to the Second Petition.30 However, they maintained
that the withdrawal of the First Petition was made in good faith and in order to correct the technical defect of
the First Petition, which was solely verified by Garciano.31
Garciano, et al. insisted that they did not commit perjury when they stated in the verification of their Second
Petition that there was no pending petition filed involving the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court.32 Garciano, et al. also argued that when they withdrew the First Petition, there was no adverse opinion
7
yet issued by the Eleventh Division.33 Finally, they claimed that the divisions of the Court of Appeals are not
different courts in relation to the other divisions, and both divisions where the Petitions were filed are part
and parcel of one court.34 Hence, there was no forum shopping.
In the Decision dated August 19, 2008, the Court of Appeals Third Division dismissed the Second Petition
with prejudice due to the deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping.35 The Court of Appeals
found that Garciano, et al., through Atty. Ferrer, filed two (2) Petitions for Certiorari successively.36 It also
held that the withdrawal of the First Petition was "intended to camouflage the glaring and blatant irregularity
committed"37 by Garciano, et al. through their counsel.38 If the withdrawal was, indeed, impelled by the lack
of verification of the other petitioners in the First Petition, then Garciano, et al. should have called the
attention of the Eleventh Division instead of filing the Second Petition.39 The Court of Appeals held that when
the Second Petition was filed (and the existence of the First Petition concealed), forum shopping had already
been committed.40cralawred
The Court of Appeals further held that neither the adjudication of cases pending before courts nor the
contents of these cases are taken judicial notice by the courts, notwithstanding that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.41 Rather, it is the party and the counsel's duty to
inform the court trying the case of any pendency of a similar case filed before any court.42 Violation of this
rule makes the parties and their counsel guilty of forum shopping.43 The Court of Appeals reiterated that the
rule against forum shopping seeks to avoid the issuance of conflicting decisions by two (2) or more courts
upon the same issue.44
The Court of Appeals concluded:
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WHEREFORE, the petition is summarily Dismissed with prejudice. Petitioners and Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer
are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of court for which a maximum fine of P2,000.00 is imposed upon
them, payable within 5 days from receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
appropriate disciplinary action against Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer.45(Emphasis in the original)
In the Indorsement dated September 1, 2008, Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, Director for Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, forwarded the Notice of Judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR S.P.
No. 79904 to the Office of the Bar Confidant.46
On November 19, 2008, this court resolved to note the Indorsement and treat the Notice of Judgment as an
administrative complaint against Atty. Ferrer.47
Atty. Ferrer was ordered to comment on the administrative complaint.48 In his Comment, he states that he
acted in good faith in the simultaneous filing of the Second Petition and the urgent ex-parte Motion to
withdraw Garciano, et al.'s First Petition49 He alleges that he withdrew the First Petition docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 79752 on October 16, 2003, the same day he filed the Second Petition docketed as CA-GR. S.P No.
79904.50
Atty. Ferrer states that there was an urgent need to file the Second Petition as the First Petition was verified
by only one petitioner instead of four.51 He also claims that the technical defect may have hampered the
immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order.52 Thus, he deems that it was "more realistic and
expedient" to file the Second Petition and simultaneously withdraw the First Petition rather than amend the
First Petition.53 He states that amending the First Petition would have required a hearing before it could be
admitted as basis for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.54
Atty. Ferrer adds that by filing the Motion to withdraw the First Petition on the same day as the filing of the
Second Petition, he substantially complied with the rule against forum shopping.55 He asserts that he was
acting in the best interest of his clients, whose "liberty [were] then at stake and time was of the
essence."56 As the withdrawal of the First Petition and the filing of the Second Petition were made
simultaneously and not one day after another, Atty. Ferrer claims that it was unlikely to have conflicting
decisions rendered by different courts on the same issue.57
Finally, Atty. Ferrer states that there was no violation of the rule against forum shopping because the First
and Second Petitions were not filed before different tribunals, although the Eleventh and Third Divisions of
the Court of Appeals are technically separate from each other.58 He states that forum shopping takes place
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than appeal or
certiorari) in another.59 Atty. Ferrer further asserts that the filing of the case took place before only one forum
�the Court of Appeals � and that no forum shopping could be considered to have taken place.60
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 17, 2009, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag
(Commissioner Hababag) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the
findings of the Court of Appeals in toto.61 He stated that the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 19,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79904 is "loud and clear."62
Based on the Court of Appeals' findings, Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Ferrer clearly violated
the rule on forum shopping.63 Thus, he recommended that Atty. Ferrer be suspended for three (3) months
from the practice of law with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more
severely.64
On February 13, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-
2013-132,65 which resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Hababag. It recommended that the penalty of Atty. Ferrer be reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the
same act shall be dealt with more severely.66 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline then transmitted the Notice of Resolution to this court through a letter dated October 7, 2013.67
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer should be held administratively liable
for violating the rule against forum shopping.
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Hababag. Respondent is guilty of violating the rule against forum shopping.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rule against forum shopping:
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Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. � The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,68 this court enumerated the instances where forum
shopping takes place:
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There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
8
adversely by some other court." The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were
explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
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Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is
litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).69 (Citations omitted)
In Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co, Inc.,70 the court elaborated on the purpose of the rule against forum
shopping:
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The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent
tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a
variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, this Court strictly adheres to the rules against forum shopping,
and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case.71ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer. All the
elements necessary for the commission of forum shopping are present.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent could have easily filed a manifestation that the other
petitioners had yet to verify the First Petition. Respondent's reason that the failure of other petitioners to
verify the First Petition may imperil the issuance of a temporary restraining order cannot justify the willful
violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Respondent must be reminded that the withdrawal of any case, when it has been duly filed and docketed
with a court, rests upon the discretion of the court, and not at the behest of litigants.72 Once a case is filed
before a court and the court accepts the case, the case is considered pending and is subject to that court's
jurisdiction.
Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to inform the court or division where he subsequently filed his
Second Petition that he had already filed the First Petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that courts
cannot take judicial notice of actions that have been filed either before their courts or before other courts.
This court's Circular No. 28-91 is instructive on this point:
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[I]n every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the petitioner . . . must certify under
oath all of the following facts or undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agencies; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is such other
action or proceeding pending, he must state the status of the same; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and such other tribunal or agency of that fact within five (5) days therefrom. (Emphasis
supplied).73ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to anticipate the possibility of being held liable for forum shopping. He is
expected to be aware of actions constituting forum shopping. Respondent's defense of substantial
compliance and good faith cannot exonerate him. The elements of forum shopping are expected to be
fundamentally understood by members of the bar, and a defense of good faith cannot counter an abject
violation of the rule.
In Alonso v. Relamida, Jr.,74 the court elaborated on the liability of counsel who was complicit in violating the
rule on forum shopping:
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The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists
when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when
he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of
obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:
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... (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of
court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays
the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for
not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and
honor.75 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
As we stated in Alonso, the incompetence of counsel in not knowing any better justifies the imposition of
administrative liability. Respondent himself admitted that he was responsible for the withdrawal of the
pending First Petition and the filing of the Second Petition, in the belief that it was in the best interest of his
clients. This court cannot tolerate respondent's inability to realize that his actions would amount to forum
shopping. Respondent had full knowledge that when he filed the Second Petition, it concerned the same
parties and same cause of action.
As for his administrative liability, this court deems it necessary to modify the penalty recommended in
Resolution No. XX-2013-132 and impose on respondent the penalty of six (6) months' suspension from legal
practice. In Alonso, this court suspended the lawyer for six (6) months and warned him not to repeat his
infraction.76
The Lawyers' Oath that respondent took exhorts him not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."77 Moreover, in Teodoro v. Atty.
Gonzales:78
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He
also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition
against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.79ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose De G. Ferrer is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months for engaging in forum shopping, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same and similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
AVIDA LAND CORPORATION(FORMERLY LAGUNA PROPERTIES HOLDINGS, INC.) vs. ATTY. AL C.
ARGOSINO
The only issue before Us is whether respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused delay in the
execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
In its questioned Resolution1 , the Board of Governors (Board) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner,3 who found
9
respondent guilty of violating Canon 12, Rule 12.044 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying
the enforcement of a writ of execution, and recommended that the latter be reprimanded or censured with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same behavior in the future shall merit a harsher penalty.5
Antecedent Facts: Complainant is a Philippine corporation engaged in the development and sale of
subdivision houses and lots.6Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development Corporation
(Rodman).7
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman,8 under which the latter was to acquire from the
former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event that such
financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full contract price of ₱4,4 l 2,254.00, less
the downpayment of ₱l,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of the loan disapproval.9
After settling the downpayment, Rodman took possession of the property.10
In three separate letters11 , complainant demanded that Rodman pay the outstanding balance of
P3,088,577.80.12Both parties agreed that the amount would be paid on a deferred basis within 18 months.13
Rodman made a partial payment of ₱404,782.56 on 22 March 1999. It also claimed to have made other
payments amounting to ₱1,458,765.06 from March 1999 to July 1999, which complainant disputed.14
Consequently, complainant rescinded the Contract to Sell by notarial act, and demanded that Rodman
vacate the subject property.15
As Rodman remained in possession of the property,16
complainant filed an unlawful detainer case against
the former before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City.17
Soon after, Rodman filed a Complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) seeking
the nullification of the rescission of the Contract to Sell. It also prayed for the accounting of payments and the
fixing of the period upon which the balance of the purchase price should be paid.18
The MTC took cognizance of Rodman's HLURB Complaint, and dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.19
HLURB Regional Office No. IV (HLURB Regional Office), through its arbiter Atty. Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino,
similarly dismissed Rodman's Complaint and ordered it to pay damages and attorney's fees.20 Rodman
appealed the ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board). 21
In its subsequent Decision,22 the HLURB Board modified the arbiter's ruling, directing Rodman "to
immediately pay its outstanding balance failing in which respondent shall have the right to rescind the
contract subject to a refund of all the sums paid by complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the
contract and less monthly compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1 % of the contract price
per month."23
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 of the HLURB Board's Decision, questioning the order to
refund the sums paid by Rodman less deductions in case of a rescission of the contract. Rodman filed a
Comment/Opposition25 to complainant's motion and sought a clarification of certain aspects of the
Decision, 26 but did not move for reconsideration.
The HLURB Board thereafter issued a Resolution27 modifying its earlier Decision.1âwphi1 Thus:
x x x [T]he complainant (Rodman) is directed to immediately pay to the respondent (herein complainant) its
outstanding balance of ₱l,814,513.27, including interests and penalties which may have accrued in the
meantime, failing in which, the respondent shall have the right to rescind the contract subject to a refund of
all the sums paid by the complainant less deductions as may be stipulated in the contract and less monthly
compensation for the use of the premises at the rate of 1 % of the contract price per month.
As neither of the parties appealed the judgment within the period allowed, it became final and executory.
The parties thereafter attempted to arrive at a settlement on the judgment, but their efforts were in
vain. 28 With the judgment award still not satisfied after the lapse of six months, complainant filed a motion
for writs of execution and possession29 before the HLURB Board. Respondent filed an Opposition/Comment
on the motion and subsequently a Rejoinder30 to complainant's Reply. 31
In an Order32 dated 10 August 2006, the HLURB Board granted complainant's motion and remanded the
case records to the HLURB Regional Office for proceedings on the execution of the judgment and/or other
appropriate disposition.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Order dated 10 August 2006, 33 raising issues on the
computation of interests. Complainant filed an Opposition34 and Rejoinder,35 to which respondent filed a
Reply36 and Sur-rejoinder 37
On 17 January 2007, the HLURB Board issued an Order38 denying Rodman's Motion for Reconsideration. It
said that the computation of interests and penalties, as well as other matters concerning the implementation
of the final and executory Decision, shall be dealt with in the execution proceedings before the Regional
Office. It furthermore enjoined the parties from filing any pleading in the guise of an appeal on collateral
issues or questions already passed upon.39
On 5 March 2007, respondent filed a Motion for Computation of Interest40 before the HLURB Regional
Office, citing the disagreement between the parties as to the reckoning date of the accrual of interest.
Complainant filed its Opposition with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Possession.41 In its
Order42 dated 31 July 2007, the HLURB Regional Office accordingly computed the interest due, arriving at
the total amount of ₱2,685,479.64 as payment due to complainant. It also directed the issuance of a Writ of
Execution implementing the HLURB Board's earlier Resolution.43
Instead however of complying with the Order and the Writ of Execution, 44 respondent, on behalf of Rodman,
filed a Motion (1) to Quash the Writ of Execution; (2) for Clarification; and (3) to Set the Case for
Conference.45 The said motion injected new issues and claims and demanded the inclusion in the Order of a
"provision that upon actual receipt of the amount of ₱2,685,479.64, [complainant] should simultaneously
turn-over the duplicate original title to Rodman." (Emphasis omitted)
Respondent also filed a Petition46 to Cite Complainant in Contempt for issuing a demand letter to Rodman
despite the pendency of the latter's Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.
On 7 November 2007, the HLURB Regional Office summoned the parties to a conference to thresh out the
problems with the execution of the writ. The conference, however, failed to serve its purpose.
10
Respondent thereafter moved for the inhibition of Atty. Aquino as arbiter of the case and for the setting of a
hearing on the Petition to Cite Complainant in Contempt.47 The motion alleged that Arbiter Aquino had
shown bias in favor of complainant, and that she had failed to set the Petition for hearing.48
In an Order dated 23 April 2008,49 the HL URB Regional Office (1) denied the motion for inhibition; (2)
granted complainant's Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Writ of Possession; and (3)
directed complainant to comment on the Petition citing the latter for contempt.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, reiterating that Arbiter Aquino should
inhibit herself from the case because of her bias. Arbiter Aquino eventually yielded and ordered the re-raffle
of the case, which went to Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda.
When complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Pending Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution, respondent submitted his vehement Opposition. He insisted that his Motion to be
Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle should be acted upon first and argued that "the merits of the instant case
as well as the motions filed in relation thereto must be re-evaluated by the new handling arbiter after the re-
raffling x x x."
On 5 January 2009, respondent filed a Manifestation on the Notice of Conference issued by Arbiter Foronda.
The Manifestation stated that Rodman would be attending the conference, not to submit itself to the
jurisdiction of Arbiter Foronda, but to facilitate the re-raffling of the case.
On 16 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Inhibition against Arbiter Foronda, claiming that his
designation violated due process.1âwphi1 He said the re-raffle was questionable because he was not
notified of its conduct despite his earlier Motion to be Furnished with Notice of Re-raffle.
Thereafter, the parties submitted various pleadings on the issue of whether or not Arbiter Foronda could rule
on the pending motions.
In a Resolution dated 22 September 2009, Arbiter Foronda held that (1) the notice of re-raffle was not an
indispensable prerequisite for a substitute arbiter to have jurisdiction over a case at the execution stage; (2)
the claim of Rodman that its Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 April 2008 Order had remained unresolved
was rendered moot by Arbiter Aquino's eventual inhibition from the case; and (3) Rodman's prayer for the
summary dismissal of complainant's motions to resolve the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution was denied.
The 22 September 2009 Resolution put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent did not file any
more pleadings.
Administrative Complaint Against Respondent
On 21 February 2007, in the midst of the squabble over the HLURB case, complainant - through its vice
president for project development Steven J. Dy - filed a Complaint-Affidavit50 against respondent for alleged
professional misconduct and violation of the Lawyer's Oath. The Complaint alleged that respondent's
conduct in relation to the HLURB case manifested a disregard of the following tenets:51
1. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
2. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
3. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
4. Canon 12 - A lawlyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
5. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
In his Comment, 52 respondent claimed that what primarily caused the delays in the HLURB case were the
legal blunders of complainant's counsel, to wit:
1. It took complainant's counsel a period of six months to file a Motion for Writ of Execution of the HLURB
Board's Decision dated 22 June 2005.53
2. The Motion for Writ of Execution was filed before the HLURB Board, which as an appellate body had no
jurisdiction to issue the writ.54
Respondent also raised the issue of complainant's counsel's erroneous acts of notarial rescission and filing
of an ejectment suit before the trial court. These acts allegedly contributed to the delay in the resolution of
the dispute.55
Further, respondent argued that he could not have possibly caused delays in the execution of the Decision
dated 22 June 2005 at the time the instant Complaint was filed on 21 February 2007, as complainant filed its
Motion for Writ of Execution before the HLURB Regional Office only in April 2007. 56
Lastly, respondent asserted that he merely followed his legal oath by defending the cause of his client with
utmost dedication, diligence, and good faith.57
As respondent allegedly continued performing dilatory and frivolous tactics, complainant filed Supplemental
Complaints58 against him. The Court referred this case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.59
On 22 June 2013, the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation on the Complaint.60 Neitherparty filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition
within the pereiod allowed.61
The Ruling of the Court: Respondent is guilty of profession misconduct.
Despite the simplicity of the issue involved in the HLURB case, the path towards its resolution became long,
tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate attempts of respondent to delay the actual execution of the
judgment therein. He continued to file pleadings over issues already passed upon even after being enjoined
not to do so, and made unfounded accusations of bias or procedural defects. These acts manifest his
propensity to disregard the authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the detriment of the
administration of justice.
11
The defense that respondent is merely defending the cause of his client is untenable.
As a lawyer, respondent indeed owes fidelity to the cause of his client and is expected to serve the latter with
competence and diligence. As such, respondent is entitled to employ every honorable means to defend the
cause of his client and secure what is due the latter.62
Professional rules, however, impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.63 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.64 The Code also obliges
lawyers to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of their client.65
In Millare v.
Montero,66 the Court ruled that it is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial
process - such as the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation, and frivolous appeals - for the sole
purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
In Garcia v. Francisco,67 a lawyer willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse – all of which were
rebuffed – to get a favorable judgment. He was found to have violated his duty as a member of the bar to
pursue only those acts or proceedings that appear to be just, and only those lines of defense he believed to
be honestly debatable under the law.
Respondent cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape liability for his
actions that delayed and frustrated the administration of justice.
While the IBP similarly found respondent guilty of professional misconduct, we find that its recommended
penalty of reprimand is not commensurate with respondent’s transgression.
Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline’s Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (IBP Guidelines),
reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer’s negligence causes injury or potential injury
to a client or a party.69 In this case, respondent’s injurious court orders. He knowingly abused the legal
process and violated orders of the HLURB Board of Regional Office with the intent of delaying the execution
of s judgment that had long been final and executory. That he continued to do so even if a Complaint was
already filed against him proved that his acts were deliberate.
Further, ethical violations analogous to respondent’s infractions have not been treated as lightly by the Court.
In Foronda v. Guerrrero, the respondent’s therein was suspended for two years from the practice of law for
filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the same subject matter in violation of Canon
1270 and Rule 12.0471 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Saladaga v. Astorga,72 the repondent was found guilty of (1) breach of the Lawyer’s Oath; (2) unlawful.
Dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and (3) disrespect for the Court and causing the undue delay of cases. For
these offenses, a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP,
was imposed.
The respondents in Millare73 and Garcia,74 meanwhile, were suspended for one year from the practice of law.

He even attempted to tum the tables on complainant by pointing out that the "legal blunders" of the latter's In Saa v. IBP,75 the petitioner was found to have violated Canon 12,76 Rule 12.04.77 and Rule 1.0378 of the
counsel contributed to the delay in the execution of the judgment. Whether or not the actions or omissions of Code of Professional Responsibility for delaying the resolution of a case. He was also suspended from
complainant's counsel brought dire consequences to its client's cause is not a factor in the instant case. practice of law for one year.
Even assuming for argument's sake that complainant's counsel committed procedural errors that prolonged
some of the case incidents, these errors did not prejudice the delivery of justice, as they were later cured.
Thus, We have meted out the penalty of one to two years' suspension in cases involving multiple violations
More important, the so-called "blunders" were independent of respondent's actions, which were the direct
of professional conduct that have caused unjust delays in the administration of justice. The IBP Guidelines
cause of the delay.
similarly provide that "suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or
rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a
Respondent argues that he could not have possibly delayed the execution of the judgment, as no Motion for legal proceeding."79
Execution of Judgment had been filed when the instant administrative case was instituted. This argument
can no longer be considered viable, as he continued to employ dilatory tactics even after the Writ of
Respondent, therefore, should not receive a mere reprimand; he should be suspended from the practice of
Execution had already been issued, and complainant later filed Supplemental Complaints against him.
law for a period of one (1) year.

What is patent from the acts of respondent - as herein narrated and evident from the records - is that he has
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03 and
made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust delays in the
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from
administration of justice. These acts are in direct contravention of Rules 10.3 and 12.04 of the Code of
the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY
Professional Responsibility, which provide:
WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
E. DUTY OF FIDUCIARY

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of judgment or misuse court
GLORIA P. JINON vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ
processes.

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disciplinary action filed by complainant Gloria P. Jinon
Further, respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath68 by disobeying the legal orders of a duly constituted
(Gloria) before the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
authority, and disregarding his sworn duty to "delay no man for money or malice."
respondent Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz (Atty. Jiz) for neglecting her case, misappropriating funds, and assigning

12
her case to another lawyer without her consent, in violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts: The complaint alleged that Gloria, after the death of her brother Charlie in July 2001, entrusted
two (2) land titles covering properties owned by their deceased parents to her sister-in-law, Viola J. Jinon
(Viola): one located in Mangasina, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo (Sta. Barbara Property) and the other at No. 12
Valencia St., Poblacion, Leganes, Iloilo (Leganes Property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-119598.2
Eventually, Gloria sold the Sta. Barbara Property, which resulted in disagreements between her and Viola
regarding their respective shares in the proceeds. Consequently, Viola refused to return to Gloria TCT No. T-
119598, prompting Gloria to engage the services of Atty. Jizon April 29, 2003 to recover the said title, for
which she immediately paid an acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00.3
In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured the transfer of the title in Gloria's name.
On August 13, 2003, Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions, remitted the amount of ₱45,000.004
to answer for the expenses of the transfer. However, when she later inquired about the status of her case,
she was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same. Moreover, when
she visited the Leganes Property, which has been leased out to one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered
that Atty. Jiz has been collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to October 2004, which amounted to
₱12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals, Atty. Jiz gave her only ₱7,000.00, explaining that the
balance of ₱5,000.00 would be added to the expenses needed for the transfer of the title of the Leganes
Property to her name.
The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of
the amounts of ₱45,000.00 and ₱5,000.00 through a letter5dated September 22, 2004, which has remained
unheeded.
To date, Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola and effect
its transfer in Gloria’s name, and has failed to return her money despite due demands. Hence, the instant
administrative complaint praying that Atty. Jiz: (1) be ordered to reimburse the total amount of ₱67,000.00
(₱17,000.00 acceptance fee, ₱45,000.00 for the transfer of title, and ₱5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the
Leganes Property); and (2) be meted disciplinary action that the Court may deem fit under the
circumstances.
In his Answer6 andPosition Paper,7 Atty. Jiz admitted accepting Gloria’s case but claimed that it was only for
the purpose of protecting her rights against her sister-in-law, Viola. According to him, the extent of his legal
services covered the negotiation and consummation of the sale of the Sta. Barbara Propertyfor a fee of
₱75,000.00;recovery of TCT No.T-119598from Viola; and the possible filing of an ejectment case against
the tenant of the Leganes Property. For his attorney’s fees, Gloria had partially paid the sum of ₱62,000.00
inclusive of the acceptance fee of ₱17,000.00, leavingan unpaid balance of ₱13,000.00.
Atty. Jiz also alleged that Gloria approached him to secure another owner’s copy of a title she purportedly
lost, but which would turn out to be in Viola’s possession. Despite her offer to pay legal fees amounting to
₱100,000.00, heclaimed to have refused to file a "fraudulent cadastral case." He likewise denied having
committed to file one or to refer the case to another lawyer.8
Thus, Atty. Jiz asseverated that he was not remiss in his legal duties to Gloria.Denying liability to reimburse
Gloria for any amount, much less for ₱45,000.00,he claimed that he had rendered the corresponding legal
services to her with fidelity and candor. In particular, he pointed to the demand letters he sent to Viola for the
return of the subject titleandto Rose,the tenant of the
Leganes Property, requiring the submission of the itemized expenses for the repair of the leased property.
He also claimed to have caused the execution of a lease contract covering the Leganes Property.Hence, he
prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
After the parties’ submission of their respective position papers,9 the CBD, through Commissioner Cecilio
A.C. Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva), submitted its October 8, 2010 Report and
Recommendation.10 He found Atty. Jiz to have been remiss in his duty to update his client, Gloria, regarding
her case, and to respond to Gloria’s letter terminating his services and demanding the refund of the sum of
₱45,000.00, in violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states:
A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client’s request for information.
Commissioner Villanueva also observed that the scope of the legal services that Atty. Jiz undertook to
perform for Gloria could have been clarified had he been more candid with the exact fees that he intended to
collect.Recognizing, however, the legal services rendered by Atty. Jizin the form of legal advice, sending of
demand letters to Viola and Rose and collecting rentals from the latter,he found the amount of ₱17,000.00
as sufficient and reasonable remuneration for his services.Moreover, Atty. Jiz’sdisregard of the CBD’s orders
– to submit his answer on time and attend hearings – showed disrespect to the judiciary and his fellow
lawyers.
With these findings, Commissioner Villanueva held Atty. Jiz to have committed improper conduct and
recommended that he be (1) ordered to refund to Gloria the amount of ₱45,000.00 with legal interest, and
(2) reprimanded, with a stern warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a
repetition of the same acts.
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2011-303,11 adopting with
modification the Commission’s Report and Recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent remiss in his duty and for
disregarding the Orders of the Commission, Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years and to Ordered to Restitute complainant the amount of ₱45,000.00 and 12% interest
from the time he received the amount until fully paid within sixty (60) days from notice.
The Issue: The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for
having been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with respect to the legal services he had undertaken to perform
for his client, Gloria.
The Court's Ruling: After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of
Commissioner Villanueva and the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer
13
in neglecting his client’s case, misappropriating her funds and disobeying the CBD’s lawful orders requiring
the submission of his pleadings and his attendance at hearings. He should thus be suspended from the
practice of law in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and
must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code.12 "Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that
is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity."13
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. x x
x xxx xxx
RULE 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x
x xxx xxx
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x
x xxx xxx
RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. x x
Undeniably, "when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society."14
Moreover, money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land
title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned.15 "A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment."16
In this case, Atty. Jiz committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar.1âwphi1 Aside
from the demand letter17 dated April 29, 2003 which he sent to Viola, he failed to perform any other positive
act in order to recover TCT No. T-119598 from Viola for more than a year. He also failed to return, despite
due demand, the funds allocated for the transfer of the title that he received from her.
The claim that the total amount of ₱62,000.00 that Gloria paid him was for the services he rendered in
facilitating the sale of the Sta. Barbara Property is belied by the receipt18 dated April 29, 2003, which states
that the amount of ₱17,000.00 paid by Gloria was for "consultation and other legal services" he would
render "up to and including April 30, 2003." His handwritten notation at the bottom portion made it clear that
he received the said amount "as full payment." He likewise failed to substantiate his averment that he
actually facilitated the sale of the Sta. Barbara Property.
Furthermore, respondent’s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD’s directives for him
to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but
also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives as an officer of the court.19 As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of the
CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests
but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.20
In Rollon v. Naraval,21 the Court suspended respondent Atty. Naraval from the practice of law for two (2)
years for failing to render any legal service even after receiving money from the complainant and for failing to
return the money and documents he received.
Similarly, in Small v. Banares,22 the respondent was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for
failing to file a case for which the amount of ₱80,000.00 was given him by his client; to update the latter of
the status of the case;and to return the said amount upon demand.
Likewise, in Villanueva v. Gonzales,23 the Court meted the same punishment to the respondent lawyer for (1)
having failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence and diligence; (2) refusing to account for and to
return his client’s money as well as the titles over certain properties owned by the latter; and (3) failing to
update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her requests for information, all in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Considering the foregoing relevant jurisprudence, the Court finds it appropriate to adopt the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend Atty. Jiz from the practice of law for two (2) years. With respect to
the amount that he should refund to Gloria, only the sum of ₱45,000.00 plus legal interest should be
returned to her, considering the finding that the initial payment of ₱17,000.00 was reasonable and sufficient
remuneration for the actual legal services he rendered.
The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.24 Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial
evidence has been more than satisfied.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, having clearly violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and disobeyed lawful orders of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
return to complainant Gloria P. Jinon the full amount of ₱45,000.00 with legal interest of 6% per annum from
date of demand on September 22, 2004 up to the finality of this Decision and 12% per annum from its finality
until paid.
JUN B vs. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA
Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a
Compromise Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client’s consent.
14
On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M.
Galarrita (Atty. Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint2 on October 14,
2002 before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon.3 The Complaint against one Jose Calvario
(Calvario) alleged that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage4 over a parcel of land in Quezon Province.5 Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed the
Complaint praying for payment of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon
Calvario’s failure to fully pay within the period.6
The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna’s presentation and offer of
evidence.7
Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his formal offer of evidence.8 They
submitted the Kasunduan9 (Compromise Agreement) before the trial court on February 14, 2006.10 It
provided that Calvario would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna
would cause the removal of the encumbrance annotation on the land title.11 The trial court approved12 the
Compromise Agreement in its February 20, 2006 Decision.13 Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed
him of this Compromise Agreement, and did not deliver to him the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty.
Galarrita had received.14
Luna’s Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel’s Report15 dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita
proposed and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for his services in the
case:16
Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay you IN CASH the full amount of One
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we are aware that it’s your desire to
fight this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us nonetheless, to present the pros and cons of having
this case be amicably settled.
Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued showing that upon signing of
the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from you Eighty Eight Thousand
Pesos (Php88,000.00) only. Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of 12% or the equivalent of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed. Consequently, it is useless for us to
argue before the court that his principal indebtedness amounted to One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php100,000.00). Hence, if you accept the compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to gain Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00). . . . .
Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as to whether he deserves to be
paid for his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose Calvario.
Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services regarding this case.17 (Emphasis in
the original)
Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel’s Reports, Requests for Funding, and Statements of
Accounts in relation to case developments, retainer’s fees, and reimbursement for expenses incurred.18
After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you went into plea
agreement for Compromise Agreement without my knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic] what we had
discussed."19 Atty. Galarrita replied through the Letter20 dated January 27, 2006, stating in part:
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am certain that in this kind of case, a
compromise is better than WINNING it.
Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to acquire the land that’s why you
signaled your approval of a compromise.
I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I can’t waste my time going to
Gumaca every now and then. Traveling time is too precious for my cases here in Metro Manila.
The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings conducted there despite
sending several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.
If that’s the case, why prolong the agony?
Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested to acquire the land and you are
not bent in spending the right remuneration for your undersigned counsel?
I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account because I just could not handle
that amount of cash in my pocket.21
In his Letter22 dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:
Yes I’m not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why I’m the one who propose to them
[that] [w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer, they are the one[s] who insist to go to Court. . . .
This is what we come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right amount to cover all those only been spent
including Acceptance fee. You even waive[d] your fee on this, for every hearing which I couldn’t understand,
[y]et we end up that we still going [sic] to pursue this case, it was discussed during my trip there. [This is]
[t]he reason I’m too surprised with your plea Agreement without my knowledge.23
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita’s negligence in handling
the case.24
In his Letter25 of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this case was archived [was] because
I could not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transport allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon. . . .
that’s moot and academic because this case was not dismissed by the court, at all."26 Atty. Galarrita then
stated that "[f]or all my shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I
betrayed you and your cases."27
In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. Tayag, seeking
delivery of the land title since they paid the P100,000.00 settlement amount.28 Another heir, Lutchiare
Calvario, wrote Luna in September 2009 again demanding delivery of title.29
Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted the P100,000.00 to date.30 He
prays for Atty. Galarrita’s disbarment.31
In his Verified Answer,32 Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint.33 He argues that
he entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney34 that includes this
purpose.35 He regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible settlement before he
entered the Compromise Agreement.36 He submits that Luna "‘slept’ on his rights."37
15
Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership
Agreement,38 Luna shall pay him _4,000.00 monthly.39 Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of November
17, 2006, and after four years with no revocation, termination, or nullification, Luna’s unpaid obligation
amounted to P208,000.00.40 He listed other unpaid amounts for his legal services.41 Atty. Galarrita, thus,
argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien.42 Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription
under Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline.43 More than four years elapsed since their last communication in 2006 when the Compromise
Agreement became final.44
In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,45 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating
Commissioner46 found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year[.]"47
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No. XX-2013-
441,48adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation in that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months and [o]rdered to [r]eturn the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant
without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer’s fee against complainant." 49 The Board of
Governors denied reconsideration in its May 3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-2014-270.50
The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed as
of November 17, 2014."51 In any case, it is this court that has the authority to discipline members of the bar.52
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively liable for
entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna’s consent, then refusing to turn
over the settlement proceeds received.
This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors,
with modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years.
I
Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings.53
Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,
in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]."54
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]"55 and to "delay no man for money or
malice[.]"56
These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary
nature of their relationship.57 Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers, certain
that this confidence would not be abused.
Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged
land in Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna’s consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled
this case with the other party.
Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following
cases: . . . (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a
judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]"
The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a
compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive anything
in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise agreements, but
as found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given any authority for the
Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the trial. Firstly, the
Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad
when the agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of
P100,000.00 in exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of the
execution of the Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only
much later.
Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special Power of Attorney wherein he
authorized the former to "enter into possible amicable settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and
alternative modes of dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, the necessity of amendment to the
pleadings, the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof, the limitation of the number of witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of
issues to a commissioner, the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist, the advisability of suspending the
proceedings, offer matters that may properly be considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the authority given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot
justify Respondent’s representation in the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. To dissect, the
SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of the Complaint for Foreclosure of
Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given therein to Respondent to enter into a
possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that could be secured or firmed up during the
preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In fact, the tenor of the SPA indicates that the SPA was
precisely executed in order to constitute Respondent as Complainant’s representative during the preliminary
conference or pre-trial.
Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be liberally interpreted
and allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still the Respondent may not have
faithfully performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory conference, it was established that at
the time the compromise was executed the Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current
information technology it would have been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client
about it. Admittedly, his failure in this regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real
intention in agreeing to the compromise agreement for and in his behalf.
16
It would seem, however, that by Complainant’s act of demanding the amount from Respondent, the former
may have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus curing the defect on the latter’s
authority to enter into the same.59 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."60 Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way
that promotes "public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession."61 Even though complainant Luna
effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita’s lack of authority to compromise the civil case
when he demanded the payment of the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts of abusing the trust
and confidence reposed in him by complainant Luna.
II
Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the former’s receipt
of the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to complainant Luna. This
court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the lawyer’s
possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]."62 Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.. . . .
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received for and on
behalf of their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
usually ranges from suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even
disbarment[,]"63 depending on the circumstances of each case.
In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata,64 respondent received four checks totalling P225,000.00 from his client’s
employer after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their compromise agreement.65 Despite full
payment of settlement award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00 to his client and refused to deliver the
balance.66 Respondent explained that he delivered P90,000.00 to his client’s wife, but his secretary
misplaced the signed receipts, and he deducted his 25% attorney’s fees of P56,250.00 from the award.67
The balance left was only P750.00.68 This court found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to
restitute to complainant the amount of P154,500.00 representing the balance after P45,000.00 and the 10%
attorney’s fees had been deducted from the settlement award.69
In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr.,70 respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk of Court
corresponding to the six shares of his clients in the estate of their deceased mother, but respondent only
delivered P751,332.26 to his clients.71 Respondent explained that he deducted P250,000.00 as his
attorney’s fees, while complainants countered that respondent could only retain P14,000.00 as they already
paid him P86,000.00 for his services.72 This court found Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered
him to return to complainants the amount of P236,000.00.73
In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,74 respondent received P255,000.00 from the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of
Court representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other party in the ejectment case respondent
handled for his client.75 Respondent did not inform his client of this transaction and failed to reply to the final
demand letter for accounting.76 Respondent did not file an Answer to the administrative Complaint despite
notice, and failed to appear at the mandatory conference.77 This court found Atty. Langit guilty of violating
Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law
for two (2) years, and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of _255,000.00 with 12% interest
per annum.78
In Bayonla v. Reyes,79 respondent should have delivered to her clients the amount of P123,582.67—the net
amount of Bayonla’s share in the expropriation compensation after deducting respondent’s 40% share as
attorney’s fees—but respondent only delivered P79,000.00 and refused to remit the P44,582.67
shortage.80 This court found Atty. Reyes guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay complainants the
amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per annum, and render accounting and inventory.81
In Jinon v. Jiz,82 respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of title expenses.83 His client
later learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals from the property amounting to P12,000.00, yet
respondent only turned over P7,000.00.84 Complainant terminated respondent’s legal services and
demanded the return of the amounts.85 Respondent countered that his legal services covered negotiation
and sale of the property for a fee of P75,000.00.86 This court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01,
16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for two
(2) years, and ordered him to pay complainant the amount of P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per annum
from date of demand until finality of Decision, then 12% until fully paid.87
In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant
Luna’s property without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue,
respondent Atty. Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00
settlement amount received. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:
On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of Complainant’s
supposed agreement to Mr. Calvario’s payment of P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent’s allegations that he
had informed Complainant about his so-called counsel’s report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant
did not give him any express approval of the same.
There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith in entering
into the Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4) years,
Respondent failed to turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to Complainant. Worse,
he failed to seasonably inform Complainant about the same. He kept the money and claimed he had the
right to retain the same invoking the counsel’s right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that Complainant
had incurred accrued attorney’s fees which he is bound to pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it
is not amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and
pave the way for the payment of his attorney’s fees. In so doing, he violated the trust reposed in him by his
client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of [P]rofessional Responsibility.
As to Respondent’s invocation of the lawyer’s retaining lien and his retention of the money, the undersigned
deems the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter
to his client." But this provision assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s
fees and as to the application of the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he
may deduct what is due him and remit the balance to his client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without
the client’s consent, the lawyer has no authority to apply the client’s money for his fees, but he should
17
instead return the money to his client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.. . . SEC. 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
. which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
On Respondent’s argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice it to state that
such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
the rules have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore carry the
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such
same.88 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client
and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions
Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence.89 This court accepts and adopts the findings of as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.99
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification increasing the period of
suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years considering that respondent Atty. Galarrita not only
First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients[’] money for [themselves] by the
compromised litigation without complainant Luna’s consent, but also refused to turn over the settlement
mere fact that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney’s fees."100 They must give prompt notice to their clients of
proceeds to date.
any receipt of funds for or on behalf of their clients.101

III
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer’s duty to "account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the client."
This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of P100,000.00 to
complainant Luna.
Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension from the practice
of law.
In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,90 the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
P937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot.91 However, respondent did not
Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney’s lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2)
turn over this amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to
lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
complainant.92 This court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant
fees."102
complainant’s prayer for the return of the P937,500.00.93

Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main
Ronquillo held that "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
issue in this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was not established.
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers."94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited
Counter evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any
to a determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
compensation for his services in the foreclosure case.103 Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty.
Bar."95
Galarrita's negligence in handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred expenses
respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to reimburse.104
Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary proceedings
"remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim
Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of a collection
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not
case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.1âwphi1
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."96

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts representing legal fees. This
years, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He
court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent’s civil
is ORDERED to return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount of Pl00,000.00, with legal interest of 6% per
liability was already established:
annum from February 2006105 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's
fee against complainant Luna.
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal
ALMIRA C. FORONDA, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding
what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent’s liability. That has been the This refers to the complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
reason why the Court has required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Almira C. Foronda (complainant) against Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. (respondent)
cases of Mortera v. Pagatpatan, supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, for the following alleged infractions:
supra.97 (Emphasis supplied)
(1) Fraud and deceit in luring [the complainant] in transacting business with [the respondent]; (2)
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his refusal to turn over Dishonesty and misrepresentation when [the respondent] misinformed [the complainant] that
the amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien.98 The Rules of Court provides for attorney’s retaining [her] annulment case was already filed when in fact it was not;
lien as follows:

18
 (3) Issuing unfunded checks as payment for [the respondent's] obligations to [the complainant]; hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were discussing a possible reconciliation.10 He
further claimed that he filed the petition on July 16, 2009 after negotiations with the complainant’s husband
apparently failed.11
(4) Violation of Canon 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities when [the respondent]
represented to [the complainant] that he know[s] of court personnel who will help facilitate [the
complainant’s] annulment case; The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to be a partner in a lending business and
clarified that the said business was being managed by a friend. He further stated that he was also involved in
the said business as a partner.12
(5) Violation of Canons 16.01 and 16.03 for failure to return [the complainant’s] money despite
numerous demands; and
The respondent admitted that only the first two (2) of the checks he issued were honored by the drawee-
bank. He stated that prior to the presentment and dishonor of the rest of the UCPB checks, he advised the
(6) Violation of Canon 18.04 when [the respondent] misinformed [the complainant] regarding the
complainant that the third check should not be deposited just yet due to losses in their lending business
status of [her] annulment case.2
caused by the failure of some borrowers to settle their obligations.13 Apart from the foregoing, the respondent
denied most of the allegations in the complaint, including the dishonor of the BDO checks, for lack of
Facts: The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned to the Philippines sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth thereof.14
to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. The respondent was referred to her and the
complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of ₱195,000.00 to be paid as follows: 50% or
By way of special and affirmative defense, the respondent asserted the following: that it was the complainant
₱100,000.00 upon the signing of the contract; 25% or ₱50,000.00 on or before June 10, 2008; and 25% or
who owed him notarial fee amounting to 80,000.00 as he notarized a deed of conditional sale executed
₱45,000.00 before the filing of the case.3 The complainant paid the amounts as agreed. The amount of
between her and a certain Rosalina A. Ruiz over a real property worth 4,000,000.00;15 and that the contract
₱45,000.00 was even paid on June 10, 2008,4 after being informed by the respondent that the petition for
he executed with the complainant was a mere contract of loan. Being a contract of loan, he cannot be held
the annulment of marriage was ready for filing.
guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) since the checks he issued were to serve only
as security for it.16
The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he received the full payment
of his attorney’s fee, or on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the complainant inquired about the status of
The parties were called to a mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD on January 18, 2010 by the
her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that her petition was pending in court; and in another
Investigating Commissioner.17 Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their respective position paper.
time, she was told that a decision by the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to
the country in May 2009, the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized
for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and found out that it was filed In an undated Report,18 the Investigating Commissioner made the following factual findings:
only on July 16, 2009.5
From the foregoing, it appears that the following facts are not disputed. The complainant is an overseas
The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed the contract of service with Filipino worker based in Dubai. During her vacation in the Philippines in May 2008, she contracted the
the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were going to discuss her case, she services of respondent to file a petition for the annulment of her marriage for an agreed packaged fee of
agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent invited her to be an investor in the lending business [P]195,000.00 which she paid in full by June 2008. Respondent, however, filed the petition for the annulment
allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law.6 The respondent encouraged her to invest ₱200,000.00 of her marriage only in July 2009. In the meantime, more specifically in June 2008, respondent obtained
which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per month. [P]200,000.00 from complainant with the promise to pay the same with interestat 4% per month starting July
2008 until June 2009. Respondent issued complainant eleven (11) checks for [P]8,000.00 each postdated
checks monthly from 10 July 2008 until 10 May 2009 plus a check for [P]108,000.00 payable on 10 June
The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue personal and post-dated
2009 and another check for [P]100,000.00 payable on 8 June 2009. When presented for payment, the first
checks in her favor dated the 10th of each month starting July 2008 until June 10,2009, representing the five
two (2) checks were good but the rest of the checks were dishonored for being drawn against a closed
percent (5%) interest that the complainant’s money shall earn. Thus, the complainant gave ₱200,000.00 to
account. When complainant demanded payment, respondent issued to her eight (8) new replacement
the respondent upon the security of thirteen (13) United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks. Eleven (11)
postdated checks dated 25th of every month from June 2009 to January 2010. All of the replacement
of said checks were for ₱8,000.00 each. The other two (2) checks dated June 8, 2009 and June 10, 2009
checks, however, were likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When respondent was
were for ₱100,000.00 and ₱108,000.00, respectively.7
unable to pay respondent, complainant filed a criminal complaint against him for violation of BP 22 before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa. The criminal complaint was eventually dismissed after
According to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank honored the first two (2) complainant executed an affidavit of desistance after she was paid a certain amount by respondent.19
checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. When she brought the
matter to the respondent, he promised to pay her in cash. He actually paid her certain amounts as interest
The Investigating Commissioner found that there was basis to hold the respondent liable, to wit: 1.
through her representative. Nevertheless, the respondent failed to pay the entire obligation as promised.
Respondent Atty. Alvarez, Jr. is guilty of delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of the marriage of
Thereafter, the respondent issued eight (8) Banco de Oro (BDO)checks as replacement for the dishonored
complainant for almost a year. Initially, in his Answer, he claims that the delay was due to the instruction of
UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were likewise dishonored for being drawn against a closed
complainant to hold in abeyance the filing of the petition as she and her husband discussed possible
account.8
reconciliation. In his Position Paper, he claims that the delay was due to the failure of the complainant to
submit to an interview by the psychologist and the time it took him to research on the guidelines on the
In his Answer,9 the respondent admitted that he filed the petition for annulment only in July 2009 but this was matter. Finally, in his Supplemental Affidavit, he admits the delay and apologizes for it. For delaying in filing
not due to his own fault. The delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed him to

19
the petition for complainant, respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which pertinent read:
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE[.]
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and the negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. x x x x
2. Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about how respondent lied to her about
the delay in the filing of the petition are very detailed. While denying he misrepresented to complainant that
the petition has been filed when it was not, respondent did not care to refute also in detail the allegations of
complainant. In his Answer, he simply denied the same for the reason [that] he has no sufficient information
to form a belief as to the truth thereof. It should be noted, however, that the allegations pertains [sic] to things
respondent said and did[,] and are therefore[,] matters which he knew or should have known. His denial is
therefore tantamount to an admission. In doing so, respondent is guilty of violating not only Canon 15 but
also Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information. x x x x
3. Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per month but failed to pay the same.
This is admitted by respondent. Rule 16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Obviously,
respondent borrowed money from his client and his client’s interest was not fully protected. In fact,
respondent repeatedly failed to comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact that he subsequently
paid complainant more than the amount due from him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed
by her against him hardly serves to mitigate his liability. x x x.
4. He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for payment. This is admitted by
respondent. x x x.20
The Investigating Commissioner, thereby, recommended the penalty of two years suspension from the
practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a heavier penalty.21
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved with
modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It directed the suspension of the respondent
from the practice of law for one year with warning that repetition of the similar conduct shall be dealt with
more severely.22
The Court’s Ruling: At the outset, it must be stressed that "[a] lawyer, by taking the lawyer’s oath, becomes a
guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice."23 He can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be
an officer of the court.24 For of all classes and professions, it is the lawyer who is most sacredly bound to
uphold the laws, for he is their sworn servant.25
"Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the
bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession."26 Therefore, it is incumbent
upon this Court to determine the full extent of the respondent’s liability, and to impose the proper penalty
therefor.
It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the respondent. She expected
the immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full payment of attorney’s fees on
June 10, 2008. However, the respondent filed the said petition only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave
out different reasons for the delay in an attempt to exculpate himself. At the end, the respondent admitted
the delay and apologized for it. It cannot be gainsaid that the complainant through her agent was diligent in
following up the petition. The different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of candor in
his dealings with the complainant.
"Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."27 "[H]e is required by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion."28 "A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession."29
Anent the ₱200,000.00 which was received by the respondent from the complainant, the respondent argued
that it was a loan and not really meant to be the latter’s investment in any money-lending business. At any
rate, the respondent issued 13 UCPB checks to serve as security for the alleged loan; among which, only
two of said checks were honored by the drawee-bank while the rest were dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account. By reason of said dishonor, the respondent paid certain amounts in cash to the
complainant as interest to the said loan. Ultimately, the respondent issued eight BDO checks as replacement
for the dishonored UCPB checks. However, the BDO checks were also dishonored due to the same reason
– they were drawn against a closed account.
The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."30"[T]he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes
a ground for disciplinary action."31
It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of
worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far as to file multiple criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that ‘a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.’ Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to
be honest and truthful when dealing with his client."32
All told, this Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation of Canons 15,33 17,34 Rule 18.04,35 and Rule
16.0436 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise, he is also liable under Rule 1.01 37 thereof
pursuant to our ruling in Co v. Atty. Bernardino.38
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. However, "[d]isbarment, jurisprudence teaches,
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would
accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the
economic life and honor of the erring person."39
20
"The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an attorney’s misconduct has
always moved the Court to treat the complaint with utmost caution and deliberate circumspection."40 While
the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in
the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its
sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if through it the end desired of
reforming the errant lawyer is possible.41
In Baldado v. Mejica,42 the Court found Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica guilty of violating Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for his negligence in protecting the interest of his client, and suspended him from
the practice of law for a period of three months, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act
will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1
In Solidon v. Macalalad,43 the Court imposed on Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) the penalty of six
months suspension from the practice of law for violations of Rule16.01 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In said case, Atty. Macalalad failed to file the required petition and did not
account for the money he received, as attorney’s fee, from the complainant.
In Junio v. Atty. Grupo,44 Atty. Salvador M. Grupo was found guilty of violating Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for borrowing money from his client and was suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one month.
In Wong v. Atty. Moya II,45 Atty. Salvador N. Moya II was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two
years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also had seriously
breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of
the IBP orders in the course of its proceedings.
Further, in Wilkie v. Atty. Limos,46 the Court held, to wit:
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was convicted
in the criminal case filed against him.
In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the
practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dinohaving been
found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which
was only entrusted to him by the complainant. But in Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, we meted out only a six-
month suspension to Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro for having issued several checks to the complainants in
payment of a pre-existing debt without sufficient funds, justifying the imposition of a lighter penalty on the
ground of the respondent’s payment of a portion of her debt to the complainant, unlike in the aforementioned
Lao and Rangwani cases where there was no showing of any restitution on the part of the
respondents.47 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
In the instant case, the Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges filed against the
respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.48 The Court
also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD and that he
completely settled his obligation to the complainant, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by
the complainant's counsel. Therein, it was acknowledged that the respondent paid the amount of
₱650,000.00 in payment for the: (1) ₱200,000.00 for the amount of checks he issued in favor of the
complainant; (2) ₱195,000.00 for the attorney's fees he received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and
expenses that the complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed against the respondent
including the instant complaint with the IBP.49 Unlike in Solidon where the respondent failed to file the
required petition and did not account for the money he received, the respondent was able to file, albeit
belatedly, the complainant's petition. In addition, he returned in full the money he received as attorney's fee
in spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition and in filing the same - not to
mention the cost he incurred for the purpose.50
In light of the foregoing and the Court's rulings in the cases mentioned above, the Court finds that the
penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is commensurate, with a stem warning that a
repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a heavier
penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the
practice of law with a stem warning that a repetition of any of the offenses involved in this case or a
commission of similar acts will merit a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty.
Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. 's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO vs. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR.
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro
(Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the
payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the
debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of
the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared
that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her
late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case
for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the
proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but
deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the
expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to
handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros.
Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent
undertook to register the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered.
Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the
registration decree over the property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged
that she would not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading
business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan
(a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be
secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by
21
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to
cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to
Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of
Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second
MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger,
postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent
likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA,
except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing,
Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA,
and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land
adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of
₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September
2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts
against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he
promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the
interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the
services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the
mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on
the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates.
He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s accounts.
Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property
he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further
alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it
for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo
who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would
help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that
Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their business
transactions were secured by real estate mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied
that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold
the property because the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged
to Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to
continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding
from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to
December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were aware
that he could no longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son
issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his
services were terminated before it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In
response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his
suspension only in May 2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-CBD found
that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero
which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the
documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-
CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates of the loans
although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to
deny that he misled Navarro and her husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them.
Respondent also mortgaged a property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value
was only ₱300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent
conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed
that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and
Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months except for
his claim that the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the postdated
checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them that it would be his wife
or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in
his accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
22
 (5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected or
the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were not clear
whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to
suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent
to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead imposed
upon respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on
the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to
nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he
later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the
fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his
son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew
that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue
the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants
believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first
batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third
batch of checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to
accounts in respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that
conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.2 The test is
whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although
Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship.
However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that
respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her.
To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-
square-meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity
with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted
the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed
the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show
that respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the IBP-CBD
that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received
various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not
present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but
the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee,
and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the
IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for
the registration of Yulo’s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since
passed away.
23
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received ₱50,000
from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds
because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero.1âwphi1Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he
secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the
checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually
questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on
his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored
because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was
not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege
on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of
the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate
from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent
failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a
member of the legal profession.7 Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took
advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his
unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his client,
Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.9 Our only concern
is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.10
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against
each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving
the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was
spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must
immediately return the money to his client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting,
and he failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to
₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule
16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from
the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to
return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office
of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.
ROLANDO VIRAY vs. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case2 he filed against
Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of complainant and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester Lopez and
Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100
(Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected the total
amount of ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the following manner:
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to
receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently, complainant made several
verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of ₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of
₱20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the
Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a
conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but
denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional
attorney's fees equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be
awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus,
from the total award of ₱189,491.60, the sum of ₱17,226.57 representing respondent's professional fees
has to be deducted, leaving a balance of ₱172,275.13.6 Then from said amount, complainant proposed that
he will get ₱100,000.00 and the balance of ₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional
25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However,
after receiving the amount of ₱95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.007 attorney's
fees, ₱17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to respondent
was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below the promised 25o/o attorney's fees
and refund of expenses in the total amount of ₱72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than what he expects
to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses Lopez the sum of ₱93,491.60.
Adding the Pl 7,000.00 respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of
₱110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of ₱100,000.00 complainant
agreed to and expected to receive.
24
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and
Recommendation9 with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2)
years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his possession
which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney's fees.10 On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139,11 which approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the
modification that respondent should restitute the sum of ₱85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue: The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure
to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return
the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling: "The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and
good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to "account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004 received
payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of complainant from
spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to three months he had been receiving payment,
respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only
when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being implemented when complainant discovered that
spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the
monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount, which
he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant brought the matter before the
barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption that he
converted it to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action against him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment. He implies
that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez to his additional 25o/o
attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of
₱72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts of ₱20,000.00,
₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was only ₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his self-serving
statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent's claim that he was authorized to
receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's
fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did
not present any document, retainer's agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to
support his claim.1âwphi1 In any event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive
payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he
received in the course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary nature of the relationship between
counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client."16 "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands
collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting." 17Moreover, a
lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorney's fees."18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the
imposition of disciplinary action."19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to account
for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the practice of law for
two years."20Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the imposable penalty.
Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in
the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the finality of this Resolution, with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severly. Atty.
Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution, the net amount of
₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is
returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION vs. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA
ROSA
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry
A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively complainants) against respondent
Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct for violating, among others, Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts: In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and
was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop business
towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.4
Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from their failed business venture, respondent, on
March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which he promised to return, with
interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be
soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued three (3)
EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s name:6
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks;
and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checksand that he agreed to return the
₱2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.7 In the afternoon of March 23,
2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by respondent.8
25
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay complainants. categorically states that he does not even know the complainants and that it was respondent alone who
Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent merely made repeated obtained the loan from them.35
promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to respondent, which the latter did not
heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the
another demand letter11 to respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the
legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to
complainants. Instead, respondent claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients,
appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the
was the real debtor. Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the
Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14
₱2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated interest.37

On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-complaint15 charging
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and
respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from
rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report in
clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.16
Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the penalty against the respondent to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that Nault was complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.
the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect from Nault and that he
was engaged for that specific purpose.19
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone, as
evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing Nault and pointed
The Issue Before the Court: The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 to a
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a copy of the Answer to Third Party
Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party defendant in a related collection case instituted by the
complainants against respondent.22 In said pleading, Nault explicitly denied knowing complainants and The Court’s Ruling: The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its
alleged thatit was respondent who incurred the subject loan from them.23 directive to return the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.

On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In the course
of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the
same were terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective position
papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which
provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which
provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name and that he
personally received and encashed them. Annex "E"30 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent
acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus
a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible. The
Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not the one who obtained the
loan, he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter; however, he did not.32 He also observed that
the acknowledgment33Nault allegedly signed appeared to have been prepared by respondent
himself.34 Finally, the Investigating Commissioner cited Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by substantial
evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3) EastWest Bank Checks, in
amounts totalling to ₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex "E"42 of the Verified
Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the complainants
the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of
the checks likewise show that respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were
issued.44 With respondent’s direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom,
absent too any credible indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeedthe
one who borrowed the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed to return,
despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent submitted a
document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants, Nault, in his Answer to
Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants and incurring the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a ₱2,500,000.00
loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the other hand, complainants
were able to submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of the checks and their encashment, as well as
his agreement to return the ₱2,500,000.00 plus interest. This is bolstered by the fact that the loan
transaction was entered into during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a greater influence over the latter in view of the trust and
confidence inherently imbued in such relationship.

26
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client unless
the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to
abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer
from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged
by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty.
Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It comes within
those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that the client is disadvantaged
by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and whose
interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence
in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will return the money plus interest
within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his
previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule
16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads: CANON 7 -
A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent
abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s return
directive.
II. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing
₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and representing conflicting
interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and respondent's continuous refusal to pay
his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the
IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return
to complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such cases, the Court's only concern is the determination of
respondent's administrative liability; it should not involve his civil liability for money received from his client in
a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this case,
respondent received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from complainants and not in consideration of his
professional services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the
ambit of this administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04,
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that
a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately
executory upon receipt.
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved the findings and the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz (respondent lawyer).
It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in
several cases after having received various amounts as acceptance fees, to wit:ch
On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, respondent lawyer borrowed
pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the
amount of P29,945.50, as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer
appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the redemption of the said
jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated
August 31, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to
learn that the check was dishonored for the reason, "Account Closed."4 Complainant immediately notified
respondent lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of the acceptance fees received by
respondent lawyer prior to the "abandonment" of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but
to no avail.
In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another lawyer, Atty. Francisco C. Miralles,
complainant yet again demanded the redemption of the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund
of the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the payment of the value of the
pledged jewelry in the amount of PI00,000.00 in order to avoid the interests due and the possible foreclosure
of the pledge; and moral damages of P 300,000.00.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pinas City, against him.7
27

On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD),8where complainant prayed for the disbarment of respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct,
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD
required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite having been duly served with a
copy of the complaint and the order to file his answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master
of the Las Pi�
as Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.
Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing on November 23,
2012, but only the complainant and her counsel appeared on the said day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the
resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013 and the personal service of the
notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given address.11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by
respondent lawyer's mother,12 he still failed to appear during the conference, prompting complainant to move
for the termination of the conference and the submission of the case for report and recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of respondent lawyer from
the practice of law.13 Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the borrowing of money from a
client, unless the latter's interests were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law which was against Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct."
On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in Resolution No. XXI-2014-698.14
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was filed.
Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP
Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b),
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15
The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the accusations against him despite
the numerous opportunities afforded to him to explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent
lawyer a chance to oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons only for known to him.
Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the orders by the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward
the same for his personal consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the Court cannot indulge.
"Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the
bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession."16Surely, respondent lawyer's
failure or refusal to participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder the Court from determining the
full extent of his liability and imposing an appropriate sanction, if any.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner with respect to respondent lawyer's violation of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and
Rules 1.01,20 16.04,21 of the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent lawyer of his client's property. He
had, indeed, come into possession of valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract
of pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth P135,000.00 to respondent
lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant
disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial
considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from
clients, unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an exception. Respondent lawyer used his
client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so
doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he might have intended
to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the
very act of his exercising influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from the
latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client
is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse.22 The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended
to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.23 The rule presumes that the
client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in
the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his representation that the subject jewelry
would be redeemed upon maturity. She accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually
dishonored upon presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not take steps to
remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his obligation, constraining complainant to avail of legal
remedies against him.
Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously, his
unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check
constitute grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his part have seriously
breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing
worthless checks patently violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust
and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action,25 and thus seriously and
irreparably tarnishes the image of the profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to
an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the Bar.27 In this case,
respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that he once made upon admission to the Bar. As
"vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."28
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court takes heed of the guidepost
provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such
as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the
consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person."29Hence, caution is called
for amidst the Court's plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,30 the
Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of three-year suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stern
warning that a repetition of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act, shall merit a
heavier penalty.
Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the rule that in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring lawyer's civil liability for
money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent lawyer to make the payment for the
subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which is yet to be determined in the appropriate proceeding.
As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The Investigating Commissioner erred in
referring to them as "attorney's fees"�
As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after payment of attorney's fees, this
commission is not fully satisfied that the complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence.
It was not fully explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases "abandoned" by the
respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the complainant. This Commission noted that not a single
document or order coming from the court of prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-Affidavit that
would at least apprise this body of what the respondent actually did with the cases he
represented.32cralawlawlibrary
28

There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney's fee is
understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the
losing party as indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by
the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is
precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus,
this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by
the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost
opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.35
In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and P15,000.00, respectively, were in the
nature of acceptance fees for cases in which respondent lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite
this oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding that aside from her bare
allegations, complainant failed to present any evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed
abandonment or neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the return of
the subject acceptance fees.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of violating Canons 1, 16, 17, and
Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING
PEDRO RAMOS, vs.ATTY. MARIA NYMPHA C. MANDAGAN
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Pedro Ramos (Ramos)
against respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan (Atty. Mandagan) for gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Complaint, Ramos alleged that Atty. Mandagan demanded from him the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) in connection with the criminal case filed against him for murder before the
Sandiganbayan. According to Ramos, the P300,000.00 shall be used as bail bond in the event that his
petition for bail in the said criminal case is granted.2 Also, Atty. Mandagan collected an additional amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for operating expenses. In both instances, an Acknowledgment Receipt
was issued in his favor as proof of payment.3
Contrary to the assurance, however, of Atty. Mandagan, Ramos’ petition for bail was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, Atty. Mandagan withdrew as his counsel without returning the amount of
₱300,000.00 despite the demand sent by Ramos’ counsel.4
On December 19, 2012, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) issued an Order5 directing Atty. Mandagan to submit her Answer to Ramos’ complaint within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the Order.
In her Answer,6 Atty. Mandagan argued that the amount of ₱300,000.00 was not intended for payment of
bail, but as mobilization expenses for preparation of witnesses, defenses, and other documentary exhibits for
both Ramos and his co-accused Gary Silawon.7 Atty. Mandagan likewise alleged that Ramos never paid her
for acceptance, appearance fees, and legal services rendered in the entire course of the proceedings until
her withdrawal as counsel.8
On April 26, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference9 directing the parties to appear for
a mandatory conference. During the mandatory conference, however, only Atty. Joselito Frial appeared, as
counsel for Ramos, while Atty. Mandagan was absent.
On August 29, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued an Order10 terminating the mandatory conference and directed
both parties to submit their respective position papers within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days upon
receipt of the said order.
On December 18, 2013, the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,11 finding Atty. Mandagan liable
for gross misconduct and for failure to render an accounting of funds, and recommended that Atty.
Mandagan be suspended for a period of one (1) year. Subsequently, the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution12 dated October 11,
2014.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Atty. Mandagan, but the same was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in a Resolution13 dated June 5, 2015.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-
CBD, as adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors, to be proper under the circumstances.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.1âwphi1 As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and
must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts, and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 14
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Atty. Rivera,15 this Court held that:
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer must render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the
lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
the client.16 (Citations omitted)
In the present case, Atty. Mandagan never denied receiving the amount of ₱300,000.00 from Ramos for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the latter’s provisional liberty. When the petition for bail of Ramos,
however, was denied by the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Mandagan failed to return the amount to Ramos. Worse,
she unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to Ramos despite demand from Ramos’ counsel.
Clearly, Atty. Mandagan failed to act in accordance with the rule stated in Canon 16 of the CPR, to wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. x x x
x
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa,17 this Court stated that:
29
[A] lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure
to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment. Indeed, it may border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of
swindling or estafa.18 (Citations omitted)
This court cannot give credence to Atty. Mandagan’s defense that the amount she received from Ramos was
not for bail but merely for mobilization expenses. Records show that Atty. Mandagan failed to substantiate
her claim. At any rate, as correctly observed by the IBP-CBD, "[Atty. Mandagan] should be forthright in
stating what constitutes legal mobilization expenses if only to dispel any doubt as to its intended purpose."19
Atty. Mandagan’s failure to make an accounting or to return the money to Ramos is a violation of the trust
reposed on her. As a lawyer, Atty. Mandagan should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to
her in her professional capacity because the CPR exacts a high degree of fidelity and trust from members of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Maria Nympha C. Mandagan GUILTY of violating Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS her from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with WARNING that a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
DATU ISMAEL MALANGAS vs.ATTY. PAUL C. ZAIDE,
Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust, and violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics2 in relation to the complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 6380 of the Regional
Trial Court [RTC] of Lanao del Norte at Iligan City) that he filed against Paul Alfeche (Alfeche) and the NEMA
Electrical and Industrial Sales, Inc./Melanio Siao (NEMA). Complainant averred that on March 6, 2003, he
figw·ed in an accident while crossing Quezon Avenue, Iligan City, when two vehicles hit and pinned him in·
between them, causing him to lose consciousness; that he was then brought to a hospital where he was
confined for four months; that he was later transferred to other hospitals where he underwent different major
operations for which he spent more than Pl.5 million; and that despite the operations, he remained crippled
and bed ridden.
Because of these, he engaged respondent lawyer's professional services to prosecute his complaint for
damages against therein defendants Alfeche and NEMA; that he gave respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing fees; that respondent lawyer made him believe that the amount of
P50,000.00 was needed as filing fees in order to commence a P5 million-damage suit covering the accrued
and anticipated damages caused by the accident; that subsequently, respondent lawyer filed on his behalf a
complaint for damages before the RTC of Iligan City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 6380; that
respondent lawyer then furnished him (complainant) with a copy of said Complaint seeking to recover
damages in the amount of P5 million; and that to assure him that the complaint had indeed been filed, this
complaint was stamped "received" by the RTC.
According to complainant, he later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been dismissed by the RTC
because of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent lawyer did not attend two hearings in the
case, and also because respondent lawyer did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed
therein by NEMA; that on account of this, he asked respondent lawyer to file a Motion for Reconsideration,
only to find out later that respondent lawyer not only did not file a motion for reconsideration from the Order
of dismissal issued by the RTC, but worse, respondent lawyer instead filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as
counsel effectively leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case; and that after this, he sent a relative to
the RTC, where he further discovered through this relative that the amount of damages sought in the
Complaint filed by respondent lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not PS million, as stated in the copy of the
Complaint given to him by respondent lawyer.
Challenging complainant's allegations, respondent lawyer claimed that complainant was in fact a client of the
Zaragoza-Macabangkit Law Offices, a law firm that he joined way back in 2002, right after he passed the Bar
Examinations; and that as a junior associate in that law fim1, he only received appearance fees in attending
to complainant's civil case. Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of
P20,000.00, and explained that complainant was already an established client of the law office he was
working for.
As regards the amount of damages, respondent lawyer claimed that in the Complaint he filed before the
RTC, he was even reluctant to ask for P250,000.00 in dan1ages, as complainant's hospital bills did not
reach this amount; but that he nevertheless prayed for this amount because he was anticipating that
complainant would incur additional expenses as a result of the accident. According to respondent lawyer, the
complaint which embodied a prayer for PS million in damages "was clearly maneuvered to create an
impression that (he, respondent lawyer) defrauded the complainant."3
Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the hearings set by the
RTC in said Civil Case No. 6380, and that although he also intentionally filed no opposition to NEMA's
Motion to Dismiss, these matters were initially agreed upon between him and complainant after he
(respondent lawyer) discovered that NEMA' s car did not in fact hit complainant, because NEMA's car was
not illegally parked where it was at the time of the accident; that although complainant was aware of these
facts, complainant suddenly changed his mind~ and insisted on continuing with the case against NEMA, and
pressing for the claim of P5 million in damages, because complainant believed that NEMA had more leviable
properties than the other defendant Alfeche. According to respondent lawyer, he also found out that despite
the fact that Alf eche had already settled with complainant, the latter still persisted in pursuing the civil case
against Alfeche;4 that at this point, he realized that complainant was acting under the compulsion of greed in
pressing for the continuation of the case against his adversaries; and that because of these reasons, he
decided to withdraw from the case as complainant's counsel.
Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero oft11e IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 29, 2013 finding respondent lawyer guilty of
dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he recommended a penalty of two years suspension against
respondent lawyer. Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's allegations more credible than
respondent lawyer's explanations, thus –
Respondent further mentioned that he has been handling cases for or against Complainant since he
embarked on law practice and has never received acceptance fee from Complainant. He pictured himself as
giving out pro bona services to Complainant for two (2) years. However, he may have contradicted his
declaration in this regard when in his Answer he mentioned that he received P7,000.00 for docket fee and
the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done by him at the hospital.6
As regards the true amom1t of damages sought in said Civil Case No. 6380, Commissioner Cachapero had
this to say:
The undersigned deems the complainant's tale plausible enough. The aforesaid page containing a statement
of claim amounting to P5,000,000.00 shows impeccably that it was typed simultaneously with the rest of the
pages of the complaint. There is no showing that it was merely inserted as a supplement or addition after
30
taking out a genuine page of the same. It is a constituent part of the complaint which could only have been
printed and/or typed by the respondent or his agent.
Respondent claimed that the insertion of the page (page 8) was 'maneuvered' by Complainant. If tliese were
true, what would have motivated Complainant to do such a 'switching' act? None. In fact, following his
discovery of the same, he conducted himself out like a man wronged. He wrote respondent twice in
September 2004 (September 1 and 9, 2004) and castigated respondent for his switching act. Surprisingly,
respondent did not care to take the matter up with complainant through letter or personal confrontation. To
the undersigned, respondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from Complainant reveals a subtle
affumation of his fault in this regard.7
Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling of complainant's
case, citing the RTC's Order of July 1, 2004, to wit-
In this regard the record will show that as early as May 18, 2004, plaintiffs counsel was furriished a copy of
said motion, but for reasons only known to him no comment or opposition was registered by plaintiff In fact, if
only to afford plaintiff [a chance] to countervail movant's motion, last May 24, 2004, as prayed for, plaintiffs
counsel was given ten (10) days to file an Opposition, but sad to say, until now, not\vithstanding the lapse of
practically 37 days no opposition, neither a comment was filed by plaintiff. With this development the Court
will have to confine its scrutiny solely on the motion to dismiss of movant.8
Action of the IBP Board of Governors
Via Resolution No. XX:-2013-91,9 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and
Negligence to Complainant, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2)
years.,
On January 11, 201410 respondent lawyer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution. But in its
Resolution11 of May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent lawyer's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Our Ruling: After a careful review of the records, we find respondent lawyer guilty of professional misconduct
and of violating Canons 1, 12 16, 13 and 1814 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Not only do
we find complainant's version more credible but we also note the glaring inconsistencies in respondent
lawyer's allegations.
Respondent lawyer claims that as a mere associate in the Zaragoza Macabangkit Law offices, "he has NO
participation whatsoever regarding the fees the complainant is giving to the office."15 But, as pointed out by
Commissioner Cachapero, respondent lawyer himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket
fees and the rest [was paid] as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the
hospital."16 Because of this admission, it can be concluded that respondent lawyer received fees "for his
services" from the complainant himself Further bolstering the fact that respondent lawyer did in fact receive
fees for his professional services are complainant's demand letters17 - one received on September 1, 2004
and another delivered by registered mail on September 9, 2004 -asking respondent lawyer to return the
amount of P20,000.00 acceptance fee and to account for the docket fees paid to the RTC of Iligan City. To
these, respondent lawyer merely replied that he "was made to understand that the 'docket fee' in Alfeche
case is part of [respondent's] claims"18 without denying that he had received such an1ount. The complainant
was thus constrained to conduct his own investigation against his own lawyer, in the course of which he
discovered that of the P50,000.00 alleged filing fees that he gave respondent lawyer, only P2,623.60 was
paid by respondent lawyer to the RTC. As Commissioner Cachapero aptly stated in his Report and
Recommendation,19 "[r]espondent's act of paying no heed to such claim from [c]omplainant reveals a subtle
affirmation" that he, indeed, received the acceptance fee.
Finally, respondent lawyer's former law partners belied his clain1 that he did not receive, as in fact it was the
law firm which received, the an1ounts paid by the complainant. In their Joint Affidavit,20 lawyers Leo M.
Zaragoza and Alex E. Macabangkit averred that "the payment made by complainant to Atty. Zaide belongs
to him exclusively and we do not interfere in the arrangement x x x and we do not [have] any share thereof.
"21
Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return the amount
paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16.01and16.03 of the CPR, to wit:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good fai1h in dealing wit
the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."22 Any lawyer who does not live up
to this duty must be prepared to take the consequences of his waywardness.
As regards the alleged switching of page 8 of the complaint, respondent lawyer claimed that it was
complainant who switched the pages "to create an impression that respondent lawyer defrauded the
complainant."23 He asserted in his Motion for Reconsideration that he came to learn of the PS million claim
only during the disbarment proceedings and that he ''thought it was a joke as respondent lawyer was NOT
able to attend the preliminary conference at the IBP Cagayan de Oro City, where he could have seen the
document. "24 That respondent lawyer seems to find it hard to get together with himself is shown by the fact
that on the very same page of his Motion for Reconsideration, he himself admitted that "when respondent
lawyer was told of the amount, he asked the clerk of the office to change it to a more reasonable and realistic
relief, which was eventually heeded, which respondent lawyer was NOT aware that herein complainant was
able to get a draft copy prepared by the office."25 To borrow Commissioner Cachapero' s apt observation,
this obvious contradiction renders his defense doubtful, to say the least. Notably, respondent lawyer's former
law partners also belied his claim that Loma B. Martinez, the person who supposedly typed the Complaint,
was a personnel of their law firm. In their Joint Affidavit, they contended that "Loma B. Martinez was never
our Office Staff. She never prepared any pleading in the office for any of us including that of Atty. Zaide." 26
Respondent lawyer's transgressions did not end there. By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or
Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in said Civil Case No. 6380, and by his failure to appear at the
hearings in connection therewith, respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to
postpone the hearings thereon, and this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case insofar as NEMA
was concerned. As previously mentioned, the RTC had to put off for 37 days its ruling on NEMA.'s Motion to
Dismiss because respondent lawyer moved for time to oppose the same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension
given to him, respondent lawyer still failed to appear at the hearings or file the appropriate pleading. These
failings are clearly offensive to Rules 18.0327 and 18.0428 of the CPR. If respondent lawyer's claim that he
and complainant had indeed agreed to drop the case against NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the
31
court should have saved the Court's precious time by at least promptly manifesting his lack of objection to
NEMA's Motion to Dismiss. This he did not do.
Given the gravity of the offenses imputed against him, and considering that this is his second administrative
case,29respondent lawyer's defense that he was a young lawyer when he went astray, hardly merits
sympathy from this Court.1âwphi1 Surely respondent lawyer could not have been unaware that when he
took the solemn oath to become a member of the bar, he did so not only to enjoy the rewards and privileges
of an attorney and counsellor at law, but he also took upon his shoulders the heavy burden of responsibility
and duty that a full-fledged membership in the Philippine Bar necessarily entailed. Respondent lawyer could
not have been oblivious of the fact that the exercise of a right or privilege is always encumbered with the
burden of responsibility and duty.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective immediately. Atty. Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return to complainant the sums
given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount of P70,000.00, from which should be
deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as docketing fees. SO ORDERED.
F. DUTY OF FAIRNESS
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-
CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of
FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all surnamed
CADAVEDO vs. VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired
a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in
Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13,
1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold
the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before the RTC(then Court of
First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of
sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo
initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case;
he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance
of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The
amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The
contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if
they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending, the
spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was subsequently
cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses
Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their
children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and
declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab initio.
It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The
case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari which this Court
dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the
publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the name
of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure
sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14,
1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting
of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel
TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty.
Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot
into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and
assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents
and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil
Case No. 3352was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement)8 in
Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya
acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreementin a
decision dated June 10, 1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for
Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied the
petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA
dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.
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The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443.
However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning
the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the respondents,
assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is
the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected
from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of
this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due
consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of Estate
in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued
in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of
10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and
ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s fee on
contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that the parties novated this
agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby
giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya
one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the conjugal
partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
as it was done precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as Atty.
Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was convinced that the
issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an
excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to perform
extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess portion of their
share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and deliver the
produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered the
spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final restoration of the
premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17, 1996
decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise agreement. In
so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from
1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years
of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –
Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve
years and even reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case
lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into
a compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to
acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of
the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that
Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA
ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in
the three cases, the probability of him losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits
resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement and
rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed
contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents accountable for the produce,
harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from
1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case
No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services, especially those
contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall
be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This
agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya
is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating
their contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee is
excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue that the issues involved in
Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed
by the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case require much
of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in research. They point out that the two subsequent civil cases should
not be considered in determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for
his services in Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus, these
cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses
Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for each of these subsequent cases,
and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the
subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case from
Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half of the subject lot should
they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy,
prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
33
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did
not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215 did
not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s
services in Civil Case No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was
not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the questioned stipulation for
attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not
to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the
subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the RTC’s approval of
their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed
the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated
administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the
compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife -Rosa -and
their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito L.
Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma.
Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16
The Court’s Ruling: We resolve to GRANT the petition. The subject lot was the core of four successive and
overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings
pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead),
filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters
in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21,
1982.
Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the latter part
of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid
and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by
the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty.
Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses
Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their
favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court would
award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the court
concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation
for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former prays from
the court as an incident to the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties,
the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior
to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case
No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is
subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies involving
written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the
contingency fee of ₱2,000.00 stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency
fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-
half of the subject lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee
agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil
Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a
contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to
public policy.18
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine
that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed "against wanton and
in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and
where the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is
characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the intermeddler." 21 Some
common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely,
that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation." 22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of assigning
doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that such individuals
would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive
an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances
of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule
34
was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial
unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."24 action.34Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired
the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established facts:(1)on September 21,
1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public
September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on
policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in
October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a
1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the
portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession that forbids a
subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of
lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at
the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise
the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client.
agreement.
To permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the
action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a
settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement
his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27 subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24,
1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein
subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the
respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court held
relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against public policy, especially if the
lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of
the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client.29 Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the
compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find them to be
prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses
contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered in existent
the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42
and void from the beginning.37
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay
or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed above underlie this rule.
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated the provisions
of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the execution
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable
of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No.
1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing,
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive and found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the services
of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved,
prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however, this recognition
that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of
does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often
any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as
a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the
observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive
litigation.40 The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the
skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot
client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41
within five years from its acquisition.

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did not and
Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed
could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the petitioners, the
between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of
Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding
these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of
the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and
unreasonable.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged
oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as the
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes
spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
between him and his clients.42

Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property
E.The compromise agreement could not validate the void oral contingent fee agreement; neither did it
that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The same
supersede the written contingent fee agreement
proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.33

35
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment
case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the disputed one-half
portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such
acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the
declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any contract directly resulting from such illegal
contract is likewise void and in existent.46
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement providing
for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity even
though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it
in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case could not have
attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with
the issue of possession de facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession
founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present action and
praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half portion and for judicial
determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –were not barred by the compromise
agreement. Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express
stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the reasonableness of
such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s
professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was
expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for
it.49
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and
the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in
determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s
fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not novel and did not
require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2)
Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until
1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted
for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and
the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property
subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the character of
the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on valuation. We believe
and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the
subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They
shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client,
not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express protection to the
rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on
the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the
other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property right over the disputed
property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the
disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly accords.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the decision
dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth
[1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the respondents previously received from the
disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to
return to the petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente
Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement. SO ORDERED.
Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency basis. The Supreme
Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as
asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed
by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the
Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided
in their favor. Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral
contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The
agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to “conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his
fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law.” The rule of the profession that forbids
a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case
at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his
client. The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both
deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel,
Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo
CORAZON M. DALUPAN vs.ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT1
In her affidavit-complaint5 dated April 20, 1999, the complainant claimed that she was a defendant in a
criminal case for grave slander pending before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan. Meanwhile, her son, Wilmer Dalupan, was also a defendant in a separate criminal case for grave
slander and malicious mischief pending before the same court. In order to represent the complainant and her
son, the complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent who then charged an acceptance fee of
₱10,000.
On August 20, 1996, the complainant paid the respondent ₱5,000 as initial payment for his acceptance fee.
On August 27, 1996, the complainant requested the respondent to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond.
However, the respondent allegedly denied the request and claimed that it was beyond the scope of his
retainer services. Thus, the complainant alleged that she caused a certain Rolly Calbento to draft the same
which was however signed by the respondent.
36
On January 31, 1997, the complainant paid the respondent the remaining balance of ₱5,000 for his
acceptance fee. When the complainant asked for an Official Receipt from the respondent, the latter refused
saying that there was no need for the issuance of a receipt. On that same day, the complainant also paid the
respondent ₱500 for his appearance fee in the preliminary conference and arraignment which occurred on
the same day.
Thereafter, the complainant alleged that the respondent neglected his duties as counsel and failed to attend
any of the hearings before the MTC. In view of the respondent’s repeated absences before the MTC, Judge
Jocelyn S. Dilig issued an Order which appointed a counsel de oficio to represent the complainant.
Aggrieved, the complainant filed the instant complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
On the other hand, in his comment6, the respondent denied all the allegations of the complainant.
The respondent allege that the complainant approached him and represented herself as an indigent party in
the following cases for which she sought to engage the legal services of the respondent: (1) Criminal Case
No. 12586, People of the Philippines v. Corazon Dalupan, et al. for Grave Slander, (2) Criminal Case No.
12585, People of the Philippines v. Wilmer Dalupan for Malicious Mischief, (3) I.S. No. 96-1104, Custodio
Family v. Cesar Dalupan, et al. for Frustrated Murder, (4) I.S. No. 97-54, Dalupan Family v. Romulo
Custodio, et al. for Physical Injuries, and (5) I.S. No. 9760 Dalupan Family v. Romulo Custodio for Frustrated
Murder. The respondent agreed to represent the complainant in the aforementioned cases subject to the
payment of an acceptance fee of ₱5,000 per case and an appearance fee of ₱500 for each court
appearance.
On August 20, 1996, the complainant paid the respondent ₱5,000 for his acceptance fee.
On August 27, 1996, the respondent filed a Motion for Reduction of Bail in favor of the complainant before
the MTC of Puerto Princesa City. On that same day, the complainant proceeded to the law office of the
respondent and demanded that the latter negotiate with the MTC judge to ensure the grant of the Motion of
Bail. When the respondent refused the demand of the complainant, the latter replied at the top of her voice:
"Binabayaran kita, bakit hindi mo ginagawa ang gusto ko?" The respondent answered her with, "Hindi po
lahat ng gusto ninyo ay gagawin ko, sa tama lamang po tayo, abogado po ninyo ako, hindi ako fixer."7 This
irked the complainant who then made verbal threats that she will replace the respondent with a certain Atty.
Roland Pay who held office nearby. However, when the MTC of Puerto Princesa City eventually ruled in
favor of the complainant and granted the motion, the latter revoked her threat that she will replace the
respondent.
On August 19, 1997, the MTC of Puerto Princesa City issued a Notice of Hearing to the complainant and her
son Wilmer Dalupan which ordered them to appear before the court on September 9, 1997 in connection
with their criminal cases pending therein. However, the respondent failed to attend the scheduled hearing as
he allegedly failed to receive a copy of the Notice of Hearing. Thus, in his written explanation dated October
7, 1997, the respondent attributed his failure to appear before the MTC to the inefficiency of the process
server of the said court.
On October 10, 1997, the complainant told the respondent that she was terminating the latter’s services on
the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Furthermore, the complainant also told the respondent that she
engaged the services of Atty. Roland Pay to replace the respondent. As a result, on October 30, 1997, the
complainant withdrew all her records from the law office of the respondent.
On January 29, 1998, the MTC of Puerto Princesa City issued an Order which relieved the respondent of
any responsibility in Criminal Case Nos. 12585 and 12586:
Acting on what the counsel of record of all the accused in the above-entitled cases call "Compliance", where
obvious on the face of which is his desire to withdraw as Counsel, and it appearing that said intention to
withdraw is not only with the full conformity of all the accused but at their own initiative, Atty. Glenn Gacott is
hereby relieved of any responsibility in the further prosecution of the above-captioned cases.8
In view of the above Order, the respondent argued that he was not guilty of abandonment or neglect of duty
because it was the complainant who willfully terminated his services even without fault or negligence on his
part.
We referred this case to the IBP for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
On December 12, 2006, Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E Reyes recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment against the respondent. At the same time, he also recommended that the
respondent return the payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.9
The Investigating Commissioner opined that the respondent cannot be held liable for abandonment or
neglect of duty because it was the complainant who discharged the respondent for loss of trust and
confidence. This was confirmed by the act of the complainant in withdrawing all her records from the law
office of the respondent. Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner said that absent evidence showing
that the respondent committed abandonment or neglect of duty, the presumption of regularity should prevail
in favor of the respondent.
Although there was no evidence to support the claim of the complainant that she paid the respondent the
remaining balance of ₱5,000 as acceptance fee and an appearance fee of ₱500 on January 31, 1997, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to an Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996 which proved that
the complainant indeed paid the respondent an amount of ₱5,000. However, the Investigating
Commissioner found that the respondent did not perform any substantial legal work on behalf of the
complainant. For this reason, and in the interest of justice, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the respondent return the amount of ₱5,000 to the complainant.
On March 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-115 which adopted and
approved in toto the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2010-544 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 27, 2007 filed by the respondent.
Hence, the present petition10 which raises the sole issue of whether the respondent should return the
payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.
Firstly, the respondent argued that when the MTC of Puerto Princesa City issued the Order dated January
29, 1998 which relieved the respondent of any responsibility in Criminal Case Nos. 12585 and 12586, the
trial court did not require the respondent to reimburse the payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant.
Thus, the IBP Board of Governors exceeded its authority in ordering the respondent to return such fees to
the complainant.
Secondly, the respondent argued that a plain reading of the Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996 would
reveal that the parties intended the payment of ₱5,000 to serve as acceptance fee which is different from
attorney’s fee. According to the respondent, the acceptance fee corresponds to the opportunity cost incurred
by the lawyer for not representing other potential clients due to a conflict of interest with the present client.
37
Thus, the payment of acceptance fee to the lawyer does not depend on the latter’s performance of legal
services.
Since the complainant failed to file any comment on the petition for review, we proceed to resolve the sole
issue raised, and rule in favor of the respondent.
We find that the respondent did not commit any fault or negligence in the performance of his obligations
under the retainer agreement which was wilfully terminated by the complainant on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence. As held by the Investigating Commissioner, the evidence on record shows that the
respondent is not liable for abandonment or neglect of duty.
However, we disagree with the conclusion of the Investigating Commissioner that the respondent should
return the payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of ₱5,000.
Firstly, the Investigating Commissioner seriously erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the
respondent as attorney’s fee. Relevantly, we agree with the respondent that there is a distinction between
attorney’s fee and acceptance fee.
It is well-settled that attorney’s fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept.11 In its
ordinary sense, attorney’s fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal
services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney’s fee is awarded by the court to the
successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.12 In the present case, the
Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney’s fee in its ordinary concept.
On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the
case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of
the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, the incurs an opportunity cost by
merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee.
Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by
the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.
In the present case, based on a simple reading of the Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996, the parties
clearly intended the payment of ₱5,000 to serve as acceptance fee of the respondent, and not attorney’s
fee. Moreover, both parties expressly claimed that they intended such payment as the acceptance fee of the
respondent. Absent any other evidence showing a contrary intention of the parties, we find that the
Investigating Commissioner gravely erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the respondent as
attorney’s fee.
Since the Investigating Commissioner made an erroneous reference to attorney’s fee, he therefore
mistakenly concluded that the respondent should return the same as he did not perform any substantial legal
work on behalf of the complainant. As previously mentioned, the payment of acceptance fee does not
depend on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered.
Secondly, the respondent did not commit any fault or negligence which would entail the return of the
acceptance fee.
Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he is expected to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion.13 In Carino v. Atty. De Los
Reyes,14 the respondent lawyer who failed to file a complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office, returned
the ₱10,000 acceptance fee paid to him. Moreover, he was admonished by the Court to be more careful in
the performance of his duty to his clients. Meanwhile, in Voluntad-Ramirez v. Baustista,15 we ordered the
respondent lawyer to return the ₱14,000 acceptance fee because he did nothing to advance his client’s
cause during the six-month period that he was engaged as counsel.
In the present case, the complainant alleged that she requested the respondent to draft a Motion to Reduce
Bail Bond which was denied by the latter.1âwphi1 She also claimed that the respondent failed to attend any
of the hearing before the MTC. Thus, the complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment on the
ground of abandonment or neglect of duty. On the other hand, the respondent denied the allegation that he
failed to draft the Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and submitted a copy of the MTC Order16 dated August 28,
1996 granting the motion to reduce bail. He also justified his failure to attend the hearings before the MTC to
the failure of the process server to provide him with a Notice of Hearing.
Other than her bare allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence to support her claim that the
respondent committed abandonment or neglect of duty. Thus, we are constrained to affirm the factual
findings of the Investigating Commissioner that the presumption of regularity should prevail in favor of the
respondent. Absent any fault or negligence on the part of the respondent, we see no legal basis for the order
of the Investigating Commissioner to return the attorney’s fee (acceptance fee) of ₱5,000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2007-115 and
Resolution No. XIX-2010-544 of the IBP Board of Governors insofar as they ordered the respondent to return
the attorney’s fee (acceptance fee) to the complainant in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000) are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
G. DUTY OF COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to
“serve his client with competence and diligence” when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint
for estafa was dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific
performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount
involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only
guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross
and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most
thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty.
Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the
Lawyer’s Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.
JULIAN PENILLA vs. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR.
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the spouses) for
the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted in their obligation.
Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the
services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s payment. When
the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he would file a criminal case
for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged ₱30,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees.
Complainant turned over the relevant documents to respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent
then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City
38
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not
appear. After the hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions that
transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that they have to
give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a favorable resolution of the
case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion,
bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for ₱950 and delivered it to respondent’s office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the spouses.
Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was "needed to have [the
resolution] reversed."2Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the
problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant
that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and presented the option of filing a civil case for
specific performance against the spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an
additional ₱10,000 to respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the
complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims
that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of the case
and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was able to talk to
respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses could not be located. In the
same meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine the whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant
returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but because respondent was not around, complainant
left with respondent’s secretary a letter regarding the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s possession.
Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga" to solve his
predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant learned that a civil case
for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6, 20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He
also found out that the filing fee was only ₱2,440 and not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga
of the same radio program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The
letter, like all of complainant’s previous letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross
misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate
administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. He
denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he charged and
received only ₱2,000. He also countered that the payment of ₱30,000 made by the complainant was his
acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise denied the following other
allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he asked
complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that
he charged ₱10,000, as he only charged ₱5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform petitioner
of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of complainant. What
allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his
office during days and times that he would be attending his daily court hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his counsel
attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were directed to file their
verified position papers within 15 days,6 to which complainant and respondent complied.7
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual and legal
bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel when he filed the criminal case
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City.
He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases as his job was to ensure that justice
is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to guarantee the success of the case and resort to
unethical means to win such case for the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the
prosecutor a bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000. Respondent
argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected exceeded
₱30,000 – the amount being claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and
transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore thumb
rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for repair of the
Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral or written, the
consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for damages. As
correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature
because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent (spouses Garin) failed to
perform their contractual obligation under the contract.x x x x
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the dismissal of the
criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed
is ₱36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC [which] has
jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the proper forum or
court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil complaint was filed in court, the
jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already
₱400,000.00.x x x x
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters marked as
Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by complainant’s secretary, except for Exhibit "H"
which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These efforts
of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore
them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the complainant and return the money and documents
received by reason of the legal engagement, but omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing
the time and place for the meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was
done in bad faith on the part of respondent.10
39
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646, adopting and
approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution11 reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of suspension be
reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a "Motion to Admit
Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to
inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He stressed that
complainant had always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in the afternoon at his
office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in Tandang Sora. He
admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to negligence in violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his
first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a second Motion for
Reconsideration15which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the records of the case to this
Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned Notices of
Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another
Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty
of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an
odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his
continued membership therein.19
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the following
provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
a)Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client;
b)Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body;
c)Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
his client;
d)Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him;
e)Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f)Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable; and
g)Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated Canon 18
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that
respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to "serve his client with competence and diligence" when
respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a
civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent
committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the
RTC. The complaint, having an alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with
the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only ₱36,000. As
correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,] vests in the
MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of demand does not
exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to
₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the criminal
complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been easily averted
had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant. What aggravates
respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be
more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently
filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent and did
not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He paid no attention
and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not
only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with complainant is
also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt to solve his predicament,
complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a radio station to recover his money from
respondent, or at the very least, get his attention.
Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays his lawyer
hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’ He must constantly keep in mind that his
actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with
the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a
good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s
cause."22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and
40
developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO C. SOTTO,
obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for information from the client. CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO, and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and SALVACION
BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the cases he
filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy We start this decision by expressing our alarm that this case is the fifth suit to reach the Court dividing the
to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) respecting four real properties that had belonged to
many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant, respondent Filemon' s estate (Estate of Sotto ).
neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the
status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
The first case (Matilde S. Palicte v. Hon. Jose O. Ramolete, et al., No. L-55076, September 21, 1987, 154
SCRA 132) held that herein respondent Matilde S. Palicte (Matilde), one of four declared heirs of Filemon,
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the had validly redeemed the four properties pursuant to the assailed deed of redemption, and was entitled to
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." The legal profession have the title over the four properties transferred to her name, subject to the right of the three other declared
dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal heirs to join her in the redemption of the four properties within a period of six months.
and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the
The second was the civil case filed by Pascuala against Matilde (Civil Case No. CEB-19338) to annul the
title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such
former’s waiver of rights, and to restore her as a co-redemptioner of Matilde with respect to the four
honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent
properties (G.R. No. 131722, February 4, 1998).
responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of
the interests of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty
and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath. The third was an incident in Civil Case No. R-10027 (that is, the suit brought by the heirs of Carmen Rallos
against the Estate of Sotto) wherein the heirs of Miguel belatedly filed in November 1998 a motion for
reconsideration praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they be still included
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant who has
as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. After the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit,
the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the complaint. In the instant case,
the heirs of Miguel elevated the denial to the CA on certiorari and prohibition, but the CA dismissed their
complainant was only able to prove respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
petition and upheld the order issued on October 5, 1989. Thence, the heirs of Miguel came to the Court on
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate his
certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), but the Court dismissed their petition for being filed out of time and for lack of
claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when
merit on September 23, 2002.
respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in
order to get a favorable decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent
indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required The fourth was The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto, represented by its duly designated Administrator, Sixto
filing fees. Sotto Pahang, Jr. v. Matilde S. Palicte, et al. (G.R. No. 158642, September 22, 2008, 566 SCRA 142),
whereby the Court expressly affirmed the ruling rendered by the probate court in Cebu City in Special
Proceedings No. 2706-R entitled Intestate Estate of the Deceased Don Filemon Sotto denying the
As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04
administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz:
The fifth is this case. It seems that the disposition by the Court of the previous cases did not yet satisfy
herein petitioners despite their being the successors-in-interest of two of the declared heirs of Filemon who
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the
had been parties in the previous cases either directly or in privity. They now pray that the Court undo the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
decision promulgated on November 29, 2002, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) declared their action for
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
the partition of the four properties as already barred by the judgments previously rendered, and the
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
resolution promulgated on August 5, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration.
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. x x x.
The principal concern here is whether this action for partition should still prosper notwithstanding the earlier
rulings favoring Matilde’s exclusive right over the four properties.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of the
Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P.
Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and Antecedents
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby imposes
upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to
commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang (Pascuala), Miguel
circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.

41
In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of Filemon, It is notable at this juncture that the heirs of Pascuala did not join the action for partition whether as plaintiffs
filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto (Civil Case No. or defendants.3
R-10027) seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen, and damages. The
CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of ₱233,963.65, among other
Instead of filing her answer, Matilde moved to dismiss the complaint,4 stating that: (a) petitioners had no
reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected against six parcels of
cause of action for partition because they held no interest in the four properties; (b) the claim was already
land and two residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were sold at a public
barred by prior judgment, estoppel and laches; (c) the court had no jurisdiction over the action; and (d) a
auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in her own name (i.e., Lots No. 1049, No.
similar case entitled Pahang v. Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been dismissed with finality by Branch 8
1051, No. 1052 and No. 2179-C), while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the two houses because her
of the RTC in Cebu City.
family was residing there. On July 9, 1980, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Cebu executed a deed of
redemption in favor of Matilde, which the Clerk of Court approved.
On November 15, 1999, the RTC granted Matilde’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint,5 holding
that Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was already barred by prior judgment considering that the decision in G.R.
On July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to the four
No. 55076, the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in Civil Case No. R-10027, and the decision in G.R.
properties. However, the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in her
No. 131722 had all become final, and that the cases had involved the same parties, the same subject matter,
favor null and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R as one of the
the same causes of action, and the same factual and legal issues. The RTC observed that it was bereft of
heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with the right to redeem the four properties.
jurisdiction to annul the rulings of co-equal courts that had recognized Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the
Matilde directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and on September 21, 1987,
four properties.
the Court, reversing the CFI’s ruling, granted Matilde’s petition for review but allowed her co-heirs the
opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for a period of six months before the probate court (i.e., RTC
of Cebu City, Branch 16) would grant her motion to transfer the title to her name.1 Following the denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration,6 petitioners appealed the dismissal of
Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to the CA, which promulgated its judgment on November 29, 2002 affirming the
dismissal.7 After the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,8 they brought this present appeal to
The other heirs of Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of September 21, 1987 to
the Court.
join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period. Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the trial court
issued an order in Civil Case No. R-10027 approving Matilde’s motion to transfer the title of the four lots to
her name, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption and issue new In the meantime, the Estate of Sotto, through the administrator, moved in the probate court (Special
certificates of title covering the four properties in Matilde’s name. Proceedings No. 2706-R) to require Matilde to account for and turn over the four properties that allegedly
belonged to the estate, presenting documentary evidence showing that Matilde had effected the redemption
of the four properties with the funds of the estate in accordance with the express authorization of
It appears that Pascuala, who executed a document on November 25, 1992 expressly waiving her rights in
Marcelo.9 The probate court granted the motion, but subsequently reversed itself upon Matilde’s motion for
the four properties covered by the deed of redemption, changed her mind and decided to file on September
reconsideration. Hence, the Estate of Sotto appealed (G.R. No. 158642), but the Court promulgated its
23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a complaint to seek the nullification of her waiver of rights, and to have
decision on September 22, 2008 adversely against the Estate of Sotto.10
herself be declared as a co-redemptioner of the four properties (Civil Case No. CEB-19338). However, the
RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CEB-19338 on the ground of its being barred by laches. Pascuala then
assailed the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-19338 in the CA through a petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP Issue
No. 44660), which the CA dismissed on November 21, 1997. Undeterred, Pascuala appealed the dismissal
of her petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 131722), but the Court denied due course to her petition on February 4,
1998 because of her failure to pay the docket fees and because of her certification against forum shopping Petitioners insist that this action for partition was not barred by the prior judgment promulgated on
having been signed only by her counsel. September 21, 1987 in No. L-55076, because they were not hereby questioning Matilde’s right to redeem the
four properties but were instead raising issues that had not been passed upon in No. L-55076, or in any of
the other cases mentioned by the CA; that the issues being raised here were, namely: (a) whether or not the
In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-10027 of the redemption of the four properties by Matilde was in accordance with the agreement between her and
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they Marcelo; and (b) whether or not the funds used to redeem the four properties belonged to the Estate of
be included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. After the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for its lack of Sotto;11 that there could be no bar by res judicata because there was no identity of parties and causes of
merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the denial by petition for certiorari and prohibition (C.A.-G.R. SP No. action between this action and the previous cases; that the captions of the decided cases referred to by the
60225). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition on January 10, 2002. Thereafter, they CA showed that the parties there were different from the parties here; and that it had not been shown that
elevated the matter to the Court via petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 154585), which the Court dismissed on this action and the other cases were based on the same causes of action.12
September 23, 2002 for being filed out of time and for lack of merit.
The sole decisive question is whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior
On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo, specifically: Lolibeth Sotto Noble, Danilo C. Sotto, Cristina C. judgment.
Sotto, Emmanuel C. Sotto, Filemon C. Sotto, and Marcela C. Sotto; and the heirs of Miguel, namely: Alberto,
Arturo and Salvacion, all surnamed Barcelona (herein petitioners), instituted the present action for partition
against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No. CEB-24293).2 Alleging in their complaint Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.
that despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four
properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeem the Petitioners argue here that the four properties be declared as part of the Estate of Sotto to be partitioned
properties, they prayed that the RTC declare the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that among the heirs of Filemon because the funds expended by Matilde for the redemption of the properties
the RTC direct their partition among the heirs of Filemon. came from the Estate of Sotto.

42
Their argument was similar to that made in The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte,13 the fourth case
to reach the Court, where the Court explicitly ruled as follows:
All these judgments and order upholding Matilde’s exclusive ownership of the subject properties became
final and executory except the action for partition which is still pending in this Court. The judgments were on
the merits and rendered by courts having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
There is substantial identity of parties considering that the present case and the previous cases involve the
heirs of Filemon. There is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also
between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties
is not required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one person
in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.
There is identity of causes of action since the issues raised in all the cases essentially involve the claim of
ownership over the subject properties. Even if the forms or natures of the actions are different, there is still
identity of causes of action when the same facts or evidence support and establish the causes of action in
the case at bar and in the previous cases.
Hence, the probate court was correct in setting aside the motion to require Matilde to turn over the subject
properties to the estate considering that Matilde’s title and ownership over the subject properties have
already been upheld in previous final decisions and order. This Court will not countenance the estate’s ploy
to countermand the previous decisions sustaining Matilde’s right over the subject properties. A party cannot
evade the application of the principle of res judicata by the mere expediency of varying the form of action or
the relief sought, or adopting a different method of presenting the issue, or by pleading justifiable
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 20 December 2002 and 2 June 2003
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 16, in SP. PROC. No. 2706-R. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
For this the fifth case to reach us, we still rule that res judicata was applicable to bar petitioners’ action for
partition of the four properties.
Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements
are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of
parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.14
The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in G.R. No. 55076 (the first case), the
decision of the Court in G.R. No. 131722 (the second case), the order dated October 5, 1989 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. R-10027 as upheld by the Court in G.R. No. 154585 (the third case), and the decision in G.R.
No. 158642 (the fourth case) – all of which dealt with Matilde’s right to the four properties – had upheld
Matilde’s right to the four properties and had all become final. Such rulings were rendered in the exercise of
the respective courts’ jurisdiction over the subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
What remains to be determined is whether Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and the previous cases involved the
same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action, and the same factual and legal issues.
We find that, indeed, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous cases as far as parties,
subject matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was
an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of the four properties.
First of all, petitioners, as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, were suing in their capacities as the
successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Miguel. Even in such capacities, petitioners’ identity with the parties in
the previous cases firmly remained. In G.R. No. L-55076 (the first case), in which Matilde was the petitioner
while her brother Marcelo, the administrator of the Estate of Sotto, was one of the respondents, the Court
affirmed Matilde’s redemption of the four properties notwithstanding that it gave the other heirs of Filemon
the opportunity to join as co-redemptioners within a period of six months. When the other heirs did not
ultimately join as Matilde’s co-redemptioners within the period allowed by the Court, the trial court in Civil
Case No. R-10027 rightly directed the Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of title covering the
properties in Matilde’s name. In Civil Case No. CEB-19338 (the second case), the action Pascuala brought
against Matilde for the nullification of Pascuala’s waiver of rights involving the four properties, the trial court
dismissed the complaint upon finding Pascuala barred by laches from asserting her right as Matilde’s
coredemptioner. The CA and, later on, the Court itself (G.R. No. 131722) affirmed the dismissal by the trial
court. In Civil Case No. R-10027, the trial court denied the motion of the heirs of Miguel (who are petitioners
herein) to include them as co-redemptioners of the properties on the ground of laches and res judicata.
Again, the CA and, later on, the Court itself (G.R. No. 154585) affirmed the denial. In G.R. No. 158642 (the
fourth case), the Court upheld the ruling of the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 2706-R denying the
administrator’s motion to require Matilde to turn over the four real properties to the Estate of Sotto.
In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an identity of parties existed because the parties
were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.15 An absolute identity of the parties
was not necessary, because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply.16 Moreover, mere
substantial identity of parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent
cases, even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient.17 As such, the fact that a
previous case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.
Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), was the same, that is,
Matilde’s right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right to
them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest,
maintained that the properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.
And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was successful, would amount
to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-24293.
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the
parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.18
Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of bar
by prior judgment, viz:
43
Section 47. Effect of judgments and final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; andx x x x
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded
on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine
is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation –interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on
the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of
the public tranquillity and happiness.19 The doctrine is to be applied with rigidity because:
x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families require that what has
been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is
this principle implanted in xxx jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders
white that which is black and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other
evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can detract from its
legal efficacy.20
What we have seen here is a clear demonstration of unmitigated forum shopping on the part of petitioners
and their counsel. It should not be enough for us to just express our alarm at petitioners’ disregard of the
doctrine of res judicata. We do not justly conclude this decision unless we perform one last unpleasant task,
which is to demand from petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay, an explanation of his role in this
pernicious attempt to relitigate the already settled issue regarding Matilde’s exclusive right in the four
properties. He was not unaware of the other cases in which the issue had been definitely settled considering
that his clients were the heirs themselves of Marcelo and Miguel. Moreover, he had represented the Estate
of Sotto in G.R. No. 158642 (The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto v. Palicte).
Under the circumstances, Atty. Mahinay appears to have engaged in the prejudicial practice of forum
shopping as much as any of his clients had been. If he was guilty, the Court would not tolerate it, and would
sanction him. In this regard, forum shopping, according to Ao-as v. Court of Appeals,21 may be committed as
follows:
As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can he committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same
prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not considered willful and
deliberate, the subsequent cases shall he dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned
above. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November
29, 2002; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit. The Court DIRECTS Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay to
show cause in writing within ten days from notice why he should not be sanctioned as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for committing a clear violation of the rule prohibiting forum-shopping by
aiding his clients in asserting the same claims at least twice.
NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ
Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners
of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander
filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag8 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them
of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of
Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community
street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC
rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented
by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a
Resolution11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the
appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was
filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions
for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as
members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and
willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that
although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised
general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer.
Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling
lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement
with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the
Association.
Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the
homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their
association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association
were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him
and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question,
among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the
Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that
complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there
was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the
imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless
complaint for disbarment.
44
On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14
On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1415 adopting
the recommendation with modifications as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12,
Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against
respondent is hereby deleted.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-
2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondent’s motion was a mere
reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19,
2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him
administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from
the practice of law is proper.
The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a
disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to
harass him.
The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must
initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to
a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome." 17
In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings
are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.
The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel
for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion
for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said
brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable
negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the
handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with
the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a
previous motion had been filed but "due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able
to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him."19 Thus, it is clear
that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of
his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also
states that:
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client as
amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Del
Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed
a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban,
43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended
for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a
brief or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases,
disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we
deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the
extent of respondent’s violation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for
violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.
JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS, vs.ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO
Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio
(respondent), for violation of Canons 15,1 17,2 183 and Rule 18.034 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), commenced thru a complaint-affidavit5 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).
This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to represent him
and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens. In his
complaint-affidavit dated March 15, 2010, the complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent: (1)
despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in the said case,6 failed to file the
corresponding petition, and it was the complainant’s wife who successfully instituted Civil Case No. 2463-
45
08,7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8, 2008; (2) even with the complainant furnishing him times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
a copy of the Summons dated December 15, 2008,8 belatedly filed an Answer9 and was able to file it only on regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.16 Lawyering is not a business; it is
March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in the Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.17
the petition on the ground of improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents
of Dasmariñas, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to discover and
It is beyond dispute that the complainant engaged the services of the respondent to handle his case. The
attend all the hearings set for the case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided10 on
records, however, definitively bear out that the respondent was completely remiss and negligent in handling
October 27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.
the complainant’s case, notwithstanding his receipt of the sum of ₱250,000.00 for the total expenses to be
incurred in the said case.
In his Answer,11 the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that: (1) after a
meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the
The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or notices from the trial court is
complainant to go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court
highly intolerable.1âwphi1 In the first place, securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was
(RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the
within the respondent’s control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing
latter had signed the verification and certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending and was later
of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the
on withdrawn because of the complainant’s refusal to testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the
respondent. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental to the
Answer was the fact that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the verification
advancement of his client’s cause of action.
thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case because he did not receive any notice from
the trial court; and (6) it was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court has already
rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed counsels. Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the progress of his client’s case
with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his client’s
interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD on October 29, 2010, only the complainant appeared;
him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of law to support his client’s interest.
thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further participate in the IBP proceedings.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.12
protecting the latter’s rights.18

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his Report and Recommendation13 dated October 22, 2011,
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor, fairness, and loyalty to his
finding the respondent guilty of violation of the Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended
client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
for six (6) months from the practice of law. Specifically, the Investigating Commissioner found that the
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
respondent failed to diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities
maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.19
considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated. The Investigating Commissioner said that
the respondent should have manifested or made known to the trial court that he was not receiving any notice
at all since it behoves upon him to make a follow-up on the developments of the cases he is handling. In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his client of due process and
his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists
As to the respondent’s argument that he indeed filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for
of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
the complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that it cannot betaken at face value absent the
preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and
presentation of the pleading itself which by a perusal of the records of the case was not submitted to the IBP-
urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the court.20
CBD. Moreso, the veracity of the Certification attached to the respondent’s answer was highly questionable
because it failed to state when the said petition was filed. Lastly, the Investigating Commissioner faulted the
respondent for not sufficiently explaining to the complainant the consequences of the petition being filed in Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the
the RTC of Malabon City since it was the respondent’s duty and responsibility to explain the complexities of Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
the same to his client for he is the one tasked with the technical know-how in the field of law. and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."21
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Investigating
Commissioner’s report but deemed it proper to increase the recommended period of suspension from six (6)
months to one (1) year.14 On February 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD transmitted the notice of the resolution and It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the complainant’s case, he became duty-
the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15 bound to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted
fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell
short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.22
The Court finds it fitting to sustain the IBP’s findings and the recommended sanction of suspension from the
practice of law since the attendant facts of the case show substantial evidence to support the respondent’s
delinquency. Thus, for the respondent’s negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case, the recommendation of
the IBP to suspend the respondent from the practice of law is well-taken. While the IBP Board of Governors
increased the period of suspension to one year, the Court finds the period of six months as recommended by
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
the Investigating Commissioner commensurate to the facts of the case.
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all

46
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 10-2673. The Court hereby
SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately
upon receipt of this Decision.
FELIPE LAYOS, vs. ATTY. MARLITO I. VILLANUEVA
In the Sumbong, it was alleged that respondent is complainant's counsel of record in Criminal Case No.
7367-B pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24 (RTC), wherein the former's
constant failure to appear during court hearings resulted in the RTC's issuance of an Order2 dated June 26,
2003 (June26, 2003 Order) waiving the defense’s right to cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the
issuance of such order, respondent remained absent and thus, complainant was only able to move for
reconsideration,3 thru respondent, only four (4) years later, or on April 21, 2007, which was denied in an
Order4 dated June 21, 2007. Aggrieved, complainant, also thru respondent, filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101274.5
In a Decision6 dated November 6, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition on the merits. The CA likewise
chastised respondent for his "lack of candidness and fervor on [his part] to champion the cause" of his client,
considering that, inter alia: (a) respondent never bothered to know the outcome of the hearings where he
was absent from; (b) it took respondent a long amount of time before moving to reconsider the RTC’s June
26, 2003 Order; and (c) respondent never questioned the appearances of other lawyers as complainant’s
counsel during his absence.7 Citing as basis such disquisition by the CA, complainant filed the instant
administrative case against respondent.
In his Comment8 dated March 30, 2009, respondent denied being remiss in his duty as complainant’s
counsel. He averred that during the hearing on April 4, 2002 where the criminal case was supposed to be
amicably settled, his car broke down and thus, he was unable to attend the hearing. After his car was fixed,
he decided to go back to his office and asked his secretary to call complainant to know what happened in the
said hearing. However, respondent was unable to contact complainant and that he never heard from the
latter for a long time. Respondent claimed that he no longer received any notices from the RTC, and thus, he
assumed that the amicable settlement pushed through and that the case was dismissed already.9
Further, respondent maintained that it was only sometime before November 15, 2005 when he receiveda
notice of hearing from the RTC.10 Pursuant to the same, he went to the RTC and found out about the June
26, 2003 Order and that other lawyers were appearing for complainant.11 After the hearing, respondent
approached the RTC personnel in order to get a copy of the June 26, 2003 Order but was unable to do so
due to lack of manpower in the RTC. Thus, he relied on the RTC personnel’s word that they would mail him
a copy of such Order, but theywere unable to do so. Hence, he was only able to move for reconsideration of
the June 26, 2003 Order on April 21, 2007 upon securing a copy of the same on April 4, 2006.12
Finally, respondent averred thathe had a hard time locating complainant who was not at his home address
and was staying at his workplace in Carmona, Cavite. According to respondent, this caused him to advance
the filing fees and other expenses of complainant’s cases, not to mention that the latter has failed to pay the
agreed appearance fees and attorney’s fees due him.13
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation14 dated February 4, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.15 Citing the CA Decision dated November
6, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101274, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent failed in his duty as
counsel to serve complainant’s interests with competence and diligence by neglecting the latter’s criminal
case which was pending before the RTC.16 In a Resolution17 dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board) unanimously adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, and hence, upheld respondent’s recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months for negligence in the performance of his legal duty to complainant.
Respondent moved for reconsideration18 which was, however, denied by the IBP Board in a
Resolution19 dated May 2, 2014. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal20 as well as a Petition for
Review on Certiorari21 before the Court.
The Issue Before the Court: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling: After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject
to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to serve his
client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the
developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is crucial in maintaining the
latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he
may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable
his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney.
The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests. In this
connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be
binding upon his client. As such, the lawyeris expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a clientwho deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.22
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002 hearing due to car trouble, respondent
no longer kept track of complainant’s criminal case and merely assumed that the same was already amicably
settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent finally knew that the case was still on-going, he
attended the November 15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the RTC’s issuance of the June 26, 2003 Order
which is prejudicial to complainant’s cause. Despite such alarming developments, respondent did not
immediately seek any remedy to further the interests of his client.1âwphi1 Instead, he passively relied on the
representations of the court employees that they would send him a copy of the aforesaid Order. Worse,
when he finally secured a copy on April 4, 2006, it still took him over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to
47
move the RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA denied the motion for
being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to the detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent failed
to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment.23
While the Court agrees that respondent should be held administratively liable for the foregoing acts and thus,
must be suspended from the practice of law, it nevertheless deems that the IBP’s recommended period of
suspension of six (6) months is too harsh a penalty, given the complainant’s seeming disinterest in the
developments of his own case. This is evidenced by complainant not communicating with respondent,
getting other lawyers referred to him by his friends despite having a counsel of record, and being indifferent
despite being informed of a standing warrant of arrest against him.24 In Venterez v. Atty. Cosme,25 a case
involving a lawyer who committed culpable negligence in handling his clients’ case, the Court reduced his
period of suspension from six (6) months to three (3) months after considering the surrounding
circumstances of the case.26 Similarly, in Somosot v. Atty. Lara27 which also involved a lawyer who was
remiss in his duties as counsel, the Court also reducedthe period of his suspension from six (6) months to
three (3) months, inlight of his client’s contributory faults.28 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months would be commensurate
penalty to the acts complained of.
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts in the prosecution or
defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at
the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an
imperative.29
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva is found administratively liable for violation of Canon 17
and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, RESPONDENT.
On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano's own counsel, Atty. Baterina.
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to take
possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge's court.
The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by Tejano,
his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property involved in the suit is a strip of land
located at the northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano's
family, but the Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road stretching from the provincial highway in
the east to the provincial government's motor pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation
proceedings.[2]
The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges would hear the
case before Judge Arquelada became the branch's presiding judge in 2001.[3] Prior to his appointment to the
bench, however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that
capacity represented the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V.[4]
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the former's
bid to "take possession" of their property and was "collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their
businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.] 5663." In support of his accusations, Tejano attached a copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-43004[5] covering Lot No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly
the daughter of Judge Arquelada; receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo,[6] sheriff at Judge Arquelada's
sala at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of rents paid to Aida Calibuso,[7] who was expressly designated by
Laderas as her attorney-in-fact[8] in collecting said rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada,
Judge Arquelada's brother.[9]
As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina "miserably failed to advance [his] cause." Specifically,
Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-
plaintiffs had waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the trial because his
mother was ill and confined at the hospital;[10] (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the order declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do
so;[11](3) not only failed to file said motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would
not be presenting any witnesses without consulting his clients;[12] and (4) failed to comply with the trial court's
order to submit their formal offer of exhibits.[13]
In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Jose P.
Perez informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative
supervision over officials and employees of the judiciary. However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint
against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was
already "being acted upon" by the OCA.[14]
In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina to file a Comment on the complaint
within 10 days from notice.[15] Failing to comply with the Court's order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once again ordered to comply with the Court's 6 July
2009 Order.[16]
In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a
kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court's indulgence and said that
his failure to comply was "not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal."[17]
Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano case. He
explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation of the
plaintiffs' case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years.[18] He alleged that this
fact was made known to Tejano's mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure
the services of another lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not
represented by a lawyer until the termination of the case.[19] Atty. Baterina instead points to the "displayed
bias" and "undue and conflict of interest"[20] of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano's predicament.
The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina's explanation "not satisfactory" and
admonished him "to be more heedful of the Court's directives in order to avoid delay in the disposition of
[the] case." The Court also referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation
After the proceedings, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and
Recommendation,[21] part of which reads:
First, it appears that respondent's failure to appear in representation of his clients in the said civil case before
the RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason
for his non-appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That
48
way, the RTC would have, in the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer.
Respondent's contention that the fact of his suspension was nonetheless circularized to all courts of the
Philippines including the RTC is unavailing. Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in properly
informing the RTC of his suspension in order to protect the interests of his clients.
Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he explained the
consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek another counsel's assistance in the meantime.
Clearly therefore, respondent's inaction falls short of the diligence required of him as a lawyer.
Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to submit their formal
offer of evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the RTC's Order dated 8
November 2004. Respondent's bare excuse that he remembers making an oral offer thereof deserves no
merit because the records of this case clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of
respondent, his clients' case was dismissed by the RTC. x x x x
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's acts constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action
against him. His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is, therefore,
respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, and be
fined in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary
action. x x x.[22]
On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237
Adm. Case No. 8235
Joselito F. Tejano vs.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross
negligence, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
However, the Fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos imposed on respondent is hereby deleted.[23]
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the IBP's report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty.
The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Lawyers have a "fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients," and must act "in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility."[24]
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client's cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter's rights. Once a lawyer's services are engaged, "he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him."[25] A lawyer's acceptance to take up a case "impliedly stipulates [that he will]
carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory."[26]
Atty. Baterina's duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to
their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer even one suspended from practicing the profession owes it to his client to not "sit idly by and leave
the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty."[27] The client "should never be left groping in the dark" and
instead must be "adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case."[28]
Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any
effort to safeguard his clients' welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients'
behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility[29] and renders him
subject to disciplinary action.[30] The penalties for a lawyer's failure to file the required brief or pleading range
from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.[31]
Further, Atty. Baterina's reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a
member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for
the Court's disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court's orders in his clients' case, he
even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.
Considering Atty. Baterina's medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have
sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, "are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of
the court."[32] As such, Atty. Baterina should "know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an
order which should be complied with promptly and completely."[33]
Proper Penalty
In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that "the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts."[34]
The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being found guilty of
gross misconduct.[35] In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file
her Answer with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession where she and her
siblings were defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in
default and unable to present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.
Atty. Baterina was also found to have "convert[ed] the money of his client to his own personal use without
her consent" and "deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be
used for filing an answer with counterclaim," which he never did.
The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina's "repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the
Court requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility
tantamount to willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court."[36]
These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients, as
well as a propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable
and will not be tolerated among the members of the Bar.
For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension period of five (5)
years.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from
49
the practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
ROBERTO P. NONATO vs. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR.
In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto
Nonato (Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a 479-sq.m. Real property ( property) at Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against
Anselmo Tubongbanua ( Anselmo), before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros
Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. MTC-282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represen ted
by Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty. Garcia). However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty.
Fudolin, the respondent in the present case.
The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance fees, no
formal retainer agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance
fees paid.
The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the complainant, engaged his services on
Restituto’s representation that they were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the case on a minimal
acceptance fee of ₱20,000.00 and appearance fee of ₱1,000.00, and did not execute any formal retainer
agreement.
The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the MTC, the
respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto
could not contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish
Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the
complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case.
After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit
their respective position papers. Since neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC dismissed
the complaint as well as the counterclaim on May 26, 2005.
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. He justified his failure to file
the position paper by arguing that he misplaced the case records, adding that he was al so burdened with
numerous other cases. The MTC denied the motion.
The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging that the ejectment case was a
me ritorious one such that its dismissal would cause injustice to Restituto (the plaintiff). He also filed a
supplemental motion, but the court denied both motions.
On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the complainant among
them.
The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suit’s dismissal as the
respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTC’s dismissal order. The complainant also asserts
that the respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by
the MTC. The complainant claims that he only found out that the case had been dismissed when he
personally went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.
Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to file the position
paper could be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondent’s
intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial compromise with the daughter of defendant Anselmo.
On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated failure to
communicate with him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position paper due to his poor health. He
also claimed that he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind, which caused the delay in the
preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment case.2
In his Answer3 dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at the time he received the MTC’s di
rective to submit a position paper, he was already suffering from "Hypertensi ve Cardiovascular Disease,
Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II." The respondent also alleged that further
consultations confirmed that he had an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous
months. His health condition led to his loss of concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case
folders, among them the re cords of the ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he focused on his
health for self-preservation, and underwent vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate
with the late Restituto and the complainant.
The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings was not
due to willful negligence but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his
clients or to the court out of fear that his disclosure would affect his private practice.
Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suit’s dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of
risking his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order.
Because the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the
position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his client’s case.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and Recommendation, finding the
respondent guilty of both negligence and betrayal of his client’s confidence. The Investigating Commissioner
found that the respondent’s failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise the
client of the status of the case demonstrated his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.
The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondent’s failure to promptly inform his client s,
including the complainant, of his medical condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of
other lawyers. Had he notified the complainant’s father of his illness before the case was dismissed, the
latter could have engaged the services of another lawyer, and the case would not have been dismissed on a
mere technical ground.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondent’s suspension for one (1) month from the
practice of law.
In a Resolution4 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation after finding it to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rules.
The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion in a
resolution5 dated June 21, 2013.
50
The Issue: The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for
negligence in the performance of duty.
The Court's Ruling: Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.
A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.6 He
should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at
least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By
consenting to be his client’s counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or
that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect
him to perform his obligations diligently.7The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.
In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties
as Restituto’s counsel.1avvphi1 His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed
to file his position paper despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so. His omission greatly prejudiced
his client as the Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit.
In addition, the respondent fa iled to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His
failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted
inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty.8 All these acts violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility warranting the court’s imposition of disciplinary action. The pertinent provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,9 we considered a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his
client to be inexcusable negligence. We held that the lawyer’s omission amounted to a serious lapse in the
duty he owed his client and in his professional obligation not to delay litigation and to aid the courts in the
speedy administration of justice.
Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin,10 we ruled that a lawyer’s failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his
client about the developments in her case fell below the standard and amounted to a violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We emphasized the importance of the lawyers’ duty to keep their
clients adequately and fully informed about the developments in their cases, and held that a client should
never be left in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the
retained lawyer and in the legal profession as a whole.
We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos1 that the trust and confidence reposed by a client in his lawyer
impose a high standard that includes the appreciation of the lawyer’s duty to his clients, to the profession, to
the courts, and to the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.12
Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in
the dark; to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer
and in the legal profession in general.13
The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required standards. He neglected to file the
required position paper, and did not give his full commitment to maintain and defend his client’s interests.
Aside from failing to file the required pleading, the respondent never exerted any effort to inform his client of
the dismissal of the ejectment case.
We also find the respondent’s excuse – that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other
illnesses – unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from
numerous health problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his medical condition
cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court pleadings. Th e respondent
could have requested an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed
his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed to do.
Furthermore, the respondent’s subsequent filing of successive pleadings (after the ejectment case had been
dismissed) significantly weakens his health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that
his physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also indicate that his illnesses (allegedly
"Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II") were
not at all incapacitating.
All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We, however, find the IBP’s recommended penalty (one (1)month suspension
from the practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the infractions committed.
Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the
respondent's acts and omissions, as well as the consequence of his negligence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon' 18, and Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar act or
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this
Decision, the date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall furnish a copy of
this Manifestation to all the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as
counsel.
TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, vs.ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR.,
Before us is a letter-complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by
Teodulo2Enriquez against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. for gross negligence and inefficiency in the
performance of his duties as a lawyer.
On January 7, 1997, Mr. Ernesto Ouano, Sr. filed a complaint3 for forcible entry against complainant Teodulo
Enriquez before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Talibon, Bohol. To defend his interests, Enriquez
51
engaged4 the services of the law office of Attys. Joselito M. Alo, R. L. C. Agapay, and Edilberto B. Lavadia,
Jr. with Atty. Lavadia as the assigned attorney.5
On March 18, 2000, in open court, Atty. Lavadia agreed to submit their position papers and affidavits within
30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be submitted for decision.
However, Atty. Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in default.
The MCTC rendered a decision6in favor of the plaintiffs.7 Atty. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal8 with sufficient
bond.
In its April 26, 2001 Order,9 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol dismissed the appeal based on
Section 7(b),10 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC stated that Atty. Lavadia failed to file the appeal
memorandum after more than 71 days. Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the RTC in its June 26, 2001 Order11 pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no
appeal memorandum was filed.
Failing once again to file his comment, the Court in its September 19, 2007 Resolution imposed a fine of
₱2,000.00 and required Atty. Lavadia to submit his comment within five days from notice.27 There is no
record to show that he complied with the September 19, 2007 Resolution.
In its August 18, 2010 Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.28
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) scheduled a mandatory conference 29 on January 14, 2011 but
both parties failed to appear.30 Parties were then ordered to submit their position papers within ten days from
receipt of the Order.
On April 20, 2011, Atty. Lavadia requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint having lost his copy
in a fire that razed his home.31 The IBP CBD resolved to furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint. It also
directed the parties to file their position papers within 15 days from August 1, 2011.32

On January 16, 2002, this disbarment complaint was received by the OBC. Enriquez alleged that in failing to
In its Report and Recommendation,33 the IBP CBD recommended that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred and his
file the necessary pleadings before the court, Atty. Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice. This
name be withdrawn from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP CBD found that not only did Atty. Lavadia cause
constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his professional duties as a
material prejudice to his clients by neglecting his duties as counsel in failing to file the necessary pleadings
lawyer.12 Enriquez thus prayed that Atty. Lavadia be disbarred. On July 3, 2002, this Court required Atty.
to defend his client’s interest, he also displayed a willful, defiant and cavalier attitude by repeatedly defying
Lavadia to submit his comment.13
the resolutions of the Court. By his actions the IBP CBD considered Atty. Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties
and responsibilities as an attorney.
On August 29, 2002, the Court received an ex parte manifestation from Atty. Lavadia stating that he cannot
file a comment because he did not receive a copy of the complaint.14 The Court, thus, required Enriquez to
On September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) resolved to adopt the report and
furnish Atty. Lavadia a copy of the complaint within 10 days and required the latter to file his comment within
recommendation of the IBP CBD.34
10 days from receipt thereof.15

Atty. Lavadia moved for reconsideration35 but it was denied.36

On December 10, 2002, Enriquez informed16 the Court that he sent a copy of the complaint and its annexes
to Atty. Lavadia on December 6, 2002 as evinced by a receipt.17
After careful review and deliberation, we agree with the report of the IBP that Atty. Lavadia is administratively
liable.
Atty. Lavadia filed two motions for extension18 citing his heavy case load and family problems as reasons in
both instances for not filing the comment. Said motions were granted by the Court giving Atty. Lavadia
another 60 days within which to file his comment.19 We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations.37 Lawyers
bear the responsibility to meet the profession’s exacting standards.38 A lawyer is expected to live by the
lawyer’s oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a
On February 18, 2003, Atty. Lavadia again filed a motion to extend to file his comment due to his wife’s
lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the
continued illness.20 The Court granted another 30-day period, stating that it would be the last extension it
bar and to his client.39 A lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to
would grant.21
the Court’s disciplinary authority.40

Failing to submit his comment within the period granted, this Court required Atty. Lavadia to show cause why
In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client and to the
he should not be held in contempt and to submit his comment within 10 days from notice.22 Still, Atty.
court. This Court notes Atty. Lavadia’s propensity for filing motions for extension of time to file pleadings but
Lavadia failed to comply. The Court thus imposed on him a ₱1,000.00 fine or imprisonment of five days if he
failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the CPR which states:
failed to pay the fine and ordered him to comply with its previous resolutions.23

Atty. Lavadia paid the fine on June 2, 2005,24 and asked for additional time to file his comment this time
stating that he had moved from Tagbilaran to Cebu because of his wife’s illness which was caused by "dark-
beings." He claimed that a series of unfortunate events plagued them, i.e., their house was razed by a fire,
the hard drive of his computer crashing, and his family members falling ill due to a "dark being." 25 The Court
thus granted a 30-day extension.26
Rule 12.03. – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. (Emphasis
supplied)
In fact, such proclivity on the part of Atty. Lavadia to file such motions precisely led to the filing of this
complaint. In the course of this administrative proceeding, he continued to flaunt to this Court his willful
defiance and disregard for court orders.

52
LAWYER AND CLIENT: RULE 12.03 AND CANON 18 AND RULE 18.03
A lawyer is expected to serve his client with competence and diligence.41 Lawyers are reminded to note
Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR:
Rule 18.03. – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
there with shall render him liable.
In Solidon v. Macalalad,42 we stated that receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services and failing to
render the services is a violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. In that case, we also stated that a lawyer’s failure
to file the position paper is a per se violation of Rule 18.03 of the CPR.43 We pointed to the fiduciary nature
of a lawyer’s duty to his client. We stated:
x x x A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with
utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and to exert
his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly,
competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these
cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer.44 (Citations omitted)
In Mariveles v. Mallari,45 we disbarred Atty. Mallari for violating Rules 12.03 and 18.03 of the CPR. There,
Atty. Mallari, after being granted a total of 245 days to file his client’s appellant’s brief failed to file the same,
resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. The Court considered Atty. Mallari’s act a shameless disregard of his
duties as a lawyer and found him to be unfit for membership in the noble profession.46 In the recent case of
Figueras v. Jimenez,47 Atty. Jimenez was found administratively liable for failing to file the appellant’s brief
on behalf of his client.
Here, Enriquez paid a total of ₱29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of
pleadings for the case including the appeal.1âwphi1 Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He
failed to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and
several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower
court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in
Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him
administratively liable. As in Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file
the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted him
four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal memorandum. His failure
adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without
actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR.
LAWYER AND THE COURTS: RULE 12.03 IN RELATION TO CANON 11
Under Canon 1148 of the CPR a lawyer is required to observe and maintain due respect to the court and its
judicial officers. We read this provision in relation to Rules 10.0349 and 12.03 of the CPR for this rule does
not merely affect the client but the judicial process.
In Vaflor-Fabroa v. Paguinto,50 this Court reiterated its previous ruling in Sebastian v. Bajar51 where we
stated that:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof." Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not
only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.
(Citations omitted).
The present complaint was filed January 2002. We granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his
comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two
of which ordered him to pay fines of ₱1,000.00 and ₱2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his
failure to file and to comply with the Court’s resolutions. In fine, we have granted him a total of 155 days
extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions.
After a lapse of eight years, this Court referred the case to the IBP where Atty. Lavadia once again filed a
motion for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same.
While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his act of
repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his
willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a
lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa52 the Court’s Resolution is not a mere request. A lawyer’s blatant
disregard or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave
Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to
fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary action.
We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez53 that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or
merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has imposed the
penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a
lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading.
In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his proven propensity
for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should
impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing clien'ts engage his services only to lose their case
due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to
his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as
recommended by the IBP appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby
DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN.OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO, vs.ATTY. ROMEO M. FLORES
Failure of counsel to act upon a client's case resulting in the prescription of available remedies is negligence
in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The general rule is that notice to counsel
is notice to client. This rule remains until counsel notifies the court that he or she is withdrawing his or her
appearance, or client informs the court of change of counsel. Untruthful statements made in pleadings filed
before courts, to make it appear that the pleadings are filed on time, are contrary to a lawyer's duty of
committing no falsehood.
Atty. Pablo B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) filed an administrative Complaint1 for violation of Canons 10 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against Atty. Romeo M. Flores (Atty. Flores) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging dishonesty and negligence on the part of Atty. Flores.
53
Atty. Francisco alleged that he filed a Complaint for forcible entry against Rainier Fineza and his mother,
Teodora Fineza, (Finezas) before the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal.2 The Finezas were
represented by Atty. Flores.3
The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the Finezas.4 Atty. Francisco filed an appeal before the Regional
Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal.5 However, the appeal was denied.6
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which was granted by the Regional Trial Court in an
Order8dated January 23, 2009. The Finezas were then ordered to vacate the property and to pay rentals.9
Atty. Flores filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the trial court's Order granting Atty. Francisco's Motion for
Reconsideration. Atty. Francisco filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.11 In an Order12 dated
March 26, 2009, Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Flores.
The registry return receipt shows that Atty. Flores received a copy of the Regional Trial Court's Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration on April 3, 2009, while the Finezas received their copy of the Order
on April 7, 2009.13
On April 7, 2009, Atty. Francisco filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Remand Records of the case to the Municipal
Trial Court for Execution of Judgment. He alleges that a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion was served on Atty.
Flores through registered mail.14
On May 20, 2009, Analiza P. Santos, Officer-in-Charge of Branch 67, Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, issued a Certification15 stating that:
This is to certify that the Order of this Court dated January 23, 2009 relative to the above-entitled case
[referring to Pablo B. Francisco v. Rainier Fineza and Teddy Fineza] has never been amended, appealed or
modified; hence, this Order is now considered final and executory.16
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution17 on June 3, 2009. Atty. Francisco alleges
that a copy of the Motion was personally served on Atty. Flores on the same day.18
Atty. Francisco also alleges that hearings on the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution were scheduled on
June 17 and 24, 2009, which were attended by Atty. Flores and the Finezas. Atty. Francisco's Motion was
granted on June 30, 2009, and a writ of execution was issued.19
On July 8, 2009, the Finezas filed a Petition20 for Relief from Judgment with application for temporary
restraining order and injunction. They also attached a Joint Affidavit of Merit21 to the Petition. The Petition
was signed by the Finezas and not by Atty. Flores.22 Atty. Francisco claims that the Petition, while not signed
by counsel, "was ostensibly prepared by respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores[.]"23 The Petition for Relief from
Judgment was docketed as SCA 09-015.24
The allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment stated:
3. Defendants did not receive a copy or have no knowledge of the Order dated 26 March
2009 denying their motion for reconsideration, hence, was not able to hire the services of other
lawyer to seek relief from the adverse consequences of the said Order;
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the
Order dated March 26, 2009[,] denying their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order
dated January 15, 2009 reversing the Order of Dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2,
Binangonan, Rizal;
5. This petition is being filed within sixty days after the petitioners obtained knowledge on June
29, 2009 of the Order/decision dated March 26, 2009 denying the motion for reconsideration
and not more than six (6) months after judgment was entered on May 20, 2009[.]25 (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Francisco filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 13, 2009, alleging that the Petition for Relief from Judgment
was filed out of time.26 He also alleged that:
2. The petition was filed in SCA No. 09-015, not in SCA No. 08-018 of the same Regional Trial
Court, in violation of Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court;. . . .
4. It can not be that petitioners came to know through their lawyer of the Order, dated March 26,
2009 only on June 29, 2009. That allegation is a travesty of facts because on June 3, 2009,
respondent [referring to Atty. Francisco] filed his motion for issuance of writ of execution of the
RTC decision with the Municipal Trial Court of Binangonan and furnished a copy of said motion
to petitioners' counsel [referring to Atty. Flores] on the same day of June 3, 2009. Said motion
was heard on June 17, 2009, with Atty. Romeo M. Flores in attendance and manifesting before
the court that petitioners have vacated the parcel of land in question[.]27
Atty. Flores entered his appearance in SCA Case No. 09-015 on August 20, 2009. Atty. Francisco claims
that Atty. Flores knew about the untruthful allegations and frivolous character of the Petition for Relief from
Judgment, yet he sought to pursue the Petition through the filing of a Motion to Admit Supplemental
Pleading.28
The Petition for Relief from Judgment was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court in an Order29 dated August
28, 2009.
On February 8, 2010, the Finezas were evicted.30 Their "personal properties were levied upon, then sold on
execution to settle their judgment debt[. ]"31
Atty. Francisco alleges that Atty. Flores thereafter "induced Rainier Fineza and Teodora Fineza to file a
complaint against [Atty. Francisco] [before] the Supreme Court[.]" 32 The case was docketed as
Administrative Case No. 8563.33
Atty. Francisco contends that Atty. Flores was negligent when he "did not make himself available" 34 during
that period when his clients could still question the trial court's denial of the Motion for Reconsideration by
filing a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals.35
Atty. Francisco prays that Atty. Flores "be found guilty of violation of Canons 10 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and be meted the corresponding penalty. " 36
On the other hand, Atty. Flores alleges that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009 until May 2009.37 The
copy of the trial court's Order sent to the Finezas was received by Glen Fineza on April 7, 2009, but
allegedly, Glen Fineza did not inform Teodora Fineza and Rainier Fineza that he received the trial court's
54
Order.38 Atty. Flores claims that he only learned about the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration
when he received a copy of Atty. Francisco's Motion for Issuance of a Writ ofExecution.39
Regarding the Finezas' Petition for Relief from Judgment, Atty. Flores alleges that he only assisted in the
filing of the Petition.40 He could not act as counsel because he had "no personal knowledge as to when the
[Finezas] learned ... of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. "41
Atty. Flores also argues that he did not violate Canon 18 because in another case, docketed as Civil Case
384-B for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Restraining Order/Injunction,42 which also involved Atty. Francisco
and the Finezas, he was able to prevent the demolition of the Finezas' family home.43
In the Report and Recommendation44 of the Commission on Bar Discipline dated April 15, 2011, the
Commission found that the allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment were "false and
frivolous"45 because when the Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed, more than 60 days elapsed from
the time that Atty. Flores and the Finezas had received copies of the trial court's Order.46 Atty. Flores
received a copy of the trial court's Order dated March 26, 2009, on April 3, 2009, while the Finezas received
their copy on April 7, 2009.47 Glen Fineza, who acknowledged receipt of the trial court's Order, is the son of
Teodora Fineza and the brother of Rainier Fineza.48When the Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed on
July 8, 2009, it was beyond the 60-day period.49
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. Flores be found guilty of violating Rules 10.01
and 10.03 of Canon 10, and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months "with
stem warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more severely"50 be imposed.51 No
pronouncement was made on the issue of whether Atty. Flores violated Canon 18.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in a Resolution52 dated June 20, 2013. However, the
Board of Governors Resolution is also silent on the issue of whether Atty. Flores violated Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Flores filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration53 and a Motion for
Reconsideration,54arguing that he was on vacation from February 11, 2009 up to "June_, 2009[.]"55 During
that period, his staff received the trial court's Order dated March 26, 200956 on April 3, 2009.57 Hence, Atty.
Francisco's allegation that he received the trial court's Order on April 31, 2009 is not true.58 In addition, Glen
Fineza did not give a copy of the trial court's Order to Rainier Fineza or Teodora Fineza.59 Further, the
charge of perjury against him, Atty. Flores, was dismissed by the prosecutor.60 Atty. Flores also argues that
he properly observed the rules of procedure in the forcible entry case, thus, he should not be found guilty of
violating Canon 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.61
Atty. Flores reiterated that this administrative Complaint originated from a civil case filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, involving Atty. Francisco and the Finezas.62 While the Finezas lost their
property in that case, he, as counsel of the Finezas, was able to prevent Atty. Francisco "from implementing
the demolition of the Fineza's family home."63
The Board of Governors, through Dominic C.M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, required Atty. Francisco to
submit a Comment on Atty. Flores' Motion for Reconsideration.64
Atty. Francisco reiterated in his Comment65 that the Finezas knew about the trial court's dismissal of their
Motion for Reconsideration because they received a copy of the trial court's Order on April 7, 2009.66 Also,
Atty. Flores received a copy of the same Order on April 3, 2009 and not April 31, 2009.67 Further, when Atty.
Francisco sought to execute the trial court's Decision, Atty. Flores and the Finezas attended "the hearing on
the motion for execution of the final judgment"68 on June 1 7 and 24, 2007.69
Atty. Francisco prayed in his Comment that Atty. Flores "be suspended from the practice of law for at least
six (6) months."70
In a Resolution71 dated August 9, 2014, the Board of Governors denied Atty. Flores' Motion for
Reconsideration but increased the penalty recommended from three (3) months to six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.72
The issue in this case is whether respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores violated Canons 10 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
This court accepts the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Based on the records of this
administrative Complaint, respondent is guilty of violating Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03, and Canon 18,
Rule 18.03.
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent was not entirely truthful. He alleged in his Position Paper that:
4. Herein respondent himself only came to know of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration in June,
2009 when he received a copy of the motion of complainant for issuance of a writ of execution against the
FINEZA[S]. This fact was immediately relayed to the FINEZA[S].. . . .
6. FINEZAS in filing the petition for relief from judgment believe in good faith that they have complied with
the requirement of the rule. They learned only of the judgment on June 29, 2009.
Herein RESPONDENT only assisted the FINEZA[S] in filing the petition for relief from judgment. He could
not personally act as counsel considering that he has no personal knowledge as to when the FINEZA[S]
learned or had knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Although the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was received in his office on April 3, 2009, respondent
was in the United States of America (U.S.A.) for a 3-month vacation from February 9, 2009 to May, 2009. He
had given instructions to his staff to furnish copies of all court processes to his clients and to refer all legal
matters to either Atty. Leonardo C. Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar O. Abasolo as collaborating counsels, both
practicing lawyers in Binangonan, Rizal.73 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent did not state the exact date when he received a copy of the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution. The record shows that he received it on June 3, 2009.74 Respondent then alleges that he
immediately informed the Finezas about the matter, but later on contradicted himself when he stated "that he
has no personal knowledge as to when the Fineza[s] learned or had knowledge of the denial of the Motion
for Reconsideration."75
55
Respondent's statement that he had no knowledge when the Finezas learned about the denial of their according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
Motion for Reconsideration is also contradicted by the Finezas' allegations in their Petition for Relief from clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
Judgment that: exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall
4. It was only on June 29, 2009 that defendants through their lawyer came to know of the Order
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
dated March 26, 2009[,] denying their "Motion for Reconsideration" of the decision/Order dated
misled by any artifice. "82 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original, citations omitted)
January 15, 2009 reversing the Order of Dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2,
Binangonan, Rizal[.]76 (Emphasis supplied)
This court also finds that respondent violated Rule 10.03 of Canon 10, which provides:
Further, respondent does not deny complainant's allegation that he and the Finezas were present when the
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution was heard by the trial court on June 17 and 24, 2009.77 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent and the Finezas knew about the trial court's Order denying
their Motion for Reconsideration before June 29, 2009. Respondent admitted that he assisted the Finezas "in filing the petition for relief from
judgment."83 Subsequently, respondent moved to withdraw the Petition for Relief from Judgment after
recognizing that it was filed erroneously.84As stated in the trial court's Order:
While the Complaint is limited to the allegations in the Petition for Relief from Judgment, this court notes that
respondent was also not truthful in his Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he alleged that: Nevertheless, the court interposed clarificatory questions to the petitioners and as a result of the discussion
this morning, petitioners' counsel moved for the withdrawal of his Petition for Relief from Judgment after
realizing that he erroneously filed the petition before another court and in another case in violation of Section
The allegation of complainant that respondent received on April 3 1, 2009 the Order of March
1 of Rule 3 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.
26, 2009 denying his motion for reconsideration is not correct. It was the law office through his
staff that received on 26 March 2009 the Order of Denial, per Reg. Receipt No. 190. Herein
respondent was on vacation in U.S.A. from February 11, 2009 up to June _y 2009.78 (Emphasis WHEREFORE, on motion of the petitioners through counsel, the Court resolved to consider the instant
supplied) petition for Relief from Judgment docketed as SCA Case No. 09-015 entitled Ranier [sic] B. Finez.a and
Teodora B. Fineza versus Pablo B. Francisco filed on July 8, 2009 and raffled to this court on July 13, 2009
as WITHDRAWN, and this case is hereby DISMISSED.85 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's allegations are conflicting. He initially claimed that he was on vacation from February 9, 2009
to May 2009.79 He subsequently claimed that his vacation was from February 11, 2009 to June 2009.80
Respondent's attempts to rectify are further evidence that what he did-file a Petition for Relief docketed as a
different case before a different trial court-was wrong in the first place.86
The glaring inconsistencies in respondent's statements are sufficient to show that he is guilty of violating
Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
Furthermore, this court finds respondent guilty of violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 was extensively discussed in Spouses Umaguing v. De
Vera,81 which involved the submission of a falsified affidavit in an electoral protest. This court discussed that:
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.. . . .
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer's Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:
therewith shall render him liable.

I,_________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
Respondent's explanation that he was on vacation is not sufficient. Being the lawyer who filed the Motion for
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
Reconsideration, he should have been prepared for the possibility that his Motion would be acted upon by
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
the trial court during the time that he was on vacation. In addition, he does not deny that his office, through
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for
his staff, received by registered mail a copy of the trial court's Order on April 3, 2009.
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. Respondent argues that he instructed his staff to inform his clients of court processes and to refer legal
matters to Atty. Leonardo C. Aseoche or Atty. Baltazar O. Abasolo.87 However, respondent did not present
evidence to support his argument.
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself

56
Respondent further argues that he was not negligent and explained that in the case docketed as Civil Case deceased.100His notarial commission was also revoked, and this court disqualified him from being
384-B for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Restraining Order/Injunction, he successfully prevented the reappointed as notary public for two years.101
demolition of the Finezas' family home.88
It is deplorable that respondent, despite having been sanctioned by this court, once again violated his oath
Respondent may not have been negligent in handling Civil Case No. 384-B, but he was negligent in handling as a lawyer.
SCA No. 08-018. When he allegedly informed the Finezas of the trial court's Order, he should have
immediately discussed the matter with his clients. The records of this case show that he did not consult his
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated
clients on what legal remedies they would like to avail themselves of after the denial of the Motion for
June 20, 2013 and August 9, 2014 are ACCEPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores is
Reconsideration.
found guilty of violating Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent attended the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, and that it was allegedly
the Finezas, on their own, who filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment. Respondent claims that he merely
Respondent Atty. Romeo M. Flores is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. He is warned
assisted the Finezas in filing the Petition for Relief, but was not representing them.89 He argues that he could
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
not represent the Finezas because "he has no personal knowledge as to when the Fineza[ s] learned or had
knowledge of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration."90
VICENTE M. GIMENA vs. ATTY. SALVADOR T. SABIO
Respondent also seems to have forgotten the general rule that notice to counsel is also notice to
client.1âwphi1 Thus, when his office received a copy of the trial court's Order on April 3, 2009, his clients are Complainant is the president and general manager of the company.2 In his Complaint3 dated March 7, 2006,
also deemed as having been notified on the same date. he narrated that he engaged the legal services of respondent in relation to a case for illegal dismissa l 4 filed
against him and the company. All the pleadings and orders were directed to respondent because the
company no longer had active presence in Bacolod, save for the stockpile of construction equipment found
Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc.91 involved the dismissal of an appeal before the National Labor
in Barangay Mansilingan.5Sometime in February 2000, complainant signed the verification page of the
Relations Commission due to its late filing.92 Respondent Alabang Country Club filed a Petition for Certiorari
position paper for the case and sent it to respondent for his signature. However, respondent filed the position
before the Court of Appeals and argued that its lawyer abandoned it, thus, it was "not effectively represented
paper without signing it.6 The labor arbiter noticed the unsigned pleading and directed respondent to sign it
by a competent counsel."93 The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari.94 Petitioner Fernando G.
within 10 days from notice.7 Respondent did not comply with the directive.
Manaya then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court, which was granted.95 This court
explained that:
In a Decision8 dated October 21, 2004, the labor arbiter ruled against the company and noted that: "[the
company J filed an unsigned position paper which cannot be considered as such. Despite the order to Atty.
It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client. In the
Salvador Sabio to sign said position paper, the order was deemed to have been taken for granted " 9
absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of
record continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the
reglementary period. As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal. Respondent received a copy of the Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not
Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time that it was terminating the services of its
counsel.96 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
notify complainant about it.10 Complainant only learned of the Decision after a writ of execution was served
on the company on June 2005 and by that time, it was already too late to file an appeal. 11
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,97 this court found Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo guilty of violating
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because she failed to file the appellant's brief within
the reglementary period that resulted in the loss of available remedies for her client.98 Complainant stressed that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law on two (2)
occasions: first was in the case of Cordova v. Labayen,12 where respondent was suspended for six (6)
months, and the second was in the case of Credito v. Sabio,13 where he was suspended for one (1) year.
Assuming that the Finezas learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration only on June 29, The latter case involved facts analogous to the present Complaint.
2009, this would further support the allegations in the Complaint that respondent violated Canon 18.
Respondent alleges that he learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration when he received a
copy of the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. While he did not state the exact date when he received In his Comment,14 respondent countered that complainant engaged his services in 2000. Complainant,
a copy of the Motion, the record shows that he received it on June 3, 2009. If it were true that the Finezas however, did not pay the expenses and attorney's fees for the preparation and filing of the position paper in
learned about the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2009, then it shows that respondent the amount of ₱20,000.00.15 The lack of payment contributed to respondent's oversight in the filing of the
did not immediately inform his clients about the status of the forcible entry case. It took him more than 20 unsigned position paper.16 Respondent also insisted that the unfavorable Decision of the labor rbiter is based
days to inform his clients on the matter. Respondent's failure to immediately update his clients and act upon on the merits and not due to default.17 Respondent further explained that he was not able inform complainant
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, which resulted in the expiration of the period for filing a Petition of the outcome of the case because he does not know the address of the company after it allegedly
for Relief from Judgment, clearly points to negligence on his part. abandoned its place of business in Barangay Mansilingan, without leaving any forwarding
address.18 Respondent claimed that complainant only communicated to him when the writ of execution was
issued on July 27, 2005.19 He faulted complainant and the company for being remiss in their legal obligation
This court takes judicial notice that respondent was previously suspended from the practice of law for two to be in constant communication with him as to the status of the case.20
years in Serzo v. Atty. Flores99 because he notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale when the vendor was already

57
Moreover, respondent averred that the filing of the administrative case against him is tainted with ill will to
compensate for complainant's failure to post a bond to stay the writ of execution and the sale of the
construction equipment levied upon.21 Respondent submitted that if it were true that he was negligent in the
handling of the case, then why did complainant, the company and the third party claimants still avail ofhis
services as attorney-in-fact in the auction sale?22
In his Reply,23 complainant insisted that the acceptance fee of respondent was ₱50,000.00. Complainant
paid respondent ₱20,000.00 as advance payment, but which was without a receipt because complainant
trusted him.24The remaining P30,000.00 was also paid to respondent, as evidenced by photocopies of
deposit slips to his Banco De Oro account. 25
We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation. During
the mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (the Commission), complainant and
respondent were asked to discuss their complaint and defense, respectively. For the first time, respondent
raised the issue of lack of attorney-client relationship. He pointed out that he and complainant had never met
each other and that there was no formal engagement of his services.26 The parties did not enter into
stipulation of facts and limited the issues to the following:
a) Whether or not there was attorney-client relationship between respondent and the company in RAB Case
No. 06-11-10970-99;
b) If in the affirmative, whether or not respondent was negligent in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99
and whether such negligence renders him liable underthe Code of Professional Responsibility.27
The Commission ordered the parties to file their verified position papers. Respondent, in his Position
Paper,28reiterated that he cannot be expected to render legal services to the company and the complainant
because no formal contract for legal retainer services was execute.29
On December 2, 2008, the Commission issued its Report and Recommendation30 fmding respondent guilty
of gross negligence.
IBP Recommendation
As regards the first issue, the Investigating Commissioner Atty. Randall C. Tabayoyong (the Investigating
Commissioner) ruled that there is indeed an attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent. Respondent's assertion that he was not a counsel of record in the case is belied by his own
admission in the Comment he filed before the Commission.31 In paragraph 1 of his Comment, respondent
stated that he was "engaged by complainant in 2000 regarding the labor case of the [company]."32 Then, in
paragraph 2, he averred that he was not paid for legal expenses and legal charges for the filing of the
position paper.33 More, the Order and Decision of the labor arbiter referred to respondent as the counsel of
the company. 34
With respect to the second issue, the Investigating Commissioner declared that the evidence on record
sufficiently supports the charges of negligence against respondent.35 Again, it was respondent's own
admissions that put the final nail on his coffin. Respondent neither denied that he filed an unsigned pleading
nor refuted the claim that he did not inform complainant of the outcome of the case and the due date of the
appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission. He only offered excuses, which the Investigating
Commissioner found as "reprehensible" and "downright misleading."36
The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the negligence that he committed in handling the case referred to him.37 Weight was also
given to the fact that respondent was previously suspended for the same offense in Credito. 38 Hence, it was
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a
warning that a similar violation in the future will merit a heavier penalty.39
The recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution 40 dated
April 16, 2010. Respondent filed a Motion for reconsideration41 but the same was denied.42
Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
Ruling: We concur with the findings of the IBP, with the addition that respondent also violated Rule 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also find that a longer period of suspension is warranted in view
of the number of times that respondent had been disciplined administratively.
There is attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant
The contention of respondent that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and the company is,
at best, flimsy.1âwphi1 It is improper for him to capitalize on the fact that no formal contract for legal retainer
was signed by the parties, for formality is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney.43 The
contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An attorney impliedly accepts the relation when he acts
on behalf of his client in pursuance of the request made by the latter.44
Respondent acted on behalf of the company and the complainant in relation to the case. Albeit unsigned, he
allowed his name to appear as "counsel for respondent"45 in the position paper that he filed before the labor
arbiter. He never called the attention of the labor court that he was not the counsel of the company. More
importantly, he admitted in his Comment that the complainant engaged his legal services. Respondent
cannot plead the same before us then later on deny it before the IBP to save him from his omissions.
Estoppel works against him. Basic is the rule that an admissiop. made in the pleading cannot be
controverted by the party making it for such is conclusive as to him, and all proofs to the contrary shall be
ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the said party or not.46
Respondent is grossly negligent in
handling RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him.47 He must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the case
that he is handling. This is true whether he accepted the case for free or in consideration of a fee.
A lawyer is presumed to be prompt and diligent in the performance of his obligations and in the protection of
his client's interest and in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the court.48 Here, however, this
presumption is overturned by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was grossly negligent as
counsel of the company and complainant in the case.
58
Every law student is taught that an unsigned pleading creates no legal effect, such that the party may be
deemed not to have filed a pleading at all. Yet, respondent, a long standing legal practitioner, did not sign a
position paper that he filed in a labor suit allegedly due to oversight. What more, he claimed that his client's
failure to pay legal expenses and attorney's fees contributed to such oversight. These actuations of
respondent demean the legal profession. Lawyering is not primarily concerned with money-making; rather,
public service and administration of justice are the tenets of the profession.49 Due to respondent's
negligence, the labor arbiter did not consider the position paper of the company and the complainant. This
circumstance deprived the company of the chance to explain its side of the controversy - an unfortunate
incident brought about by its own counsel.
All told, respondent seems unfazed by the sanctions we have so far imposed upon him. He did not learn
from his previous suspensions and continued with his negligent ways. In Tejano v. Baterina,59 we imposed a
longer period of suspension on account of the lawyer's previous suspension for negligence in handling a
case. We found the lawyer's pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients and his propensity to disrespect the
authority of the courts unacceptable.60
For this reason, we impose upon the respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice oflaw for three
(3) years.

WHEREFORE, for violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Respondent's inattention is further highlighted by his disobedience to the labor arbiter's directive that he sign
respondent Atty. Salvador T. Sabio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for THREE (3)
the position paper. His conduct evinces a willful disregard to his duty as officer of the court. This alone
YEARS. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
warrants the imposition of administrative liability.
more severely.

Respondent's irresponsibility went beyond the unsigned pleading and refusal to obey court orders; he also
admittedly failed to apprise the company and the complainant of the adverse decision against them. He even
had the audacity to place the blame on his client for not communicating to him as regards the status of the
case. He furthermore justified his omission by saying that he was not aware of the address of the company.
The foregoing excuses should be rejected. As the IBP correctly observed, respondent overlooked the
attached affidavit of the complainant in the unsigned position paper, which clearly indicates that the principal
office address of the company is at Quirino Highway, Sacred Heart Village IV, Novaliches, Caloocan
City.50 Respondent himself had notarized the affidavit.51 Thus, contrary to his contention, it appears from the
records that he was fully aware of the address of the company. There was no justifiable reason for him not to
notify complainant and the company of the adverse decision against them.

Respondent's conduct is inconsistent with Rule 18.04 of the Code, which requires that "[a] lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request
for information."

In Alcala v. De Vera,52 we ruled that the failure of a lawyer to notify his client of a decision against him
manifests a total lack of dedication or devotion to his client's interest expected under the lawyer's oath and
the then Canons of Professional Ethics. 53

Then in Garcia v. Manuel, 54 we decreed that the failure of a lawyer to inform his client of the status of the
case signifies bad faith, for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary; thus, the
ever present need to inform clients of the developments of the case. 55 It is only in this manner that the trust
and faith of the client in his counsel will remain unimpaired. 56

Respondent is a repeat offender

This is not the first time that respondent was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In Credito,57 the then
members of the Third Division found respondent guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Similar to the present case, respondent's legal services were engaged in
connection with a labor suit. The labor case went up to us only to be dismissed due to respondent's failure to
attach the required certification on nonforum shopping and to pay the total revised docket and other legal
fees. Respondent also kept his clients in the dark as to the fact that their petition was dismissed.

Prior to Credito, respondent was also held administratively liable in Cordova58 for instigating his clients to file
a complaint against a judge to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders.

59