Jonathan Israel - Empires and Entrepots - The Dutch, The Spanish Monarchy and The Jews, 1585-1713 (2006) PDF

EMPIRES AN D ENTREPOT S
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EMPIRES AN D ENTREPOT S
THE DUTCH ,
THE SPANIS H MONARCH Y
AND TH E JEWS , 1585-171 3
JONATHAN I . ISRAE L
THE HAMBLEDO N PRES S

LONDON AN D RONCEVERT E
Published by The Hambledon Press 1990
102 Gloucester Avenue, London NW1 8HX (U.K.)

309 Greenbrie r Avenue, Ronceverte WV 24970 (U.S.A.)
ISBN 1 85285 022 1
©Jonathan!. Israel 1990
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Israel, Jonathan I . (Jonathan Irvine )

Empires an d entrepots: th e Dutch, the Spanis h
monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713
I.Europe 1517-178 9
I. Title 940.2* 2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Israel, Jonathan Irvine.

Empires and entrepots: the Dutch, th e Spanish monarchy,
and th e Jews, 1585-1713 / Jonathan I . Israel.
Essays, most o f which appeared i n various publication s
between 197 4 an d 1987 .
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Netherlands - Histor y - War s of Independence, 1556-1648 .
2. Netherlands - Histor y - 1648-1714 .
3. Netherlands - Commerc e - History .
4. Netherlands - Relation s - Spain .
5. Spain - Relation s - Netherlands .
6. Spain - Histor y - Hous e of Austria, 1516-1700.
7. Spain - Colonie s - Americ a - Commerc e — History.
8. Sephardim - Netherlands . I. Title.
DH186.5.186 199 0 949.2'0 3 - dc2 0 894805 8 CIP
Printed and bound in Bristol and Maesteg by WBC Ltd.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements vi i
Preface i x
1A Conflict o f Empires: Spai n and the Netherlands ,
1618-1648 1
2 Th e Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish Conflict ,
1621-1648 4 3
3 Frederic k Henr y an d the Dutch Politica l Factions ,
1625-1642 7 3
4 Th e States Genera l an d the Strategi c Regulatio n of
the Dutch Rive r Trade,1621-1636 10 1
5 Th e Phases of the Dutc h Straatvaart, 1590-1713 :
A Chapter in the Economi c Histor y o f th e
Mediterranean 13 3
6 Olivare s and the Governmen t o f the Spanis h
Netherlands, 1621-164 3 16 3
7 Spain , the Spanis h Embargoes, and the Struggl e fo r
Mastery of World Trade, 1585-166 0 18 9
8 Th e Politics o f International Trade Rivalr y during
the Thirt y Year s War: Gabriel de Ro y and Olivares'
Mercantilist Projects, 162 1 -1645 21 3
9 Manue l López Pereira of Amsterdam, Antwer p an d
Madrid: Jew, New Christian, and Adviser t o th e
Conde-Duque de Olivares 24 7
10 Olivare s and the Governmen t of the Spanis h
Indies, 1621-164 3 26 5
11 Mexic o and th e 'Genera l Crisis ' of the Seventeent h
Century 28 5
12 Th e Portuguese i n Seventeenth-Century Mexico 31 1
13 Duarte Nune s da Costa (Jacob Curiel ) of Hamburg,
Sephardi Noblema n and Communal Leader, 1585 -
1664 333
14 Spain and the Dutc h Sephardim , 1609-166 0 355
15 The Economie Contribution o f Dutch Sephard i
Jewry to Holland's Golden Age, 1595-171 3 417
Index 449
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The articles reprinte d her e first appeared in the following places

and are reprinted b y kind permission of the origina l publishers.
1 Past and Present, 76 (1977), pp. 34-74. Worl d Copyright:

The Past and Present Society , Corpu s Christi College,
Oxford, England.
2 Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis
der Nederlanden, 9 4 (1979), pp . 41-69 .
3 English Historical Review, xcviii (1983), pp. 73-99 .
4 Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis
der Nederlanden, 9 5 (1980), pp . 461-91 .
5 Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 99 (l 986), pp . 133-62 .
6 Thi s chapter appears here for the firs t time .
7 Thi s chapter appear s here for the first time.
8 International History Review, viii (1986), pp. 517-49.
9 Studia Rosenthaliana, xix (1985), pp. 109-64 .
10 Thi s chapter appear s here for th e firs t time .
11 Past and Present, 63 (1974), pp . 33-57 . Worl d Copyright:
The Past and Present Society, Corpus Christi College,
Oxford, England.
12 Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft un d
Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, 1 1 (1974), pp. 12-32 .
13 Studia Rosenthaliana, xx i (1987), pp. 14-34 .
14 Studia Rosenthaliana, xi i (1978), pp. 1-61 .
15 Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 96 (1983), pp . 505-35 .
PREFACE
The article s an d essay s collecte d i n thi s volum e focu s o n th e conflic t

between tw o grea t maritime empires, thos e of Spain and the Dutch, i n
the perio d 1585-1648 , an d the complicated aftermat h as well as the far-
reaching ramification s o f tha t encounter . Accordingl y th e volum e
combines broa d geographica l sweep , takin g i n muc h o f Europe , th e
Mediterranean, Africa , Asi a and th e Americas , with wha t I hope ma y
fairly b e describe d a s a compact an d reasonabl y orderly thematic core .
Even thos e article s devoted t o singl e individual s such a s the Walloo n
noblemen Gabrie l de Roy, o r the Portuguese New Christia n economi c
writer, Manue l Lópe z Pereira , ar e concerne d wit h politica l an d
mercantile career s whic h wer e profoundl y influenced , eve n largel y
shaped, by the effects of the global struggle between Spain and the Dutch
as it evolved afte r 1585 .
But what was the nature of this confrontation of empires which forms
the themati c heart o f thi s book , a n encounte r whic h i n a less warlik e
format persisted even after the Peace of Munster (1648) ended the Eighty
Years' Wa r - unti l Spai n and the Dutch finally became allie s against
France, in 1673? For it was far from being a routine matter, a conflict of a
familiar type . No t onl y were the Spanish and Dutch empires afte r 160 0
both key politico-economic component s of the world a s it then was; not
only did the two empire s differ i n character radically from each other: in
their separate ways both were also fundamentally novel and quite unique
phenomena.
It i s b y n o mean s alway s recognize d tha t thi s i s so , th e Spanis h
imperium ofte n being treate d a s if it were merel y muc h large r but no t
otherwise significantly different fro m other great empires of the time and
of the past. Fernand Braudel believed that the post-1590 Dutch empire of
trade wa s i n essenc e muc h lik e earlie r trade-base d empire s revolvin g
around a sequence of rising and falling entrepots such as Venice, Genoa ,
Bruges and Antwerp. But i t is surely much more convincing to classif y
the Dutch trading empire after 159 0 as an entity radically different fro m
previous entrepot-base d empires . Wherea s th e predecessor s wer e al l
regional in scope, o r in the case of Antwerp not full y global , the Dutch
empire o f trad e was th e firs t whic h wa s trul y global . Wherea s earlier
x Empires and Entrepots
entrepots were largely if not exclusively based on the traffic in high-value

goods o f lo w bulk , involvin g relativel y fe w ship s an d problem s o f
transportation, the Dutch trading system was based not on bulk carryin g
(as is usually assumed) but - thoug h not before 1590 - on a combination
of bulk carryin g an d hegemony ove r th e 'ric h trades' , a pattern whic h
was t o som e exten t repeate d late r wit h th e ascendanc y of Britai n bu t
which ha d certainl y neve r occurre d previously . Finally , whil e n o
previous entrepot-base d empire , leas t of al l Antwerp, ha d a t the same
time bee n a major Europea n powe r i n a broader politica l and militar y
context, th e Dutc h seaborn e empir e wa s th e firs t t o combin e trad e
hegemony wit h grea t power statu s on lan d a s well a s at sea, a pattern
again subsequently repeated in the case of eighteenth-century Britain but
unprecedented at the time.
In early modern times the entrepot phenomenon ha d a significance for
all empires , an d indee d al l politica l an d economi c life , whic h wa s
unquestionably muc h greater than in previous eras or than was to be the
case later , afte r th e Industria l Revolution. Railways , steamships , air -
freight, an d telecommunication s hav e create d a worl d i n whic h
commodities an d manufactures are shifted fro m on e part of the globe to
another i n a regular , even , controlled , an d predictabl e stream ,
eliminating th e factor s whic h onc e mad e th e entrepo t phenomeno n
central t o Europea n life . But , befor e the Industria l Revolution, a s was
pointed ou t originall y b y the Dutch economis t T.P . va n der Kooy and
has been more recentl y restated by P.W. Klein, th e flow of goods fro m
one part of the world to another, even one region of a country to another,
was s o irregula r an d unpredictabl e tha t ther e wa s n o possibilit y o f
achieving an y sor t o f stead y distribution, an y balancing of supply and
demand, an y sort of price stability, except by stockpiling great reserves
of commodities i n central storehouses, o r entrepots.1 The basic need for
these central reservoirs of goods to iron out the unevenness and ensure a
certain regularit y of flo w an d stabilit y o f prices was bound t o besto w
enormous powe r an d influence , politica l a s wel l a s economic , o n th e
main entrepots and this, in turn, led to a process of unending struggle, on
the one side to expand and, on the other, t o curb them.
But a s agains t th e entrepot-base d empire , th e seventeenth-centur y
world also knew th e more traditiona l type of imperial hegemony base d
on monarchica l power, territor y an d relative administrative efficiency.
Of these territorial empires endowed wit h large bureaucracies first Spain
and then, afte r 1659 , Franc e was supreme. But until the late seventeenth
century Spain was the only such empire which was truly global in scope
at any rate, or particularly, during the period that the Portuguese crown
was joined to that of Spain (1580-1640) whe n Spai n ruled not only vast
1
Se e P.W. Klein , D e Trippen i n de 17 e eeuw: een studie over het ondernemersgedrag o p de
Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen , 1965) , pp.3-13.
Prefacex xi
stretches o f the New Worl d an d the Philippines an d her European and

North African dependencies but also protected the Portuguese empire in
Africa an d Asia as well as in Brazil.
In many ways an immense territorial empire such as that of Spain was
a much mor e imposing affai r tha n any entrepot-based imperiu m coul d
be. Controlling large blocks of territory, a n empire such as that of early
seventeenth-century Spai n seemingly disposed of far greater resources of
population, revenues , administrativ e machiner y an d militar y
organization tha n eve n th e mos t favoure d tradin g empir e could . I n
culture an d religio n a territoria l empir e suc h a s Spain wa s als o muc h
more disciplined and authoritarian than the entrepot empire s of the day.
It wa s in th e nature not just o f the Dutch Republi c bu t an y entrepot-
empire of early modern times to tolerate religious minorities at home and
to mak e n o attemp t t o chang e th e religio n an d cultur e o f subjec t
populations i n th e empire . Bu t i t wa s quit e otherwis e wit h Spain , a
power uniquel y firml y committe d t o enforcin g th e Counte r
Reformation an d th e supremac y o f th e Catholi c fait h an d uniquel y
successful, bot h at home in the Peninsula, and in her overseas empire, in
breaking dow n othe r religion s an d culture s an d acculturatin g an d
Catholicising he r subjec t populations. I t ma y b e tha t thi s cultura l and
religious programm e wa s far from wholl y successfu l eithe r amon g th e
Indians o f Spanis h Americ a or th e forme r Muslims an d Jews o f Spain
itself. Bu t wha t wa s achieve d i n thi s directio n wa s remarkabl e an d
unparalleled and, boosted by the endeavours of the Inquisition, appeared
at th e tim e mor e imposin g tha n i t actuall y was. An d wha t i s tru e o f
culture an d religio n i s tru e als o o f institution s an d administration .
Historians, quit e rightly , pu t muc h emphasi s o n th e failur e o f th e
Spanish crow n durin g th e sixteent h an d seventeent h centurie s t o
integrate the viceroyalties of Catalonia, Valencia, Aragón and Mallorca
institutionally into the framework of Castile. But before 1640 the failure
of the Spanish crown t o incorporate large parts of the Iberian Peninsula
into a common institutiona l framewor k was less striking than the rock-
like solidit y o f Castile' s administrativ e an d institutiona l gri p ove r th e
Spanish America n viceroyaltie s an d dependencie s an d th e apparen t
solidity o f Castile's hol d ove r Portugal , souther n Italy and the Spanish
Netherlands. Eve n afte r th e revolt s o f Catalonia an d Portugal i n 1640 ,
after whic h Spain's powe r seeme d muc h les s formidabl e than before ,
Spain wa s stil l th e mai n powe r i n th e Ne w Worl d an d th e principa l
counterweight to the rising power o f France in Europe. It was only afte r
the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) , and the humiliating failur e of Spanish
efforts t o reconquer Portugal in the 1660s, that it came to be recognized
that Spain was now irreparably weakened and no longer the chief rival to
France for the leadership of Europe.
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the encounter
between th e riva l empire s o f Spai n and th e Dutc h ha d a fundamenta l
xii Empires an d Entrepots
character, a n absolutenes s an d intensit y suc h a s no othe r Europea n o r

world conflic t the n had . I n Spanis h eye s th e Dutc h wer e 'rebels' ,
'heretics' an d usurpers o f the economi c order , inevitabl e enemie s wh o
challenged the basic principles - roya l authority, Catholic allegiance, and
closed, bureaucrati c methods o f regulating economic an d social life- on
which th e world' s greates t empire , th e Spanis h Monarchy , rested .
Initially, durin g the reign of Philip I I (1556-98), the Spanish crown wa s
chiefly motivate d i n its struggle wit h th e Dutc h b y a determination t o
crush rebellio n an d heres y an d reasser t Spanis h sovereignt y ove r th e
northern Netherlands . Durin g th e reig n o f Phili p H I (1598-1621) ,
however, unde r th e lethargic guidance of the duke of Lerma, ther e was
an immediate and fundamental shift away from question s of sovereignty
and religion, though these continued to influence the struggle at any rate
down to the 1620s and to add to its intensity. After 1598 the main element
in th e conflic t wa s Spain' s ministers ' perceptio n o f Dutc h maritim e
expansion a s posing a fundamental threat to thei r empire. I t was in th e
years 1598-160 5 tha t th e Dutc h ouste d th e Portugues e fro m thei r
previous hegemony in the trade to the East Indies and captured the traffi c
in peppe r an d spices . I t wa s a t precisely th e sam e tim e tha t th e Dutc h
wrested th e Guinea trade from the Portuguese an d replaced the English
as the main challenge to Spanish power an d navigation in the Caribbean.
At the same time, th e Dutch tightened thei r grip on the Scheldt estuary,
throttling Antwerp , th e main entrepot o f the Spanish Netherlands, and,
in 1607 , a t the battle of Gibraltar, became the first European s to inflict a
crushing naval defeat on Spain off her own coast . Under Lerma, Spain' s
chief ministe r fro m 159 8 t o 1618 , unde r Balthasa r de Zúñiga , leadin g
minister from 1618 to 1622, and under Olivares, the principal architect of
Spanish policy from 1622 until his downfall in 1643, th e central objective
of Spain's war against the Dutch was to disband the Dutch East and West
India Companies , forc e Dutc h evacuatio n of the Indie s east and west ,
break the Dutch stranglehold on the Scheldt, and generally weaken if not
destroy th e Dutch mercantil e system. I n this respect, howeve r differen t
in others, Lerm a and Olivares had more in common with each other than
either had with th e attitudes of Philip II.
A considerabl e par t o f this volume , includin g tw o o f the thre e new
pieces, those on the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish policy and strategy
in th e Ne w World , deal s wit h th e statecraf t o f th e Count-Duk e o f
Olivares. Ther e has, of course, recently been a strong upsurge of interest
in thi s fascinatin g statesman in th e wak e o f J.H. Elliott' s masterl y Th e
Count-Duke o f Olivares. The Statesman i n an Age o f Decline (1986) . Thi s
work is in many, an d perhaps mos t respects , al l but definitive . There is
only one aspect — Olivares' rol e in the government o f the Spanish Indies —
where the reader will encounter any serious disagreement with the views
of Professor Elliott. For the rest it is a matter only of minor differences o f
interpretation. Ye t I d o fee l tha t thes e hav e a certain significance, that
Preface xiii
there stil l ha s not bee n enoug h emphasi s (thoug h ther e i s now muc h
more tha n ther e use d t o be ) o n Olivare s th e mercantilist , an d o n th e
Almirantazgo, an d that the Count-Duke's role in the government o f the
Spanish Netherland s an d i n determinin g Spanis h strateg y agains t th e
Dutch require s furthe r comment . Recen t assertion s b y other historian s
who writ e abou t thi s perio d o f Spanis h history strengthe n m e i n m y
conviction tha t ther e i s still a good dea l o f confusio n abou t Olivares '
Dutch policy , hi s objective s i n th e Lo w Countrie s an d north-wes t
Germany, an d hi s strategi c preoccupation s followin g th e outbrea k o f
war between Franc e and Spain, in 1635, whic h need s to be cleared up.
The third of the new pieces, that dealing with th e Spanish embargoes
against the Dutch o f 1585-90, 1598-160 8 and 1621-47, onc e again takes
up wha t i s perhap s th e mos t importan t singl e issu e i n thi s volume :
namely Spain' s attempt , ove r severa l decades , t o us e he r unrivalle d
control o f territory , resource s an d route s t o attac k th e Dutc h tradin g
system head-on b y political means. The enforcement of these embargoes
was on e o f th e centra l formativ e principle s o f Spanis h polic y an d
diplomacy fo r mor e tha n hal f a century . Mor e significantl y stil l th e
imposition o f thes e embargoe s was , i n m y view , th e mos t importan t
single facto r determinin g th e distributio n an d redistributio n o f
commercial powe r betwee n England , th e Hansa town s an d the Dutc h
during the first half of the seventeenth century. The embargoes were also
the singl e mos t importan t aspect , a t an y rat e afte r 1598 , o f Spain' s
intervention in Portugal. I n dealing with this central issue I have resumed
my critiqu e of Braudel. Som e o f my friend s hav e suggested that I have
pressed this too strongly and perhaps I have. Yet I remain convinced that
Braudel's conception tha t the rise of Dutch worl d trad e primacy rested
on underlyin g shift s i n subsistence , grai n prices an d shippin g capacit y
and tha t i t neithe r was , no r coul d be , seriousl y affecte d b y a 'mere '
political challenge such as the Spanish embargoes is not just wrong in the
sense that historians are ordinarily in error but an altogether fundamental
misconception which , a s long a s it continue s to comman d acceptance,
makes it quite impossible to understand what the Dutch tradin g system
really wa s an d wha t th e Dutch-Spanis h conflic t afte r 159 0 wa s reall y
about. It is precisely because Braudel was a historian of immense creative
power and unrivalled influence that his ideas about trade and the impact
of mercantilist policies on commercial life in early modern times need to
be brought in question.
London, 2 September 198 9

l
A CONFLICT OF EMPIRES:
SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1618-164 8
"SINCE THE Y DERIV E AL L THEI R GAIN S FRO M TRAD E WIT H SPAI N AN D

Italy", claimed the marqués de Aytona, referring to the Dutch in the
Spanish Counci l o f Stat e i n Jul y 1622 , "shoul d the y los e thi s
commerce, they shall be less powerful enemie s and w e can expect a
good settlemen t favourabl e to Spain". 1 Thi s assertio n o f on e o f
Philip IV's senior ministers well illustrates the thinking that lay behind
Spanish policy at the outset of the Spanish-Dutch struggl e of 1621-48.
Essentially, Philip's ministers aime d to weaken the Unite d Province s
sufficiently t o wi n a buen concierto, an agreement settling th e various
issues in Spanish-Dutc h relations, mostly relating to commercial and
colonial matters , t o th e advantag e of the Catholi c Monarchy . Th e
principal mean s by whic h it wa s proposed t o achiev e this, and tha t
which was primarily used, wa s the applicatio n o f economic pressur e
on a scale that had never before been attempted and with which there
was t o b e nothing comparable until Napoleon' s Continenta l Syste m
more than a century and a half later. I n the conflic t of 1621-48 the
land war was mostly rather stati c and ofte n perfunctory . Th e fame d
army of Flanders played a largely secondary and defensiv e role. A s
regards Spai n at least, it wa s in the spher e o f economic warfare tha t
the majo r effor t wa s made, producing a considerable impac t not only
on th e Netherland s an d Spai n itsel f bu t o n muc h o f th e res t o f
Europe.
By any measure, the second Spanish-Dutch wa r was a key formative
episode in early modern history and yet curiously, until very recently,
it ha s attracte d virtuall y no scholarl y interest. Partl y perhap s thi s
may b e du e to a lingering tendency to regar d th e conflic t as a con -
tinuation of the Dutch struggle for independence which , to all intents
and purposes , wa s won by 160 9 whe n the firs t Spanish-Dutc h wa r
ended. A commo n assumption , a t an y rate , i s tha t ther e i s a n
essential continuit y betwee n th e wars , tha t th e struggl e o f 1621-4 8
was merely the second phase of a so-called Eighty Years War in which
a declinin g bu t incorrigibl y obstinat e Spai n exhauste d itsel f in -
* An earlier version of this paper wa s read to the Dutch Histor y Semina r a t
the Institut e of Historical Research , University o f London, January 1976 . I t
is based on research forming part of a long-term project, supported by the Social
Science Research Council, on the social and economic context of Spanish-Dutc h
conflict an d rapprochement i n the period 1618-60 . I should also like to record
my gratitude to Professor K. W. Swart and Professor J. H. Elliott fo r their hel p
and advice with this article .
1
Consulta, 6 July 1622 , fo. 5: Archivo Genera l d e Simancas, Estado , legaj o
(hereafter A.G.S . Est.) 2036 .
2 Empires and Entrepots
effectually striving to suppress the political and religious independence
of an increasingly vigorou s republic. An d this, except perhap s fo r
old-fashioned Dutc h patriots , doe s no t constitut e a ver y edifyin g
subject. Nevertheless , ther e ha s long been good cause for doubting
such a n interpretation. Decade s ag o it wa s shown that th e wa y in
which th e Spanish-Dutc h ruptur e wa s presente d publicl y i n th e
United Provinces in 1621 was largely determined by domestic political
considerations and especially the need to convince the Dutch people of
the necessit y of a war for which there was enthusiasm only in certai n
quarters.2 Th e missio n o f Archduk e Albert' s delegate , Petru s
Peckius, from Brussels to The Hagu e in March 1621, was deliberately
twisted by the stadhouder, Prince Maurice, an d his circle to look like
an uncompromisin g demand that th e State s Genera l submi t t o th e
sovereignty of Philip III whe n in fact it was nothing of the kind. Th e
actual Spanish demands of 1621, satisfaction of which was the condi -
tion fo r renewal of the truce , wer e that freedo m o f worship be con -
ceded t o th e Dutc h Catholi c minority , tha t th e rive r Scheld t b e
reopened and that the Dutch withdraw from the Indies east and west.
This too has long been known3 and yet, until recently, little or nothing
has been done to take the analysis further, and to consider how serious
Spain was in making these demands, why they led to the type of war
that ensue d an d ho w Spanis h and ' Dutch thinkin g change d a s th e
struggle proceeded . No r ha s muc h though t bee n give n t o th e
enormous impact of this struggle on the countrie s involved.
The vie w o f the secon d Spanish-Dutc h wa r put forwar d recentl y
by José Alcalá-Zamora in a major Spanis h contribution t o our know-
ledge o f Europ e i n thi s period, 4 thoug h i t stop s shor t a t 1639 , i s
unquestionably a dramatic advance on the meagr e picture tha t pre -
ceded it. "Spain' s struggl e from 162 1 to 1639" , conclude d Alcalá -
Zamora, "wa s mor e a figh t fo r economi c survival , unde r threa t o f
constriction an d paralysi s by th e Dutch , tha n a ques t t o realiz e a
programme of territorial expansion or hegemony".5 Alcalá-Zamora ,
3
M. G . d e Boer , "D e hervattin g de r vijandelijkhede n n a he t twaalfjari g
bestand", Tijd. Gesch., xxxv (1920), pp. 34-49 ; I . Schöffer , "D e crisi s van de
jonge Republiek , 1609-1625" , Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlandent ed . J. A .
van3 Houtt e et al., 12 vols . (Utrecht, 1949-58), vi, pp. 57-8 .
De Boer , op. cit., p. 35 ; Pieter Geyl , Th e Netherlands Divided, 1609-1648
(London, 1936) , p. 84 ; J. J. Poelhekke, 'T Uytgaen va n den Treves: Spanje e n
de Nederlanden
4
i n 1621 (Groningen, 1960) , pp. 37-41 .
José Alcalá-Zamor a y Queip o d e Llano , España, Flandes y e l Ma r de l
Norte, 1618-39 (Barcelona, 1975). I first read Alcalá-Zamora after completin g
the original draf t o f this piece. I n th e present version an attempt is made to
condense the analysis as much as possible where it agrees substantially with that
of Alcalá-Zamora.
5
Ibid., pp . 475-6. I n anothe r recen t wor k Pete r Brightwell , thoug h h e
makes severa l importan t point s regardin g colonia l rivalry , i n genera l lean s
towards an older view, seeing the Spanis h crown as being insistent above all on
maintaining the territorial integrity of the empire, and leaves out of the account
much of the economic reasoning: Pete r Brightwell , "The Spanish Syste m and
the Twelve Years Truce", Eng. Hist. Rev., Ixxxix (1974), pp. 270-92.
A Conflict of Empires 3
convinced that the struggle was essentially for domination of the North
Sea and the Baltic , concentrates o n Spanish naval activity and ambi-
tions i n nort h Europea n waters, ' though h e doe s conside r tha t th e
Spanish wa r effor t wa s intended t o damag e Dutc h interest s i n al l
parts. However , Alcalá-Zamora di d not us e any Dutch o r Flemish
sources, printed or manuscript, and although his work is based on the
rich Spanis h archival material at Simancas , he confined himself only
to certain sections of it.7 Th e result is that his documentary base is
relatively narrow — indeed, rathe r too narrow for what he attempts .
Major aspect s o f th e conflic t in th e north , especiall y the effec t o f
Spanish action s o n the Dutc h bu t also , i n som e cases, th e Spanis h
actions themselves, such as the grea t river blockade of 1625-9 or th e
attack on Dutch North Sea fishing, are treated too cursorily, with many
features distorte d o r omitted . Furthermore , Alcalá-Zamora , pre -
occupied with the north, barely touches on Spanish actions against the
Dutch in the sout h which, arguably, are no less crucial and possibly
more so. Wit h Alcalá-Zamora we have an extremely significant new
picture, bu t on e that is rathe r roughly sketched an d in need of both
modification and extension, particularly by reference to a fuller range
of sources, Spanish and non-Spanish .
In Spain , Flander s an d Portugal (which was then attache d to th e
Spanish crown), discussio n o f Spanish-Dutc h relation s was intense
throughout th e perio d o f th e Twelv e Year s Truce (1609-21 ) and ,
from 1618 , the Dutch question was a chief concern of no less than four
royal councils at Madrid, those of State, War, Portugal and the Indies.
In all those councils, and also at Brussels, at least among the Spanish
officials, an d at Lisbon, it was the general view that the truce of 1609
had been utterly ruinous both for Spain and for the empire as a whole
and that it was vital, on its expiry in April 1621, to put an end to the
situation that had arisen from it, either by negotiating different terms
or b y war . Som e influentia l officer s an d official s suc h a s Lui s d e
Velasco, Carlo s Colom a and Jua n d e Villela , openl y preferred war,
advising that Spain should only seem to want a new truce for the sake
of appearances.8 Others , more aware of the chronic state of the royal
6
7
Alcalá-Zamora, op. cit., pp. 46-8, 67 , 172.
The Simanca s serie s containin g relevan t material o f importance which are
unused b y Alcalá-Zamora ar e the rough draft s of consultas relating t o the Low
Countries (A.G.S. Est. 2138-2160) , royal correspondence wit h Flanders (A.G.S .
Est. 2230-2246) , letter s fro m minister s i n Flander s t o th e kin g (A.G.S . Est .
2300-2321), consultas relating t o Spai n an d Portuga l (A.G.S . Est . 2645-2664) ,
and th e consultas for th e relevan t year s of the consejo d e guerra an d consejo d e
hacienda. O n thes e papers , se e M . va n Durme , Le s Archives genérales d e
Simancas et rhistoire de la Belgique, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1964-73) , and G . Parker ,
Guide to the Archives of the Spanish Institutions in or concerned with the Nether-
lands,
8
1556-1706 (Brussels, 1971) .
Velasco to Phili p III , 1 1 Feb. 1619 : A.G.S. Est. 63 4 doc. 321 ; Villela to
Philip III, 2 02 Dec.do1620: A.G.S. Est. 2309; "Carta de Don Xroval de Benavente
para s u Mg haz relación d e las cosas de Olanda", 9 June 1620 : Brit . Lib.,
Add. MS. 14005, fos. 34-40.
finances, on balance preferred new terms.» Bu t all, virtually without
exception, agreed that war was better than the old terms. Th e advice
of George s d e Henin , a Walloo n officia l wh o wa s almos t alon e a t
Madrid i n urging that Spai n should a t all costs avoid war and seek a
respite fro m struggl e ( a respit e whic h i n hi s vie w was desperatel y
needed if the many internal problems of the country were to be solved),
was dismissed by Balthasar de Zúñiga, Olivares's uncle and the mos t
influential ministe r o f the period , a s well-intentioned bu t hopelessl y
confused.10
The genera l convictio n i n the Iberia n worl d that th e truc e wa s a
disaster was based mainly on the obviou s fact that the year s of truce
had coincide d with a transformatio n o f the Spanish-Dutch relation -
ship t o th e disadvantag e of Spain . Clearl y the truc e year s wer e a
period o f dramati c expansio n i n Dutc h navigatio n an d trad e an d
Philip Ill' s minister s wer e inclined t o lin k th e tw o phenomen a a s
cause an d effect. 11 Th e truc e ha d remove d al l obstacles t o Dutc h
trade wit h Spai n and Portugal, 12 ha d lef t Antwer p blockaded while
Amsterdam continue d t o usur p th e functions tha t ha d onc e bee n
Antwerp's,13 an d enable d th e Dutc h t o dominat e Europe' s north-
south carryin g trade, includin g th e vita l flow of Baltic grain, coppe r
and naval stores to the Iberia n peninsul a and Italy, to an extent tha t
had never bee n seen before. 14 Thi s in turn mean t that a very large
proportion o f th e silve r leavin g Spai n proceede d t o Holland , thu s
making possibl e furthe r Dutc h investmen t i n navigatio n an d trad e
and bringin g th e Dutc h a decisive advantage over such rivals as th e
English an d the Hanseati c towns. 15 I t wa s also evident that Dutc h
and Dutc h Jewis h merchants were, by such means as misusing grain
licences an d smugglin g i n quantitie s o f fals e coppe r coinage , usin g
their succes s in Spai n and Portugal t o evade the king' s trade regula -
tions and to extract additional silver illegally, thereby increasing further
9
Consulta o f th e Brussel s junta , 3 Apr . 1620 , an d Alber t t o Phili p III ,
14 Apr. 1620 : Correspondence d e l a cour d'Espagne su r le s affaires de s Pays-Bas
au XVII e siècle, ed. H . Loncha y and J . Cuvelier , 6 vols. (Brussels , 1923-37),
i, docs.
10
146 6 and 1468 .
"Jorge de Henin muestr a la s consideraciones ..." and the memorandum
on this of Balthasar de Zúñiga: A.G.S. Est. 2851.
11
Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.2O78, fos. 45-52; Brit . Lib., Add. MS. 14005, fos.
34-40.
12
"Olandeses. Discurs o sobr e e l prorroga r mejora r o rompe r la s tregua s
con13ellos", 1 5 Jan. 1620 : Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 14005, fo. 46.
Ibid.', Carlo s Colom a t o Phili p III , Cambrai , 8 June 1620 : A.G.S . Est .
2308.
14
Consulta o f the Counci l of Portugal, 2 8 May 1618 , and memorandu m of
Francisco
15
Retama: A.G.S. Est . 634 .
Ibid. Th e expor t o f silver t o Asi a was of course crucial to th e operation s
of the East India Company: Kristof Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740
(Copenhagen and The Hague , 1958) , pp. 51-3; for the role of Spanish silver in
Dutch-Russian trade, see S. Hart, "Amsterdam Shipping and Trade to Northern
Russia in th e Seventeent h Century", Mededelingen van de nederlandse vereniging
voor zeegeschiedenis, xxvi (1973), pp. 26-9 .
the alarmingly adverse balance of Ibero-Dutch trade.16 Significantl y
in thes e year s a numbe r o f Spanis h writers , suc h a s Sanch o d e
Moneada,17 wer e inclined t o se e in th e unfavourabl e trade balanc e
the mos t important caus e of Spain' s economi c declin e an d i t wa s a
widespread belief in the peninsul a that i t wa s an increasingly poorer
Spain that wa s financing Dutch growth .
A second feature of the truce deplored by Philip Ill's ministers was
the added impetus that it had lent to further Dutc h expansio n i n the
East an d Wes t Indies. 18 B y 1619 , whe n th e Dutc h Eas t Indi a
Company establishe d it s principa l Fa r Easter n bas e at Batavia , th e
Portuguese ha d alread y los t severa l possession s an d muc h o f thei r
share of the spice trade.19 I n the Americas the Dutch had made less
progress and indeed had at first shown some inclination to respect the
rather vagu e clause of the 160 9 truce whic h implied that they were
excluded from th e kin g of Spain's Indies . Ther e was at an y rate a
marked reductio n i n Dutc h activit y i n th e Caribbea n afte r i6o9. ao
However, Dutc h involvemen t i n the Brazilia n sugar trad e ha d con -
tinued and, from about 1615, numerous incidents showed that Dutc h
ambitions in the Americas were reviving. Th e exploits of a squadron
under Va n Spilberge n of f the Pacifi c coast s o f Peru an d Mexic o i n
1615 cause d particula r indignatio n i n Madrid . Th e overthro w of
Oldenbarneveldt in 161 8 removed any lingering tendency i n Hollan d
to accep t exclusio n fro m th e Ne w World and , althoug h th e Wes t
India Compan y wa s no t finall y forme d unti l Jun e 1621 , afte r th e
outbreak of war, Spanish officials in Brussels, who carefully scrutinized
commercial initiatives i n Holland, kne w by 162 0 that i t woul d be set
up and that short of the use of force or the negotiation of dramatically
new terms, ther e was no way of preventing the Dutc h makin g rapid
gains in Spanis h America. 21
A thir d substantia l disadvantag e o f th e truc e fo r Spai n resulte d
from the shift in economic power: increasing wealth enabled the Dutch
to acquire, beside s the world' s larges t navy , the onl y standing army
in Europe remotely comparable in strength to that of Spain and this,
in turn, facilitated the extensio n of Dutch influenc e through Europ e
18
Albert to Philip III, Ghent , 18 Aug. 1618: A.G.S. Est. 2305; memorandum
of the
17
cond e de Benavente, 1 2 Sept. 1620 : A.G.S. Est. 2309.
Sancho de Moneada, Restauración politica de España (Madrid , 1746 edn.),
pp.1812 , 17, 2i-2, 53-6.
Memorandum of Jua n d e Qirica: A.G.S . Est . 634 , doc. 318 ; Phili p II I
to Albert, 12 Jan. 1620 : Correspondance d e la cour d'Espagne, ed . Lonchay an d
Cuvelier,
19
i, doc. 1450.
Consulta of the Counci l of Portugal, 2 8 May 1618 : A.G.S. Est . 634. O f
the most valuable Asian commodity, pepper, the Dutch handled over twice as
much
20
as the Portuguese by 1621 : Glamann, op. cit., p. 74.
C. Goslinga, Th e Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680
(Assen,
21
1971), pp. 82-3 .
Albert to Philip III, Brussels , 28 Feb. 1619 : A.G.S. Est . 2306 ; Pedro de
San Juan to Juan de Cirica, Brussels, 29 Feb. 1620 : A.G.S. Est. 2308.
and beyond in a way that contrasted al l too obviously with the meagre
international rol e played by the republic before 1609. Morever , thi s
spreading Dutc h influenc e seeme d t o b e devote d specificall y t o on e
aim — that of checking Spain at every point. I n Germany , by 1620,
the republi c ha d occupie d Emden , muc h o f Julich-Cleves , an d i n
addition th e vita l fortres s o f Papenmut z (Mondorf ) o n th e Rhin e
between Cologn e and Bonn 22 and, by providing men and money else-
where, wa s assuming the lea d in obstructin g Habsbur g ambitions in
central Europe. I n Italy, the United Provinces had succeeded Franc e
as the mai n foreign threa t t o the Spanis h ascendanc y and, by agree -
ments an d militar y an d nava l co-operatio n wit h Venic e an d Savoy ,
had become a powerful force in the central Mediterranean area. 23 I n
North Africa , where Spain hel d coasta l stronghold s fro m Larach e to
Oran a s a barrie r betwee n Isla m an d Spain , an d Isla m an d th e
Protestant powers , there wa s a remarkable growth in Dutch involve -
ment fro m 1608 , using Dutch an d Morocca n Jews as intermediaries;
by 162 1 the republic was the main supplier of arms and manufactures
to Nort h Afric a an d th e chie f all y o f th e sulta n o f Morocc o in hi s
confrontation wit h Spai n — a fac t tha t cause d muc h disquie t i n
Madrid, especiall y a s i t coincide d wit h a marke d resurgenc e i n
Muslim piracy around the coasts of Spain, Portugal and Sicily. 24
The truce that Madrid would have settled fo r in 162 1 was one that
would have reversed the shif t that ha d occurred i n the years 1609-21.
The three conditions were intended precisel y to secure such a reversal.
The demand for religious rights for Dutch Catholics, thoug h invariably
placed firs t an d undoubtedl y o f consequence , wa s nevertheless th e
least important of the three as is shown by the lesser emphasis placed
on it by Spanish ministers in any discussion o f the propose d terms.25
Partly, thi s requiremen t derive d fro m th e traditionall y militan t
Catholic stand of the Spanis h crown, but it was also a shrewd political
move, not only in that Dutch complianc e with it would serve Spanish
prestige internationall y bu t als o becaus e th e Dutc h Catholic s wer e
22
Consulta, 1 2 Nov . 1620 : A.G.S . Est . 2034 ; Brit . Lib. , Add . MS.I4OO5 ,
fo. 2835 .
Ibid., fos . 35 , 45; Alfre d va n de r Essen , "L'alliance defensiv e hollando -
vénétienne de 1619 et I'Espagne", in Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van
der24Essen, 2 vols. (Brussels and Paris, 1947), ii, pp. 819 , 829.
See the discours e o f Carlos Colom a printe d i n Antoni o Rodrigue z Villa ,
Ambrosio Spinola, primer marqués d e lo s Balbases (Madrid , 1904) , pp . 385-6 ;
Sultan Moulay Sidan to the States General, Marrakesh, 10 Apr. 1611 , and other
documents: Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc d e 1530 á 1845, ed. H . d e
Castries, 2nd ser., Archives et bibliotheques des Pays-Bas, 6 vols. (Paris and Th e
Hague,
25
1906-23), i, pp. 668-71.
Poelhekke, 'T Üytgaen va n den Treves, pp. 37,40; memorandum of Juan de
Cirica: A.G.S. Est. 634 , doc. 318 . A recent articl e seem s to make the mistake
of confusing the religious issue of 1621 with the very different an d more decisive
religious issue that prevaile d before 1598: see G. Parker, "Wh y di d the Dutc h
Revolt last Eighty Years", Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc., 5th ser., xxvi (1976), p. 62.
such a larg e an d potentiall y activ e minorit y i n th e republic . I n
Madrid th e mountin g religiou s strif e in th e Unite d Province s afte r
1609 — both the growin g dissension amon g the Protestants, and the
persistence of the Catholic s in the face of increased Calvinist pressure
— was regarded a s the on e solid gain from th e truce, 26 and anything
likely t o undermin e Dutc h domesti c stabilit y stil l furthe r wa s con-
sidered highl y desirable . A t th e sam e time th e deman d explicitly
acknowledged Dutch political and religious independence and demon-
strated the changed and strictly limited nature of Spanish aims. Th e
second condition, concerning the Scheldt , was doubtless partly meant
to involve the interest s o f the Souther n Netherland s i n those of the
empire a s a whole with respect t o the confrontatio n with the Dutc h
Republic. However , i t i s quit e clea r tha t th e reviva l o f Antwerp
was above all intended t o restore part of Europe's north-south carry -
ing trade to direc t Spanis h contro l an d reduce th e rol e of Holland ,
thereby strippin g th e Dutc h o f the gain s the y ha d mad e sinc e th e
closure o f the Scheld t an d particularl y sinc e loop. 27 Th e las t de -
mand, concernin g th e Indies , reflecte d th e fear s o f th e council s of
the Indies and of Portugal. Th e Spanish intention was to prevent the
formation of the Wes t India Company , secure unqualified acceptance
from the States General of Dutch exclusion from the New World and
salvage at least a part of the Portuguese-Asian trade. I n other words,
the thir d conditio n wa s designed t o bring Dutc h colonia l expansion
to a complete halt .
The Spanis h conditions , thoug h they did not directly threaten the
existence of the republic, stood no chance whatever of being accepted,
precisely becaus e the y di d threate n it s prosperit y an d well-being .
The ver y group s wh o stoo d t o los e mos t fro m wa r an d wer e least
swayed by thoughts o f liberating Flanders fro m the Spanis h yoke, the
merchants o f Holland, would have had to make the greatest sacrifices
to obtain a new truce. Th e almost miraculous economic boom of the
previous twelve years simply could not continue beyond 1621 whether
the States General gave in to Spanish pressure or not. I n the circum-
stances th e unenthusiasti c wer e force d int o th e cam p o f Princ e
Maurice an d th e wa r party . Nevertheless , mer e rejectio n o f th e
Spanish term s wa s quit e inadequat e a s a popula r explanatio n and
justification o f the war . Th e statu s of the Scheld t was of concern to
relatively fe w an d it s openin g woul d actuall y hav e favoure d som e
parts o f th e country, 28 whil e colonia l commerc e hardl y seeme d a
"Brit. Lib. , Add . MS.I4OO5 , fos . 36^37; consult^ 3 0 July 1621 , fo . 5 :
A.G.S. Est. 2035 .
" Coloma to Philip III, 8 June 1620 , fo. 2: A.G.S. Est. 2308 .
" Isabella to Philip IV, 22 Sept. 1621 : Correspondence d e la cour d'Espagne,
ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, doc. 109 . Indeed , some Zeelan d towns , notably
Flushing, seemed quit e anxious that i t b e reopened; see A. Gielens, "Onder-
handelingen met Zeelan d over d e opening de r Schelde , 1612-13" , Antwerpsch
archievenblad, 2nd ser., vi (1931), pp. 194-9 .
fundamental issue in the four inland provinces now faced with heavier
taxation and other burdens. Consequently , there was some reversion
in the Dutc h popula r pamphlets o f 1621 to the stirrin g themes of an
earlier epoch: 29 th e crue l an d oppressiv e Spaniar d was determine d
still t o plac e the Dutc h onc e again under hi s despotic rule . A t th e
same time, however, there was added some additional propaganda more
relevant to the times . War , i t wa s held, woul d serve both th e eco -
nomic an d politica l interest s o f th e republic. 30 Th e economi c
argument, which was to play a major role in Dutch as well as Spanish
thinking throughou t th e struggle , perhap s mad e littl e sens e wit h
respect to Holland, but in other areas, notably Zeeland where the truce
had brought stagnation rather than growth, 31 war did offe r som e real
attractions, especiall y the prospec t o f trade wit h th e America s an d
privateering. A s for political aims Dutch pamphleteers claimed that
the republi c woul d neve r b e full y secur e whil e Spai n remaine d s o
powerful, an d tha t numerou s advantage s would follo w wer e Spai n
to be weakened. I t i s difficult t o see that they were wrong.
The conflict envisaged in Brussels and Madrid during the course of
the deliberation s of 1618-21 was emphatically not a war of conquest.
Spanish officials , mindfu l o f th e strengt h o f th e Dutc h defences ,
proposed either a limited us e of the arm y of Flanders i n conjunction
with economic pressures o r else, in some cases, of economic pressure s
alone. Cristóba l de Benavente, veedor general of the army of Flanders ,
urged th e conques t o f Cleve s an d a limite d thrus t i n th e Arnhe m
region, combine d wit h embargoe s in th e peninsul a an d the Spanis h
viceroyalties in Italy, and a river blockade in Flanders and north-wes t
Germany.3 2 Other s such as Carlos Coloma made similar proposals.3 3
Hurtuño de Urizar , however, a Basque official o f long experience i n
Flanders, propose d keepin g the arm y entirely o n th e defensiv e and
defeating the republic by economic means alone — in particular, th e
breaking of the Dutch north-south carryin g trade by embargo.3 * Th e
peculiarly Spanis h inclination toward s a systematic use of embargoes
had, in fact, been generally apparent both in Spain and Flanders since
the sporadi c attempts a t such action in the year s 1598-1607. Phili p
29
Anon., Propositie ghedaen vanden Ambassadeur Peckius (The Hague , 1621;
Knuttel 3187) ; anon. , Aen-merckinge o p d e propositie vanden Ambassadeur
Peckius (Amsterdam , 1621 ; Knutte l 3196) , p . 8 , state s tha t Peckiu s ha d
demanded that : "We should recognize the king of Spain as our lor d and submit
ourselves to th e Spanis h yoke"; see also anon., Den Compaignon vanden verre-
sienden
80
Waerschovwer (Th e Hague , 1621; Knuttel 3204), fo. 2 V.
81
Den Compaignon, fos. 3-4 .
Ibid., fo . 3 ; anon. , Resolutie by de heer en Roeden ende Vroetschappen de r
Stadt Aherlem [sic] ghenomen (Haarlem, 1630; Knuttel 4009), p. 8; F . Snapper,
Oorlogsinvloeden o p de overzeese handel va n Holland, 1551-1719 (Amsterdam ,
i959)>
88 PP- 63, 65-6 .
83
Brit. Lib., Add. MS . 14005, fos. 37-9 .
34
Rodríguez Villa, Ambrosio Spinola, pp. 387-9 .
Recommendations of Hurtuño de Uricar, 3 Feb. 1618 : A.G.S. Est. 2847 .
Ill's embargoe s had undoubtedl y made some impact. 85 I t wa s an
appealing argumen t tha t muc h greate r succes s coul d b e achieve d
simply b y maintainin g th e embargoe s longer an d wit h mor e deter -
mination tha n before . Thus , embarg o ha d a centra l plac e i n al l
Spanish strategi c thinkin g o f th e period . Th e strateg y actuall y
decided o n in the first instance was that favoured b y most officials, a
limited land war combined with economic pressure.
The expir y o f the truc e i n Apri l 162 1 wa s followed not b y an y
immediate outbrea k o f hostilities , bu t b y month s o f genera l un -
certainty both in the Low Countries an d the peninsula, to which the
death of Philip III a few days before the expiry added considerably.38
However, to those in the know, the situation in the spring and summer
of 162 1 was much less unclea r than i t wa s generally, since there was
no sign of any shift in previously stated position s a t either Madri d or
The Hague , an d th e youn g king, Phili p IV , wa s clearly resolved to
follow th e pat h indicate d b y his father. Th e inactio n o f the arm y
of Flanders was in fact du e to its lack of preparedness and especially
its lack of cash.3 7 Onl y in the economic sphere did the conflict begin
in earnes t i n Apri l 1621 . Dutc h vessel s wer e ordere d ou t o f al l
ports of the empire in Europe and North Africa and everything owned
or manufactured by subjects of the republic was placed under a total
embargo. A massive exodus took place from Flanders, the peninsula
and souther n Italy . A t Sa n Sebastiá n the entir e Dutc h contingen t
left por t o n the da y of the expiry, 38 while on the Spanis h east coast
the vicero y of Valenci a within fiv e day s expelled 4 1 Dutc h vessel s
including n fro m th e sal t pan s o f L a Mat a alone. 39 Eventually ,
however, th e lan d wa r bega n also . Spinola , commande r o f th e
Flanders army , firs t o f al l move d agains t Dutch-occupie d Jülic h
which fell afte r seve n months of siege in Februar y 1622 ; during th e
summer o f 162 2 h e invade d Dutc h Braban t capturing Steenberge n
and layin g siege to Bergen-op-Zoom . Thi s siege , thoug h no t dis -
cussed b y Alcalá-Zamora , wa s in fac t a majo r turning-poin t o f th e
war. I t wa s not merely unsuccessful but rather a ruinous failure i n
which Spinola's strike-force of 18,000 men melted away through death
and desertio n t o 7,00 0 i n onl y a fe w months. 40 No t surprisingly ,
86
J. H . Kernkamp , D e handel o p den vijand, 7572-1609 , 2 vols. (Utrecht ,
I93i-4)j «> PP- 227-8,252, 260,271; E. Sluiter, "Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the
Caribbean Area, 1594-1609", Hispanic Amer. Hist. Rev., xxviii (1948)5 pp. 170 ,
176-7.
*• Isabella to Phili p IV, 26 July 1621 : Correspondance d e la cour d'Espagne,
ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii , doc. 73; Poelhekke , 'T Uytgaen va n den Treves,
PP.871-3 -
88
Consultas, 17 and 3 0 July 1621 : A.G.S. Est. 2035.
89
Martín de Amezquita to Philip IV, 1 4 Apr. 1621: A.G.S. Guerr a 873.
Viceroy o f Valenci a t o Phili p IV , 1 8 Apr . 1621 : Consej o d e Aragón,
Archivo
40
de la Corona de Aragón, Barcelona (hereafter A.C.A . C.A.), 684 86/2.
Consulta, 27 Oct. 1622, fo. 3: A.G.S. Est. 2036.
l O Empires and Entrepots
the setbac k cause d a considerable shoc k i n Madri d an d indeed pro -
voked a marked reaction agains t the whol e concept o f using the arm y
to put pressur e o n the republic. 41 Spanis h ministers, with Olivare s
increasingly prominen t amon g them, 42 conclude d tha t besiegin g
Dutch town s wa s nothin g bu t a wast e o f me n an d money . Th e
Council o f Stat e reckone d tha t i n Flander s i n 1622 i t ha d spen t t o
no purpos e som e 3,700,00 0 ducat s fro m th e Spanis h an d Italia n
revenues.43 Th e decisio n t o dispens e entirel y wit h th e arm y a s a
means o f puttin g pressur e o n th e Dutch , thoug h no t finall y take n
until afte r 1623 , wa s certainly i n th e making . I n Decembe r 162 3
Brussels wa s instructed t o reduc e th e monthl y expenditur e o n th e
army from 300,00 0 t o 250,00 0 ducat s an d to increas e naval spendin g
in Flanders fro m 20,00 0 to 70,000 ducat s a month.44
The Bred a campaign o f 1624-5 , the mos t famou s Spanis h succes s
of the wa r and th e inspiratio n fo r on e of Velazquez's greatest paint-
ings, wa s begun o n Spinola' s ow n initiative, possibl y to redee m hi s
reputation, bu t i n an y cas e t o th e utte r dismay , whe n the y learn t
the news, of Philip I V's ministers in Madrid.4 5 Bred a was even better
fortified tha n Bergen-op-Zoo m an d i t wa s considere d i n Madri d
that, even if Bred a fell, the sieg e would serve only to decimat e onc e
again bot h th e arm y and the king' s coffers . Indeed , even Spinola' s
triumph, the taking of Breda and the enormous impact of its captur e
in the capital s of Europe, faile d t o weaken in the least the convictio n
now deepl y entrenche d i n Spai n tha t besiegin g Dutc h town s wa s
completely pointless, leadin g inevitabl y and onl y to "littl e fruit and
much cost". 46 Ther e was some half-hearted discussion as to whethe r
Dutch territor y coul d b e usefull y invade d withou t besiegin g towns ,
but fro m thi s nothin g emerged . Afte r th e fal l o f Breda , Isabella ,
Philip's aun t an d th e governes s o f th e Souther n Netherlands , was
instructed t o keep the arm y strictly o n the defensive. 47 Durin g th e
period 1625-3 5 arm y o f Flander s remaine d unde r thes e order serd
and, apart from th e brie f invasion of 1629 to Amersfoort intended t o
force the liftin g of the siege of De n Bosch by the Dutch , fought only
guerra defensiva. Th e Bred a campaign , then , le d t o wha t b y an y
standard is an extraordinary situation. A predominantly land power,
much weake r tha n it s opponen t a t sea , havin g wo n a resoundin g
victory o n land, resolved t o dispens e wit h it s land forces and defea t
its enemy by economic pressure alone .
41
42
Consultas, 23 Oct. 1622 , and 1 6 Sept. and 2 6 Oct. 1623 : A.G.S. Est. 2037 .
43
Consultas, 14 and 24 June 1623 : A.G.S. Est. 2037 .
44
Consulta, 14 Apr. 1623 : A.G.S. Est. 2037 .
La Cueva to Philip IV, 4 Jan. 1624 : A.G.S. Est. 2038 ; Isabella to Philip IV,
7 Jan.
48
1624 : A.G.S. Est. 2038 .
48
Consultas, 18 Sept . and 5 Dec. 1624 : A.G.S. Est. 2038 .
47
Consultas, ii Mar. , 29 June an d 28 Sept. 1625 : A.G.S. Est. 2039 .
Rodríguez Villa , Ambrosio Spínola, pp . 440 , 446- 7 j Alcalá-Zamora ,
España, Flandes y e l Mar de l Norte, p . 210 .
A Conflict o f Empires 1 1
This economi c pressur e certainl y include d a measur e o f nava l
warfare. Spai n possesse d in 162 1 substantial naval forces a t Cádiz ,
Lisbon, on the Basque coast and elsewhere and, in 1621, new armadas
were established i n Flanders and Galicia and at Gibraltar. However ,
these force s were not used, at any rate before 1639 , to challenge the
Dutch navy as such. Thei r role was to protect Spanis h an d Portu -
guese traffic , especiall y th e Atlanti c flotas , an d t o disrup t Dutc h
commercial shipping . A s regards the latter , especiall y hig h hope s
were placed on the armada of Flanders and, initially, on the Gibralta r
squadron, on which some 150,000 ducats yearly was spent in the early
i¿2os. *8 Bu t the squadron and straits of Gibraltar in the event posed
a much less considerable hindrance to the Dutch Mediterranean trade
than Spanis h minister s ha d hoped . Althoug h som e Dutc h vessel s
were los t a t Gibraltar , th e Dutc h admiralt y colleges countere d th e
threat b y forming the straetvaert into large , heavil y armed convoys,
usually o f ove r fift y vessel s carryin g som e seve n hundre d guns ,
convoys that were too strong for the Gibralta r squadro n to tackle. 49
Despite this, the Mediterranean convoy system was a major nuisanc e
and expens e fo r Dutc h merchant s an d adde d considerabl y t o th e
strain o n the resource s of the Dutc h navy . Nevertheless , onl y the
armada of Flanders cause d heavy losses to the Dutch a t sea.
At first, the armada o f Flanders gre w slowly. I n 162 2 there were
only fou r coningsschepen (king' s ships) , thoug h thes e capture d a
dozen Dutch vessels in that same year, mostly carriers of salt and wine
from western France. 50 Afte r the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, how-
ever, the build-u p i n the Flemis h ports acquired new momentum.51
By 1625 there were twelve coningsschepen, a number of privateers and
plans fo r acquiring up t o fifty royal vessels and, althoug h expansion
ceased wit h th e financia l collaps e of 162 9 i n Flanders , ther e were ,
throughout the 16308 and 16405, some twenty large warships in Philip's
northern armada. T o this force the Dutch admiralty authorities could
find no answer. Havin g formed th e straetvaert into a costly convoy
system, the Dutc h were by 1625 forced t o use convoys on every route
to th e Danis h Sound , Norwa y an d Muscovy , as well a s to London ,
Yarmouth, "Scotland " (usuall y Newcastle) , St . Malo , Nantes ,
48
La Cuev a t o Phili p IV , 2 2 Sept . an d 2 6 Dec. 1621 : A.G.S . Est . 2310 ;
Philip I V t o commande r o f th e armada de l estrecho, 2 Feb . 1623 : A.G.S .
Guerra 888.
49
Records o f th e Admiralt y Colleges , verzamelin g Bisdom , Algemee n
Rijksarchief, Th e Hagu e (hereafte r A.R.A. Bis.) , vol. 4 8 ii, pp . 89 , 164 , 491.
The fifty-on e straetvaerders o f th e convo y of May 162 2 carrie d a total o f 72 0
guns,
50
an immense armament for the time.
"Relación de las pressas q ha hecho el armada", 8 Oct. 1622 : A.G.S. Est .
2312.
11
A.R.A. Bis . 52 , fo . 106; A.R.A . Bis. 53 , fo. 140; A.R.A . Bis 54, fo. 305;
A.R.A. Bis . 55, fo. 63 V.
Bordeaux an d Bayonne. 62 However , i t wa s simply no t possibl e t o
convey al l Dutc h sea-born e trad e b y convoy s and , i n an y case , th e
armada wa s too powerful for any but th e stronges t escort squadrons.
Immense effor t wa s put int o blockadin g th e armada's bases , Ostend ,
Nieuwpoort an d Dunkirk , wit h usually thirty an d often more Dutc h
warships patrolling the Flemish coast , but it was impossible, given th e
conditions o f the tim e (especiall y afte r storm s an d durin g th e lon g
winter nights) , to mak e the blockad e full y effective. 63 Th e armada
consequently carrie d ou t som e extremel y punishin g sweeps, 64 th e
first in November 162 5 when several dozen Dutch vessel s were seized
and sunk . Fro m Januar y to Marc h 162 7 the armada, together wit h
the privateers , too k 38 Dutch and Englis h vessel s and sank a further
18. I n th e firs t tw o month s o f 162 8 the armada san k 3 vessels an d
captured 3 6 Dutch an d English prizes , valued at 400,000 ducats — or
more tha n th e entir e cos t o f maintaining th e arm y of Flanders fo r a
period o f six weeks. I n th e winte r o f 1636-7 the coningsschepen too k
35 prizes and in 1642 , among numerous others, captured a convoy of
9 returnin g fro m Archange l wit h fur s an d caviar e wort h 130,00 0
ducats. I n vie w o f such losse s i t i s not surprisin g that , as Spanis h
officials note d with satisfaction, freight and insurance rates in Hollan d
were force d u p drastically. 65 Betwee n 162 5 (whe n i t wa s alread y
much higher than in 1621) and 1645, the cost of shipping timber from
Norway t o Hollan d increase d b y ove r 5 0 pe r cen t an d a t time s b y
nearly 10 0 per cent . Th e benefi t o f this shar p ris e i n Dutc h cost s
was o f cours e mainl y enjoye d by Holland' s competitors .
The armada o f Flanders , beside s disruptin g Dutc h merchan t
shipping, wa s also employe d agains t anothe r majo r pilla r o f Dutc h
prosperity — the Nort h Se a fisheries . I t ha d lon g bee n a Spanis h
aim to attack the famous herring fishery, which was thought to account
for som e three-fifth s o f the tota l Dutc h fis h revenues , earnin g ove r
600,000 ducats yearly. 56 Som e herring-busses wer e sunk as early as
62
Papers o f th e Dutc h Admiralt y College s (hereafte r A.R.A . adm. ) 2456 ,
Res. Coll. Zeeland , 2 1 Feb., 29 June, n Jul y and 3 Oct. 1626 ; th e Bordeau x
convoys sometimes took the Calais voerders and others with them; at other times
separate
53
convoys were organized for Calais, Rouen, St. Malo and Nantes .
A.R.A. Bis. 51, fos. 18-19; A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 71-2; A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. 33.
The blockad e force was strengthened and its official fire-power raised from over
60064 to over 700 guns in 1627 : A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 305^307.
Alcalá-Zamora, op . at., p. 205; L a Cuev a t o Phili p IV , 2 3 Apr. 1627 :
A.G.S. Est . 2318 ; Isabell a t o Phili p IV , n Mar . 1628 : A.G.S . Est . 2321 ;
E. Stols , De Spaanse Brabanders o f d e handelsbetrekkingen de r zuidelijke Neder-
landen
66
met de Iberische wereld (Brussels, 1971), pp. 172-6 .
La Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Mar. 1628 : A.G.S. Est. 2321; J. Schreiner, "Di e
Niederlander un d di e norwegisch e Holzausfuh r i m 17 . Jahrhundert" , Tijd.
Gesch.,
66
xlix (1934), p. 324.
Analecta Vaticano-Bélgica, 2n d ser. , Nonciature d e Flandre, v i (1938) ,
pp. 658-9; P . J . Blok , "Een merkwaardi g aanvalsplan gericht tegen visscheri j
en hande l de r vereenigd e Nederlande n i n d e eerst e helf t de r I7d e eeuw" ,
Bijdragen e n mededelingen va n he t historisch genootschap, xix (1898), pp. 8-9 .
1622 but th e rea l pressure bega n i n Octobe r 162 5 whe n the armada
caught the Sout h Holland division of the herring fleet off the Scottis h
coast, destroyin g 8 0 busse s accordin g t o Spanis h source s an d 6 0
according to reports fro m Newcastle. 57 Th e State s General assigned
as man y warship s a s wa s feasible to th e protectio n o f th e fisherie s
(19 in 1626 ) but the overburdene d admiralty colleges, hampere d by a
constant shortage of cash, could not cope. 68 Eve n when naval escorts
were up to strength, which was rare, it was difficult t o shield the herring
fleets from attac k because the siz e and complexit y of their net s com -
pelled the busses to spread ove r a wide area. I n 162 6 there were more
losses, while in October 1627 the Dunkirkers crushed part of the naval
escort an d capture d an d san k man y dozen s o f herring-busses. 59
Another heav y attac k occurre d i n 1632 , whil e i n Augus t 163 5 th e
armada ravaged the Zuide r Zee division of the groóte visscherij o n its
way t o th e fishin g grounds , capturin g 90 6 herring-men an d sinkin g
89 herring-busses , accordin g t o Spanis h sources , an d ove r 100 ,
according t o the tow n of Enkhuizen, which too k the heavies t loss. 60
In 163 7 well over on e hundred mor e busses wer e destroyed; and i n
1639," an d agai n i n 1642 , whe n Zierikze e alon e los t 1 8 herring -
busses, ther e wa s further considerabl e damage. 62 Som e idea of th e
scale of losses to th e Dutc h herrin g town s is given by the report s of
the State s o f Hollan d t o th e State s Genera l o n th e situatio n a t
Maassluis, the leading herring port of the Sout h Holland area supply-
ing the Rotterda m market. 63 Th e Sout h Hollan d fleets formed on e
of the thre e mai n groups o f fleets, those o f Zeeland, Sout h Hollan d
and th e Zuide r Ze e constitutin g th e Dutc h herrin g fishery . Th e
three wer e of roughly equa l size though th e Zeelan d fleets formed a
slightly smalle r entit y tha n th e othe r two. 64 Fro m 163 1 t o 163 4
Maassluis, beside s losing 25 non-herring fishin g craft , lost 16 2 busses
with their nets , affecting nearl y two thousand fishermen ; anothe r 5 0
were los t i n th e year s 1635- 7 whe n Enkhuizen , i n fact , too k muc h
heavier losses . Herring-busses , sizeable craf t wit h a n averag e crew
size o f ten, thoug h ofte n manne d b y as man y as sixteen men , wer e
67
Consulta, 25 Nov. 1625: A.G.S. Est. 2039; A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 26ov, 271,
277;
68
Calendar of State Papers: Venetian, 1625-6, p. 213 .
59
A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 130, 139, i63 v, 165-6.
Consulta, 8 Oct. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2041.
•° A.R.A. adm. 2458 , Res. Coll. Zeeland, 29 Jul y 1632 ; A.R.A . Bis. 62, fo.
191; Memorial histórico español, 4 9 vols. (Madrid , 1851-1948), xiii , pp. 247-8,
272,
61
308; Calendar o f State Papers: Venetian, 1632-6, pp. 44-5.
62
Memorial histórico español, xiv, pp. 201-2.
Lieuwe van Aitzema, Historie ofverhael va n saken va n staet e n oorlogh in,
ende ontrent d e Vereenigde Nederlanden, 1 4 vols . (Th e Hague , 1667-71) , v ,
pp.48360-1.
64
A.R.A. Bis. 62, fo. 59; Aitzema, op. cit., vi, p. 624.
The nava l escort fo r th e Zeelan d fleets was fixed in rati o o f 5: 7 or , i n
some years, of 4:6 as against both the South Holland and Zuider Zee divisions:
A.R.A. Bis. 50, fo. 60, and A.R.A. Bis. 52, fo. 72.
officially reckone d as being worth over 5,000 guilders each, so that i n
this seven-yea r perio d Maasslui s lost on e million guilder s wort h of
herring gear , th e equivalen t o f 350,00 0 Spanis h ducats . I f on e
counts thi s a s hal f th e damag e suffere d b y one-thir d o f th e tota l
herring fleet during about half of the period of heavy Spanish pressur e
(surely a conservativ e estimate), th e tota l damage , without countin g
loss o f herrin g sale s or ransom s paid fo r capture d fishermen , ma y
well have been i n exces s o f twelve million guilders . Nevertheless ,
despite th e exten t o f thi s destruction , Spanis h nava l activit y ha s
scarcely figure d i n recen t account s o f th e herrin g fisher y i n th e
seventeenth century, 66 thoug h i t ha s bee n suggested , contrar y t o
what was once commonly believed, that the herring fleets were in fact
in declin e wel l befor e th e firs t Anglo-Dutc h war of 1652-4. I t ha s
been notice d tha t certai n herrin g fleets , notabl y those o f Schieda m
and Delftshaven , both belongin g t o th e Sout h Hollan d division, "
contracted markedl y in th e firs t hah 0 of the century . Wha t shoul d
be noted in addition, however, is that the decline at Schiedam at least,
from a n average of 49 busses in the decad e 1616-25 to only 23 in th e
decade 1626-3 5 (a loss of more than half ) is very abrupt, suggestin g
not a gradual process but a sharp setback in the 1620 5 and 1630 $ —
caused, surely , b y Spanis h nava l action . Certainl y othe r factor s
besides the Dunkirkers can be pointed to as contributing to the herring
recession in these years. Th e rive r blockade damaged herring sales ,
at least briefly, while the salt shortage contributed to the sharp increase
in herring prices in Holland after i627 67 and , possibly, to the sligh t
shrinking in the proportion of herring in Dutch exports to the Baltic.88
But these phenomena were also consequences of Spanish actions an d
ones designed to complement the activit y of the armada and, to tha t
extent, the y woul d tend t o strengthe n th e argumen t that ther e i s a
direct lin k between Spanish pressur e and th e declin e of the Dutc h
herring fishery.
Yet th e armada o f Flanders , fo r al l it s undoubte d effectiveness ,
should not be seen as being in itself Spain' s alternative to the army of
Flanders as the principal means of attacking the Dutch. Whe n Philip
68
Kranenburg doe s not mention the Spanish campaig n and nor does van der
Woude i n hi s stud y o f the Noorderkwartier , thoug h i t i s mentioned i n som e
older work s suc h a s tha t o f d e Jonge : H . A . Kranenburg , D e zeevísscheríj
van Holland in de tijd de r Republiek (Amsterdam , 1946) ; A. M. va n der Woude,
Het Noorder kwartier, 2 vols . (A . A . G . Bijdragen , xvi , Wageningen , 1972) ;
J. C . d e Jonge, Geschiedenis va n he t Nederlandsche zeewesen, 5 vols. (Haarlem,
1858-62),
88
i, pp. 235-6, 262 .
Kranenburg, op . cit., pp. 33-4, 217-18 ; H . Watjen , "Zu r Statisti k de r
hollándischen Heringfischere i i m 17 . und 18 . Jahrhundert" , Hansische Gesch-
ichtsblatter,
67
xvi (1910), p. 159 .
N. W . Posthumus , Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1943 -
64),88 i, p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 658.
A. Christensen , Dutch Trade t o th e Baltic about 1600 (Copenhage n an d
The Hague , 1941) , diagram 20; van der Woude, Noorderkwanier, ii, p. 406 .
IV's minister s stated , as did the duqu e de l Infantad o in Jul y 1622 ,
that th e "greates t hostilit y tha t ca n b e show n t o th e Dutc h i s t o
deprive the m absolutel y and totally o f their commerce , increas e th e
armada o f Flanders an d arrange matters a t the Strait s [o f Gibraltar]
so tha t the y enter an d leav e [th e Mediterranean ] wit h difficulty", 69
what the y mean t wa s that nava l actio n wa s to b e par t o f a wide r
programme i n whic h th e embargoe s were to b e th e mai n element .
Alcalá-Zamora, thoug h h e misse s severa l o f th e mai n point s con -
cerning th e Dunkirker s an d thei r effect , nevertheles s maintain s tha t
the nava l offensive wa s the principa l Spanis h weapo n and dismisse s
the embargoes, on which he says little, as unworkable, ineffective an d
of only marginal importance.70 I n fact, however, Spain kept within
fairly modest limits in taking the offensive at sea. Annua l expenditure
on th e armada o f Flander s neve r exceede d 600,00 0 ducat s an d was
usually mor e in th e regio n o f 400,000 ducat s o r les s — about one -
eighth of the spending on the army.71 Arguably , the new commercial
system wa s considerabl y costlier , require d a greate r administrativ e
effort an d ha d a fa r heavie r impac t o n th e Dutc h an d Iberia n
economies.
The departur e o f several hundred Dutc h vessel s from Phili p IV' s
European dominions in April 1621, though it severely jolted Europe's
commercial structure , wa s only a first step in th e layin g of the em -
bargoes. Dutc h flags and passports were no longer seen in the penin -
sula, but Dutc h merchant s were able, at first, to continue their trad e
there by various means. Dutc h cargoe s were transported i n neutral
shipping, especiall y Englis h an d Hanseatic, 72 whil e som e Dutc h
vessels continued to visit Spanish-controlled port s under the pretence
of being neutrals. Eve n so, the setbac k was considerable. Man y of
the eight to nine hundre d Dutc h vessel s which had traded annually
with the Spanis h territories durin g the last years of the truce 73 could
no longer be used, causing a serious slump in shipping in Holland. 74
••
70
Consulta, 6 July 1622 , fo. iv : A.G.S. Est. 2036 .
Alcalá-Zamora, España, Flandesy e l Mar de l Norte, pp. 182-4 .
71
"Relación de lo q SMd ha menester ..." gives 600,000 ducats for the peak
year 1626 : A.G.S . Haciend a 621 ; th e consulta o f 8 Dec . 163 0 give s unde r
300,000 ducats for 1631 : A.G.S. Est. 2148 ; and the "Relació n de la provissio n
.. ." gives 349,80 0 for 1644: A.G.S. Est. 2062 .
12
H. Taylor , "Trade , Neutralit y an d the 'Englis h Road' , 1630-48" , Econ.
Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., xxv (1972), pp. 236-60; H. Kellenbenz , Unternehmerkrafte
im Hamburger Portugal- una Spanienhandel, 1590-162 5 (Hamburg, 1954), p. 63 .
78
Francisco d e Retama , i n hi s "Conssideraciones ...", fo. 4, estimates 82 1
vessels yearly: A.G.S . Est. 2847 ; Alcalá-Zamora , i n what i s presumably a mis -
print, gives the figure of 8,000: Alcalá-Zamora, op. cit., p. 179 .
74
La Cuev a t o Phili p IV , 1 7 Oct . 1621 : A.G.S . Est . 2310 ; L a Cuev a t o
Philip IV, ii Mar . 1622 : A.G.S. Est. 2311 . Tha t there was a shipping slum p
in Hollan d i n or aroun d 162 1 is not i n dispute; however, th e phenomeno n is
usually explaine d withou t an y referenc e t o Spain . Se e Christensen , Dutch
Trade to the Baltic, p. 88; M. Bogucka , "Amsterdam and the Baltic in the First
Half oi f th e Seventeent h Century" , Econ. Hist. Rev., 2n d ser. , xxv i (1973) ,
pp. 437-8.
Moreover Dutch ships still trading with the peninsula after April 1621
had t o sai l mainl y wit h foreig n crews , whic h force d thousand s o f
Dutch seame n out o f the carryin g trade, though ther e wa s now the
alternative of an expanding navy and the newly-founde d West Indi a
Company. Th e carryin g o f sal t fro m Portugal , i n whic h a hig h
proportion of the Dutch ships visiting the peninsula had been involved
was continued , thoug h sporadically , wit h Frenc h an d particularl y
Scottish crew s — as the State s Genera l explaine d t o th e Morocca n
sultan, baffled a s to why numerous Scots sailors were suddenly falling
into th e hand s o f hi s captain s of f Portuga l an d wh y Th e Hagu e
desired hi m to treat thes e Scotsme n as he would Dutchmen.75 Ye t
despite the early impact of the embargoes, ministers in Madrid, aware
that th e Dutc h coul d no t easil y be forced to give in an d confronted
daily b y evidence o f loopholes, wer e at firs t highl y dissatisfied with
the workin g of their measures .
Little b y little th e embargoe s were extended an d refined . Loca l
authorities in the ports were instructed t o insist that neutral shipper s
to th e peninsul a brin g certificate s from thei r port s o f embarkation ,
signed b y magistrates and statin g tha t cargoe s had not originate d i n
the republic and were not owned by Dutch subjects. 76 Ship s owned
by neutrals but built in Holland after th e expiry of the truce were also
placed under embargo. Appeal s from th e royal Council of Finance ,
disturbed b y th e shortag e o f coppe r afte r i62i, 77 an d fro m th e
authorities concerne d wit h organizin g America n trade i n Seville, 78
hampered b y the growin g shortage of naval stores, that Dutc h ship s
be allowed with Germa n crews to brin g at least some supplies, were
repeatedly rejected: it was made clear in the Counci l of State that th e
exclusion o f th e Dutc h wa s to tak e priorit y ove r ever y other con -
sideration n o matte r ho w vital . Earl y i n 162 2 th e corregidores
(district officers) o f the Castilia n ports, under new instructions, began
inspecting neutral shipping more methodically than previously and the
first English and Hanseatic ships were seized for carrying Dutch goods.79
In Galicia similar new boarding procedures were introduced in 1623-4
by th e captain-general , th e marqué s d e Cerralvo. 80 Nevertheles s
evidence continue d t o accumulat e that loca l official s wer e often les s
than zealou s i n imposin g th e embargoe s an d tha t th e syste m o f
76
States Genera l t o Moula y Sidan , Th e Hague , 2 0 Jan . 1623 : Le s sources
inédites d e I'histoire du Maroc, ed . CastrieS j 2n d ser. , Archives et bibliothèques
des7 Pays-Bas, i, pp. 261-2.
77
* Consulta, 27 Nov. 1621 : A.G.S. Est. 2645 .
78
Consulta, 7 July an d 3 Nov. 1621 : A.G.S. Est. 2645 .
Antonio Domíngue z Ortiz , "Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el
reinado
79
de Felipe IV", Híspanla, xxiii (1963), p. 73.
80
Corregidor o f Guipúzcoa t o Philip IV, i May 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2847 .
Cerralvo t o Phili p IV , Corunna , 2 6 Ma y 1623 : A.G.S . Guerr a 898 ;
Cerralvo t o Philip IV , 1 9 Feb. 1624 : A.G.S. Guerra 901.
certificates wa s as yet very imperfect.81 A case particularly noted i n
Madrid wa s tha t o f a Ne w Christia n o f Lisbon , Jorg e Rodriguez ,
who ha d bee n arreste d fo r infringin g th e embargoe s an d i n whos e
possession wa s a letter fro m a Jewish merchant o f Hamburg, Duart e
Esteves d e Pina , revealin g that th e senat e o f Hambur g wa s openly
providing merchant s wit h fals e certificate s assertin g tha t the y ha d
sworn befor e magistrate s tha t the y wer e complyin g wit h th e em -
bargoes, when in fact no such oaths were actually taken. I n Octobe r
1623 the crown, using special commissioners, simultaneously put int o
effect a n embargo general i n Andalusi a an d Portugal , seizin g 16 0
neutral and ostensibly neutral vessels, including 44 (the largest group)
in Sa n Lúcar an d 3 3 in Cádiz. 82 Trad e was brought to a standstill
for months and there was a storm of protest from foreign ambassadors,
but the exceptionally thorough searc h that took place led to numerous
foreign merchants sufferin g fines and confiscations for acting as inter-
mediaries for the Dutch and the arrest of several secret correspondent s
of Dutc h merchant s wh o ha d bee n operatin g alon g the coas t fro m
Málaga to Lisbon.
Such findings made it clea r that ther e wa s a limit to how far com -
mercial regulatio n coul d b e tightene d whil e employing th e existin g
administrative machinery. 83 I f mor e wa s to b e achieved , ne w an d
more efficient institution s wer e needed. Alread y in Decembe r 162 2
Philip IV had set up a new central economi c committee, the junta de
comercio, to advise on virtually every aspect of Iberian economic life ,
but wit h th e specifi c purpos e o f findin g mean s o f renderin g th e
measures agains t th e Dutc h mor e effective. 84 Als o i n 162 2 i t wa s
decided tha t implementatio n o f the embargoe s coul d n o longe r b e
entrusted t o the ordinary local administration, particularly not in the
most vital areas, Andalusia and Portugal, and plans were accordingly
drawn u p fo r establishin g mor e specialize d an d readil y discipline d
officers. Commissioner s o f commerc e wer e appointe d i n Seville ,
San Lúcar , Lisbon , Oporto , Bilba o and othe r port s an d als o i n th e
Canaries an d the Azore s where the Dutc h ha d begun to go for many
of the products they could no longer obtain in the peninsula. 85 The n
in Octobe r 1624 , i n a crucia l ste p toward s a reforme d commercial
administration, Phili p I V se t u p th e almirantazgo d e lo s países
septentrionales, based in Seville , to supersede completely the previou s
81
Fernando Alvi a d e Castr o t o Phili p IV , Lisbon , 8 an d 1 9 Oct . 1622 :
A.G.S.
82
Est. 2847; Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte, p . 26.
Instructions t o Pedr o d e Arze : A.G.S . Contadurí a Mayo r d e Cuenta s
(hereafter A.G.S . C.M.C.) 2267 expediente 10 ; papers relating to the embargo
general in San Lúcar: A.G.S. C.M.C. 1437; Pedro de Arze to Philip IV, Cadiz,
18 85Feb. 1624: A.G.S. Guerra 895; Kellenbenz, op. at., p. 26.
84
Consultas, 6 July, 28 Sept. and 8 Oct. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2036.
86
Philip IV to Montesclaros,d i Dec. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2847.
"Los comissarios q s u M h a nombrad o par a l o de l comercio" : A.G.S.
Est. 2847 .
arrangements for the control of trade between Andalusia and norther n
Europe.86 Partly , th e almirantazgo wa s intended t o organize heavily
armed convoys sailing between San Lúcar and Dunkirk, but in this it
was no t ver y successful. It s majo r importanc e wa s as an extremely
formidable custom s apparatu s whic h b y 162 6 wa s staffe d b y sixt y
regular officer s operatin g i n al l th e Andalusia n ports . I n 162 5 a n
almirantazgo wa s also established i n Flanders , base d at St . Winoks -
bergen near Dunkirk, with the purpos e o f acting in conjunction wit h
the bod y at Seville. 87 I n th e Souther n Netherland s an d eventuall y
also i n th e Hanseati c town s th e almirantazgos, usin g a syste m o f
permanent residents , wer e abl e t o develo p a considerabl y mor e
sophisticated framewor k o f procedure s an d certificate s tha n ha d
previously existed . I n addition , t o handl e th e man y case s arisin g
from infringement s o f the embargoe s wit h reasonabl e dispatch , th e
crown removed such cases from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
and set up a special judicial structure for commercial cases at the head
of which it placed the tribunal mayor de l almirantazgo formed in 162 5
at Madrid .
Clearly the impac t of the ne w methods wa s considerable. I f th e
embargo general ha d onl y a temporary effect , th e ne w boarding pro -
cedures, th e almirantazgos an d th e commercia l court s transforme d
conditions i n Spain' s port s fo r good . Th e cit y administration s o f
Seville, Sa n Lúcar, Málag a and elsewher e proteste d repeatedl y tha t
their trad e wa s being ruined, 88 bu t th e crow n remaine d unmoved .
Philip IV's ministers preferred to suffe r los s of trade and commercial
revenues i f in s o doing they coul d injure the Dutch . Th e pressur e
was unremitting. On e Spanish write r declared that:
with the almirantazgo all the trade of the entire world passe d to Holland an d
Amsterdam ... for the almirantazgo, armed with the decrees agains t contra -
band, especially that of 15 October 1625 , closed the door to all commerce, of
friends an d enemies alike, with their certificates, inspections, condemnations
and confiscation s suc h tha t withi n a shor t time , Spai n wa s without trade ,
ships, supplie s o r foodstuffs , custom89 s revenue s fel l an d th e produc e o f th e
country was without means of exit.
And indeed , th e evidenc e fo r th e contractio n o f thos e sector s o f
Castilian commerce in which the Dutch had predominated until 1621,
while th e shar e o f neutral s sharpl y increased , i s generall y s o sub -
stantial that th e historia n ha s either t o attribute th e phenomeno n to
problems o f supply affecting th e Dutc h alone , o f which there i s n o
indication, or accept that in large measure the Dutch were shut out of
84
Royal cédula, 4 Oct. 1624 : A.G.S. Est. 2847 ; Domínguez Ortiz , "Guerr a
económica y comercio extranjero", pp. 78-9 .
87
88
Ibid., p. 79.
Consulta d e parte, n Aug . 1627 : A.G.S. Est . 4126; consulta pf the/unra
de comercio, 30 Jan. 162 6 and 28 Sept. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2645; Seville to Philip
IV,89 7 Sept. 1627 : A.G.S. Est . 2646 .
"Cavsas po r dond e creci ó e l comercio d e Olanda y se hizo vn monopoli o
vniuersal": Brit. Lib., Add. MS.i4OO5, fo. 27.
Castile b y Spanis h action . Th e expor t o f Andalusia n salt , whic h
had bee n carrie d onl y b y th e Dutch , dwindle d i n th e fou r year s
1621-5 to virtually nothing.90 Indications of a chorinic shotage of
copper, timbe r an d othe r nava l stores fro m 162 1 are so frequent that
it can scarcely be doubted tha t the supply of these materials t o Spain
was interrupted . I n exportin g t o an d carryin g fro m Bilbao , San -
tander an d Sa n Sebastián , th e English , Frenc h an d othe r neutral s
took a dramaticall y increased shar e o f the trad e fro m 162 1 whil e at
the same time the total value of trade to the north Castilia n ports was
almost exactly 10 per cen t lower in the year s 1621-4 than it had been
in 1617-20 and, after 1625 , much more than 10 per cent lower.91 Th e
conclusion mus t surel y b e tha t th e Dutc h carryin g trade t o Castil e
largely collapsed .
In eastern Spain, as in Castile, economic warfare against the Dutch
was wage d with considerabl e determination . Th e crow n had thre e
initial aim s in th e eas t o f the peninsula: 92 t o hal t th e supplyin g of
Valencia, Barcelon a an d Alicant e b y th e Dutc h wit h th e grai n an d
fish which traditionally had been imported there in massive quantity,
to den y th e Dutc h th e us e o f th e sal t pans , especiall y those o f L a
Mata and Ibiza, and to prevent the entry of Dutch good s into Castile
from th e neighbourin g Frenc h por t o f Bayonn e vi a Navarr e an d
Aragón. I n 162 3 a fourth ai m wa s added when , prompte d b y th e
junta d e comercio, the crow n sought to exclude spices from th e Dutc h
East Indies, previously a major import at Alicante, by decreeing that in
future, whateve r merchant s an d ship s brough t th e spices , onl y
Portuguese spice s registere d i n Lisbo n coul d b e admitted. 93 Thes e
aims, despit e som e evasion facilitated by th e grea t strengt h o f local
institutions i n th e easter n viceroyalties , were on the whol e achieved.
As in Castile new boarding and inspection procedures were introduced
at the ports and trade contracted, with sharp falls bot h in the import-
ing o f foodstuffs an d th e expor t o f local wines, soap and fruit. 94 A t
a time when salt was short in much of Europe, the salt pans of Valencia
and Ibiz a fell almos t into disus e owing to th e effort s o f the viceroys
of Valencia and Mallorc a t o driv e th e Dutc h away. 95 Spice s were
90
91
Consulta, 8 Mar. 1626 : A.G.S. Hacienda 621 .
"Diezmos del mar de Castilla" gives the yearly revenue totals for the various
north
9i
coas t ports for 1617-28: A.G.S. C.M.C. 1950 expediente i.
"Para l a prohibició n de l comerci o d e lo s rebeldes", section s o n Aragón,
Catalonia
93
and Valencia: A.G.S. Est. 2847 .
Protest of the arrendador o f the aduana of Alicante: A.C.A. C.A. 603 12/16;
"Discurso sobre la prohibición d e la entrada d e pimienta de la India oriental en
Alicante":
94
A.C.A. C.A . 60 3 12/28.
Consulta, 1 2 Sept . 1630 : A.G.S. Est . 2648 ; "Diputái s de l gn l de l reyno
de 96Valencia", 24 Jan. 1629 : A.C.A. C.A . 576 .
Viceroy of Valencia t o Phili p IV , u Feb . 1623 : A.C.A . C.A. 60 3 doc. 5.
Pedro Martíne z d e Ver a state d tha t n o sal t wa s extracte d fro m L a Mat a i n
1622 owin g t o th e "war s o f Flanders" : Pedr o Martíne z d e Ver a t o Nicola s
Mensa, 9 Mar. 1623 : A.C.A. C.A. 60 3 doc. 6.
checked systematicall y for Lisbo n seals , much t o th e distres s o f th e
city counci l o f Alicante. 96 Th e loophol e throug h Navarr e prove d
extremely difficul t t o clos e an d th e corte s a t Pamplon a fough t it s
hardest t o resist the jurisdiction of the tribunal mayor de l almirantazgo
in Navarre; but i t indicates the extent of royal determination tha t th e
question o f Castilia n procedure s an d jurisdictio n i n checkin g trad e
became the foremost constitutional issu e in Navarre and remained so
throughout th e i62os .
More importan t tha n th e campaig n i n easter n Spain , however }
though likewis e unmentioned b y Alcalá-Zamora , wa s the campaig n
in Portugal . Th e Portugues e port s wer e a majo r marke t fo r naval
stores an d on e of the larges t for Balti c grain, a s wel l a s bein g a n
important sourc e of suppl y fo r suga r an d othe r Brazilia n products ,
and wines, olive oil and fruit; moreover, at Setubal lay the richest sal t
pans i n al l Europe . Portugues e trad e wa s i n fac t o f fundamenta l
importance in the overall structure of Dutch European commerce since
much o f th e Dutc h Balti c trad e depende d directl y o n it; 97 an d
Portugal, in the sphere of European trade, was in fact Philip IV' s most
vital possession after Andalusia. Consequently , throughou t the period
from 162 1 unti l th e Portugues e secessio n i n 1640 , the regulatio n of
Portuguese commerc e wa s a majo r preoccupatio n i n Madrid . Th e
decision t o circumven t th e loca l Portugues e administration , whic h
in Spai n wa s regarded a s being particularl y unreliable , wa s put int o
effect eve n befor e that relatin g t o Andalusia . Despit e th e fac t tha t
since annexatio n i n 158 0 Madri d ha d bee n war y o f antagonizin g
Portuguese feeling and had mostl y left Portugal' s administration a s it
was, fro m 162 3 the crow n did not hesitat e t o use Castilia n officers t o
impose the embargoe s an d place d them under th e jurisdictio n not of
the Counci l o f Portugal bu t o f the Counci l of War, staffed mainl y by
Castilian noblemen . Considerabl e tensio n develope d betwee n Port -
uguese an d Castilia n officer s i n Portugal , an d als o betwee n the tw o
councils i n Madrid, 98 bu t ther e wa s no relaxatio n o f the pressure .
Diego Lópe z d e Haro , wh o directe d th e operatio n i n th e Lisbon -
Setubal area , introduce d th e ne w boarding procedure s and , by May
1623, reporte d t o Madri d that the Dutc h ha d give n up Lisbo n an d
were bein g drive n fro m Setubal. 99 On e vesse l manne d b y Scot s
escaped fro m Setuba l onl y b y threatenin g Lópe z d e Har o an d hi s
88
Alicante to Phili p IV , 1 4 Mar . 1624 : A.C.A . C.A . 60 3 12/3 ; vicero y of
Valencia t o Phili p IV , 1 5 Jan . 1624 : A.C.A . C.A . 60 3 12/14 . O n Ibiza , see
the97consulta of 8 Aug. 1631: A.G.S. Guerr a 1030 .
98
Bogucka, "Amsterdam an d the Baltic", pp. 437-8 .
López d e Haro to Philip IV , Lisbon , 1 2 Aug. and 2 3 Sept. 1623 : A.G.S .
Guerra 898 ; consulta o f th e Counci l o f Portugal , 2 Sept . V1624 : Brit . Lib. ,
Egerton
99
MS.ii3i; and Brit. Lib., Egerton MS. 1135, fo. I99 .
López d e Har o t o Phili p IV , Lisbon , 7 Jan . 1623 : A.G.S . Guerr a 895 ;
López de Haro to Philip IV, 5 Feb. 1623 : A.G.S. Est. 2847; López de Haro to
Philip IV , 1 9 May 1623 : A.G.S. Guerr a 988.
guards with a salvo of muske t fire . Subsequentl y Castilia n commi -
ssioners wer e also used in investigations a t Oporto , Aveiro , Faro and
elsewhere.100 Th e Lisbo n cit y council complaine d endlessl y that th e
Castilian officer s wer e ruinin g Portugal' s trad e wit h norther n
Europe,101 but these complaints, though supporte d b y the Counci l of
Portugal, mad e no headway in the Counci l o f State, which supporte d
the Counci l o f War . Spanis h minister s di d no t den y that the ne w
procedures wer e causing or contributing t o the economi c depressio n
in Portuga l bu t hel d that, i f slum p wa s the pric e o f damagin g th e
Dutch, the n the y wer e determine d t o pa y it. 102 A t Lisbo n an d
Setúbal the slum p wa s to continue, despit e th e granting afte r 163 0 of
licences t o a limited numbe r o f Dutch shipper s t o take salt, until th e
revival i n Dutch-Portugues e trad e began i n 1641 . A t Far o i n th e
Algarve Dutc h shippin g almos t entirely disappeare d unti l 164 1 and ,
despite a marked increas e i n neutral an d especiall y Hanseati c traffic ,
the increas e wa s a mere fractio n o f th e massiv e los s cause d b y th e
absence o f the Dutch. 103
In Ital y there was further scope for Spain in the economic struggle
with the United Provinces. Italy , like Spain and Portugal, ha d since
the 1590 5 imported vi a Hollan d grea t quantitie s o f Baltic grain an d
other nort h Europea n products. 104 Eve n i n year s o f goo d harves t
Dutch shippin g wa s used extensively to carry Sicilia n grain to Naples
and Geno a and also i n Italian coasta l trad e generally . Ital y was also
dependent o n Dutch shipping to bring wool and salt from Alicante and
La Mata . Generally , th e Dutch-Italia n trad e wa s believe d t o b e
balanced heavil y in favou r o f th e Dutch , wit h Italy' s stoc k o f cash
being drained graduall y into the financing of other Dutc h activitie s in
the same way as Spanish silver.los Th e embargoes of April 1621 were
imposed in the Spanis h viceroyalty of Naples (in area the largest stat e
in Italy) , an d i n Sicily , Sardini a an d th e duch y o f Milan, 106 while
100
Consulta of the junta de comercio, 28 Apr. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2847; consultas,
13 101
Jan. 162 7 and 2 4 May 1628 : A.G.S. Est . 2646.
Elementos para a historia do Municipio d e Lisboa, ed. E. Freiré de Oliveira,
6 vols. (Lisbon , 1882-91) , iii , pp . 154 , 417 , 458 , 525 , 567 , an d iv , p . 145;
Rau, A explorando e o comercio do sal de Setúbal (Lisbon, 1951) 5 pp. 166 , 174.
V. 102
Consulta o f th e Counci l o f State , 2 7 Sept . 1624 : Brit . Lib. , Egerto n
MS.H3I,
103
fos. 288, 290-1.
V. Rau, "Subsidio s pat a o estud o d o moviment o do s portos d e Far o e
Lisboa durant e o sécul o XVII" , Anais d a Academia portuguesa d e historia,
2nd104ser. , v (1954), pp. 219-27.
H. Wátjen , Di e Niederlánder im Mittelmeergebiet zu r Zeit ihrer höchsten
Machstellung (Berlin , 1909) ^ PP - 122-3 , 393 > 398-40 3 í G . Coniglio , / / viceregno
di Napoli en secólo XVII (Rome , 1955), pp. 52 note, no , 12 0 note; C. Trasselli,
"Sul navigli o 'Nórdico' in Sicili a nel secólo XVII", in Homenaje a Jaime Vicens
Vives,
108
2 vols. (Barcelona, 1965-7), ii, pp. 689-702.
Consulta, 6 July 1622 , fo. 5: A.G.S. Est . 2036 . Se e also Antonio Serra ,
Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento dove
non sonó miniere (1613) , repr . i n Scrittori classici italiani d i economía politica,
ed.106
P. Custodi , Parte antica, 7 vols. (Milán, 1803-4), i.
Philip III t o Italian viceroys, 27 Mar. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 1883 ; Brit. Lib.,
Add. MS.18787 , fos. 223v-4-
Genoa, with whic h Spai n ha d clos e ties, and the Papac y wer e sub -
jected to heavy pressure not to deal with the Dutc h i n the matte r of
grain supplies. 107 Th e forc e o f th e Spanis h measure s i n Italy ,
though doubtles s rathe r les s i n overal l impac t tha n i n th e Iberia n
peninsula, wa s nevertheles s considerable . Th e harves t o f 1621- 2
was ba d throughou t Italy , ye t th e Dutc h were , excep t fo r a fe w
specially licensed cases , prevented fro m carryin g supplies to Naples ,
and the y di d no t transpor t Sicilia n grain; Genoa , despite maximum
diplomatic effort i n Madrid, could not obtain Spanis h consent to call
in th e Dutch . Moreover , th e vicero y o f Naples wh o infringed th e
embargoes through fea r o f the consequence s o f food shortag e in th e
largest city in Italy, was rebuked by the king with special seventy and
left in no doubt that in future he had to face riots in the streets rather
than again call in the Dutch. 108 Th e Dutch were certainly cut out of
the carryin g trad e betwee n Spai n an d Italy wit h considerable injur y
to man y Genoes e merchant s wh o ha d hithert o supplie d Ital y wit h
Spanish products usin g Dutch shipping. 10" O f course, the republi c
still had reliable entrepots a t Livorno and Venice; and after 1630 , at
Naples, a s i n Portuga l an d Spain , th e crow n bega n t o issu e grai n
licences t o Dutc h shipper s i n times of food shortage . Nevertheless ,
it is clear that Dutch trade with Italy suffered throug h Spanish action
in a variety of ways and that a substantial number of Dutch ships and
crews, attempting t o trade unde r foreign flags, were seized in Sicil y
and Naple s during the cours e of the war. 110
In norther n Europ e Spanis h power in 162 1 was based principally
on Flanders an d the adjoinin g area s of Germany where Spain main-
tained plazas fuertes (fortifie d strongholds) . I n this region economic
warfare agains t the republi c was waged in two phases, one of which,
a total rive r an d canal blockade, laste d onl y the four year s from 162 5
to 1629 . Befor e an d afte r thes e years only a limited embarg o was in
effect bu t i t nevertheles s deprive d th e Dutc h o f on e o f thei r bes t
customers for shipping in Europe. Wher e Dutch ships had formerly
crowded Flemis h ports , fro m 162 1 t o 164 6 the y wer e almost com -
pletely absen t an d Flemis h merchant s use d Englis h an d Frenc h
shipping.ni Furthermore , not only did they dispense with the Dutch
in their carryin g trade but, knowin g only too well the rigour s of the
107
Philip IV to viceroy of Naples, 22 Jan. 1622 : A.G.S. Est. 1884 .
ios Viceroy o f Naples to Philip IV, 1 7 Mar. an d 2 June 1622 , and vicero y o f
Naples
109
t o Mateo de Aróstegui, 3 Mar. 1622 : A.G.S. Est. 1884 .
Castañeda t o Philip IV, Genoa, 22 June 1624: A.G.S. Est. 1936 ; Castañeda
to Philip
110
IV, 1 4 Oct. 1624 : A.G.S. Est. 2038 .
Castañeda t o Philip IV , 4 Dec. 1624 : A.G.S. Est. 1936 ; viceroy of Sicil y
to Philip IV, 1 4 Sept. 1641: A.G.S. Est. 1893 . Ther e were 11 5 Dutch sailor s
prisoner
111
i n Sicil y i n 1629 : A.R.A. Bis . 56 , fo. 39.
Stols, De Spaanse Brabanders, pp. 121-9 ; J. de Smet, "Le mouvement d e
la navigatio n a u por t d'Ostende , 1640-55" , Bulletin d e l a Commission royale
d'histoire, xciv (1930), pp. 208-14.
almirantazgos) cease d also importing Dutc h clot h an d manufacture s
via the binnenstromen (inland waterways ) for re-export t o the penin -
sula, Spanis h Ital y an d Spanis h America. 112 Fro m 1622 , however,
Spanish ministers in Madrid began working towards something rather
more rigorous . On e o f the mos t vita l sector s o f Dutc h commerc e
was th e export , vi a the inlan d waterways , of immense quantitie s o f
foodstuffs, material s an d manufacture s to th e Spanis h Netherlands ,
Liege and the Cologn e region, and the importing by the sam e routes
of Rhine an d Maa s timber, Flemis h flax and othe r materials . Th e
revenues collecte d b y Isabell a fro m thi s traffi c wer e substantial ,
amounting in 162 3 to over 800,000 florins or 270,000 Spanis h ducats ,
the larges t part fro m th e Maa s comptoirs and about 25 per cen t fro m
the plazas fuertes o n the Germa n routes , especially th e Rhine , Lippe
and Ems;113 understandably, Philip's aunt was reluctant to relinquish
them. Th e pressur e fro m Spai n howeve r wa s suc h tha t i n Jul y
IÓ25114 a full river and canal blockade against the Dutch was put into
effect, whil e i n Octobe r th e republi c replie d t o thi s "insolen t an d
tyrannical edict " wit h thei r ow n ba n o n inlan d trade, 115 a mov e
interpreted in Brussel s as an attempt t o avoid loss of prestige. Th e
Dutch ban was subsequently removed in 1627 in response to domesti c
pressure.
The blockade , contrar y to th e vie w o f Alcalá-Zamora who alleges
that it was ineffective,116 ha d an enormous impact. Fleet s o f barges
were turned back at Antwerp, and on the Maas, Rhine, Ems and other
Flemish an d Germa n waterways. 117 Spanis h claim s tha t wha t
remained o f Zeeland's trad e now collapsed totally, that th e commo n
people o f Hollan d suffere d heavil y fro m th e los s of outlets fo r then *
herring and other produce , an d that Dutc h chees e prices fel l b y hal f
(not to mention one report that Dutch cheese, butter and wine prices
tumbled t o virtuall y nothing) ar e doubtles s rathe r exaggerated , bu t
nevertheless grounded in fact.118 Chees e and butter prices in 1625-6,
while the y ros e sharpl y at Antwer p and Brugge, 119 i n Hollan d col -
lapsed t o almos t thei r lowes t leve l of the seventeent h century , an d
112
113
Stols, op. cit.y p. 161.
Isabella to Phili p IV , Brussels , 18 Apr. 1624 , and enclose d list o f rive r
revenues:
114
A.G.S. Est . 2038.
Anon., Ordinantie ons Heer en des Conincx, inhoudende verbodt vanden
coophandel mette gherebelleerde provintien (Brussels, 29 July 1625; Knuttel 3584);
Aitzema, Va n stoet e n oorlogh, ii , pp . 75-9. Th e ba n wa s impose d o n th e
Scheldt,
115
Maas , Rhine , Lipp e and Ems (at Lingen) and at Groenlo (Grol).
Placcaet of 1 5 Oct . 1625 : A.R.A. archive of the State s Genera l 4947 ii;
A.R.A.
116
adm. 2457, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 1 4 Oct. 1627 .
117
Alcalá-Zamora, España, Flandes y e l Mar de l Norte, pp. 184-6 , 297-9.
118
Consulta, 28 Sept. 1625 : A.G.S. Est. 2039.
La Cuev a to Phili p IV , 1 7 Sept . an d 2 Oct . 1625 : A.G.S . Est . 2315 ;
Analecta
119
Vaticano-Bélgica, 2n d ser., vi, p. 661.
Dokumenten voor d e geschiedenis van prijzen e n lonen i n Vlaanderen e n
Brabant, xv e-xviïie eeuw, ed. C. Verlinden et al., 3 vols. (Brugge , 1959-65) , i ,
PP- 63, 85, 104-5, ii2, and iii, pp. 712, 720, 734-5, 739.
24 Empires an d Entrepots
there wer e sharp fall s als o in wine , herring an d othe r fis h prices. 120
At the same time Flemish flax and fruit and German timbe r an d wine
were held back causing, according to Spanish sources,121 among other
effects a ris e o f 3 0 pe r cen t i n th e cos t o f shipbuildin g timbe r i n
Holland. Ther e wa s als o a tota l ba n o n correspondence , whic h
disrupted muc h o f Antwerp' s insuranc e busines s i n th e republic .
However, th e blockad e was soo n defeate d b y it s ow n drasti c effect .
Food shortage, ruinous price rises and mounting difficulty in supplying
the Spanis h garrison s led in June 1626 to the lifting of the ban on the
importing of butter, cheese, grai n and herring.122 I n othe r respects ,
however, the blockade continued. Spices , wines, sugar, cloth, bricks,
soap and Newcastl e coal were the Dutc h commoditie s most affected ,
while the ban on the Rhine continued to hamper Dutch shipbuilding .
The importin g of sugar from Hollan d via Antwerp, a thriving activity
until 1625 , remaine d a t a mer e fractio n o f it s previou s level. 123
Rhenish win e continue d t o be largely absent fro m Dutch export s t o
northern Europe. 124 Th e rive r blockade , wit h th e exceptio n o f a
special ban on Rhine timber, was finally called off, not in i630, 125 bu t
in April 1629. Th e reaso n was not that the blockade was ineffective,
nor tha t i t annoye d the Germa n princes , thoug h i t di d anno y the m
considerably,126 bu t simpl y tha t i t wa s provin g to o damagin g t o
Flemish commerce, was causing too much discontent in the Souther n
Netherlands, and was depriving Brussel s o f sizeable fund s at a time,
during th e Mantua n Successio n crisi s i n norther n Italy , whe n con -
siderable Spanis h resources wer e being diverte d fro m Flander s an d
120
Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, ii, pp . 262 , 474 , 500 , 708-9 ,
776,
121
807 .
123
La Cueva to Philip IV, 2 Jan. 1626 : A.G.S. Est. 2316 .
A.R.A. adm. 2684, Res. Coll . Zeeland, 20 June 1626; Relazione veneziane :
Venetiaansche berichten over d e Vereenigde Nederlanden van 1600-1795, ed. P . J .
Blok
las
(Rijk s geschiedkundige publicatiën, vii, Th e Hague , 1909), p. 190 .
H. Pohl , "Di e Zuckereinfuh r nac h Antwerpe n durc h portugiesisch e
Kaufleute wáhrend des 80 jahrigen Krieges", Jahrbuch fur Geschichte von Staat,
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas, i v (1967) , pp . 355-8 ; th e article ,
however, gives no explanation as to why sugar importing from Holland collapse d
in 1625
124
.
J. M . Bizière , "The Balti c Wine Trade, 1563-1657" , Scandinavian Econ.
Hist.
126
Rev., xx (1972), pp. 125-32 .
Alcalá-Zamora i s inaccurat e o n this : Alcalá-Zamora , España, Flandes y
el Ma r de l Norte, pp. 297-8. Se e Isabella to Phili p IV , 3 Mar. 1629 : A.G.S.
Est. 2322 ; anon. , Nievwe Liiste va n t' Recht vande Licenten . . . lancx de riviere
van Antwerpen, Sa s van Gendt.. . (Antwerp , Apr . 1629) ; H . H. G. Wouters,
"Het Limburgs e Maasda l gedurend e d e tachtigjarig e e n d e dertigjarig e
oorlog", i n Limburg's verleden: Geschiedenis van Nederlands Limburg to t 1815,
E . C . M . A . Batta e t al, 2 vols. (Maastricht , 1960-7) , ii, p. 200 .
ed.126
Consulta, 1 6 Feb. 1628 : A.G.S. Est. 2328 . Th e liftin g of the river block -
ade was apparently proposed by Olivares, worried at the condition of Flanders,
in January 1629 : consulta, 9 Jan . 1629 , i n Correspondance d e la cour d'Espagne,
ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier , ii, doc . 1334 ; see also Hurtuño de Urizar to Philip
IV, 8 June 1629 : A.G.S. Est. 2322 .
the Brussel s administratio n wa s facin g a n exceptionall y difficul t
financial situation.
In German y th e Spaniard s wer e drive n fro m Wesel , Rheinberg ,
Lingen, Orsoy and their other lower Rhine and Ems bases in the years
1629-34, an( * thereby los t an y remaining capacit y to damag e Dutc h
interests on German waterways . However , besides the north Rhine
region, ther e remained anothe r are a o f German y offerin g importan t
assets t o Spai n i n th e economi c struggl e wit h th e republi c — th e
north Germa n maritim e zone . I n th e year s 1626-9 , durin g whic h
the armie s o f the empero r an d th e Catholi c Leagu e largel y overran
north Germany , Madri d endeavoure d t o establish , i n co-operatio n
with th e empero r an d th e kin g o f Poland , a combine d Spanish -
German navy at Wismar, to be paid for largely by Spain, and intended
to secure northern Germany, dominate the Baltic and impose a measure
of Habsbur g contro l o n th e Balti c trade. 127 Thi s project , wit h it s
obvious danger s fo r the Dutc h republic , collapse d wit h the Swedis h
invasion o f 163 0 an d th e captur e o f the material s an d cas h already
gathered b y Spai n a t Wismar . However , ther e remaine d a les s
grandiose schem e whic h ha d lon g attracte d Spanis h attentio n an d
which was more easily realizable — that o f persuading the Hanseati c
towns t o accep t a measure of Spanis h influenc e in th e regulatio n o f
their trade, while in return filling the vacuum in the carrying trade to
the peninsula lef t b y the departur e of the Dutch . Spai n had to have
Baltic grain, coppe r an d naval stores, an d it woul d clearly constitute
a major gai n were these to be supplied by the Hanseati c towns acting
as rivals to the Dutc h rathe r tha n as their intermediaries. 128 I t was
grasped i n Madri d tha t purel y commercia l factors , suc h a s freigh t
rates and shipping resources , tol d agains t the nort h Germans , but i t
was considered that forging new Spanish-Hanseatic links was precisely
the sort of shift that could be achieved by Spain's unrivalled territorial
and administrativ e power. Th e Hanseati c towns did no t lik e either
the resident s sen t t o them fro m Rander s an d Spai n o r the rigorou s
inspection o f cargoe s b y custom s authoritie s i n th e peninsula , bu t
although friction over certificates an d boarding continued throughou t
the Spanish-Dutc h war , the Hanseati c town s were forced t o accom -
modate themselve s bot h t o th e almirantazgos an d t o th e residents ,
especially wit h th e developmen t o f substantia l Spanish-Danis h
commercial co-operatio n fro m 162 8 onwards. 129 Althoug h i t ha s
been questioned whether the Hanseatic towns managed to increase their
Iberian trad e afte r th e outbrea k o f the Spanish-Dutc h war, 130 i t i s
127
128
Alcalá-Zamora, op. cit.} pp. 267-76 .
129
Consulta, 8 Oct. 1622 : A.G.S. Est. 2036 .
Consulta., 14 May 1628 : A.G.S. Est. 2328 i consulta, i Sept. 1629 : A.G.S.
Est. 2329 ; H . Kellenbenz , Sephardim a n de r unieren Elbe (Wiesbaden , 1958) ,
p. 144
130
.
Christensen, Dutch Trade t o the Baltic, p. 89 .
perfectly clea r tha t excep t fo r Emden , whic h bein g unde r Dutc h
occupation wa s embargoed i n commo n wit h the Dutch, 131 Spanish-
Hanseatic trad e expande d dramatically . Hambur g becam e Spain' s
principal supplier of Baltic product s and organized a massive convo y
system.132 Ove r 50 Hamburg vessels sailed to the peninsula in 1625,
most o f the tonnag e boun d fo r wes t Andalusi a and Portugal . Th e
Hamburg convoys of 1627 and 162 9 were also of over 50 vessels each,
while that of 1633 was of 43; in each case San Lucar was the port most
visited. Lübeck , despit e th e Balti c depressio n o f the 16205 , which
was i n fac t mainl y a Dutc h depression , als o greatl y increase d it s
business with the peninsula, culminating i n the decad e 1630- 9 when
two and a half times as many Lübeck vessels visited the peninsul a as
in th e decad e 1610-19. 133 Lik e Hamburg , an d i n th e fac e o f con -
tinuing Dutch hostility, Lübec k formed its Iberian trade into convoys,
that of 1626 consisting of 17 vessels loaded with grain, masts, ropes and
copper. Muc h o f the Lübec k commerce , however , involved Portu -
guese salt and largely collapsed in the 1640 5 when the Dutch returne d
in force to the Portuguese sal t pans. Othe r nort h German port s that
notably increased their traffic to the peninsula until 1641 were Danish-
controlled Glückstadt , Friedrichstadt , Stettin an d Danzig itself. 134
In genera l the Spanis h measures against the Dutc h ca n be said to
have been on e of the principa l factor s determinin g Dutc h economi c
development — and indeed that of all Europe — in the period 1621-48.
Until 162 1 the Dutc h carrie d Balti c grain chiefl y t o the Iberia n an d
Italian peninsulas . I n the 16205 , while the Hanseatic grai n trade was
thriving, the Dutch Balti c trade entered a severe slump owing at first
largely to Spanish measures, and in h e years 1626-30 to a combination
of Spanis h measure s an d Swedis h actio n agains t Danzi g an d th e
Prussian ports. 135 Fro m 163 0 Du c h Baltic trade revived , aide d by
a ru n o f exceptionall y bad harves t 5 in Portugal , Spai n an d Nort h
Africa but, as has been shown,136 instead of carrying to Lisbon, Seville ,
Valencia and Naples, the Dutch now carried mainly to western France,
especially Bordeaux, from which port the grain was often carried on in
131
182
Consulta s 27 Nov. 1621 : A.G.S. Est. 2645 .
A.R.A. Bis . 53 , fos . 76 V, in ; A.R.A . Bis . 54 , £05.96^97 , 239 , 253 V;
Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte, pp . 61, 63 ; Kellenbenz , Sephardim a n de r
unieren
133
Elbe, p. 144 .
A.R.A. Bis. 53 , fo. ui; W. Vogel, "Beitrag e zur Statistik der deutschen
Seeschiffahrt i m 17 . und 18 . Jahrhundert" , Hansische Geschichtsblatter, xxxii i
(1928),
134
pp. 135-41 .
Consultas of the junta d e estado, 28 Sept. 162 7 and 3 Jan. 1628 : A.G.S.
Est. 2328 ; Kellenbenz , Sephardim a n de r unieren Elbe, p . 144 ; A . Jurgens ,
Zur schleswig-holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte des 16. und ij. Jahrhunderts
(Berlin,
185
1914) , pp. 197 , 203-7.
Bogucka, "Amsterda m an d th e Baltic" , pp . 434-5, 437-8 ; Christensen ,
op.138
cit., pp. 88 , 104, 315-16.
Bogucka, op . cit., pp. 438-9. Boguck a demonstrate s the shift but entirel y
misunderstands th e reaso n fo r it , offerin g th e unconvincin g explanatio n tha t
trade wit h th e Iberia n peninsul a ha d becom e unprofitable .
English an d Frenc h vessels . Onl y fro m 1641 , wit h th e reviva l i n
Dutch-Portuguese trade , wa s Dutch grain-carryin g restore d t o ful l
health. N o les s affecte d tha n grai n wa s salt . I f th e Dutc h wer e
denied Iberian salt, they were also deprived of the Caribbea n supplies
which they ha d bee n exploitin g sporadically since the 15908. 137 I n
1621 the Spaniard s bega n buildin g fort s a t th e Caribbea n sal t pan s
and, i n th e Decembe r o f that year , the firs t convo y of Dutch zout-
voerders (salt-ships ) returne d empt y t o th e Zuide r Ze e fro m th e
Venezuelan coast. 138 B y th e lat e i620 s ver y littl e Caribbea n sal t
was reaching Holland . I t i s true tha t i n shiftin g the focu s o f their
carrying trade from th e peninsula to western France, th e Dutch were
able to obtai n L a Rochell e salt withou t difficulty , excep t durin g th e
sieges of the Hugueno t tow n by the French government , but Frenc h
salt matche d the Iberia n produc t i n neithe r qualit y nor quantity. 139
Salt price s i n Amsterdam , fro m bein g stabl e a t jus t over 5 guilders
per barrel during the truce, rose to over 10 guilders in the periood
1628-34 and did not again falll below 8 guilders untill after the Portu-
guse secession 140 - and all this despite the coollapse of Dutch salt-
carrying to Italy and a marked shrinking in Dutch sal t exports to the
Baltic.141 Th e shar p rise in the pric e of salt in turn affecte d a wide
range o f Dutc h foo d prices. 142 I n addition , a numbe r o f othe r
consequences resulte d fro m France' s replacement of the peninsul a as
Holland's chie f tradin g partne r i n the west , notabl y the virtua l dis-
appearance o f Spanis h an d Portugues e wine s fro m nort h Europea n
markets combine d wit h th e dramati c boo m o f viticultur e i n th e
Bordeaux region. 143 Al l Dutc h merchant s involve d i n Europea n
carrying wer e affecte d b y thes e grea t changes , som e ver y seriously.
One o f th e majo r indicator s o f th e effectivenes s o f th e Spanis h
measures was the setback sustained by the Dutch Jews . Amsterda m
Jewry, a grou p whic h ha d specialize d i n th e Iberia n trade , was,
despite the prominent rol e it played in the trade with western Franc e
and North Africa, so hard hit b y the change s of 162 1 that it was only
after Portugal' s secessio n fro m Spai n that i t began finally to recover.
As lat e a s 164 1 there wer e stil l onl y 89 Jewis h depositor s wit h th e
Amsterdam Wisselbank, as compared with 106 in 1620. 144
Arguably on e of the mos t important consequence s o f the Spanis h
137
138
Goslinga, Th e Dutch in the Caribbean, pp. 126-37 .
139
A.R.A. Bis. 48 ii, fo . 170.
140
Consulta, 12 Sept. 1658 : A.G.S. Est. 2091.
Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, i , pp . 215, 217-18 , an d ii ,
pp.141
291-2, 453, 633, 778.
142
Ghristensen, Dutch Trade t o the Baltic, diagrams 9 and 10 .
143
Posthumus, op. cit., i, p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 500, 658.
144
Bogucka, op. cit.} p. 438; Bizière, "Baltic Wine Trade", pp. 124,127,132.
A.R.A. Bis . 49 i , fos. H3v-ii4v; J. G . van Dillen, "Vreemdelinge n t e
Amsterdam in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw. I, De Portugeesche Joden",
Tijd. Gesch., l (1935), pp. 14-16 .
measures was the setbac k to new drapery production i n Hollan d an d
the general transformation of the Dutch textile industry, accompanied
by the temporar y advanc e of new drapery outpu t i n Flander s an d a
more permanent advanc e in England, and due particularly to loss by
the Dutc h of key markets controlled b y Spain. Unti l about 1621 the
manufacture o f a wid e rang e o f cheap , ligh t draperie s ha d steadil y
developed i n severa l Dutc h town s an d particularl y a t Leiden , th e
centre o f the Dutc h textil e industry . A s with Flemish an d Englis h
new draperie s a larg e par t o f Dutc h productio n wa s destine d fo r
export t o souther n Europ e an d especiall y Andalusi a and Portugal .
Although N . W . Posthumus, th e grea t historian o f the Leide n clot h
industry, assigne d n o rol e t o Spai n i n hi s accoun t o f the declin e o f
Dutch new drapery output afte r i62i, 145 the evidence for the los s of
the territorie s controlle d b y Spai n as textile market s for the Dutc h is
so considerabl e tha t ther e ca n scarcel y b e doub t tha t i t di d indee d
constitute a serious blow. Certainl y in Brussel s it was assumed tha t
Spain ha d inflicte d grea t damag e on Holland' s clot h industrie s and ,
by 1626 , it wa s estimated tha t some 40,000 textile workers had bee n
thrown ou t o f wor k i n th e republi c sinc e 1621 , man y havin g t o g o
abroad i n searc h o f work. 146 Th e correspondin g growt h in outpu t
of similar types of textiles in Flander s an d England strongly suggest s
that as a result o f the Spanis h measure s these rivals were ab'e to take
over what Holland was losing.147 O f course, as it happened, Leide n
managed to compensate for its losses in new draperies by expanding its
production o f old draperies , th e celebrate d lakens whic h wer e mor e
suited t o north Europea n markets; bu t althoug h the overal l value of
textiles produced a t Leiden undoubtedl y increased betwee n 162 1 and
1648 (old draperies being much costlier than new draperies), in term s
of quantity o f cloth produce d an d o f labour required Leide n i n fac t
declined. Durin g th e 1620 5 th e Dutc h als o completel y los t thei r
former prominenc e in the carryin g of Castilian wool from Bilba o and
San Sebastián to northern Europ e — first to the English, then to the
French and , afte r 1630 , once again to the Englis h — and ceased also
to carry such vital dyestufFs as Mexican cochineal, Campeche wood and
Guatemalan indig o fro m Sevill e an d Cádiz ; thes e change s howeve r
were probably much less harmful t o Dutc h industr y than th e los s of
markets. Ver y little Spanish wool was used at Leiden until after 163 5
when the French textile centres of Normandy and Brittany, which had
traditionally use d muc h mor e Spanis h woo l tha n Holland , wer e cut
145
N. W . Posthumus , De geschiedenis va n d e Leidsche lakenindustrie, 3 vols.
(The
148
Hague , 1908-39) , iii, pp . 930-2 if.
147
La Cuev a t o Philip IV, 27 Mar. 1626 : A.G.S. Est. 2316 .
Stols , D e Spaanse Brabanders f pp . 147-50 ; E . Coornaert , L a draperie-
sayetterie d'Hondschoote (Paris , 1930) , pp. 50, 53, 57; P. Deyo n an d A. Lottin,
"Evolution de la production textile á Lille aux XVI e et XVII 6 siècles", Revue
du Nord, xli x (1967), pp. 31-2 .
off fro m thei r supplie s b y th e outbrea k of the Spanish-Frenc h war ,
and Leide n di d not go over to a virtual dependence on Spanish wool
until after 1648 . However , it is noteworthy that the price of Mexican
cochineal o n th e Amsterda m exchang e rose sharpl y i n th e 16205 ,
remained high throughout the wa r and fell steeply again from 164 6 as
the embargoe s began to b e lifted. 148 Indig o price s i n Hollan d rose
likewise as Guatemalan indig o became scarce, thoug h her e the Eas t
India Compan y wa s able t o profi t fro m th e situatio n b y importin g
limited supplie s fro m Asia ; with the return of Guatemalan indigo in
the mi d 16405 , indig o price s i n Amsterda m dropped b y nearl y 50
per cent .
Yet for all the evidenc e that th e Spanis h measures affected Dutc h
interests substantially , fo r various reasons which require explanation,
the Dutc h Republi c wa s not weakene d and the State s Genera l came
nowhere nea r bein g force d t o su e fo r a truc e o n Spanis h terms .
Moreover the war did so much damage to the economies of Spain and
Portugal tha t Spanis h minister s bega n to conside r whethe r th e dis -
advantages of the wa r for Spain were not even greater than what they
continued to regard as the disadvantages of the truce. Alread y before
1621 there had been some disagreement in Madrid as to whether war
or a new truce on Spanish terms was the better alternative; after 162 1
the rang e o f disagreemen t widened . B y 162 3 a smal l junta , con -
sisting of Agustín Messía, Fernando Girón and the bishop of Segovia,
and delegated to assess the contacts being made between Brussels and
The Hague , wa s strongly criticizing the view s of such hard-liners as
the marqué s de Montesclaros, hea d of the junta de comercio, and th e
Cardinal de la Cueva, the chief Spanish minister in Brussels.149 Th e
Dutch were supposedly willing to agree to a new truce on the terms of
1609, plus a few lesser concessions, but would go no further. Montes -
claros and L a Cueva persisted i n maintaining, for all the ruinou s cost
to the king and the collapse of trade, that the previous truce had been
worse tha n th e presen t war . The y eve n hel d tha t i t wa s better t o
suffer militar y setbacks and lose some Flemish towns than settle again
for th e term s o f 1609. 15° Th e bisho p o f Segovi a an d thos e wh o
thought lik e him, b y contrast, considere d that, given the state o f the
finances and the risk of mutiny and other disasters in Flanders, Phili p
had n o choice but t o compromise; the war, they believed, was worse
for Spai n tha n th e previou s truce. Th e matte r wa s decided a t th e
highest level . Philip , guided presumabl y by Olivares , wh o incline d
to th e har d line , pu t a sto p t o th e discussion ; ther e wa s to b e n o
148
Posthumus, Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis, i , pp. 415-16,420-1.
148
Consulta o f th e junt a deliberatin g contact s wit h th e Dutch , 5 Mar. ,
4 and
lío
1 4 July 1623, and junta to Olivares, 5 July 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2147 .
Consulta, 14 Nov. 1623 : A.G.S. Est. 2147 .
settlement on terms close to those of 1609. Majo r concessions by the
Dutch wer e essential. 151
From 162 3 until the start o f the Mantuan Successio n crisis in Italy
in 162 8 the respective Spanish and Dutch stands remained essentially
unchanged. However , the diversio n of Spanish funds an d troops to
Italy in 1628, which very substantially weakened the Spanis h position
in th e Lo w Countries , le d t o a resumptio n o f heavy pressure fro m
moderates i n bot h Madri d an d Brussels . A t the time, the principal
point o f contact betwee n Spanis h an d Dutc h wa s at the talk s bein g
conducted b y official s o f both side s at Roosendaa l in Dutc h Brabant
over a propose d exchang e of prisoners . Isabell a use d the occasio n
to sound out the Dutc h an d met with a somewhat conciliatory initial
response which included some mention of the Scheldt being re-opened
in the event of a new truce being arranged.152 Many , possibly most,
Spanish officials, an d still more Isabella and Spinola , now considered
that the king should quickly come to a settlement. I n the end, afte r
protracted and at times bitter argument in Madrid, the opportunity ,
if suc h i t actuall y was , was allowed to sli p by . Traditionally , thi s
failure t o respon d ha s bee n blame d o n th e allege d monumenta l
inflexibility and blindness to reality of Olivares himself.15 3 Certainl y
he was now personally determining Spanis h policy to a much greater
degree than in the early i62os, but it is by no means clear that he was
acting so imprudently. I t needed considerable courage not to panic in
the circumstances that prevailed in 162 9 when there was a real pros-
pect of the simultaneous collapse of Spanish power both in the Nether-
lands an d nort h Italy . A s the Roosendaa l talks proceeded Olivares
became convinced that the Dutch were not negotiating in earnest, bu t
simply holding ou t bai t as part of thei r schem e for exploiting to th e
utmost an unrivalled opportunity t o weaken Spain.154 Whe n in the
summer of 1629 the Dutch forces lay siege to Den Bosch, the most vital
Spanish fortres s tow n i n nort h Brabant , h e wa s confirme d i n thi s
belief. Olivare s in any case was right in thinking that i n 162 9 Spain
was negotiating from a position of exceptional weakness and that there
was n o reason to thin k that thi s weaknes s would long continue. I f
the European situation, and Olivare s normally looked at matters in a
European perspective , promise d th e Dutc h grea t successes , i t wa s
also on e fraugh t wit h danger s fo r them , owin g t o th e Habsbur g
161
162
Ibid.
Isabella t o Phili p IV , 1 3 Aug. 162 8 and 3 June 1629 : Correspondence d e
la cour d'Espagne, ed . Loncha y an d Cuvelier , ii , docs . 1265 , 1405 ; Aitzema ,
Van staet en oorlogh, ii, pp. 907 ff.; J. Cuvelier, "Les negociation s de Roosendael,
1627-30", in Mélanges d'histoire offerts á Henri Pirenne, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1926) ,
i, pp.
188
73-80.
Cuvelier, op . at., pp. 74 , 78 ; Rodrigue z Villa , Ambrosio Spinola, pp .
480-92.
164
Consulta, 2 June 1629 "voto del conde duque", and consulta, 29 Aug. 1629:
A.G.S. Est . 2043 .
A Conflict of Em p ires 3 1
victories in Germany, the crushing of Denmark, and the occupation of
much of north Germany by Catholic forces. An d indeed, despite the
situation a t De n Bosch , it seeme d highl y probabl e i n 1629 , barring
the unexpected , tha t once Spai n extricated itsel f fro m Italy , i t could
in combination with the emperor have put heavie r pressure than ever
on the republic .
Olivares's assessment that the republic was not in earnest in wanting
a truce in 162 9 was based at least in part o n information sent to him
from Flander s b y Spanis h officials , wh o were following the politica l
situation in the republic and recognized that the Dutch wa r party was
still muc h stronge r tha n th e peac e party. 155 An d i n thi s analysis ,
Olivares's informant s wer e undoubtedl y correct . Thi s continue d
preponderance o f the hard-liners in the United Provinces ma y appear
at first sight to tell against the notion that Spain succeeded i n inflicting
considerable damag e o n th e Dutc h economy . Th e stadhouder
Frederik Hendrik (1625-47) and the military leadership were doubtless
likely to favour wa r because their influenc e wa s much greater i n war
than in peace-time . Bu t this is no answer for, as Spanish observers
saw, th e strengt h o f th e Dutc h wa r part y derive d no t fro m th e
stadhouder, th e arm y or the French , bu t fro m massiv e support fro m
the city administrations and provinces of the republic. War s that are
extremely expensiv e and hav e been several years in progres s are not
normally popular . Moreover , beside s th e genera l evidenc e tha t
Spain di d damag e to the Dutc h economy , it shoul d be noted tha t i t
was widel y realize d i n th e republi c durin g th e 1620 5 tha t Dutc h
trade was contracting under Spanish pressure because, despite various
increases in duties, total customs receipts for Holland failed to increase
while those for severa l parts of the countr y actually fell.156 Beside s
this, the additiona l taxation needed for the wa r was often highl y un -
popular, a s is show n by th e cas e o f the increas e i n 162 4 o f the ta x
on butte r i n Hollan d whic h cause d riot s a t Alkmaar , Haarlem ,
Amsterdam and Enkhuizen and the killing of several burghers by the
troops calle d ou t t o quel l them. 157 Al l this present s th e historia n
with a problem .
Actually, opinion ove r the wa r in the republi c wa s deeply divided
but, for several reasons, those who wished to fight on had the greater
influence a t al l level s o f Dutc h government . Dutc h societ y i n th e
golden age , fo r al l it s confidenc e an d prosperity , wa s racke d with
tensions. Th e republi c ha d a fa r large r Catholi c minorit y tha n
15S
Pedro d e Sa n Jua n t o Olivares , 3 0 Aug . 1629 , an d Jua n Boberi o t o
Olivares,
168
13 Noy. 1629 : A.G.S. Est. 2322 .
A.R.A. Bis. 54 , fos. 93~94 V; de Jonge, Nederlandische Zeewesen, i, p. 240;
Snapper,
187
Oorlogsirvuloeden, pp. 70-1 , 73.
La Cuev a t o Philip IV, 1 5 June 1624 , and "avisos de Amsterdam", 3 and
10 June 1624: A.G.S. Fst. 2314 ; see also La Cueva t o Philip IV, 1 6 Apr. 1626 :
A.G.S. Est. 2316 .
England an d this minority , estimate d a t 40,000 in Amsterdam alone,
considered pro-Spanis h an d suspecte d o f collusio n i n th e fal l o f
Amersfoort t o th e Spaniard s i n 1629 , wa s rigorously exclude d fro m
any part i n th e politica l process. 158 Also , th e Protestan t majorit y
was i n tur n sharpl y spli t betwee n Remonstrant s an d Counter -
Remonstrants.159 Sinc e th e overthro w o f Oldenbarneveld t i n 161 8
most city councils in the republic ha d been linked with the staunchly
Calvinist Counter-Remonstran t part y an d associate d politically with
the stadhouder. A t the sam e time faction s oppose d t o the Counter -
Remonstrants remaine d activ e and , wit h th e suppor t o f man y who
opposed th e war , gathered strength , particularly i n Holland . Sinc e
the Counter-Remonstrants , a dominan t bu t threatene d group , ha d
always presente d themselve s a s the patrioti c part y an d preache d th e
necessity of war with Spain , Dutc h loca l government wa s in effec t i n
the hand s of an embattled faction , representative o f only a section of
Dutch societ y an d strongl y incline d t o continu e th e wa r fo r loca l
political an d religiou s reasons . Th e mor e thos e oppose d t o th e
Counter-Remonstrants spok e o f the nee d fo r a truce , th e mor e th e
latter sough t t o overwhel m their opponent s wit h vote s an d printe d
propaganda advocating war.
This however is only part o f the answer . Fo r whateve r the ideo -
logical stand o f the Counter-Remonstrants , the y coul d surel y not for
so lon g hav e dominate d enoug h cit y administrations , an d therefor e
the provincia l states , ha d the y no t ha d th e assistanc e of importan t
economic force s an d effectiv e economi c propaganda . Curiously ,
it wa s maintained b y the Dutc h wa r party wit h onl y somewhat less
persistence tha n i t was in Madri d tha t th e truc e o f 160 9 had bee n a
disaster fo r thei r trad e and , lik e Montesclaro s an d L a Cueva , the y
argued that whateve r the disadvantage s of the war , the situatio n was
nevertheless stil l bette r tha n tha t o f th e truce. 160 Th e Counter -
Remonstrants claime d tha t severa l regions , notabl y Zeeland , ha d
declined durin g the truce , implie d an d sometimes openl y stated tha t
it wa s actuall y bette r fo r Dutchme n t o d o withou t trad e t o th e
peninsula, and held that in any case the war had not adversely affected
the commo n man . And , indeed , Zeelan d ha d stagnate d durin g th e
truce. I t i s true, of course, that Zeeland' s trad e dwindled still more
after 162 1 and that everyone in Zeeland knew it: the State s of Zeeland
declared in the State s Genera l i n 162 7 that its customs revenues had
158
Anakcta Vaticano-Bélgica, 2nd ser., v, p. 162 . Gey l mentions an estimat e
that one quarter of the population o f Holland was Catholic in 1624 and one third
that of Friesland an d Groningen: Geyl, Netherlands Divided^ p . 144 .
of 169
Aitzema, op. cit.s ii, p. 919, and iii, pp. 54-60; the Counter-Remonstran t
war party dominate d mos t completel y in Frieslan d an d Zeeland .
i«o Wiiiem Usselincx , Waerschouwinge over den Treves ... (Flushing, 1630 ;
Knuttel 4016) ; Resolutie ... der Stadt Aherlem, pp. 8-9 , 14 ; anon. , Klare
Aenwijsinge dat de vereenigde Nederlanden gheen Treves met den Vyandt dienen te
maecken (The Hague , 1630; Knuttel 4014) , pp. 8 if.
fallen ever y yea r sinc e 161 6 owin g t o Spanis h action. 161 Bu t thi s
did not lessen in the slightest Zeeland' s fierce support for the Counter-
Remonstrants an d th e war . O n th e contrar y th e wa r wa s regarded
as the salvatio n of Zeeland, for the fund s an d seame n of Middelbur g
and Flushing , drive n fro m loca l an d Europea n trade , foun d ne w
opportunities i n the West India Company, itself bor n of war, and th e
privateering, chiefl y a t Portuguese expense , whic h was supported b y
the Company . Thi s crucia l shift , a frequent them e o f La Cueva' s
reports t o Madrid, 162 made Zeeland the staunches t supporter among
the seve n province s o f the Wes t Indi a Compan y an d wa s the mos t
dramatic instance of several investment and employment shifts withi n
the Dutc h econom y which favoured the wa r party. Th e Eas t Indi a
Company, like the West India Company , strongly opposed peace with
Spain, even after the secessio n o f Portugal,1** not only in the hope of
acquiring additional Portugues e possession s in Asia, but becaus e the
slump a t home favoured it b y causing a flow of cash from Europea n
into colonia l commerce . Th e othe r majo r beneficiar y o f th e war ,
and therefor e o f th e slum p i n Europea n trade , industr y an d th e
fisheries, wa s Dutc h agriculture . I f Spanis h minister s wer e right ,
as surel y the y were , tha t th e expor t o f foodstuff s vi a th e binnen-
stromen was of vital importance t o the Dutch, it cannot be denied that
the war increased this importance — except briefly in the years 1625-6.
The Dutc h an d Spanis h armies , b y fa r th e larges t an d mos t costl y
armies i n Europe , encampe d clos e togethe r i n fixed positions alon g
the canals and rivers of the Lo w Countries and north-west Germany ,
did no t pilfe r thei r foo d i n th e styl e o f th e armie s i n th e res t o f
Germany. The y represented a fixed and strong demand and paid in
cash. Th e hug e sums spent on the food supplie s of the Dutch force s
may b e viewe d a s a subsid y paid b y th e Dutc h maritim e town s t o
inland agriculture , whil e expenditure o n the Spanis h forces wa s also
in a sense payment by the non-nobl e populac e of Castile and Naples
to th e Dutc h farmers . I n thi s respec t th e Counter-Remonstrant s
were right to argue that their war by no means injured the commo n
man.
After th e failur e o f th e Roosendaa l talk s th e characte r o f th e
Spanish-Dutch struggl e wa s soo n considerabl y change d b y events .
In 1630 , strengthened b y the captur e o f the Mexica n silver flee t i n
1628, West Indi a Compan y forces gained thei r firs t substantia l foot-
hold i n th e America s — the Pernambuc o region o f northern Brazil .
141
A.R.A. Bis . 54 3 fo . 94; L a Cuev a t o Phili p IV , 1 8 Oct . 1627 : A.G.S .
Est. 2319 .
"» La Cuev a t o Phili p IV , 1 5 Jan . an d 4 Feb . 1627 : A.G.S . Est . 2318 ;
La161
Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Mar. 1628 : A.G.S. Est. 2321 .
Aitzema, Va n stoet e n oorlogh, vi, p. 87. A s it happens , th e en d o f th e
Spanish-Dutch war and th e reviva l of Dutch trad e wit h Spai n from 164 7 di d
in fact coincide wit h a remarkable loss of momentum in the development of the
East Indi a Company : Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 16 .
In 163 2 Frederi k Hendri k launche d th e mos t successfu l Dutc h
offensive o f the wa r a t home , capturin g Venlo , Roermond , Sittard ,
Maastricht an d Limbur g i n rapi d succession . Wit h thi s break -
through in the Maas valley Spanis h power in Flanders , severely cur -
tailed b y th e lo w leve l o f remittance s fro m Spai n followin g th e
Mantuan war , th e los s o f th e silve r fleet , an d th e crushin g o f
Habsburg forces in Germany in the unexpected forc e of the Swedish
invasion, came close to collapse. A wave of revulsion against the war
swept the Souther n Netherlands , and Isabella, in her panic and much
to the displeasur e of Philip I V and Olivares, 16* gave way to pressure
to conven e th e previousl y almos t defunc t State s Genera l o f th e
southern provinces . Th e representative s o f the souther n province s
at onc e opene d negotiation s wit h th e Dutc h State s General , thu s
initiating th e mos t publi c and forma l o f the variou s rounds of talks
that too k plac e durin g th e conflict , thos e o f 1632-4 . Th e Dutch ,
seemingly on the verg e of massive victories, were understandably i n
no moo d t o offe r anythin g t o Spain. 1*6 I n retur n fo r a truc e th e
Dutch State s Genera l demande d th e tota l withdrawa l o f Spanis h
forces fro m th e Lo w Countrie s an d north-wes t Germany , th e con -
tinued closure of the Scheldt, the restitution o f Breda, the annexatio n
of all the places captured by the Dutch plus those parts of the hinter-
land of Den Bosch still occupied by Spain, the status quo in the Indies
east an d west , numerou s tarif f concession s an d suc h freedo m o f
movement an d privat e religiou s practic e fo r Jewis h subjects of th e
republic in the Spanis h territories a s Dutch Protestant s woul d enjoy.
This, o f course , wa s a n openin g positio n an d th e Dutc h wer e
prepared to yield somewhat on certain points. 1SS Nevertheless , eve n
the most conciliatory Flemish delegate s were appalled by the vast gulf
that no w existe d betwee n th e tw o sides . Olivare s wa s thoroughly
disgusted wit h the whol e affair. 187 H e wa s totally opposed even to
considering the Dutch terms, whether regarding Europe or the Indies.
Besides looking on the talks as disreputable, originatin g as they did in
circumstances verging on rebellion against the crown, he regarded the
Dutch ambition s for territory o n the Maa s and Rhine , a s well as i n
Brazil, as incompatible with the essential interests o f Spam which he,
in distinction perhaps toother Spanish ministers, saw as being strategic
as much as economic and colonial . Th e Dutc h no w held almos t all
the Maas and lower Rhine crossings formerly possessed by Spain and ,
in Olivares's view, unless Spai n recovered the majo r Maa s crossings ,
especially Venlo and Maastricht, an d at least one key Rhine crossing ,
"*
195
Consulta, 2 Mar. 1633 : A.G.S. Est. 2151 .
M. G . d e Boer , Di e Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien una den
Niederlanden i n den Jahren 1632 und 1633 (Groningen, 1898), pp. 66-8 .
"•
147
Ibid., p. 90.
Consulta^ 2 9 May 163 3 "vot o d e Olivares" , and consulta, 16 Jun e 163 3
"voto del sr conde duque" (drafts): A.G.S . Est. 2151 .
preferably Rheinberg (the "whore of war")» Flanders woul d no longer
serve as a viable base, or plaza de armas, for Spanish power in norther n
Europe.168 Deprive d of all her Maa s and Rhine strongholds, Spai n
in Flanders , a s th e conde-duqu e subsequentl y pu t it , woul d b e
"locked i n a cage". 169 T o secur e a Spanish-Dutc h compromis e a t
this time , Olivare s wa s prepared t o offe r th e Dutc h Breda , Steven -
sweert, on e million ducat s an d concession s i n th e suga r marke t a t
Lisbon i n retur n fo r northern Brazil , the disbandmen t o f th e West
India Company , an d Venlo , Maastrich t an d Rheinberg , i t bein g
understood tha t th e Dutc h woul d kee p thei r othe r conquests. 170
But as matters stood he saw that there wa s not the slightest chance of
the Dutc h acceptin g thes e terms . Mos t o f th e conde-duque' s
colleagues i n Madri d wer e a s indignan t a s h e wa s a t th e Dutc h
"condiciones indecentes" , as they were termed b y the duk e of Alva,
most of all that regarding the Jews,171 and when the Dutch suggested,
in view of the impasse reached concerning the Indies, that the proposed
truce relat e t o Europ e only, leaving the wa r to continu e i n Asia and
the Americas , the indignation sprea d to the council s of Portugal and
the Indies. 172 I t wa s consequently , despit e th e no w catastrophi c
condition o f bot h arm y an d finances , muc h easie r fo r th e conde -
duque t o flin g bac k th e Dutc h term s i n 163 4 tha n i t ha d bee n i n
1629.
With th e breakdow n of th e talk s o f 1632-4 , continue d Spanis h
weakness in Flanders an d Swedis h success in Germany , it seemed to
Olivares tha t wha t was now neede d wa s a majo r effor t b y Spai n to
swing the Europea n balance of power back in her favour. Onl y thus
could Spai n wrest reasonable terms fro m th e republic . Fo r several
years heavie r taxes ha d bee n levie d in Castile , Portuga l an d Naple s
and, b y Septembe r 1634 , Spanis h ministers wer e planning to spend
the enormous sum of 5 ^ million ducats i n Flanders — that is, agains t
the Dutc h — i n 1635 . Th e sendin g o f Ferdinand , th e cardinal -
infante, t o th e Spanis h Netherlands , becaus e of his exploit s agains t
the Swede s in German y in 163 4 during the marc h from Milan , an d
the subsequen t outbrea k o f war between Franc e an d Spai n in Ma y
1635, has never been sufficiently recognize d as being a move intended,
essentially, to swing the balance against the Dutch. I t has even been
written, quite erroneously, that whe n the Spanish-Frenc h wa r began
in 1635 , the "war against the Dutch wa s at once abandoned".173 I n
"• "Voto del conde-duque", 1 6 Oct. 163 3 (draft): A.G.S. Est . 2151 .
"• Olivares to the cardinal-infante, 1 5 Dec. 1636: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek
(hereafter
170
B.S.) , MS. cod . hisp.
or
22, fo. 33V.
"El cond e duqu e m i s sobre l a tregua" (undate d 1633 , draft) : A.G.S.
Est.1712151 .
171
Consulta, 16 Mar. 1634 : A.G.S. Est. 2048.
173
Constata of the Counci l o f the Indies, 4 Mar. 1634 : A.G.S. Est. 2150 .
G. Parker , "Spain , He r Enemie s an d th e Revol t o f th e Netherlands ,
1559-1648", Past and Present, no. 49 (Nov. 1970) , p. 92.
factj n o sooner wa s the Frenc h invasion of Flanders in 163 5 repulsed
than Ferdinand, aided by a diversion of Dutch forces due to a success-
ful surpris e attac k o n Schenkenschan s i n July , invade d Dutch -
occupied territor y wit h 26,00 0 me n capturin g Goch , Cleve s an d
Gennep, whil e another Spanis h forc e retoo k Limburg. 174
The Spanis h offensive of 1635 against the Dutch, though a departure
from th e concep t o f guerra defensiva o f 1625-34 , wa s nevertheles s
consistent with the strategic maxims formulated i n Madrid i n 1622- 4
in that Ferdinand, attacking where he could penetrate quickly , while
still posin g a threat , nevertheles s studiousl y avoide d besiegin g an y
well-fortified towns . Th e takin g of Schenkenschans on the Gelder -
land border, an unexpected strok e of luck, breached the entire Dutc h
defensive syste m i n th e east , openin g a n eas y route , nort h o f th e
rivers, int o th e hear t o f th e republic . Th e even t cause d disma y
throughout the United Province s and so elated the conde-duque that,
with his usual extravagance of phrase , h e assured Ferdinan d that , in
holding Schenkenschans , h e coul d no t wi n mor e glor y wer e h e t o
capture Pari s o r Th e Hague. 175 Th e purpos e o f the offensiv e wa s
made clea r whe n Ferdinan d entere d int o ne w truce talk s wit h th e
Dutch at Kranenburg in the duchy of Cleves. I n line with Olivares's
aspirations Spain demanded Venlo, Maastricht, Rheinber g and Dutch
withdrawal fro m th e Americas , offerin g i n retur n Schenkenschans ,
Goch, Gennep, Cleves, Bred a and a large cash sum. 176 Onc e again ,
the talk s broke down.
To Olivares the capture of Schenkenschans signified no t just a vital
breach i n th e Dutc h defence s bu t als o th e chanc e t o fortif y a lin e
running fro m Eindhove n vi a Helmon d an d Genne p t o th e Rhine ,
which woul d undoubtedly hav e prove d extremel y dangerous for th e
Dutch an d woul d hav e virtually cu t of f Venlo and Maastrich t fro m
the rest of Dutch-occupied territory. 177 Althoug h in 1636 the conde -
duque and his colleagues gave priority to the French front , there was
a great reluctance to do so. Remarkabl y enough, the start of the war
with Franc e coincide d wit h a completely new phase in the Spanish -
Dutch wa r i n whic h Spai n fo r th e firs t tim e sinc e 162 2 resume d
174
Cardinal-infante t o Philip IV, 24 Dec. 1635 : A.G.S. Est. 2050 ; A . Wad-
dington, L a r¿publique de s Provinces-Unies, la France e t le s Pays-Bos espagnoh
de 178
1630 á 1650, 2 vols. (Paris, 1895-7), i> PP- 272-3.
Olivares to th e cardinal-infante , 1 4 Mar . 1636 : B.S . MS . cod . hisp . 22,
fo. 12 ; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14007 , fos. 53 V, 57-60; F . H . Westermann , Rück-
blick auf die Geschichte des Herzogthums Cleve ... vom Jahre 1609 bis 1666
(Wesel,
178
1830), pp. 189-90 .
Cardinal-infante t o Philip IV, Gennep, n Oct . 1635 : A.G.S. Est. 2050 ;
Martin d e Axpe to the cardinal-infante , Kranenburg , 27 Oct. 1635 : Correspon-
dance d e la cour d'Espagne, ed . Loncha y an d Cuvelier , iii , doc . 219 ; Aitzema,
Van staet en oorlogh, iv, pp. 223-4 .
177
"El cond e duqu e sobr e lo s punto s principale s de l ultim o despach o d e
Flandes", 1 9 Sept . 1635 : A.G.S. Est . 2153 ; consulta, 1 6 Nov. 163 5 "vot o de l
conde duque" : Á.G.S. Est. 2153 .
deliberate use of the arm y of Flanders as a major mean s of squeezing
the Unite d Provinces . I n th e year s 1635-9 , i n bot h Flander s an d
Madridj there took plac e a continuing strategi c debat e a s to whether
it wa s in principl e bette r fo r Spai n t o direc t he r mai n effort agains t
France or the republic and, in general, there was a marked preference
for concentratin g agains t the latter. 178 I t wa s argued that although
it was easier to invade France and take French towns than to penetrate
Dutch territory , ther e wa s little t o b e gaine d b y doin g so. I t wa s
thought tha t Spain' s bes t prospec t fo r breakin g th e Franco-Dutc h
alliance wa s to maintai n the pressur e that ha d bee n kep t u p fo r s o
long an d us e th e exceptionall y larg e fund s availabl e in th e year s
1635-8 to gain the additiona l bargainin g counters neede d to secur e a
satisfactory settlemen t wit h th e republic . However , thi s genera l
preference wa s partially checked by the fea r o f leaving France with a
free han d and , i n particular , th e ris k o f a French invasion o f Italy .
Thus the Spanis h invasio n of France fro m Flander s i n 1636 , which
caused suc h pani c i n Paris , wa s nothin g mor e tha n a short-ter m
preventive strik e which , i n Madrid , wa s considered b y n o means as
important strategically as holding the gains made at the expense of the
Dutch i n 1635 . Whe n Ferdinand , a s a resul t o f the effor t agains t
France, nevertheles s los t Schenkenschan s in Apri l 163 6 there wa s a
great storm of anger and dismay in Spain , includin g on e of the wors t
rages of Olivares's entir e career. 17"
In 1637 , however , th e Dutc h theatr e o f wa r wa s once agai n th e
centre of operations and, although Ferdinand was too slow to prevent
Frederik Hendrik' s encirclement o f Breda and the subsequen t loss of
the town, he did break the Dutch line in the Maas valley, recapturing
Venlo an d Roermon d an d isolatin g Maastricht ; despit e thi s h e was
rebuked in Madrid bot h for the loss of Breda and for not penetrating
further an d layin g sieg e t o Grav e o r Nijmegen. 180 Th e offensiv e
of 163 7 wa s the fina l attemp t o n lan d t o acquir e more bargainin g
pieces from th e Dutch . Th e los s of Breda also put a n end to plan s
for initiating a new phase of amphibious warfare, using heavily armed
barges on the canal s running nort h fro m Breda . I n th e thre e years
1635-7 Spai n had spen t ove r 15 million ducats in Flander s with only
modest gains, an d ye t th e fund s availabl e for offensive actio n against
the Dutc h a s a result o f the increased taxation in the peninsul a were
not yet exhausted.m Th e stalling of the offensive on land was due to
178
Consultas, 8 3 25 an d 2 6 Feb . 1637 : A.G.S . Est . 2051 ; consulta, j Oct .
1637: A.G.S. Est. 2052; consulta of the junta de estado, 7 Mar. 1638: A.G.S. Est.
2053.
"•Consulta, 1 7 Jun e 1636 : A.G.S . Est . 205 1 i B.S . MS . cod . hisp . 22 ,
fos.180I7 V-I9V.
181
Consulta, 7 Oct. 163 7 "voto delVconde duque" : A.G.S. Est . 2052 .
B.S. MS. cod . hisp. 22, fos. 30 , 4iv; officially, th e cardinal-infant e was
receiving 500,000 ducats monthly durin g the firs t hal f of 1638.
the increasin g co-ordinatio n o f th e Frenc h an d Dutc h attack s o n
Flanders an d th e mountin g difficult y o f supplyin g th e Souther n
Netherlands wit h Spanis h an d Italia n troops , especiall y afte r th e
capture of Breisach by the French in 1638 which effectively close d the
Rhine rout e t o Spain . Th e las t phas e o f the Spanis h offensiv e t o
end the Dutch war consequently took place at sea. I n 163 9 two large
armadas were dispatched fro m Spain , one to Brazil to try t o end th e
most troublesom e o f Spanish-Dutc h embroilment s i n th e colonia l
sphere by recapturing Pernambuco , and the othe r t o the Channe l t o
force supplie s throug h t o Flander s an d challeng e th e Dutc h t o a
decisive battl e fo r supremac y at sea . Bot h initiatives failed utterly ,
with the battle of the Downs ending in a major disaster for Spain with
32 warships destroyed by the Dutch under Admiral Tromp.182 Th e
losses involve d in th e tw o setbacks , nava l and financial , wer e over-
whelming. Fro m 163 9 Spai n neither did , nor could , endeavour any
longer t o acquir e gain s fro m th e Dutc h b y forc e and , weakene d
further b y th e paralysin g effec t o f th e revol t o f Cataloni a an d th e
breakaway o f Portugal, bot h i n 1640 , wa s reduced t o th e rol e o f a
shattered power striving only to keep what it still held against superior
forces. I n 164 1 Portugues e Brazi l followe d Portuga l itsel f an d
severed its links with Spain.
The los s o f southern Brazil , an d wit h it al l prospect o f recovering
any part of the territory, was actually much less decisive in determining
Spanish-Dutch relation s i n th e 1640 5 tha n on e migh t suppose .
Brazil had, of course, been the single most difficult poin t of contention
in the variou s negotiations of the 1630 5 and, in the long run, it s loss
cleared th e pat h t o peac e b y makin g plausible th e exclusio n o f th e
Dutch fro m Spanis h Americ a withou t deprivin g th e Wes t Indi a
Company of all raison d'etre. Bu t in the mediu m term, as was soon
realized i n Madrid, 183 th e implication s o f th e los s o f Brazi l fo r
Spanish-Dutch relations were not particularly auspicious . Th e Wes t
India Compan y itself, contemplating a reduced Spai n and seemingly
an eas y task fo r itsel f i n Brazil , no w ha d les s reaso n tha n eve r fo r
agreeing to relinquish it s other America n ambitions, an d was indeed
far fro m doin g so as is shown by the sending of th e expedition unde r
Hendrik Brouwe r t o Chil e i n 1643 . I n an y cas e th e cru x o f th e
problem la y not i n th e Indie s bu t i n th e Unite d Provinces , wher e
Frederik Hendrik and the war party were still dominant and , aided by
French mone y and influence, had every intention o f keeping the war
in progress. Th e stadhouder, despite considerabl e ill-health, showed
a continuin g zes t for leading the Dutc h force s an d conquerin g more
Flemish territory which , indeed, the recent collapse of Spanish power
188
183
Alcalá-Zamora, España, Flandesy e l Mar de l None, pp. 429-34.
J. J . Poelhekke , D e Vrede va n Munster (Th e Hague , 1948), appendix iv,
PP- 547-51-
promised t o facilitate . I n th e cit y administrations , thoug h losin g
ground i n Holland , th e Counter-Remonstrant s stil l ha d th e uppe r
hand. Moreover , ther e ca n be littl e doub t tha t Spanis h minister s
were correct in their somewha t pessimistic forecast. Indeed , opposi -
tion t o a Spanish peac e in the republic , despit e a wavering Holland,
remained s o stron g afte r 164 1 that , despit e enormou s effort s b y
Madrid, Brussel s an d thos e i n th e Unite d Province s wh o wanted
peace, there wa s no significan t breakthroug h i n the Spanish-Dutc h
talks at Munster unti l th e winte r of 1645-6."*
The breakthrough, whe n it came, took place essentially because of a
crucial shif t i n th e balanc e o f politica l force s withi n th e republi c
which substantially increased the power of those interests involved in
European commerce. Althoug h the resurgence of Dutch-Portuguese
trade fro m 164 1 made good one of the principa l setbacks that Dutc h
commerce ha d suffere d fro m th e Spanis h economi c measures , th e
embargoes an d th e Dunkirker s continue d t o registe r a substantia l
effect which, it may be argued, in the gradually changing circumstances
of Dutc h domesti c politic s i n th e 1640 5 actuall y produced bette r
results fo r Spai n tha n durin g th e year s whe n th e embargoe s ha d
included Portugal . Th e Dutc h continue d t o b e shu t ou t o f every
Spanish por t excep t insurgen t Barcelona , an d als o ou t o f souther n
Italy an d Flanders . Th e effectivenes s o f th e Dunkirker s agains t
Dutch merchantme n an d fishing fleets alike, especiall y in th e years
1641-3 when very heavy losses were suffered b y the Dutch, was such
that Dutc h marin e insuranc e an d freigh t rate s no w reache d thei r
highest level s o f th e entir e war. 185 A t th e sam e time th e flo w o f
capital from Europea n into colonial commerce, which had served the
Dutch wa r part y s o wel l in th e 1620 5 an d 16305 , no w completel y
ceased and , indeed , move d strongl y back . B y 164 1 Wes t Indi a
Company share s wer e already losing value as it becam e clearer tha t
judged a s a commercia l enterpris e th e compan y made n o sense : i t
had t o figh t bot h Spaniard s an d Portugues e t o mak e its way , and
colonial warfare was so costly that it could make no profit. However ,
after 1641 , responding t o the failure either to complete the conques t
of Brazil or to reduce military spendin g there , and the Chilean fiasco,
the company' s share s began to fall muc h faster, so that b y 164 5 they
stood a t wel l under hal f the value they had held in i64O, m and th e
company carried a mere fraction o f the political weight in the Unite d
Provinces tha t i t ha d don e formerly . Elsewher e o n th e Dutc h
181
Consulta of the junta d e estado, 3 June 1646: A.G.S. Est. 2065 ; Colección
de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, ed . M . Fernánde z Navarrete
et al.,
18Í
112 vols. (Madrid, 1842-95), Ixxxii, pp. 317, 331-45.
Aitzema, Va n stoet e n oorlogh, v, pp . 360-1, an d vi , p. 216; Schreiner ,
"Die Niederlánde r un d di e norwegisch e Holzausfuh r i m 17 . Jahrhundert" ,
p. 324
18
-
• Goslinga, Th e Dutch in the Caribbean, p. 509 .
political scen e th e othe r champion s o f war were also losing ground .
The hard-lin e Counter-Remonstrant s wer e virtuall y stripped o f all
power i n th e tow n council s o f Holland, an d interest s hostil e t o th e
ambitions of the stadhouder an d intent o n promoting European trade
began to become more assertive.187 Th e contentio n of the war party
that Spai n in Flanders was a continuing threat to Dutch security was
increasingly countered by pointing out that Franc e in Flanders would
now be an even graver threat. Fo r a time Frederik Hendri k an d th e
army pressed on with their campaigns, recapturing Gennep after a hard
siege in 1641 and, in 1644 and 164 5 after fighting through a formidable
complex of canals and forts , th e stadhouder conquered , muc h to th e
advantage of Zeeland, the town s and district s of Sass van Ghent an d
Hulst i n Flanders . Hulst , however, wa s the las t campaign . Fro m
1645 Hollan d refuse d an y longe r t o provid e funds fo r th e wa r and ,
since Hollan d wit h its great wealt h supplied more than the othe r si x
provinces put together , this brough t th e arm y t o a complete halt .
Peace was finally forced through in the years 1646-8, almost entirely
owing to the pressure of the great commercial centres of Holland and
against continuing strong resistance — especially in devoutly Calvinist
Friesland, i n Utrech t wher e the nobilit y wa s influential and closel y
linked with the stadhouder, and above all in Zeelan d which fought to
the last to keep the wa r alive.188 Eve n after th e signing of the treaty
of Munster , formall y endin g th e twenty-seve n yea r war , th e issu e
was far from dead. "Thos e of Amsterdam", Spain' s first ambassador
to the republic informed Philip I V in 1649, "are ou r best friends an d
those wh o contributed mos t t o the peace and who contribute stil l t o
maintain it despite the wishes of other towns".m Amsterda m more-
over soo n obtaine d it s reward . Trad e betwee n Spai n an d Hollan d
flowered s o rapidl y fro m 1647 , a s th e carryin g trad e o f Holland' s
competitors t o Spain , Flander s an d souther n Ital y slumped , that i t
was soo n onc e agai n a key elemen t i n Dutc h Europea n commerce .
Indeed, in som e respects, suc h a s the greate r dependenc e of Dutc h
textile manufacturin g o n Spanis h wool , Spanish-Dutc h economi c
relations in the year s after 164 7 were closer than they had ever been .
Before long it was again the cas e that when Spanish ministers viewe d
with alar m the outflo w o f silver fro m Spai n t o norther n Europ e i n
payment fo r import s o f foo d an d manufactures , wha t preoccupie d
them almos t exclusively was its movement to Holland. 190
The struggl e of 1621-48, obviously, was essentially a victory for th e
United Provinces , yet i n man y ways the treat y of Munster wa s less
is
198
r Geyl, Netherlands Divided, pp. 139-40 .
10
Poelhekke, De Vrede va n Munster, pp. 515-17 , 529 .
Brun to Philip IV , 2 7 Aug. 1649 , an d consulta, 15 Sept . 1650 : A.G.S .
Est.1902070 .
Consulta, 26 Dec. 1649 : A.G.S. Est. 2070 ; consulta, 5 Feb. 1650 : A.G.S.
Est. 2072 ; consulta, 24 Aug. 1656 : A.G.S. Est. 2088 .
41
A Conflict of Empires
an ending tha n a turning-point i n the Spanish-Dutc h confrontation
as it had begun to develop since the time of the Twelve Years Truce.
Spain ha d gon e to wa r to weake n the republi c in orde r to solv e th e
problems pose d b y increasin g Dutc h influenc e bot h economi c an d
political. I n fact, as a result of the conflict, as well as of other factors ,
it wa s Spain that wa s weakened. Nevertheles s Spai n remained th e
centre o f a large empire of crucial importance in international affair s
and trade, and many of the specific problems that had arisen during the
truce wer e t o reappea r afte r th e treat y o f Munster . Th e Dutc h
largely dominated commerc e with Spain itself an d became by far th e
leading Europea n interlope r i n Spanis h America , especiall y a t
Cartagena and Buenos Aires.191 Furthermor e i t was more important
than eve r for Spain , increasingl y threatened b y th e risin g powe r of
France an d England , t o preven t th e republi c fro m reinforcin g he r
enemies. I n 162 1 Madri d ha d sough t a solution throug h war ; th e
solution that was attempted fro m 164 8 onwards was to try t o forge a
special politica l relationshi p wit h th e Unite d Provinces , bot h a s a
counterweight t o Franc e an d England , whic h Spanis h minister s
claimed wer e a threat t o th e well-bein g o f the republi c a s well as to
Spain (a s indeed they were) , an d also to provid e th e politica l mean s
with which to moderate the forc e of Dutch economi c penetration.192
Although most of the point s in disput e a t Munster ha d been settle d
in favour of the republic, wit h Dutch Catholics remaining without the
right o f publi c worship , th e Scheld t stayin g close d an d th e Dutc h
keeping thei r conquests , ther e ha d been one solid Spanis h gain: th e
republic formally acknowledged and accepted the total exclusion of its
subjects from al l the territories o f Spain in the Indies. 193 Fro m this
starting-point Spanis h ministers started o n a new path afte r 164 8 to
obtain b y pressur e an d agreemen t a series of furthe r concession s i n
commerce and navigation, 194 t o kee p constant chec k on the working
of these agreement s b y means of Spanis h representatives and agent s
in Holland , an d t o secur e the co-operatio n o f the State s Genera l i n
their implementatio n by every political means at Philip IV's disposal.
In this way, after 1648 , relations with the Dutc h Republi c continued
to b e a majo r pre-occupatio n o f thos e wh o governe d th e Spanis h
empire.
181
Consulta, 7 Oct . 1651 : A.G.S. Est . 2076 ; consulta o f the Counci l of th e
Indies, 1 9 Apr. 1652 : A.G.S. Est . 2078 .
"* Consultas, 15 and 25 Sept. 1650 : A.G.S. Est. 2072 ; "Parecer del conde de
Peñaranda sobr e union co n Olandeses": A.G.S. Est. 2081 .
"* Consulta, 6 Aug. 1650 , fos. 2v-j: A.G.S . Est. 2072 ; Poelhekke, De Vrede
van1MMunster, pp. 359-60 .
Consulta, 3 July 1650 : A.G.S . Est . 2072 ; consulta, 2 Oct . 1651 : A.G.S.
Est. 2076 .
2
THE HOLLAN D TOWN S AN D

THE DUTCH-SPANISH CONFLICT , 1621-164 8
Although the provinc e of Holland surpassed by far the other six Dutch provinces
in wealth an d populatio n durin g the Golde n Age , there were nevertheless major
political episode s i n which Holland faile d t o exercise effective leadershi p o r exert
decisive influence . Indeed , i t could eve n occur that a clear majorit y o f the voting
members of the province o f Holland, with Amsterdam, the Republic's richest and
largest cit y taking the lead, could fai l to get its way when the other provinces were
split thre e agains t three . On e highl y instructiv e such episode wa s the prolonge d
political battl e withi n the Republi c tha t continue d throug h mos t of the secon d
Dutch-Spanish war of 1621-164 8 over whether or not to accept Spanish proposal s
for a truce o r peace . Althoug h this subject i s not much discussed o r very familiar
today, fo r a quarter of a century durin g th e Golde n Age , it loomed a s the mos t
important issu e in Dutc h lif e secon d onl y to the rivalr y between th e Counter-Re-
monstrant an d Remonstran t factions . Over man y year s i t was referre d to i n th e
deliberations o f the Dutc h provincial assemblies and cit y administrations simply
as the groóte saecke or the groóte werck t o mark it off from th e mass of less signi-
ficant questions . Th e proble m fo r th e historia n i s that almost al l of the relevant
secret resolutions o f the States of Holland hav e been lost. To reconstruct the story,
he mus t rely , fo r th e mos t part , o n th e record s o f th e variou s cit y councils .
While Dutch-Spanis h negotiation s proceede d almos t without break in the years
1621-1628, through variou s intermediaries, it was only in the winter of 1628-1629,
that Phili p I V finally dropped hi s insistence that the Dutch Republic must make a
number o f concessions before h e would accep t a truce. I n January 1629 , the Spa -
nish king signed a secret authorizatio n for the Archduchess Isabella, governess of
the Souther n Netherlands , empowerin g he r t o conclude a truce of long duration,
on th e line s o f that o f 1609 , without requiring an y concession b y the Dutc h tha t
did not figur e in the earlier truce , and in February, he also authorized her , should
there b e an y difficult y i n renewing the term s o f 1609 , to agre e to a simple armi-
* A n earlie r versio n o f this pape r wa s delivered t o the Dutc h Histor y Seminar o f Londo n Universi-
ty's Institute o f Historical Researc h i n March 1978 . It is a preparatory stud y preceding publicatio n of a
book o n Spanish-Dutch relation s i n the period 1618-1660 , the research fo r which was supported b y the
Social Scienc e Researc h Counci l o f Britain. I woul d lik e t o thank, fo r thei r helpfu l suggestions wit h
this paper , Professo r K . W . Swar t an d Mr . J . Kluiver .
slice, valid for from fou r t o six years, without any conditions whatever except that
it apply i n the Eas t an d Wes t Indies as well as in Europe'. At that time, there was
a painfu l awareness , i n bot h Brussel s an d Madrid , tha t th e entanglemen t wit h
France i n Italy over the Mantuan succession question, compelling th e deployment
of large force s in Italy , and starvin g the Flander s arm y of cash and supplies , was
causing a marke d swin g in th e balanc e o f powe r i n th e Lo w Countrie s agains t
Spain. 'An d i f they should besieg e suc h a place as Belduque ['s-Hertogenbosch ]
or Breda' , wrot e Isabell a t o Philip , in Februar y 1629 ,
we ca n se e n o wa y o f savin g it, fo r w e have n o mone y wit h which t o brin g ou t a field

army .. . and i n th e fortifie d strongholds , ther e are no munition s or essential supplie s fo r
their defenc e .. . and th e troop s ar e i n suc h a stat e tha t I d o no t kno w ho w the y hav e
suffered suc h misery , fo r mos t hav e no t bee n pai d fo r fou r months 2.
Isabella communicate d Phili p IV' s readines s t o sig n a lon g truce , withou t an y

Dutch concession , t o Frederik Hendri k through her representative to the Roosen-
daal talks on prisoner exchanges , Jan Kesselaer , heer van Marquette, who impart-
ed th e messag e t o hi s Dutc h counterpart , Gerar d va n Berckel , burgomaster of
Rotterdam. Frederi k Hendri k the n consulted, as was his usual procedure, a small,
advisory, inne r committe e o f the State s General. However , for some months , no
reply whatever was communicated vi a Roosendaal to Brussels 3, not owing to any
long-term intentio n t o preven t th e truce , bu t because , wit h the preparation s fo r
the descen t o n 's-Hertogenbosc h wel l advanced, the stadholde r an d hi s advisors
had n o wish to miss a unique opportunity to win a major militar y triumph. Two
months befor e the star t of the great siege, Isabella wrot e to Philip of her growing
anxiety ove r th e lac k o f Dutc h respons e t o th e truc e offer". However , soon afte r
the commencemen t o f th e siege , Bercke l wa s sen t b y th e stadholde r t o confe r
again wit h Marquette , examin e Philip IV' s authorizatio n t o Isabell a an d obtai n
1. Algemee n Rijksarchie f Brussel s (hereafte r AR A Brussels ) SE O 200 , fo . 62, Philip IV to Isabella ,

Madrid, 1 4 Feb. 1629 ; Philip's key authorizatio n t o Isabella was dated 1 2 Jan. 1629 , see Brit. Lib . MS .
Add. 14,005 , 'Relació n d e l o que h a passad o en el tratado de las treguas', fo . 218v; Lieuwe va n Aitze -
ma, Historie of Verhael van Saken van Stael en Oorlogh in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden
(15 vols. ; The Hague , 1657-1671 ) ii , 908; bot h Waddington and Cuvelie r ar e inaccurat e here, as they
state tha t Phili p I V only came t o thi s poin t month s later , whil e th e siege was actually i n progress, A.
Waddington, L a République de s Provinces-Unies, L a France e t les Pays-Bos Espagnols d e 1630 á ¡650
(2 vols. ; Paris, 1895-7 ) i , 67; J. Cuvelier, 'Le s Negociation s diplomatique s de Roosendael (1627-30)' ,
Mélanges d'Histoire offerts á Henri Pirenne ( 2 vols. ; Brussels , 1926 ) i , 79 .
2. AR A Brussels , SE G 200 , fo . 57 , Isabell a t o Philip , Brussels , 1 3 Feb. 1629 .
3. Brit . Lib . MS . Add . 14,005 , fol . 218v .
4. AR A Brussels , SE G 200 , fo . 119 , Isabell a t o Philip , 2 7 Mar . 1629 .
The Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish 45Conflict
the detail s o f th e thirty-fou r year s truc e tha t wa s bein g offered 5. Th e Dutc h re -
sponse o f Ma y an d Jun e 162 9 stimulated ne w hope s fo r a n earl y settlemen t i n
Brussels an d Madri d and , b y late July , th e Spanis h kin g wa s expressing hi s joy
that a ver y lon g truc e wa s all bu t signed 6. Bu t afte r thei r initially positiv e reply,
the Dutc h sid e agai n bega n t o dela y plainl y wit h a vie w to holdin g matter s up
until afte r the fal l o f 's-Hertogenbosch 7. Isabella trie d to threaten tha t if the town
fell, th e Spanis h offe r woul d be withdrawn. Finally in desperation, th e Spaniards
launched thei r Augus t invasio n acros s th e Veluwe, with the ai d of the Emperor,
culminating i n th e captur e o f Amersfoort .
The Dutc h State s General , wit h both the siege of's-Hertogenbosch an d the Spa-
nish occupatio n o f th e Veluw e continuing , o n 5 September , debate d i n secre t
whether i t was now time to reveal the Spanish truc e offer t o the provinces and city
governments, bu t decide d no t t o d o s o yet 8. Bercke l was directed t o excus e the
prolonged dela y t o Marquette o n the groun d that th e matte r was of such impor-
tance, with s o many intereste d partie s i n the Republic , tha t length y consultation
was unavoidable 9. Then, on 21 September, the State s Genera l instructe d Berckel
to inform Marquette tha t the Republic would only agree to proceed i f the Infant e
undertook t o withdra w th e Spanis h an d Imperia l force s fro m Veluw e uncondi-
tionally10. A fe w day s later, Phili p wrot e fro m Madri d urgin g Isabell a afres h t o
'make th e peace o r truce, as of when and wit h the conditions tha t are obtainable,
without any restriction a t all'". On 2 October too k place a crucial secre t debate in
the State s General : i t was announced tha t Bercke l ha d receive d assurance s fro m
the archduchess , throug h Marquette , that the Spanish and Imperia l force s would
in fac t b e withdrawn from th e Veluw e shortly and unconditionally 12. Thereupon ,
the State s General , having sought the agreement of Frederik Hendrik , resolved to
lay the Spanis h proposa l o f a thirty-four year truce between Spain and the United
5. 'Mae r als o sic h dese n verlede n Somer', state d Aitzem a somewhat vaguely, 'weder occasie van by
eenkomste to t Roosendae l o p ' t subjec t al s voren presenteerde: so heeft d e H . Marquett e aldaer dés e
materie wede r opghegeve n ae n de Burgemeeste r Berckel vertoonende ende t e lesen grievende de Pro -
curatie van de n Koninc k van Spagnie n o p d'lnfante gedateer d d e 1 2 January 1629' , Va n Slaet en Oor-
logh, II, 908 ; this crucial meeting too k place on 1 8 May, see ARA Brussels , SEG, 200 , fo . 251, Isabella
to Philip , 1 8 Ma y 1629 .
6. Ibidem, SE G 201 , fo . 119 , Philip t o Isabella , 2 6 Jul y 1629 .
7. Cuvelier , 'Le s negociations' , 79 .
8. Gemeentearchie f (hereafte r GA ) Amsterdam , Algemeen Bestuur, no. 11 , 'Extracten uit de secre-
te resolutië n va n d e State n Generaal , 1622-1635' , fo. 181v.
9. Ibidem, fos . 182-v , Bercke l t o Marquette , Rotterdam , 9 Sep . 1629 .
10. Ibidem, fos . 182v-183 ; ARA Brussels , SE G 201 , fo. 233, Isabella t o Philip . 30 Sep. 1629 : Isabella
despatched a specia l messenge r t o Roosendaa l t o delive r th e assurance .
11. Ibidem, fo . 219v, Philip to Isabella, 2 7 Sep. 1629 : 'me a parecido da r d e nuevo facultad a V. Alte-
za (com o l o hago ) par a qu e pued a haze r l a Pa z o Tregu a com o quand o y con la s condiciones qu e
pudiere si n limitació n ninguna' .
12. G A Amsterdam , 'Extracten' , fos . 184-185 .
Provinces befor e th e provinces and cit y councils, askin g the deputies to return to
The Hagu e withi n te n day s wit h th e answer s of thei r respectiv e provinces .
The hecti c rus h wit h which thi s initial debat e wa s conducted i n Gelderland , a
province whic h had incline d toward peace wit h Spain since the expiry of the ear-
lier truc e i n 1621 , on accoun t o f th e heav y taxation an d othe r burden s that th e
war involved , wa s described b y Alexander van de r Capelle n i n his Gedenkschrif-
ten'3. I n Gelderland , feelin g ra n strongl y i n favou r o f the truce bot h i n hi s own
quarter, tha t of Zutphen, and i n the rest of the province. In Overijssel, peace feel -
ing was also strong and the State s of that province were likewise quick to support
the truc e moves' 4. I n Utrecht , despite som e resistanc e o n th e par t o f the cit y of
Utrecht which, both in 1629-163 0 and agai n in 1632-1633 , opposed th e truce pro-
posals, the province, dominated b y a trêviste nobility, likewise declared i n favour .
In Holland, howeve r the affair progresse d mor e slowly. The gecommitteerde raden
of the provinc e wrot e to th e cit y administrations, bringing th e Spanish offe r for -
mally to their attention , only on 6 October. Thu s by the time that the Amsterdam
city counci l discusse d th e proposa l o n 9 October , Overijssel , Gelderlan d an d
Utrecht ha d al l come out i n favour an d th e truce movement had acquire d a for-
midable momentum . Amsterdam too, keenly aware of the burdens and uncertain-
ties of the war and the exhaustion of the Republic's finances, resolved to throw its
great weigh t behin d th e initiative 15.
Beside Amsterdam, it was, as Van der Capelle noted , Rotterdam that showed the
most inclinatio n towar d a truce . Rotterdam debate d th e hoochwichtich ende im-
portant poinct on 11t h October and , afte r prolonge d discussio n with some dissent-
ing voices , agree d t o suppor t th e move s to en d a wa r which it thought involved
excessive cost an d losse s t o the Republic 16. In addition, Dordrech t an d Alkmaar' 7
were emphatically i n favour . Delf t debate d th e groóte saecke on the same day as
Rotterdam an d decided , no t surprisingl y i n a town with quite a strong committ-
ment to the West India Company , that th e 'charter give n to the West India Com -
13. Gedenkschriften va n jonkheer Alexander va n de r Capellen, 1621-1632 (2 vo!s. ; Utrecht , 1777 ) I ,

549, 551-552 , 555-556 ; Algemee n Rijksarchief , The Hagu e (ARA) , Provincial e Resoluties , vol . IX ,
Gelderland, 7 Oct . 1629 .
14. Ibidem, vol . CCCCLXXXVI , Overijssel , 2 Oct . 1629 .
15. G A Amsterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , vol . XVI , fol . 109, 9 Oct . 1629 : 'Insiende va n d'een e
syde de swaerigheyd end e onsekerheyd van uytkomst van der oorlogh ende d e uytputtinghe der finan-
cien e n va n ander e syd e lettend e o p ' t voorsz . advise n end e inclinati e va n d e Prince .
16. Va n de r Capellen , Gedenkschriften, I, 555; GA Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 1 Oct. 1629 :
after referrin g to the 'onheylen van d'alverslindende oorlog ' and th e uncertainty o f its outcome, conti-
nues 'mae r insonderhey t geconsidereer t d e stae t e n gelegenthey t va n financiën dat sodanig h geepui -
seert end e wtgeputte t syn , dá t i n 't toekome n nauwelyck e immers nie t sende r perycke l van intestin e
swaericheyden gevonde n soude n kunne n werden' .
17. G A Alkmaar , Stadsarchie f n o 43 , fo. 281 v: 'is nae deliberati e verstaen da t me n va n wege n dés e
stede goed e genegendhey d heef t o m to t ee n goed e verseekeert e trefv e t e moge n comen' .
The Holland Towns an d the Dutch-Spanish Conflict 4 7
pany should b e confirmed before response is made to the truce offer"8; neverthe-
less, Delf t appear s t o have sided unequivocall y with the truc e party in the State s
of Holland during th e preliminar y deliberation s o f October an d November. The
towns o f th e Noorderkwartie r an d som e small towns of Sout h Hollan d adopte d
no stan d a t al l initially , requirin g thei r deputies simpl y to gage the moo d i n the
province and repor t back. Thus Schieda m considere d th e Spanish proposa l o n 9
October, bu t too k n o definit e stan d for or against" , whil e Enkhuize n resolve d a
day late r b y pluraliteyl va n advijsen tha t its representatives should simply hear the
views o f th e othe r town s an d see k clarificatio n wit h respec t t o th e Wes t Indi a
Company, th e struggle i n Germany an d consultatio n with th e Republic's allies 20.
Hoorn likewis e mad e n o furthe r initia l respons e tha n t o requir e mor e informa-
tion21. Schoonhoven wa s more explicitly hostile, th e majorit y of its council consi-
dering tha t th e
war should b e continued i f the finance s o f the land wer e in any way able t o bear it, but
that if not, it s representatives shoul d alig n with th e best poin t o f view or tha t of the ma-
jority22.
Only tw o Hollan d town s were resolved fro m th e firs t t o rejec t th e Spanis h ap -

proach outright - Haarle m and Gorkum23. What, however , made the opening de-
bate in the State s of Holland, o n 1 3 October, rather ominous for the Trêvistes was
that beside s th e outrigh t rejectio n by Haarlem , the thir d larges t cit y o f Holland,
Leiden, the secon d cit y of the province, without rejecting the initiative there an d
then, wa s distinctly coo l adopting a very different stan d fro m tha t of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam . Afte r deliberatin g th e truc e offer a t great length, on 1 1 October,
the Leide n groóte vroedschap resolve d tha t th e 'sai d truce offe r shoul d no t as yet
be refused outright , but that neither should the aforesaid negotiation be proceed-
ed with', but that the Leiden deputies should endeavour to delay and that in the
18. G A Delft , Resolutie-boek , IV, 1 1 Oct. 1629 ; Rijksarchie f i n Zeeland, papers o f the States of Zee -
land (hereafte r RA Z sz ) no . 2099 , Zeeland deputie s i n Th e Hagu e t o States , 1 1 Nov . 1629 ; De Lae t
lists te n director s o f th e WI C chambe r o f th e Maa s fro m Delf t fo r th e perio d 1621-1636 , a s agains t
nine fro m Rotterdam , Joannes de Laet , larlyck verhael va n de verrichtinghen der geoctroyeerde West-
Indische Compagnie ( 4 vols. ; Th e Hague , 1931-1937 ) I , 35 .
19. G A Schiedam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 9 Oct . 1629 .
20. Archiefdiens t Westfries e Gemeente n (hereafte r AWG) , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 10
Oct. 1629 .
21. AWG , Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 1 Oct . 1629 .
22. Streekarchie f Krimpenerwaard , Schoonhoven , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 7 Oct . 1629 : 'so o ver -
staen d e meest e lede n da t me n d e oorloc h soud e continuere n ingevall e d e finanti e van t lan d t'selv e
eenichsins can lijden , soo niet, sullen d e Gecommitteerden hae r mogen conformere n met de meest oft e
beste advijsen .
23. G A Haarlem , Vroedschap s Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1629 ; GA Gorcum , Vroedschap s Resoluties, 9 Oct .
1629.
meantime, th e regim e should conside r and resolv e to establish a better and firme r orde r
and regulatio n fo r th e greate r securit y o f bot h th e religiou s an d secula r affair s o f th e
state o f thi s Republic 24.
For severa l years , especiall y sinc e th e victor y o f th e libera l opponent s o f th e

Counter-Remonstrants o n th e Amsterda m vroedschap i n the mid-1620s 25, an d a n
accompanying marke d increas e in Remonstran t activit y in Amsterdam and Rot -
terdam, Leiden , like Haarlem, ha d showe d a marked anxiety for the futur e pros -
pects of the Counter-Remonstran t factio n in the province and mountin g hostility
to th e change s i n the religiou s and politica l atmospher e in Amsterdam and Rot -
terdam. Thu s wit h its resolutio n o f 1 1 October , Leide n firml y linke d together in
the Dutc h politica l aren a th e question o f Dutch-Spanish relation s with the over-
riding domesti c issu e of the day, though in fact this linkage had alread y occurred ,
earlier i n th e year , i n the argument s between the Hollan d town s over whether or
not to launch a military offensive agains t the Spanish Netherlands. Leiden was to
proceed graduall y fro m thi s initia l position , i n th e autum n in 1629 , to for m to -
gether with Haarlem , some of the town s of the Noorderkwartier, and late r fo r a
time als o Gouda , th e cor e o f a formidabl e Hollan d wa r party .
After th e openin g debat e i n th e State s of Hollan d o n th e Spanis h offer , o n 1 3
October, th e deputies reported t o their respective city councils revealing the rang e
of disagreement withi n the province and pressing those tha t had not yet adopted a
stand t o do so. Through October , ther e was a good deal of discussion of the ques -
tion, bot h i n the city administrations an d th e States of Holland, accompanie d b y
frequent referenc e to th e view s of the stadholder . The Hoor n vroedschap, havin g
learnt tha t man y towns of the provinc e favoure d th e truce but that mos t had sub -
stantial reservation s concernin g th e West India Company, th e domestic situation ,
circumstances i n German y an d th e questio n o f consultatio n wit h Franc e an d
England, agree d tha t a 'firm , secure truce or peace with the king of Spain would
be much t o the advantage o f the land', but that before it would consent, adequat e
assurances ha d t o b e obtaine d fro m th e Germa n Emperor , th e Republic' s allie s
consulted, an d th e Wes t Indi a Compan y maintaine d i n ful l vigour 26. Enkhuize n
delayed unti l 27 October an d the n aligned itself with Leiden, resolving that before
it woul d agre e t o the truc e itself bein g discusse d th e 'presen t publi c religion an d
24. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 448 , fo . 139v , 1 1 Oct . 1629 : 'hebben di e va n selv e vroetscha p ...
geresolveert dá t d e voorsz . aenbyeding e va n Trefves nyet soo plotselick voo r alsnoch behoor t t e wer-
den afgeslagen , ende da t ooc k voo r alsnoc h i n de voorsz . handelinge nyet behoort getrede n t e werden
maer dat me n tstuc k raette beste grati e sal soucken te delaijeren end e da t me n ondertusschen .. . by d e
regieringe behoort t e werden gedelibereert e n geresolveert om bete r en vaster ordre ende reglemen t t e
stellen opt e geestelickhey t van selv e ...' .
25. Joha n E . Elias , D e vroedschap va n Amsterdam, 1578-1795 ( 2 vols. ; Haarlem , 1903-1905) I , Ixxii ,
Ixxiv, Ixxvii , Ixxviii .
26. AWG , Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 5 Oct. 1629 .
regime shoul d b e firml y established' 27. Rotterdam , reviewin g th e progres s o f the
truce move s o n 2 2 October, note d tha t mos t o f the town s of the province ha d se-
rious reservations abou t th e truce especially regardin g the securing of religion an d
regime withi n th e Republic , th e Wes t Indi a Company , an d relation s wit h th e
Republic's allies, but resolve d nevertheles s t o continue to press for prompt accep -
tance o f th e truc e 'fo r reason s alread y mentione d an d especiall y owin g t o th e
chronic lac k o f public funds' 28. Th e Leide n vroedschap, on 2 6 October, agai n in -
structed it s deputies to insist on prior secur e establishment of'regim e and religion '
in th e Republi c befor e consentin g t o an y furthe r truc e proceeding s an d 'i n cas e
the concluding of the said points (concernin g regim e and religion ) shoul d b e put
off o r delayed , tha t the n th e sai d deputie s mus t rejec t th e truc e offe r outright' 29.
Frederik Hendrik , fo r hi s part 30, professe d stric t neutralit y i n th e deliberations ,
but nevertheles s seeme d t o lean towar d the truce party, asserting that the occasio n
was especiall y favourabl e fo r a prestigiou s settlemen t an d criticizin g som e of the
points pu t forwar d b y th e wa r town s particularl y tha t concernin g consultatio n
with allied monarchs; h e pointed ou t tha t non e o f these suppose d allie s had lifted
a finger to assist the Republic durin g the dangerous weeks of the Spanish invasio n
of th e Veluwe .
On 1 0 November, i n a key session of the State s of Holland, al l the towns, except-
ing only Medemblik and Schoonhove n whos e deputies wer e absent, formally pre-
sented their advysen o n the groóle saecke in the presence o f the stadholder. Whil e
only Haarle m an d Gorku m rejecte d the thirty-fou r year truc e altogether , beside s
the nobilit y onl y thre e towns , Amsterdam, Rotterda m an d Dordrech t wer e unre -
servedly in favour of prompt acceptance 31. All the rest require d variou s conditions
to b e me t first , thoug h o f these, Delf t an d Alkmaa r di d als o sho w considerabl e
27. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 2 7 Oct . 1629 : 'da t voo r e n alee r te n principale n i n
'tselve stuc k t e handelen , sa l vas t gestel t d e tegenwoordig e publyque religi e ende regering e en alle s
gecommuniceert me t d e geallieerd e princen'.
28. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties, 2 2 Oct . 1629 .
29. G A Leiden , Secretarie Archief 448, fo . 144 : 'ingevalle de vaststelling e der voorsz . poincten sou-
den werden getraineert ofte gedelayeer t dat alsda n de voorsz . gecommitteerden de voorsz. aenbyedin -
ge va n Trefve s sullen hebben a f t e slaan' .
30. Ibidem, fos . 142-v ; Va n de r Capellen , referrin g t o earl y October , report s th e prince' s view a s
being tha t 'me n moet resolveeren tot continuatie van oorlogh, ende onderhout van 't volck n u in dienst
synde, also o hy andersint s niet soud e kunnen uytrichten , oft e o m de n trefve s aentenemen , kunnend e
met meerde r reputati e de wapene n nie t afleggen' ; th e edito r of th e memoirs , misreadin g th e passage
apparently, place d th e heading i n the margin 'De Print s inclineert tot continuatie van oorlogh', which
seems to b e incorrect, see Va n de r Capellen , Gedenkschriften, I , 548; Aitzema, moreover , confirms tha t
the prince , though professedly neutral , 'mee r voor , als tegen sprack' , see L. van Aitzema , Verhael va n
de Nederlantxhe Vreede Handeling (Th e Hague , 1650 ) 2 parts , I , 127.
31. G A Leiden , Secretarie Archief 448, fo . 144v : 'waer va n twe e waren de voorsz . aengeboden han-
delinge pla t affslaende , dri e tott e selv e inclinerende , end e alle de vorder e insisterende o m eerst ende
alvorens t e delibereren ende resolvere n op seecker e ander e poincten de vasthey t end e verseeckerheyt
van stae t dese r Lande n concernerende'.
Empires and Entrepots
keenness for the truce. The Zeeland deputie s in The Hague reported to the States
of Zeelan d tha t th e Hollan d nobility , Dordrecht, Delft , Amsterdam , Rotterdam
and Gouda (which , it seems, they may have mentioned in mistake fo r Alkmaar32)
were incline d t o accep t th e truc e offer , bu t disagree d t o som e exten t ove r th e
conditions, whil e the res t of the province , other tha n the two towns that rejected
talks outright, had stron g reservations which they insisted must be satisfied before
they would assent to further truc e proceedings, but were not, as yet, authorized by
their respective towns to discuss these points in detail". Having heard the advysen,
Frederik Hendri k lef t th e chamber without saying a word. On being pressed after -
ward t o impar t a t leas t som e advic e t o th e assembly , he mad e known , through
Raadpensionaris Cats , tha t h e remaine d neutra l o n th e chie f point , bu t tha t he
deemed th e occasio n opportun e fo r a long truce and tha t (i n clear contradiction
of Leide n an d Enkhuizen ) the
affairs o f religion and regim e of these lands must be separated from thi s negotiation wit h
the enem y an d tha t eac h must be dealt with apart, withou t one having to wait until the
other b e arranged.' 4
After hearin g th e prince's advice , the States went on to deliberate whether or not
to proceed t o more detailed discussio n of terms and conditions, but despite heavy
pressure fro m Amsterda m and Rotterdam , th e majorit y followe d Leiden in wis-
hing t o recess and refe r th e discussio n back to the vroedschappen. Thi s move lar-
gely stripped the truce initiativ e of whatever momentum remaine d and the follow-
ing week s wer e attende d b y littl e o r n o furthe r progres s apar t fro m a marke d
increase i n public discussion of the Spanish truce offer stimulate d both by a wave
of printe d pamphlet s that were issued a t thi s time, particularly in certai n town s
strongly committed to the war party, and by some fiery denunciations of the truce
32. I have not s o far been abl e to determine the position of Gouda durin g the 1629-163 0 talks; during
1632-1633, Goud a wa s on e o f th e wa r towns.
33. RA Z s z 2099, Zeelan d deputie s in Th e Hagu e to sz, 1 0 Nov. 1629 ; 'werden i n tegenwoordicheyt
van sy n Extie . de advyse n van all e d e Lede n over d e groóte saeck e ingebracht. Haarle m en Gorcum
alleen sloege n d e handelinghe aff. De Edelen , Dordrecht, Delftt , Amsterdam , Rotterdam, Gouda wa-
ren dae r to e genegen ; mae r lettend e o p d e Westlndisch e Compagni e en eenig e andere n pointe n d e
welke de selve Leden hare nie t eenparig en verclaren; de andere Steden verstonden datt alvoren gere-
solveert moesten werde n opde conservati e vande voorsz. Westlndische Compagnie, vastsettingh e van-
de Regieringe en Religi e binnen s'lands, I n wat pointen men staen soude me t de Keyser en opde com-
municatie t e doen aend e Geallieerd e Coningen , In welcke besoigne d e selv e seyden noch geen last te
hebben mae r di e va n hui s t e moete n haelen' .
34. GA Leiden , Secretari e Archief 448, fo. 164v : 'zyne Extie. hadde verklaer t eerstelick opte saecke
selfs, da t he m di e indifferen t wa s en oversulcx ingevalle de hoochstgemelte Staten goetvinden te trac-
teren va n Trefv e dat s y het n u me t reputati e connen doen , ende ter contrarie ingevalle me n den oor -
loch soud e wille n continueren , da t d e selv e nye t defensive , mae r offensiv e soud e moete n gevoert
werden...datmen de saecke van relligie ende regieringe deser Landen moste separeren vand e handelin-
ge metten viandt, ende dat elc k apart most e werden gedaen sonder dat het een nae het ander behoefde
te wachten' .
The Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish Conflict 51
moves fro m th e pulpi t b y variou s Counter-Remonstran t preachers. Among th e
pamphlets tha t appeare d wer e the supposedly secret Consideraren against the tru-
ce whic h wer e submitte d b y th e Wes t Indi a Compan y director s t o th e State s
General, early i n October, and whic h wer e printe d significantly , i n Haarle m by
the printer t o the vroedschap, Adriae n Rooman , th e Remonstrantie of the preten-
der t o the Bohemia n crown , printe d a t Leeuwarden , the Tractaet tegen Pays, pu-
blished a t Th e Hague , an d Discours Aengaende Den Treves whic h appeare d a t
Haarlem33. That publi c opinion wa s running quite strongly against the endin g of
the Spanis h wa r ma y b e inferre d fro m th e fac t tha t virtuall y al l th e pamphlet s
were hostil e t o th e truc e an d tha t i t was the trêvistes who, at th e time, sough t to
restrain publi c opinion . Lat e in November, the Rotterdam city fathers instructed
their deputie s i n Th e Hagu e t o urg e the speedin g u p o f the proceeding s i n th e
States an d t o propos e i n th e assembl y that
order shoul d be imposed generall y tha t this matter should not be discussed fro m th e pul-
pit and against the issuing and printing of pamphlets whether for or against the truce.36
In Rotterdam itself , the Counter-Remonstrant predikanten received a stern warn-

ing fro m th e burgomaster s to ceas e thei r pronouncement s o n th e subject.
On 7 December, th e State s o f Holland conducte d a second ful l presentatio n o f
advysen fro m th e towns assembled. Little had change d since 1 0 November, except
that Schoonhoven an d Purmeren d no w joined Haarle m and Gorku m in fully re -
jecting th e initiative while most towns were now better prepared t o enter into de-
tailed discussion o f the issue and its implications37. Leiden's deputie s were author-
ized t o procee d
not on th e matter of the truce itself , bu t onl y on the following points an d subjects : firstly
and abov e al l tha t bette r orde r shal l b e pu t i n th e affair s o f thi s state , tha t i s that th e
placards of the State s Genera l already issue d a s permanent edict s agains t th e forbidde n
gatherings an d conventicle s o f the Remonstrant s togethe r with those agains t th e banne d
Remonstrant predikanten b e maintaine d an d properl y execute d an d tha t al l thos e wh o
are alread y i n an y publi c offic e o r positio n i n th e regim e o r justice o f thes e lands , o r
35. Se e th e Consideratien ende redenen de r E. Heeren Bewind-hebbers vande Geoctrojeerde West-Indi-

sche Compagnie inde vergaderinghe vande... Staten Generaal... overgelevert nopende de teghenwoordige
deliberatie over den Treves met den Coning van Hispanien (Haarlem , 1629 ) (Knutte l 3909) ; Remon-
strantie, van weghen den Coninck van Bohemen A en de... Staten Generaal ...Op het Tractaet van Tref ves
(Leeuwarden, 1629 ) (Knuttel , 3914) ; Discovrs over De n Nederlantschen Vrede-handel Ghestelt door
een Liefhebber de s Vaderlandts (Leeuwarden , 1629 ) (Knuttel , 3917) ; Tractaet tegen Pays, Treves, en
Onderhandelinge me t de n Koningh va n Spaignien (Th e Hague , 1629 ) (Knuttel , 3918) ; Discovrs Aen-
gaende Treves of Vrede, Mei d e Infante ofte Koning va n Hispanien (Haarlem , 1629 ) (Knuttel , 3919) .
36. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 2 6 Nov . 1629 .
37. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 448 , fo . 169 .
52
hereafter shoul d b e elected to such, should be of the religion publicly established here, or
at leas t accep t it , and al l should promis e to uphold an d maintai n the sai d religio n an d
placards38.
In addition , Leiden' s deputies wer e authorized to discuss the West India Compa -
ny, th e Germa n war and othe r question s formin g the background to Dutch-Spa-
nish relations . Frederi k Hendri k havin g receive d th e advysen fro m Pensionaris
Cats, communicated throug h hi m t o the States , o n 8 December, hi s view that a
Dutch-Spanish truce , shoul d i t b e proceede d with , would be placed o n a firme r
basis were the Souther n Netherland s State s Genera l t o be involved and sig n and
swear t o th e agreemen t an d wer e it t o b e accompanie d b y a dismantlin g of key
fortifications includin g th e Spanis h fortresse s of Lingen, in Germany , to the east
of Overijssel, an d Zand vliet and others, Dutc h and Spanish, on the Schelde below
Antwerp39. The prince thus took the initiative in the States of Holland with a view
to breakin g th e deadloc k betwee n th e town s and assistin g the truc e party. Four
towns at onc e rejecte d the stadholder' s proposal s bu t a clear majority , including
Leiden, agree d tha t i t should b e referre d back t o th e cit y council s for their deci -
sion. However , i n th e chamber s o f the vroedschappen, th e prince' s proposal s me t
with a mor e generall y negativ e reaction . Leide n judged that the 'proposa l o f his
excellency, wit h reverence , woul d no t obtai n th e desire d securit y o f th e sai d
negotiation'40. Hoorn deeme d th e prince's recommendation s to be of groóte consi-
deratie bu t one s tha t coul d b e taken n o furthe r unti l the main pre-conditions fo r
truce talks had bee n settled withi n the States of Holland4'. Meanwhile the trêvistes
urged Frederi k Hendrik's recommendation s on the opposition as being the means
of procurin g th e additiona l securit y tha t the y sought 42.
On 1 3 December, th e State s of Holland formall y reviewe d th e stat e o f opinio n
within th e provinc e fo r th e thir d time . Five town s were now against 43, fiv e onl y
were for , considering tha t th e archduchess' s offe r shoul d no w b e responde d t o
38. Ibidem, fo . 167 , 'te trede n i n besoign e nye t o p d e saeck e va n Trefv e selfs , mae r alleenlick opte
naevolgende poincte n e n saecken. T e weten datmen eerst en alvorens beter ordre sal stellen opte saec -
ken va n desen staeten, dát is maincteneren ende behoorlick executeren de placcaten der Ho : Mo: Hee-
ren State n Generaa l di e voo r dese n verklaer t sij n voo r ewige edicten jegens de verbode n vergaderin -
gen en conventiculen de r Remonstranten, mitsgaders jegens de wtgeseyde Remonstrantse Predicanten
geemaneert, ende da t all e die gene die alrede i n eenige publiq dyensten ofte State n van regieringe ofte
Justitie deser Lande n syn , ofte noc h namael s daer to e verkozen sullen werden, sullen syn van relligie
publiquelick alhier aengenomen , ofte te n minsten de selve toegedaen, end e alle de selve sullen beloven
de voorsz . relligi e end e Placcate n t e honthoude n end e t e maincteneren'.
39. Ibidem, fo . 169 ; G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 0 Dec. 1629 .
40. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 448 , fo . 169v .
41. AWG , Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 1 Dec . 1629 .
42. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 1 Dec . 1629 .
43. Th e fift h town , evidentlv . wa s Brielle .
positively, albei t requirin g Spanis h acceptanc e o f the stadholder's proposed con -
ditions, whil e al l th e rest , includin g Leiden , Enkhuizen , Hoor n an d presumabl y
Gouda, understood tha t Frederi k Hendrik's points would not procure the neces -
sary securit y and tha t their own conditions had to be met before they would agree
to proceed 44. At this, i t was proposed b y the nobility tha t a way out of the dead -
lock ha d t o be found and a final decision arrive d a t and that a possible mean s to
this woul d b e a special inne r committe e of the States , made up both o f towns in
favour o f and agains t th e truce, selected t o confer with the stadholder, to work out
and the n refe r bac k t o th e ful l assembl y a sound preparator y basis fo r the truce
talks. Som e town s readily agreed , bu t many , including Leide n objecte d and th e
assembly adjourne d fo r some hours for private thought and discussion . O n resu-
ming in the afternoon, it was found that there was now a majority in favour o f the
nobility's recommendation , ye t despite heav y pressur e Leiden , Haarle m an d
others stil l refuse d t o accep t it . Finally, however, after th e despatc h o f letters by
the State s to various resistin g vroedschappen, som e of the latter, includin g Leide n
acquiesced i n th e settin g up o f the specia l inne r committee 45.
The inne r committe e consiste d o f representative s o f th e nobility , Dordrecht ,
Amsterdam an d Alkmaa r which were all inclined to the truce, Haarlem that flatly
rejected it , an d Leide n an d Enkhuize n which had stron g reservations. However,
Haarlem, which , lik e Gorkum , rejecte d al l preparator y conference s a s wel l a s
truce talk s proper , refuse d t o participat e whic h thereb y place d th e committe e
squarely i n th e hand s o f the peace party . Without Haarlem, the body soon cam e
to th e recommendation , ove r the objection s of Leiden, that a positiv e initial re -
sponse shoul d b e mad e t o Isabella , indicatin g readines s t o rene w th e term s of
1609, bu t wit h the participatio n o f the southern States General an d th e dismant-
ling of Zandvliet, Linge n and othe r fortresses as well as assurances from th e Ger -
man Empero r an d th e Catholic Leagu e that they too would acknowledge and re-
spect suc h a Dutch-Spanis h truce . Significantly, there was to be no insistence on
the explici t resignatio n o f sovereignty over the United Province s by Philip IV , or
that Spanish , Italia n an d othe r foreig n troop s b e withdraw n from th e Souther n
Netherlands, no r were France an d England to be consulted 46. The proposals only
44. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 448, fos . 170-v : 'dá t voorsz . las t va n respectiv e principale n ver -
scheyde wesende , ooc k heeft veroorsaect disparitey t van opinien als hebbende vyf f de r gemelte Lede n
de praesentati e va n viand t simpelic k afgeslagen , ander e vyf f gemeyn t i n effecte , datme n va n wegen
dése Republiqu e d e voorsz. praesentati e va n de n viandt behoorden mette n eerste n t e beantwoorden ,
ende daerbij t e verklaren datmen va n dése syde genegen is totte handelinge .. . ende de vordere Lede n
van welgemelt e vergadering e hebbend e geoordeelt , da t mette n voorsz . voorslac h va n syn e Extie . de
gemeynde verseeckerthey t de r voorsz . handeling e nye t en soude n werde n getroffen' .
45. Ibidem, fo. 172v , 1 6 Dec. 1629 ; the Leide n deputies o n th e inne r committee wer e instructe d to
press, fo r the 'total e renunciati e va n koninge va n Spagnien va n Souveraniteyt dese r Landen , he t ver-
trecken vand e wtheems e Garnisoene n end e he t vaststelle n van ee n kerckelick e ordonnantie' .
46. Ibidem, fo . 175v .
54
served however to sharpen still further th e dissension in the States with agreement
only that th e matter b e referred bac k to the city administrations fo r further delib-
eration. The State s broke u p havin g fixed its next session to begin on 8 Januar y
1630.
Before thi s happene d though , o n 1 7 December, a ne w complication was intro -
duced int o th e situatio n when it was learned tha t th e Venetian ambassador ha d
informed Frederi k Hendri k that h e had receive d informatio n from th e Venetia n
embassy i n Pari s tha t Loui s XIII and Cardina l Richelie u had indicated that the y
favoured a n activ e resumptio n o f the old Franco-Dutch alliance and proposed to
make war on Spain , invading Artois and Hainaul t with some 45,000 men, should
the Republi c launc h its own offensive o n the Spanis h Netherlands with an arm y
of similar size. Th e effec t o f this news within the States of Holland was to induce
yet more dissension wit h Amsterdam, Rotterdam and their allies insisting that th e
Republic shoul d delive r a n initia l answe r t o Spai n first , befor e considerin g th e
French offer , an d thei r opponents arguing that it was preferable to respond first to
France. Frederik Hendrik, however, succesfull y skirte d thi s impasse with his ad -
vice that the Republic should first answer the Venetian ambassador provisionally ,
then speedil y decid e o n th e financia l provisio n fo r th e arm y and nav y so a s t o
maintain bot h o n a viabl e wa r footing , an d finall y repl y t o th e Spanis h truc e
offer, al l i n suc h a way as to keep bot h set s of negotiations alive to the profi t of
the Republic 47.
Although the general conjuncture confronting the United Provinces was thus be-
coming more complex i n lat e December 162 9 and earl y January 1630 , and ther e
was a good dea l o f further discussio n i n the vroedschappen, th e lines of division i n
the State s o f Holland showe d little sign of shifting. Rathe r the councils tended t o
harden thei r previous position. Thu s Amsterdam resolved to employ 'all mean s to
help pus h an d advanc e (th e truce negotiation ) on' 48. Leiden , seeing tha t i t ha d
entirely faile d t o influence the inner committee, determined to oppose any subse -
quent suc h conference an d reverte d to its earlier absolute refusal t o proceed wit h
truce talks until and unles s its requirements wer e met 49. Enkhuizen re-iterated its
insistence tha t religio n an d regim e mus t b e firml y establishe d befor e i t woul d
agree to proceed with negotiations with the enemy 50. Schiedam now followed Lei-
den an d Enkhuize n i n demandin g a goede kerkelycke ordonnantie befor e bein g
ready t o deliberat e o n th e truc e proper 51. Schoonhove n determine d t o
47. ¡bidem, fos . 174-v .

48. G A Amsterdam , Vroedschaps Resoluties , vol. XV, fo . 135 , 31 Dec . 1629.
49. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archief 448, fo . 177, 7 Jan. 1630 .
50. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 7 Jan. 1630 .
51. G A Schiedam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 7 Jan . 1630.
persist wit h Haarlem , o r if Haarlem shoul d conform with the other deputies (i n agreeing
to ente r int o truc e talks) , t o d o likewis e bu t tha t i n suc h case , befor e th e negotiatio n
should begi n o r b e allowed , tha t regim e an d religio n shoul d b e firml y establishe d
as wel l a s assurance s obtaine d fro m th e Germa n Empero r an d th e Wes t Indi a
Company maintained 52. Alkmaar, interestingly, continued to favour th e truce, but
at the same time resolved to press for a stricter ordering of religion and regime 53.
The Frenc h ambassado r appeare d befor e th e State s Genera l o n 2 6 December ,
proposing, o n behal f of his master, an arrangemen t between Franc e an d th e Re-
public whereby either Loui s XIII would initiate hostilities with Spain, shortly , or
else assis t th e Republi c continue it s war wit h Spain t o th e exten t of one million
guilders yearly , unde r conditio n tha t th e Unite d Province s woul d no t conclud e
any truc e or peac e wit h Spain withou t the assen t of His Most Christian Majesty .
Against thi s dramatic background , the State s of Holland resume d their delibera -
tions o n th e Spanis h truc e offer , durin g th e secon d wee k in January , fallin g a t
once int o profoun d disagreement 54. T o resolv e th e deadlock , Frederi k Hendri k
proposed tha t th e deputie s be sen t bac k to the respectiv e cit y administrations t o
emphasize th e urgency of the situation and press those that had been delaying the
proceedings t o reconside r thei r position . Afte r som e sharp exchanges , th e State s
did the n resolv e t o send bac k th e deputies and agree d t o despatch a special mis -
sive t o Haarle m pointin g out tha t onl y a smal l fraction o f the provinc e rejected
truce talks altogether an d that whichever way the matter was settled, it simply had
to be decided speedil y 'becaus e long deliberation on this issue can not be otherwi-
se than prejudicial t o this state'55. Leiden duly reviewed its position on 1 4 January,
but the n produce d precisel y th e sam e instruction s fo r it s deputie s a s before . A
similar missiv e a s tha t despatche d t o Haarle m wa s rea d t o th e Schoonhove n
vroedschap o n 1 6 January, but produced onl y an unanimous resolution me t Haer-
lem ende Gorcum th e persisteren an d confor m wit h th e majorit y onl y i f thos e
towns did 56. On 1 8 January, th e Zeeland deputie s in The Hagu e reported t o Mid-
delburg tha t althoug h th e State s o f Hollan d ha d b y the n bee n considerin g th e
groóte saecke fo r 'man y days' , a decisio n remaine d a s remot e a s ever , progres s
being effectivel y blocked , accordin g t o what the y had bee n abl e t o discover, 'by
Haarlem, Leiden , Briel , Gorinchem , Schoonhove n an d som e small town s of the
Noorderkwartier'57.
The Haarle m vroedschap, afte r some delay, answered the States with a long reso-
52. Streekarchie f Krimpenerwaard , Schoonhoven , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 6 Dec. 1629 .

53. G A Alkmaar , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 5 Jan. 1630 .
54. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 448 , fo . 180 .
55. G A Haarlem , stadsarchief , kas t 3/ 4 no . 12 , fos . 364-365 , State s t o Haarlem , 1 2 Jan. 1630 .
56. Streekarchie f Krimpenerwaard , Schoonhoven , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 6 Jan. 1630 .
57. RA Z s z 2113 , deputie s i n Th e Hagu e t o sz , 1 8 Jan. 1630 .
lution, date d 3 1 January , which afte r bein g printe d subsequently , firs t i n a n
unauthorized version , wa s the n reprinted b y the vroedschap itsel f on th e groun d
that i t considered itsel f obliged t o correct th e inaccuracies in the allegedly pirate d
version58. Considerin g th e specia l clea r scrip t i n whic h th e resolutio n wa s taken
down i n th e cit y council's minutes , however, it seems likely that i t was its inten-
tion t o publis h th e resolutio n fro m th e first . I n thi s tract , whic h end s with a re-
sounding resolution to persist in rejecting the truce offer outright , Haarlem chiefl y
stressed th e grav e dangers which it considered th e propose d truc e would pose for
the ruling political factio n in Holland, th e Counter-Remonstrant party. The truce,
it argued, would inevitably be accompanied, a s had been the Twelve Years Truce,
by a resurgence of both the Remonstrants an d the Catholics who would b e aided
and encourage d fro m th e Souther n Netherlands . Wher e th e State s o f Hollan d
claimed i n it s missiv e tha t regim e an d religio n woul d b e safe-guarded , com -
plained Haarlem , th e contrar y wa s already permitte d i n 'certai n towns' :
for whil e th e predikanten an d othe r hones t person s are beginnin g to b e expelled fro m
towns, Arminian s ar e enterin g into the regime , Papists ar e finding positio n an d offic e i n
the tow n militia s an d othe r institutions , th e Arminia n preacher s wh o ar e th e caus e of
many disturbance s ar e no t prevented bu t protected , s o that on e sees the unrest an d dis-
turbances gro w daily 59.
In addition, in a reference t o general economic considerations, which was rare in

the vroedschap resolution s o n the groóte saecke, Haarlem maintained tha t the Re-
public enjoye d it s greates t prosperit y precisel y whils t i t wa s a t wa r wit h Spain ,
arguing that durin g the past truce 'business ha d diminished', Zeelan d ha d declin-
ed an d Dutc h shippin g ha d bee n subjec t t o arrest s i n Spai n an d Portugal 60.
The unyielding persistence of the war towns through January 1630, led by Haar-
lem an d Leiden , brough t th e truc e moves in the province of Holland finall y t o a
halt. Increasingl y exasperated , Rotterda m ha d resolve d o n 2 0 January t o 'ente r
upon th e pat h whic h i s indicated i n the nint h articl e o f the Unio n o f Utrecht' 61,
meaning that s o grave an unresolved issue should b e put to the stadholder a s final
arbiter, but in fact ther e was to be no further significan t ste p toward th e breakin g
of the deadlock i n the province of Holland durin g 1630 . Despite this, the question
58. Se e th e Resolutie B y d e Heeren Raeden ende Vroetschappen de r Stadt Haerlem, Ghenomen o p

seeckere Missive aen haerlieden ghesonden van d'E. Groot Moghende Heeren Staten van Holland! ende
West-Vrieslandt, nopende 't stuck vanden Treves (Haarlem , 1630 ) (Knuttel , 4010) ; se e also W. P . C.
Knuttel, Catalogus va n d e Pamfletten-Verzameling berustende i n d e Koninklijke Bibliotheek ( 8 vols. ;
The Hague , 1889-1916 ) I , part ii, nos. 4008-4010 ; so far, I have been unable to see the earlier version.
59. Resolutie de r Stadt Haerlem, 11-12 .
60. Ibidem, 8-9 .
61. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resolutie , 2 0 Jan. 1630 .
of the Spanis h truc e offe r remaine d very muc h alive in the publi c mind and wa s
fed b y a furthe r batc h o f printed pamphlets . The subjec t wa s also raised during
the summer in the States General by the English ambassador, giving rise to some
further deliberatio n i n th e State s o f Holland an d th e vroedschappen. Enkhuizen ,
for instance , re-iterate d twic e during the autumn of 163 0 that it would permit n o
truce talk s unti l religion an d regim e had firs t bee n firml y established 62. Some of
the pamphlets, interestingly , touched on the economic aspects of the groóte saecke
rather mor e freel y than di d the city council resolutions . On e attack o n the (revis-
tes, the Klare Aenwijsinge, pointe d ou t tha t th e propose d truc e woul d lea d t o a
great reviva l o f Dutc h commerc e wit h Spain , Portuga l an d Ital y whic h would
enable the Spanish kin g to make arbitrary arrests and seize Dutch property when-
ever he chose. Th e sam e tract asserted that wages, prices of agricultural produce,
houses, rent s and bequest s were all as buoyant as during the past truc e and tha t
although, officially, Iberia n an d Sout h Italia n trad e wa s lost, i n reality, throug h
neutrals an d othe r means , i t wa s being continued, remarking that this was wel l
known to , an d woul d b e confirme d by, th e weaver s of Leide n and Haarlem 63.
Following th e haltin g o f truce moves in 1630 , the secon d majo r roun d of truce
talks, durin g th e secon d Dutch-Spanis h struggle , too k plac e durin g th e year s
1632-1633. O n thi s occasion , th e initiativ e arose fro m a direc t approac h b y th e
South Netherland s State s General, gathere d at Brussels, to the State s General of
the Unite d Province s an d a goo d dea l mor e actual negotiation betwee n the two
sides too k place 64. The contex t i n which the ne w moves began, in October 1632 ,
was considerabl y differen t fro m tha t o f 1629 . Philip I V ha d extricate d himself
from hi s entanglement wit h Louis XIII in Italy , but hi s treasury was exhausted.
Frederik Hendrik' s triumphan t advanc e u p th e Maa s valley , capturin g Venlo ,
Roermond, Maastrich t and Limbur g in rapid succession , had reduced Isabella to
despair, furthe r demoralize d th e much weakened Spanis h army of Flanders, an d
aroused suc h revulsion agains t the war and the Spaniards in the Southern Nether-
lands, that Spanis h rul e appeare d t o be on the verg e of collapse. I t was in a state
of panic tha t Isabell a gav e in to pressure to convene the southern States General
and permitte d i t t o ente r a t onc e int o truce talk s with the Dutch . Furthermore ,
whereas in 162 9 the conflict i n Central Europe had been goin g badly fo r the Pro-
62. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resolutie , 1 7 Sept. an d 2 Dec . 1630 .

63. Klare Aenwijsinge Da t d e Vereenigde Nederlanden, gheen Treves me t de n Vyandt dienen t e
maecken sijnde het derden deel van'l traclael tegens Peys, Treves, ende Onderhandelinghe met den Vyant
(The Hague, 1630 ) (Knuttel , 4014): 'De Leytsch e ende Haerlemsche wevers weten da t wel , ende sul -
len on s da t al s d e best e getuyge n dae r va n zijnd e certificeren' .
64. O n th e actual talks, see: M . Gachard, ed., Actes des Etats Généraux de ¡632 (Brussels , 1853 ) an d
M. G . d e Boer , Di e Friedensunterhandlungen ¿wischen Spanten und de n Niederlanden i n de n Jahren
1632 un d 1633 (Groningen , 1898) .
CO
testants, wit h the Habsburg s dominant in Nort h Germany, by 1632 , the Catholic
forces i n German y ha d bee n flun g bac k b y th e hamme r blow s of th e Swedis h
advance. An d yet , though the Spanis h position was certainly weaker in 163 2 than
three years previously , it would be wrong to infe r tha t Philip was now even more
anxious tha n befor e t o sig n a lon g truc e with the Dutc h Republic" . Th e break -
down o f roya l authorit y i n the Souther n Netherland s had proceede d s o far, that
Philip an d Olivare s wer e incline d t o believ e tha t n o acceptabl e agreemen t with
the Dutch wa s possible until Spanish power in the Low Countries had been revi-
ved. Moreover, wherea s in 1629 , the Dutch had ha d no firm foothold in the Ame-
ricas, b y 1632 , the Wes t Indi a Compan y hel d Pernambuc o an d a considerabl e
area of Northern Brazil. Accordingly, whereas Philip's councils of Portugal and of
the Indies , i n Madrid , ha d wishe d fo r a speed y end t o th e war i n 1629 , in 1632 ,
they ha d muc h greate r reservations , maintaining that withou t total Dutc h with-
drawal fro m Brazi l no truc e shoul d b e entered into , for a permanent Dutc h pre -
sence there , i t wa s asserted , woul d pos e a n intolerabl e threa t t o th e empire s of
both Portuga l an d Spain .
It wa s reveale d t o th e deputie s o f th e Dutc h State s Genera l tha t th e State s a t
Brussels ha d requeste d peac e o r a truce , a t th e beginnin g o f October 1632 . The
deputies were asked t o obtain resolution s from thei r respective provinces within a
few day s as to whether they were now ready to respond. Ther e then took place a
somewhat hurrie d procedur e reminiscen t o f tha t o f Octobe r 1629 66. A s before ,
Gelderland promptly came out in favour, a s did Overijssel and Utrecht, although
in the latte r province , th e city, which maintained that regim e and religion should
be firmly established before talks with Spain be entered into, was again overruled,
much to its displeasure67, by the treviste nobles and clergy. Zeeland, Friesland and
Groningen, adherin g stil l t o their hard line , delaye d for some weeks though they
too eventuall y agreed t o th e negotiations , albeit wit h strong reservations 68. Onc e
again, the initiative lay squarely in the hands of Holland, th e towns of which were
written t o b y th e gecommitteerde raden o f the State s o n 3 October an d aske d t o
present thei r advysen withi n thre e days , althoug h fe w in fac t di d s o promptly.
Amsterdam deliberate d th e initiativ e o n 5 October and , referring once again t o
scarcity o f publi c funds , vigorousl y supporte d th e moves 69. Th e nex t day , th e
65. Se e J. I . Israel, 'A Conflict of Empires: Spain and th e Netherlands, 1618-1648' , Past and Present,
LXXVI (1977)67-68. ; see above, 34-35.
66. Va n de r Capellen , Gedenkschriften, l , 658.
67. RA Z s z 2102, Zeeland deputie s in The Hagu e to sz, 1 9 Oct. 1632:'d e Staedt Utrech t inde verga-
deringe va n provinci e was byde andere steden en leden overstemt'; GA Utrecht, Vroedschaps Resolu-
ties, 'Consideratio n vande vroetschap' , 2 6 Oct . 1632 .
68. Th e firs t o f thes e thre e t o d o so , five days afte r th e submissio n of Holland' s resolutio n to the
States General, was Groningen, se e ARA, SO, loketkas 198, resolution of Groningen, 23 Oct. 1632.
69. G A Amsterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties, XV, 265.
Dordrecht vroedschap resolve d unanimousl y t o emplo y ever y mean s a t it s dis -
posal to advance th e truce talks™ . The nobility, Rotterdam, Alkmaar, Medembli k
and eve n Purmeren d an d Gorku m likewise decide d promptl y in favour 71. How -
ever, it was also clear that a large part of the province was by no means so warmly
disposed a s thes e town s t o th e prospec t o f a n earl y en d t o th e war . Enkhuizen
authorized it s deputies to consent t o talks if the truce were to be made excluding
the kin g of Spain, bu t to speak against i t otherwise 72. Hoorn consented provision-
ally, but with very strong conditions, including the demand that Dunkirk, Oosten-
de, Antwer p an d othe r town s of the Souther n Netherland s should be garrisoned
by Dutch troop s indefinitely 73. Gouda' s deputie s were instructed only to hear the
advysen o f th e othe r town s an d the n repor t back 74. Haarlem' s deputie s wer e in-
structed t o agree to hear th e detailed offe r o f the other side but not yet to agree to
any furthe r negotiation 75. Leiden' s representative s were likewise instructed, but
with th e adde d reservatio n tha t all seve n provinces had t o be unanimous before
they woul d agre e t o talks 76.
On 9t h October , th e Haarle m vroedschap di d decid e t o agre e to peac e o r truce
talks, bu t a t th e sam e tim e adopte d th e specifi c har d lin e t o whic h i t adhere d
through the 1632-163 3 negotiations and which came to be shared by the provinces
of Zeeland, Friesland an d Groningen . Haarle m consente d t o meet wit h 'those of
the othe r side ' strictly under the condition that the Spanish kin g and Infanta Isa-
bella were excluded fro m the proceedings77, that all Spanish, Italian and other for-
eign troop s wer e withdraw n fro m th e Souther n Netherlands , tha t Antwerp ,
Rheinberg, Breda , Orsoy , Linge n an d othe r town s be garrisoned indefinitel y b y
Dutch troops , tha t the reforme d faith b e tolerated freel y i n the Southern Nether-
lands as well as that the Schelde woul d remain closed and other conditions. Enk -
huizen assente d t o negotiations fo r peace or a truce on the same day as Haarlem78.
For som e week s however, Leide n stoo d ou t fro m th e othe r oppositio n town s in
70. G A Dordrecht , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 6 Oct . 1632 ; 'dat he t vz . werck met all e middele n va n
devoir so o in t publie k al s int particulie r byd e leden (de s noo t syñ ) sal werden gevordeert ten eijnd e
dat he t selv e o p he t spoedichst e te n effect e mac h werde n gebracht' .
71. G A Delft , Resolutie-boek , IV , 8 Oct. 1632 : 'verstonden d e heere n Edelen , Dordrecht , Amster -
dam, Rotterdam , Gorinchem , Alckmaar, Medemblic k ende Purmerend dat men behoort t e comen en
acceleren d e handelingen' ; Delf t itsel f joined wit h th e othe r peac e towns .
72. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 6 Oct . 1632 .
73. Ibidem, Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 6 Oct . 1632 .
74. G A Gouda , Oud-Archief , n o 50 , fos. 45v-46 .
75. G A Haarlem , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 5 Oct. 1632 .
76. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 449 , fos . l-4v , 9 Oct . 1632 .
77. G A Haarlem , Vroedschap s Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1632 : 'dát den Coninck van Hispanien, mitsgader s
d'Infante hertoginn e va n Brabant , buyte n dés e tractati e end e onderhandeling e geslote n e n da t har e
qualiteyten oft e name n to t geen e aggreatie n ofl e approbatie n in t alderminste n gebruyck t sulle n
werden'.
78. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 9 Oct . 1632 .
withholding consent to negotiate with the Brussels delegates at all and protestin g
repeatedly tha t it would not yield 79. On 1 5 October, against the single vote of Lei-
den, the States of Holland finall y agree d to make known its readiness to proceed,
in the States General. A week later, a delegation of the States of Holland, consist -
ing o f Raadpensionaris Cats , th e heer Van Brederode , and Nannin g van Foreest ,
secretary o f Alkmaar , appeare d befor e the Leide n vroedschap an d endeavoure d
with numerou s argument s to contriv e that i t confor m wit h the res t of the prov -
ince80. Leiden di d then relent as regarded entering into talks and preliminary dis-
cussion i n the State s of Holland, bu t continue d t o insist that there should be n o
substantive negotiatio n until all seven provinces of the union had declared them-
selves willing, thre e bein g yet t o d o so.
During November and Decembe r 1632 , the State s of Holland debate d the form
and conten t o f the proposed peace negotiations. In particular, there was consider-
able argument as to whether the Brussels States General shoul d be dealt with as a
free an d sovereig n body or be acknowledged to be subject to Spain, The majority,
the peac e party, pushe d har d fo r inclusion o f the kin g of Spain an d afte r som e
weeks of discussion wer e able to get their way. Gouda presse d resolutely for ex -
clusion o f th e kin g o f Spai n an d th e Infant a a t an y rat e durin g November 81.
Hoorn strov e until 1 4 December t o procure the exclusion of Spain but then, yield-
ing to the pressure o f the majority, dropped it s insistence82. Leiden's deputies wer e
instructed to press fo r negotiations a s with 'fre e State s that hav e throw n of f th e
yoke or sovereignty o f Spain' as far as possible, but then to yield i f this could no t
be obtained 83. Holland, le d by Amsterdam an d Rotterdam , wa s thus free b y De -
cember to exert pressure in the States Genera l on the three provinces that persist-
ed in pressing for exclusion o f Spain. 'Thos e of Holland', commented Aitzema ,
were mor e moderat e [tha n Zeeland , Frieslan d an d Groningen] , considerin g tha t i f

Spain wer e excluded , they would the n no t enjo y freedom o f commerce i n Spain , Italy
and othe r land s o f th e king 84.
In orde r t o present a unite d front t o the delegate s o f the Southern Netherlands ,

the Unite d Provinces , heade d b y Holland , wer e compelled t o presen t term s s o
harsh as to cause outright disma y in Brussels and indignation i n Madrid. In addi-
tion t o withdrawa l o f foreig n troops, th e transfe r of many towns, demolition o f
79. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 449 , fos . 4v-8 .

80. Ibidem, fo . 8v-9 .
81. G A Gouda , Oud-Archief , vol . 50 , fo. 48v .
82. AWG , Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 4 Dec. 1632 .
83. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 449 , fo . 13v , 7 Dec . 1632 .
84. Aitzema , Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling, I , 194 .
The Holland Towns an d the Dutch-Spanish Conflict 61
fortresses an d toleratio n o f Calvinism i n the South, retention of Dutch conquests
in the East an d Wes t Indies and continue d closure of the Schelde, there were ma-
jor tarif f demand s sough t b y Zeelan d t o preven t the us e of Flemish port s to cir-
cumvent Zeelan d toll s o n th e Scheld e an d th e conditio n tha t th e Dutc h Jews
should hav e th e sam e freedoms , throughou t th e Spanis h empir e i n Europe , a s
would other Dutch subjects 85. As the negotiations proceeded throug h the spring of
1633, therefore, an d a s it became cleare r that these terms would simply have to be
somewhat watere d dow n i f a fina l Dutch-Spanis h settlemen t was to be reached,
friction betwee n th e wa r an d peac e factions , both within the State s General and
the State s o f Holland, tended t o persist as the war party endeavoured to prevent
the making of concessions. Thus when the peace talks reached thei r climax in the
late spring and earl y summer of 163 3 and th e gap between the two sides was nar-
rowed to the point that there seemed to be a real likelihood o f an early end to the
war, the Dutch wa r party again began to assert itself to its utmost. Zeeland, Fries -
land an d Groninge n adopte d a progressively mor e hostile tone in their pronoun -
cements on the talks. The city of Utrecht, breaking constitutional convention, no-
tified th e States General directly that it regarded it s being overruled by the nobili-
ty an d clerg y o f the provinc e a s illegal an d refuse d t o accept tha t the province of
Utrecht wa s supporting the moves 86. The Hollan d wa r towns readied themselve s
for furthe r round s o f argumen t i n th e State s o f Holland .
By late May , 1633, there were two major remaining points of disagreement. One
was the issu e o f the Indie s where the Spaniard s wer e insisting that th e Republi c
must make concessions and , i n particular, agre e to withdraw from Brazil , and the
other, tha t o f th e Meieri j o f 's-Hertogenbosch , a rich , thickl y populate d an d
overwhelmingly Catholic regio n which, though stil l partly in Spanish hands , was
demanded b y the Dutch o n the ground that it all pertained to the town and seat of
the bishopric, whic h they had captured i n 1629 . As an inducement to give up Per-
nambuco, Philip was offering th e Dutch substantial financial compensation. The-
se crucial remaining point s were referred back by the Dutch States General to the
provinces, an d b y th e province s t o thei r members , s o tha t i n th e firs t wee k of
June, the groóte saecke lay again in the hands of the Holland vroedschappen. Am -
sterdam now carrie d it s rift with the West India Compan y so far that while it in-
structed it s deputie s t o pres s fo r retentio n o f Pernambuco u p t o a point , rathe r
than allo w the talks t o break down , to agree to abandon Brazi l in return for mo-
85. Th e deman d concernin g th e Jew s i s rather perplexing , fo r no Dutc h demand caused more an-
noyance i n Madri d a t thi s time, such that i t appears unlikely that it was prompted by any peace tow n
and ye t it was, of course, normally Amsterda m that concerned itsel f with the Jews; on the place of the
Jews in the Dutch-Spanis h conflict , se e my article 'Spai n and th e Dutc h Sephardim, 1609-1660' , Stu-
dia Rosenthaliana, XII (1978 ) 1-61 ; see below, 355-415. \
86. ARA , SG , loketkas 198 , Resolution 8 July 163 3 on missive of Utrecht to States General, 2 7 May
1633.
netary compensation 87. Rotterdam authorize d it s representatives t o assent t o what-
ever wa s necessar y t o brin g a n en d t o thi s sorrowfu l an d burdensom e war' 88.
Dordrecht resolve d to do all that was possible t o bring the negotiations to a suc-
cesful conclusion 89. Delft , mor e cautiou s ove r th e colonia l issu e tha n th e othe r
peace towns , assente d t o furthe r concession s excep t tha t matter s relating t o the
Indies should b e referred back 90. At the sam e time, on the other hand, Haarlem' s
deputies wer e instructe d t o refus e an y furthe r concession 91. Whil e Gouda , stil l
militant, determined t o recommend continuatio n o f the war outside of Europe in
both th e Eas t an d Wes t Indies 92. Hoor n an d Enkhuize n onc e agai n expresse d
strong suppor t fo r th e grea t colonia l companies , urgin g continuatio n o f th e
Dutch-Spanish struggl e outside of Europe". Leide n characteristically insisted that
Dutch Brazil be kept and al l the Meierij acquired 94. The meeting of the Schiedam
vroedschap brok e u p inconclusively . Although there was no explicit statement in
the Rotterda m an d Dordrech t resolution s tha t thes e town s were now read y to
abandon Brazil , given the context , it seem s clea r tha t thi s is their significance .
Until Jun e 1633 , Amsterdam, Rotterdam , Dordrech t an d Alkmaar, the core of the
Holland peac e part y had commande d a solid majorit y i n the provincial assembly
and ha d successfull y enforced step after ste p in the direction of peace. Ove r Brazil
and th e Meieri j however , tha t majorit y dissolve d an d fro m Jun e onwards , it
proved impossibl e to secur e an y furthe r progres s i n th e talks . Indeed they were
only precariously kept alive during the next six months owing to the vigorous de-
termination o f the Hollan d peac e towns . I n earl y August , the State s of Holland
debated the advic e o f Frederik Hendrik, wh o seems to have discarded hi s former
leaning towar d the peac e cam p b y thi s time, that i f the enem y did no t giv e way
over th e Meieri j an d th e Indie s within a month, reckoned from 2 9 July, then the
negotiations should b e broken of f by the Dutc h side. Haarlem wanted this dead-
line t o b e strictl y enforced 95, a s di d Enkhuizen , Schoonhoven 96 and othe r towns .
87. G A Amsterdam , Vroedschaps Resoluties , XVI , fos. 1-v ; Waddington, L a République, I , 198-202 ;
De Boer , Di e Friedensunterhandlungen, 104 .
88. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 9 June 1633 .
89. G A Dordrecht , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 6 June 1633 : 'is eenpaerlick e n eenstemmenlick geresol-
veert e n gepersisteert, dát d'heeren di e de voorsz . saecke vertrouwee n is , alsnoch met alle n ijve r ende
devoir sullen poogen t e volvoeren, ende alle hae r actië n daer toe dirigeren, da t den Vreden ofte treves
mach getroffe n e n geeffectueer t werden' .
90. G A Delft , Resolutie-boek , IV , 6 Jun e 1633 .
91. G A Haarlem , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 7 Jun e 1633 .
92. G A Gouda , Oud-Archie f 50 , fo . 68 , 7 June 1633 .
93. AWG , Hoorn , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 3 June 1633 , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 6
June 1633 ; on the issue of occupying Flemis h harbours, interestingly, Hoor n strov e longest amon g the
Holland wa r town s and b y early Jun e was lef t completel y isolated .
94. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 449 , fos . 45v-46 , 8 June 1633 .
95. G A Haarlem , 4 Aug . 1633 .
96. Streekarchie f Krimpenerwaard , Schoonhoven, Vroedschaps Resoluties , 8 Aug. 1633; this resolu-
tion suggest s tha t Schoonhove n stil l incline d toward s th e wa r camp .
Peace town s suc h a s Rotterdam , b y contrast, considered that contact shoul d cer-
tainly no t b e broken off , that n o limi t shoul d b e set and tha t with the ai d o f the
Almighty a wa y t o peac e woul d b e found" . Th e deadloc k produce d dela y an d
later, in November, a second dead-lin e wa s set. Again the peace cam p fought th e
proposal, Delf t for instance resolving that the 'deputies [fro m Brussels ] shoul d be
kept her e an d no t mad e t o go back, before it is seen what outcome the Almighty
in thi s mos t importan t matte r shal l b e please d t o grant' 98. O n 2 December, th e
States of Holland vote d agai n a s to whether to break off negotiations finall y an d
send back the Brussel s deputies. Four votes only were cast in favour of a complete
break - thos e o f Haarlem, Leiden , Goud a and , intriguingly , the nobility. Thos e
which voted fo r keeping th e Brussels representatives in The Hague were seven -
Amsterdam, Rotterda m an d Delft , predictably , an d als o Edam , Monnikendam ,
Medemblik and Purmerend . Eigh t towns adopted a middle positio n favourin g the
sending bac k o f th e deputie s bu t no t a fina l breakin g off , but 'me t clar e en uyt-
druckelijcke woorde n t e kenne n gheve n dat me n de n hande l hou t voo r geconti-
nueert': thes e wer e Dordrecht , Gorkum , Schiedam , Schoonhoven , Brielle , Alk -
maar, Hoor n an d Enkhuize n ". On e wonders , wit h regar d t o th e switc h i n th e
position of the nobility , whether this might hav e been connected wit h the shif t in
Frederik Hendrik' s ow n stance . A t length , afte r severa l weeks more wrangling ,
negotiations wit h Brussels were finally broken off at the end of December 1633 .
After Decembe r 1633 , apar t fro m a brie f flurr y o f truce move s initiated by th e
Cardinal-Infante i n 1635-1636 , there wer e no othe r substantiv e negotiations be -
tween Spai n an d th e Republi c unti l 164 3 when the Munste r talk s began i n ear -
nest. Throughou t thi s length y prolongatio n o f the war , oppositio n t o a Spanis h
peace, thoug h steadil y waning , di d surviv e as an activ e forc e within the States of
Holland, it s las t outpos t bein g Leide n whic h eve n followin g ratificatio n o f th e
treaty o f Munster, alon e among Hollan d town s refused, i n June 1648 , to compl y
with th e State s General's reques t tha t publi c festivitie s b e arranged throughou t
the Republic t o celebrate th e Peace 100. Taking a broad vie w of the Dutch-Spanis h
conflict o f 1621-1648 , the significance o f this persistent wa r sentiment i n Hollan d
lies not onl y in that i t contributed substantiall y t o frustrating the hopes for peace
of Amsterdam, Rotterdam , Delf t and Dordrecht ove r many years, but also in that
it allows muc h insigh t int o the deeper meanin g o f the long struggle both fo r Hol-
land and Dutc h lif e of the Golden Ag e generally. Lengthy wars involving burden-
some taxation ar e not usually popular. Thu s when the heavy taxation and the ma-
97. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 0 Aug. 1633 .

98. G A Delft , Resolutie-boek , IV , 3 0 Nov . 1633 .
99. Se e J. J. Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik. Prins van Oranje. Ee n biografisch drieluik (Zutphen , 1978 )
404-405.
100. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 963 , fo. 237, 4 June 1648 .
ny other heavy burdens imposed by the struggle, including ver y extensive disrup-
tion to Holland's European trade , are taken into account, i t must seem extraordi-
nary that suppor t fo r the conflict remained vigorou s for so long. What makes the
phenomenon stil l mor e remarkabl e is that the nobility which tended in most Eu -
ropean countrie s t o hol d war-makin g in highe r estee m tha n muc h of the res t of
society, in Holland, Utrecht , Gelderland an d Overijsse l were, at least for much of
the time , i n favour of peace. Ther e i s no denying that outsid e the three war pro-
vinces, th e main support for the conflict came from certai n particular towns, nota-
bly Haarlem, Leiden , Gouda, Utrecht , Hoorn and Enkhuizen. The question beco-
mes stil l mor e perplexin g i f on e refer s bac k t o th e year s 1607-1609 , when th e
Dutch entere d fo r th e firs t tim e int o truce talk s with Spain. A t that time , many
towns, includin g Haarle m an d Leiden , whic h late r adhere d t o the Hollan d wa r
party, the n supporte d Oldenbarnevel t an d hi s truc e moves 101. Gouda , whic h in
1632-1633 belonged t o the militant opposition , was , before 1609, more desirous of
a Spanis h peac e tha n an y other Hollan d town' 02. More remarkable still , what sig-
nificant resistanc e tha t ther e wa s i n th e State s o f Holland , i n 1607-1609, ' to th e
truce polic y emanate d fro m Amsterdam 103. The attitud e o f Amsterdam in 1607 -
1609, however , afford s a valuabl e insigh t int o th e natur e o f later development s
and a n ap t starting-poin t fro m whic h t o wor k toward a genera l explanatio n fo r
the subsequen t division s amon g th e Hollan d town s during th e secon d Spanis h
war. A t the tim e o f Oldenbarnevelt's truc e moves , the stric t Calvinis t part y ha d
recently come to dominate within the Amsterdam vroedschap. Thi s meant of cour-
se a shift i n religious polic y in the city. It also involved the ascendancy of a politi-
cal factio n whic h wa s quit e sharpl y define d an d delineate d a s regards familia l
connections fro m th e party of those later to be known as the Remonstrant regents .
Of course, there is nothing new in asserting tha t the future Counter-Remonstrant s
and thei r opponents wer e political groupings and networks of patronage a s much
as religious parties. What needs to be stressed, though, is that any political group -
ing exercising extensive patronage and great influence over local economic admi -
nistration, procedures an d taxatio n will inevitably be, or tend to become, a n eco-
nomic factio n also . I n a highl y comple x economy , suc h a s that o f seventeenth -
century Holland , interest s naturally vary and in the nature of things where oppos -
ing groups fight for power, the rival political and politico-religious bodie s becom e
identified wit h competin g economi c interests .
Amsterdam undoubtedl y wa s devoted above all to sea-borne commerce . Bu t by
1607-1609, ther e was , a s wa s t o b e stil l mor e th e cas e afte r 1621 , a deepseate d
101. Ja n de n Tex, Oldenbarnevelt ( 5 vols. ; Haarlem-Groningen , 1960-1972 ) II , 575 .

102. A . M. van de r Woude , 'De Gouds e magistraa t en d e strijd tege n d e koning', Bijdragen voor de
Geschiedenis der_ Nederlanden, XII I (1959 ) 101-107 .
103. De n Tex , Oldenbarnevelt, H, 562, 575 , 607 , 658 ; Elias , Vroedschap va n Amsterdam, I, xlix, l, lui.
contradiction betwee n th e requirement s of th e Europea n carryin g trad e o n th e
one han d an d o f colonia l commerc e on th e other' 04. Whil e th e forme r suffere d
from th e stringen t embargoe s impose d b y the Spanish crow n against Dutch ship-
ping and good s in Spain, Portugal, Spanish North Africa an d southern Italy, fro m
1598 onwards, and fro m th e beginning s o f Flemish privateering , colonia l trad e
gained bot h fro m th e war-time opportunity to attack Portuguese and Spanish tra-
de and possession s in the Fa r Eas t an d the Americas and, indeed , als o from th e
set-backs t o Europea n trade , whic h caused a majo r diversio n of investment and
energy fro m Europea n int o colonial trade. Th e loss of access t o Portuguese an d
Andalusian salt , on e o f th e principa l Dutc h import s from souther n Europe and
re-exports t o the Baltic , no t only directly cause d Dutc h exploitation o f the Vene-
zuelan salt-pan s i n the year s 1598-1609 , but accorde d Caribbean sal t a commer-
cial value in Europ e that i t could no t possibly hav e gained withou t th e Spanis h
embargoes an d whic h wa s a t onc e remove d in 160 9 with th e commencemen t of
the truce 105. In no small measure , th e same was also true of spices and sugar with
disruption and embarg o in Europe stimulating direct contact with the East Indies
and Brazil . Thus Dutch colonia l trade, both in its origins and its later progress, in
part live d of f the misfortune s of the Europea n carryin g trade. The victory of the
hard-line Calvinist s a t Amsterdam , a s i s wel l known 106, no t onl y marke d th e
triumph o f a churc h factio n and patronag e network, but th e ascendanc y of the
East Indi a Compan y an d thos e wh o aspired t o th e settin g u p o f a Wes t Indi a
Company. Th e Amsterda m city council first decided in 160 6 to support plans for
a Wes t Indi a Compan y an d fro m then , unti l the mi d 1620s , remained th e chie f
patron o f th e Wes t Indi a interest .
The West Indi a Company is certainly the clearest instance i n seventeenth-centu-
ry Holland of a specific economic entity with a pronounced political orientation.
After th e establishmen t o f th e compan y i n 1621 , th e Amsterda m chamber wa s
heavily dominate d b y Counter-Remonstrant s and Sout h Netherlanders, th e Re-
monstrant regent s havin g onl y a tin y representation 107. Durin g the mi d 1620s, as
the Counter-Remonstrant s los t thei r dominatio n o f th e cit y administratio n and
there occure d a resurgenc e o f Remonstran t religiou s activity , tolerate d b y th e
vroedschap, ami d th e friction and general unres t in the city, the Company openly
took side s wit h the Counter-Remonstran t minorit y o f the vroedschap, callin g o n
104. Israel , 'Spai n an d th e Netherlands', 661 ; see above, 33 and below, 355-415.
105. Enge l Sluiter , 'Dutch-Spanis h Rivalr y i n th e Caribbea n Area , 1594-1609' , Hispanic American
Historical Review, XXVII I (1948 ) 170 , 176-178 ; C . Goslinga, Th e Dutch i n the Caribbean andón th e
Wild Coast, 1580-1680 (Assen , 1971 ) 82-83 .
106. Elias , D e vroedschap va n Amsterdam, I , xlix , 1 ; W. J . va n Hoboken , 'Th e Dutc h Wes t Indi a
Company; the Politica l Background of its Rise and Decline' , in: J. S . Bromley and E . H. Kossmann,
ed. Britain an d th e Netherlands, I (London , I960 ) 48 .
107. Ibidem, 50-54 .
the stadholder t o intervene against th e Remonstrants. Thus well before the truce
talks o f 1629 , the vroedschap majority , led by Andrie s Bicker, and th e Compan y
were al l a t onc e opponent s i n religion , politic s an d economi c policy . Wit h th e
campaign b y the so-calle d Libertin e majority of the city council to terminate th e
Spanish war , a policy threatening the most vital interests of the Company, and th e
withdrawal b y Bicker' s brother, Cornelis, o f his large investment in the Compa -
ny's shares , relation s deteriorated almos t t o the point of a feud . Member s of th e
Amsterdam vroedschap wh o remained heavily involved in the West India Compa-
ny, suc h a s Reynier Reasl an d Simo n van de r Does' 08, a t the sam e time a s the y
identified wit h the Counter-Remonstrants in religion and opposed the Bicker fac-
tion politically , publicl y pressed fo r continuatio n o f th e Spanis h war.
The victor y of the Remonstrants in Amsterdam and the break with the Compa -
ny brough t abou t th e hegemon y o f the Europea n carryin g interest in th e vroed-
schap an d growin g appreciation of its needs. This also fitted in well with the parti -
cular busines s enterprise s o f Bicke r himself . Moreover , a t thi s ver y point , th e
needs of European trad e were especially pressing and particularly opposed t o tho -
se o f colonia l commerce . Dutc h Europea n carryin g traffi c suffere d fro m muc h
heavier Spanis h pressur e afte r 162 1 than it had befor e 1609' 09. Effective exclusio n
from Spain , Portuga l an d souther n Italy , combined with the increasingly dama -
ging activity of the Dunkirkers, which rarely captured heavily armed India-men ,
but too k hundred s offluytsts ailing to an d fro m France , Italy , England an d Nor -
way, made a very considerable impac t indeed. The contraction in Mediterranea n
trade, moreover , adversely affected Balti c commerce, fo r much of the Baltic grain
and timbe r wa s destine d fo r Mediterranea n markets , especiall y thos e tha t wer e
now closed, while among the leading Dutch exports to the Baltic were Iberian salt
and herring , supplie s o f which depende d o n adequat e provisio n of sal t i n Hol -
land.
Beside Amsterdam , tw o othe r Hollan d town s which may be sai d t o hav e bee n
highly sensitiv e to Spanis h economi c pressur e wer e Rotterda m an d Dordrecht .
Rotterdam, a major centre of European carrying, where the West India Compan y
was relatively weak , was at the sam e time a strong-point of the opponents t o th e
Counter-Remonstrants. Dordrecht' s principa l interest , economically , la y i n th e
busy inland river traffic o f which it was a focal point and within which carrying t o
Antwerp and th e Souther n Netherland s figured large. The general contraction o f
river an d canal-born e commerc e betwee n th e tw o part s o f th e Netherlands ,
caused b y a variety of war-time measures, and especiall y by the great river bloc-
108. Thes e two were amon g those Heere n XI X of the Company wh o signed th e remonstrance to th e
States Genera l i n Octobe r 162 9 bitterl y attackin g th e truc e moves .
109. Se e above, 15-22.
kade impose d b y th e Spaniard s durin g th e year s 1625-1629"° , undoubtedly had
considerable advers e consequence s for Dordrecht and goe s far to explain the ex-
ceptional fervou r fo r peace evinced by Dordrecht during the 1629-163 3 truce and
peace negotiations . Othe r ports seriously affected b y the Spanis h embargoes and
Flemish privateering wer e Hoorn an d Enkhuize n which between them furnishe d
a larg e par t o f th e shippin g employe d i n Balti c an d Mediterranea n trade . Bu t
there, th e Counter-Remonstran t faction , whic h ha d alread y bee n dominan t wel l
before 1618 , sustaine d bot h itsel f an d th e loca l econom y throug h th e relativel y
huge expansio n i n Eas t an d Wes t Indi a Compan y activit y during th e 1620 s and
1630s. I t appear s tha t ther e wa s a particularl y intimat e connectio n i n the West
Frisian ports between th e town councils and the Noorderkwartier chambe r o f the
West Indi a Company. O f eleven West India Compan y directors from the town of
Hoorn betwee n 162 2 and 1636 , fo r instance, no les s tha n fou r wer e also burgo -
masters o f Hoorn an d a t least thre e others were also members o f the vroedschap
during th e 1632-163 3 negotiations'" .
In additio n t o th e clas h o f interest s a s betwee n Europea n an d colonia l trade ,
however, there existed withi n the province of Holland a still deeper contradictio n
of interest , a s betwee n sea-born e commerc e an d manufacturing , which like th e
former difference , becam e linke d t o Remonstran t an d Counter-Remonstran t
rivalry. Leide n an d Haarle m ha d buil t u p thei r woollen, linen and dyin g indus-
tries rapidly i n the lat e sixteent h century , helped b y the ruin of the textile indus-
tries o f the Souther n Netherland s an d th e grea t migratio n o f Flemish an d Wal -
loon cloth workers and employers to the United Provinces. Gouda developed into
a significant secondary centr e of textile production somewhat later, mainly during
the first quarter o f the seventeenth century. From an early stage, however, Dutch
cloth producers were keenly aware of their all-too-evident vulnerability to foreign
competition an d particularly o f the increasingly formidable threat that the textiles
of Lille , Hondschoote , Valenciennes , Tilburg , Lièg e an d elsewher e woul d pos e
once recover y i n th e Souther n Netherland s began , a s it soon did 112. With an in -
dustrious, highl y skille d an d experience d wor k force, good communication s an d
significantly lowe r wag e rates , Souther n Netherland s clot h outpu t coul d not ,
indeed, b e otherwise tha n highl y menacin g fro m th e moment recovery began. As
early a s 1585 , Leiden, Haarle m an d Delf t wer e pressing fo r a ban o n commerc e
110. Ibidem, 23-24 ;\for furthe r informatio n o n Dordrech t during the second Dutch-Spanish war, see
my Th e Dutch Republic an d the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford , 1982) , 167 , 201 , 231 , 242 .
111. AWG , OAH , III , se e name list s a t th e head s o f vroedschaps-resoluties; D e Laet , Jaerlyck Ver-
hael, 36 .
112. N . W . Posthumus , D e geschiedenis va n de Leidsche lakenindustrie ( 3 vols. ; Th e Hague , 1908 -
1939) III , 955-963 ; Idem, ed., Bronnen to t de geschiedenis van de Leidsche textielnijverheid ( 6 vols.; Th e
Hague, 1910-1922 ) IV , xi; S. C. Regtdoorzee Greup-Roldanus, Geschiedenis der Haarlemmer Bleekt-
rijen (Th e Hague , 1936 ) 22 , 27 , 38 , 267 .
with th e Spanis h Netherland s so as to preven t wool and othe r ra w materials for
industry being supplie d ther e and t o shut out Flemis h fabrics' 13, predictably, Am -
sterdam an d othe r tradin g towns resisted fiercely. From thes e beginnings, arose a
prolonged rivalr y betwee n Leide n and Haarle m o n the one side, and Amsterda m
and Rotterda m o n th e other , whic h arguably greatly contributed to the deep rif t
between th e fou r leadin g town s of Hollan d ove r man y decades .
In 1607-1609 , the Holland war-party , led by Amsterdam, had had powerfu l sup-
porters i n Leiden and Haarlem , an d Amsterdam had hoped t o form an oppositio n
block wit h the m agains t th e truc e moves . As i t happene d though , Oldenbarne -
velt's supporter s i n the city councils of the textile towns carried the day and Am-
sterdam was left isolated . The consequence o f this development, however, was the
immediate los s by the cloth town s of the substantial tariff protection tha t they had
enjoyed durin g th e las t phas e o f the first Dutch-Spanish war , under the tariff list
introduced i n 1603 . The entire range of manufactures entering the United Provin-
ces from, o r through, Spanish-controlle d territory , suddenly paid only a tiny frac -
tion o f the duty payabl e befor e the truce" 4. The impost on Southern Netherlands
woven linen, fo r instance , fel l t o one-fifth o f its war-time level. Of course, loss of
protection, during the truce , was largely compensate d fo r by the vigorous growth
that occurred i n Holland's European sea-born e trad e during the truce years. New
markets were acquired, especially fo r says and othe r new draperies, in the various
countries o f th e Spanis h Monarchy . Bu t at th e sam e time , the growing demand
from th e merchan t exporter s o f Hollan d sucked i n increasing quantitie s o f cloth
from th e Souther n Netherland s an d i n effec t assiste d it s industria l recovery .
Accordingly, whil e some, thoug h no t all , Dutc h textil e activities continued to ex-
pand unti l th e resumptio n o f war, in 1621 , Spanish Netherland s competition was
also being fel t mor e keenl y during these years. The overthrow of Oldenbarnevelt
in 161 8 and subsequen t ascendanc y of the Counter-Remonstrants, however, led to
a shar p resurgenc e o f protectionism i n the State s of Holland fomente d especially
by Leide n an d Haarlem .
The assertio n tha t i s ofte n pu t forwar d tha t tariff s o n importe d manufacture s
were normall y kep t ver y or relatively low during the Dutch Golden Age" 5, at the
insistence o f th e grea t commercia l towns , actuall y require s drastic qualification ,
indeed contradiction , a s regards th e year s of the secon d Dutch-Spanis h struggle .
Even befor e th e expir y of the truce, th e States of Holland deliberate d whethe r to
raise th e tariff s o n manufacture s produced i n 'enemy ' territory , o r reachin g th e
113. De n Tex , Oldenbarnevelt, I , 273 , 276 , 282 .
114. Groot Placcaet-boek, I , 2388-2389, 2404-2405 , 2458 , 2466-2467 ; Regtdoorze e Greup-Roldanus ,
Haarlemmer Bleekerijen, 255-256 ; C . G . Cobet, Bijdrage to t d e geschiedenis der belastingen in Neder-
land (Leiden , 1864 ) 133 .
115. Se e J. G . va n Dillen, 'Leiden als industriestad tijdens d e Republiek', Tijdschrift voor Geschiede-
nis, LI X (1946 ) 35-36 .
United Province s throug h enem y territory , an d ther e wa s pressure t o increas e
duties on ra w wool export s 'to t bete r conservatie va n de Inlandtsche manufactu-
ren'116. In 1623 , the States General , at Leiden's demand, prohibited altogether th e
export of local (hierlandtsche) uncombe d wool, both to Spanish and neutral terri-
tory, and tightl y restricted export s of combed wools" 7. In July 1625 , the protectio -
nist drive of the early 1620 s continued wit h the re-introduction b y the States Ge-
neral of the war list of 1603 , a list which involved considerable tarif f increases on
all foreig n manufacture s but wit h a specia l additional tarif f o n good s manufac-
tured in, or entering the Republic through, Spanish-controlled territory" 8, as well
as heavie r dut y o n exporte d foreig n wools . A t provincia l leve l meanwhile, a s a
supplementary war-tim e measure , ta x payabl e o n th e differen t type s of Spanish
Netherlands clot h sol d i n Holland wa s raised by three and fou r times, while duty
on Lièg e lakens remained unchanged 119.
Despite thes e measures , som e Flemis h manufacture s doubtless still entered th e
Republic whil e local ra w wool seeped out . The Leiden city council certainly con -
tinued to receive complaints about diversion of wool supplies. In addition, Leide n
and Haarle m undoubtedl y los t expor t market s i n Spain , Portuga l an d Italy ,
though there were pamphleteers wh o denied this. Spanish ministers were not alto-
gether wron g i n believin g tha t thei r measure s adversel y affecte d Dutc h textil e
production, a s is indicated b y the steady decline o f say output at Leiden fro m th e
early 1620s , at a time whe n Flemish an d Englis h export s of new draperies t o the
Iberian peninsul a wer e increasing . Bu t wit h Souther n Netherland s competitio n
reduced, othe r clot h outpu t and , afte r 1635 , especially th e famou s lakens, which
were much costlier cloth s than says, expanded 120. It is true that measured in terms
of quantit y of output, the gain s o f war wer e cancelled ou t b y the losses , s o that
total productio n stagnate d a t a more or less even plateau between 162 1 and 1648 ,
but the value and profitability of Leiden's production rose steadily throughout the
war. Moreover , man y o f Leiden's competitor s i n th e Souther n Netherlands , ha -
ving lost access to the Dutch market , were forced into recession. That Leide n ha d
the uppe r han d durin g th e 1620 s and 1630 s over it s chief Souther n Netherland s
rivals i s furthe r suggeste d b y th e marke d increas e i n th e migratio n o f skille d
116. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 1621 , see th e beschrijving an d discussio n o f poin t 1 0 of Marc h
and poin t 9 o f April .
117. Groot Placcaet-Boek, I , 1172-1173 , 2 2 Apri l 1623 , re-issue d 8 June 1630 .
118. Ibidem, \ , 2415-2416 , 1 2 June 1625 ; anothe r war-tim e protectionis t measur e wa s th e ba n o f
January 163 0 o n the importin g of rough woven linnen (tijcken) int o the Unite d Provinces from Flan -
ders an d Brabant .
119. Groot Placcaet-Boek, I , 1900 , 1901 , 1909 ; J . G . va n Dillen , ed., Bronnen to t d e geschiedenis van
het bedrijfsleven e n het gildewezen va n Amsterdam, II (1612-1632) (RG P LXXVIII ; Th e Hague , 1932 )
415.
120. Posthumus , D e Leidsche lakenindustrie, III , 1179-H80 , 1184 .
workers fro m Lieg e t o Leide n durin g thos e years , wherea s after 1648 , the drif t
was ver y muc h i n th e othe r direction 121.
Following th e conclusio n o f th e Dutch-Spanis h wa r i n 1648 , the advantageou s
position o f the Dutc h textil e industry wa s at onc e lost , with a shar p increas e i n
imports fro m th e Souther n Netherland s into the United Provinces and a marked
weakening i n th e competitiv e position o f Leiden in particular 122. Admittedly, the
celebrated economi c theoris t o f seventeenth-centur y Leiden, Piete r d e l a Court ,
placed relativel y little emphasis on th e los s of protection an d th e withdrawa l of
the war-tim e tariff lis t a s reason s fo r th e post-164 8 weakening of Leiden' s posi -
tion, preferring to blame excessively tight guild controls over the processes of pro-
duction; but he was well aware that the Dutch textile industry had flourished best
during the lon g war , attributing this to the damage suffere d b y the textile indus-
tries of northwest German y and the destructio n wrough t by the French in Flan -
ders, afte r 1635 123. Thus i t may b e gathered tha t when Haarlem declared tha t th e
Spanish wa r wa s n o ba d thin g economically, whil e Amsterdam and Rotterda m
referred t o th e burden s and losse s caused b y the struggle , n o real contradiction
was involved. Fo r Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht , the conflict wa s dama-
ging; fo r Leiden , Haarlem , Goud a an d als o Utrecht , i t wa s beneficial.
Thus i t ma y b e said , i n conclusion , tha t economi c a s well as internal politica l
and religiou s rivalrie s cause d th e shar p spli t betwee n the two groups of Hollan d
towns which is the mos t important featur e o f the Dutc h response t o the Spanis h
truce and peac e initiative s of 1629-1633 . Or rather economic rivalry, between two
competing set s of interests, forme d an inheren t part o f the domestic political an d
religious rivalr y whic h prevente d an y promp t o r unifie d Dutc h respons e t o th e
peace proposals . I t is true that th e Hollan d tow n councils themselve s seldom re -
ferred t o the economi c contex t i n their deliberation s ove r the truce moves , but i t
would seem tha t thi s was simply to avoid appearin g t o be motivated by local ra -
ther tha n nationa l interest . Thu s eve n where there is such reference, as by Haar-
lem in its long resolution o f January 1630 , the vroedschap concerne d trie d to justi-
fy it s case with arguments tha t allegedl y applie d t o Amsterdam and Zeeland ra -
ther than t o itself. In 1629-1630 , desire fo r stricter exclusion of Remonstrants and
Catholics fro m offic e wa s repeatedly asserte d t o be the main motive of the opposi-
tion town s and, undoubtedly , it was a major concern; an d yet, not all the towns by
any means tha t desired stricte r exclusio n o f Remonstrants supported the policy of
121. idem, 'De industriëel e concurrentie tussche n Noord - e n Zuid-Nederlandsche nijverheidscentr a

in de XVIIe and XVIH e eeuw', Mélanges d'histoire offerts á Henri Pirenne (Brussels, 1926 ) I, 372-373.
122. Ibidem, 373-378 ; P. D. Huet, Mémoires sur le commerce des Hollandois (Amsterdam , 1717) 82.
123. Thoug h D e l a Cour t di d als o criticize th e lac k o f tarif f protection , se e Pieter de l a Court , He t
welvaren va n Leiden. Handschrift ui t he t jaar 1659 (Th e Hague , 1911 ) 29-30 , 100-102 ; Th. va n Tijn ,
'Pieter de l a Court . Zij n leve n e n zij n economisch e denkbeelden' , Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, LXIX
(1956) 351 , 360 .
Leiden and Haarlem ; Alkmaar, fo r instance, supported th e peace moves . During
the 1632-163 3 deliberations, o n the other hand, there was scarcely any mention of
exclusion o f Remonstrants a s an issue, yet Leiden an d Haarlem continued t o lead
the resistance to peace, even when supposedly the chief issues were the West India
Company an d th e Meierij , i n whic h neither ha d much , i f any, direct concern .
3
FREDERICK HENRY AND THE

DUTCH POLITICAL FACTIONS, 1625-1642
FREDERICK HENR Y figure s indisputabl y a s a majo r Europea n

statesman and military leader of the Thirty Years War period; and yet,
until the recent massiv e study of his life an d work by Professor J. J .
Poelhekke,1 th e literatur e abou t hi m ha d remaine d remarkabl y
sparse. Apar t fro m th e muc h shorte r bu t stil l usefu l biograph y
published b y P . J . Blo k i n 1924 ^ ther e previousl y existe d n o
systematic treatment of his political role. The few brief evaluations to
be foun d i n th e writing s o f othe r Dutc h historians 3 mostl y jus t
reiterate Blo.k's basic propositions which , indeed, as far as they go, are
mainly, though not entirely, accurate. Blok saw Frederick Henry as an
exceedingly cautiou s an d astut e politicia n wh o threade d hi s wa y
between the rival factions in the States General and Dutch provincial
assemblies usuall y by steerin g a middle cours e an d t o som e exten t
retaining the support of all. He was a master of gradual methods and
subtle compromise . Rober t Fruin , th e fathe r o f moder n Dutc h
historiography, applie d to him the dictum fortiteri n re, suaviter in modo.
Gradually, h e enhance d hi s ow n authorit y a s Stadholder , usin g a
small clique of leading members of the States General to manage and
manipulate th e vote s o f tha t bod y a s wel l as o f th e province s an d
influential towns. Eventually , encouraged b y the kings of France and
England, he evinced unmistakeably monarchical tendencies which, in
the end, however, wer e thwarted by the watchful regents of Holland.
Poelhekke's wor k ha s certainly refine d an d elaborate d o n Blok' s
picture in som e respects and yet, despit e its bulk, it is striking that
relatively littl e space i s devoted t o Frederic k Henry' s dealing s wit h
the political factions and to the problem of how he actually managed
1. J . J . Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrik, Prins va n Oranje. Ee n biografisch drieluik
(Zutphen, 1978) .
2. P . J . Blok , Frederik Hendrik. Prins van Oranje (Amsterdam , 1924) .
3. See , in particular, Piete r Geyl, Oranje en Stuart (19)9) (repr . Arnhem, 1963) , pp .
13-15; Pieter Geyl, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam (3 vols. Amsterdam/Antwerp,
1948—9), i . 396— 7 ff . E . H . Kossmann , 'Th e Lo w Countries , 1621—1648' , New
Cambridge Modern History, IV (ed. J. P . Cooper, 1970) , pp. 374-5 ; J. H . Kluiver, 'D e
Republiek n a he t bestand , 1621-1650 ' [Th e New ] Algemene Geschiedenis de r
Nederlanden, V I (1979) , pp. 352-6 .
the State s General, provinces and cit y councils (vroedschappen). Thes e
unavoidable questions, however, lie at the very heart of what is still in
some ways the enigma of Frederick Henry . It is frequently maintaine d
that the prince relie d on th e strictl y Calvinist Counter-Remonstrant
party, stronges t i n Zeeland , Utrecht , Frieslan d an d Groningen , t o
support hi s military ambitions, his pro-French polic y and his alleged
desire t o prolon g th e struggl e wit h Spain . O n th e othe r hand , a s
Poelhekke confirms, 1 h e als o depended , particularl y i n th e earl y
years, on the so-called Arminians among th e Holland regent s whos e
political position h e strengthened, in part because he was personally
averse t o th e intoleran t religiou s an d politico-religiou s attitude s of
the Counter-Remonstrants , bu t i n par t als o becaus e h e considere d
that h e needed th e Arminian s a s a politica l counter-weigh t t o th e
Counter-Remonstrants.2 But while Poelhekke is acutely conscious of
the seemin g contradiction s i n Frederic k Henry's position , i t canno t
be said that he deals with this problem in any way conclusively. Apart
from bein g brie f on the subject, it seems that he was also mistaken on
certain points . What follow s i s an attempt to move a little closer to a
precise account o f Frederick Henry' s styl e of leadership and manner
of handling the Republic's politics .
Frederick Henry' s predecesso r a s stadholder , hi s elde r brothe r
Maurice, ha d hel d undispute d swa y i n th e Republi c fro m hi s
successful coup d'etat against Oldenbarnevelt, i n 1618 , until his deat h
in April 1625 . But, despite this, it is certainly the cas e that Maurice's
authority and prestige were, in some respects, eroded durin g the early
16203. Thi s wa s du e partl y t o th e failur e o f hi s purel y defensiv e
strategy in the renewed war against Spain after 1621 , and his only too
evident inability to coax the provincial assemblies into voting enoug h
finance for eve n thi s limite d warfare. Breda, on e o f the ke y fortres s
towns o f th e Netherlands , wa s o n th e poin t o f bein g los t t o th e
Spaniards whe n Mauric e died , an d th e credi t o f th e Republi c wa s
rapidly sinking . Beside s this , ther e wa s th e increasingl y ominou s
outlook i n German y wher e th e Protestan t coalitio n ha d suffere d
defeat afte r defea t an d th e Habsburg s registere d impressiv e gains .
'Here', as one Dutch observe r expressed it in 1625 , 'there is nothin g
but gloom for the present and fear for the future.'3 An d while military
and financia l failur e ha d sappe d th e stadholder' s prestige , th e
underlying bitterness an d tensio n generate d internall y by Maurice' s
brusque repressio n o f th e Arminia n part y ha d persiste d unabated .
Indeed, in some of the Holland cit y councils, particularly Amsterdam
and Rotterdam , th e gri p o f th e Counter-Remonstrant s wa s bein g
1. Poelhekke , op. cit. pp. 180 — i, 212—13 .

2. 'W e zie n d e prins zijn leven lang met dez e twee groepen worstelen'; Kluiver,
loc. cit. p. 3 5 5.
3. Nicolaes van Reigersbercb, brieven aan Hugo de Groot, ed. H . C . Rogge (Amsterdam,
1901), p. 23 .
Frederick Henry an d the Dutch Political Factions 7 5
weakened i n a way which placed the whole future o f Maurice's style
of government fundamentally in question .
In the overthrow o f Oldenbarnevelt an d his subsequent handlin g
of th e State s o f Holland , Mauric e ha d relie d a goo d dea l o n th e
dominant orthodo x Calvinis t factio n i n th e Amsterda m vroedschap
headed b y Reynier Pauw.1 Like most groupings i n the vroedschappen,
this clique was in reality less motivated b y considerations o f doctrine
and church organizatio n tha n b y sheer political opportunism spice d
in the cas e of Amsterda m by a strong commitmen t to th e Eas t an d
West India Companies 2, and therefore also to the war against Spain.
While Pauw's faction evidently remained more popular with the bulk
of th e Amsterda m populac e tha n it s Arminia n rivals, th e advers e
effects o f the resumed war with Spain on Dutch Europea n a s distinct
from colonia l trad e see m t o hav e ha d a disastrou s impac t o n th e
standing o f the Pau w group among th e upper echelons of the city's
bourgeoisie. Alread y by 1622 , when three of the fou r newl y elected
burgomasters, includin g Antoni e Oetgens , wer e Arminians , th e
political ascendancy o f the Counter-Remonstrants i n the Amsterda m
vroedschap wa s visibly crumbling and by 162 4 it had disintegrated. 3 It
is true that the political Arminian s in the Amsterdam vroedschap wer e
not yet quite in the majority, and that in any case the general climate in
the countr y wa s stil l to o hostil e t o allo w ah y relaxatio n i n th e
repression o f religious Arminianism , that is Arminian preaching and
church services; but the much increased strength of the Remonstrants
together with the split between Pauw's adherents and a splinter group
of Counter-Remonstrants led by Jacob Gerritsz. Hoyngh4 mean t that
the stadholder could n o longer rel y on Amsterdam to back Counter-
Remonstrant policie s and attitudes.
The fac t tha t Frederic k Henr y had neve r associated himsel f with
Maurice's harsh measures against the Remonstrants and was known
to have Arminian sympathies undoubtedly lent added momentum to
the resurgenc e o f bot h politica l an d religiou s Arminianis m at thi s
time.5 A s a youth , th e princ e ha d bee n tutore d b y Johanne s
Uyttenbogaert, no w leade r o f th e Dutc h Arminia n churchme n i n
exile, an d wa s a clos e frien d o f Corneli s va n de r Mijle ,
1. Joha n E . Elias , D e Vroedschap va n Amsterdam, ijjS—iyy; ( 2 vols . Haarlem ,

1905-5), i. Ixxii-lxxiv, 191-201 .
2. W . J . va n Hoboken , 'Th e Dutc h Wes t Indi a Company ; th e Politica l
Background o f its Ris e an d Decline' , i n J. S . Bromley an d E . H . Kossman n (eds. )
Britain ami the Netherlands (London, 1960), pp. 48 ff.; J. I . Israel, 'The Hollan d Towns
and th e Dutch-Spanis h Conflict' , Bijdragen e n Mededelingen betreffende d e Geschiedenis
der Nederlanden, vol . 9 4 (1979) 62-6 ; see above, 64-68.
5. Elias , op. cit. i. Ixxvii .
4. Jaco b Gerritsz. Hoyng h (1593-1625 ) died in July 1625 . He had been a director
of the West Indi a Compan y sinc e 162 2 and wa s burgomaster of Amsterdam i n 1618 ,
1620 and 1621 ; see Elias, i. 202-4.
;. Si r Dudley Carleto n and Sir Albert Morton to Lord Conway, 4 July 1625 . PR O
SP 84/128 , fos. 14-15.
Oldenbarnevclt's son-in-law , wh o returne d fro m exil e an d wa s
restored t o favou r a t The Hagu e within week s of Maurice's death.1
But while Frederick Henry seems indeed to have had a deep aversion
to religiou s intoleranc e o f an y hue an d woul d certainl y have don e
something fo r his friends in exile in any case, there is no evidence that
he ha d an y particular inclination toward s religiou s Arminianis m as
such, an d i t woul d b e quit e wron g t o assum e tha t th e ne w
stadholder's subsequen t policy o f promoting th e political Arminia n
factions i n th e vroedschappen wa s simpl y a consequenc e o f hi s
sympathies and upbringing. Determine d thoug h h e was to forc e an
end t o th e harshe r aspect s o f th e repression , ther e wa s nothing t o
prevent th e prince , afte r 1625 , fro m endeavourin g t o prolon g th e
political domination of the party committed to the Spanish war and to
colonial expansion . He certainl y ha d no t th e slightes t intentio n o f
undermining the established Reformed Church as reorganized by the
Synod o f Dordrecht, in 1619 , or of bringing about the ecclesiastical
changes desired by the Arminia n clergy.
An importan t point to gras p is that som e months elapsed befor e
Frederick Henry had a chance to turn his attention to internal affair s
and tha t i n th e interim , th e greate r par t o f 1625 , th e politica l
Arminians achieve d fres h gain s whic h mad e i t quit e impossible ,
except b y th e mos t drasti c means , t o g o bac k t o even a modifie d
version o f Maurice' s styl e of government . Whil e Frederic k Henr y
succeeded hi s brothe r a t onc e a s captain-general o f th e Republic' s
forces, h e was not formall y installe d in the provinces a s stadholder ,
with all the political accoutrements of that office , unti l some months
later.2 I n an y case , the demand s o f th e 162 5 campaig n agains t th e
Spaniards absorbe d al l hi s attentio n unti l lat e i n th e autumn ,
preventing him during these crucial months from influencing internal
political developments and appointments:
that whic h is most considerabl e [reporte d an unnamed Englis h diplomat in
The Hagu e to London, in August 1 6 z. 5 ] is that Amsterdam, having when th e
Arminian faction wa s here a t theire Highest, orthodo x magistrates was, b y
adhering fas t t o th e lat e Pr. o f Orange, the chief e caus e o f reformacon an d
now th e dissension o f thos e magistrate s chiefl y th e two burgomaster s Pa w
[Pauw] and Honing s [Hoyngh], having mad e a gap fo r Bas [Dirk Bas ] and
other Arminian s to ente r int o authority out o f which th e former are quit e
excluded, in case this Prince of Orange should prove otherwise affecte d tha n
his brother, the same cause may produce the like effects o f alteracon speciall y
yf the faction should b e countenanced b y France, as it was heretofore whe n
the orthodox partye was sustayned b y England. 3
By the time that Frederic k Henry could begin to assert his authority
internally, the States of Holland, and to some extent those of the other
i. Blok , pp. 9, 78, 80
z. Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrik, pp. IJ7~8 -
3. PR O S P 84/128 , fo. 114 .
provinces, wer e alread y deepl y split . Indeed , th e mos t thoroughl y
divided provinc e wa s that o f Utrecht. Th e old tussl e for supremacy
between th e provincial nobility , or ridderschap, an d the city of Utrecht
had bee n fiercel y resumed . Th e ver y procedur e o f nominatin g
Frederick Henry stadholder of Utrecht intensified the battle as a good
deal turne d o n th e precis e term s o f th e prince' s appointment . Th e
Utrecht nobles , formerl y supporter s o f Oldenbarnevelt , politica l
Arminians and , i n som e cases , crypto-Catholics by faith , desire d t o
accept th e princ e under th e term s of Maurice's appointment o f 1 5 90
which restricted th e stadholder's influence tightly and assigned th e
ridderschap a major sa y in elections t o th e city' s vroedschap. I t wa s th e
Counter-Remonstrant party , heade d b y burgomaste r Joha n va n
Weede wh o the n dominate d th e vroedschap, whic h presse d fo r th e
retention o f th e revise d term s o f 161 8 which ha d greatl y enhance d
Maurice's powe r i n th e provinc e an d assigne d t o th e stadholde r a
major say in the vroedschap elections. 1 The resul t was a compromise
reached in June 1625 , but on e closer to the wishes of the city than of
the ridderschap. However , th e battle between th e Utrech t noble s an d
the cit y wa s t o continu e throughou t Frederic k Henry' s
stadholdership.
The dee p division s i n th e province s an d vroedschappen b y th e
autumn o f 1625 , an d th e ragin g controversie s ove r religion ,
confronted Frederic k Henr y with a bleak choice . H e had eithe r t o
restore som e semblanc e o f unit y b y throwin g hi s weigh t int o th e
scales against the resurgent Arminians or else to find some sufficientl y
safe an d reliabl e mean s o f balancin g th e parties agains t eac h other ,
leaving the power an d effectiveness o f the state and its armed forces
unimpaired, fo r the Counter-Remonstrants wer e much too strongl y
entrenched t o be totally thrust aside. Either cours e was fraught wit h
obvious risks . Ye t i n man y ways , th e forme r optio n mus t hav e
seemed the less practicable. If Maurice had failed to command enoug h
leverage wit h the State s of Holland t o obtain adequat e finance even
with a measure o f help from Amsterdam , wha t chance was there of
doing s o if the stadholder wer e to b e openly at odds with Holland' s
chief cit y where, exceptionally , th e stadholde r wielde d virtuall y no
influence o n vroedschap elections ? I n th e main , th e Counter -
Remonstrants wer e relative newcomers i n Dutch urba n politics an d
tended t o com e fro m lowe r dow n th e socia l scal e than thei r rivals .
They pose d a s th e popula r part y an d thei r greates t asse t wa s th e
support tha t the y enjoyed i n th e cities , including Amsterdam. 2 Bu t
for precisel y thi s reason , th e orthodo x part y i n th e vroedschappen
tended t o b e reluctant to vote new taxes and step up fiscal pressure.
Shortly afte r Frederic k Henry' s assumptio n o f militar y command ,
several secret conference s took plac e between representative s of th e
1. Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrik, pp . 94—96 ,
2. PR O SP 84/141, fos. 24 , 25.
provincial assemblie s a t th e prince' s cam p ove r whethe r o r no t a
diversionary offensive shoul d b e launche d in a last attemp t t o sav e
Breda. The prince found tha t while the eastern provinces wer e keen
to besiege Wese l or another Spanis h base on the eastern border, an d
Zeeland presse d fo r a n attac k o n Flanders , Holland , throug h it s
Raadpensionaris, Antoni e Duyck, a committed Counter-Remonstrant ,
insisted on a continued defensiv e posture.1 The fac t was that though
the Hollan d Counter-Remonstrant s o n occasio n pai d lip-servic e t o
the cause of liberating the South Netherlands from Spai n and Popery,
they habitually preferred the cheaper cours e of remaining strictly on
the defensive.
What th e princ e ha d t o fin d wa s a mean s t o manag e th e
vroedschappen an d province s s o a s t o co-ordinat e strategy , rais e
essential taxation an d place the entire war-effort o n a viable basis. I n
this regard , th e political Arminian s offered distinc t advantages , fo r
they woul d t o a considerabl e degre e remai n dependen t fo r thei r
offices an d power o n the prince's favour . I n return , he could expec t
more co-operation than Maurice had enjoyed regarding war-finance .
But then, of course, the Remonstrants were known as the Trevtsten, or
'pacificators' a s Carleto n calle d them, 2 th e grou p committe d t o
seeking a new truc e o r peac e with Spain . Poelhekk e sa w this a s the
central contradictio n i n Frederic k Henry' s polic y durin g th e early
years: th e prince's decision to back the political Arminians won him
the temporary support o f Amsterdam but was incompatible with his
long-term objectiv e of conquerin g extensiv e territor y i n th e Sout h
Netherlands. Poelhekk e thus tende d t o what is, in fact , th e conven -
tional vie w amon g Dutc h historians , tha t Frederic k Henry , a s
Kossmann pu t it , wa s 'possessed b y the ambitio n t o reconque r th e
Southern Netherlands', 3 though it is noteworthy tha t on thi s point
Blok wa s much mor e cautiou s and , i n fact , mor e accurat e tha n th e
others.4 For there is no evidence that that was the prince's objective,
at least not befor e 163 2 or 1633 . In any case, such an aim, until 1629,
would hav e bee n wholl y impracticable . Apar t fro m th e stil l ap -
parently superior strength of the Spanish army of Flanders, the South
Netherlands constituted a veritable maz e of fortifications, dikes and
canals scarcely less formidable as a fortress territory than the Republic
itself. Moreover , ther e wa s th e expansio n o f Habsbur g powe r i n
North German y t o recko n with . Th e princ e certainl y hoped fo r a
victory or two with which to enhance his own prestige, restore that of
the Republic and check the rising tide of Habsburg power, bu t fo r a
long perio d such aim s ha d nothin g t o d o wit h scheme s fo r
conquering or partitioning th e South Netherlands.
1. Carleto n to Conway , 10/2 0 May 1625 , PR O S P 84/127 , fos. 52-55 .
2. PR O S P 84/128 , fos . 14™ .
3. Poelhekke , pp. 181 , 212 , 314 , 406; Kossmann, loc. cii.
4. Blok , pp. i ;o, 1 5 5 .
Indeed, Frederic k Henry' s politica l Arminianism , includin g hi s
willingness t o wor k fo r a n early end t o th e Spanis h war , was much
more marke d tha n hi s suppor t fo r religiou s Arminianism . Hi s
attitude to church politic s was soothing and conciliatory, but his one
real concer n wa s t o hal t al l persecution ; beyon d tha t h e wa s
indifferent t o Arminia n teachin g a s such. I n effect , i n th e religiou s
sphere he strove t o b e neutral, th e 'indifferen t and moderate cours e
which his Excy hath hitherto holden', as the younger Carleton noted
in January 1626 , 'being little satisfactory t o either [party]'.1 When the
prince's old teacher , Johanne s Uyttenbogaert , returne d t o Hollan d
from Antwer p i n Septembe r 1626, the princ e ensure d his safety bu t
refused t o receiv e hi m o r favou r him officially. 2 Whil e the placards
prohibiting Remonstrant prayer meetings and other religious activity
quickly cease d t o b e enforce d i n man y localities , th e stadholde r
repeatedly reiterate d hi s commitmen t t o maintai n th e Reforme d
Church a s established a t Dordrecht an d no t t o allo w i t to b e in any
way subverted. Despit e repeate d appeals for their release, the grou p
of Remonstran t preacher s who m Mauric e ha d incarcerate d a t
Louvesteyn were kept there by Frederick Henry until 1631 , and even
then were allowed to escape rather than actually released. The prince
wanted toleration fo r the Arminians, but flatly rejected all pretensions
that 'their teaching and doctrine is the only approve d doctrine and
religion o f the wholle reformed church.'3
Such wa s th e strengt h o f feelin g i n man y quarter s agains t th e
Arminians tha t i t too k severa l year s completely t o hal t th e perse -
cution. Th e prince' s mos t crucia l ste p followe d a disturbanc e a t
Schoonhoven i n Apri l 1627 . Th e town' s adamantl y Counter -
Remonstrant magistracy had called in a detachment of English troops
of the loca l garrison t o brea k u p a n Arminian prayer meeting. Th e
incident le d t o heate d exchange s i n th e State s o f Hollan d an d th e
adoption o f a firm stand by the stadholder. H e constrained wha t was
still th e majorit y factio n i n th e provinc e t o accep t tha t th e burgo -
masters should n o longe r hav e the right , a s they had sinc e 1618 , t o
call on th e military for assistance against Arminian religious activity.
Troops wer e t o b e use d i n futur e onl y 'i n cas e o f publiqu e
tumults and violences when there could be noe other remedie used',
but no t t o suppres s peacefu l meetings , lawfu l o r otherwise ,
except o n th e expres s orde r o f th e State s Genera l or o f himsel f as
captain-general.4 'Man y member s o f th e assembli e o f Holland' ,
commented Carleton ,
i. Carleto n to Conway, 8/1 8 Jan. 1626 , PRO SP 84/131, fo. f.

z. Blok , p. 80.
3. Carleto n junior t o Conway , 23 Oct./z Nov. 1626 . PRO S P 84/132, fo. ii5 v .
4. PR O S P 84/133 , f°s . I32 V -41 Reigersbercb, uneven, pp . 88-89 ; Blok , p . 81 .
Evidently in Utrecht, the prince had already indicated in February 1626 that he would
not permit the use of troops to enforce the placards; see Uyttenbogaert to Grotius, 14
appeared muc h offende d who understoo d tha t th e authentic of th e States
Generall wa s flatly cryed downe and tha t the meaninge o f the placéate was
perverted and that soe long as his Excie should use such a course there was
little power in the Magistrates, whoe have noe other strength o f themselves
than a scoute with half e a dousen Serjeants .
And s o i t proved . Fro m 162 7 onwards , regula r an d largel y un -
hindered Arminian gatherings becam e a feature of life through muc h
of the country, despite a continuing an d systematic drive on the part
of th e hard-lin e Counter-Remonstran t factio n i n th e State s o f
Holland, heade d b y Leide n an d Haarlem , an d includin g Alkmaar,
Gouda, Enkhuizeri , Brielle, Schoonhoven an d several other towns, 1
to revers e the process and secure strict enforcement of the placards.
To preven t religiou s dissensio n fro m paralysin g th e state , t o
weaken the orthodox part y and strengthe n hi s own hand , Frederic k
Henry chose to build up the so-called Arminian faction - tha t is, not
declared religiou s sectarians , bu t 'Arminian s i n har t an d faction ,
dissemblinge themselve s so e farr e a s t o frequen t th e [established ]
Churches and to come to the communion'. The stadholder wished the
latter t o b e a n effectiv e politica l counter-weigh t t o th e Counter -
Remonstrants an d thei r popula r backing . Onc e embarke d o n thi s
course, th e princ e ha d t o ac t vigorously ; henc e hi s politica l
Arminianism was a much more definit e an d urgent impulse than his
rather fain t inclinatio n toward s th e Arminia n clergy . I n short , h e
systematically manipulate d the vroedschap elections. 2 A t Amsterdam,
by 1627 , the political Arminians had wo n a n outright victory , albeit
essentially owing to the support o f the local regent class; in that year,
all four burgomaster s - Dirk Bas , Antonie Oetgens , Geur t Dircksz .
van Beuningen and Andries Bicker - wer e liberal on religious matters
and adversarie s of th e stric t Calvinists . Elsewhere , however , th e
impetus came from th e prince. In December 1626 , Carleton reported
to London tha t 'at Utrecht and Delft... certaine bitter Arminians are
crept int o th e Magistraci e by the nominaco n o f the Burgers , but b y
the Election of the Prince of Orange who m the late Prince had in the
time o f Reformaco n displaced fo r Arminianisme'. 3 At Nijmegen , a
town wher e th e princ e wa s i n a particularl y strong positio n t o
influence th e outcom e o f vroedschap elections , he brough t i n a whole
clique of Arminians at the beginning of 1627, * causing in the process
Feb. 1626 , Briefivisselingvan Hugo Grotiused. P. C. Molhuysen and B. L. Meulenbtoek,
III (1961) , pp. 18-19 .
1. Gemeentearchie f (hereafte r GA) , Leiden , Secretari e Arch . 447 , fo . 305 ;
Reso/atien van de Staten van Holland e n West Vmsland va n het jaar 1524 tot het jaar 179} (277
vols n.d., n.p.) (hereafter Res. Holi.) , 5 May, 21 May , 14 , 2 9 June an d 3 0 July 1627 .
2. Lieuw e va n Attzema , Historie o f Verhael va n Saken va n Staet e n Oorlogh in , ende
omtrent d e Vereenigde Nederlanden ( i j vols . Th e Hague , 1657-1671) , ii . 67 ;
Gedenkschriften va n jonkheer Alexander va n der Capellen ( 2 vols. Utrecht, 1777) , i. 438 .
3. PR O S P 84/132 , fo . 190 ; Brieven en onuitgegeven stukken van Johannes Wtenbogaert
ed. H . C . Rogge (7 vols. Utrecht , 1868-75) , vol. III , part i . 62-65.
4. Va n de r Capellen , i . 437—8 .
a distinct rise in the political temperatur e of Gelderland. Ther e too k
place fierc e battle s fo r contro l o f th e vroedschappen o f Alkmaa r an d
Gouda, agai n with the prince supportin g th e Remonstrants. 1
And yet the stadholder's powe r to decide the outcome of vroedschap
elections where his intentions went against the trend o f local opinio n
was, undeniably , rather limited. Although i n the autumn o f 162 7 he
further bolstere d th e Arminia n cliqu e in the Utrech t vroedschap with
the suppor t o f most though not al l of the ridderschap, imposin g th e
liberal Jan Florisse n Nieuwpoor t a s one of the city' s burgomasters ,
Johan va n Weede nevertheless kep t his grip an d the cit y remained a
bastion o f Counter-Remonstrant policies. Durin g th e fierce religious
disputes of 1627— 8 in the States of Utrecht, while the Arminian cause
was backed by th e ridderschap an d th e town s o f Wij k bi j Duursted e
and Amersfoort where the vroedschap was itself deeply split, Johan van
Weede rallie d th e Utrecht , Rhene n an d Montfoor t vroedschappen
together with the clergy in support of a hard-line orthodox stand. 2 At
Nijmegen, thoug h th e Arminians , backe d b y th e prince , no w
represented a powerful force , th e Counter-Remonstrant s neverthe -
less retained the upper hand. 3 At Delft, th e vroedschap was rent dow n
the middle. 4 Th e inevitabl e consequenc e o f suc h a policy , a s th e
prince must have foreseen, wa s to perpetuate and widen the divisions
which particularl y plague d th e State s o f Holland , Utrech t an d
Gelderland. Historians , whe n referring to th e Dutch politic s of this
period are, an d hav e lon g bee n ap t t o spea k o f a confrontatio n
between 'th e Hollan d party ' an d th e stadholder . Bu t i t i s a
fundamental misconceptio n t o thin k i n thi s way . Throughout th e
period o f Frederic k Henry' s stadholdershi p ther e wer e tw o quit e
distinct Holland partie s continually at odds wit h each other: Leiden ,
Haarlem, Gouda , Enkhuize n an d othe r town s forme d a powerfu l
bloc whic h opposed th e factio n heade d b y Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
Delft an d Dordrecht . A s has been seen , th e prince certainl y did no t
choose such a political strateg y on accoun t of religion, t o which , at
bottom, a s bot h Englis h an d Venetia n diplomat s noted , h e wa s
neutral an d indifferent. 5 No r indee d wa s the lenient, pro-Arminian
stand on churc h matters adopted b y the Amsterdam and Rotterda m
vroedschappen an d like-minde d grouping s motivate d t o an y ver y
significant exten t b y religiou s conviction . Religio n wa s th e pretext
for th e dissension , bu t n o mor e tha n i n 161 8 wa s i t th e basis . Th e
political Arminians, noted an English observe r in The Hague in 1626,
persevered 'no t fo r love o f truth, but fo r love of revenge, of money
and o f rule'. 6 'Fo r I a m sure' , h e added , speculatin g a s t o th e
1. Brieven, Wtenbogaert, iii. i, 85 , 91 .
2. Brieven, Wtenbogaert, iii . i, 158 , 150-2 , 158 , 174-5 .
3. Ibid. iii . ii, 326; iii. iii, 177-8, 358 ; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp . 164 , 182 .
4. Brieven, Wtenbogaert, iii . ii, 259.
;. PR O S P 84/152, fo. 248"; Blok, p. 79; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp. 165-7 .
6. PR O S P 84/132 , fo. 250" .
likelihood o f the Dutch signin g a new truce with Spai n to which he
considered Frederic k Henr y t o b e 'inclinable' , tha t 'n o ma n wil l
alleage conscience , no r religion , wh o hat h an y knowledg e o f thi s
state'. Th e prince's approac h t o handling th e Dutch assemblies , and
that o f thos e wh o becam e hi s intimates , wa s purel y a matte r o f
political calculation .
The great seventeenth-century Dutc h historian Aitzema accounted
Frederick Henry's manipulations of the vroedschappen a s essentially a
means o f balancin g th e Remonstrant s an d Counter-Remonstrant s
against eac h other t o make himself the indispensable arbiter of their
quarrels and render both dependent o n his will.1 In fact, this view is
not quit e exact; it suggests a greater measure of aloofness from th e
factions tha n th e stadholde r actually displayed. Whateve r hi s neut -
rality on churc h affairs, th e prince, unti l the summe r of 1633 , subtly
and consistentl y worke d han d i n han d wit h th e politica l Arminia n
cliques in managing the vroedschappen an d provincial assemblies. This
was hi s chose n metho d o f procurin g mone y fo r hi s campaigns ,
forging a coherent militar y strategy and determining Dutc h foreig n
policy. The attractions of the Arminians for the prince were precisely
that the y wer e a small , partl y noble , partl y urba n grou p which
included numerou s able but vulnerabl e and mostly unpopular men .
Perhaps n o incident demonstrates mor e clearly how dependent eve n
the Arminia n burgomaster s o f Amsterda m wer e o n th e prince' s
support (and on the detachments of troops which, at their request, he
had statione d i n th e cit y in th e lat e 16205 ) tha n th e furor e ove r th e
expulsion from Amsterda m of the stridently Calvinist and anti-truce
preacher, Adriaan Smout, at the height of the truce talks with Spain in
January 1630. 2 'This in all appearance', note d Si r Henry Vane at The
Hague,
had no t th e Princ e o f Orang e formerl y sen t garrison s t o suppor t an d
maintain th e authorit y o f the magistra l against the commo n peopl e woul d
have been th e cause of great disorder s an d mutinies amongs t them. 3
So sharp was the disparit y of views between vroedschap an d populac e
that according t o Vane , 'of th e 3 6 of Amsterda m [th e vroedschap] i n
which consist s th e govt . o f th e towne , ther e ar e bu t 8 o f th e
Contraremonstrants, al l the res t bein g Arminian s an d th e commo n
people of the towne against them.'4
But while the stadholder aligned himself with the Arminian faction
until 1633 , th e smal l circl e o f clos e personal adviser s on who m h e
1. Aitzema , Historie, ü. 67 ; Poelhekk e als o seem s t o m e t o plac e to o muc h
emphasis o n Frederic k Henry' s alleged neutrality; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp .
156-7.
2. O n thi s episode , se e Aitzema , Historie, ii. 197 ; Ja n Wagenaar , Vaderlandsche
Historie, vervattende d e Geschiedenissen de r n u Vereenigde Nederlanden (2 1 vols . Amst .
1749-59), II. 76-86 ; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp. 210 , 211 , 531 .
3. Van e t o Dorchester , 10/2 0 Jan. 1630 , PRO S P 84/141, fos. 2o"-2i.
4. Van e t o Dorchester , 13/2 3 Jan. 1630 , PRO S P 84/141, fo. 25.
Frederick Henry and the Dutch Political Factions 8 3
relied to organize th e votes of the vroedschappen an d assemblies were,
with a few exceptions, the same experienced personnel o n whom his
brother Mauric e had depended. Fraôis van Aerssen,1 perhaps best-
known of Maurice's associates , a n arch-foe of Oldenbarnevelt an d of
the latter's son-in-law (Frederic k Henry's friend , van der Mijle ) was
too closely identified with the Counter-Remonstrant cause to adapt to
the new role which Frederick Henry had in mind for his managers; he
fell from favour2 and only finally became one of the prince's intimates
after th e volte-face o f 1633 . Antoni e Duyck , Raadpensionaris o f
Holland, was inevitabl y a good dea l involved e x officia i n decision -
making until his death in 1629, but he too was closely associated with
Counter-Remonstrantism3 and was never one of the prince's confid-
ants. Adriaan de Manmaker, a leading figure of the States of Zeeland,
being th e representativ e o f th e 'firs t noble ' o f th e provinc e an d
another uncompromisin g Counter-Remonstrant , likewis e fell fro m
favour.4 Nevertheless , b y an d larg e thos e wh o ha d rise n t o
prominence i n the provincial assemblie s and in the State s General's
various secre t committees , durin g th e late r year s o f Maurice ,
continued i n their functions as the key political managers, organizers
and negotiator s unde r Frederic k Henry . Fo r example , i n th e
conferences wit h th e Frenc h ambassado r i n Th e Hagu e whic h
preceded the Franco-Dutch treat y of Compiègne - a development of
great importanc e t o th e Republi c which took plac e whils t Maurice
was still stadholder i n 16z 4 - th e principal Dutch negotiator s were
Nicolaas van de n Bouckhorst , hee r van Noordwi j ck, then a leading
representative o f th e ridderschap i n th e State s o f Hollan d wh o
subsequently acte d fo r man y year s a s Frederic k Henry' s chie f
manager in Holland; Swede r van Haersolte,5 who became Frederick
Henry's regular organizer of the States of Overijssel; and Arnold van
Randwijck,6 subsequentl y and for many years one of the two regular
managers of the State s of Gelderland.
It i s incorrec t t o argue , a s d o Gey l an d Poelhekke, 7 tha t ther e
existed a standin g secre t committee , o r Secreet Besogne, of th e States
General formall y empowered t o confe r o n a regular basi s wit h th e
i. O n va n Aerssen' s earl y diplomati c career , se e S . Barendrecht , Francois van
Aerssen, Diplomaat aa n bet Franse Hof(ifyf-iárj),13), (Leiden, 1965) .
i. Brieven, Retgersbercb, p. 100 .
3. Brieven, Wtenbogaert, iii. i, 222—5 .
4. F . Nagtglas , Levensberichten van Zeeuwen (2 vols. Middelburg, 1890) , ii. 125-7 .
5. Swede r va n Haersolt e to t Swaluenborc h (1582-1643) , membe r o f th e
Overijssel ridderschap, becam e a member of the State s General fo r Overijssel in 1621 .
In 1630 , he organized th e appointment o f the stadholder' s son , Prince Willem , then
three years old, as general o f the cavalry, and i t was chiefly throug h hi s influence, a
year later, that the boy received the right (survivance) to inherit his father's offices in
Overijssel; see Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, (hereafte r NNBW), ed. P .
C. Molhuysen et ál. (10 vols. Leiden, 1911-37) , vi. 677.
6. Arnol d van Randwijck (i 574-1641), member of the ridderschap o f the Nijmegen
quarter of Gelderland; se e NNBW, iii. 995-6.
7. Geyl , Oranje e n Stuart, p. 14 ; Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp . 324-5 .
stadholder and make the major strategic , military and foreign policy
decisions. I n fact , fo r ever y ne w ste p i n foreig n policy, th e State s
General appointe d a fres h a d hoc secre t committee , i n theor y fro m
among the membership of the States General as a whole; before every
campaign, a new a d hoc committee, know n a s th e gedeputeerden o p ' t
employ van 't leger, was chosen, just as was a fresh committe e every year
actually to accompan y the prince o n campaign an d confer with hi m
on all military and political matters in his camp. This might suggest,
with so many new committees being constantly formed, that in reality
the stadholder ha d very little control over the advisers appointed t o
confer wit h him. But actually, the names of the committee members
vary only in the case of the minor committees such as those chosen t o
deal with les s important diplomati c business. On an y matter o f real
substance, thoug h th e committee s wer e constantl y forme d an d
reformed, the same key personages wer e nominated again and again.
For instance , amon g th e eigh t commissioner s wh o negotiate d th e
alliance with Englan d o f Octobe r 1625 , wer e Noordwijck, Duyck ,
Simon van Beaumont,1 an Arminian who rose to prominence i n 16 2 5
and was for some years one of Frederick Henry's two managers of the
States of Zeeland; Floris, count van Culemborch, who acted together
with Randwijck as the prince's manager of the States of Gelderland ;
and Goosen Schaffer who was for many years the prince's manager of
the State s of Groningen, a province o f which Frederick Henr y wa s
not actuall y stadholder. 2 Th e allianc e wit h Denmark , arrange d
almost simultaneously , was handle d o n th e Dutc h sid e b y seve n
commissioners, includin g Randwijck , Haersolte, Culemborc h an d
Schaffer.3 Th e team appointed by the States General to deal with th e
delicate Jülich-Cleves negotiations of 1629—3 0 included Noordwijck,
Haersolte, Culemborc h an d Vosbergen. 4 Whe n Charle s I sen t Si r
Henry Van e a s hi s ambassado r extraordinar y to Th e Hagu e i n
November 162 9 fo r top-leve l secre t consultation s with hi s ally , the .
eight representative s nominated by the States General to confer with
him include d none othe r tha n Noordwijck , Randwijck, Beaumont ,
Haersolte, Schaffe r an d Adriaa n Ploos, th e noblema n wh o wa s th e
prince's manage r o f th e State s of Utrecht. 5 Th e elaborat e series o f
Franco-Dutch talk s o f 1625-30 , whic h le d t o th e renewa l o f th e
French subsid y arrangemen t i n Jun e 1630 , wer e handle d o n th e
Dutch sid e b y Noordwijck , Beaumont, Haersolte , Schaffer , Ploos ,
1. Simo n van Beaumont (15 74-16 i 4), a Dutch minor poet; from 1611 , pensionary
of Middelburg ; he alone among Frederick Henry's managers seems to hav e been
closely linked with the Arminian cause; see P. J. Meertens, Letterkundig leven in Zeeland
in de êstiende e n de eerste helft de r êventiende eeuw (Amsterdam , 1945), pp. 299 , 301 .
2. L . va n Aitzema , Verhael va n d e Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling ( 2 vol s Th e
Hague, 1650) , i . 97—100.
3. Ibid. i . 71-72.
4. Ibid. i . 116 .
5. Aitzema , Historie, ii. 939; Ploos' noble title was that of heer van Tienhoven.
Jan Veldriel , burgomaste r o f Dokku m an d on e of the prince' s tw o
organizers o f the State s of Friesland, and , finally , Dir k Bas , head o f
the Arminia n faction a t Amsterdam . *
As in foreign policy, so i n strategy and militar y matters. Th e ke y
negotiators o f th e Republic' s foreig n polic y als o repeatedl y ac -
companied th e prince durin g hi s campaigns. A t the sieg e of Grol in
1627, fo r instance , th e provinces ' 'deputie s i n th e field ' wer e
Randwijck (Gelderland) , Haersolt e (Overijssel) , Schaffe r
(Groningen), Vosberge n (Zeeland) , Piete r va n Walth a (Friesland )
who wa s th e prince' s othe r manage r o f th e State s o f Friesland ,
Hartevelt (Utrecht) , Jaco b va n Broekhoven , th e Counter -
Remonstrant burgomaste r o f Leide n (Holland) , an d Oetgen s
(Holland), th e Arminian burgomaster o f Amsterdam. 2 I n Ma y 1626 ,
the committe e t o revie w th e vital matter o f the Dutc h an d Spanis h
river blockades whic h ha d by then almost totally disrupted th e inland
trade o f th e Lo w Countries , include d Noordwijck , Randwijck,
Haersolte, Schaffe r an d Vosbergen. 3 Th e 163 1 'gedeputeerden op't
employ va n 't leger 1 wh o planne d th e invasio n of Flander s tha t too k
place that summe r was, once again, compose d o f Frederick Henry' s
managers o f th e provincia l assemblies , includin g Noordwijck ,
Randwijck an d Beaumont. 4
While onl y Beaumon t seem s t o hav e bee n linke d wit h th e
Arminians befor e 162 5 a s a forme r supporte r o f Oldenbarnevelt ,
Noordwijck, Ploos , Veldriel , Waltha, Haersolte , and , i n fact , ever y
single one of Frederick Henry' s managers can be shown t o have been
active i n bluntin g Counter-Remonstran t pressur e i n th e provincia l
assemblies durin g th e lat e 1620 5 an d i n promotin g th e politica l
Arminian factio n i n th e vroedschappen. I n thi s way , th e princ e
collaborated wit h th e Arminian s essentially in orde r t o contro l th e
assemblies, obtai n fund s an d achiev e th e formulatio n o f coheren t
strategies and policies. It is true that there was probably neve r a time
when Frederic k Henr y wa s eve r wholl y satisfie d wit h th e co -
operation tha t h e received . Uytenbogaer t refer s t o th e prince' s
displeasure in late 162 6 on finding that th e Arminian s whom h e had
just brought into the vroedschappen wer e less than fervent in seconding
his demand s fo r subsidie s and ne w taxes. 5 Eve n so , i t is undeniable
that durin g the prolonged dispute s ove r war-financ e in the States of
Holland during th e later 16205, it was invariably the Arminian towns
1. Aitzema , Verhael,i. 155-6 .
2. Res . Holl. 2 July 1627 ; Aitzema, Historie, ii. 147.
3. Algemee n Rijksarchief , Th e Hagu e (hereafte r ARH ) S G 3185 , fo . i d f ; } . I .
Israel, 'Th e State s Genera l an d th e strategi c regulatio n o f th e Dutc h rive r trade ,
1621-36', Bijdragen e n Mededelingen betreffende d e Geschiedenis de r Nederlanden (hereafte r
BMGN), vol. 9 5 (1980), pp. 476-7; see below, 107-8. ^
4. G A Amsterdam, Algemeen Bestuur , no. 11 , fos. 199-200. Secret, res. SG, 8,30
Apr. 1631 .
5. Wtenbogaert , iii. i, 72; Carleton to Conway, 3 1 Mar. 1628 . PRO S P 84/136, fo.
246.
which supporte d Frederic k Henr y an d th e Counter-Remonstran t
towns whic h obstructe d hi s requests . I n Apri l 1626 , the requeste d
additional finance for th e prince' s planne d attack on Oldenzaa l was
chiefly obstructe d b y Leiden , Goud a an d Delf t (th e latter then stil l
split hal f and hal f between the factions). 1 Fo r man y months durin g
1627, Haarlem , Leiden , Enkhuizen , Briell e an d othe r oppositio n
towns persiste d in refusing to vot e an y further wa r fund s unti l the
religious controvers y wa s settled t o thei r satisfaction. 2 Durin g th e
spring o f 1629 , as prince an d State s General prepared thei r massive
assault o n 's-Hertogenbosch , th e driv e t o extrac t th e necessar y
finance from th e State s of Holland wa s obstructed fo r some time by
Haarlem, Enkhuizen, Schoonhoven an d Edam, but o n this occasion
not by Leiden.3 At the same time, Friesland, Groningen an d Zeeland
were oppose d t o th e blo w bein g struc k i n Brabant , th e norther n
provinces preferrin g t o attac k Lingen ; th e princ e ha d t o obtai n
consent fo r his plan in the State s General by mobilizing Gelderland,
Utrecht an d Holland .
But, o f course , Frederic k Henry' s politica l Arminianis m wa s
tempered by a strong admixture of caution, subtlety and tact. He took
great pain s to avoi d embittering th e Counter-Remonstrants against
himself. B y insistin g o n the , preservation intac t o f th e establishe d
Reformed Church, he thwarted the Arminian clergy and ensured that
the orthodo x ha d t o loo k t o himsel f t o preserv e wha t wa s mos t
essential t o thei r cause . Thoug h va n Aersse n wa s i n disfavour ,
Frederick Henry took car e not to alienate him completely. Nor were
the Counter-Remonstrants totall y excluded from the secret commit-
tees. It was, on the contrary, fundamental to Frederick Henry's whole
style of leadership carefully to balance the factions against each other.
As during the Grol campaign of 1627, it was usual for the 'deputies in
the field ' t o includ e tw o representative s fro m Holland , th e mos t
important province, against one from each of the others. Moreover, it
was the States General's custo m in Frederick Henry's day to appear to
balance the two Holland factions against each other, that is to appoint
one representative fro m eithe r party . Thu s a t the sieg e of Grol, the
influence o f th e Arminia n Amsterda m burgomaster, Oetgens , wa s
ostensibly offse t b y the presenc e o f th e Leide n burgomaste r Jaco b
van Broeckhoven whom Frederick Henry seems to have been at some
pains t o cultivate . Durin g th e crucia l sprin g month s o f 1629 ,
confronted a s in previous year s with Counter-Remonstrant obstruc-
tion in the States of Holland, the prince wrote direct to Broeckhove n
1. Res . Holl. 4, 9 , 1 6 and 1 7 June 1626 .
2. 'Voo r en al eer het stuck van de religie vast gesteldt sal zyn', Res. Holl. 30 Apr.
1627; see also 21 May, 50 July, 2 Aug. 1627 .
3. Res . Holl. i o a n d 2i Marc h 1629 ; Arnoldus Montanus, 'T Vermeerderde Leven en
Zedryfvan Frederik Henrikprinse va n Oranje» (Amsterdam , 16; 3), pp. 1 86-7; Mémoires
de Frederic Henri Prince d'Qrange (Amsterdam , 1733) , P - 55 1 J - ! • I srae', Th e Dutch
Republic an d the Hispanic World (Oxford , 1982) , pp. 174-5 .
appealing t o him to deflec t Leiden' s vot e awa y from th e oppositio n
on that occasion.1 And sure enough, i n that yea r Leiden di d not join
Haarlem in trying t o block the extra war subsidies.
But howeve r muc h tempere d b y hi s elaborat e tact , Frederic k
Henry's programme was political Arminian not only in the sense that
he collaborated wit h the Remonstrant cliques in the vroedschappen an d
that h e relie d o n them t o suppor t hi s military plans an d diplomacy ,
but in his willingness to ignore the interests of the colonial companies
which wer e closely identified wit h th e Counter-Remonstrants, 2 an d
to countenance a n early end to the war with Spain . There are several
contemporary Englis h reference s t o th e Princ e o f Orang e bein g
'inclinable' to a new truce or peace with Spain in the opening years of
his stadholdership. 33Earl y i n 1628 , afte r th e Dutc h victorie s a t
Oldenzaal and Grol but with anxiety in the Republic rising due to the
overrunning o f mos t o f Nort h German y b y Habsbur g forces an d
their allies, and at a time of temporarily frigid relation s wit h France ,
Frederick Henr y pu t ou t specifi c peac e feeler s o f a kin d whic h
occasioned brie f jubilatio n a t Brussel s an d Madrid. 4 Throug h th e
Dutch representativ e at the joint Dutch—Spanish prisoner exchang e
talks then i n progress i n Flanders, Gerar d va n Berckel - a strongly
pro-peace Arminia n burgomaste r o f Rotterda m — the stadholde r
conveyed wor d to Olivare s and Phili p IV tha t he was read y to
consider not merely a new truce but one on terms less favourable to
the Republic than those of 1609 . Admittedly, in itself this is no mor e
conclusive than the assurances brought fro m Th e Hague to Brussels
in the autumn o f 162 5 b y Mme 'T Serclaes , the noble lady who fo r
some year s had bee n actin g a s an intermediar y between stadholde r
and Infanta, to the effect tha t the prince genuinely wished to end the
war. 5 I n i6z8 , th e Republi c face d a situation o f exceptional dange r
and it is arguable that the prince was merely engaging i n a stratagem.
To grasp the extent of Frederick Henry's politica l Arminianism fully
one must , abov e all , conside r hi s attitud e an d polic y durin g th e
prolonged Dutch—Spanis h truc e an d peac e negotiations o f 1629—3 0
and 1632 . Despite noting that the Venetian ambassador in The Hague
reported t o Venice in November 162 9 that the prince was supporting
the truce moves,6 and despite knowing that both Aitzema and van der
i. G A Leide n Sec . Arch. 447, fo. 99", vroedschap res. , 2 Feb. 1629 .
z. Se e Israel, 'Th e Hollan d towns', abov e 65-67.
3. PR O S P 84/126 , fo . 193 ; no. 128 , fo. 11 5 an d no . 132 , fo. 250 .
4. Algemee n Rijksarchief, Brussel s (ARB) SEG 126 , Spinola to Infanta, Madrid ,
30 Apr. 1628 ; Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado 2042, consulta junt a de
estado, 2 3 Apr. 1628 .
}. ARB , Papiers d'Etat et d'Audience 1379 , 'Rapport de Mme. Serclaes'(22 Sept .
1625).
6. Capita Seleíis Véneto-Bélgica, I (1629 - 1631). Studies van het Nederlands Historisch
Instituut t e Rome ed. J . J . Poelhekk e (The Hague , 1964) , p. 36 ; Poelhekke, Frederik
Hendrik, p . 313 .
Capellen state that the prince backed the truce,1 Poelhekke has argued
that Frederic k Henry' s action s an d statement s wer e merel y stra -
tagems intended t o mislea d the Arminians , hasten th e rapprochement
with Franc e (whic h indee d di d tak e place a s a result of the i6zy~$o
negotiations) an d frighte n th e Dutc h war-part y int o bein g mor e
forthcoming wit h regar d t o finance. 2 Tha t Frederic k Henr y ca n i n
earnest hav e sough t peac e with Spai n a t thi s earl y date simpl y doe s
not fi t i n wit h Poelhekke' s vie w o f th e princ e a s th e would-b e
conqueror o f Flanders an d Brabant. Bu t the fac t i s that he did seek a
truce.
Although th e Spanis h offe r o f a thirty-fou r yea r truc e wa s
evidently generall y unpopular,3 at least in Holland, Zeelan d an d the
northern provinces , ther e wa s a concerted attemp t i n Octobe r an d
November 162 9 to rush a favourable decision through the provincial
assemblies and States General. Van der Capellen note s no t onl y tha t
Gelderland, Overijsse l and Utrech t cam e out i n favour o f the truce ,
but that their resolutions wer e settle d a t break-neck speed before the
Counter-Remonstrant oppositio n ha d ha d a chanc e t o organiz e
itself.4 Thi s wa s tru e eve n i n Utrech t wher e th e cit y wa s fiercely
opposed t o th e truce . Befor e th e publi c debat e bega n i n October ,
Frederick Henr y ha d fo r severa l month s bee n considerin g th e
Spanish offe r i n secre t wit h hi s circl e o f politica l intimate s an d
managers. The fac t that Bercke l who wa s a known advocate of peace
with Spai n ha d bee n entruste d b y th e princ e wit h 'thi s underhan d
treaty', as Carleton called it, already suggested th e drift of what was to
follow. A s earl y a s July, Si r Thoma s Ro e ha d astutel y reporte d t o
London that
it may be counted a paradoxe t o think e that their prosperity e at Boisleduc
f's-Hertogenbosch] wil l facilitat e a peace : whic h I do e fo r man y reason s
believe, thoug h other s suppos e the y will e b e blown e u p wit h Insolence .
But I do e conside r the y doe no t dessign e grea t conquests , bu t a securitye
which thi s Towne may give the m an d the expense i s so immense that they
will be glad t o take breath. 5
It was the prince who chose the moment an d dictated th e initial pace
with whic h th e Spanis h term s wer e pu t befor e th e State s General ,
provincial assemblies and vroedschappen. Carleto n reported to Londo n
how Antoni e Duyck , Raadpensionaris o f Holland , wh o wa s e x officia
1. Aitzema , Verhael, i. 127 ; the latter subsequently state s that't afbreecken van die
handelinge was de geboorte van een tractaet me t Vranckrijck'; see van der Capellen ,
i. 568 , 563 .
2. Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrtâ, pp. 309-14 .
3. 'L'universal e d i quest i popoli, ' reporte d Gusoni , 'pe r raggion e e t pe r geni o
abborrisse ogni accomodemento co n l a Spagna; ma l i pi u reputat i et auttorevoli de l
governo v i si dimostrane hormai inclinati'; Capita, i . 76.
4. AR H Provinciale Resoluties vol. 9, res. St Gelderland, y/17 Oct. 1629 ; and vol.
486, res. S . Overijssel, 2/1 2 Oct . 1629 ; van de r Capelle n i. 549 , 551-2, 555-6 .
5. Ro e t o Dorchester , 1 5 / 2 5 Jul y 1629 , PRO S P 84/139 , fo . 231 .
party t o th e secre t deliberations , though no t on e o f th e prince' s
managers, wa s force d t o g o alon g wit h hi s polic y 'contrar y t o hi s
owne minde which certainl y was ever against Truce and Treaty with
Spaine'. 'Some few there are', he wrote, 'among th e States (as I heare)
of opinion, that al l is but a strategem of his Excy. to feed e the enemy
with hopes of peace, and to advance the affaires of the state the better
. . . but I confess e that considerin g th e persons of the men be hath
trusted, I much misdoubt th e intention.'1
Overijssel declare d firs t i n favou r o f truc e talks , th e province' s
prompt respons e bein g organized by none other than Haersolte. 2 I n
Utrecht, th e oppositio n o f th e powerfu l Counter-Remonstran t
faction wa s speedil y elbowe d asid e du e t o th e adroitnes s o f va n
Ploos.3 It i s true that these provinces had in any case long been f revis te
and ha d opposed th e pro-wa r fervour predominant in Holland an d
Zeeland in 1621 , but th e fac t remain s that it was the prince's friend s
who steere d thes e resolution s through . I n th e other provinces, th e
prince's intimates worke d i n the sam e direction i f mostly with les s
success. Fro m th e resolutions o f the State s o f Friesland , one learn s
only tha t Veldrie l wa s depute d b y th e State s Genera l t o g o t o
Leeuwarden and explain the position, bu t not whether he worked for
or against the truce.4 But it is not to be doubted that in fact he pressed
in favour in view of the fac t tha t his colleague Goosen Schaffe r met
both th e Groninge n assembl y and vroedschap, emphasizin g bot h th e
propitiousness o f the moment for a truce and the chronic position of
the state finances which, he claimed, could only be remedied by means
of a truce. 5 Bot h State s an d vroedschap nevertheles s vote d agains t
entering into truce talks. Similarly, in Zeeland, Simon van Beaumont
who ha d bee n depute d t o explai n the position t o th e State s o f that
province, pressed hard in favour of the truce, much to the displeasure
of bot h th e provincia l assembl y an d hi s ow n city , Middelburg. 6
Zeeland, usuall y regarde d i n Dutc h historiograph y a s a bastio n o f
support fo r the stadholder , o n this occasion acted most forcefully o f
all agains t th e prince' s policy . Indee d Flushing , conventionall y
supposed t o hav e been th e Zeelan d tow n mos t unde r his influence ,
went s o far as to propos e tha t th e province lodge a formal protest in
the State s Genera l abou t th e prince' s conduc t i n allowin g truc e
contacts with Spain to develop to such an extent without the province
knowing anything about them.7 And if the prince's intimates worked
1. Carleto n to Dorchester , 12/22 Sept. 1629 , PRO S P 84/140, fo. 40.
2. Va n de r Capelien , i. 5 5 5 .
3. Ibid. i . 5 5 5 , 569 .
4. Rijksarchie f in Friesland, Leeuwarden, Res. S. Friesland 9/19,10/20 Oct. 1629 .
5. G A Groningen , vroedschap res., 3/15 , 5/1 5 Oct . 1629 .
6. Va n de r Capellen i. 556 ; Notulen van de Ed: Mog: Hieren S tasten van Zeelant d'Anno
1629, pp. 363 , 369-70 .
7. Ibid. p. 370 : 'Dog h hebben die van Vlissingen verklaert expresselyck gelast te
zyn van haer principalen, dat men in den voorsz. Brief aen de Gedeputeerde mede zal
infereren, dat sy syn Excellentie ende de Leden van de Unie zullen vertoonen, dat de
assiduously fo r th e truc e in the si x lesser provinces, this is precisely
what they did also in Holland. On the death of Duyck in the midst of
the deliberations , Jacob Cats, pensionary of Dordrecht, wa s elected
to serve as acting Raadpensionaris. I n the opening week of discussions
in the State s of Holland, Cats , according to Carleton, aspiring to fill
Duyck's place
complying wit h th e Princ e o f Orang e an d th e Arminia n part y fo r thi s
purpose, hat h bi n ver y bus y t o mak e th e [Spanish ] offe r seem e plausible;
so tha t havin g firs t bi n som e daie s wit h hi s Exc y a t th e Buss e
['s-Hertogenbosch], t o tak e hi s instructions; fro m ther e h e made a circuit
into North-Holland throug h mos t o f the Townes, t o induce them t o accep t
this truce; and to come to the assembly with good resolutions ; and others of
the comitie Counsell \gecomitteerde raad\ of Holland, packed and made for this
businesse, visite d th e other Towne s t o informe them of the occasion o f the
assembly at hand. But things succeede d no t according a s the Arminians had
promised themselve s fo r althoug h Mons . Buckhors t [Noordwijck] , a man
wonne t o thi s business e you r Lordshi p ma y easil y coniectur e b y wha t
meanes, thoug h h e hat h bi n otherwis e eve r agains t th e Arminians , ha d
thought to hav e carried th e voice of the nobless e an d drawn a t least som e
part of the Townes after hi m with a long préméditât oration persuadin g th e
acceptacon o f th e truce , an d representin g th e seasonablenes s o f th e time ,
now tha t the Spaniar d is lowe and the States victorious; his turne being t o
speak afte r him , Aerssen s too k th e matte r i n han d an d showe d man y
important reason s why the State s ough t no t t o trea t with Spaine , an d sai d
that thi s wa s rathe r a tym e t o mak e greater advantag e uppo n th e enem y
during thei r disorder an d confusion. 1
The campaig n vigorousl y pursue d b y Noordwijc k and Cat s t o

secure acceptanc e i n th e State s o f Hollan d wa s supporte d b y
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft, Dordrecht an d the Holland nobility ,
but th e opposition , heade d by Haarlem and Leiden, rallie d mos t o f
the smal l town s an d th e peac e part y foun d thei r pat h completel y
blocked.2 There ensued months of stalemate in the States of Holland.
Outside Holland, the provinces were deadlocked three against three.
Throughout thes e month s th e princ e stuc k t o hi s policy. 3 Th e
Counter-Remonstrants responde d with a vigorous popular publicity
campaign, striden t preachin g fro m th e pulpi t and , a t Amsterdam,
actual incitement o f the populac e against the burgomasters . As ha s
been seen, against this pressure, the prince supported the Amsterdam
vroedschap wit h troops. I n November, Joh n Quarks , writing to Lor d
Heeren State n va n Zeelan t see r vreem t vinden, dat zo o verr e i n dése handelinge i s
geprocedeert zonde r voorweten va n de provintie van Zeelant. D e ander e zes leden
hebben onnodig h geagh t da t deselv e clausule i n de n voorsz . Brie f zoud e werde n
geinfereert.'
1. Carleto n t o Dorchester , 5/1 5 Oct . 1629 , PR O S P 84/140, fös . 71-72 .
2. Rijksarchie f in Zeeland, Middelburg (RAZ), SZ 2099, Zeeland deputie s in Th e
Hague t o State s of Zeeland, 1 1 Nov. 1629 ; van der Capellen, i. 5 5 5 ; Israël, 'Holland
Towns', pp. 44—46 .
3. Montanus , ' T Vermeerderde Leven, p. 581 .
Dorchester fro m Delft , confirme d tha t Frederic k Henr y whil e
publicly pretendin g t o b e neutral continue d t o wor k fo r the truce ,
commenting that the 'most eminen t man in opposition t o this truce is
Aerssens an d mos t o f th e towne s (o f Holland ) d o cleav e t o hi s
opinion'.1 When, on 1 0 November, the States of Holland voted agai n
concerning th e truce , i n th e presenc e o f th e stadholder , an d wer e
again split, many towns followed Haarlem and Leiden in demanding
the secur e establishmen t o f 'regim e an d religion ' i n th e Republi c
before deciding o n renewal of the truce talks. 2 In answer, the prince
made known his view that the issue of the truce should on no account
be mixed with the internal debate over church matters but dealt with
entirely separately. Thi s di d nothing to lesse n th e opposition . On 7
December, Hollan d agai n spli t five votes agains t five, the rest of the
towns adopting intermediat e positions.3 After this, the prince tried a
new initiativ e t o brea k th e impasse , advisin g tha t th e propose d
negotiation woul d b e place d o n a secure r basi s i f th e Sout h
Netherlands State s Genera l wer e t o b e formall y involved , an d th e
outlying Spanish fortresses at Lingen, Zandvlie t and elsewhere were
demolished a s part o f the truc e terms. 4 Thi s wa s designed t o mee t
some of the objections of the opposition. However, th e vroedschappen
of Leiden, Hoorn and other Contra-Trevist town s flatly contradicted
the stadholder , maintainin g tha t suc h provisions woul d no t i n fac t
place a ne w truc e o n a secure r footing. 5 Thu s onc e again , th e
stadholder's path was blocked b y internal opposition .
The deliberations over the Spanish offer dragged on inconclusively
during most of 1630, but by the spring, seeing tha t the deadlock wa s
unlikely t o b e broken , Frederic k Henr y switche d hi s attentio n t o
securing th e rapprochement wit h Franc e an d preparin g hi s nex t
campaign. But this change must be understood a s being tactical rather
than bein g par t o f an y grandiose , long-ter m schem e o f conquest .
Frederick Henry 'hath bin and is still affected t o the Truce', noted Sir
Henry Van e i n Augus t idô. 6 Th e preparation s fo r th e Dutc h
campaign of 165 0 again present the familiar paradox of the war towns
obstructing th e plan s an d the peac e town s activel y supportin g th e
stadholder's strategy. In som e bewilderment, Van e referred to the
1. Quark s t o Dorchester, 5/1 5 Nov . 1629 , PRO S P 84/140, fb. i z i .

2. RA Z S Z 2099 , Zeeland deputies to SZ , 1 0 Nov. 1629 ; GA Leide n Sec. Arch
448, fo. 164" .
3. Ibid. Sec . Arch 448, 169" .
4. Ibid. fo . 169 ; G A Delf t vroedschap , res . 1 0 Dec . 1629 ; G A Rotterda m
vroedschap res. 1 0 Dec. 1629 .
5. G A Leiden, Sec. Arch. 448, fo. 169"; 'hebben die vande selve vroetschappe om
pregnante redene n geoordeel t da t d e voors . voorslac h va n syn e Extie , onde r
reverentie de gemeynde verseeckertheyt van 't voors. tractaet nyet en soude geven.'
6. PR O S P 84/142, fo. 1 5 ; see also Joseph Cuvelier, 'La correspondance secrète de
l'Infante Isabell e (1621-1633)' , Bulletin d e l'Institut historique belge d e Rome I V
(Rome/Brussels, 1924) , p. 117 .
Remonstrant [party ] pressing th e making of an offensive warre an d laying
on the hundredth penny presently to be collected; whic h they conceive will
be s o heavie, as the commo n peopl e wil l no t b e able to bear e it, bu t tha t
finding thei r purse s t o smart , the y wil l conclud e fo r a peace . Th e
Contraremonstrant seein g this will not by no means consent to the laying on
of th e hundredt h penny , no r o f makin g a n offensiv e warre , o r scarc e
thinking o f puttin g thei r arm y int o th e fiel d thi s year e othe r the n fo r
defence.1
During th e interva l betwee n th e 1629—3 0 an d th e 163 2 truc e
negotiations, Frederick Henry continued hi s policy of strengthenin g
the Arminian and pro-peace element in the vroedschappen. 22 T o buttres
his somewha t wea k positio n i n th e State s o f Zeeland , th e princ e
removed Adriaa n Manmaker3 as his representative a s 'first noble' o f
Zeeland - a man, i n Vane's words , 'tha t wa s much employe d and
trusted by the last prince in the businesses of Barnevelt' - and replaced
him wit h th e mor e pliabl e Joha n d e Knuyt 4 wh o subsequentl y
emerged, after th e eclipse of Beaumont in 1633 , as his chief manager
of tha t province . Th e stadholder' s resolv e t o pursu e a n Arminian
policy, moreover, was further stiffened b y developments elsewher e in
the Europea n struggle . Th e endin g of the 1628—3 1 Franco-Spanish
conflict in North Ital y over the Mantuan succession, under the treaty
of Cherasco of June 1631 , at once deprive d th e Dutch o f the benefi t
that the y ha d receive d fro m th e diversio n sinc e 162 8 o f Spanis h
troops an d funds t o Milan, and fed the stadholder's growin g doubt s
about th e real long-term intention s of the French crown. Since 1625 ,
and still more after the Anglo-Spanish peac e treaty of 1630 , Frederick
Henry evinced a marked disinclination to rel y on either Englan d o r
France fo r support . Indeed , h e considere d bot h power s totall y
unreliable, pointing ou t t o those who had argued that England and
France should have been consulted durin g the truce deliberations of
1629, tha t neithe r powe r ha d lifte d a finge r t o hel p th e Republic
during th e Imperialis t interventio n i n Gelderlan d an d Utrech t i n
IÓ29. 5 H e certainl y ha d no t th e slightes t though t o f tyin g th e
Republic to any long-term anti-Habsburg alliance when he embarked
on hi s mos t successfu l militar y campaign , th e push alon g th e Maa s
culminating in the captur e of Maastricht in 1632 .
The rôle of the States General's 'deputies in the field' was especially
notable in 1632, because the preliminary peace talks of that year began
in September , i n th e prince' s camp , immediatel y afte r th e fal l o f
Maastricht. OverijsseP s representativ e wa s agai n Haersolte ,
Zeeland's again Beaumont.6 Of the two Holland representatives, the
1. Van e to Dorchester , 2 4 Feb./4 Mar. 1630 . PRO S P 84/141, fo. 89.
2. Van e to Dorchester , 10/2 0 Sept. 1630 . PR O S P 84/142, fo. 78.
3. Nagtglas , "Levensberichten, ii. 125-7 .
4. O n d e Knuyt , se e Poelhekke, Frederik Hendrik, pp . 421—3 , 427—9, 5 58—9.
5. G A Leide n Sec . Arch . 448, fo. 165 .
6. PR O S P 84/145 , fo. 22.
1
Arminian wa s Cornells va n Teresteyn, burgomaste r o f Dordrech t
and one of the prince's most active supporters in the States of Hollan d
both durin g an d afte r hi s Arminia n phase , whil e th e Counter -
Remonstrant wa s van den Meer, from th e staunchly pro-war town of
Haarlem.2 Initially , th e stadholder' s intentio n wa s t o obtai n th e
prompt acquiescence of the provinces in formal peace negotiations t o
be held a t Maastricht betwee n representative s o f the State s Genera l
and o f the Infant a and th e Sout h Netherland s State s General , the n
convened a t Brussels . Thi s woul d hav e bee n t o negotiat e wit h hi s
army encamped a t his side. Frederick Henr y wrote repeatedl y fro m
Maastricht to The Hagu e demandin g a speed y respons e fro m the
provinces.3 Teresteyn, Beaumont and Haersolte, but significantly not
van den Meer, who was kept at the prince's side, were sent in person
to organiz e matter s i n th e State s Genera l an d thei r respectiv e
provinces.4 Terestey n communicate d th e prince' s forma l advic e t o
the States of Holland, tha t whil e His Excellency was 'indifferent' on
the mai n point , th e State s General' s decisio n mus t b e reache d 'a s
promptly a s possible , withou t los s o f time'. 5 Bu t th e pretenc e a t
neutrality notwithstanding , i t wa s patentl y obviou s wha t wa s th e
prince's desire. Leiden' s deputie s protested i n the State s of Hollan d
over th e way matters wer e bein g handled , thoug h withou t directl y
criticizing th e stadholder. 6 Throug h Jaco b Cats , still , alon g wit h
Noordwijck, the prince's leadin g organize r i n the States of Holland ,
heavy pressur e wa s brough t t o bea r o n Leide n t o desis t fro m it s
opposition. I n October, the States General dispatched a delegation to
put pressur e o n th e anti-truc e State s o f Friesland , consistin g o f
Waltha an d Boreel , th e Arminia n pensionar y o f Amsterdam. 7 I n
November, a similarly weighted pro-peac e delegation , consistin g o f
Dr Marienburg, burgomaster of Deventer, and Jacob Cats was sent to
Zeeland. Cat s evidentl y harangue d th e Zeelander s with suc h forc e
that he contrived to get even Flushin g t o acquiesce provisionall y in
the peace talks. 8
Because of the long delay, the substantive negotiations bega n only
in Decembe r 1632 , afte r th e princ e ha d disbande d hi s arm y for th e
1. Cornell s van Teresteyn (i 579-1643) entered the Dordrecht vroedschap i n 1606 , and
was burgomaster of Dordrecht in 1621-4 , !6}4-6, and 1645 ; see NNBW V. 897-8 .
2. PR O S P 84/145 , fo . 2z; Aitzema, Verhael, i. 186.
3. G A Leiden, Sec. Arch. 449, fo. 3'; Carleton to Lord Treasurer, 9/19 Oct. 1652 .
PRO S P 8 4 14 5 fo . 55 V .
4. G A Goud a vroedschap res. 6 Oct. 1632 ; van der Capeilen, i. 657.
5. G A Delf t vroedscha p res. 8 Oct. 1632 .
6. G A Leiden , Sec. Arch. 449, fös. 4 , 5 (9 Oct. 1652) : Leiden protested 'da t d e
voorne Gecommitteerden van dése syde int Leger sich nopende de voors. admissie
vande Gedeputeerde n va n d'ander e zyd e end e communicati e mette selve , nye t
volgens d'ordr e vand e regieringe dese r Republique en hebben gedragen ende dat
sulx voortaen nyet meer behoort t e werden geleden.'
7. W . Marienbur g to Devente r vroedschap , 11/2 1 Oct . 1632 . G A Deventer ,
Repub. I, 19 .
8. Accordin g to Johannes Heinsius, 'D'haerange die mijn heer Cats, wel tegen sijn
winter, and at The Hague i n place of Maastricht. But despite the lost
opportunity an d unremittin g Frenc h an d Swedis h pressure , th e
Dutch peace party retained the initiative, essentially due to Frederick
Henry's backing . Concession s wer e wrun g fro m Brussels , an d
substantial compromise s o n th e initia l Dutc h positio n wer e force d
through th e State s General. 1 Th e negotiatin g committe e appointe d
by the State s General t o deal wit h the Brussel s representative s was
composed o f the prince's usual managers, including Beaumont and de
Knuyt for Zeeland, and Noordwijck and Adraan Pauw who had been
elected Raadpensionaris o f Hollan d i n Apri l 1631 , fo r Holland .
However, ther e wer e ominous sign s fro m th e beginnin g tha t suc h
was the opposition t o peac e with Spain , in certain quarter s at least ,
that th e prince' s familia r techniqu e o f manipulatin g th e province s
was agai n likel y t o brea k down . Beaumon t an d d e Knuy t wer e
plainly unable to handle the State s of Zeeland. I n a tense meeting of
April 163 3 at The Hagu e betwee n the princ e and severa l Zeelan d
representatives t o the States General, Frederic k Henry had to answer
complaints about the growing rumour s in Zeeland that he favoured a
settlement wit h Spain. 2 Th e stadholde r answere d candidl y enoug h
that indee d h e wa s not avers e t o settlin g wit h Spai n provide d th e
terms were reputabl e and secure.
The elaborate negotiations of 163 3 broke down during the summer
owing to disagreement between the parties over border demarcatio n
in Brabant and, especially, over Brazil. While Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and Dordrech t wer e prepared t o g o s o far as to sacrific e th e Dutc h
gains in Brazil to secure peace with Spain , sentiment i n favour o f the
West Indi a Compan y wa s to o stron g elsewher e fo r thi s t o b e
acceptable eithe r to the States of Holland a s a whole or to the State s
General.3 Mos t o f the Hollan d towns no w swun g behin d Haarle m
and Leide n which , onc e again , wer e leading th e opposition . I t was
during thes e summe r month s o f 163 3 tha t Frederic k Henr y finally
concluded tha t hi s polic y o f collaboratio n wit h Amsterda m and o f
seeking peace with Spai n simply could not work . His volte-face, afte r
some months of vacillation, ha d virtually nothing t o do with Frenc h
or Swedish pressure . I n his efforts t o derail th e proceedings during
the spring , th e Frenc h ambassador , Hercul e d e Charnacé, had bee n
thoroughly frustrated. 4 I t wa s simpl y that b y the summe r o f 1633 ,
herte, heef t gedae n i s so o krachtic h geweest , da t sij , tot Vlissinge n incluis , to t
handelinge heef t doe n verstaen' ; Kronijk va n hei Historische Genootschap gevestigd te
Utrecht, ;th ser. vol. 3 (1867), pp. 299-500 .
1. Se e above, 60-63.
2. M . G . de Boer, Die Friedensunterhandlungen %n>iscben Spanten undden Niederlanden in
d(n Jabren 16)2 und i6j) (Groningen , 1898) , pp. 141-2 .
j. G.A . Amsterda m vroedschap s resolutie s XVI , fös . i-i v; G A Dordrecht ,
vroed. res. 6 June 1633 ; de Boer, p. 104 .
4. Se e Charnacé's notes o f his audienc e with Frederick Henr y on 1 4 Mar. 1633 ,
Archives o u correspondance inédite d e l a Maison a"Orange-Nassau, éd . G . Groe n va n
Prinsterer, zn d ser. 5 vols (Utrecht, 1857-61) iii. 36-37.
Frederick Henr y ha d becom e convince d tha t ther e wa s too muc h
internal oppositio n i n th e Republi c t o peac e wit h Spai n fo r hi s
previous policy t o succeed . Hi s managers, Beaumont and de Knuyt
for Zeeland , Schaffe r an d Walth a fo r Groninge n an d Friesland ,
simply could not deliver the votes of those provinces.1 Because of the
problem o f Brazil , fro m whic h Phili p I V an d Olivare s wer e
determined t o forc e Dutc h evacuatio n b y whateve r means ,
Noordwijck and Pauw were unable to muster a majority of the States
of Holland. Eve n so, the prince had good reason to hesitate. To break
with Amsterdam and Holland's new Raadpensionaris., wh o had shown
himself an eager proponent of peace with Spain, was no simple or easy
matter. I t mean t fo r certai n tha t th e prince' s gri p o n th e State s of
Holland would be loosened and that, in future, Holland would be less
readily disposed to vote funds fo r his campaigns. Inevitably, it meant
army cuts. Furthermore, he had to be absolutely sure that he had cast-
iron guarantee s o f support and regular subsidie s over a long perio d
from France , a power of which he remained wary, for France, should
he switch hi s policy, would hencefort h have to act as a surrogate for
Amsterdam as the driving force behind the stadholder's party. This in
turn would mea n that the prince would have to surrender part of the
Republic's an d hi s ow n much-prize d freedo m o f actio n i n inter -
national affairs an d become in some measure the tool of Richelieu.
The change in the prince's policy dated from Augus t 1633 when he
advised th e State s Genera l t o en d the deadloc k i n th e negotiation s
with the Brussels States General by insisting that the Dutch demands
over th e Indie s an d th e dispute d territor y i n Braban t be accepte d
within a month o r else the negotiation b e broken off. 2 Charnac é was
suddenly much heartened an d reported t o Pari s that i t now seeme d
likely that the prince would abandon the Dutch peace party and align
himself wit h France. 3 I n fact , th e Amsterda m faction succeede d in
delaying the breaking off of the peace talks until December 1633 , but
from November , if not earlier, the stadholder and his managers were
actively working t o abor t th e talks . Th e Hollan d nobilit y switche d
sides from the peace to the war camp.4 In the States of Utrecht where,
in th e spring , th e stil l strongl y Counter-Remonstran t an d pro-wa r
city ha d bee n repeatedly outvoted b y the noble s an d clergy , Ploo s
engineered a n abrup t switc h whic h brough t th e State s o f Utrech t
over to the war camp.5 The prince's managers were similarly active in
Gelderland and Overijssel. The States of Zeeland was now free of the
pressure to which i t had formerly bee n subjected. Frederick Henry' s
1. AR H SG 12 , 548 , secret res. of SG, n Jun e i6jj.
2. GAHaarlem , vroed. res. 4Aug. 163 5; GA Rotterdam, vroedschap res. loAug.
16 j 3 ; GA Leiden Sec. Atch 449, fos. 49v- 5 o; de Boer, p. 12 1 ; Jean de Pange, Cbarnacé
et f alliance Franco-Hollandaise (t6))-i6)j) 7)(Paris, 1905), pp. 75-76 .
3. Archives, iii. 38-41.
4. Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrik, p. 404.
5. Utrech t vroedschap to SG , 2 7 May 1633 , ARH S G 12,548 ; de Pange, p. 62.
next ste p wa s to forc e through th e projecte d new treaty o f alliance
with Franc e whic h woul d assur e increase d an d regula r Frenc h
subsidies, bu t whic h als o stipulate d tha t shoul d Loui s XII I brea k
openly wit h the Habsburgs, neithe r th e Republic nor Franc e shoul d
negotiate peac e or a truce with Spai n 'que conjointement e t d'un commun
consentement*. The deliberations over thi s treaty developed into a long
and bitte r battl e i n whic h Amsterdam , Rotterdam , Delf t an d
Dordrecht fough t wit h ever y mean s a t thei r disposa l t o preven t
Frederick Henr y an d th e wa r part y fro m havin g thei r way . At th e
heart o f th e struggl e wa s th e contes t fo r contro l o f th e State s of
Holland. The prince, according to Charnacé, admonished Pauw that
the Holland peace party
n'estoient que quatre ou cin q aveuglés de leur interest privé qui n'estoient
pas raisonnables, et qu'il n'estoit pas juste qu'ils gaignassent au préjudice du
public; Pau répliqua que c'estoit toute la province; sur ce contraste Orange
dit qu'il feroit voir à Pau que non, et que pour cet effet i l falloit assembler les
Estais de la Province.1
And so it proved. Thoug h Frederic k Henry lost Pauw with who m
he had clashe d fiercely in December 1633 , he nevertheless managed ,
through Noordwijc k who change d side s as promptly i n 163 3 a s he
had in 1625 , an d throug h th e influentia l Françoi s va n Aersse n wh o
was now restored to favour, to force the treaty through th e States of
Holland despit e everything that Amsterdam could do to prevent it. 2
His managers worked relying on Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda a s the
spearhead o f the stadholder's ne w faction . Meanwhile, the State s of
Utrecht was disposed in favour of the French alliance by the dexterity
of Ploo s an d th e State s of Overijssel , a s usual, by Haersolte. 3 Th e
fight was difficult, but resulted in the end in a decisive victory for the
prince. Aersse n confide d t o a correspondant a t Paris that
. . . de fait il ne s'est guères veu que d'Arminiens qui se soient opposez aux
propositions d e l a France , laquell e il s taschoien t d e nou s figure r plu s
dangereuse à cet Estât que l'Espagne mesme, tant ont-ilz dégénéré de nostre
ancienne probité. Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange a puissament aydé a faire
accepter cest e alliance et , san s so n interventio n e t sage s persuasions nou s
fussions tousjour s reste z en irrésolutions, espérans qu'il fus t ven u quelque
nouvelle ouvertur e d'Espagne , ce qui cesser a désormai s a u moye n d e c e
traitté, auque l M r d e Charnac é s'es t employ é ave c grand e dextérit é e t
patience. J'avou e qu e j'a y parfoi s désespér é d u succe z d e cest e affair e e t
m'estonne d e ce que l'Espagno l a esté s y imprudent d e ne nous avoir fai t
parler de trêve en aucune sorte, puis qu'il est assez bien informé d e nostre
constitution; car , s'il en eus t autremen t usé , i l nous jectoi t san s dout e e n
partialité, qui nous devoit rendre inutiles à toutes actions dehors et dedans.4
1. Archives , iii. 47.
2. Aersse n to Richelieu , The Hague , 2 Apr. 1634 , Archives, iii. 56.
3. D e Pange, p. 62; A. Waddington, La République des Provinces Unies, La France et
les Pays-Bas Espagnols, i6}o-i6;o ( 2 vols. Paris, 1895) , p. 221 .
4. Archives, iii. 54.
Even so , th e relativ e narrownes s o f th e prince' s victor y wa s an
ominous indicatio n o f the underlying weakness of his new position.
The ol d proble m o f how , successfully , t o manag e th e provincia l
assemblies and vroedschappen wa s as acute as ever, if not mor e so. Bu t
while the stadholder's policie s had switched an d he now depended on
a differen t factio n fo r support , b y an d larg e hi s intimat e circl e o f
managers remaine d a s before. Th e mai n change, apar t fro m th e re -
emergence o f Aersse n as a central figure , wa s the disappearanc e o f
Beaurnont who was evidently too closely linked with the old policie s
and, presumably, under too much of a cloud in Zeeland to continue in
his former capacity. Havin g los t the prince's favour , he also lost his
offices a t Middelbur g an d ende d up , ironically , i n Grotius ' ol d
position a s pensionar y o f Rotterdam. 1 Haersolt e remaine d th e
dominant personalit y i n th e State s o f Overijsse l unti l hi s deat h i n
1643; o n severa l occasion s afte r 1633 , h e wa s agai n Overijssel' s
'deputy in the field' and, i n the yea r of his death, h e was nominated
Overijssel's plenipotentiar y a t th e projecte d Munste r peac e con -
gress.2 Increasingly , h e wa s seconde d i n hi s activitie s b y Wille m
Ripperda,3 a n Overijsse l nobl e wh o ha d marrie d Alid a va n de n
Bouckhorst, Noordwijck' s daughter , an d who , i n 1644 , wa s ap -
pointed t o succee d Haersolt e a s th e province' s representativ e a t
Munster. Vosbergen continue d t o figure prominently in the States of
Zeeland an d was severa l time s th e province' s 'deput y i n th e field' ;
Schaffer staye d a t th e hel m i n Groningen , an d Culemborc h i n
Gelderland, whil e Cat s remaine d instrumenta l i n organizin g th e
States o f Holland . Ploo s continue d fo r som e year s t o dominat e
Utrecht bu t was increasingly seconde d b y Godard van Reede, 4 wh o
was Utrecht's'deputy in the field'in 1634 , 1637 , 1638 , 1641, 164 2 and
other years .
All of these men, togethe r wit h Corneli s Musch , secretar y of th e
States General, who during the early 16303 became one of the prince's
closest advisers , naturall y cam e t o b e well-known , a t leas t b y
reputation, t o Europe' s statesma n an d particularly to Richelieu . As
they were the managers of the provinces, i t was always they who too k
charge o f negotiating secre t matter s of state and especially anything
concerning Franco-Dutc h relations . I n Marc h an d Apri l 1634 , th e
secret State s General committe e depute d t o dra w up th e new treaty
1. Meertens , Letterkundig leven, p. 301 .
2. Kroniek va n het Historisch Genootschap jthser.no . 3 (1867), p. 657 , jthser. vol. 5
(1869), p. 744.
3. Wille m Ripperda, heer van Hengeloo (1600-1669), entered the State s General
for Overijsse l in 1631 ; according to the Swedish envoy at Munster, 'il passe pour tres
avare, flatteur, affectionné tan t a la France qu'a l'Espagne selon le profit qu'i l peut
tirer d e l'un e ou d e l'autre , mais pourtan t toujours dévou é au Princ e d'Orange' ;
NNBW vi. 1193 .
4. Godar d van Reede van Amerongen (i 593-1641), heer van Nederhorst, despite
his marriage into a Catholic family, pursue d a stridently anti-Spanish policy during
the 1646- 8 deliberations over the proposed peace with Spain; NNBW iii. 1006-7.
with Franc e consiste d o f Noordwijck , Culemborch , Pauw , Knuyt ,
Ploos, Ripperda and Coenders de Helpen.1 In the States of Holland, it
was Noordwijck in particular who continued to be regularly chosen
to represent the province in secret deliberations concerning France. 2
During th e winter of 1655- 6 when, to the annoyance of the French,
Frederick Henry entered into secret talks with representatives of the
Cardinal-Infante, governo r o f th e Spanis h Netherlands , i t wa s
Noordwijck and Musch who were delegated by the States General to
explain away this highly sensitive matter to the French ambassador.3
When th e Franco—Dutc h allianc e was renewe d in Septembe r 1636 ,
the secret committee which negotiated wit h the French consisted o f
Noordwijck, Culemborch , Cats , Knuyt , Ploos , Haersolte , Schaffe r
and Oetgen s beside s on e othe r representin g Friesland. 4 Shortl y
afterwards, Loui s XIII, who had promised handsom e gifts t o thos e
with th e power an d inclination to influenc e the proceedings accord -
ing t o hi s wishes , distributed , throug h Charnacé , 20,00 0 livres t o
Musch, 10,000 each to Noordwijck and Ploos, 6,000 to Cats and 5,000
to Knuyt . O f thos e approached , onl y Haersolt e an d Vosbergen ,
apparently, refuse d th e French cash. 5
In hi s late r years, Frederick Henr y continued t o pac k the State s
General's an d th e State s o f Holland' s secre t committee s wit h hi s
trusted confidant s an d manager s in th e sam e way a s he ha d alway s
done. The real continuity throughout his time as stadholder thu s lies
not i n hi s policies, whic h change d radically , but i n his unchanging
method and choice of personnel for managing the assemblies. Be they
former Remonstrant s o r Counter-Remonstrants , associated with or
opposed t o th e forme r truc e moves , th e sam e familia r name s
constantly recur. The State s General kept on appointing ne w secret
committees wit h th e accustome d frequency , bu t Frederic k Henr y
ensured that the same key personages were regularly renominated. In
1640, the State s General's freshl y reconstitute d secre t committee t o
decide campaign strateg y togethe r wit h th e stadholde r consiste d o f
Randwijck, Noordwijck , Teresteyn , Cats , Vosbergen , Rijnswoude ,
Haersolte, Loo , Aldringa , an d Musch . Th e stadholde r himsel f
nominated th e secre t committe e tha t he wanted fro m th e State s of
Holland; and i n 164 0 these were Cats (Raadpensionaris), Noordwijc k
(nobility), Terestey n (Dordrecht) , Broekhove n (Leiden) , Beaumont
(Rotterdam) an d thre e others , withou t on e representativ e fro m
Amsterdam.6 H e steadfastl y persevere d wit h his pro-French polic y
for man y year s until h e change d once again , in 1646 , an d switche d
i. Aitzema , Verbaeli. 297 . 2 . See , for instance , Res. Holl. 1 9 Sept. 1634 .
;. Aitzema,Kereaf/ , i . 325 . 4 . Ibid. i . 349. 5 . Waddington,La République, p.283 .
6. ARH , Collecti e Sypestein, no. 48 , fo. 12 5 ( 1 am indebted for this reference t o
Professor K . W. Swart); regarding his choice fro m th e States of Holland, the Prince
used th e followin g words : 'Uy t d e regeering e va n Holland t heb b ic k bi j mi j
geassumeert o m t e delibereere n e n resolveere n o p d e saecke n va n Oorlog h D e
Heeren Noortwijck , Teresteyn,' etc.
back to an active search for peace with Spain. He was thus committed
by secre t understanding s wit h France, throughou t th e year s 1634 to
1646, to partition o f the Sout h Netherland s between Franc e an d the
Republic. But he was much less effective i n his campaigns against th e
Spaniards fro m 163 4 onward s tha n h e ha d bee n durin g th e perio d
1626 to 1633 , and thi s despite th e fac t tha t from 1635 , Spai n was at
war with France as well as with the Republic. Furthermore, whilst he
had not intended or attempted the conquest of the South Netherlands
during th e year s o f stead y gains , h e mus t hav e known , whe n h e
changed hi s policies i n 1633 , that the strengt h o f his army would be
reduced an d thu s tha t prospect s fo r capturin g mor e territor y were
diminished. During the winter of 1634—5 , the prince for the first time
encountered determine d oppositio n fro m Amsterda m ove r troo p
levels an d arm y funds , an d fro m the n o n th e Republic' s militar y
strength was slowly but inexorabl y reduced.l Th e paradox is that in
the ver y year s that Frederic k Henry' s prestig e reache d its zenit h a t
Paris an d London , his effectiveness a s a military leade r was sharpl y
curtailed. If the stadholder wa s ever really eager to go through wit h a
partition of the South Netherlands which is by no means evident from
his campaign strateg y afte r 1635 , then he was certainly content tha t
this should b e achieved b y France rathe r than by himself.
The essentia l weakness of the prince's position afte r 16 3 3 was that
in the long run the faction headed by Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda was
simply no t powerfu l enoug h t o dominat e th e State s o f Holland .
Haarlem an d Leide n remaine d staunchl y committe d t o th e
stadholder's cause throughout his last years 2 — at no stag e is it reall y
correct to speak of Holland versus the prince -but not enough towns
were able or prepared t o confront Amsterdam. The arm y continue d
to shrink and Frederick Henry's power to wane. Besides, the Holland
war towns , essentiall y motivated b y thei r ow n economi c interests ,
were themselve s lukewar m whe n i t cam e t o votin g fund s fo r th e
army. Finally, in January 1642, a savage new round of cuts was agreed
to almos t unanimousl y by th e State s o f Holland , onl y th e nobilit y
voting against; 3 an d despit e th e prince' s effort s i n th e othe r
provinces, h e coul d no t preven t thes e cut s bein g adopte d b y th e
States General . 'So n authorit é s e diminue beaucoup', remarke d th e
French ambassador. 4 Undeniably, during the last six or seven years of
his life, Frederic k Henry' s authority did sin k far below the leve l no t
only of the years of his great victories but eve n below that of his first
uncertain years of 162 5 t o 1628 .
1. Res . Holl. 7, 13 , ii Dec . 1634 ; 1 4 Feb., 2 ; Apr . 1635 .

2. Se e GA Haarlem , vroedschap res. 2 2 May 1643 ; GA Leiden , Sec. Arch. 450,
fos. iio r ~ v .
3. Res . Holl. 22 , 2 7 Jan. 1642 .
4. Correspondance authentique d e Godefroy d'Estrades, ed . A . d e Sain t Léger an d L .
Lemaire (Paris, 1924), 149 . '
4
THE STATES GENERAL AND THE STRATEGIC REGULATION

OF THE DUTCH RIVER TRADE, 1621-163 6
Few aspects o f the Dutch economic miracle of the seventeenth century were more
fundamental t o Dutc h prosperit y o r mor e distinctiv e t o th e countr y tha n th e
Republic's flourishin g rive r trad e bot h internall y an d wit h th e neighbourin g
Spanish Netherland s an d north-wes t Germany . Th e Dutc h Republic , Europe' s
leading entrepô t fo r foodstuffs , notabl y Balti c grain , fis h an d herring , salt ,
wines, sugar, spice s and dair y products, possessed a major marke t fo r these and
other provision s i n th e densel y populated , relativel y highl y urbanise d an d
industrial belt of territor y girdling the United Provinces to the south an d south-
east. S o substantia l indee d wa s thi s transfe r o f foodstuff s alon g th e inlan d
waterways of th e Low Countries an d Westphalia , that fro m a n early stage in the
Dutch revol t agains t Spain , th e binnenstromen cam e t o b e seen as a formidable
strategic instrument. Durin g th e year s 1621-1636 , th e States General repeatedl y
closed th e waterway s for limite d periods, i n most cases , bu t no t all, onl y to th e
passage of foodstuffs an d certain materials beyond Dutch territory. The purpose
of engagin g i n suc h actio n wa s i n th e mai n strategic , particularl y tha t o f
inconveniencing as far as possible on e or more Spanish or Imperia l armies in the
field. Du e to the complex, decentralise d characte r o f th e Dutch political system,
however, i t ofte n prove d difficul t t o implemen t these temporar y blockade s i n a
consistent manner . Especiall y revealing about Dutc h political lif e a t th e tim e is
the way conflicting economic interest s within the Republic were able at different
times to influence both the form and duration of these blockades. Undoubtedly,
the major tension i n this respect wa s between the interests o f the inland towns on
the on e hand an d thos e o f th e maritime town s o f Hollan d an d Zeelan d o n th e
other.
The histor y o f Dutc h regulatio n o f th e rive r traffi c befor e 1609 , admirabl y
described b y J. H . Kernkamp 1, shows that th e practice then took severa l forms,
that it s effect s varie d greatl y i n differen t part s o f th e Republi c an d tha t o n
* Fo r hi s most helpfu l advic e with thi s article, I should like to than k Professo r K . W . Swart.
1. J . H . Kernkamp , D e handel op de n vijand, I572-I609 (2 vols.; Utrecht , 1931-1934).
102 Th e States General and the Dutch River Trade
occasion thes e consequences wer e drastic. A s early as th e summer of 1572 , with
most o f Hollan d i n rebel hands and th e States o f that provinc e the n gathered a t
Dordrecht, step s wer e taken to preven t water-borne traffic reachin g Delft which
was slowe r tha n th e other s i n breakin g wit h Spain , an d Amsterda m whic h
adhered resolutel y to th e Spanis h cause unti l 1578 2. Followin g th e collaps e o f
Spanish powe r i n mos t o f th e Netherland s durin g th e late r 1570 s an d th e
subsequent partin g o f way s betwee n th e rebelliou s majorit y an d th e Walloo n
provinces which reverted to Philip II, the States General in Brussels endeavoured
intermittently to halt trade by river, canal and overland wit h the Walloon towns .
The advance of Parma's troops int o Flanders and Brabant i n 1584, led the Dutch
to ba n al l trad e wit h enem y territor y indefinitely and clos e th e Rhine , Waal ,
Maas and Usse l beyond Arnhem , Nijmegen , Venlo and Deventer while the Eems
was barre d b y State s warships , patrollin g it s estuary . Thi s measure , mor e
comprehensive tha n it s forerunners, spread consternatio n i n Holland an d quit e
soon, at the request of the 'burgomasters an d merchants' of Dordrecht, th e chief
river entrepô t i n Holland , wa s amende d t o permi t entr y fro m enem y territor y
along the Maas and Rhine of Rhenish wines and timber, coal and iron from Liège
and th e Ruhr , an d Walloo n lime , essential imports 3. Whil e resented a t Arnhem
and Nijmegen , bus y intermediar y river town s betwee n Hollan d an d Germany ,
the ba n wa s supported b y the provinces of Utrech t and Zeelan d whic h lost little
trade b y it and i n the latter case was in imminent danger fro m Parma's advance .
While evasio n o f th e ba n wa s widespread, especiall y th e nocturna l transfe r o f
foodstuffs t o th e Spaniards overlan d b y wagon, th e patrolling o f the waterways
by naval craft and land routes by cavalry was effective enoug h to curb the traffi c
and caus e considerable hardshi p to Parma's troops". Also th e retention o f large
stocks withi n Holland tende d t o depres s foo d price s whic h was undoubtedl y
popular wit h the lower classes and wa s reflected in the attitud e of towns such as
Utrecht wher e influence of th e guild s was marked. Afte r th e fal l o f Antwerp to
the Spaniard s i n 1585 , pressur e fo r re-openin g th e rive r trad e increased ,
especially i n Holland . Nevertheless , th e State s General , guide d b y Quee n
Elizabeth's representative , th e ear l o f Leicester , maintaine d it s stringent policy.
Indeed, b y placcar d o f 4 August 1586 , th e ba n wa s again widene d t o cove r al l
trade with enemy territory, includin g French ports east of the Seine estuary (so as to
prevent sea-born e supplie s reachin g Flander s vi a Calai s an d Boulogne ) an d
2. Ibidem, I , 20-21 .
3. N . Japikse, éd., Resotutien der Staten-Generaal, 1576-1609, IV (RGP , XLI1I ; Th e Hague, 19I5- )
no. 75 0 (30-8-1584); Kernkamp , Handel, I , 162 ; o n Dordrecht's river trade during this period, see J.
L. van Dalen, Geschiedenis va n Dordrecht ( 2 vols.; Dordrecht, 1931 ) I , 314, 32 2 and P . W . Klein , D e
Trippen i n de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag o p de Hollandse stapelmarkt (Assen ,
1965) 66-89.
4. Kernkamp , Handel, I , 163 , II , 15 .
Empires an d Entrepots 10 3
German port s fro m Breme n westwards . Durin g 1587 , th e ba n wa s graduall y
relaxed particularl y regardin g export s b y se a to neutra l port s an d i n November
the State s warship s were withdrawn from th e Eems . Fo r som e town s indeed , i t
was not unadvantageous t o leave the main river blockade in force while the Eems
and sea-route s wer e open, fo r thi s diverte d th e flo w o f foodstuff s throug h th e
ports o f Hollan d an d Zeelan d vi a Calais, Boulogne , Emde n and Breme n to th e
Spanish garrison s strun g ou t alon g th e easter n an d souther n border s o f th e
Republic. Naturally , thi s approac h wa s bitterl y oppose d b y Holland' s rive r
towns, Dordrech t an d Gorkum , b y th e inlan d province s an d thos e chiefl y
concerned wit h the strategic purpos e o f the blockade. Th e ban i n force since the
summer of 158 4 was finally lifted, following Leicester's resignation , in the spring
of 1588 .
After th e prolonge d actio n o f th e mi d 1580s , closin g th e river s wa s mostl y
resorted t o by the States General fo r shor t interval s only so as to inconvenienc e
the Spanish force s during a particular campaign. Often , i n an effort t o reconcile
the conflictin g demands o f strateg y an d trade , suc h measure s applied onl y to a
narrow secto r o f waterways . Thu s durin g the 159 0 Dutch offensiv e in Brabant ,
transporting provision s int o Braban t betwee n th e Scheld e an d Maa s wa s
forbidden fo r some months, but Maurit s could obtai n closur e of the Schelde and
Maas themselve s onl y briefly* . Durin g th e prince' s advanc e upo n Zutphe n i n
1591, onl y th e IJsse l beyon d Devente r was closed . O n th e othe r hand , durin g
1599 a general prohibition o n trading with the enemy was declared i n reply to the
ban o n commerc e wit h th e 'rebels ' issue d i n Februar y 159 9 b y th e Archduke
Albert. I n descending on Grave, in 1602 , Maurits was again assisted by the States
with a temporary ba n a s he was again i n 160 4 with the closing of th e canals int o
Flanders during the siege of Sluis. With Spinola's major counter-offensive on the
eastern border s of th e Republi c in 1606 , th e Maas , Waal , Rhin e and Eem s were
closed t o foodstuff s fo r severa l months .
Following th e signin g of th e Twelve Years Truce i n 1609 , th e Spanis h army of
Flanders wa s substantiall y reduce d i n size 6 whic h itsel f reduce d deman d fo r
Dutch provision s whil e a t th e sam e time , th e Dutc h nava l blockad e wa s
withdrawn from the Flemish coast s o that foodstuff s that previousl y could ente r
only b y river , cana l o r overlan d coul d no w b e shippe d b y se a t o Osten d an d
Dunkirk. Th e Brussel s regime's polic y of improvin g the Flemis h canal s during
the truc e years and particularly the digging of the new Gent-Brugge canal starte d
in 161 3 also encourage d diversio n of traffi c awa y fro m th e Scheld e an d othe r
binnenstromen t o th e Flemis h coas t a s di d Albert' s astut e refusal t o lowe r th e
5. Ibidem, I .
6. Geoffre y Parker, Th e Army of Flanders an d th e Spanish Road (2nd éd.; Cambridge, 1975 ) 271-
272.
licenten (import-expor t dutie s pertainin g t o trad e betwee n th e norther n an d
southern Netherlands ) o n th e Sout h Netherland s side 7. Yet , despit e thes e
negative factors, th e river trade did benefit i n some respects fro m the truce. The
very cessation o f hostilities permitted closer north-south links such as the regular
beurtvaart* (sailing barge) services established at this time connecting Vlissingen,
Delft, Rotterda m an d othe r Dutc h town s wit h Antwerp . Mor e importan t still ,
was the lowerin g of th e licenten on the Dutch sid e from th e comparatively high
war-time level as fixe d b y the States General i n 1603 to a much lower truce-time
level'.
Although difficul t t o compar e owin g to th e variou s stoppages befor e 1606 , i t
appears fro m th e list s o f toll s pai d a t Venl o tha t o n averag e slightl y mor e
shipping plie d betwee n th e Northern an d Souther n Netherland s alon g the mos t
important artery , th e Maas , durin g the truc e tha n i n th e previou s few years10.
Certainly, import s o f Lièg e coa l alon g th e Maa s int o th e Republi c ros e
significantly du e to th e sizeable reduction i n the Dutch import duty. Returns on
the riddertol, a dut y levied on barg e traffi c dockin g a t Antwerp , likewise rose
slightly during the period 11.
The situation on the binnenstromen wa s again transformed by the expiry of the
truce in April 1621 . Th e armie s of bot h side s were considerably expanded, th e
army of Flanders soon reachin g a war-time level of around 60,000 men up from a
truce-time level of les s tha n hal f o f thi s figure 12. Th e army of Flanders, lik e its
Dutch counterpart , wa s essentiall y a standin g army , retaine d throughou t th e
year, distributed in fortified garrison s located alon g the borders o f the Republic.
Among the largest Spanish garrisons were those on the German river s to the east
of Dutc h territory , notabl y Linge n o n th e Eem s and Wese l o n th e Rhine, eac h
having a fixed garriso n o f around 2,50 0 men during the 1620s 13, and Lipstadt o n
the Lippe . Othe r importan t stronghold s t o th e eas t o f th e Republi c wer e
Oldenzaal and Gro l unti l the capture of these by Frederik Hendri k in 162 6 and
7. Se e P. Voeten , 'Antwerps e hande l ove r Duinkerke n tijden s he t twaalfjari g bestand' , Bijdragen

tot d e geschiedenis inzonderheid va n he t ou d hertogdom Brabant, XXXI X (1956 ) 69 , 70 ; idem,
'Antwerpse reacties op he t twaalfjarig bestand' , ibidem, XLI (1958) 214, 218 .
8. O n the Beurtvaart services, see Jan d e Vries, 'Barge s and Capitalism. Passenger Transportation
in th e Dutc h Economy , 1632-1839' , AA G Bijdragen, XX-XX Î (1978 ) 47-48 .
9. Se e tables I and I I below .
10. J . A . van Houtte, 'Le tonlieu de Lith et le commerce su r la Meuse de 1551 à 1701', Economische
geschiedenis va n België. Handelingen va n het colloquium te Brussel, 17-19 november 1971 (Brussels ,
1972) 304 .
11. R . Baetens , D e nazomer va n Antwerpens welvaart ( 2 vols.; Brussels , 1976 ) I , 321 .
12. Parker , Army of Flanders, 271-272 .
13. Se e Archivo Genera l d e Simanca s (hereafte r ÄGS) , Estad o 2321 . Gaspa r Rui z d e Pered a t o
Philip IV, Brussel s 20 October 162 7 and othe r simila r list s compiled b y the paymasters-general of th e
army o f Flanders .
Empires and Entrepots j0 5
1627, Rheinberg , Geldern , Hamm , Orso y an d Dusseldorf . Similarly , Spanis h
strongholds were dotted along the Maas, notably a t Maastricht where over 1,00 0
men were stationed, Venlo and Roermond, in and around 's-Hertogenbosch , and
on the Schelde in and around Antwerp. Finally , there was a veritable comple x of
fortresses linke d b y canals i n Flanders a t Hulst , Sas van Gent, Damme , Brugge,
Gent, Ostend, Nieuwpoort and Aalst. Lik e the Dutch, the Spanish army in the
Netherlands a t thi s time almost neve r pilfered or scoure d th e countryside for its
provisions. After 1621 , mutinies wer e extremely rare and ther e was virtually no
sacking of towns or villages by the Spanish soldiery . Spanish expenditur e on the
army of Flanders fluctuated a t around four and a half millio n ducat s (some thir -
teen million guilders) yearl y during the 1620s , th e bulk being expended o n grain,
fish, salt , dair y produce , wines , horses , fodde r an d timbe r importe d alon g th e
binnenstromen from Dutc h territory , Liège and Westphalia .
The river trade also benefited in 1621 from th e resumption b y the Dutch of their
naval blockad e o f th e Flemis h coast 14. Thi s deprive d Rotterdam , th e Zeelan d
ports and th e Noorderkwartier towns of their truce-time carrying of supplie s by
sea t o Flanders , divertin g almos t al l suc h traffi c vi a th e inlan d waterway s
especially the Schelde, a shift whic h favoured the otherwise stagnant economy of
Zeeland. However , th e coastal blockad e also mad e possibl e a return to the high
level o f ¡icenten on th e river s prevailin g unde r th e war-lis t o f 1603 , th e extr a
money bein g require d t o pa y th e burgeonin g cost o f th e navy . I t i s extremely
important t o note i n this connection tha t reversion to the 160 3 war-list occurred
not, a s ha s sometime s bee n state d i n th e past 15, i n Jul y 162 5 when the State s
General republishe d th e list , but , a s th e State s General' s instruction s t o th e
admiralty college s mak e clear 16, whe n war wa s resumed , i n Apri l 1621 . I n th e
case of essential imports such as iron fro m Lièg e and th e Ruhr , re-imposition of
the war-list involved no extra duty, but i n most instance s as is shown by tables 1
and 2 , the new list involved large increases o n import s and export s both t o and
from enem y and neutra l territory .
14. Dutc h merchan t vessel s wer e being prevente d fro m enterin g Flemish ports b y the Dutc h navy
from th e en d o f Apri l 1621 , se e Algemeen Rijksarchief , Th e Hagu e (ARA) , Staten Generaa l (SG) ,
3180, fö . 187v , Res . 2 1 April 1621 . The Dutc h blockade o f th e Flemis h coast wa s operative in mos t
years fro m Apri l to October.
15. Thi s i s state d i n severa l nineteenth-centur y works an d b y Becht , se e als o J . C . Westerman ,
'Statistische gegeven s ove r de n hande l va n Amsterda m í n d e zeventiend e eeuw', Tijdschrift voor
geschiedenis, LXI (1948 ) 5, 6 .
16. ARA , S G 3180 , fos . 168v , 170v , 201 , Res . 19 , 21 Apri l an d 7 May .
Table 1 'Convoy and Licence' Money on key commodities under the 1609 Truce List"
a) Exports: Item T o Enemy Territory
Dutch butter (per vat) 4 guilders
Dutch cheese (per 100 15
Wheat (per last) 1 0 guilders
Herring (per last) 4 guilders
Salt (refined, 't hondert) 1 5 guilders
From Neutral Lands From Enemy Lands

b) Imports: Lièg e coal (de hondert wagen ) . 0 gld -15 st 0 gld -15 st
English coa l (d e honder t
wagen) 0 gld -10 s
Iron (de duyse 1 gld - 0st
Lime (calcK,11 hoedt) - Ogld-3s t
Rhine wine (ses Amen) 3 gld - 0 st -
Table 2: 'Convoy and Licence' Money on key commodities under the 1603 war-list re-
introduced f or the years 1621-48 1*
To Neutral Territory To Neutra l Lands
r
a) Exports: Item 1 o Enemy Lands via the Maas via Rhine or Waal
Dutch butter (vat) 16 gld 1 3 gld 1 0 eld
Dutch cheese (1 00 Ib) 3 gld - 5t 2 gld- 15 st 2 gld - 5st
Wheat (last) 36 gld 34 gld 27 gld
Herring (last) 12 gld 11 gld 1 0 gld
Salt ft hondert) 100 eld sld 75 gld
b) Imports: From Enemy Territory From Neutral Territory

Liège coal (hondert wagen) 1 gld- 5 st
English coal - 1 gl d - 0 st
Iron(1,000pond) 1 gld- Os t l gld- Os t
Lime ('t hoedt) Ogld - 4s t O g l d - 3 s t
Rhine wine (ses Amen) 7gld-10s t7 gld-10 st
This heft y ris e i n convo y an d licenc e charge s initiall y sprea d consternatio n

among th e Dordrech t skippers ' guilds 19. Th e increase s tende d t o diver t trade ,
most dramatically in the case of sal t where the rise was steepest, awa y fro m th e
main binnenstromen such a s Maas an d Scheld e to a numbe r o f minor , indirec t
routes, notably via Breda and the n overlan d t o smal l towns in Spanish Braban t
17. C . Cau , éd. , Groot placaet-boeck ( 9 vols.; The Hague , 1658-1796 ) I , column s 2388/2416 .
18. Ibidem, I , column s 2415/2486 .
19. Se e the petitio n o f Dordrecht' s Maa s skipper s t o th e Dordrech t vroedschap (undate d 1621 ) i n
ARA, S O 12 , 562, no . 14 .
whence the salt was distributed t o its usual markets. Ove r th e years, however , th e
net result of th e resumptio n o f wa r wa s marginally positive rathe r tha n negativ e
so far a s the rive r trad e was concerned. The combined impac t o f the increase in
military spendin g an d th e blockad e o f th e Flemis h coas t evidentl y slightl y
outweighed that of the increases i n convoy an d licence money and the disruptions
of war . I n th e years 1623-1624 , despit e month s o f dislocation o f th e river trade,
slightly more traffi c passed betwee n th e Northern an d Souther n Netherland s o n
the Maas than in 1618-1619, th e best year s of the truce20. Similarly, returns on the
Brabantse watertol collected o n rive r craf t dockin g a t Antwer p wer e higher fo r
1623-1624 and fo r mos t o f th e 1630 s tha n the y ha d bee n durin g th e truce". Of
this bus y war-tim e traffi c betwee n on e quarter an d on e third plie d th e Maas, a
little les s tha n one fift h saile d o n th e Rhin e an d on e eighth o n the Schelde".
While the volume of river trade slightl y increased i n the early 1620s, it s structure
was more markedl y altered b y the transition t o war. Unquestionably, despite th e
higher duties , deman d fo r foodstuff s i n th e Souther n Netherland s greatl y
increased. O n the other hand , Lièg e coal entere d th e Republic in notably smaller
quantities in the 1620 s tha n previously , presumabl y a s the higher duty increased
the attractiveness to the Dutch consume r o f domestic peat supplies" . Import s of
German wine s into th e Republi c wer e likewise hit by the highe r duties suc h tha t
there was a marked trend during these years for the proportion o f Dutch wine re-
exports consistin g o f Frenc h wine s t o increase , a process particularl y damaging
to Dordrecht , th e Dutc h entrepô t fo r Germa n wines" .
Spinola an d Maurit s too k th e fiel d i n Augus t 1621 , th e Spaniard s advancin g
north-eastwards fro m Maastrich t wit h 1,80 0 suppl y wagons i n thei r train . Th e
subsequent sieg e of Jülic h b y the Spaniard s continue d for fiv e month s until th e
fall o f th e tow n i n Januar y 1622 . Durin g October , th e State s Genera l severa l
times debated whethe r to clos e the Rhine and Maa s to provision s en route to the
Spanish army . Thoug h Hollan d prove d somewha t reluctan t t o d o so , o n 2 3
October, Holland' s deputies consented t o the ban provided that herring , fis h an d
salt wer e exempte d an d wit h thi s provis o th e passag e o f foodstuff s wa s dul y
forbidden thoug h along th e Rhin e only 25. Maurit s himself considered thi s action
unnecessary and even inconvenient to the Dutch forces in the Emmerich area an d
20. Va n Houile , 'L e tonlie u d e Lith' , 304 .

21. Baetens , Nazomer, I , 396 .
22. Fo r furthe r statistic s on th e rive r trad e se e my forthcomin g boo k 'Th e Dutc h Republi c and th e
Hispanic World , 1606-1661' .
23. Va n Houtte , 'L e tonlie u d e Lith' , 304 .
24. Klein , De Trippen, 77 ; M. Bizière , 'The Balti c Wine Trade, 1563-1657' , Scandinavian Economic
History Review, X X (1972 ) 121-132.
25. ARA , SG 318 0 tbs . 501v , 512 , 513v, Res . 19 , 23 Octobe r 1621 .
following consultatio n wit h th e State s General' s deputie s t o th e arm y wa s
countermanded afte r onl y a fe w days26.
In th e nex t year , th e armie s too k th e fiel d i n July . Whil e one Spanis h arm y
distracted th e Dutc h i n th e Cleve s area , Spinol a occupie d Steenberge n an d
descended upo n Bergen-op-Zoom . Promptly , th e Middelburg admiralty colleg e
in whos e repartitie (custom s jurisdiction ) Berge n an d th e Scheld e fell ,
provisionally banne d th e export by river, canal or overland of food, timber 27 and
peat, asking the States General t o confir m it s action. Th e latter havin g alread y
ordered the Rotterdam college to halt foo d export s into Brabant o n the routes of
its repartitie, promptl y di d s o an d instructe d th e governor s o f Breda ,
Geertruidenberg and Heusden to prevent passage o f supplies from those towns to
the surroundin g villages except b y certificat e an d upo n paymen t o f cautionar y
deposits s o a s t o preven t seepag e o f victual s int o Spanis h hand s overland 28.
Soon after , th e governors wer e further ordere d t o stri p the village windmills of
key parts and tak e these into custody within the garrison towns . In early August,
the Rotterda m colleg e complained tha t whil e it had halte d th e exit of all victuals
from it s repartitie, th e States of Zeeland wer e allowing export of (French) wines,
Middelburg's chief item of trade, a s well as of salt , vita l to the refinin g tow n of
Zierikzee29. A t once, Zeeland wa s made to cease thi s practise. On 6 August, th e
States General' s ba n wa s widened to includ e hay and othe r hors e feeds .
As the siege of Bergen-op-Zoo m continued durin g August, anxiety in Zeeland ,
the provinc e most immediatel y threatened, mounted . On e consequenc e o f th e
ban was a massive diversion of provisions by sea from Zeeland and Rotterdam to
the port s o f north-eas t Franc e whenc e the y coul d b e transported , albei t a t
considerable inconvenienc e and cost, throug h Flander s t o th e besieging army in
Brabant. T o reduc e this flo w (th e State s o f Zeelan d di d no t wis h t o preven t it
altogether), th e State s Genera l wa s aske d t o exten d th e specia l war-tim e licent
charged on exports to Calais, t o Boulogne and the other French ports as far west
as Dieppe , th e surcharg e t o b e re-imburse d upo n presentatio n o f testimonials
from magistrate s in those ports tha t cargoes ha d reall y been unloaded there and
not a t Calais 30. Soo n after , alarme d b y report s o f furthe r larg e consignments
passing to the Spaniards vi a Calais, Zeelan d requested a temporary raising of the
charges fo r Calai s a s hig h a s thos e pertainin g o n th e Schelde 31. Th e State s
26. Ibidem, fos . 537v , 553.
27. Regardin g timber , the aim wa s to prevent passage o f Norwegia n sparren ende deeíen use d i n the
construction o f sieg e works , trenche s an d fo r minin g unde r walls.
28. ARA , S O 318 1 fos . 329v , 330 , 334 , Res . 2 5 and 2 7 July 1622 .
29. Ibidem, fos . 350v-351 , Res . 4 Augus t 1622.
30. Zeelan d t o SO, 1 3 August 1622 , Notulen va n de Staten van Zeeland, 1622 , 309; ARA , S G 3181,
fö. 377 , Res . 1 7 August 1622 .
31. Notulen Zeeland, 1622 , Res . 1 5 August 1622 ; ARA, SG 3181, fos. 391 , 393 , Res . 24 , 25 August
1622.
General, afte r consultin g th e thre e Hollan d admiralt y colleges , no t onl y raise d
the charge s fo r Calai s t o th e Scheld e leve l and thos e fo r Frenc h port s beyon d
Calais as fa r a s the Somm e estuar y t o th e prio r leve l for Calais , bu t banne d al l
trade o f an y kin d temporaril y wit h Spanis h Braban t an d Flanders . A fe w days
later, Zeeland bega n pressin g for closur e o f th e Maas i n line with the waterways
further wes t an d fo r impositio n o f th e Scheld e lis t o n al l victual s shippe d t o
French port s between Calais an d the Seine32. The States Genera l closed the Maas
on 3 September an d thoug h Hollan d wa s reluctant t o concede Zeeland' s secon d
point, th e inlan d province s insisted , an d th e Scheld e lis t wa s duly extende d t o
provisions fo r Frenc h port s up t o thoug h excludin g the Sein e estuar y while for
French port s fro m th e Sein e westward s deposit s ha d t o b e pai d refundabl e o n
presentation o f testimonial s fro m th e relevan t Frenc h authorities .
The Spanis h arm y finall y withdre w in defeat fro m befor e Berge n on 4 October
1622. Although the confiscated spillen were then speedily restored t o the Praban t
village windmill s under States ' control , th e binnenstromen remaine d close d a t
Maurits' recommendatio n fo r severa l mor e weeks . I n th e secon d wee k o f
October, th e Zeelan d authorities , withou t prior authorizatio n fro m Th e Hague ,
allowed export o f wines to Flanders an d Antwerp alleging that excessive stocks of
wine ha d accumulate d a t Middelbur g sinc e July . Annoyed , th e State s Genera l
nevertheless remove d th e ba n o n win e export s o n 1 7 Octobe r an d tha t o n
foodstuffs generall y tw o day s later 33. Thus th e 162 2 river blockade wa s in force
for a little under thre e months altogether. Zeeland' s role during that perio d may
be accounted tha t o f a province muc h alarmed by the Spanis h threat and willin g
to plac e strategi c necessit y befor e commercia l interes t u p t o a point , bu t
nevertheless remaining highly sensitive to the commercial needs of its merchants.
During 162 3 there took plac e n o Spanish offensiv e agains t the Dutch. Even so,
the yea r wa s on e o f concer n i n th e Republic , particularl y in Overijsse l an d
Gelderland, regardin g th e build-u p o f Spanis h force s a t Lingen , Geldern ,
Oldenzaal an d Gro l an d th e proximit y fo r a tim e of th e arm y o f th e Germa n
Catholic Leagu e unde r Till y t o th e Republic' s easter n border . I t wa s widel y
feared tha t eve n withou t direct co-operatio n betwee n th e tw o Catholi c armies ,
Spinola coul d invad e fro m th e sout h wit h Maurit s being compelled t o retai n a
large par t o f hi s force s fa r t o th e north 34. Durin g February an d Marc h 1623 ,
Overijssel too k th e lea d a s had Zeelan d th e previou s year in pressing for actio n
on th e rivers , t o imped e th e build-u p o f enem y force s les t th e latte r shoul d
32. ARA , SG 3181, fos. 414, 426v, 429 , Res . 3 , 1 0 and 1 2 September 1622 ; Notulen Zeeland, 1622 ,
15 Septembe r 1622 .
33. ARA , SG , 3181 , fos . 466 , 472v , 474v , 478, Res . 8 , 15 , 1 7 and 1 9 October 1622 .
34. Gedenkschriften va n jonkheer Alexander va n de r Capeilen ( 2 vols. ; Utrecht , 1777 ) I, 95 .
110 Th e States General an d the Dutch River Trade
attempt t o besieg e 'eenig e vand e Overijsselsch e steden' 35. Encounterin g th e
reluctance of Holland, Overijsse l despatched a n extraordinar y delegation t o The
Hague to back th e demand. I n early April Holland's consent wa s obtained fo r a
provisional closur e fo r tw o month s o f th e Maas , Rhine , IJsse l (beyon d
Deventer), Wese r an d Eem s t o foodstuffs , munition s an d timber , win e t o b e
included bu t no t salt 36. Shortly after, th e States Genera l als o close d th e Scheld e
and canal s leadin g int o Flanders . Warship s wer e despatched t o patro l th e Eem s
and Wese r estuaries .
With th e Rhin e shu t t o foodstuff s an d th e troop s a t Zutphe n interceptin g
supplies passin g eastward s beyon d Deventer , th e State s o f Gelderlan d receive d
complaints that n o butter, chees e o r herring was reaching Doetinchem, Borculo ,
Bredevoort, Winterswij k an d othe r localitie s i n th e count y o f Zutphen .
Gelderland an d Overijsse l whic h had a simila r problem wit h regar d t o district s
east o f Deventer , the n aske d th e State s Genera l t o permi t passag e t o ratione d
consignements on payment of caution mone y as had lon g bee n th e practice with
outlying village s unde r States ' contro l i n Brabant 37. I n response , th e State s
General, advise d b y the Raad va n State, drew up fixe d quota s o f provisions fo r
the localities concerned, allocatin g each t o a specified distribution point, usually
Zutphen, Arnhe m o r Deventer , fro m wher e the ration s were to b e released. O n
the expiry of th e origina l ban, o n 1 4 June, th e measure was renewed indefinitel y
and maintaine d throug h Jun e an d mos t o f July . Protest s wer e registere d b y
Dordrecht concernin g the damage t o river commerce generally and fro m th e city
of Breme n and th e Danish crown on behalf o f the latter ove r the blocking of th e
Weser b y State s warships 38.
On 1 9 July, a Holland delegation conferred wit h Maurits who agreed tha t ther e
was no w littl e reaso n t o prolon g th e blockad e whic h experienc e showed wa s
damaging Dutc h trade . Th e nex t day , le d b y th e pensionar y o f Dordrecht ,
Holland's delegatio n to the States General, showing particular concern on behalf
of th e new herring catch, demande d withdrawa l of the ba n on the ground that it
was ineffective , th e enem y bein g wel l supplied , an d becaus e th e admiralt y
colleges coul d n o longe r suppor t th e los s o f th e licenten 39. Initially , th e State s
35. ARA , S G 3182 , fos . 76v , 89v , 90v , 99v , Res . 2 2 February 4, 6 and 1 3 March; th e entr y for 2 2
February reads: 'Di e va n Gelderlant ende Overijssel hebben vtoon t de seer grote magasinen va n vivres
ende ander e crychsprovisien , di e de n vyan t i n di e quartiere n i n syn e stede n i s maeckende ,
apparentelick omm e eenig e va n dese r lande n frontiere n te n bequaeme n saisonn e va n ' t jaa r me t
belegeringe ae n t e tasten' .
36. Resolution Stalen va n Holland, 3 1 March 1623 ; ARA , S G 3182 , fos . 132v , Res. 4 Apri l 1623 .
37. Ibidem, fo . 173 , Res . 4 Ma y 1623 .
38. Resolulien Stalen va n Holland, 2 2 July 1623 ; ARA , S G 3182, fos. 203v , 226 , Res . 3 0 May an d
16 Jun e 1623 .
39. Ibidem, fo . 276 , Res . 2 0 Jul y 1623 ; G A Deventer , Republie k I , no . 19 , Joha n Lulo p t o
Deventer, 2 6 Jul y 1623 .
Empires an d Entrepots H l
General considere d exemptin g herrin g fro m th e ba n an d re-openin g th e canal s
into Flanders an d Braban t whil e keeping the routes t o the east closed. However ,
Friesland an d Groningen reacte d t o Holland's pressure by insisting that if herring
and fis h wer e exempte d the n s o shoul d b e butte r an d chees e likewise 40. Th e
consequent deadloc k wa s broken onl y severa l week s later when , o n th e prince's
advice, th e inlan d province s an d Zeelan d gav e way to Holland , agreein g t o re-
open al l th e river s fro m 1 2 August41. Bu t o n 6 August, Tilly' s force s aide d b y
some Spaniard s vanquishe d th e Protestan t arm y o f Christia n o f Brunswic k a t
Stadtlohn, almost withi n sight of the Gelderland borde r whic h province an d th e
Overijssel towns , especiall y Deventer , thereupo n determine d t o prolon g th e ban
on thei r waterways , appealin g t o th e State s Genera l t o suspen d it s order 42. Six
provinces consented a t once to keep the Rhine, Maas, Usse l and Eems closed fo r
the interi m whil e Hollan d di d s o reluctantly . Subsequently , th e Overijsse l an d
Gelderland deputie s i n The Hagu e repeatedl y reminde d their colleagues tha t th e
evidence gleaned fro m Wesel and elsewhere established beyond doubt tha t al l the
Imperialist, Catholi c Leagu e an d Spanis h force s i n th e are a wer e sufferin g
severely fro m shortag e o f supplie s tha t bot h Cordoba' s troop s a t Bueric h an d
Anholt's forc e clos e by coul d b e compelled t o withdra w within a fe w weeks by
keeping th e rivers closed43. Thus, the blockade was continued through Septembe r
despite mountin g impatienc e i n Holland . O n 2 6 September, representative s o f
the groóte visscherij (herrin g fishery ) o f Sout h Hollan d appeale d t o th e State s
General tha t herrin g sale s ha d suffere d severely , asking that thi s product migh t
now be permitted throug h t o Cologne an d neighbouring markets 44. Finally, on 2
October, after a total of si x months stoppage , th e Rhine, Maas, Usse l and Eem s
were re-opened 45.
During 1624 , th e chie f militar y development wa s th e commencemen t o f th e
siege o f Bred a b y th e Spaniards ; bu t wel l befor e th e actua l invasion , th e
preparations wer e fully eviden t and th e Dutc h responde d wit h regulation o f th e
rivers. O n 2 2 July , th e Middelbur g admiralty college submitte d t o th e State s
General that owin g to th e large-scal e movement of sparren ende deelen throug h
Zeeland t o Antwer p for us e by the Spanish army , i t had provisionall y forbidden
40. ARA , S G 3182 , fos . 276 , 277v , 283v-284, Res . 20 , 21 , 2 6 an d 2 8 July ; Maurit s proposed re -
opening som e binnenstromen bu t keepin g th e Rhin e an d Maa s close d whic h Hollan d oppose d
deeming 'dá t d e Lycente n o p d'een e plaet s te openen, e n o p d'ander e ghesloten t e houden, causeren
soude groót e diversi e van Neeringe' , Resoluíien Stalen va n Holland, 3 August 1623.
41. ARA , SG 3182, f o. 297, Res . 4 August 1623; GA Deventer , Republiek I , no. 19 , Johan Lulo p to
Deventer, 4 Augus t 1623.
42. Ibidem, Gelderland to Deventer , 12 August 1623; ARA, SG 3182 , fo. 314 , Res. 1 4 August 1623.
43. Ibidem, fo . 357v , Res . 6 Septembe r 1623 ; GA Deventer , Republiek l, no . 19 , Johan Lulo p t o
Deventer, 1 4 August an d Gelderlan d t o Deventer , 26 August 1623.
44. ARA , S G 3182 , fo . 388v , Res . 26 September 1623 .
45. Ibidem, fo . 389 , Res . 2 7 Septembe r 1623 .
export o f such timbers 46. Shortl y after , th e State s instructe d th e Rotterda m
college t o sto p passag e o f foodstuffs , includin g wine, bee r an d hors e fodder ,
along Maas or Waal or into Brabant 'op dát den vyant die extraordinaris diert e in
sijn lege r heeft , daarmed e nye t e n werd t version 47. O n 7 August , th e State s
ordered th e Middelburg college to shut the Schelde also and, as in previous years ,
pronounced forfei t al l foodstuffs togethe r wit h the barge s and wagon s in which
they wer e conveye d intercepte d b y it s ship s an d troop s e n route t o Spinola' s
army48. Whil e th e Rhin e an d Usse l remaine d open , th e Amsterda m an d
Noorderkwartier college s wer e instructe d t o assis t wit h preventin g passag e o f
provisions fro m thos e route s southwards . Jus t befor e Spinol a encircle d Breda ,
on 2 3 August , Gelderlan d propose d a genera l prohibitio n o n passag e o f
foodstuffs b y waterway or overland out of the Republic, but with Holland agai n
pre-occupied wit h th e issu e of herrin g exports t o Cologn e and Westphalia , th e
Rhine stil l remaine d ope n eve n thoug h i t wa s wel l know n i n Th e Hagu e tha t
much o f the provision s being conveyed alon g th e Rhine were being unloade d a t
the Spanish garrison towns of Wesel and Rheinberg and transported overlan d t o
Venlo an d thenc e t o Spinola' s army 49. Whil e supplie s continue d t o flo w
eastwards, ther e wa s als o a majo r diversio n o f provision s fro m Zeelan d
especially to Calais. Earl y in November 1624, the States General raise d th e licent
on exports to Calai s to th e Schelde leve l and t o other Frenc h port s a s far a s th e
Somme estuar y to th e prio r leve l Calais 50.
By Decembe r 1624 , after fiv e month s o f closur e of th e Schelde , Maa s an d th e
waterways between, pressure had buil t up fro m Gelderland , Overijssel , Zeelan d
and als o fro m the stadholde r fo r closin g the Rhin e likewise. However, Hollan d
refused t o agre e t o thi s s o lon g a s th e sea-rout e t o Calai s remaine d open ,
knowing tha t Zeelan d woul d no t consen t t o closur e o f th e latter 51. A s th e
position o f Bred a steadily deteriorated, s o demands for a tighter rive r blockad e
increased. I n lat e Januar y 1625 , being advised by the Rotterda m colleg e tha t s o
much foo d wa s being shipped up th e Rhin e that eve n grain was passing b y tha t
route, which was previously unheard of, Holland at last gave in and th e river was
closed". A s the month s passed , th e besiegin g arm y wa s doubtless sustaine d b y
the prospec t o f th e eventual fall o f Breda , bu t ther e is no doubt tha t th e troops
suffered severel y from lac k o f supplie s an d toward s th e en d o f th e sieg e th e
46. Ibidem, S G 3183 , fo . 390 , Res . 2 5 July 1624 .

47. Ibidem, fo . 399 , Res , 2 9 July 1624 .
48. Ibidem, fos . 420v , 421v , Res . 7 August 1624 .
49. Ibidem, fos . 625v , 665 , 745v .
50. Ibidem, fo . 645 .
51. Ibidem, fos . 733v-734 , 745v , 737v-738 , Res . 20 , 2 1 and 2 8 Decembe r 1624 .
52. Ibidem, S G 3184 , fos . 29 , 31 , Res . 20 , 2 1 Januar y 1625 .
besiegers were in fact reduced to a far worse state of distress than the defenders 53.
In part , thi s wa s due t o lac k o f pay , bu t i t does see m tha t th e Dutc h blockad e
contfibuted also . Whe n Bred a finall y fell , th e admiralt y college s desperatel y
short o f fund s fo r th e navy , a t onc e presse d th e State s Genera l t o restor e th e
licenien". Shortl y after , o n 1 2 June, a grou p o f Amsterda m merchant s wh o
exported herrin g an d fis h t o Westphalia , backe d b y th e Amsterda m
burgomasters, petitione d th e States General fo r the re-opening of the rivers. Fish
exports wer e promptl y exempte d fro m th e ban . Afte r consultin g Frederi k
Hendrik, the new stadholder, the States finall y opene d al l the binnenstromen t o
provisions an d th e othe r prohibite d merchandis e fro m 3 0 June 1625 , excep t fo r
the routes to Breda an d 's-Hertogenbosch which remaind blockaded55. Export of
horses was allowed a few days earlier to enable Dutch dealers to participate in the
Besançon hors e fair . Th e Maa s an d Scheld e ha d bee n close d t o foodstuff s an d
munitions fo r littl e shor t o f a year .
The re-opening o f the waterways, however, proved to be brief. July indeed was
the onl y month i n 162 5 whe n rive r traffi c wa s unimpede d a s i s reflected i n th e
high return on the Brabantse watertol at Antwerp fo r that month 56. Then, o n 29
July, th e Brussel s regime , finall y complyin g wit h pressur e emanatin g fro m
Madrid fo r som e time , forbad e trad e o f an y kin d wit h th e 'rebels' , suspende d
indefinitely th e ¡icenten on the Spanish sid e on all water and land routes between
Spanish and Dutch-occupied territor y and closed the Rhine to the Dutch at Wesel
and th e Eem s at Lingen 57. Fleet s o f Dutc h barge s wer e turned bac k b y Spanish
troops an d official s o n th e Maas , Rhine , Scheld e an d othe r waterways .
Unquestionably, th e measur e struc k har d a t bot h sides : Dutc h rive r commerc e
was all but paralyse d bu t i n the Souther n Netherland s prices o f grain , herring,
butter, cheese , sal t an d suga r ros e steeply 58. Spanis h cavalr y operatin g o n th e
fringes o f Gelderlan d an d Overijsse l bega n t o disrup t th e flo w o f supplie s
overland to Zutphen , Doesburg , Emmeric h an d othe r Dutc h garriso n towns , a
practice which they had previousl y scrupulously avoided for fea r of retaliation in
53. Algemee n Rijksarchie f (ARA ) Brussels , SE G 193 , fö . 23 , Isabell a t o Philip , Brussels , l Ma y

1625.
54. ARA , S G 3184 , fös . 224 , 232 , 243v , Res . 7 , 1 2 June 1625 .
55. Ibidem, fö . 248v , Res . 2 3 June 1625 .
56. Baetens , Nazomer, I , 322 .
57. ÄG S Estado 2039, consulta 28 September 1625 ; Ordinance ons Meeren des Conincx inhoudende
verbodt vanden coophandelmettegherelleerdeprovintien (Knutte l 3584; Brussels, 2 9 July 1625); J . 1.
Israël, ' A Conflic t o f Empires . Spai n an d th e Netherlands , 1618-1648' , Past an d Present, LXXV I
(1977) 5 6 ; see above, 23.
58. Ibidem; Va n de r Capetien , Gedenkschriften, I , 454 . O n th e collaps e o f suga r import s fro m
Holland t o Antwer p i n 1625-162 9 se e H . Pohl , 'Di e Zuckereinfuh r nac h Antwerpe n durc h
portugiesische Kaufleut e währen d de s 8 0 jahrige n Krieges' , Jahrbuch fur Geschichte vo n Staat,
Wirtschaft und Gese/lschafr Lateinamerikas, I V (1967) 356-357 .
114 The States General and the Dutch River Trade
kind. The State s General wer e slow to respond , firs t deliberatin g what to d o in
answer t o the Spanish edict on 1 2 and the n 1 9 August, bu t as yet were unable to
agree o n an y action . Ther e the n ensue d a perio d o f intensiv e debate o n thi s
question among th e Dutch provinces, cit y councils, admiralt y colleges and othe r
administrative bodies 59.
In all, formulating a response to the Infanta's verbodt took some two and a half
months. Th e Dordrech t vroedschap pondere d a t lengt h an d consulte d variou s
local merchant s before concluding, almost unanimously , that th e mos t effective
reply t o th e Spanish actio n would b e to retaliat e in kind bannin g al l trade no t
only wit h enem y territor y but wit h neighbouring neutra l land s a s well , wit h a
view to forcing Isabella t o retract her prohibition quickly 60 . Likewise Amsterdam
judged it best to proceed 'volgende 't exempel vande vijand' 61 . Zeeland onc e again
was kee n t o procee d wit h stringent actio n o n th e rivers . Finally, on 1 6 October
1625, th e State s Genera l issue d a sweepin g counter-prohibition, know n a s th e
placaet va n retorsie, forbidding trade by inland waterway or overland wit h either
enemy, neutra l lands or villages and districts under contribution to the States but
lying beyond th e frontier garrison town s - Arnhem , Nijmegen, Zutphen, Grave ,
Heusden, Geertruidenber g an d Bergen-op-Zoom 62. A s adjunct s t o th e edict ,
merchandise shipped westward s to French port s fro m Calais to the Somme were,
for th e duration, t o pay the Schelde licent while exports to the Zevenbergen and
Prinsenland district s lying between Spanish-occupie d Bred a an d Thole n ha d t o
pay th e stil l highe r Bosch licent . Application s fo r exemptio n o f consignment s
arranged befor e 1 6 October , includin g on e fro m Loui s d e Gee r wh o foun d
himself unable to receive a delivery of pistol locks and bandeliers along the Maas
from Sittard , wer e rejected . Meanwhile , fearin g Dutc h cavalr y retaliatio n i n
Brabant an d Flander s agains t th e supplyin g o f Spanis h garrison s fro m loca l
villages, th e Spanis h governor s i n th e regio n mad e i t know n t o thei r Dutc h
counterparts tha t th e Brussel s edic t woul d no t involv e Spanis h attempt s t o
disrupt movement s o f provision s fro m borde r village s int o Dutc h garrisons ,
though fo r som e month s the dislocatio n continued o n th e eastern frontier" .
The effect s o f th e 162 5 rive r blockad e wer e undoubtedly drastic . Th e Dutc h
action increase d furthe r th e diversio n o f trad e fro m th e binnenstromen which
had commence d a t th e en d o f Jul y with the Brussel s edict. A massiv e flo w o f
59. ARA , S G 3184 , fo . 320v , Res . 1 2 August 1625 ; Resoluiien Staten va n Holland, 2 3 September,
2, 3 October 1625 .
60. Gemeent e Archie f (GA ) Dordrecht , sectio n 3 , vol . 46 , fo . 23 , vroedschapsresolutie , 2 7
September 1625 .
61. G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XIV, fo . 123 , Res . 2 2 September 1625 .
62. ARA , S G 3184 , fo . 405v , 408v , Res . 16 , 1 8 October 1625 ; for instance , trade relation s between
Grave and th e Cuyk region were completely severed much to the distress of the Grave vroedschap, se e
ARA, S G 4947 , 11 , Burgomaster of Grav e t o SG , 1 December 1625 .
63. Ibidem, 3184 , fos . 383 , 396v , 494 .
Emp ires and Entrepots 11 5
provisions, material s an d manufacture s which normall y ha d passe d alon g th e
rivers now passed vi a Amsterdam an d the Noorderkwartier ports to Bremen an d
Hamburg whenc e they were shipped up the Weser and Elbe and then overland t o
the Eem s an d Rhin e vallies 64. I f Breme n ha d previousl y suffere d fro m Dutc h
river regulation , o n thi s occasio n th e cit y profited . Revealingly , whil e th e
Middelburg, Rotterda m an d Noorderkwartie r admiralt y college s advise d th e
States General t o impose the Schelde licent for exports t o Bremen and Hamburg ,
Amsterdam argue d agains t an d th e matte r wa s shelved 65. Despit e th e raise d
tariffs o n goods for the north-east Frenc h ports, ther e took plac e a simultaneou s
diversion of trade vi a Rotterdam an d the Zeeland port s to Calais an d Boulogne .
During th e autum n o f 1625 , man y request s reache d th e State s Genera l fro m
villages under contributio n but beyond the border comptoiren, asking for special
arrangements fo r their supplies. A t the States' bidding , the Raad va n State drew
up list s o f approve d provision s base d o n number s of inhabitant s an d assigne d
each villag e t o a depo t - Dordrecht , Gorkum , Bergen-op-Zoom , Heusden ,
Grave, Arnhem , Nijmege n o r Devente r - whenc e thes e wer e t o b e obtained .
Oudenbosch, fo r example , a villag e of 34 4 inhabitants, locate d betwee n Bred a
and Bergen , wa s allocate d weekl y at Dordrech t only , fixe d ration s o f ry e an d
oats, on e hundred pounds o f cheese, hal f a sack of salt, fou r barrel s of beer, fift y
pounds o f soap and fou r stoops of wine 'for sic k women' a s well as measures of
herring, othe r fish , cooking oi l and timbe r for th e upkeep of thei r houses 66. The
same ration s wer e assigne d t o othe r village s in proportio n t o population , th e
nearby twi n village s o f Ou d an d Nieu w Gastel , fo r instance , wit h 66 3
inhabitants, wer e allocated a t Dordrech t tw o hundre d pounds o f chees e weekly,
twice the provision of herring and fis h an d fift y percen t more beer and win e than
Oudenbosch67. Th e list s testify t o th e wid e variety of need s and particularl y the
large amoun t o f herrin g consume d b y th e Braban t peasantry . Chees e wa s
allocated o n th e basi s o f ove r a quarte r o f a Dutc h pound pe r wee k fo r ever y
adult and chil d in the villages. Inevitably, the system prompted rivalrie s between
the depo t town s for possessio n o f thes e captive markets. Gorku m and Heusde n
quarreled, fo r example , over the provisioning of variou s villages in thei r vicinit y
while Rotterda m objecte d tha t th e Prinsenlan d wa s assigned t o Dordrecht , fo r
previously muc h o f th e area' s grai n an d fis h ha d bee n procure d fro m
Rotterdam 68 .
64. Despit e heav y diplomati c pressure , Spain wa s unable to secur e th e closin g o f th e Wese r t o th e
Dutch b y th e neighbourin g Germa n princes, se e ACS Estad o 2040 , consulta , 3 Decembe r 1626.
65. ARA , SG 3185 , fo. 52v , Res. 5 January, 1 2 February 1626.
66. Ibidem, fos . 59-60 , Res . 27 February 1626.
67. Ibidem, fos . 51v , 60, 61v , Res. 12 , 17 , 1 8 February 1626 .
68. Ibidem, fos . 64, 75v , Res. 21 February , 6 Marc h 1626 .
l !T/z e Stótó General and the Dutch River Trade
Among th e repercussion s o f th e blockade s ther e wa s a sudde n dislocatio n o f
commerce i n neighbouring neutral lands . Lièg e for instanc e was entirely cut of f
from it s Dutc h market . Whil e the Lièg e cit y counci l secure d permissio n fro m
Brussels for th e passage throug h Spanis h territor y to the city of grain purchase d
from th e Dutch , th e State s Genera l refuse d t o allo w consignment s fo r Lièg e
through it s comptoiren 69. Application s fro m Goch , Calcar , Cleve s an d othe r
neutral localities o n the Rhin e to b e allowed provision s from th e Republi c were
held u p fo r month s i n the State s whil e the province s considered wha t was to b e
done70.
Pressure for som e relaxatio n o f th e blockad e wa s perceptibly mounting by the
spring of 1626 . I n May, while rejecting petitions fro m th e skippers of Nijmegen,
Arnhem, Tie l an d Culembor g fo r permissio n t o conve y fis h an d othe r
perishable merchandis e to neutral lands and from Dordrecht vroedschap to allow
in a consignemen t o f Lièg e iro n an d coal , th e State s General , prompte d b y
Overijssel an d Gelderlan d whic h were suffering mos t fro m th e action, delegate d
a committe e t o deliberat e the feasibilit y of restorin g trade wit h neutral s on th e
basis o f a highe r tha n norma l licent 71. Ther e wer e powerfu l group s however ,
including stadholder, Raad van State, and several city councils, who continued t o
insist that theplaccaet va n retorsie should not be altered but strictl y maintained.
Indeed, th e State s o f Hollan d agree d o n resistin g the pressur e fro m th e inlan d
provinces and persevering with the ban as it stood, disagreeing only over the issue
of Calais , some towns , doubtless includin g Dordrecht an d othe r inlan d centres ,
wishing to raise the licent or close the route altogether, whil e the maritime towns
preferred t o maintain the status quo™. Amsterdam persisted throughou t 162 6 in
wanting th e blockad e t o remaine d unaltered" . Th e Raad va n State, as always,
was highl y critical of thi s latte r attitude , advisin g the State s Genera l tha t th e
licent en alnoch behooren verhoogt t e worden [to Calais an d Boulogne] , niet alleen voo r
desen tegenwoordige n tyd t mae r ooc k altijd t duerend e d e oorlog , end e da t tselv e
streecken soud e to t groote n diens t va n tland t ende ongerie f f vand e vyandt 74 .
That strategi e reasoning was actually less important than commercial calculatio n
in formulating Dutch policy over the placcaet va n retorsie is demonstrated b y the
69. Ibidem, fo . 64 , Res . 2 1 February 1626 .

70. Ibidem, fo . 191 , Res . 3 0 May 1626 .
71. Ibidem, fo . 165v , Res . 1 5 May 1626 .
72. Resolutien Sloten va n Holland, 13 , 19 , 25 June 1626 .
73. G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XIV , fös . I59v , 182v , Res . 9 Jul y an d 1 7 November
1626, declarin g in th e latte r 'i n ' t opene n vand e licente n op d e neutral e Lande n nie t t e consentere n
voor end e a'ee r de n vyan d va n syn e syde dae r ¡nn e geconsenteerd sa l hebben'.
74. Advy s of Raa d va n Stat e t o SG , 2 4 Jul y 1626 , ARA , S G 5494 , I .
Empires an d Entrepots H '
fact tha t the Raad va n State changed it s stance at the end of September 162 6 and
switched to favouring re-opening the licenten for neutral territory, as the ban was
being extensivel y evade d du e t o disobedienc e an d corruptio n amon g th e nava l
crews and troops patrollin g the rivers and routes who frequently extorte d money
for condonin g prohibite d traffi c an d o n accoun t o f th e no w desperat e shortag e
of nava l funds" ; ye t despite this , th e placcaet remaine d unmodified . Whil e
Utrecht, Frieslan d an d Groninge n wer e willin g t o alte r th e ban , Gelderlan d
and Overijssel , denude d o f their German trade , calle d mor e and mor e stridently
for relaxation , firs t intimatin g tha t the y woul d b e unabl e t o mee t thei r annua l
quotas towards the States General's budget if this were not done and, by January
1627, actuall y threatening t o re-ope n th e licenten o n thei r river s unilaterally.
Holland, in the face of this pressure, while still preferring complete closure, was
willing b y Januar y 162 7 t o conside r modification . However , th e solutio n
acceptable t o th e majorit y o f th e province , restorin g th e licenten fo r neutra l
territory onl y on th e basi s o f th e Bosc h licent, wa s entirely unacceptabl e t o th e
inland provinces 76. The latte r wer e only willin g to rais e the licenten fo r neutrals
on Maa s an d Rhin e i f thos e fo r th e sea-route s t o th e Eems , Wese r an d Elb e
estuaries, a s th e Raad va n State advised , wer e increase d pari passa; otherwise
they insisted o n restoration o f trade wit h neutral s on the regula r war-time basis.
For a time , Hollan d incline d toward s a compromis e whereb y river commerc e
with neutral s woul d pa y th e regula r war-tim e licent o n trad e wit h enem y
territory, bu t thi s to o prove d unacceptabl e to Overijsse l and Gelderland" . I t is
not entirel y clear whethe r the oppositio n o f Dordrech t t o th e Holland majorit y
over thi s proposed compromis e wa s chiefly du e to Dordrecht' s dislik e of seeing
the ga p i n licenten charge d o n rive r a s distinc t fro m maritim e traffi c widene d
further, o r t o a belie f tha t suc h modificatio n o f th e placcaet woul d remov e
pressure from the enemy to lift his blockade by enabling the Spaniards to procur e
their provisions indirectly via neutrals. Proposal s t o placate the inland provinces
and Dordrech t by increasing the licent on the sea-routes a t least to the Eems and
Weser estuarie s to th e leve l normally applying on th e Rhin e and Maa s t o trad e
with neutrals , thoug h supporte d b y most Hollan d town s was firmly blocke d by
Amsterdam an d fo r a tim e b y Rotterdam 78. Significantl y th e softenin g i n
Holland's approach earl y in 1627 , caused disma y in Zeeland becaus e re-openin g
75. ARA , S G 3185 , fos . 398v , 401, Res . 3 and 6 October 1626 ; ibidem, SG 5494, II , Advy s Raad
van Stat e to SG, 29 September 1629 ; ARA, Raad va n State, 44, Res. 29 September an d 2 4 December
1626.
76. ibidem, SG 3186 , fo . 20v , Res . 1 5 January 1627 ; Resolutien Staten va n Holland, II , 1 4 and 1 8
January 1627 .
77. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 18 , 1 9 January 1627.
78. Ibidem.
to neutral s but no t t o the enemy mean t i n effect th e resumption o f some activity
on the Rhine and Maa s whil e the Schelde an d Ghen t cana l remaine d completel y
closed suc h that Braban t an d Flander s woul d be supplied indirectl y from neutra l
localities o n the Rhine and Maas 79, while Zeeland's trade with Calais contracted .
One notabl e differenc e between th e 1625-162 7 blockade an d th e less prolonge d
interruptions o f rive r trade durin g th e 1620 s wa s tha t whil e the latte r involved
only provision s an d certai n materials , th e 1625-162 7 actio n applie d t o al l
merchandise, shuttin g out foreig n manufactures in the process. Fo r thi s reason,
the 1625-162 7 ban proved t o be of greater concern tha n the others to the Holland
industrial a s wel l a s commercia l towns . Whil e th e work-forc e o f Leiden ,
Haarlem, Delf t an d Goud a undeniabl y benefitted i n al l the blockade s fro m th e
cheaper foodstuff s and therefor e lower cost o f livin g that resulted 80, exclusion of
South Netherlands , Westphalia n an d Lièg e manufactures especially appealed t o
vroedschappen which , prompted b y the textile guilds, were in highly protectionist
mood durin g th e 1620s 81. Thu s couple d wit h the resistanc e o f Amsterda m an d
other maritim e towns to th e demands o f the eastern provinces and Hollan d rive r
towns was that o f Leide n and th e manufacturing interest. Afte r considerin g th e
representations o f the inland provincies in June 1626 , the Leiden vroedschap ha d
instructed it s deputies i n th e Hagu e t o
serieuselick helpe n arbeyde n da t d e licente n o p d e neutrale lande n geslote n blyve n end e

dat d e sluyte n nae r de n viant , me t goede wachten bese t end e bewaer t moge n werden 8'
Middelburg, whic h consistently strov e throug h 162 7 t o stiffe n th e resistanc e i n

Holland t o re-openin g th e river s discerningly mad e a poin t o f stressin g that b y
shutting out Flemis h manufactures the river blockade wa s significantly damagin g
industrial lif e acros s th e border .
Undeniably though , th e staunches t suppor t fo r th e blockad e stemme d fro m
those town s whic h profite d fro m th e diversio n o f rive r commerc e t o th e sea -
routes. Frequently , thi s expanded trad e wit h north-eas t Franc e an d north-wes t
Germany wa s indirect . Herrin g an d salt-fish , fo r instance , wa s shippe d i n
abundance fro m Rotterdam an d Zeelan d firs t t o Dove r an d the n to Calai s s o as
to avoi d th e highe r licenten payabl e o n th e direc t rout e t o Calais 83. Th e
79. Notulen Zeeland, 1627 , Gecommitteerd e Rade n t o Zeelan d towns , Middelburg , 2 2 Januar y
1627.
80. Va n der Capelien, Gedenkschriften, \ , 454 ; Israel , ' A Conflict' , 56-57, ; see above, 23-24.
81. J . I . Israel , 'Th e Hollan d Town s an d th e Dutch-Spanis h conflict' , Bijdragen e n mededelingen
betreffende d e geschiedenis de r Nederlanden, XCI V (1979 ) 65-68. ; see above, 67-70.
82. G A Leiden , Secretariearchie f 447, fo . 303 , Res . 2 3 June 1626 , se e also ibidem, fo. 332 , Res . 1 8
November 1626 .
83. Notulen Zeeland, Res . 1 8 March 1626 .
fundamental motivatio n fo r Zealand' s persisten t oppositio n t o restorin g th e
licenten on the river s is revealed b y its reaction t o th e demand s fro m Overijssel ,
Gelderland an d th e Raad va n State tha t th e charge s fo r Calai s shoul d b e
increased i n orde r t o reduc e th e diversio n b y tha t route . Th e inlan d province s
were naturall y bitte r tha t other s shoul d profi t fro m th e cessatio n o f thei r ow n
trade whil e the Raad judge d tha t th e grea t scal e o f th e diversio n wa s in effec t
nullifying th e intende d strategi c impac t o f th e placcaet. I n Novembe r 1626 ,
Zeeland instructe d it s deputies i n The Hagu e tha t the y
zullen devoi r doe n da t dés e opening e va n licente n o p Neutrale n gee n voortgang h e n

gewinne, mae r d e zaecken laten verblyven by den teneu r van he t placcaet va n retorsie.. .
ende sonderlinge nie t mede de meerder verswaringe van het Por t e n de Haven va n Calis ,
op da t de n cours va n de n Handel nie t e n werde gediverteert 84.
The Middelburg vroedschap wa s the most anxious of any in the United Province s
to retain the blockades a s it stood and i n its drive to hold th e line in Zeeland an d
Holland, elaboratel y set out its arguments85. Replying to claims tha t the placcaet
was no t i n fac t denyin g provision s t o th e enem y bu t merel y denudin g th e
admiralty college s o f sorel y neede d funds , Middelbur g judged tha t i n realit y
great damage was being dealt to the Southern Netherland s through the blockade .
If supplie s were entering via Calais an d othe r Frenc h ports , thes e were costly due
to th e hig h licenlen, a facto r whic h als o compensate d th e admiralt y college s i n
part, becaus e th e Frenc h taxe s ha d t o b e pai d befor e suc h victual s entere d
Spanish territory , an d owin g t o th e heav y cost o f transportatio n b y cana l an d
overland t o th e Spanis h forces . I n consequence , th e Spanis h Netherland s ha d
suffered a punishing rise in foo d prices . Sal t was then selling at Liège , according
to th e Middelbur g vroedschap, a t fiv e time s it s pric e i n Hollan d an d Zeeland .
Rye, a cheap grain , was then selling at Ghen t fo r ove r twent y five pe r cen t mor e
per last than was wheat at Middelburg. Restoring river trade with neutrals, it was
argued, would no t onl y har m the commerce of Hollan d an d Zeelan d bu t provide
both th e Spanish arm y and th e Emperor wit h all the supplies they needed thereby
undermining th e strategi c interest s no t onl y o f th e Republi c bu t als o o f it s
protestant allie s i n German y an d o f th e Danis h king 86. A t th e sam e time ,
Middelburg maintained that the licenten fo r Calai s should no t b e raised les t sea -
borne commerc e shoul d suffer .
84. Ibidem, Res . 2 4 Novembe r 1626 .

85. Se e Rijksarchie f i n Zeeland , Middelburg , archiv e o f th e State s o f Zeeland , vol . 933 :
'Consideratien va n d'Heere n borgemr s schepene n end e Råe t dese r sta d Middelbur g ove r he t opene n
vande licente n of t uytganc k vande goederen o p ende vand e neutrale n Landen stede n end e dorpen o p
contributie zittende' , 5 Februar y 1627 .
86. Ibidem, 9-13 .
During Februar y an d Marc h 1627 , whil e th e State s o f Zeeland , speciall y
summoned o n accoun t o f thi s issue , unanimousl y re-affirme d suppor t fo r th e
existing placcaet , an d whil e Hollan d remaine d divided , Overijsse l an d
Gelderland intensifie d thei r pressur e 'me t affirmati e dat zonde r dés e opening e
niet een stuyver tot subsidie van de Admiraliteyten i s te verwaghten'87. To back its
claims, Overijsse l pu t t o th e State s Genera l a missiv e fro m th e Devente r
vroedschap maintainin g that owing to continued closure of the rivers, Deventer' s
former Germa n trad e (chiefl y wit h th e town s o f north-centra l German y vi a
Munster and Osnabrück ) had bee n wholly diverted via Holland, Bremen and th e
Weser route 88. Confronte d b y such pressur e an d tha t o f group s within Hollan d
who claime d tha t import s suc h a s lime , iro n an d molensteeuen wer e urgently
needed fo r agricultur e and th e windmills 89, th e State s o f Hollan d equivocate d
during Februar y an d th e State s Genera l provisionall y resolved by majority vote
to restor e rive r trad e wit h neutrals a s fro m 1 3 February 1627 90. Shortl y after,
even Rotterdam, on e of the Holland town s that gaine d mos t fro m th e blockade ,
consented to restoring river commerce with neutrals provided that this was on the
basis of the war-tim e licent on trad e with enemy territory, hoping i n this way to
retain a substantial gap between the cost o f river-borne as distinct from sea-born e
commerce91. Ye t th e disput e wa s fa r fro m ove r an d th e schedule d re-openin g
failed t o tak e place . Severa l Hollan d town s continue d t o insis t o n th e 'enemy'
licent on trade wit h neutrals while the Raad va n State still pressed fo r the Bosch
licent bot h o n export s by rive r an d b y se a t o Calai s an d Breme n an d Zeeland
flatly refuse d t o accep t th e majorit y vote i n favou r of re-opening" .
During March , th e inlan d province s continue d t o insis t tha t the y would onl y
accept furthe r closur e o f th e river s i f th e diversionar y sea-routes wer e closed
likewise, an d warship s employe d t o bloc k th e entrance s o f Emden , Bremen ,
Calais, Boulogn e an d th e Somm e estuar y as i n 1599 93. Whe n Hollan d objecte d
that thi s woul d b e costl y an d woul d anno y th e foreig n state s affected , asking
whether simpl y raisin g th e ¡icenten o n th e sea-route s woul d no t suffice , th e
inland province s replied tha t i t woul d no t bu t tha t the y would accept restoring
the rive r trade to neutral s o n th e basi s o f the sam e increase d licent a s would b e
applied to the sea-routes. Thi s prompted a groóte dispariteyt amon g the Holland
towns 94 . A majorit y of th e provinc e comprising manufacturing, river and othe r
87. Notulen Zeeland, 1627 , 122 .

88. ARA , S G 3186 , fö . 46 , Res . 3 0 January 1627 .
89. Notulen Zeeland, 1627 , 108 .
90. ARA , S G 3186 , fo . 53v . Res . 4 February 1627 .
91. G A Rotterdam , Ou d Archie f XX , vroedschapsresoluties , 2 4 February 1627 .
92. ARA , S G 3186 , fo . 65 , Res . 1 3 February 1627 .
93. Ibidem, fo . 104 , Res . 1 3 March 1627 .
94. Resoluüen Staten va n Holland, 1 0 March 1627 .
Emp ires and Entrepots 12 1
inland town s now brought heavy pressure to bear on Amsterdam, Rotterda m an d
the Noorderkwartie r port s t o conced e a generale sluytinge whic h woul d include
the disputed sea-routes . O n 20 March, a majority of the States o f Holland vote d
for a general closur e
sonder da t di e va n Amsterda m t e bewege n waren tot he t sluyte n va n d e Havene n van

Calis, Boulogn e ende de Somme met de Eems ende Weser, ofte de convoyen van dien te
verhoogen, omm e niet all e d e neringen uyt den Land e t e diverteren".
Nevertheless, on 26 March, Holland consente d i n the States General to deliberate

a generale sluytinge, agreein g t o closur e o f th e Eem s an d Wese r b y Dutc h
warships and that Loui s XIII should be asked to forebear the closing of Calais to
Dutch merchant vessels 96. Soon after, Rotterda m gav e way to the clamour fo r a
general closure 97. However , whe n it emerged subsequentl y that a t Amsterdam' s
insistence Hollan d woul d conced e shuttin g the Eem s an d Wese r t o foodstuff s
and munition s onl y an d no t t o othe r merchandise , th e fiv e non-maritim e
provinces retorted tha t i f Holland refuse d to proceed wit h a general closure such
as ha d bee n envisaged , tha t the y woul d the n insis t o n implementin g th e
resolution o f 4 February an d re-ope n th e rivers to trad e wit h neutrals98. To this
Holland an d Zeelan d replie d that the y would not accep t a majority vote by the
five inlan d province s o n a n issu e concerning convoy and licenc e money.
The deadloc k continue d unchange d fo r a furthe r tw o months . Durin g June ,
however, discussio n resume d o n th e basi s of a fres h approac h whereb y exports
by rive r an d overlan d t o neutral s woul d b e allowe d excep t fo r foodstuff s an d
munitions, th e Eem s an d Wese r woul d be closed bu t likewis e t o foodstuff s an d
munitions onl y an d al l import s fro m neutra l territor y admitte d b y rive r
'uytgesondert manifacture n i n vyande n stede n end e lande n gemaect' 99. Deftl y
though this formula accommodate d most o f th e conflicting interests involved, it
failed to clinch the matter. Zeeland proved willing to concede admission o f timber,
iron, lime , molensteenen an d othe r ke y imports fo r whic h ther e wa s mounting
demand i n Holland, though Vlissingen at firs t resiste d the addition of iron to th e
list allegin g tha t sufficien t iro n wa s arrivin g b y sea . I n othe r respect s though ,
95. Ibidem, 2 0 March 1627 .

96. ARA , S O 3186, fos . 118 , 156 , Res. 24 March, 17 April 1627; Resaluden Staten va n Holland, 2
April 1627; Notulen Zeeland, 1627 , 107-108, reports from Th e Hague dated 3, 1 4 and 2 0 April; in the
first o f thes e i t i s state d tha t 'di e va n Hoilan t nie t we l lange r konne n derve n kalck , yse r e n
Molensteenen, di e s y nodigh hebbe n to t har e Lantwercken, molen s e n sluysen' .
97. G A Rotterdam , Oud Archie f XX , 18 , Res . 29 March 1627 .
98. ARA , SO 3186 , fö. 156 , Res . 1 7 April 1627 ; Nolu/en Zeeland, 1627 , 109.
99. ARA , SO 3186 , fo s 243v-244, Res. 1 2 June 1627 ; Notulen Zeeland, 1 1 Jun e 1627 ; Resolutien
Staten va n Holland, 3 0 June 1627.
Zeeland wa s les s placator y insistin g tha t traffi c carryin g good s fro m neutra l
lands t o th e Republi c shoul d retur n empty . I n Hollan d als o th e proposa l wa s
eventually rejecte d becaus e Frederi k Hendri k an d th e arm y wer e the n abou t t o
take th e fiel d an d i t was thought bes t t o kee p th e blockade a s it stood. Eve n so ,
on 1 7 July, hard presse d t o admit imports o f materials , the States Genera l finall y
agreed t o allo w i n good s fro m neutra l territor y o n th e regula r war-tim e basis ,
excepting onl y manufacture s fro m enem y territory 100 . Immediately , permission
was granted t o a merchant o f Hasselt to convey dow n th e Maas 10,000 Ib of iron
and larg e consignment s of Lièg e coa l an d lime .
After th e campaignin g season , th e inlan d province s resume d thei r driv e t o
secure either a ful l resumptio n of rive r trade with neutrals or else a total lifting o f
the rive r blockade. Th e financia l predicament o f the admiralt y colleges wa s now
such that a n immediat e subsidy o f 800,00 0 guilders from th e States Genera l wa s
considered essential . The fiv e provinces used thi s as a lever to forc e Holland int o
compliance, refusin g t o vot e th e subsid y unti l th e rive r ba n wa s furthe r
relaxed101. B y majorit y vote , th e State s General , o n 9 October , provisionall y
agreed t o re-open th e rivers shortly on the basis applying before October 1625 102.
In Holland, a majority including Amsterdam an d Rotterdam wer e now willing to
terminate th e blockad e completel y bu t Haarlem , Schieda m an d Hoor n stil l
preferred th e relaxatio n t o b e o n th e basi s o f trad e wit h neutral s onl y whil e
Enkhuizen an d Schoonhove n steadfastl y oppose d an y change 103. Dordrech t
consented t o th e re-openin g o n 1 1 October . Zeeland , however , remaine d
reluctant, proposin g tha t i f Spai n di d no t promptl y respon d b y liftin g it s ow n
ban, th e Stati ; General shoul d then re-impos e its blockade wit h both enem y and
neutral territory and tha t i n any case export s shoul d b e on the basis of the Bosc h
licentw*. Despit e th e reservation s o f som e Zeelan d an d Hollan d towns , th e
licenten o n river , canal an d overlan d commerc e wer e a t las t restore d tw o year s
and fou r day s after th e original declaration o f the blockade o n 20 October 1627 .
The river s remained full y ope n o n th e Dutc h sid e (the Spanish ba n remaine d in
effect) fo r a mer e thre e month s before the Dutc h again sough t t o regulat e them
for strategi c purposes . I n Januar y 1628 , followin g the recen t arriva l of Catholi c
League troop s unde r Tilly and Imperialis t detachments in East-Friesland , som e
of thes e force s encampin g within vie w o f th e Dutc h garriso n a t Leeror t o n th e
Eems, th e State s Genera l decide d t o tr y t o compe l thes e unit s t o withdra w by
100. ARA , S G 3186 , fo . 312v , Res . 1 7 July 1627 .

101. Resoluüen Staren va n Holland, 9 October 1627 .
102. ARA , S G 3186 , fo . 426 , Res . 9 October 1627 .
103. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 9 Octobe r 1627 ; G A Dordrecht , sectio n 3 , vol . 46 , fo . 109 ,
Res. 1 1 Octobe r 1627 .
104. ARA , S G 3186 , fo . 437v , Res . 1 8 October 1627 .
halting export s o f foo d u p th e Eem s an d overlan d fro m th e Dutc h border . A
frigid neutralit y persisted between Dutc h an d Imperialists , 'hoewel', a s Aitzem a
put it , 'he t Har t ende gemoed t wedersijt s hostijl genoec h was' 105. As the pretext
for it s action, th e States General gav e out tha t owin g to th e wars in Poland an d
East Prussi a supplie s wer e ver y shor t i n th e Republic . I t wa s decide d i n Th e
Hague t o refrai n fro m preventin g passage o f foodstuff s fro m th e bishopri c of
Munster and overlan d from Hamburg to East-Friesland 'd e wij l ' t selv e al te seer
soude smake n n a ruptur e vand e Neutraliteyt' , but th e admiralt y college s o f
Dokkum an d Amsterda m wer e ordere d t o despatc h warship s t o th e Eem s an d
East Frisian coast and allow no sea-borne provision s to enter Griet o r Norden or
beyond Emde n whil e th e Dutc h governor s o f Leerort , Bellingwold e an d
Bourtange wer e to allo w n o supplie s through fro m th e provinc e o f Groningen .
When Till y protested a t suc h conduct, th e States General agai n alleged shortage s
on account o f th e occurrences i n Poland. The ban seem s to have had only a very
limited effect, however , due to the Elbe and Rhine remaining open an d following
a petitio n fro m th e cit y o f Emde n pointin g ou t tha t th e Imperialist s wer e
receiving most o f wha t the y needed fro m Munster , Cologne an d Hamburg , th e
ban wa s lifte d afte r eigh t month s duration durin g August106 .
The next occasion when the States General suspende d th e river trade was during
the major Dutc h offensiv e that began in May 1629 . The long Spanish prohibition
on trad e wit h th e 'rebels' , operativ e sinc e Jul y 1625 , wa s finall y calle d of f i n
April 162 9 after urgen t pleas from Brussels had secured the consent of Philip and
his minister s in Madrid 107. A t thi s point , th e conditio n o f th e Spanis h troops ,
starved o f supplie s and i n some cases havin g received no pa y fo r a s long as four
months, was , a s Frederi k Hendri k was wel l aware , mor e wretche d tha n a t an y
stage sinc e 1621 . Th e Dutc h descent upo n 's-Hertogenbosc h bein g intended as a
surprise, the States General waited until the army was well entrenched around th e
great fortres s tow n whe n th e Brussel s regim e wa s endeavourin g wit h muc h
difficulty t o muste r a n arm y o f relie f befor e imposin g th e ne w blockade . Th e
moment wa s undeniabl y wel l chose n a s th e shortag e o f al l foodstuff s an d
military supplies in the Southern Netherlands was then acute. In the second week
of May , the Raad va n State proposed a n immediat e ban on exports of provisions
and munition s along th e river s and canals . Holland , excep t for Dordrecht which
briefly resisted 108, acquiesce d and , o n 1 7 May, the States General introduce d th e
105. Lieuw e va n Aitzema , Historie o f verhael va n saken va n staei e n oorlogh i n ende omtrent d e
Vereenigde Nederlanden (1 4 vols. ; Th e Hague , 1667-1671 ) II , 431 ; se e als o Bernar d Hagedorn ,
Ostfries/ands Handel und Schiffahrt des 16. Jahrhunderts bis zum Westfalischen Frieden (1580-1648)
(Berlin, 1912 ) 506-507.
106. Aitzema , Historie, II , 438-441 .
107. Se e above, 24.
108. G A Dordrecht , sectio n 3 , vol . 46, Res . 1 3 May 1629 .
ban exemptin g onl y win e a t Zealand' s request . Th e stoppag e applie d t o th e
Schelde, Maas and waterways into Flanders and Brabant only, leaving the Rhine,
Eems and Weser open109. As before, special arrangements were made for various
localities in Dutch Braban t t o receiv e rationed supplies .
At the end of May, the States General debated whether to extend the ban also to
the Rhine, Ussel and Eems for which there was good strategi c reason bu t put of f
its decision owin g to th e reluctanc e of Holland , o r a t leas t o f Amsterda m an d
other commercia l towns 110. Through June and earl y July, discussion amon g th e
provinces focusse d o n th e Rhine , Eem s an d sea-lane s t o Calais, Boulogne ,
Emden and Bremen. Predictably, Zeelan d wishe d to keep the sea-routes open but
to clos e th e Rhin e 'alzo o ander s d e Nering e derwaert s wer t gediverteert , to t
groóte prejuditie van de inwoonderen van Zeelant'111. Whil e most Holland town s
desired closur e o f bot h th e sea-lane s an d th e Rhine , Amsterda m insiste d tha t
both shoul d remai n open" 2. Amsterda m thu s clashe d wit h Middelbur g o n th e
question of the Rhin e as well as on that o f wine which Amsterdam wished to b e
included i n th e ban . A t length , Amsterda m gav e i n o n th e forme r an d
Middelburg o n th e latte r point , th e State s Genera l closin g th e Rhin e an d
encompassing wine s withi n th e blockad e o n 7 July" 3, thereb y evokin g
considerable displeasure in Zeeland wher e merchants evidently had larg e stocks
of wine in hand awaiting shipment to Antwerp and Ghent114. Zierikzee was much
aroused tha t th e prohibition applied als o t o salt .
During July , a s i t becam e clea r tha t th e Republi c faced a full-scal e strategi c
emergency, th e inland provinces and som e Hollan d town s repeatedly demande d
that the river blockade be extended further . Attempting to save 's-Hertogenbosc h
by mean s o f diversion , th e Spanis h force s advance d north-eastwards , crossin g
the Rhin e a t Wese l and , o n 2 2 July , seizin g a vita l crossin g o n th e Usse l a t
Westervoort. Also, it seemed increasingly probable that Imperia l troops, then tri-
umphant in North Germany , would, as indeed the y soon did , mov e to assist th e
Spaniards. I n response, th e States Genera l firstl y closed th e Eems above Leeror t
109. ARA , S O 3188, fos . 286v , 287v , Res . 13 , 14 May 1629 ; ARA , Admiraliteite n 2456 , Res. Coll .
Middelburg, 13 , 1 6 May 1629 .
110. ARA , S O 3188 , fö . 324 , Res . 3 0 May 1629 ; G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XV , fö .
93v, Res . 6 July 1629 ; th e Amsterdam vroedschap note d that previously suc h action had not seriousl y
hindered th e enemy 'doo r die n hi j niettegenstaende ' t sluyten , evenwel toevoe r va n alles ghekreghen
heeft doo r d e ingesetene n va n eenigh e particulier e steden, al s Devente r end e ander e plaetse n opd e
frontieren ghelegen , oock Dordrecht , sonder dat he t Land zyn gerechtigheyt daer van gekregen heeft .
Te mee r also o door' t selv e sluyte n de n vyan d tegenwoordig h nieuw e oorsaeck e gegheve n soude n
worden, om tot groo t nadee l van dése Landen, van syne syde de licenten generalick med e te sluyten'.
111. Notulen Zeeland, Res . 1 1 July 1629 .
112. Resaluden Staten va n Holland, 7 Jul y 1629 .
113. ARA , S O 3188 , fö . 393 , Res . 7 July 1629 .
114. Notulen Zeeland, Res . 11 , 12 , 1 9 July 1629 .
on 1 9 July115. The fiv e province s an d most Hollan d town s als o presse d Amster -
dam, Rotterda m an d Middelburg t o consent t o closure of the sea-lanes t o north -
east Franc e an d north-wes t German y but withou t success . I n early August, com -
bined Spanish an d Imperia l forces thrust into the heart of the Republic, the town
of Amersfoort capitulatin g t o the Imperialist genera l Montecucul i o n 1 3 August.
Soon after , th e States General shut the rivers Weser and Jad e to prevent passag e
of supplies to the enemy via Bremen and Munster 116. Two warships were assigned
to bloc k th e Weser estuar y an d tw o that o f th e Jade.
Through Septembe r 1629 , wit h th e Spanis h occupatio n o f th e Veluw e
continuing, th e Dutc h maintaine d thei r rive r blockade . Undoubtedly , th e
dangerous militar y situation did much to unify Dutc h opinion ove r the closure of
the river s excep t tha t ther e wa s som e frictio n betwee n Zeelan d an d th e othe r
provinces ove r th e inclusio n o f win e an d sal t i n th e ban 117 . Th e consensu s
dissolved, however , a s soo n a s th e emergenc y passe d wit h th e withdrawa l o f
enemy troops from th e Veluwe and IJsse l in mid October. Afte r som e discussion,
the blockad e wa s finall y lifted , afte r fiv e an d a hal f month s i n operation , o n 1
November, excep t i n th e cas e o f grai n whic h wa s the n i n shor t suppl y i n th e
Republic and expor t o f whic h wa s forbidde n indefinitely 118.
After th e dramati c campaign s o f 1629 , fo r tw o years (1630-1631) there was n o
major advanc e b y either sid e in the Lo w Countries and ther e was no significan t
interruption o f river traffic othe r tha n the continuing Spanish ba n on the passag e
of timbe r dow n th e Rhin e and Maa s t o Dutc h territor y an d th e Dutc h ba n o n
grain export s whic h wa s renewe d i n Ma y 163 0 an d maintaine d unti l Augus t
16311". Th e massin g o f Spanis h force s aroun d Antwer p i n Augus t 163 1
preceding Ja n va n Nassau' s ill-fate d ventur e int o Zeelan d elicite d merel y a
temporary Dutc h ba n o n exports of certain timber s (sparren, deelen ende andere
noordsche waeren) to the Spanish Netherlands 120. Nor during Frederik Hendrik' s
great break-throug h alon g the Maas valley in 1632, did the States Genera l seek to
regulate rive r traffi c a s par t o f it s strategy . Soo n afte r th e sieg e o f Maastrich t
began, i n Jun e 1632 , th e State s o f Zeeland , i n vie w o f th e shortag e eviden t a t
115. ARA , S O 3188, fos . 414 , Res . 1 9 July 1629 ; G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XV, fo .
99v, Res . 1 9 July 1629 .
116. ARA , SG 3188, fos . 486v , 503, Res . 2 5 August, 1 September 1629 ; ARA , Admiraliteiten 2457 ,
Res. Coll . Middelburg , l Septembe r 1629 .
117. ARA , S G 3188, fos . 533v , 548v , Res . 2 2 September, 8 October 1629 ; Notulen Zeeland, Res . 7
September 1629 .
118. ARA , S G 3188 , fo . 570 , Res . 2 4 October 1629 .
119. Se e above, ch, l , p . 24i;)o n th e importanc e t o th e Dutc h o f timbe r import s dow n th e Rhin e
from th e Blac k Forest , Odenwald , Saarlan d an d elsewhere , se e H. C . Diferee , D e geschiedenis va n
den Nederlandschen handel to t de n va l der Republiek (Amsterdam , 1908 ) 218-219 ; fo r th e ba n o n
grain exports , se e ARA, Admiraliteiten , verzamelin g Bisdom , vol . 58 , fos . 136 , 226 .
120. Ibidem, fo . 243v .
Zandvliet an d othe r Spanis h fort s aroun d Antwerp , provisionall y banne d th e
export o f foodstuff s alon g th e waterway s o f it s repartitie int o Flander s an d
Brabant, bu t bot h th e States General and the Raad va n State reacted negatively ,
deeming tha t suc h actio n shoul d no t hav e bee n take n withou t prope r
authorization, an d th e ba n wa s soo n lifted 121 . Thi s an d th e subsequen t lack o f
debate ove r the matter seems to suggest that th e decision not to regulate the rivers
during th e Maas offensiv e arose fro m strategi c considerations. Presumably , th e
fact tha t th e Dutch army operated ove r a long stretch o f the Maas valle y beyond
the comptoiren mean t tha t ther e wa s littl e sens e i n closin g th e Maa s t o Dutc h
traffic an d wit h the Spanish an d Imperialis t armies of relief drawn into the sam e
area, neithe r wa s ther e an y sens e i n closing th e othe r rivers . Durin g 1633-1634 ,
there was again n o action o n the river s except tha t i n 163 4 whilst the marqués de
Aytona sough t t o cu t of f th e Dutc h garriso n a t Maastrich t b y establishin g
fortifications blockin g the Maas i n and aroun d Stevensweert , the States Genera l
forbade transportatio n b y water o r overland o f supplies to the Stevensweert are a
and impose d a general ban on the passage o f Scandinavian timbers to the enemy.
The las t occasio n whe n th e State s Genera l impose d a full-scal e river blockad e
for strategi c purpose s too k plac e i n 1635-163 6 followin g th e Spanis h an d
Imperialist offensiv e o n th e easter n frontie r o f th e Republi c during the autumn
of 1635 . Afte r th e failur e o f th e combine d Franco-Dutc h invasio n o f th e
Southern Netherland s i n Jun e 1635 , th e Spaniard s succeede d i n surprisin g th e
strategic Dutc h fortres s of Schenkenschan s o n th e Rhine between Nijmege n and
Emmerich jus t beyon d th e Dutc h border , a fortres s whic h commanded a n eas y
entrance int o Gelderlan d nort h o f th e grea t rivers . Th e Cardinal-Infant e had
swiftly followe d u p thi s break-through , buildin g a linkin g fortress , For t
Ferdinandus, betwee n Schenkenschan s an d Cleve s an d connectin g thi s ne w
enclave wit h th e mai n Spanis h territor y by seizin g and fortifyin g Gennep . Thi s
advance represente d th e mos t dangerou s threa t t o th e Republi c sinc e 1629 ,
especially a s Imperialis t troop s move d t o assis t th e Spaniard s i n holdin g th e
Cleves enclave. In early August, the States Genera l imposed an d strictl y enforced
a ba n o n th e passag e o f foodstuff s alon g th e Rhin e and Maa s beyon d Dutc h
territory1". When , however , some day s later , th e Raad va n State proposed tha t
the blockade should b e extended t o encompas s th e Schelde an d other route s int o
Brabant an d Flander s a s well as the Eems and Weser , whil e the inland provinces,
121, ARA , S G 3191 , fo . 295v , Res , 2 2 Jun e 1632 .

122. ARA , S G 5515,1, SG (minute) to Coll. Rotterdam, 6 August 1635 ; ibidem, SG 3194, fo . 410v ,
Res. 1 8 August 1635 ; ibidem, S G 5494 , II , Coll . Rotterda m t o SG , 1 7 and 2 2 Augus t 1635 ; i n
November 1635 , th e Rotterda m colleg e reporte d tha t i t ha d twent y fiv e arme d vessel s wit h averag e
crew siz e o f thirt y o n th e river s o f it s repartitie, ARA , S G 5515 , II , Coll . Rotterda m t o SG , 2 2
November 1635 .
being thos e mos t immediatel y threatened , agreed , Hollan d an d especiall y
Amsterdam an d Dordrecht , an d Zeeland , th e latte r no w havin g discarded it s
earlier zea l fo r suc h action , refused 123 .
On 3 0 August , th e State s Genera l peremptoril y instructe d th e Middelbur g
admiralty colleg e t o sto p export s o f provision s fro m it s repartitie indefinitely,
without th e State s o f Zeelan d havin g consente d t o this' 24 . Th e orde r wa s no t
implemented and th e college and State s o f Zeeland endeavoure d t o persuad e th e
other province s an d th e stadholde r tha t i n th e interest s o f th e Republi c as a
whole, th e Scheld e shoul d no t i n fac t b e closed . Whil e Zeelan d wa s unable t o
sway th e princ e wh o i n fac t ha d clea r evidenc e that th e enem y troop s o n th e
eastern frontie r wer e sufferin g fro m sever e shortag e o f supplie s whic h coul d
readily b e mad e mor e acut e b y widenin g the blockade 125, Zeeland' s argument s
proved mor e effectiv e i n Hollan d an d especiall y wit h th e Amsterda m
vroedschap126. Consequently , al l furthe r move s toward s widenin g the ba n wer e
blocked fo r th e tim e being . Indee d Holland , a t th e promptin g o f Dordrecht ,
advised Frederi k Hendri k o n 6 Decembe r tha t i t no w favoure d re-openin g th e
Maas an d Rhin e and presse d hi m fo r his reasons why this should not be done127.
The princ e insiste d tha t th e countrysid e aroun d Cleve s wa s derelic t an d
uncultivated, that the enemy was hampered by lack of victuals and that therefore
for strategi c reasons th e river s should remai n closed .
During January 1636 , delegate s from Hollan d an d Zeelan d a s well as fro m th e
States Genera l conferred severa l times with th e stadholde r over th e questio n of
the blockade . Th e princ e and inlan d provinces continued to deman d closur e of
the Schelde , Eem s an d Wese r an d a suspensio n o f licenten o n provision s fo r
neutral as well as enemy territory. Holland and Zeeland objected tha t were this to
be done, th e Spaniard s woul d receive Dutch foodstuff s b y sea indirectly via th e
ports of south-east Englan d and tha t onc e thi s commerce was diverted to Dove r
and elsewher e i t would b e difficul t t o retriev e it . Th e stadholde r answere d tha t
the blockad e woul d b e fo r a shor t perio d onl y an d tha t i f supplie s reache d
Flanders fro m England , i t woul d b e laboriou s an d costl y fo r th e enem y t o
transfer suc h victuals to it s forces in the Rhin e valley128. The issue of whether to
halt passag e o f supplie s overlan d fro m Grave , 's-Hertogenbosch , Geertruiden -
123. ARA , SG 3194 , fo . 425 , Res . 25 Augus t 1635.

124. Ibidem, fo . 432v , Res . 3 0 August 1635 ; Notulen Zeeland, Res . 1 5 September 1635.
125. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 1 1 Septembe r and 1 2 October 1635 ; for confirmatio n o f th e
prince's information, se e ARA Brussels , SE G 213, fo. 89 , Cardinal-infante t o Phili p IV , 20 August
1635.
126. G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XVI , fös. 97 , 97v , Res. 1 5 and 2 3 October 1635 .
127. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 6 , 1 1 Decembe r 1635.
128. ARA , S G 3195 , fos . 57v-58 , 66v-67 , Res . 19 , 21 , 2 3 Januar y 1636 ; Resolutien Staten va n
Holland, Res . 24 Januar y 1636 .
berg an d Bergen-op-Zoo m t o neutra l territor y and village s under contributio n
was held up in the States-General, agains t the advice of stadholder an d Raad van
State, fo r severa l weeks . Finally, i n lat e Januar y 1636 , the Amsterda m vroed-
schap reluctantly changed its stance, consentin g to a general blockade 1", and the
opposition i n Holland t o the demands of stadholder, inlan d provinces and Raad
van State collapsed. O n 1 February 1636 , the States General suspended the licen-
ten o n al l export s o f foodstuff s vi a binnenstromen o r overland , closin g th e
Rhine, Maas , Waal , Schelde , Zwijn , Eem s an d Weser 130. Th e questio n a s t o
whether t o clos e th e Elb e als o wa s kept bac k fo r furthe r consideratio n b y
Holland an d firml y blocke d b y Amsterdam .
Zeeland accepted th e ban only with great reluctance 131. A request for exemption
of fis h an d sal t put t o the States General on behalf of Zierikzee was rejected. A s
in th e past , troop s a s well as considerable nava l forces were used t o enforc e th e
blockade an d confiscat e good s an d barges , horse s an d wagon s employe d t o
circumvent it . Request s fro m Dordrech t merchant s fo r permissio n to despatc h
provisions onder cautie through th e Spanish-controlle d section s o f th e Maa s t o
Venlo, Roermon d an d Maastrich t wer e rejected 132. O n seekin g clarificatio n
regarding margina l commodities , th e admiralt y college s wer e instructe d t o
include in the ban beside s sparren ende deelen, sugar , spices, soap , olives , caviar
and tobacco 133. I n March , protest s wer e submitted i n The Hagu e b y the city of
Bremen, indignant at th e closin g of th e Wese r and th e Coun t o f Eas t Frieslan d
and cit y of Emden, aroused b y the closing of th e Eems. Thes e wer e disregarde d
except that the States General permitted resumption of export of spices and drugs
to Bremen 134. Breme n als o appeale d directl y t o th e Amsterda m vroedschap,
claiming tha t th e State s General' s measur e woul d surel y fai l i n it s strategi c
purpose whil e having the adverse strategi c effec t o f deprivin g the Swedis h army
and othe r Protestan t force s in North Germany of their supplies (much of which
came fro m Hollan d vi a Bremen) to th e advantage o f th e Emperor .
As always , th e blockad e cause d hug e temporar y diversion s i n th e trad e i n
foodstuffs an d befor e lon g attentio n i n th e Republi c wa s centerin g o n th e
question o f extendin g th e ba n further . Althoug h th e Amsterda m admiralt y
129. G A Amsterdam , vroedschapsresolutie s XVI , fö . 114 , Res . 2 8 January 1636 .

130. ARA , S O 3195 , fo . 87v , Res . 1 February 1636 ; Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 1 February
1636.
131. Notulen Zeeland, 1 1 February 1636 ; ARA , S O 3195, fo . 115v , Res . 1 5 February 1636 .
132. Ibidem, fos . 120v-121 , 125 , 133v .
133. Ibidem, fo . 100 , Res . 7 February 1636 ; i n late Apri l 1636 , Amsterda m presse d fo r exemption
of suga r an d spice s from th e ba n 'al s nie t anders zynde als delicatessen waer door den vyandt niet en
kan werde n gespijst' , Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 2 2 April 1636 .
134. Aitzema , Historie, IV , i , 337 ; Ludwi g Beutin , Quellen und Forschungen zur Bremischen
Handelsgeschichte, II , Bremen un d di e Niederlande (Weimar , I939 ) 9-10 , 36-37 .
Empires an d Entrepots 12 "
college confirme d i n mi d February , tha t supplie s wer e bein g shippe d i n larg e
quantities to th e enem y fro m Hollan d vi a Hamburg and th e Elbe and throug h
Dover an d Dunkirk , Hollan d oppose d broadenin g th e blockad e t o encompas s
the Elb e an d Dove r a t th e insistenc e o f Amsterdam 135. Eve n so , ther e wa s
growing fear in Holland o f the consequences o f leaving the Dover rout e open an d
nowhere mor e s o tha n a t Rotterdam . Rotterda m complaine d i n th e State s o f
Holland o n 2 9 February tha t Englishme n wer e buyin g up sal t fis h i n quantity ,
intending t o shi p i t t o Flander s vi a England 136. Th e gecommitteerde raden o f
Zeeland wrote to The Hague shortly after complaining that provisions were being
shipped dail y fro m Zeelan d t o Englan d fo r trans-shipmen t t o Dunkir k an d
transfer t o the Rhine, urging the States Genera l to bring forward its schedule for
blockading th e Flemis h coast 137. Whil e in most years , th e State s General' s flee t
blocked the Flemish coast fro m April onwards, the programme wa s so delayed in
1636 that no nava l action wa s taken to check th e flow of supplies either in April
or May , causin g consternatio n no t onl y i n Middelbur g and Vlissinge n but i n
Rotterdam whic h wanted eithe r a wide r ban, t o encompas s England , o r els e a
total liftin g o f th e blockade 138.
Schenkenschans fel l t o th e Dutc h o n th e las t da y o f April , but despit e thi s th e
ban wa s kep t i n forc e fo r som e monfh s longe r a t th e insistenc e of stadholder ,
Raad va n State and inlan d province s i n order t o weake n the remainin g Spanish
and Imperialis t forces in the Cleves an d Genne p areas. During May, pressure in
Zeeland fo r re-openin g th e river s steadily mounted until , on 28 May, the State s
agreed tha t th e blockad e coul d simpl y no t b e suffere d b y th e inhabitant s o f
Zeeland an y longer such tha t i f the State s General would not immediatel y lift it ,
as would be preferred, then Zeeland woul d break with accepted procedur e and re-
open it s waterway s unilaterall y fro m th e en d o f May 139. Th e States ,
licentmeeslers and militar y governors i n Zeeland wer e warned not to act without
States General authorization, bu t Zeelan d wen t ahead nevertheles s and official s
on the Schelde followed their province rather tha n the orders from The Hague 140.
The State s General , State s o f Hollan d an d stadholde r reacte d wit h grea t
indignation, summonin g several officials o f th e Middelburg admiralty college to
be disciplined in The Hague an d sendin g in Holland warship s to patrol Zeeland' s
waterways. I n thi s way Zeeland wa s quickly forced t o retrac t an d re-impos e th e
blockade o n th e Scheld e fo r th e fina l fe w weeks of th e action 141. Finally , on 25
135. Resolutien Staten va n Holland, 2 0 February 1636 .
136. Ibidem, 2 9 February 1636 .
137. Ibidem, 2 6 April 1636 .
138. G A Rotterdam , Ou d Archief , no . 21 , 101 , vroedschapsresoluties , 1 9 May 1636 ; ARA , S G
3195, fös . 200v , 216v , 232v-233 , 2 9 March , 7 , 1 4 April 1636 .
139. Notulen Zeeland, 2 8 Ma y 1636 .
140 ARA , S G 3195 , fös . 349 , 366v-377 , Res . 3 0 May, 5, 6 Jun e 1636 .
141. Notule n Zeeland , 8 , 1 3 and 2 0 June 1636 .
June, th e States Genera l di d restore th e licenten, this being the very last occasio n
that thi s occurred . A s Aitzema expresse d i t
't gheheel e werc k tege n Zeeland t wier t ghelate n i n ruste ; end e de n vij f e n twintichste n
lunii wierde n d e licenten generalijc k geopent ; to t sluyting e vande welcke men noy t dae r
na heef t wille n verstaen 142.
Compared wit h th e earlie r rive r blockades , th e last , tha t o f 1635-1636 , show s

some significan t point s o f divergence . Perhap s mos t strikin g i s th e totall y
different rol e playe d b y Zeelan d i n 1636-163 6 tha n previously , thoug h th e
explanation i s clear enough . Th e outbrea k o f wa r betwee n Franc e an d Spai n i n
May 163 5 entirely transformed Zeeland's positio n vis-à-vis strategic regulation of
the Dutc h waterways . In th e past , closin g Scheld e and Zwij n ha d simpl y meant
swelling Zeeland' s commerc e wit h Calais , Boulogn e an d Dieppe . Afte r Ma y
1635, however , wit h th e borde r betwee n Franc e an d th e Spanis h Netherland s
shut, suspending Dutch river traffic merel y meant transferrin g lucrative business
to th e Englis h suc h that , a s Aitzem a observe d o f th e 1635-163 6 blockade ,
Zeeland suffere d mor e tha n an y othe r province . Th e enormou s growt h o f th e
entrepôt trad e a t Dover , briefly , durin g the mi d 1630s , wa s entirely due t o tw o
factors - th e outbrea k o f th e Franco-Spanis h wa r an d th e las t Dutc h rive r
blockade an d ther e can b e n o doub t tha t th e latte r wa s o f grea t importanc e in
shaping thi s shor t phas e i n Dover' s history . Whereas n o Frenc h wine s were re-
exported fro m th e Dove r entrepô t i n 163 4 o r unti l Decembe r 1635 , fro m th e
latter mont h unti l Novembe r 1636 , n o les s tha n 3,66 6 tun s wer e re-exported ,
almost al l t o Dunkirk 143 . Th e ris e o f Dove r wa s also looke d upo n wit h evident
anxiety a t Amsterda m an d stil l mor e a t Rotterdam . Before , 1635 , wit h th e
Calais-Dunkirk connection viable, Zeeland ha d generall y been the most eage r of
the provinces to engag e i n river regulation. While the clearest evidenc e relates t o
the year s 1625-162 9 when England wa s als o a t wa r wit h Spain, tha t i s to year s
when re-exports from Dover t o Dunkirk were forbidden by the English crown144 ,
and t o 162 2 whe n Zeelan d wa s directl y threatene d b y Spinola' s operations ,
during th e 1623-162 4 blockade s Zeelan d ha d als o readil y participated . Despit e
England the n being at peace wit h Spain, th e Dutch naval blockade o f the Flemish
coast ha d curtaile d English exports t o Flander s and Zeeland' s trad e by sea with
north-east Franc e ha d muc h expanded .
After 1636 , ther e wa s onl y on e majo r Spanis h offensiv e b y lan d agains t th e
142. Ailzema , Historie, IV , i , 301 .

143. Se e J. S . Kepler , Th e Exchange of Christendom. Th e International Entrepôt a ! Dover, ¡622-
¡641 (Leicester , 1976 ) 55.
144. Ibidem, 34-35.
Dutch, i n 1637 , and afte r th e recapture o f Bred a b y the Dutc h i n the sam e year ,
there occurre d onl y severa l fairl y mino r advance s b y th e Dutch , th e mos t
important bein g th e campaign s culminatin g in the captur e o f Sa s van Gent an d
Hulst (1644 , 1645 ) in Flanders. Thu s i t might b e said tha t fro m a strategic poin t
of view , the Dutc h ha d littl e real reaso n t o resor t agai n t o rive r regulation afte r
1636. Ye t the 163 7 campaign wa s a majo r on e an d durin g the siege s o f Genne p
(1641), Sa s van Gent an d Huls t ther e was in fact reaso n t o impose rive r blockade s
at leas t i n certai n specifi c sectors . Th e fac t tha t thi s wa s no t attempte d doe s
suggest that th e new-found fea r of the consequences o f shutting the rivers evident
at Middelburg , Rotterda m an d Amsterda m i n 1635-163 6 owin g t o th e
burgeoning o f th e Dove r entrepô t acte d a t leas t t o som e exten t a s a deterrent .
In conclusion , i t ma y b e sai d tha t whil e those wh o oppose d regulatio n of th e
waterways habituall y claime d tha t suc h actio n wa s ineffectiv e i n denyin g
provisions t o th e enem y an d whil e evidenc e of contraban d trad e an d collusio n
with contrabandist s b y th e ver y official s an d troop s assigne d t o preven t i t
abounds, i t does see m tha t considerable inconvenienc e was in fact caused bot h t o
the Spanish an d Imperialis t forces . Spanis h documentatio n confirm s that durin g
at leas t fou r majo r campaigns , thos e o f 1622 , 1624-1625 , 162 9 an d 1635-1636 ,
the arm y o f Flander s wa s severel y impeded b y lac k o f provisions . Th e fac t tha t
supplies wer e brough t i n grea t quantitie s fro m Hollan d t o Spanis h force s a t
Bergen-op-Zoom, Bred a an d i n th e Rhin e valle y vi a Calai s an d Dunkir k o r
through Breme n an d Emde n surel y proves conclusivel y that th e Spaniard s wer e
forced t o procur e victual s with grea t difficult y an d a t grea t cost . Furthermore ,
the tendency of the Dutch provinces to be sharply at variance as to when and how
to blockad e th e river s demonstrates tha t th e effect s o f such actio n wer e bot h
widespread an d profound . Ove r thi s issue , th e interest s o f th e inlan d town s
diverged sharpl y from thos e o f th e maritim e towns and th e blockades wer e seen
to caus e majo r i f temporar y shift s i n pattern s o f trade . Th e economi c
repercussions wer e therefor e ver y diverse , som e localitie s reapin g handsom e
profits fro m th e misfortune s o f others , an d could , a s severa l reference s i n th e
Dordrecht cit y counci l record s indicate , influenc e fo r prolonge d period s th e
entire tone of lif e o f majo r towns 145.
145. See , fo r instance , G A Dordrecht , sectio n 3 , vol . 46 , fos . 31v-32 , 128 , Res . 2 9 November 1625 ,
22 Augus t 1628 .
5
THE PHASES OF THE DUTCH STRAA TV AAR T , 1590-171 3 : A

CHAPTER IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
It is probable that no other single country, with the possible exception o f Britain in
the nineteenth century, has ever exerted so great a preponderance ove r the world
economy as a whole, and for so long a period, as did the Dutch Republi c from th e
end of the sixteenth down to the middle of the eighteenth century. For ove r a cen-
tury and a half, Amsterdam was universally acknowledged t o be the hub o f world
trade, shippin g and finance . Yet thi s unprecedented degre e of economic influence
exerted by the Dutch was by no means evenly spread. Amounting to overwhelming
control in some sectors such as northern Russia or large parts of the East Indies, the
Dutch ascendanc y wa s less pronounced an d possibl y absent i n some others. On e
region wer e th e Dutc h rol e wa s les s predominan t tha n elsewher e a s ha s bee n
pointed out by a good man y historians, and among them J.G. van Dillen, 1 was the
Mediterranean. Th e Dutc h did , fro m 159 0 onwards, loom large in the lif e o f th e
Mediterranean. Dutch merchants and manufacturers showed a keen interest in all
parts of the region from Spai n to Turkey and their impact throughout its length and
breadth wa s both profoun d an d enduring. Yet it seems clear that the y achieved a
pre-eminent positio n i n Mediterranea n commerc e durin g at mos t tw o relatively
short periods . Fo r th e large r part o f th e perio d o f Holland's worl d commercia l
supremacy, the Dutch were forced to accept second o r third place among the domi-
nant trading nations of the Mediterranean and had at all times to share control with
their main rivals-the English, French an d Venetians.
This in itself raises interesting questions. Taking the period a s a whole, how and
why did the Dutch fai l t o achieve a position of unrivalled preponderance i n Medi -
terranean trade? But this question at once leads on to others. For even a most flee -
ting acquaintance with the changing pattern of international rivalry in the Mediter-
ranean in early modern times reveals that the Dutch role in the Mediterranean from
1590 down t o th e earl y eighteenth centur y underwent a whole series o f dramati c
shifts i n form , organization an d volum e each o f which radically transformed th e
competative position of the Dutch in relation to their rivals. Thus anything whic h
purports t o be an adequate accoun t o f Dutch trad e with the Mediterranean i n this
period ha s no t onl y to delineat e its essential strength s an d weaknesse s bu t mus t
attempt t o identify , defin e an d explai n it s majo r phases. Va n Dillen , practicall y
alone amongs t Dutc h historians , mad e a tentativ e start a t this. 2 H e identifie d a
vigorous early phase fro m 159 0 down to around 162 0 followed by a lower level of
activity dow n t o 1645 . In tha t yea r the outbreak o f th e Venetian-Turkish wa r of
1
J.G . va n Dillen , Va n rijkdom e n regenten. Handboek to t d e economische en sociale geschiedenis va n
Nederland tijdens d e Republiek (Th e Hagu e 1970 ) 71-72,87 , 502 .
2
Ibidem , 77 , 87, 357, 502 , 569 .
1645-'69 which largely paralysed Venice's trade with the Levant combined with the
effects o f th e civi l wa r i n England whic h Van Dille n (following A.C . Woo d an d
Ralph Davis ) supposed temporaril y weakene d the English position i n the Mediter -
ranean, gave rise to a period of Dutch predominance which lasted down to the early
1660s. I n Va n Dillen' s fourth phase , afte r 1672 , the Dutc h straatvaart, o r traffi c
through th e Straits o f Gibraltar, steadil y declined .
But ho w vali d is thi s schematization ? Th e proble m o f th e form , volum e and
phases of the Dutch straatvaart, l would suggest , needs to b e looked a t again fo r
two principal reasons. In the first place while it remains true that reliable statistics
for Dutc h Mediterranea n trade in the seventeenth century are fairly scarce , a cer-
tain amount of new material has come to light in recent years which makes it pos-
sible to modify and perhaps refine Van Dillen's framework in a number of respects.
In th e second place , Va n Dillen' s brie f analysis , helpful thoug h it is, has faile d t o
have much impact outside the Netherlands on historians' perceptions of the Dutch
role in the Mediterranean . Far mor e influential i n the genera l historiography are
the very different (an d in my view altogether unsatisfactory) judgments of English
historians suc h a s Ralp h Davi s an d th e Frenc h grand maître Fernan d Braudel .
There is, I propose, a pressing need to modify Van Dillen and to see off the views of
Davis and Braudel.
In general , Britis h historian s hav e tende d t o seriousl y underestimat e Dutc h
involvement i n the Mediterranea n from th e late sixteenth to th e early eighteenth
century, maintaining that the English role was incomparably more important. A.C.
Wood, fo r instance, th e historia n o f th e Englis h Levan t Company , judge d tha t
Dutch activity in the eastern Mediterranean hardl y amounted to 'serious competi-
tion' to that of the English which he thought unsurprising given that 'with the small
natural resource s of their country they could not hope to compete with the output
of England' 3, a curiou s remar k i n vie w of Dutc h superiorit y over the Englis h in
most areas of world trade during the seventeenth century. Ralph Davis was of the
view that the Dutch came nowhere near the English in volume of traffic either in the
Levant or in the Mediterranean as a whole. As he saw it, it was the English who took
over the former trade of the Venetians and French with the Ottoman Empire, attai-
ning by the middle of the seventeenth century a position of unprecedented superio -
rity over all rivals. At a conference in Venice, he urged his continental colleague s
that 'les Anglais firent plus que de s'emparer d u commerce vénitien ou français, ils
vendirent en Turquie plus de marchandises que les marchands de ces deux nations
n'en avaien t jamais vendu'. 4 Meanwhile , th e Dutch , i n hi s opinion, were , in th e
Levant, an entirely marginal factor.
This tendency to minimize the role of the Dutch in the English historiography is
especially strikin g when it is noted tha t historian s othe r tha n Britis h and Dutc h
have tended to assume that the Dutch and not the English wer e the dominant tra-
3
A.C . Wood , A History o f th e Levant Company (2n d edn. ; Londo n 1964 ) 54-55, 99-100.
4
Ralp h Davis, 'Influences de l'Angleterre su r le declin de Venise au XVIIème siècle' in: Aspetti e cause
délia decadenza económica veneziana nel secólo XVII (Venic e an d Rome , 1961 ) 210, 219 , 229 ; se e also
Ralph Davis , 'Englis h Import s fro m th e Middl e East, 1580-1780 ' in : M.A. Coo k éd. , Studies i n the
Economic History of th e Middle East (London 1970 ) 203; Van Dillen has already pointed ou t that 'Ralp h
Davis underrates th e importance o f the Dutch Mediterranea n trade' , see J.G. van Dillen, 'Amsterdam's
Role in Seventeenth-Century Dutch Politics and its Economic Background' in: J.S. Bromle y and E.H.
Kossmann ed. , Britain and the Netherlands II , Papers delivered to the Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference
(1962) (Groninge n 1964 ) 136 .
The Phases of the Dutch Straatvaart 13 5
ding powe r i n th e Mediterranea n a t leas t fro m 159 0 when Baltic grain was firs t
shipped t o Ital y o n a large scale, down t o th e middle of the seventeenth century.
This wa s th e vie w o f th e Germa n economi c historian Ludwig Beutin 5 and mor e
recently of Fernand Braudel . Braudel asserts in his famous study of the Mediterra-
nean in the sixteenth century that while the English were the first 'nordics' t o ply a
regular seaborne commerce with the Mediterranean, which they did from the 1570 s
onwards, the y had los t thei r lead b y 159 0 being unable to complet e with Dutc h
superiority in shipping and Dutc h access to Spanis h silver, a crucial ingredient in
the Levant trade.6 Practically the only non-Dutch historia n who presents a picture
of rough equivalence as between the Dutch and English for much of the seventeenth
century was the late nineteenth-century French historian Paul Masson.7
Regarding th e main phases i n the development of Dutch Mediterranea n com-
merce, Van Dillen's framework stand s completely at variance with that of Braudel.
Van Dillen believed that war and political factors could be decisive in shaping pat-
terns of trade and that the Dutch role in the Mediterranean entered its most flouris-
hing period onl y after 164 5 in which, as I hope t o show , he was entirely correct.
Braudel, by contrast, de-emphasizing political factors in favour of what he argues
was the 'secular trend' , explains the Dutch rol e in the Mediterranean in terms of a
rise and fall rhythm which fits in with his wider conceptions of the Mediterranean's
economic evolution. He argues that trade in bulky goods, especially grain, was the
decisive factor in determining the balance of commercial power in the Mediterra -
nean and that the Dutch predominated-a t first jointly with the Hanseatics-for as
long as they maintained a high level of grain shipments which (he alleges) continued
down to 165 0 or thereabouts.8 After 1650 , according to Braudel, Dutch Mediterra-
nean commerce declined alon g with demand for, and shipment of, Baltic grain.
For Braudel the preponderance of northern Europeans in the economic life of the
Mediterranean begin s with th e massive upsurge in grain shipment s to Ital y tha t
began in 1590. 9 For the first time, drawn by rocketing prices for grain on the Italian
market, whole fleets of'nordic ' ship s sailed through the Strait s of Gibraltar. But,
even while insisting on the centrality of the grain trade, Braudel failed t o grasp the
scale o f the Dutch incursion . He supposed tha t onl y som e dozens of Dutch ship s
were arrivin g in Ital y each yea r i n th e 1590 s an d tha t thes e were matched b y a
roughly comparabl e numbe r o f Hanseati c vessels. 10 While he wa s righ t that th e
English played a negligible role in shipping this grain, it is clear that he vastly under-
rated the part played by the Dutch and exaggerated that of the North Germans. He
even thought that in one or tw o years, notably 1593 , the Hanseatic grain trade to
5
Ludwi g Beutin , 'L a décadenc e économique de Venis e considérée d u point de vue nord-européen',
Aspeltie cause délia decadenza económica veneziana, 93-94; see also Ludwig Beutin , 'Der wirtschaftlich e
Niedergang Venedigs i m 16 . und 17 . Jahrhundert', Hansische Geschichtsblatter 76 (1958) 49-50 .
6
Fernan d Braudel, La Méditerranée e t le monde mediterranean à l'époque d e Philippe IL 2 vols. (Paris
1966)1,544-75.
7
Pau l Masson, Histoire d u commerce français dans l e Levant a u XVHe siècle (Pari s 1896 ) 119 , 123 ,
126-127.
8
Braudel , La Méditerranée I , 545, 567-569,572-573 ; much of Braudel's analysi s of this topic is drawn
from th e following works : Hermann Wätjen, Di e Niederlander i m Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeil ihrer höch-
sten Machtstellung (Berlin , 1909 ) see especially pp. 114-11 6 and Ludwi g Beutin , De r deutsche Seehandel
im Mittelmeergebiet bi s zu den Napoleonischen Kriegen (Neumiinster 1933 ) 11-15 .
9
Fernan d Braude l an d Ruggier o Romano , Navires e t marchandises à l'entrée d u Port d e Livourne
(1547-1611) (Pari s 1951 ) 51; Braudel, L a Méditerranée I , 568-569.
10
Ibidem .
Italy outstripped tha t of the Dutch. Bu t this is hardly tenable. If in 1593 thirty-four
ostensibly Hanseati c vessel s reached Livorn o as against onl y twelve classified as
'Dutch', no less than twenty-eigh t of these ships loaded thei r grain in Amsterdam
rather tha n German port s which show s th e centrality o f Holland in the trade. In
view of th e politica l situation which Braudel (characteristically ) ignores, it seem s
likely tha t man y o f the ship s claimin g to b e 'Hanseatic' wer e in fact Dutch . Th e
Spaniards were then seizing large numbers of Dutch vessels in the Mediterranean-
26 in 159 1 alone-so that Dutch vessel s sailing there were often supplied wit h false
papers an d flags . Bu t in any case it is inherently improbable tha t Hanseatic com -
merce with Italy ever remotely approached th e level of Dutch trade, sinc e the Han-
seatic town s together possesse d onl y about a quarter a s many vessels capable o f
sailing with grain to the Mediterranean as the Dutch." But what matters most of all
is that the Livorno data use d by Braudel give a wholly unrealistic notion of the scale
of Dutch trade with Italy in the 1590s . Dutc h notaria l deed s sho w that very much
larger numbers of Dutch ships were involved than Braudel supposed. I n 1591 , for
instance, from fifty to one hundred Dutc h ships sailed fro m Amsterda m alone and
we know that large contingents sailed also from Hoor n an d Enkhuizen and smaller
numbers fro m Rotterda m an d Middelburg. 12 There i s no questio n tha t th e tota l
exceeded on e hundred . But the rea l number wa s probably much higher . I t seem s
unlikely that the Spaniards can have captured o r sank a quarter o f the total volume
of Dutch shipping sailing to the Mediterranean in 1591, yet we know that they did in
that year alone successfuly intercept twenty-six Dutch vessels off the coasts of Spain
and Italy. 13 According to Velius, the seventeenth-century chronicler of Hoorn, with
wheat sellin g fo r 60 0 guilders per las t i n Italy i n 159 1 and onl y one thir d o f this
amount in Holland, no less than 400 'large ships' sailed from Hollan d t o Italy that
year.14 This may be an exaggeration but it is certainly more realistic than the notion
of just a few dozen 'nordic' ship s each year. In 1592, over one hundred Dutch vessels
entered th e port o f Genoa alon e and th e level of grain shipments from Holland t o
Italy remained at a similarly high level through 1593-4. 15
Having followed Beutin in postulating a rough balance between Dutch an d Han-
seatic shipping to th e Mediterranea n i n the 1590s , Braudel goes o n t o assert tha t
after 160 0 Hanseati c competitio n collapse d almos t totally , neve r t o revive . 'A u
début de XVIIe siècle,' he asserts, 'le s Hanséates étaien t éliminés et leurs navires ne
dépassaient plus guère l'escale de Málaga.'16 This is a remarkable assertio n and a
particularly clear illustration of the dogmatic tendenc y in Braudel for the very aut-
horities whom he cites, Beutin and Wätjen, show that the collapse was only tempo-
11
Pierr e Jeannin , 'Entreprises hanséate s e t commerce méditerranée n à la fm d u XVI e siècle' \n:Mé-
langes en l'honneur de Fernand Braudel (Toulouse 1973 ) 263-264, 266 , 269 .
12
Simon Hart, 'Die Amsterdamerltalienfahrt, 1590-1620'in: WirtschaftskrafteundWirtschaftswege.
Festschrift fur Hermann Kellenbenz. 5 vols. (Nuremberg 1978-1981 ) II, 147-149 .
13
14
Ibidem , 146.
Theodoru s Velius, Chronyk va n Hoorn, daar in hel begin, aanwasch en tegenwoordige staat dier stad
verhaalt worden. Annotated b y S. Centen (4t h edn.; Hoor n 1740 ) 490 .
15
Edoard o Grendi, ' I Nordic i e il traffico de l porto di Genova, 1590-1666', Rivista Storica Italiana 83
(1971)67.
16
Braudel , La Méditerranée I , 568-69; thi s and othe r strands o f Braudel's analysis have already bee n
criticised b y Baetens , se e Rolan d Baetens , D e Nazomer va n Antwerpens welvaart. D e diaspora e n het
handelshuis De Groóte tijdens d e eerste helft de r 17de eeuw. 2 vols. (Brussels 1976 ) I, 50, 70, 72.
17
rary and du e to politica l factors. Hanseati c activity in the Mediterranean i n the
early years of the new century fell off sharply owing to the Dutch-Spanish cease-fire
in 160 7 and subsequen t Twelve Years' Truce whic h removed one of the main hin-
drances t o the progress o f the Dutch i n the Mediterranean. Wit h Dutch shipping
secure from the Spaniards, Dutch freigh t and insurance rates to the Mediterranean
fell sharply and the Hanseatics, fo r the time being, could no longer compete. But no
sooner ha d Spai n re-impose d it s embargoes o n Dutc h ship s an d goods , in April
1621, a ban which wa s to remai n i n force unti l 1647 , tha n there wa s a significan t
revival in North German traffi c no t onl y to Málaga , Alicant e and othe r Spanis h
Mediterranean port s but also t o Marseille, Genoa and Livorno. 18
But were the Dutch and Hanseatics preponderant i n Mediterranean commerce in
the 1590s in the sense that Braudel assumes? In fact there is good reaso n t o question
the view that grain shipments were the key to trade supremacy i n the area and that
Dutch primac y i n bul k shippin g an d th e grai n trad e automaticall y assigne d th e
Dutch first place among the northern nation s involved. To begin with, in the early
years, as is well known, Dutch trade t o Italy was to a considerable extent merely a
shipping service for merchants based outsid e th e Netherlands . Dutc h shippin g in
the Mediterranean wa s present in great volume from 159 0 onwards but was not yet
a symptom of commercial control . Th e grain was often bough t i n Amsterdam by
leading Genoese, Venetia n and Tusca n merchant s through local factors several of
whom, notably Jaspar Quingetti and Jan and Filippo Calandrini , wer e themselves
Italians.19 This was especially true in the 1590 s when the leading purchaser fo r th e
Tuscan marke t wa s none othe r tha n th e Grand Duk e himself , but remaine d so in
some measur e a t leas t dow n t o th e earl y 1640s. 20 Furthermore , th e shippin g of
Baltic grain to Italy using cheap, unarme d and lightly manned/Mis had ver y little
to do with what were known to the English as the 'rich trades' of the Mediterranean
and i t was these last which were always the chief focus of international rivalry. In
trade with Italy , th e tussle for control and th e main profit s revolve d aroun d th e
exchange of textiles, spices and silver for Italian silks and other luxury goods. In the
Levant, Baltic grain played practically no role at all.
To regard Dutch primac y in the shipping in of Baltic grain to the Mediterranea n
as conferring a general trad e hegemony i n the area dow n to 165 0 is thus a majo r
distortion. In reality, apart fro m supplyin g northern grai n to Italy, the Dutch suc -
ceeded in capturing hardly any Mediterranean commerce in what I propose to call
the first phase, tha t i s from 159 0 down t o 1607 . Their path wa s blocked b y major
obstacles. The Dutch wer e stripped o f their trade with Spain, following Philip Ill's
general embargo on 'his rebels', in 1598, and this, in turn, had a much wider impact,
preventing the Dutch fro m participatin g in the crucially important carryin g trade
between the Iberian Peninsula and Italy. Braudel, in line with his general approach ,
insists that these Spanish measure s were ineffective an d had n o significant impact ;
17
Se e for instance Beutin , De r deulsche Seehandel, 29, 35,45.
18
Algemee n Rijksarchief , Th e Hague (ARM), Archive of the State s Genera l (SG) vol . 6906. Alber t
Muilman t o State s General, Genoa, 1 5 August 1648 ; Grendi, 'I Nordici', 56 ; Jonathan I . Israel, Th e
Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford 1982 ) 210, 342.
19
G.G . Guarnieri , 11 Movimiento délie navi da guerra e mercantili nel porto di Livorno al tempo del lerzo
granduca di Toscano (1587-1609) (Livorn o 1911 ) 16; Hart, 'Amsterdamer Italienfahrt' , 163-66 .
20
O f twenty-three Dutch grain ship s which arrived at Geno a i n April 1648 , nine or ten a t leas t had
been chartered b y the Genoese Senate , ARH S G 6906. Alber t Muilma n to SG, Genoa, 1 1 April 1648 .
and it is true that quite a number of historians have tried to back him up.21 The myth
of the ineffectiveness of the Spanish embargoes agains t the Dutch has remained so
appealing t o som e historian s precisely because Braudel' s gran d concep t ca n no t
survive without it. But the data we have scarcely leave room fo r doubt. Dutch trade
with Spain and Portuga l was already at a low ebb in the early 1590s. 22 It expanded
considerably in th e middl e years of the decade , especially with Portugal , bu t wa s
then dramatically cut back b y Spanish governmen t action i n the years 1598-1607 .
The evidence of the freight contracts whic h have survived in the Amsterdam nota-
rial archives shows, as we see from Table 3, that something like seventy or eighty per
cent of Dutch sea-borne trad e with Spain was eliminated.
Table 3 Th e collapse o f Dutch trade with Spain ( 1597-1602)21
Year Total To Castile To To Portugal In North

Number of Valencia- German ships
voyages from Mallorca
Amsterdam
to the Iberian
Peninsula
1597 192 65 10 117 1

1598 201 44 8 149 4
1599 15 1 2 12 8
1600 57 4 4 49 10
1601 62 8 2 52 10
1602 34 5 4 25 9
Moreover, a large slice of such trade between Amsterdam and the Iberian Peninsula
as survived was now being carried i n North Germa n ship s and thi s time, it would
appear fro m th e details about th e skippers given in the freight contracts, ship s sai-
ling from Amsterdam classified as 'Hanseatic' really were Hanseatic .
Denied access to Spain, excluded from the carrying trade between the Peninsula
and Italy, and sharing extensively in none of the 'rich trades' except for the supply of
costly Russia n leathe r an d caviar e t o Geno a an d Livorno , th e Dutc h wer e in a
generally weak position i n the Mediterranea n durin g phase one , despite the huge
numbers of Dutch ships in evidence. As a consequence of its basic weakness and
narrowness, in those years when Italian harvests were abundant, suc h as in the late
1590s, the entire Dutch straatvaart slumped dramatically. 24 For Braude l there was
just one fundamental pattern to Dutch Mediterranean trad e down to 1650 and this,
21
Fernan d Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle. 3 vols. (Paris
1979) III, 175; see the arguments put forward as to the ineffectiveness of the second Spanish embargo in
the 1620 s in José Alcalá-Zamora, España, Flandes y e l Mar de l Norte (1618-1639) (Barcelon a 1975)
182-184; similar arguments have been put forwar d b y Henry Kamen and James Casey.
22
J.W . Ijzerman,'Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten, 1591-1602.1 : De vaart op Spanje en Por-
tugal' in: Economisch Historisch Jaarboek 1 7 (1931) 164 .
23
Thi s table is assembled from the freight contract data listed by Ijzerman in loc. cit. lists for the years
1597-1602.
24
Grendi , 'I Nordici' , 67; Hart, 'Amsterdamer Italienfahrt', 149 .
The Phases of the Dutch Straatvaart l3 9
he believes, was established i n the 1590s . Bu t the longue durée, a deep-seated shif t
occurring ove r a lon g perio d an d shape d b y basi c 'material ' needs , factor s an d
forces, can not b e accepted i f it fails to fit the facts. With the next major upsurge in
Dutch traffic to the Mediterranean, i n the years 1606-9, the 'structure' o f the Dutch
straatvaart in fact changed fundamentally. Its entire character, for m and organisa -
tion were transformed. The Dutch-Spanish cease-fir e of April 160 7 and subsequen t
lifting of the embargoes made it much safer fo r the Dutch t o sail to the Mediterra -
nean, re-admitted the m to the ports of Spain and Portugal and enabled th e Dutch
for the first time to engage on a large scale in the carrying trade between the Penin-
sula and Italy , the key carrying trad e o f the western Mediterranean . A t the sam e
time, the Dutch wer e now able to enter on a large scale into the carrying of oil, grain
and sal t fro m th e agriculturall y ric h area s o f Spanis h souther n Italy-especiall y
Puglia and Sicily-to the north Italian states. 25 Throughout wha t I propose to call
the second phase, fro m 160 7 to 162 1 (but not i n one year before or one year after,
until 1647) , the Dutch wer e the principal carriers of Castilian wool, Valencian salt
and Portuguese suga r to Genoa, Livorno and Venice and similarly also of Puglian
oil, Puglian and Sicilia n grain and Sicilia n salt.26 The Hanseatics wer e for th e time
being eliminate d fro m th e sea-lane s betwee n Spai n an d Ital y whil e th e Englis h
played n o more tha n a marginal role in the carrying of either Iberian products t o
North Ital y or of south Italia n products to North Italy . In the carrying trades, th e
Dutch role was now much more diverse and strongl y based tha n before; but stil l a
large part o f this expanded activit y was in th e service of Genoese, Livornes e and
Venetian merchants, and however important, can not be said to have amounted in
itself to a Dutch hegemon y ove r Mediterranean commerce.
If we now ask how much progress did the Dutch make during this early period in
the carrying of valuable goods in the Mediterranean , it seems t o me , once again,
that what must be chiefly stressed i s the change in the 'structure' o f the straat vaan in
the years 1607-9. Before 1607 , a few leading Amsterdam merchants, such as Isaac le
Maire, Gaspa r va n Ceulen , an d Guillerm o Bartolotti , were shippin g costly mer-
chandise t o Italy , especiall y Russia n leather , furs , an d caviar e t o Livorno. 27
Throughout th e seventeenth century, Italy was much the most important market
for Russia n caviare and this traffic wa s controlled by the Dutch as early as 1600 , or
earlier, to judge from th e fact that b y then several Dutch vessel s were sailing each
year direct from Archange l to Livorno. 28 But as yet the Dutch brought no spices to
Italy or Spain and there was practically no direct contact between Holland and the
Levant. It is true that significant quantities of cottons an d other Levant goods were
reaching Amsterdam , an d ofte n i n Dutc h ships ; bu t mos t o f thi s merchandis e
25
Israel , Th e Dutch Republic, 44-46.
26
Ibidem , 140; Watjen , Niederlander i m Mitte/meergebiei. 122 ; in th e sam e way , but no t befor e or
after (until 1647) , the Dutch dominated the carrying of grain to eastern Spai n fro m Sicil y and Sardinia,
see Alvaro Castillo Pintado, Tráfico marítimo y comercio de importación en Valencia comienzos delsiglo
XVII (Madri d 1967)78 , 168-177 .
27
Simo n Hart , 'Amsterdamse scheepvaart en hande l op Noord-Rusland i n de zeventiende eeuw' in:
Simon Hart, Geschrift e n getal. Een keuze uit de demografisch-, economisch- en sociaal-historische studiën
opgrond va n Amsterdamse e n Zaanse archivalia, 1600-1800 (Dordrecht 1976 ) 288-291.
28
Ibidem ; in a paper on the caviare trade, the English diplomat Si r John Finch reported fro m Tuscany
in 166 7 that 'Italy consumes 39 parts of 40 of that commodity', see Public Record Office , Londo n (PRO)
SP 98/8. Finch to Arlington , Livorno, 7 March 1667 .
arrived via Venice and was remitted by Venetian merchants.29 Thus, a Dutch ship en
route to Amsterda m whic h san k i n a stor m of f Sicil y i n 159 5 was carrying Zant e
currants, cummin , and other costl y goods but thi s cargo was loaded a t Venice on
the initiative of Venetian merchants. A Dutch shi p captured b y the Spaniard s off
Gibraltar th e following year was carrying Turkish cottons, currants, and a range of
Near Eastern drugs but again was sailing from Venice and for Venetians. The début
of the Dutch themselve s at Aleppo occurred i n 159 9 when a Dutch shi p arrived on
the Syria n coast carryin g 100,00 0 ducat s i n silve r with whic h t o purchas e silks ,
spices, an d cottons . Accordin g t o th e Venetia n consul, th e arriva l o f thi s vessel
proved quit e a shoc k fo r th e residen t Venetians , French an d Englis h alike. 30 I n
March 1600, Henry Lello, the English envoy at Constantinople, wrote to Sir Robert
Cecil, tha t th e 'Ffleming s merchant s do e beginn e t o trad e int o thes e countrye s
which wil l cleane subvert ours, although i t be now butt little worth'.31 But, as yet,
Dutch participation in the Levant trade, if enough to worry the dominant commer-
cial powers of the region, was still essentially marginal. According to the Portuguese
traveller Pedro Teixeira, Dutch remittances to Aleppo in 1604 were running at only
half the rate o f those of the English and were of little account compare d wit h the
investments of the Venetians and French . (Se e Table 4)\
Table 4| Western remittances in cash and goods t o Aleppo i n 1604 and 1614 (valued in
Venetian ducats J32
Trading Nation 1604 (Teixeira) 1613 (Morosini)
Venetians 1,250,000 850,000

French 800,000 1,750,000
Dutch 150,000 500,000
English 300,000 250,000
But, ove r th e nex t decade , th e pictur e change d dramaticall y as i s confirmed by

several independent contemporary reports as well as the figures compiled in 1614 by
the then Venetian consul at Aleppo, Girolam o Morosini . By 1613, Dutch trade at
Aleppo was estimated to be around twice as important a s that of the English and,
what is just as striking, the Dutch role was expanding rapidly whereas English trade
29
Albert o Tenenti , Naufrages, corsaires e t assurances maritimes à Venise, 1592-1609 (Pari s 1959 )
184-185, 219, 233 , 275 , 30 7 et seq.
!
" 'Gli olandesï, reporte d th e consul , Giorgio Emo, 'sono di danno comune', se e th e 'relazione ' of
Giogio Em o date d 1 2 Dec. 159 9 in: Gugliclmo Berchet, Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria (Turin
1866)102-103.
31
Bronnen rot de geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel. K. Heeringa éd. 2 vols, in three parts (The
Hague, 1910-1917 ) I , 169 ; A.L. Horniker , 'Anglo-French Rivalry i n th e Levan t from 158 3 to 1612' ,
Journal
32
o f Modern History 1 8 (1946)298.
Th e tw o set s o f figure s fo r 160 4 and 161 3 are take n respectively fro m th e Relaciones d e Pedro
Teixeira d'El origen, descendencia y succession de los reyes de Persia, y de Hormuz, y de vn viage hecho por
el mismo avtor desde la India oriental hasta Italia por tierra (Antwerp 1610) 181 -18 3 and th e 'relazione' of
Girolamo Morosini of 9 Feb. 1614 in Berchet, Relazioni, \ 58-159; 'la nazione fiamminga', reports Moro-
sini, 'negozia un milione di reali la maggior parte contadi ed alcune poche merci di Alemagna, ambre,
argenti vivi, cinabri, fil fi rame, ottone e ferro; by contrast 'la nazione inglese negozia un mezzo milione,
lo sfarzo principal e e in carisce (ie. kerseys), londre, stagni ed alcuni pochi contadi'; see also Guglielmo
Berchet, La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia (Turin 1865) 75.
with Aleppo seemingl y declined steadily from the moment th e Dutch appeare d on
the scene, in 1599 , down t o 1621. 33 How is one to account for the obvious superio -
rity at this stage of the Dutch over de English? According to Morosini's predecesso r
as Venetian consul a t Aleppo , Gio Francesc o Sagredo , Dutc h commerc e in the
Near Eas t ha d gaine d rea l impetu s 'seguito la tregua col re cattolico', that is since
the signing of the Twelve Years ' Truce i n 160 9 and tha t i n the two years since the
signing of the Dutch-Spanish truc e 'many houses' of Dutch merchant s had come to
Aleppo.34 And thi s was indeed th e crux o f the matter. Jus t a s the resumptio n o f
traffic between Holland an d Spanish territory enabled the Dutch to take over much
of the bulk carrying trade between Spai n and Italy in the years 1607-21, so access t o
Spanish silve r enabled th e Dutch to step u p their bullio n remittances t o Ottoman
territory lending their traffi c eas t o f Sicily an entirel y new impetus. 35 The Spanis h
truce, i n othe r words , free d th e Dutc h fro m wha t hithert o ha d bee n th e chie f
obstacle to their progress in the 'rich trades' of the Mediterranean, namely their lack
of manufactures o f their ow n whic h they could sel l in Italy an d Turkey. 36 But, in
addition to Spanish silver, there was also another factor of great significance which
also came into play in the years around 1609 . Since 1598 Dutch merchants had been
importing larg e quantitie s of pepper an d Eas t Indi a spice s int o norther n Europe .
After a major effor t i n the Moluccas i n 1605 , the Dutch finally gained control ove r
the trade in nutmegs, mace and cloves. But it still took several years until the Dutch
began t o shi p significan t quantities o f peppe r an d spice s t o th e Mediterranean .
What wa s possibl y th e firs t consignmen t o f pepper to reac h Ital y from Hollan d
arrived at Livorno in December 1605. 37 But as late as 160 7 practically th e whole of
the Mediterranean's provisio n o f pepper an d spice s came either via Lisbon or else
overland from the Far Eas t via Aleppo and Alexandria. A regular stream of Dutc h
pepper an d spice s bega n arrivin g in Livorn o onl y from 160 9 an d i n Venice fro m
around 1612. 38 B y 1620 , n o mor e spice s wer e arrivin g at Alepp o an d th e entir e
Mediterranean marke t wa s bein g supplie d principall y fro m Hollan d an d t o a
(much) lesser extent from England and Portugal .
Equipped with silver and spices, the Dutch were a force to be reckoned wit h in the
trade to Ital y an d Turke y i n th e year s 1607-2 1 in a wa y that the y had no t bee n
during phase one of their straatvaart. A t this point, the Dutch stat e began to take an
eager interes t i n Mediterranean trade . I n 1609 , a convoy ofte n larg e ships sailed
from Hollan d fo r 'Cyprus , Syria , Palestine, and Egypt ' provide d wit h extr a men
and gun s by th e State s General . I n 1610 , the States Genera l resolve d t o promot e
33
Accordin g to Emo, the English were shipping 500,000 ducats worth of goods to Aleppo in 1599; and
while the English in the years around 160 0 were the first to challenge Venice's grip on the cotton exports
of Cyprus and Smyrna , by 1611 , the Dutch, who were better placed to supply cotton t o Germany, had
replaced the English as the chief challengers to Venetia n control.
34
se e the 'relazione'of Gio Francesc o Sagred o of 4 July 161 1 in: Berchet, Relazioni, 151 : 'lanazione
fiamminga ha ingrossalo grandemente il negozio seguito la tregua col re cattolico, ed ha posto nuovamente
in Aleppo molle case'.
35
Th e State s General i n Septembe r 160 9 authorized the mintin g of 100,00 0 silve r Leeuwendaalder a
expressly to 'advanc e our trad e wit h Syria', see Resolutiën tier Staten-Generaal van 1576 to t 1609 XIV.
(1607-1609). H.H.R . Rijperma n ed . (The Hagu e 1970) 900.
36
Va n Dillen , Van rijkdom en regenten, 76.
37
Braude l and Romano , Navires et marchandises, 57.
38
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levani.ichen handell, 15-16,98 , 105 ; though initially, at Venice,
the English brought more than the Dutch, see Domenico Sella, Commerci e industrie a Venezia ne!secólo
X Vil (Venice and Rom e 1961 ) 73-74.
Dutch trade in the Levant by seeking a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Sulta n
and, despit e Frenc h an d Englis h obstruction thi s was quickly accomplished. 39 In
1611, business suddenly booming , th e Amsterdam Levan t merchant s summe d u p
their view s on th e fas t developing situation in a petitio n t o th e State s General. 40
While conceding that the Near East's role in the world spice trade was now rapidly
being eliminate d b y VO C activit y i n th e Fa r East , th e merchant s confidentl y
claimed tha t the Levant trade was now one of the most valuable and important i n
which the Dutch were engaged and perhaps even more vital to the United Province s
than its flourishing trade with the East Indies . This bold assertion the y grounded on
the fac t tha t fro m th e Near Eas t came a rang e o f costly ra w materials-cottons,
mohairs, silk s and gallnuts-require d b y th e textil e industries o f th e west . I f th e
Dutch could dominate the Levant trade, as they had that of the Baltic and Far East ,
then the industrial potential o f Holland's textile towns, Leiden and Haarlem, woul d
be greatly enhanced an d th e German textil e towns would be made dependen t fo r
their supplie s o n th e Dutch entrepôt . Th e Amsterda m Levan t merchant s judged
that they now already controlled th e trade i n cotton fro m Cypru s and Egyp t an d
were the chief supplier s of cotton t o German y an d th e Sout h Netherlands. 41 Bu t
they had, the y declared, made less progress in the traffic in Persian raw silk, sold to
the west through Aleppo , an d i t was this, the most valuabl e strand o f the Levan t
trade whic h the y no w propose d t o wres t fro m th e hand s o f th e Venetian s an d
French. The y estimate d th e then value of Dutch trad e wit h the Ottoman Empir e
including Cyprus at around fou r million guilders yearly, or some £ 400,000, whic h
would seem to confirm that Dutch commerce wit h the Near East now substantially
surpassed tha t o f the English.42 Yet, as Venetian sources confirm, 43 the Dutch wer e
only now beginning to buy up raw silk in any quantity and while the Dutch heavily
dominated th e trad e i n cottons , Englis h sil k purchase s a t Alepp o probabl y
remained larger than those of the Dutch fo r some years after 1611. Indeed, down to
1621 the Dutch conspicuously failed to gain the same momentum in the silk trade as
in other sphere s of Near Easter n Trade . There were several reasons fo r this, as we
shall see further on , but one reason wa s the relatively low level of demand fo r ra w
silk in the Low Countries themselves at this time.44 For as long as most Persian raw
silk continue d t o reac h th e west through Turkey , th e French an d Venetian s were
bound t o retain their primacy in this traffic; fo r France an d Ital y were then muc h
the larges t consumer s an d considerabl y neare r t o Alepp o tha n Hollan d o r Eng -
39
A.H . de Groot, Th e Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. A History of th e Earliest Diplomatic
Relations, 1610-1630 (Leiden and Istanbu l 1978) 90.
40
se e the 'Memori e betreffende de n Levantsche n handel' (1611 ) in: Bronnen tol d e geschiedenis van
den Levantschen handel l, 429-431.
41
Dutc h primacy in trade with Cyprus was achieved between 160 5 and 1611 , in the former year the
Venetians being still in first place and the English en French still as active as the Dutch, see the Relaciones
de Pedro Teixeira, 19 8 and Sella , Commerci e industrie, 27-28.
42
Th e 4% consulage dues paid by the Dutch on their exports from Ottoman territor y then amounted
to 160,00 0 guilders yearly, see Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I, 430.
43
Archivi o di Stato di Venezia (ASV), Cinque Savii alia Mercanzia (CSM) 1st series vol. 153, fo. 48
res. 4 August 1611; in his 'relazione' of 24 September 1610, Tomaso Contarini, reporting fro m Holland ,
states that fifteen Dutc h ships sailed that year to 'Cypro et Soria...per levar...gottoni et fïladi, ma gottoni
il piu, poiche sede et speciarie le hanno con piu vantaggio dall' Indie' in: Relazione veneziane. Venetiaan-
sche berichten over de Vereenigde Nederlanden van ¡600-1795. P.J. Blo k éd. (The Hague 1909 ) 37.
44
O n thé Amsterdam and Antwerp silk industries in the early seventeenth century, see L. van Nierop,
'De zijdennijverhei d va n Amsterda m historisch geschetst', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 45 (1930) 33,
152-153, 169.
land.45 In other words, the Dutch Levan t trade undoubtedly surpasse d tha t o f the
English during phase two but structural factors prevented either nation toppling the
French and Venetians from first and secon d place. Taking the Dutch lead over the
English i n th e Levant trade , togethe r wit h thei r preponderanc e i n th e carryin g
trades to, and between, Spain and Italy, it would seem that the Dutch i n the Medi-
terranean were now in an uniquely strong overall position. Since 1607-9 , the straat-
vaart had become much more complex and diverse in structure so that the shipping
in of Baltic grain, though still very significant, was no longer anything like the sol e
driving force it had formerl y been. In years when there was little demand for Baltic
grain in the Mediterranean, a s in 1615-1616, Dutch predominance in the Meditera-
nean carryin g trades no w clearl y continued despit e th e lac k o f consignments o f
grain from Holland. Apar t fro m th e silks from Aleppo , an d th e trade i n currants
from Zant e and Cephalonic a (which was in English hands), practically everything
else was dominated b y the Dutch. I n the period from September 161 5 to April 1616,
forty-three Dutch ship s entered th e port of Venice while another forty-two arrived
during th e res t o f 1616. 46 This mad e a tota l o f eighty-fiv e Dutc h ship s reachin g
Venice in just sixtee n months. W e have a lis t of th e cargoes brough t by th e first
forty-three ships, down to April 1616 , drawn up by the Dutch consul in Venice. The
most strikin g thing abou t th e lis t i s that no t a singl e one o f thes e Dutc h vessel s
carried Baltic grain. Seven of the ships had sailed in convoy from Seville loaded with
Spanish wool for Venice's woolle n cloth industry . Five had saile d i n convoy fro m
Alicante carrying Castilian woo l and Valencian salt. Another five had sailed from
Crete and other Venetian islands with wine and currants and two from Cyprus with
cotton yarn. Six ships had sailed from the Spanish viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily
with grain , two fro m Constantinople wit h Turkish wools, tw o fro m Tunisi a wit h
hides, wool, and amber, one from Lisbo n with sugar, another from Zant e with raw
silk and the rest from Holland wit h fish, lead, spices, and naval stores, especially tar.
No less than nineteen of the forty-three Dutch ship s in question had loaded in har-
bours under Spanish control .
Dutch ship s carried som e Cypru s cotton t o Venic e but th e bulk of the island's
cotton export s they were now bringing back t o Amsterdam for distribution in the
Low Countrie s an d Germany . Accordin g t o th e first Dutch ambassado r i n Con -
stantinople, Cornelis Haga, in a letter to the States General of May 1615, neither the
French no r the English any longer handled more than a small fraction of Cyprus'
exports.47 In 1614 , we learn, no less than ten Dutch ships loaded cottons in the ports
of Cyprus and thes e must indeed have accounted fo r the bulk of the few thousand
bales of cotton produced in Cyprus each year. The Dutch dominated also in Egypt.
But i n Crete an d othe r Venetia n islands, th e positio n wa s different . Dutc h mer -
chants showed interest in the trade in currants and Cretan wine and, in 1618, at their
45
Th e directors of the English and Dutch East India Companies calculated in 1620 that roughly 6,000
bales of Persian raw silk were being exported to the west each year through Aleppo; of these, no less than
3,000 bales were destined for the French market, via Marseille, 1,500 bales for Venice, 400 bales for other
parts of Italy, 600 bales for England and a mere 500 bales for the Low Countries, see the Bronnen tot de
geschiedenis der Oostindische in Perzië I (1611-1638). H. Dunlop éd. (The Hague 1930) 11.
46
AS V CSM new series vol. 24 'Nota delli vascelli dei paesi et stati bassi venuti a Venetia' (September
1615 to Apri l 1616) ; for a n abridge d version of this document, see Bronnen tot d e geschiedenis va n den
Levantschen handel I, 61-62.
47
Hag a to SG, 3 0 May an d 2 8 November 1615 i n Bronnen to t d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen
handel I, 463,481.
144 Em p ires and En trepo ts
request, th e States Genera l appointe d a consul t o reside on Zante. 48 But here the
English remaine d pre-eminen t even though th e Venetia n government woul d no t
allow the sale of English cloth in the Venetian colonies. Sir Thomas Roe, England' s
ambassador a t Constantinople in the 1620s , estimated that the English nation were
then spending £ 53,000 yearly in cash on Zante currants , providin g Venice with a
windfall, being 'so inamored with plumporredge, cakes, and pies , as they will with
currants swallow anything.'49
If phase tw o (1607-1621) was one o f vigorous expansion and rapi d diversifica-
tion, the third phase, tha t of 1621-4 5 corresponding t o th e period whic h Braudel
saw a s th e high-poin t o f Dutc h Mediterranea n trade, 30 wa s in fac t on e o f disas -
terous slump and contraction. Philip IV's edicts of April 1621, banning Dutch ships
and cargoe s fro m Spain , Portugal , an d hi s Italia n viceroyalties , paralyse d th e
Dutch carryin g trade between Spain and Italy , stopped th e Dutch obtainin g silver
in Spain , an d prevente d them from carryin g grain, sal t and oliv e oil from Sicily ,
Puglia and Sardinia to northern Italy. Moreover, the impact of the Spanish embar -
goes was not just immediate and drasti c but als o lasting. Amsterdam merchants ,
such as Jacques Thierry and Jeremias va n Ceulen, were later able to obtain passe s
from the viceroys of Naples and Sicily for trade with southern Italy. 51 But in the case
of Spain itself the embargoes were still effective a s late as 1646 , the last full yea r of
the Spanis h driv e against Dutch commerce. 52 The books o f the 'directors ' o f the
Dutch Levan t trade for 1646- 7 reyeal that even in the last full yea r of the Spanis h
embargoes practically all merchandise shipped fro m Spanis h Mediterranean ports
to Dutch territory , was loaded ont o Hanseatic ships, ships which, from th e details
given, d o see m t o hav e bee n genuinel y Hanseati c an d manne d b y Germa n
crews.53
The evidenc e also shows , despite what has been sai d t o th e contrary , tha t th e
Dutch wer e shut out of the viceroyalties of Valencia and Mallorc a as well as fro m
Castile.54 Shipments of salt from the salt-pans of Valencia to Genoa and Livorno all
but ceased in the early 1620s owing to lack of Dutch shipping. 55 There was a ruinous
48
49
Ibidem , I, 66.
Th e Negotiations o f Si r Thomas Roe, i n His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from th e Year 1621 to
1628 Inclusive (London 1740 ) 10, 626.
50
Braudel , L a Méditerranée I , 572 ; although their view s have been criticise d by some othe r Dutc h
scholars, A.M. van der Woude and other Dutch 'Braudelians' have laid it down as something of a dogma
that Dutc h oversea s trad e in general, including Mediterranean trade , expanded vigorousl y in the firs t
half of the seventeenth century and the n stagnate d afte r 1650 , see A.M. va n der Woude, 'D e "Nieuw e
Geschiedenis" i n een nieuw e gedaante', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden V (Haarlem 1980 ) 19 -
20.51
Amsterda m City Archives (GAA), Notarial Archive (NA) vol. 694B, doc. 60, vol. 664, pack 17 , fos.
70-2, and vol . 675, fos. 69v-70.
« lsrae[, The Dutch Republic, 205-217, 337-345.
53
O f thirty-nine ships which returned from the Mediterranean t o Amsterdam between May 164 6 and
April 1647 , fourteen had loaded part of their return cargoes i n Spanish ports; o f these fourteen carrying
Spanish good s no less than twelve are listed as Hanseatic an d had German skippers, see ARH Levants e
Handel 264 , fos. 21, 88, 194 v and Wâtjen , Niederlander im Mittelmeergebiet, 221-226 .
54
Israel , The Dutch Republic, 140-141 ; for Casey's disagreemen t wit h my arguments on this point, see
James Casey, Th e Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridg e 1979 ) 97-98.
55
O n 1 1 February 1623 , the viceroy of Valencia reported to Madrid that exports of salt from the great
salt-pan of La Mata, in the viceroyalty of Valencia, had completely ceased owing to the outbreak o f war
between Spain and the Dutch, th e Dutch b y 1621 havin g become virtuall y the sole carriers of Valencia n
salt to Italy, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Consejo de Aragón vol. 603, doc. 6 . Viceroy of Valencia to
Philip IV, Valencia , 11 Feb . 1623 .
shortage o f Spanis h woo l a t Venic e in th e earl y 1620s , adequat e supplie s bein g
restored onl y from 162 5 when more non-Dutc h shippin g became available; 56 and
this could no t have occurred ha d the exclusion of the Dutch faile d t o tak e effect i n
the realm of Valencia as well as in Castile. The armada which the Spaniards estab -
lished at Gibraltar faile d to disrupt Dutch shipping . The States General neutralized
the threa t pose d b y Spanis h nava l powe r b y formin g the straatvaart int o large ,
heavily armed convoys which were escorted a s far as Genoa, Marseille and Livorno
by units of the Dutch navy. But the cost o f the extra me n and guns , as well as the
increasing threat of the privateers based a t Dunkirk, dramatically forced up Dutch
freight an d insurance rates for voyages to the Mediterranean. In the years 1617-20,
Dutch freigh t charges for shippin g grain fro m th e Baltic to Ital y were running at
levels from nine to eleve n ducats per last. 57 I n 1621 , these freight rate s shot u p t o
nineteen an d twent y ducats per last , practicall y double th e level of a fe w months
before. Whereas durin g phase tw o the Dutch ha d enjoye d a clear advantage ove r
the English in respect o f shipping costs, phase three began with a complete reversal
in the balance o f freight an d insurance charges with a decisive shift i n favour of the
English.58 Eight years later, Amsterdam merchants pin-pointed this factor as one of
the main reasons for the sharp overall contraction of Dutch Mediterranea n trad e as
from 1621 . I n fact , shipping grain direct fro m th e Balti c to th e Mediterranea n in
Dutch ship s virtually ceased after 1621.
It was soon well known to Dutch merchants and the Dutch public alike that the
recently flourishing straatvaart wa s no w in a ba d way . Pamphleteers advocatin g
support fo r the newly set up West Indi a Compan y uninhibitedl y cited th e misfor-
tunes of the straatvaart when urging investors to switch their funds to the coffers of
the new company. 59 Amsterdam merchant s repeatedly state d tha t i t was not just
trade t o Spai n whic h wa s affected but tha t ther e was a profoun d slum p also i n
Dutch commerce with Italy.60 As for Dutch trad e to the Near East , i t was in a state
of virtual collapse. Ther e th e impact took th e form not just of a contraction i n the
volume of Dutch activit y but of a drastic narrowing in its scope. As Haga reporte d
to Th e Hagu e i n Novembe r 1623 , th e subsidiar y branche s o f th e Dutc h Levan t
trade no w withere d away , wha t was lef t bein g concentrate d mor e an d mor e o n
Aleppo and Cyprus , Dutch commerc e wit h 'Alexandria, Cairo, Smyrna an d Con -
stantinople being completel y ruined'. 61 I n 1625 , the Levan t merchant s requeste d
help from th e States General. 'I n th e last few years', they declared, 'partly owing to
the wars this land wages against th e king of Spain and partly owing to the charters
awarded t o the East an d West India Companies,' they found themselves 'stripped
and denude d o f all their commerce an d traffi c (wit h the Ottoman Empire ) excep t
56
AS V CSM 1s t series vol. 146, fo. 158 . res. 2 March 1625.
57
Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel i n de zeventiende eeuw VI, (1617-
¡625). P.H . Winkelman ed. (The Hague 1983 ) 81, 191 , 197, 281,421, 440, 446,449-450.
58
'Koopmansadvieze n aangaande het plan tot oprichtingeener compagnie van assurantie ( 1629-35)'.
P.J. Blok ed . in : Bijdragen e n Mededeelingen va n het Historisch Genootschap 2 1 (1900) 51-52.
59
Accordin g to the Korte Onderrichtinge ende vermaeninge oen alle liefhebbers de s Vaderlants (Knuttel
no. 3363 ) (Leiden 1622) the straatvaart had now become 'very dangerous and virtuall y fruitless' .
60
'D e negoti e op Italien is naest eenige jaren seer vermindert, werdende de fijne ware n ten deele over
landt gesonden ende de grove waren met diere vrachten ende premien beswaert', 'Koopmansadviezení,
64; as for trade to North Afric a and th e Levant these wer e stated i n 162 9 to b e 'nu bijnae geheel ver-
vallen', ibidem, 67.
61
Hag a to SG , Constantinople , 2 5 November 162 3 in: Bronnen tot d e geschiedenis van den Levant-
schen handel I, 497-498.
for a few places and islands in the Mediterranean' an d that 'as a result, the trade t o
Italy has also becom e very bad'.52 It was in response t o this that th e States o f Hol-
land and States General agreed, i n June 1621 , to set up an umbrella organisation t o
supervise and generally assist Dutch trad e with the Mediterranean. This organiza-
tion, called the college of'Directeuren va n den Levantschen handel en navigatie in
de Middellandsch e Zee ' (Director s o f th e Levan t Trad e an d Navigatio n i n th e
Mediterranean Sea), at first having only one chamber, meeting at Amsterdam, was
not a joint stock company on the model of the East and West India Companies, o r
of the Englis h Levant Company.63 It di d no t itsel f engage i n commerce a t all . Its
purpose was to represent the interests of Dutch merchants trading to the Mediter-
ranean in dealings with the Dutch state and with the admiralty authorities, to regu-
late the convoy system and shipping practices, and to collect certain charges o n the
trade on behalf of the government which were used in part t o fun d th e network of
Dutch consul s in Italy and th e Near Eas t which was set up during the flourishin g
Twelve Years' Truc e perio d bu t whic h was now being maintained with increasing
difficulty.
Beside the impact of the 162 1 Spanish embargo on Dutch trade , the other major
factor depressin g the Dutch Levant trad e during phas e thre e was the Dutch East
India Company' s growin g success , beginnin g in th e 1620s , i n shippin g sizeabl e
quantities of Persian sil k fro m source , i n the Persian Gulf , and fro m Surat , roun d
Africa t o Hollan d by-passin g the Mediterranean . By the late 1620s , shipments of
raw sil k b y the VOC fro m Persia and Sura t were exceeding th e combined tota l of
raw sil k bein g shippe d t o Hollan d fro m th e Mediterranea n an d Archangel-t o
where further significant quantities were being transported overlan d fro m Persi a
via Moscow. According t o a memorandum compiled for the admiralty authorities
by the Sephardi merchant Sebastian Pimentel , in January 1630 , some 1,50 0 bales of
raw sil k were then reachin g Hollan d yearly. 64 Of this , more tha n half , some 800
bales yearly, was now being shipped b y the VOC round Africa , while another 400
bales yearly was reaching Amsterdam via Moscow and Archangel, with only some
300 bales yearly being shipped to Holland fro m Turke y and Italy combined. Then,
in th e mi d 1630s , the VOC steppe d u p it s drive and trie d to divert the bulk of all
Persia's silk exports round Africa to Holland, thereby stripping the English, French
and Venetians of the large quantities they were accustomed t o purchase at Aleppo .
This was a grandiose project an d on e which proved impossible to attain. But for a
decade or so this initiative did have an immense impact on the silk trade and, at its
height, i n th e lat e 1630s , appear s t o hav e accounte d fo r somethin g lik e hal f o f
Persia's tota l silk exports. 65 This was not enough to put an end to Aleppo's rol e as a
silk emporiu m fo r th e English , French an d Venetian s but s o much sil k wa s no w
« Ibidem , I , 505-506.
63
A.H . d e Groot, 'Th e Organisatio n o f Western Europea n Trade in th e Levant , 1500-1800 ' in : L.
Blussé and F . Gaastra éd. , Companies an d Trade (Leide n 1981 ) 234-235.
64
Sebastia n Pimentel, 'Memorij va n de rau zijd e dij jaerlicks indese Lande n comt' fo. 1 in: ARH S G
(Admiraliteiten) 5501/1.
65
Whil e th e principal Dutc h buye r i n Persia reported that he bought up , on behalf o f the VOC, 74 3
out o f a reduced tota l of only 1 , 073 bales exported fro m Persi a in 1635 , and 1,00 0 ou t o f an estimated
total o f 1,47 3 bales , i n 1636 , i t i s eviden t tha t h e somewha t underestimate d th e continue d seepag e
through t o Aleppo , Bronnen to t de geschiedenis de r Oostindische Compagnie i n Perzië I , 598-599 , 612,
654; N. Steensgaard , Carracks, Caravans an d Companies: Th e Structural Crisis in European-Asian Trade
in the Earlv Seventeenth Century (Copenhage n 1973 ) 374-376, 390-396 .
The Phases of th e Dutch Straatvaart 14 7
reaching Holland o n VOC ships from th e Far East that the importing of silk to the
Netherlands fro m th e Mediterranea n wa s depresse d t o ver y lo w level s indeed.
Much th e sam e happene d als o wit h certain othe r Asia n products . Rhubarb , fo r
instance, previously obtained b y the Dutc h an d thei r rival s alike in Aleppo, wa s
now also largely re-routed vi a the Persian Gulf and the Cape.66 All this reduced th e
Dutch Levan t trade to such a point, that Amsterdam merchants m the 1630s were in
the habit of saying that it was completely lost.67 Lewes Roberts was being perfectly
accurate whe n he wrot e in hi s Marchant's Mapp o f Commerce, o f 1638 , that th e
English, Frenc h an d Venetian s were the 'onely thre e Christian nation s that hav e
any trad e o f moment' a t Aleppo , th e 'trade drive n here b y the Dutch (being ) not
worthy of consideration'.68 But Ralph Davis referred t o this assertion in support of
his contention that the English far outstripped th e Dutch in the Levant trade during
the seventeenth century without realising that this applies only to one specific phase
in a sequence of vast structural shifts. B y the mid 1640s , the VOC's purchases of silk
in Persia had fallen off sharply, due to a variety of factors, and before long the bulk
of the supply was again reachin g th e west via Aleppo an d Smyrna . But the poin t
remains, until around 164 5 there was little incentive for Dutc h merchant s to bu y
silk in the Levant.
If th e Dutc h straatvaart slumpe d fro m 162 1 down t o th e clos e o f th e Thirt y

Years' War , th e Englis h share of'th e Levan t trade , previousl y shrinking during
phase two, now surged vigorously ahead. But contrary to Ralph Davis' views, there
was nothing especially remarkable about th e impetus or volume of England's gro-
wing trade with Turkey. Nor did English commerce manifest any inherent superio-
rity over that of England's rivals . Roberts estimated that in the late 1630s , when the
Dutch Levant trade wa s at its nadir, England was shipping some 6,000 cloths and
100,000 rix-dollars in silver to Aleppo yearly. This was in fact only a modest quan -
tity of silver and th e same is true of the cloth. In 1605 , according t o Teixeira, the
Venetians had been exporting five to six thousand cloths to Aleppo not to mention a
like quantity of finished silks and brocades , and th e Venetian woollens were some
thirty pe r cen t longer. 69 Nor wa s it b y any mean s the Englis h alone who streng -
thened thei r position i n the Levan t a t thi s time . While the Frenc h Levan t trade
declined steadily during the Thirty Years' War, especially after the outbreak of the
1635-59 Franco-Spanis h wa r cu t Marseill e merchants of f fro m thei r source s o f
silver,70 th e Venetians , as fro m 1621 , stage d a remarkabl e recover y which laste d
down t o th e outbrea k o f the 1645-6 9 Venetian- Turkish war. This late reviva l is
especially notabl e i n vie w o f th e conflic t i n Germany , which , a s ha s ofte n bee n
observed,71 disrupted th e trad e an d communication s of Venice's principal remai-
ning western market. Yet despit e the fighting north of the Alps , the re-expor t o f
Levant good s overlan d from Venice t o German y and th e Netherlands remained
66
Bronnen toi de geschiedenis der Ooslindische Compagnie in Perzië I, 587, 656.
67
'Koopmansadviezen' , 65 , 67, 85, 88.
68
Lewe s Roberts, Th e Marchants Mapp o f Commerce (London 1638 ) 139.
69
Ibidem ; Sella, Commercie industrie, 13-14 , 27, 119 .
70
Masson , Histoire d u commerce français dans le Levant a u XVHe siècle, 118 ; Gérar d Tongas , Le s
relations de la France avec l'Empire Ottoman durant la première moitié du XVlle siècle (Toulouse 1942 )
209.
71
Sella , Commerci e industrie, 52; B. McGowan, Economie Life i n Ottoman Europe. Taxation, Trade
and the Struggle fo r Land, 1600-1800 (Cambridge 1981 ) 19.
surprisingly buoyan t an d thi s trade wa s effectivel y controlle d b y Venice. 72 Thus
Venice's role was bolstered b y the collapse of the Dutch straatvaart and , in the years
1625-9, when the river trade betwee n th e Netherlands an d German y wa s halted,73
the Serenissima again enjoyed an undisputed swa y over th e distribution o f Levant
goods to the German textil e towns. Havin g since the 1590s , established a firm grip
over the overland routes linking Constantinople an d Salonik a with the Dalmatia n
ports of Split and Valona, a trading network based on a close collaboration betwee n
Venice and Balka n Sephardi Jewry which effectively prevente d Venice's rivals fro m
developing any significant seaborne trad e with the Ottoman capital,74 the Venetians
now move d bac k vigorousl y int o th e trad e wit h Cypru s an d Egyp t wher e th e
English strikingly failed to step into the shoes of the Dutch. I n these areas it was the
Venetians, not th e English, who profited fro m the collapse o f the Dutch traffic . I n
1626, a Venetian convoy swept up virtually the whole of Cyprus' cotto n crop, lea-
ving nothing at all for the English or Dutch. 75 In the 1630s , when the strife between
Dutch and Portuguese i n Brazil temporarily devastated th e sugar plantations there ,
the Venetians were able to revive their former sugar trade with Cyprus and Egypt. 76
The Venetian s were no w back i n second plac e t o th e Englis h a t Alepp o an d ha d
recovered thei r former primacy in Cyprus and Egypt as well as in all the lesser ports
of Syria, Palestine and Turkey where the local Venetian colonies briefly recapture d
some o f their former vigour. 77
But just a s abruptly as the Dutch straatvaart collapse d i n the early 1620s , so it
arose anew i n the year s 1645- 7 with the outbrea k o f the wa r betwee n Venic e an d
Turkey over Crete, i n 1645 , and th e final liftin g o f the Spanish embargoe s i n 1647 .
The Venetian-Turkish wa r of 1645-6 9 at once paralyse d sale s of Venetian woolle n
cloth throughout th e Ottoman Empire. 78 With the removal of the threat of the Dun -
kirk privateer s an d peac e wit h Spain , Dutc h freigh t an d insuranc e rate s t o th e
Mediterranean, fel l a s spectacularl y i n 164 7 as the y had rise n i n 1621 . By 1648-9 ,
freight charges quoted in Amsterdam fo r voyages to the Mediterranean wer e often
less tha n hal f thos e applyin g durin g th e earl y 1640s. 79 Indee d th e turn-abou t i n
1645-7 was extraordinarily abrupt and every bit as dramatic as the collapse in 1621 .
In 1644 , th e Dutc h wer e stil l sayin g tha t the y ha d completel y los t thei r forme r
Levant trad e 's o tha t i n many year s we have ha d n o ships sailing to, or returning
from there , th e Englis h havin g wholly taken take n ove r tha t trade.' 80 But by Feb -
12
'Koopmansadviezen' , 13 , 64-65, 85 .
73
O n the four-year stoppage of the river trade between Dutch territory and Germany, see Israel, The
Dutch Republic. 217-223; on th e effect s o f this on th e distribution of Turkish products i n Europe, see
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I, 557-559 and 'Koopmansadviezen' , 65: 'Wat de
Levantsche negotie belanght, die vervalt va n sic h selffs , doorda t d e Persische ende Suratse waren, die
daerover plachten te comen, ons van anderen wegen worden toegevoert doch de grove waren, van daer
comende, sij n hie r nu al s i n eene n sack, vermit s d e licente n geslote n ende betercoo p ove r Italie n in
Duytslandt en elders daer se getrocken worden, connen gebracht worden. '
74
Renz o Paci , L a 'Scala' di Spalalo e il comercio veneziano nei Balcanifra cinque e seicento (Venice
1971) 106-111 ; Venetian trade with Constantinople and Salonik a through the Dalmatian ports was at its
height in the 1620 s and 1630s .
75
Bronnen tot d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel I , 533, 559-560.
76
Simon e Luzzato, Discorso circa il stato d e gl'hebrei e t i n particolar dimoranti nett' ínclita cilla d i
Venetia (Venic e 1638 ) fo. 17 ; Sella, Commerci e industrie, 53-54.
77
Roberts , Marchants Mapp, 128-129 , 139, 141.
78
Britis h Librar y MS. Add. 10130 , fo. 79v ('Relazione della cittá e República di Venezia').
79
GA A N A 1532 , fos . 35, 74. 16 9 e.v.
80
Bromen to t d e geschiedenis va n den Levanlschen handel I, 1075 .
ruary 1649 , the English Levant Company was so alarmed by the sudden upsurge in
Dutch activity , so conscious tha t th e Dutch no w enjoyed lower costs an d readie r
access t o Spanis h silve r than th e English , that it s directors feare d that th e entir e
English position i n the Near Eas t was in danger o f imminent collapse.81 A furthe r
unmistakeable symptom of the radical turn-abou t which took plac e i n 1645- 7 was
the resumptio n (a s had happene d previousl y only before 1621 ) in the shippin g of
commercial quantities of Turkish products from Holland to England. 82 And simul-
taneously with th e revival i n Dutch sea-born e trade with th e Levant, there was a
marked expansio n i n Dutc h overlan d trad e wit h Ital y vi a Frankfur t an d Augs -
burg.83 Greatly increased quantities of Dutch and Dutch Eas t Indies products were
now reaching Italy by land, stimulated by the end of the Thirty Years' Wa r in Ger-
many as well as by the blockin g of Venetian exports t o th e Balkans . And thi s tre-
mendous recover y in Dutch trad e with Italy and the Levant b y sea and land was to
be sustained. This was the beginning of the most flourishing period in the history of
Dutch Mediterranean trad e and it was to last down to the late 1680s. 'Avec le milieu
du XVIIe siècle', asserted Braude l about the changing balance of commercial power
in th e Mediterranean, 'l a roue du sor t va tourner contre l a Hollande'. 84 He could
not hav e been more wrong.
The vigorous expansion of Dutch Mediterranea n trad e in the post-1645 perio d
offers a number o f parallels with the earlier expansion of the Twelve Years' Truce .
As before, larg e numbers o f Dutch ship s began t o frequen t the ports o f southern
and easter n Spain. 85 As before, i t became customar y fo r Dutc h vessel s to collec t
large quantities of silver bullion at Cadiz, Sa n Lúcar , Málag a an d Alicante which
they then carried o n to Genoa, Livorno, Venice and Smyrn a where what was to be
the main Dutch merchan t colony in Turkey was established a t this time. With this
silver the Dutch wer e able to pay for part o f their purchases o f silks, mohairs an d
cottons. Similarly , where the Dutc h ha d bee n th e chief carriers o f Baltic , Sicilian
and Puglian grai n t o Valencia and other parts of eastern Spain durin g phase two ,
they now resumed tha t role in phase fou r (1645-88). 8f) But it would be wrong to see
the fourt h and mos t successfu l phase i n the evolutio n of the Dutc h straatvaart a s
essentially a repetitio n o f phas e two . There wer e in fac t majo r difference s i n th e
structure, that is the form, pattern and organization, of Dutch Mediterranea n trad e
in the two periods. During the second phase , Dutch enterprise in the Mediterranean
had show n great vigou r but als o grav e limitations . Most notabl y the Dutc h ha d
proved unable to sell their manufactures in any quantity and (except for cotton) had
not bee n majo r consumer s o f raw materials from the Mediterranea n area . Dutc h
merchants ha d exporte d som e line n an d Leide n say s t o Ital y an d bough t som e
Venetian clot h t o sel l i n Turkey . Bu t basicall y the Dutc h ha d relie d on Spanis h
81
Calendar of Stale Papers. Domestic 1649-50, 12 .
82
Ibidem .
83
Friedric h Blendinger , 'Augsburge r Hande l i m Dreissigja'hrige n Krieg' , in : Winschaftskrafte und
Wirtschaflswege II , 304 , 308 .
84
Braudel , La Méditerranée I , 572-573 .
K
Israel , Th e Dutch Republic, 416-423 .
86
O f twenty-nin e Dutch ship s captured b y Barbary corsairs i n the western Mediterranean betwee n
September 166 2 and Decembe r 1663 , eight were carrying grain from Sardinia , Sicily or Puglia to Spain,
see H. Brugmans éd. 'De notule n en monumenten van het College van Commercie te Amsterdam. 1663 -
1665', Bijdragen e n Mededelingen va n het Historisch Genootschap 1 8 (1897) 307-310 .
silver to settle their purchases i n the Levant. 87
All thi s no w changed . Afte r 1645 , th e Dutc h Republi c emerge d muc h mor e
strongly in the international arena a s a producer o f industrial goods than before. 88
It was in the second half of the seventeenth century that the Dutch reached th e peak
of thei r succes s in earl y modern time s as a n industria l powe r an d whil e thi s also
changed th e character o f Dutch trad e wit h many parts of northern Europe, now -
here is this more evident than in the Republic's relationship to the Mediterranea n
world. Peace with th e Spanish Netherland s meant tha t more Flemish line n could
now b e bleached a t Haarle m an d shippe d fro m Hollan d to Italy ; and ther e is no
doubt tha t linens now rivalled 'says' a s the most importan t Dutch manufacture d
product exported to Italy.89 With the Venetian camlet industry in a state of collapse,
Leiden now began to produce large quantities of fine camlets (greinen) woven from
Turkish mohair. 90 Most importan t of all, the Dutch now succeeded i n ousting the
English almos t completel y fro m th e buyin g up an d shippin g of Spanis h wools. 91
This assured Hollan d effectiv e contro l over southern Europe' s mos t valuable raw
material. From 1645-buildin g on the collapse of Venice's cloth exports to Turkey
- Leide n emerged as Europe's leadin g producer o f fine woollen cloth (lakens) and
this proved t o be the key to a greatly expanded rol e in the Levant. Leiden's output
of fine woollens rose sharply in the late 1640s and rarely dipped below 17,000 pieces
yearly durin g th e res t o f th e century. 92 An d a hig h proportio n o f Leiden' s tota l
output, in some years as much as a third, was destined for the Levant. After 1650 ,
Leiden's burgomaster s were always acutely aware tha t Turkey was of paramoun t
importance t o th e prosperit y an d well-bein g of thei r city. 93 Jus t a s high-quality
woollen cloth, made from Spanis h wool, had bee n th e basis of Venetian pre-emi-
nence in the Levant trade in the sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the seven-
teenth, so it became the basis of the new Dutch bid for preponderance i n the Levant
in the years 1647-88 when Holland's Mediterranea n trad e was at its height.
But Englis h cloth export s als o benefite d from th e collaps e o f Venice' s textil e
industries during the 1645-6 9 Turkish war. From 6,00 0 long and shortcloths yearl y
in the 1630s , the total rose to ten to twelve thousand in the 1660s. 94 In 1669 , admit-
tedly an exceptional year for the English Levant trade, 13,98 0 pieces were exported
to Turkey, mainly to Smyrn a and Aleppo. 95 In 1663 , 12,190 long and shortcloth s
87
AC V CS M 1s t serie s vol . 143 , fo . 48 ; Berchet , Relazioni, 158-159 ; Van Dillen , Va n Rijkdom e n
regenten, 76 .
88
Eve n thos e scholar s wh o maintai n tha t th e Dutc h econom y i n genera l wa s stagnatin g b y 165 0
accept tha t ke y sectors of industry expande d fo r some decades afte r tha t date, see , fo r instance , P.W .
Klein, 'De zeventiende eeuw , 1585-1700 ' in : J.H. va n Stuijvenberg éd., De economische geschiedenis van
Nederland (Groninge n 1977)97-100 , 108 .
89
Wàtjen , Niederlander l m Millelmeergebiel, 355-35 9 et seq; Blendinger, 'Augsburger Handel', 304 -
308.
90
N.W . Posthumus , D e geschiedenis va n de Leidsche lakenindustrie. 3 vols. (Th e Hagu e 1908-1939 )
III, 272-279 .
51
Aggrieve d Englis h merchant s complained tha t withi n a yea r o r tw o of the Dutch-Spanish Peac e
(1648), th e Dutch wer e shipping fou r time s a s much Spanis h woo l as the English , th e Englis h havin g
controlled th e trad e since 163 0 dow n to 1647 , se e A Brief Narration o f th e Present State of the Bilbao
Trade (London 1650 ) 1-2,9 ; Israel, Th e Dutch Republic, 412, 420 .
92
Posthumus , Geschiedenis va n de Leidsche lakenindustrie II , 930 , 932 .
93
See , for instance, the resolution of the Leiden burgomasters and vroedschap of 18 December 1668 in
Bronnen to t de geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel II, 69 .
94
Britis h Librar y M S Add. 36785 , fo . 33; Roberts, Marchants Mapp, 139 .
95
Britis h Librar y M S Add. 36785 , fos. 6, 33.
accounted for £ 163,61 0 out of £ 167,661 worth of English manufactures exported
to Turkey. Bu t the marked strengthenin g o f the English Levant trade durin g the
middle decades o f the seventeenth century was acheived wholly at the expens e of
Venice and France. Ralph Davis was mistaken in supposing that England was gai-
ning also on the Dutch. Durin g th e third quarter of the century, exports of Leiden
lakens t o Smyrna , where the Dutc h re-establishe d thei r factor y in 1651, 96 and t o
Aleppo (which, however, now increasingly took secon d plac e to Smyrna ) rose to
around si x thousand pieces yearly, these so-called halve lakens being nearly as long
as th e Englis h lon g cloths. 97 Thi s i n itsel f represents nearl y half th e quantit y o f
England's cloth exports to the Ottoman territory. But then we must remember that
the Dutc h produc t wa s a finer cloth, manufacture d from costlie r wools, and fet-
ching a higher price.98 From 164 5 down to the 1690s , it was a fact of commercial life
in the Levant that Dutch and not English cloth was the western product most highly
esteemed b y th e Turks. 99 Leiden lakens cornered th e uppe r en d o f th e Ottoma n
market. And if Dutch cloth exports to Turkey by sea fell off more sharply than the
English during the second, and especially the third Anglo-Dutch War ( 1672-74), the
Dutch partiall y countered thi s by stock-piling at Livorno and Smyrn a and by cir-
cumventing Venice's ba n on the passage of foreign woollens overland throug h he r
territories.100
During the most successful phase of the Dutch straatvaart, from 164 5 to 168 8 the
value of Dutch woolle n cloth exporte d to Turkey, we can assert with some confi-
dence, was equivalent to between half and two-third s of the value of English cloth
exports. I t migh t seem tha t thi s still lef t th e Englis h with th e uppe r hand . Bu t if
relatively few lakens perculated by the overland route, through Venice and Ancona,
into th e Turkish Balkans , and t o Constantinople , ther e was no suc h ba n o n th e
passage of Dutch linens and we know that substantial quantities were passing over-
land vi a Italy into the Balkans. 101 And the n on to p o f this the Dutc h ha d a much
%
O n th e re-establishment o f the Dutc h merchan t colon y a t Smyrna , se e Calendar of State Papers.
Domestic, 1651, 290-291 ; an d als o Ja n Wille m Samberg , D e hoüandsche gereformeerde gemeente t e
Smirna. De geschiedenis eener handelskerk (Leide n 1928 ) 28, 31.
97
Va n Dillen was certainly mistaken in accepting Savary' s estimate that around 167 0 the Dutch wer e
supplying only around 2,00 0 or 2,500 lakens to the Levant yearly, Van Dillen, Va n Rijkdom e n regenten,
78; contemporary Dutch an d English sources establish that the main Dutch Smyrna convoy in the 1660s
usually carried fou r t o five thousand lakens . Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel II ,
98-98, 303 ; a n Englis h report tell s us tha t th e outward-boun d Dutc h Smyrn a convoy whic h reache d
Livorno in January 166 9 carried 4,589 tokens beside s some camlets, se e PRO S P 98/10, fo. 26 ; on th e
second annual convoy, I assume that there were at least another 1,00 0 lakens; thus, I agree with Masson's
statement about the Dutch a t the height of their Levant trade: 'les Hollandais portaient dan s le Levant
quantité d'épiceries mais surtout 6,000 ou 7,50 0 pièce s de leurs draps', Masson, Histoire d u commerce
français dans le Levant a u XVIle siècle, 126 ; o n th e length s of the Englis h and Dutc h pieces , se e Post-
humus, op . cit . ii , 940, not e 4 and B.E . Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change i n England, ¡600-1642
(Cambridge 1964 ) 257-258.
98
Posthumu s values Leidens halve lakens in the 1640 s at 19 0 guilders each wher e the average value of
English cloths in the 1660 s was 15 0 guilders; on thi s basis, the 6,000 lakens shipped yearl y to Turkey in
this period wer e worth som e 1,150,00 0 guilders or £ 105,000 , Posthumus, Geschiedenis van de Leidsche
lakenindustrie II , 940-941.
'9 Sella , Commerci e industrie, 64.
100
I n a matter of months before the outbreak o f war wit h France an d Englan d in 1672 , Dutch mer -
chants shipped t o Smyrna on two convoys some 14,00 0 lakens which in English terms were worth nearly
a quarter o f a million pounds , see PRO S P 99/51, fo. 158 . Doddingto n t o Williamson, Venice, 8 April
1672.
101
Paci , 'Scala'di Spalalo, 117-118;seeals o J.G. van Bel, De linnenhandel van Amsterdam inde XVIlIe
eeuw (Amsterdam 1940)69-70 .
larger shar e of the trade in pepper and spices to both Ital y and Turkey, an d in the
flow of Spanish silver . The English did export som e silver to Turkey t o boost their
purchases o f levant goods; bu t it is striking that such silver partly, or perhaps even
mostly, consisted o f Dutch leeuwendaalders-a silve r coin minte d i n Holland spe -
cially for the Near East-which had first to be specially imported int o England fro m
Holland.102 All considered, th e Dutch havin g a lively transit trad e throug h Venic e
and Ancon a whic h the English did not, 103 there would see m t o be no grounds fo r
supposing tha t in this period th e English Levant trade surpassed tha t of the Dutch ,
let alone for accepting Ralp h Davis ' clai m that 'Englan d was.. . fo r several decade s
in th e middl e o f th e seventeent h century.. . muc h th e larges t wester n trade r wit h
Turkey'.104 As for his assertions tha t the Dutch Levan t trade 'declined rapidly afte r
1660' and that 'France was the only country whose seaborne trad e with the Levant
rivalled England' s i n th e seventeent h and mos t o f th e eighteent h century', thes e
would see m t o b e totally at varianc e wit h the evidence. Fa r mor e realisti c are the
contemporary Frenc h assessment s o f the position whic h include a valuable statis -
tical survey of exports fro m Smyrna to th e west in the year 1687.'° 5 This confirms
that in the 1680 s the Dutch wer e the only serious rivals to the English and tha t the
French stil l then lagged far behind .
Table 5 Th e value of goods shipped from Smyrna t o the West i n ¡687 (i n piastres)
Destination Value
England 1,300,00 0
Holland 1,100,00 0
France 254,45 0
Venice 79,86 0
If during phase four (1647-1688) the English seaborne trade to Turkey exceeded
the Dutch b y something like a ratio of around five to four106 which was offset by the
102
G.F. Abbott, Under th e Turk i n Constantinople. A Record of Si r John Finch's Embassy, 1674-1681
(London 1920 ) 237-238; Arthur Attman, Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550-1800 (Göte-
borgI983)38-39.
103
Eve n Sir John Finch who liked to boast that the English Levant trade was 'ten times as great as that
of Holland' admitted that 'a t Venic e allmost all English business e is either in Italian or Dutch hands',
PRO S P 98/5. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 1 3 June 1665 and SP 98/9, fos. 230,277. Finch to Arlington,
Florence, 3 July and 1 9 August 1668 .
104
Davis , 'English Imports from th e Middle East', 203.
105
F . Braudel , P . Jeannin , J. Meuvre t an d R . Romano , 'L e décli n de Venise au XVll e siècle' , in:
Aspeiii e cause délia decadenza económica veneziana, 59-61 ; Colbert, for his part, clearly believed that the
Dutch Levan t trade far surpassed that of the English, a judgment he based on data obtained for him by
the French ambassador in Holland, see Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV. G.B .
Depping éd. 4 vols. (Paris 1850-1855 ) III, 348-349; Simon Elzinga, Het voorspel va n den oorlog van 1672.
De economisch-politieke betrekkingen tusschen Frankrijk e n Nederland i n dejaren I666-I672 (Haarlem
1926) 119-120 ; the Frenc h envoy sent t o Constantinopl e in 167 0 was tol d i n his instructions that alto-
gether the western trading nations were then shipping out 20 million livres worth of goods from Ottoman
territory yearly, of which the Dutch were considered to b e taking more than half, te n or eleven millions
worth, the English a mere one third of this, and th e Venetians most of the rest, but these figures certainly
give an exaggerate d picture of the Dutc h role, see Recueil des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs et
minisires de France depuis le s traités de Westphalie jusqu'à l a Révolution Française 29 , Turquie. Pierr e
Duparced. (Paris 1969)71 .
106
Se e agai n Tabl e 5 an d als o th e figure s i n Tongas , Le s relations de l a France avec l'Empire
Ottoman. 208-209.
Dutch share in the overland trade, via Venice, Ancona, Ragusa an d Split, to Con -
stantinople and Salonika, thi s does still mean that Dutch trad e with the Levant was
relatively weak, weaker than in most other major sectors of world commerce. This is
especially noteworthy in that the Levant trade can in some respects be said to have
been more vital to the Dutch Republic than to England. Turkey was probably th e
single larges t marke t fo r Leide n lakens. Th e Levan t wa s th e onl y sourc e o f th e
mohair yarns , spu n fro m th e hai r o f th e Angor a goa t i n th e village s of western
Anatolia, which were the indispensable raw material for what was the second mos t
important textile branch a t Leiden from the 1640 s down to the mid eighteenth cen-
tury. 107 In the 1650s , there were some 9,000 men and women engaged in the manu-
facture of camlets at Leiden, compared with 14,000 in the M:e«-industry and 7,000
producing says. As late as the 1690s, by which time the Leiden camlet industry was
past its prime, it was reckoned tha t Holland consume d som e two-third s of all the
mohair yar n exporte d fro m Turkey , mostl y a t Leide n bu t als o a t Haarle m an d
Amsterdam.108 An d the n i t i s als o clea r tha t th e Dutc h sil k industry , base d a t
Haarlem an d Amsterdam , gre w faster tha n th e Englis h from th e 1650 s onward s
when Hollan d bega n t o dra w of f a larg e proportio n o f th e skille d work-forc e
engaged in silk manufacture at Antwerp. 109 By the end of the century, surprisingly
large quantities of Dutch finishe d as well as 'thrown' silk were being exported from
Holland t o England as well as to other Europea n markets. 110
The explanation fo r the relative weakness of the Dutch Levan t trade would cer-
tainly seem to li e in the fact that through th e later seventeenth centur y (as well as
earlier) th e Dutc h Eas t Indi a Company , unlik e its Englis h rival, imported larg e
quantities of Asia n ra w silk round th e Cape. Beside s Chinese and , late r on . als o
Bengali silk, the VOC continued t o ship sizeable quantities of Persian sil k albeit not
in such massive amounts as during the decade 1635-45.' n Adde d to this, there was
throughout a substantial flow of Persian and Armenian silks across the Caspian sea
to Moscow , fro m wher e Dutc h merchant s sen t them , vi a Archangel , t o
Amsterdam. 112 While little or n o sil k reache d Englan d from Russia , silks shipped
from Archange l were constantly influencing suppl y and deman d fo r sil k i n Hol -
land. Thus , structurally , there wer e majo r difference s betwee n th e Dutc h an d
English Levan t trades . Th e importin g of silk s fro m Smyrn a an d Alepp o b y th e
Dutch was essentially a marginal activity designed to supplement stocks pouring in
from Asi a and Russia . The main Dutch Smyrn a convoy sailed late in the year and
could not sail until it was known how much silk was arriving on the VOC ships and
the returning Russia convoy. ' '3 The 'directors' o f the Dutch Levant Trade resolve d
in Septembe r 1686 , fo r example , tha t th e dat e fo r th e sailin g of th e Novembe r
107
Posthumus , Geschiedend va n de Leidsche lakenindustrie II , 937 , 939 , 941 ; i n 1665 , the valu e of
Leiden's total camlet output, in that year at a peak of just over 3 million guilders, even slightly exceeded
that of her lakens.
108
Se e th e 'Memorie ' writte n i n th e yea r 170 0 i n Bronnen tut d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen
handel II , 305-306 ; tota ! annual exports of Turkish mohair wer e then estimated a t 600,00 0 pounds i n
weight worth £ 141,000 .
109
A.K.L . Thijs, De zijdenijverheid te Antwerpen i n de zeventiende eeuw (Brussels 1969 ) 100-101 .
110
Ott o Pringsheim , Beitrage zur wirtschaftlichen Entwickelungsgeschichte de r vereinigten Nieder-
lande im 17. und 18 . Jahrhundert (Leipzi g 1890 ) 33.
111
Kristo f Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740 (Copenhagen an d Th e Hagu e 1958 ) 127-128.
112
AR H Levants e Handel vol. 1,256 . res. 1 8 October 166 2 and vol . 6, res, 24 January 1685.
113
Ibidem ; Bronnen tol de geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzié'}, 528 , 564, 612.
j54 Empires an d Entrepots
convoy for Smyrna would be fixed, and announce d a t the Amsterdam Bourse , 'a s
soon as the date of the auction of the East India Company's goods is announced'. l' 4
If the importing o f silks from Turkey was at botto m marginal , th e essence o f the
Dutch Levan t trade was the exchange of lakens for mohair yarns.115 Meanwhile the
essence of the English trade was the exchange of cloth for Persian raw silks. While
both th e Dutc h an d th e Englis h focused mor e an d mor e o n Smyrn a rather tha n
Aleppo, afte r 1651 , an d whil e bot h continue d t o pl y som e trad e wit h Aleppo ,
through Iskanderun, it does seem that the Dutch trade was even more concentrated
on Smyrn a tha n th e Englis h which i s perhaps attributabl e t o th e greate r rol e o f
Anatolian yarns in their commerce.116
According to Frenc h estimates , reporte d b y Masson, Dutc h purchase s of Tur -
kish mohai r yam s i n th e late r seventeent h centur y wer e frequentl y a s hig h a s
300,000 Ib or 1,50 0 bales yearly.117 Dutch figures for the 1690 s show us that at that
time thei r purchases wer e sometimes far higher . I n Septembe r 1699 , for instance
there were reportedly 4,000 bales of mohair yarn stockpiled in Amsterdam of which
2,760 bales had arrive d on Dutch ship s from Smyrn a and Livorn o in the previous
nine months.118 It is true that earlier on, notably in the 1660s , the English seem t o
have had a much large r shar e of the trade in mohair yarns. Bu t the relatively hig h
figure o f 267,48 7 Ib, or 1,34 0 bales, reportedly imported t o Londo n i n 166 3 doe s
seem to have been wholl y exceptional." 9 At any rate the corresponding figur e fo r
1669, which we know to have been an unusuall y good on e for th e English Levant
trade, was down to 186,37 2 Ib of 930 bales.120 The lo w figure of only 126,469 Ib of
mohair yarn imported to Amsterdam i n 166 8 can not be considered representative
as this we know to have been an exceptionally poor yea r for the Dutch. 121
The Dutc h Levan t trad e diverge d structurall y from th e Englis h als o i n bein g
much mor e closel y linke d t o Spai n an d Italy . Th e Englis h Levan t Company' s
sphere of activity was legally confined to the Levant proper. Bu t the Dutch Levan t
trade was so closely connected t o the 'rich trades' of Spain and Italy, that there was
no way of separating the different section s of Dutch Mediterranea n trade admini-
stratively. The directors o f the Dutch Levan t Trade were responsible for, and col -
lected a toll known as lastgeld, from all Dutch shipping entering the Mediterranean.
It is sometimes argued that because the Dutch were forced to use larger, morehea -
vily arme d ship s i n th e Mediterranea n tha n wa s thei r wont o n thei r othe r trad e
114
AR H Levants e Handel vol . 6, res, 1 1 September 1686 .
115
Bronnen tot d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel II , 306 : '...sijnd e buyte n ail e twijffe l d e
verhandelinge van de Hollandtsche lakenen tegen s de Turxsche garens he t voornaamste va n de Neder-
landschen hande l o p dése plaetse va n Smyrna. '
1 6
' Eve n so , as late as the 1680s , sections of the Dutc h Smyrn a convoy s di d regularl y calle at Iskan -
derun, o r 'Scanderoon' as the English called it , see, fo r instance, ARH Levants e Hande l 6, res. 9 April
1687; in collecting a forced loa n o n wester n merchants , i n 1685 , the Turkish governmen t estimate d tha t
seven tenth s o f western commerc e wa s concentrated a t Smyrna , one tenth a t Constantinople , an d on e
fifth at Aleppo-Iskanderun .
' '7 Masson , Histoire du commerce français dans ¡e Levant au XVlIe siècle, 126 .
1 8
' Bronnen to l d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel II , 102-103 .
119
Britis h Librar y MS.Add. 36785 , fo . 21 .
120
Ibidem , fo . 47; PRO SP 98/10, fo . 177 . Dethick t o Williamson, Livorno , 1 6 May 1669 .
121
W e also kno w tha t i n 1668 , Dutc h merchant s had , throug h specia l circumstances , t o shi p a large
part o f thei r Levan t good s bac k o n Englis h ships , PR O S P 98/10. Finc h t o Arlington , Livorno , 14
January 1669 ; se e H. Brugmans , 'Statistie k va n den in - en uitvoer van Amsterdam, 1 October 166 7 - 30
September 1668' , Bijdragen e n Mededelingen va n het Historisch Genootschap 1 9 (1898) 141 .
routes they thereby lost their usual advantage of cheap shipping. 122 But this is cer-
tainly wrong as far as the most successful phase of the Dutch Mediterranea n trad e is
concerned. Piete r d e l a Cour t ascribe d wha t h e sa w as Dutc h supremac y i n th e
Mediterranean specificall y to the greater size and securit y of the Dutch ship s and
their naval escorts.123 It was the size and reliability of the Dutch ships , he believed,
which attracted the custom of the Genoese, Livornese, Armenian, and Jewish midd-
lemen of the Mediterranean. Th e English had replaced th e Dutch a s the main car -
riers between Spai n an d Ital y during the Thirty Years' War. 124 But even Sir John
Finch never one to praise Dutch methods if he could help it had to admit that it had
not taken the Dutch lon g to regain control of the traffic afte r 1647. 'The reaso n is' ,
as he put it
'the Dutch , observing that all forraigners gav e greate r freight s t o ou r ship s than theirs , by
reason of the goodnesse of our vessels, they , partly for their own security, against th e Barbary
Coast, partly to invite forraigners to load on their vessels, send out a yearly convoy to protect
theyr ships which take s up all the Spanish mony and fine goods from Spay n for Italy, fro m
Italy for the Levant and agayn from the Levant fo r Italy and from Italy for Spayne and in this
trade they employ theyr men of warr.'125
In fact, during the successful fourth phase of Holland's Mediterranea n trad e ther e
were usually two of these heavily armed an d escorte d convoy s each year, a larger
autumn convo y whic h saile d afte r th e arriva l o f th e returnin g VOC an d Russi a
convoys and a smaller spring fleet. In peace time , these were both usually escorted
by two warships. In 1662 , for example, the smaller con voy-two 'great ships ' an d
two warships-arrived at Smyrn a on 1 2 June and the larger-five 'grea t ships ' an d
two warships on 1 0 November; in addition, te n other Dutch vessel s arrived singly
that yea r a t Smyrn a fro m Livorn o an d Venice. 126 Clearl y b y n o mean s al l th e
valuable goods transported acros s th e Mediterranean by the Dutch went in convoy
and, despit e th e convoys , ther e wer e some spectacula r losses . On e o f th e Dutc h
vessels captured b y Barbary pirates in 1662, sailing from Cadi z to Genoa, wa s car-
rying 140 bales of Spanish wool, 50,000 silver pieces of eight, and other merchandise
the whol e cargo bein g worth 195,00 0 guilders. 127 As tim e went on , thes e Dutc h
'great ships ' a s well as the warships were more and more heavily armed. The main
convoy which returned fro m Smyrn a t o Amsterda m i n the summe r o f 166 5 con -
sisted of seven vessels with from twenty to twenty-eight gun s apiece, escorted by two
warships.128 The spring convoy of 1685 consisted o f four 'great ships ' of forty gun s
apiece.129 Three 'grea t ships ' sailing from Amsterdam to Livorno in May 169 0 car-
ried fifty-four, forty, an d thirty-fou r gun s respectively and togethe r were manned
by about 25 0 men.130
122
Davis , 'Influences d e l'Angleterre' , 216, 219; Ralph Davis, Th e Rise of th e Atlantic Economies
Ithaca and Ne w York 1973) 183 .
123
Piete r de la Court, Interest va n Holland ofte Gronden va n Hollands Welvaren (Amsterda m 1662)
62.124
'Koopmansadviezen' , 51, 65.
125
PR O S P 98/8. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 1 3 June 1667.
126
AR H Levants e Handel vol. 122: 'Notitie van schepe n in Smirna gearriveert en vertrocken anno
1662'.
127
128
Brugmans , 'Notulen en monumenten', 308.
PR O S P 94/49, fos. 22, 69.
129
130
AR H Levants e Handel vol. 6, res. 14 February 1685.
AR H Levants e Handel vol. 7, res. 2 May 1690.
In the years after 1670 , when the third of the Dutch Levant Trade chambers was
set up at Rotterdam , some of the smaller convoys were referred t o as 'Rotterdam '
convoys and som e sort o f division of labour betwee n Amsterdam and Rotterda m
does see m to hav e evolved. 131 Certainl y Rotterdam cam e t o play a n increasingly
significant part in the Dutch Levant trade in the last third of the century whilst the
second chamber, that of the North Hollan d ports, lodged at Hoorn, with represen-
tatives from Hoorn , Enkhuizen and Medemblick, steadily waned in importance.132
The fortunes of Hoorn's straatvaart diverged markedly from thos e of Amsterdam
and Rotterdam because it consisted almost entirely of shipping Baltic grain to Italy,
an activit y whic h became les s an d les s important fro m th e lat e 1650 s onwards.
Meanwhile, there was also an up-and-coming involvement, at least in the western
Mediterranean, on th e part o f Zeeland merchant s and eventually , in 1690 , it was
decided to set up a fourth Levant Trade Chamber, a t Middelburg. 133
If the Dutc h an d Englis h Levan t trade s o f the seventeent h century reveal pro -
found difference s of structure, the same is true of these nations' traffic t o Italy and
the Venetian stato del mar. Here again , ra w silk s played a crucial role . Englan d
imported somewha t les s sil k fro m Ital y tha n fro m Turkey ; nevertheless , silks
formed nearly half the total value of England's imports from Ital y and provided the
basis of her Italian trade. I n the 1660s , for example, London merchants imported
roughly hal f th e quantit y of sil k (130,0001b ) fro m Ital y tha t the y shippe d fro m
Turkey and practically nothing direct from Persi a or the Far East , giving a grand
total o f som e 400,000 I b yearly. 134 The Dutc h b y contrast wer e shipping in over
200,000 Ib yearly fro m Persia , China , and Benga l on their East Indi a ships and a
substantial quantity, certainly not less than 50,000 Ib yearly, from Archangel . On
top of this, Amsterdam continued to receive sizeable amounts of silk from northern
Italy overland , vi a Augsbur g and Frankfurt , while the governmen t in Brussel s
encouraged th e Antwer p silk industr y to impor t it s ra w sil k overlan d from Ital y
rather than by sea, in Dutch ships, by offering special fiscal concessions.135 All con-
sidered, therefore, it is not surprising that Holland's import s of raw silk from Italy
by sea tended to be much smaller than England's. 136
There were indeed also other strands of Italian trade heavil y dominated b y th e
English even while Holland's Mediterranean trade was at its height. Partly this was
a matte r of patterns of consumption in the home market and partl y of division of
labour wit h the Dutch . Whil e Rotterdam and Amsterda m largely controlled th e
131
See , fo r instance , PR O S P 98/13, fo . 90. Dethick t o Williamson , Livorno, 2 1 Jun e 1671 ; on th e
establishing of the Rotterdam chamber which included representative s from Leiden an d Dordrecht, see
ARM Levantse Handel vol. 292, I ; and D.W . Canneman, Dissertalio histarico-oeconomico-polilica inau-
guralis de Batavorum mercatura Levantica (The Hagu e 1839 ) 59-60; officially th e Rotterda m director s
were style d 'Directeure n va n de n Levantsche n hande l e n navigati e in d e Middelandsch e ze e o p d e
Maze'.
132
O n the Hoorn chambe r see ARH Levants e Handel 292, res. SG 1 0 March 1644 ; Canneman, Dis-
sertatio, 62-63; down t o the 1650s , in years when grain prices i n Italy were high , Hoorn's role was cer -
tainly substantial; thus, in 164 6 when some sixty-six vessels sailed from Amsterdam fo r the Mediterra -
nean, a t leas t anothe r thirt y sailed fro m Hoorn , se e Bronnen to t d e geschiedenis va n den Levantschen
handel\, 152.
133
Canneman , Dissertatio, 64-65.
134
Britis h Librar y Add . M s 36785 , fos . 26v-27 ; Davis , 'Englis h Import s fro m th e Middl e East '
199.
135
Thijs , De zijdenijverheid t e Antwerpen, 3-4 .
136
Amer e 34, 3251bin 1646 and scarcel y more in \667l8,see'W :d\)en,NiederlanderimMittelmeerge-
biet, 256; Brugmans, 'Statistiek', 141 .
distribution of French an d Rhenish wines to northern Europe, they tended to ship
relatively littl e win e fro m th e Mediterranea n a t an y rat e unti l afte r 1672 . Th e
English, by contrast, shipped remarkably little French or German win e but sizeable
quantities of southern wines, in the third quarter of the century, mainly from Spain
and th e Canaries. I n the field of olive oil, the Dutch (afte r 1647 ) concentrated o n
Spanish oils, th e English on Puglian and Gallipol i oils. As Sir Josiah Chil d note d
'our country consumes within itself more of Spanish wines and fruit , Zant currans
and Levant oyls then any country in Europe'.137 Every year, whole fleets of English
ships, twenty together in February 166 5 for example, entered the Mediterranean t o
'load oils of Gallipoli an d Puglia and currans of Zante'.138 In the case of currants, it
was certainly the heavy demand at home which provided the key to English control.
According t o th e Englis h consu l a t Venice , in 1672 , it wa s especiall y England' s
women an d childre n wh o demande d Zant e currant s fo r thei r 'cake s an d mince -
pyes'.139
But on e simpl y ca n no t infe r a genera l Englis h ascendanc y i n Italia n trad e
between 164 7 and 168 8 fro m thes e specialise d strands . Eac h i n it s ow n wa y i s a
special case . Ther e wer e other sector s o f Italian trade , involvin g bot h bulk y and
valuable merchandise wher e Dutch preponderance i s just as obvious. Ric e from the
Po valley, for instance, wa s imported i n only small amounts into England but was
carried in some quantit y by the Dutch bot h t o Spai n an d t o northern Europe . I n
1646, 2,534,06 0 I b o f Italia n rice , wort h £ 30,000, wer e imported t o Amsterda m
compared wit h only one fifth of this amount importe d into England in 1663. 140 In
1646, Amsterda m importe d 55,05 0 I b o f Idria n quicksilve r compared wit h fa r
smaller quantitie s shippe d t o England ; i n th e lat e seventeent h century , Hollan d
exercised a virtual stranglehold over the distribution of Idrian quicksilver. 141 An d
then, of course, th e Dutch virtuall y monopolised th e shipping not just of grain to
Italy but o f Baltic naval stores, gunpowder , copper , and Russia n product s inclu -
ding caviare, most of which, as we have seen, was distributed from Livorno. On to p
of this we must tak e int o account th e enormous scal e o f Dutch peppe r an d spic e
consignments to Italy, Turkey, and Spain. In 1646, pepper and spices valued at over
£ 60,000 accounte d fo r mor e tha n a quarte r o f the valu e of all Dutch export s t o
Italy.142 The Dutc h Smyrn a convoy, six 'great ships ' an d tw o men of war, which
reached Livorn o in September 1670 , carried beside s cloth, Spanish silver, and colo -
nial dyestuffs, no less than 595,000 I b of pepper, in 1,700 bales, a quantity represen-
ting nearly ten per cent of Europe's total annual pepper consumption. 143 As a rule,
the value of England's imports from Italy, boosted b y the high cost of silk, greatly
exceeded th e valu e o f her export s t o Italy . Englan d seem s t o hav e run a rathe r
unfavourable balanc e o f trade with the centra l Mediterranean , caused largel y by
137
Si r Josiah Child , A Ne w Discourse of Trade (London 1693 ) preface.
138
PR O S P 98/5. Read to Bennet , Livorno, 1 4 February 166 5 and S P 98/11, fo. 17 . Dethick t o Wil-
liamson, Livorno, 19 May 1670 .
139
PR O S P 99/51. Doddington t o Arlington Venice , 11 March 1672 ; in 166 9 more than six times as
much Zante currant s wer e shippe d t o Londo n a s had reache d Amsterda m th e previous year , British
Library M S Add. 36785, fo . 47v; Brugmans, 'Statistiek', 144 .
140
Britis h Library M S Add. 36785 , fos . 26v-27 , 52v-53; Wâtjen, Niederlànder im Mittelmeergebiet,
255.
141
Ibidem .
142
Ibidem , 296.
143
PR O S P 98/11. Dethick t o Williamson, Livorno, 8 September 1670 .
the refusal of most of the Italian states to admit foreign woollen cloth.144 The Dutch
could no t sel l their lakens in Ital y either, excep t t o a smal l exten t i n Naples an d
Sicily. But they could and did sell to Italy large amounts of linen and camlets as well
as spices and Baltic products. I n short, ther e seems little doubt that the Dutch plied
a more evenly balanced commerc e wit h Italy than did their English rivals and tha t
the value of their exports t o Italy tended t o exceed thos e of England. I n 166 3 and
1669, Englis h export s t o Ital y (mostly 'new draperies' ) wer e worth £ 170,47 8 and
£250,209 respectively. 145 Dutc h export s jus t fro m Amsterda m b y se a t o Ital y
already reached £ 168,710 (1,855,815 guilders) as early as 164 6 and tha t is without
counting the value of the linens sent t o Geno a an d Venic e overland, th e Russia n
products shippe d direct from Archangel to Livorno, or the large grain shipments by
sea from Hoor n which, in 164 6 (even if much of the grain was rye) must have been
worth a t least another £ 40,000.146
The fifth and las t phas e i n the evolution o f the Dutch straatvaart durin g Hol -
land's golden ag e began wit h the outbreak o f the Nine Years' War (1689-98) and
continued dow n t o th e end o f th e Franco-Dutc h conflict , in 1713 . Braudel, wh o
denies th e impac t o f the Spanis h embargoe s i n the firs t hal f of th e century, also
assures us that the efforts of the French stat e to subvert Dutch trad e after 1667 were
largely or wholl y ineffective. 147 But , again, h e is simply wrong. This fifth phase is
characterised by relentless French pressur e whic h drastically weakened the straat-
vaart though, of course, Franc e coul d no t wholly undermine Dutch navigatio n t o
the Mediterranean .
But why , one asks , shoul d th e Nin e Years ' War , an d th e Wa r o f the Spanis h
Succession (1702-13) , have had a n altogethe r severe r an d longe r term impac t o n
Dutch Mediterranea n commerc e tha n th e three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-4, 1665-
67, and 1672-74 ) given that England surpassed Franc e as a maritime power? At first
glance this seems especially perplexing in that in the two later wars, England and the
United Province s wer e allied, th e maritim e power s possessin g togethe r a n over -
whelming naval superiority over France .
In fact, naval force was a relatively minor element in the situation. Down to 1688 ,
the economic factors buttressing the Dutch straatvaart- Leiden lakens, heavy home
demand fo r Turkis h yarns , an d Dutc h primac y i n Spanis h trade-ensure d rapi d
recovery fro m th e Republic' s maritim e wars . No r wa s Dutc h sea-born e trad e
always paralysed b y war. If the Dutch fared badly overall during th e first Anglo-
Dutch Wa r (1652-4) , the y won in the Mediterranean , shuttin g the Englis h out o f
southern Spai n an d blockadin g a n Englis h Smyrn a fleet in Livorno . I n Januar y
1653, the English Levant Company lamente d that for the present English Mediter-
ranean trad e wa s lost, th e 'Dutch by giving protection t o thei r merchants having
now totally gained the same to the dishonour an d losse of this nation'.148 Attempts
144
PR O SP 98/9, fos. 73,181, 241-42,330. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 5 March, 8 May, 24 July and
16 145
October 1668 .
Britis h Library MS Add, 36785, fos. 21, 38v.
146
AR H Levants e Handel 264, fos. 3v, 40; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I,
152; Wàtjen, Niederlânder i m Mittelmeergebiet, 355 .
147
Braudel , Civilisation matérielle III, 217-218.
148
PROSPL05/151,P . 183.
to retrieve the trapped fleet were crushed b y the Dutch in the battle off Livorno in
March 1653 . During the second Anglo-Dutc h Wa r (1665-67), there was deadlock in
the Mediterranean whic h temporarily paralyse d th e trade of both sides . Briefly , it
was the French wh o profited. But despite their 'now having the whole Levant trade'
in their grasp, exper t observer s o f the Mediterranean scen e knew that thi s French
predominance wa s built o n flimsy foundations and woul d vanish as soon as Hol -
land and England mad e peace. 149 For the French lacked manufactures suite d to the
Ottoman market .
Colbert, fo r his part, recognized tha t there could b e no sustained Frenc h break -
through in the Levant without first producing a French woolle n cloth of high qua -
lity and competitive price . Th e French driv e to undermine Anglo-Dutc h commer -
cial preponderance i n Ital y an d Turke y wa s certainly well underway b y th e lat e
1660s and ther e can be no question tha t th e initiative for this came no t fro m mer -
chants bu t fro m th e state . Dutc h skille d artisan s wer e brough t a t governmen t
expense t o Languedo c an d settle d a t th e tw o larges t clot h factorie s unde r roya l
protection, a t Sapte s an d Villenouvette , to adap t th e technical innovations which
had given Leiden lakens their edge in quality and price over Venetia n cloth.150 The
state helped th e cloth producers o f the Carcassonne regio n with procuring Spanis h
wool, by buying quantities of cloth and distributing them in Paris, with interest free
loans and by paying money incentives to Marseille merchants to export th e cloth to
Smyrna.151 B y 1670 , th e Languedo c woolle n industr y wa s certainl y producin g
'draps fins de toutes sortes de couleurs, aussi beaux et aussi fins que ceaux de Hol -
lande'.152 Bu t fo r man y years , th e quantitie s reachin g Smyrn a wer e to o smal l t o
make much impact. I n the four years 1667-1670 , only 859 Languedoc cloth s i n the
Dutch styl e were exported t o Turkey. And in the whole of the first seventeen years
of Colbert' s initiativ e (1666-1683 ) onl y 4,50 6 Languedo c fin e cloth s reache d
Smyrna.153 It was not unti l 1685-6 that large r quantitie s were sent an d tha t it was
reported t o Paris, fo r the first time, that sales of French cloth in Turkey were begin-
ning to eat significantly into sales of Leiden lakens.I54 All reports confirm that it was
the Dutc h primarily , rathe r tha n th e English , wh o suffere d fro m thi s growin g
French encroachment . B y 1698, Marseille merchants were selling 3,200 Languedo c
cloths yearl y in Turkey, value d a t around £ 64,000.155 By this date the Frenc h ha d
conquered somethin g lik e half of the former Dutc h clot h market i n th e Ottoma n
empire. Moreover , i n thei r attempts t o counte r th e threat, Dutc h merchant s ha d
been force d t o drastically cut their prices. 156
149
PR O SP 98/7. Chillingworth to Arlington, Livorno, 23 August 166 6 and Finc h to Arlington, Flo-
rence, 26 October 1666 .
150
Th e basi s of Leiden's superiority were technical innovations which were both labour-saving and
economical in use of wool, see P. Boissonade, 'Colbert, son système et les entreprises industrielles d'etat
en Languedoc (1661-1683)', Annales du Midi 1 4 (1902) 11-12.
151
Ibidem , 12-14; Correspondance administrative sous la règne de Louis XIVIII, 508 , 622-627, 643-
644; Elzinga, Eet voorspel, 126 .
152
Boissonade , 'Colbert', 12.
153
Ibidem , 16-17 .
154
Correspondance administrative sous le règne d e Louis XIV III , 650; Recueil des Ins/ructions, 29 ,
Turquie, 124.
155
Boissonade , 'Colbert, son système et les entreprises industrielles', 27.
156
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel II, 262, 303-304; Robert Paris, Histoire du
commerce de Marseille: Le Levant (1600-1789) (Pari s 1957 ) 544.
Thus th e outbrea k o f th e Nin e Years ' Wa r cam e just afte r th e initia l break -
through of Carcassonne Dutch style woollens on the Ottoman market. The insecure
conditions a t se a affected all parties, th e Dutc h bein g forced to consolidate thei r
Levant traffic int o one annual convoy which clearly had many disadvantages fro m
a commercial point of view.157 Marseille now had a distinct edge over Amsterdam
and London in that it was close enough to the Levant, and the Italian ports, to serve
as an entrepo t fo r th e growing volume of local neutra l shipping , chiefly Genoes e
and Livornese , which plied betwee n Ital y and th e Levant. 158 Marseill e was also a
convenient entrepo t fo r the Hanseatic shippin g which now carried Levan t good s
from souther n Franc e t o Spain and northern Europe .
As we see from Table 6;, the volum e of Dutc h shippin g entering theMediterra -
nean, as reflected in th e lastgeld returns, fell of f markedly during the Nine Years '
War whil e the brief recovery in 1698-9 9 was not sustained in 170 0 and 1701 . Then,
during the 1702-1 3 war, Dutch Mediterranea n trade, again encumbered with high
insurance costs an d a rigid convoy discipline, suffered a n even severer contraction
than during the previous war. The number o f Dutch merchant houses at Smyrna,
having risen from around fifteen in the mid 1650 s to about twenty-fiv e by 1688 now
steadily sank, reaching a nadir of only six or seven by 1719. 159
Table 6\Lastgeld returns and numbers o f Dutch ships entering th e Mediterranean i n 1645-48
and!689-1725m
Year Lastgeld ships Year Lastgeld ships
1645 8,701 (79) 1708 5,629 65

1646 10,480 (85) 1709 3,621 50
1647 12,124 (109) 1710 3,530 47
1648 12,980 (117) 1711 2,851 42
1689 (6,000) 1712 2,744 38
1690 (6,000) 1713 7,073 122
1694 20,511 1714 13,829 205
1697 6,567 60 1715 8,085 141
1698 16,577 147 1716 8,996
1699 17,144 180 1718 6,883
1700 9,701 105 1719 6,938
1701 6,725 88 1720 5,291
1702 4,757 50 1721 4,845
1703 2,284 16 1722 9,364
1704 3,638 33 1723 6,617
1705 3,347 35 1724 6,369
1706 5,298 56 1725 7,983
1707 4,318 49
157
158
Bronnen lot de geschiedenis va n den Levantschen handel II, 295-297, 310.
Eve n i n peace time mos t wester n shippin g docking a t Smyrn a originate d from Mediterranea n
ports; in January 1669, for instance, there were thirty vessels anchored at Smyrna, comprising a few large
Dutch and English vessels and a majority of small ships mostly from Livorno , Genoa and Marseille, see
ARH Levants e Handel 123/i. Jacob van Dam t o Directors, Smyrna, 28 January 1669.
It was in fact precisely during the peace years 1698-1701, that the directors of the
Dutch Levan t Trade chambers in Holland, and their consuls in the Mediterranean,
first realised just how serious was the structural crisis that now confronted them. By
1700, the Dutch consul a t Smyrn a estimated that averag e annual sales of Leiden
lakens in the Levan t had falle n b y over half from th e levels prevailing before 1689
and were now running at only about 2,500 yearly.161 Not only were the French now
selling more cloth than the Dutch in Turkey they were buying increasing quantities
of mohair yarn as well as of cottons an d silks. Some of the Turkish yarns' shipped
to Marseille were being loaded ther e by Dutch vessel s for Holland; but ther e were
also increasin g sign s tha t mor e mohai r wa s bein g use d b y manufacturer s i n
France.162 Mor e Levan t good s wer e als o reachin g Hollan d fro m London . I n
response to the crisis, the directors proposed tha t the States General no w ban the
indirect importing of Turkish merchandise , fro m Franc e and England. 163 This pro -
posal wa s widely debated, i n th e cit y councils of Leiden , Haarlem , Middelburg ,
Rotterdam an d Amsterda m a s wel l a s i n th e State s o f Hollan d an d amon g th e
Levant Trade chambers. But , as happened s o often durin g the Dutch Golde n Age,
the interest s of on e grouping , the Levan t merchants, no w clashed head-o n wit h
those of another, the manufacturers of Leiden and Haarlem. Delegates fro m Leide n
and Haarlem insisted that their factories and workshops already faced severe shor-
tages of mohair yarns , silks, cottons and gall-nut s and tha t i f the flow o f Turkish
raw materials from Marseille and London were cut off, the only result would be still
graver shortages and higher prices.164 Leiden and Haarlem were adamant and in the
end no action could be taken.
In the years after th e Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Dutch observers , suc h as Danie l
Jean d e Hochepied, consu l a t Smyrna , did not expec t th e Dutch Levan t trade t o
recover to its former 'flourishing' state.165 Even so, they were appalled by the almost
total lac k o f recovery . 'Contrar y t o al l expectation' , Hochepie d wrot e fro m
Smyrna, in Januari 1721 , this traffic 'has declined more and more and now seems to
be lapsing into total decay'. Bu t he was in no doubt a s to th e reason. Th e Frenc h
now seemingl y hel d al l th e advantage s an d increasingl y dominated commerc e
throughout the Near East. Their Languedoc woollens sold at lower prices than the
Dutch an d Englis h equivalents and were preferred by the Turks also for their pat-
terns an d colours . Wherea s onc e th e Dutc h an d Englis h ha d carrie d Turkey' s
exports of mohair yarn to the west, now the French alone carried 4,00 0 bales each
159
AR H Levants e Hande l 122 . M. d u Mortie r to SG , Smyrna , 9 October 1657 ; W.E. van Dam ,
'Eenige lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668-1688' , Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche
Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 4t h serie s 6 (1907), 121; Bronnen lot de geschiedenis va n den Levantschen
handel U, 299; G.R. Bossch-Erdbrink, Al th e Threshold o f Felicity. Ottoman-Dutch Relations during the
Embassy o f Cornells Calkoen at the Sublime Porie, ¡726-1744 (Ankara 1975) 33.
160
Th e figures for the years 1645-1648,1702-1715and 1718-172 5 are from Bronnen tot de geschiedenis
van den Levantschen handell,152 and II, 30, 112, for the figures for 1689-1690,1694,an d 1697-1701,se e
ARH Levants e Handel 7, res. 22 August 1691, 8 res. I Jun e 1695,20 August 1698 and 2 6 October 1699
and vol. 9 res. 25 November 1700,30 November 170 1 and 1 3 September 1702; for the figure for 1716 , see
vol. 1 1 res. 18 December 1717 .
161
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantsche handel II, 99, 303 .
'"Ibidem, 310.
163
Ibidem , 98-104,275-276,303-305; see also ARH Levants e Handel 323, pp. 12-13 . res. of the Mid-
delburg chamber of the Levant Trade directors.
164
Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantsche handel U, 98-99.
165
Ibide m II, 373-374 . Daniël de Hochepied t o SG, Smyrna, 10 January 1721.
year, over two-thirds of the total supply.
By the 1720s, the Dutch Levant trade was at a strikingly low ebb. It had decline d
severely in absolute terms and not just relatively. 166 Since 1689 the structure of this
trade had changed and become seriously weakened. This went hand in hand with a
marked deterioration , sinc e 1702 , in Dutc h trad e wit h Spain. I n som e measure ,
these two processes wer e obviously linked, Holland now having less access to Spa-
nish silve r and losin g much o f the carrying trade betwee n Spai n an d Italy . Bot h
processes ar e als o closel y linked to th e marked contraction i n Dutch trad e with
Genoa, Livorno, and Venice which set in at the end of the seventeenth century. 167
Only Dutch trade with Marseille, buoye d b y the re-export of Levant goods fro m
that port remained vigorous in the early eighteenth century. But to see the develop-
ment of Dutch Mediterranea n commerce in the seventeenth century as just a pro -
cess of rise and fal l is to miss its essential features. Nothing could be more mislea -
ding than t o contemplate th e phenomenon i n Braudel's terms as a long phas e o f
expansion, dow n to 1650 , followed by a long phase of contraction. Wha t th e evi-
dence does show is a highly complex evolution through five phases, phases not just
of expansion and contraction , bu t i n which the structure of the straatvaart, using
the term 'structure' i n the specifically non-Braudelian sense intended here, is each
time transformed. As each phas e give s way to th e next, a changed confluenc e of
political and economic forces gives rise to a radically altered pattern of trade. And
in each case it is the impact o f state power on the market-place which is theprimum
mobile of change.
166
Masson , Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVUIe siècle, 374-375; Bossch Erdbrink,
At th e Threshold of Felicity, 142 ; for the still influential view that from the end of the seventeenth century
Dutch commerce declined relative to that of other powers but not in absolute terms, see Johann de Vries,
De economische achteruitgang der Republiek i n de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1959 ) introduction.
167
G.J . Hoogewerff , 'D e Nederlandsch-Duitsch e gemeente te Livorno en haar kerkhoff, Medede-
lingen van het Nederlandsch Historisch Instituut te Rome l (1927 ) 173-74.
6
OLIVARES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS, 1621-1643
Ever sinc e th e 1550 s th e Spanish crown ha d become use d t o seein g th e

Netherlands, o r tha t par t o f th e Netherland s unde r it s rule , a s th e
strategic hub , th e place d'armes {plaza d e armas) o f th e Monarchy . Unti l
Philip I V mad e Portuga l th e mai n theatr e o f Spanis h operation s
following th e Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), that is for over a century, the
Netherlands wer e the principal pivot o f Spanish hegemony o r would-be
hegemony i n Europe. Th e Lerma years were, i n important respects , an
exception t o thi s rule for Lerma's policy wa s to disengag e in the nort h
and reorientate Spain's basic aspirations towards the south.l But the basic
thrust of Spanish strategy from the 1550s to 1659 was to shift the focus of
struggle with Franc e from Ital y to the Low Countries, t o seek to bridle
France an d overaw e wester n Christendo m fro m he r norther n
stronghold.2 The Netherlands, moreover, wer e admirably suited to this
role give n th e condition s and characte r o f sixteenth- and seventeenth -
century warfar e wit h it s emphasi s o n th e new-styl e fortification s
impervious t o artiller y barrage . Consistin g o f a dens e clusterin g o f
fortified town s an d grea t fortresses , linke d b y waterways , canal s and
dikes, th e whol e countr y wa s a n almost impenetrabl e defensiv e maze;
•while a t th e sam e time , wit h it s advance d economy , equippe d t o
maintain an d suppl y withou t disruptiv e effect s o n th e loca l populac e
even the largest standing army, it was the perfect base, being so close to
Paris, fro m whic h t o moun t offensiv e pressur e or the threat of it. Fro m
across th e border s o f Spain' s al l but impregnabl e Netherland s bastio n
both the Paris basin and the Rhineland lay alluringly open and accessible.
In his approach to the strategic possibilities of the Spanish Netherlands
1
J.I. Israel , The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford 1982), 3-11,
17-18; it is worth pointing out (again ) how misleadin g is Stradling's claim that Lerma had
'no positiv e o r dynami c purposes', se e R.A. Stradling , Philip I V an d the Government of
Spain, Í62Í-Í665 (Cambridge , 1988) .
2
J.I . Israel , 'Spanj e e n de Nederlandse Opstand' , Republiek tussen vorsten ed . Frouke
Wieringa (Amsterdam-Zutphen , 1984) , 51-3 ; o n th e Spanis h strategie debate in th e
1550s, se e M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, Th e Changing Face of the Empire. Charles V , Philip U
and Habsburg Authority, i 551-1559 (Cambridge, 1988) , 171-6 .
Olivares stoo d much closer to Charles V , Philip II, and Spanish policy-
makers of the late 1640s and 1650s than he did to Lerma. In some respects
his approac h wa s traditionalist . But ther e was als o a marked streak of
originality i n Olivares ' polic y toward s th e Spanis h Netherlands. Th e
essential statecraf t o f the Conde Duque ha s been wel l characterized by
John Elliot t a s a quest to wel d th e sprawlin g Spanish Monarchy into a
more integrate d whole , t o achiev e a 'genuin e partnership ' betwee n
Castile an d th e rest , t o cu t back maladministration and corruption, t o
mobilize th e empire' s resource s mor e efficiently , t o reviv e commerc e
and industry , an d insofa r a s 'customar y right s an d constitutions '
impeded th e attainment of these goals to sweep them aside. 3 No soone r
do we pose the question of the Conde Duque's impact on life, wa r and
politics i n th e Spanis h Netherland s tha n w e encounte r a comple x
mixture of tradition and innovation.
But it needs to be emphasized that even that part of Olivares' approach
to the Spanish Netherlands whic h wa s traditional involved a process o f
forceful reassertion , fraught wit h drama and tension. Fo r the suspension
of Spain's traditional post-1550 relationship with the Netherlands during
the Lerma period had been a prolonged one . Indeed , durin g th e Lerma
years th e Sout h Netherland s ha d stoo d i n a looser relationshi p to th e
Spanish crown than did Spain's other European dependencies: Portugal,
Naples and Lombardy. Admittedly , th e formal independence concede d
to th e Archduke s by th e dying Philip II in 1598 was in many respects a
sham.4 The army of Flanders continued to be the main armament of the
Monarchy an d continued to be paid by, an d remained under oath to, the
king o f Spain . The thre e most crucia l strongholds o f the country — the
citadels o f Antwerp, Ghen t an d Cambrai - a s well as an assortment of
lesser ones , remaine d firmly under the thumb o f Spanish garrisons and
governors. Th e Archdukes ' foreig n polic y was , i n mos t respects ,
thoroughly subordinat e t o tha t o f Spain . Furthermore , Alber t an d
Isabella generally made little effort t o oppose Spanis h requirements and
demands. Albert , fo r example , thoug h i t wen t agains t hi s ow n
inclinations, on being prodded by the then Spanish minister at Brussels,
Don Balthasa r de Zúñiga (Olivares' uncle ) entered fully into the Spanish
general embarg o agains t Dutch trad e an d shippin g o f th e year s 1598 -
1608.5 Yet, eve n though th e South Netherland s of the Archdukes was,
3
J.H. Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares. Th e Statesman i n an Age o f Decline (Ne w
Haven and London, 1986), 676-7 , 680-1.
4
J . Lefèvre , 'Le s ambassadeur s d'Espagne à Bruxelle s sous le règne d e l'Archiduc
Albert', Revue Belge de Philologie e t d'Histoire i i (1923) , 64-7 ; H . d e Schepper , 'D e
katholieke Nederlande n va n 158 9 to t 1609' , Algemene Geschiedenis de r Nederlanden v i
(Haarlem, 1979) , 290-2.
5
D e Schepper , loc.cit. ; J . d e Sturler , 'U n episod e d e l a politiqu e douanièr e des
Archiducs: l'expérience de Juan de Gauna (1603-1605)', Revue de l'Université d e Bruxelles
xlii (1936/7), 364, 371,385.
Olivares and the Spanish Netherlands 16 5
unquestionably, a satellite of Spain, it was stil l the cas e that Albert and
Isabella maintaine d a n ostensibl y sovereig n cour t wit h th e abilit y t o
distribute favour s an d posts , confe r ennoblement , an d conduc t a n
apparently independen t diplomacy . I t was also they who administere d
justice an d collecte d taxe s an d who , throug h a lavis h programm e o f
artistic an d ecclesiastica l patronage, buil t u p thei r loca l prestig e an d
authority. Th e trapping s o f independenc e togethe r wit h th e
development o f a courtl y cultur e an d syste m o f patronag e base d o n
Brussels inevitabl y whette d th e appetit e o f th e Flemis h an d Walloo n
nobility t o pla y a more conspicuou s part than they had been abl e to d o
since the 1580 s i n the political, administrative , military and diplomatic
life of their provinces.6
Furthermore, durin g th e perio d 1598-161 8 Lerma' s innovativ e
imperial strateg y encouraged thi s distancing of the Sout h Netherland s
provinces fro m Castile , lessenin g th e emphasi s o n thei r functio n a s
Spain's principa l militar y base . Fo r Phili p Ill' s favourit e strove fo r a
lasting peace with the Dutch rebels , first through his secret peace feelers
to Th e Hagu e o f 1606- 7 an d the n again , i n 1612 , wit h Rodrig o
Calderón's secre t missio n t o th e Netherlands , offerin g t o abando n
Spanish sovereignt y ove r th e norther n Netherland s provinces , an d
concede th e Dutc h outrigh t politica l an d religiou s independenc e fro m
Spain, i n exchang e fo r Dutc h evacuatio n o f al l th e Indies , 'eas t an d
west'.7 At the same time Lerma set to work to exploit Spain's traditional
anti-Moslem fervour , endeavourin g t o redirec t Castilia n aspiration s
southwards towards North Africa, Ital y and the Levant. Accordingly, in
his Lo w Countrie s policy , th e duk e tende d t o encourag e Alber t an d
Isabella in their quasi-independence from Spain, as well as in their effort s
to minimize friction wit h the French, the German Protestants, and , afte r
1607, with the Dutch.8
The Archduke s wer e greatl y helpe d b y thei r harmoniou s workin g
relationship with Lerma and remained in close touch with him by means
of correspondenc e an d throug h thei r agent s a t Madrid. Wit h Lerma' s
backing they consolidated their position and their prestige, as well as that
of th e Catholi c Church , i n th e souther n Netherlands , no t leas t b y
diverting larg e resource s fro m th e militar y secto r fo r us e i n othe r
spheres. A s a resul t o f Lerma' s statecraft , th e arm y o f Flander s wa s
drastically cu t a s from 1608 , fallin g withi n a few year s from 60,00 0 t o
6
D e Schepper , loc.cit. , 283-4 ; Victo r Brants , L a Belgique a u XVII e siècle, Albert et
Isabelle. Etudes d'histoire politique et sociale (Louvain-Paris, 1910 ) 16 , 27;]. Lefèvre, Spinola
et la Belgique (Brussels , 1947) , 15 , 23-8, 51 .
7
Israel , Th e Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 12-14 , 20-1 .
8
J. Lefèvre , 'L'interventio n d u du c d e Lerme dan s le s affaires de s Pays-Bas (1598 -
1618),' Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire xviii (1939), 478-81 .
under 20,000 men.9 The Archdukes drew grea t benefit from this, on the
one hand basking in a relaxation of fiscal pressure on their war-ravage d
country whil e a t th e sam e tim e bein g abl e t o increas e massivel y their
spending o n ecclesiastica l and secular building, patronage , an d creation
of new posts. 10 A frenzy o f church-building suc h as was unique in th e
history o f th e souther n Netherlands , wa s se t i n motion . Alber t
assiduously flattered the nobility drawing them to his court with a lavish
distribution o f favours and offices, i n some case s using money remitte d
from Madri d specificall y fo r th e upkee p o f th e arm y an d th e
fortifications. Whil e th e Archdukes too k goo d care not t o conven e the
States Genera l agai n afte r thei r difficul t experience s wit h tha t body i n
1600, the y took pains to foster good relations with the provincial estates
with th e result that the latter tended to increase their hold over th e fiscal
process an d t o ai r thei r constitutiona l pretension s wit h enhance d
boldness.11 With the army's troop strength drastically reduced, i t was an
easy matte r fo r th e Archduke s t o wi n adde d popularit y locall y b y
cancelling most of the billeting of soldiery on the citizenry, relocating the
remaining troop s i n purpose-buil t barrack s whic h Alber t no w ha d
constructed righ t acros s th e Sout h Netherland s fro m Dunkir k t o
Geldern.12 A leadin g membe r o f th e Counci l o f Stat e i n Madri d
commented sarcasticall y afte r Albert' s deat h tha t h e ha d bee n suc h a
'good prince ' tha t h e ha d treate d th e populac e o f th e souther n
Netherlands 'more like children than subjects'. 13
Many o f th e change s i n th e Sout h Netherland s whic h w e associate
with th e Olivare s er a began in fac t i n the wake o f Lerma's downfall in
1618. Th e rapi d expansio n o f Spanis h military an d naval power i n th e
'loyal' Netherland s bega n immediately . Th e dispatc h from Madri d t o
Brussels, i n July 1618 , o f th e hard-lin e marqué s d e Bedmar , bearin g
highly detaile d instructions drawn up by the new regime, pu t an end to
the pamperin g o f th e Sout h Netherland s unde r la x supervisio n fro m
Spain.14 Zúñig a realise d tha t th e 'obedient ' province s had no w t o b e
more rigorousl y discipline d an d subordinate d t o Castilia n contro l i f
Spam's wide r imperia l goal s i n Europ e wer e t o b e attainable . I f th e
southern Netherland s were onc e mor e t o functio n as the mai n plaza de
armas fro m whic h Spai n sough t t o dominat e Europe , checkin g France
9
Geoffre y Parker , Th e Army o f Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge,
1972), appendix A.
10
Brants , ibid.; H . d e Schepper , 'Belgium Nostrum' 1500-1650. Over integratie e n
desintegratie va n het Nederland (Antwerp , 1987), 34 .
11
Brants , La Belgique, 52-7 .
12
See , for instance, F. Nettesheim, Geschichte der Stadt und des Amtes Geldern (Crefeld ,
1863), 372 .
13
Archiv o General de Simancas (hereafter AGS ) Estado 2037. Consulta of the Consejo
de Estado, Madrid , 1 4 April 1623, fo.3 .
14
Lefèvre , 'Le s ambassadeurs d'Espagne', 76 .
and the Dutch and intervening a t will in Germany, then Spanish control
at Brussel s had to b e made mor e effective , th e army of Flanders vastly
expanded, th e contribution s o f the 'loyal ' province s ver y substantially
increased, remittance s from Spai n boosted, an d extensive new billeting
arrangements fo r th e additiona l soldier y impose d o n th e Sout h
Netherlands towns .
Part of this ambitious programm e was achieved before Albert's death
in July 1621 . I n three years the army of Flanders trebled i n size, a good
deal of work was done on improving th e country's fortifications, an d the
plans for the establishment o f a royal armada in the Flemish sea-ports had
begun t o be implemented unde r the supervision of the Spanish official ,
Juan d e Villela. 15 Eve n so , Alber t wa s undoubtedl y a restrainin g
influence durin g thes e years , especiall y i n th e sphere s o f taxation ,
expenditure an d patronag e and a t the tim e o f the popular protests and
disturbances in Brussels, in 1620, intervened forcefully t o prevent the use
of Spanis h troop s t o suppres s thei r 'insolence'. 16 Onl y afte r Albert' s
demise and the formal reversion o f the South Netherlands to the Spanish
crown, i n accordance with th e provisions o f the testament s of Philip II
and Philip II I in the event tha t Albert should di e childless, wa s the way
opened fo r a mor e radical , far-reachin g programm e o f politica l an d
administrative reform. Isabella , now Phili p IV' s regent, was instructed
as t o who m sh e mus t consul t i n makin g decisions an d appointments .
Albert had already kept the grand Conseil d'état, staffed b y th e country's
leading seigneur s t o on e side , preferrin g to contro l th e administratio n
through a smal l inne r commissio n o f official s severa l of who m wer e
Spaniards.17 But there was now a total separation between the old Conseil
d'état whose functions wer e hencefort h largely ceremonial - thoug h the
title o f conseiller d'Etat remaine d a prestigiou s on e - an d th e small ,
secretive bod y o f jurists an d Spanis h officer s wh o actuall y rule d th e
country. T o liais e with th e regen t an d he r adviser s on administrativ e
matters, patronag e an d appointments , th e kin g i n 162 1 revive d th e
former Counci l o f Flanders at Madrid. Matter s o f high policy affectin g
the 'loyal ' Netherland s remaine d th e responsibilit y o f th e Spanis h
Council of State.
Zúñiga an d hi s colleague s reverse d Lerma' s priorities . The y forge d
closer links betwee n Castil e an d th e Spanis h Netherlands . Wherea s
Lerma and Albert had wanted to renew th e Twelve Years' Truce , o n its
expiry in 1621 , Zúñig a oppose d th e making of any new deal s with th e
15
J. Alcalá-Zamor a y Queipo d e Llano, España, Flandes y el Mar del None (Barcelona,
1975), 156-7; Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 166 .
16
Lefèvre , 'Le s ambassadeurs d'Espagne', 79.
17
D e Schepper , 'D e katholieke n Nederlanden' , 284 ; P . Janssens , 'L'éche c de s
tentatives d e soulèvement aux Pays Bas sous Philippe IV (1621-1665)', Revue d'Histoire
Diplomatique 92(1778), 111-12 .
Dutch unless , an d until, th e latter wer e prepare d t o mak e much mor e

extensive concessions to Spanish interests than had been the case in 1609.
It i s no t tha t Zúñig a believe d th e reconques t o f th e rebe l norther n
provinces by Spai n to be a practicable proposition. O n th e contrary, h e
fully realise d tha t Spai n coul d no w n o longe r hop e t o reconque r th e
Dutch provinces , give n the strength o f their defences, thei r great forces
on lan d an d se a an d thei r variou s alliances. 18 Nevertheless , h e wa s
adamant tha t Spain must revert t o war with th e Dutch unles s adequat e
concessions were forthcoming. This would be a war of attrition designed
to wea r th e Dutc h down . Fo r unti l th e 'rebel ' province s coul d b e
weakened sufficiently t o compel them to evacuate the Indies, re-open the
Scheldt and allow the public practice of Catholicism i n their territory no
settlement wit h the m coul d b e acceptable , secur e o r honourabl e fo r
Spain.
Zúñiga an d hi s nobl e allie s a t Madri d wer e perfectl y awar e tha t
Albert's death opened th e way not only to a tighter Spanish grip over the
South Netherlands an d a more efficient militar y and naval build-up bu t
also t o far-reaching administrative and fiscal reform. A t the meeting o f
the Counci l o f Stat e in Madri d whic h considere d th e news o f Albert' s
demise, th e duk e de l Infantado , on e o f Zuniga' s allies , declare d tha t
government financ e an d militar y administratio n i n th e Sout h
Netherlands ha d languished in deplorable 'disorder' for years due to the
fact tha t whils t th e Archduk e ha d live d Spinola , wh o coul d neve r b e
moved to oppose the man who had made his career possible in anything,
had been utterly impervious t o pressur e for change from Madrid; no w
that Alber t wa s dead, h e insisted i t was vital to pres s on with stringen t
reform a t once; fo r if the administration o f the Sout h Netherland s wa s
not now rigorousl y take n in hand by Spanish ministers all the additiona l
money whic h Castil e wa s now remittin g t o th e Sout h Netherland s t o
finance the military and naval build-up migh t just as well 'be thrown in
the street'.19 Another minister, the conde de Benavente, commented tha t
with Albert' s death , th e Spanish crown coul d now sypho n of f much of
the cash being raise d by the provincial estates of the South Netherland s
for other purposes to help pay the upkeep of the army of Flanders thereby
relieving some of the pressure on Castile itself. 20
But there was to be no clean sweep in the Spanish Netherlands in 1621.
With a majo r wa r no w i n progres s an d a vas t militar y machin e t o
manage, i t wa s essentia l t o ensur e stabilit y an d continuit y a s wel l a s
greater administrative and financial efficiency. Isabella , who wa s held to
18
Archive s Générales du Royaume , Brussels (hereafte r AGR ) SEG 183, fos . 168-70.
Zúñiga to Juan de Ciriza, Madrid, 7 April 1619.
19
Archiv o Genera l d e Simanca s (hereafter ACS ) Estad o 2035 . Consult a o f 30 July
1621, fo.3. 'Vot o del duque del Infantado'.
20
Ibid., fo.5. 'Voto de l conde de Benavente'.
enjoy th e love an d estee m o f the commo n people , wa s retaine d as the

king's regen t an d Spinola , regarde d i n Madri d a s indispensable , a s
commander o f the army. This made it inevitable that there should b e a
basic split in the government at Brussels with those who wer e identified
with th e Albertin e legac y an d local interests o n th e on e hand, an d the
'Spanish' party , thos e wh o were , o r wh o mad e themselves , th e
instruments o f close r contro l fro m Madrid. 21 O n th e on e sid e wer e
Isabella, Spinola , Chancello r Peckiu s of Brabant (all advocates of peace
with the Dutch) an d other leading official s an d nobles of the provincial
assemblies, o n the other th e king's chie f minister at Brussels during the
1620s, the marqués d e Bedmar (subsequentl y cardina l de la Cueva), th e
Spanish tercio commander s an d governor s o f th e mai n fortresse s who
were mostly hostile to Spinola (of whom they were openly jealous), and
a handful of local noble s and jurists, suc h as the comte d e Coupigny, a
leading figure in the financial administration, and Pieter Roose who was
to b e Olivares ' right-han d man , me n wh o buil t thei r career s o n their
unswerving devotion to the service of the crown.
In the years 1621-2, before Olivares emerged as the dominant voice in
Spanish policy-making , th e tendency amon g Spanis h minister s was to
support th e view s o f th e 'Spanish ' part y at Brussels and to strengthen
their han d i n th e running o f the Spanis h Netherland s and th e army of
Flanders. Minister s agree d with the conde de Salazar, one of the leading
Spaniards in the South Netherlands, that the local nobles were not men in
whom th e kin g coul d hav e ful l confidence . In August 1621 Phili p IV
instructed Isabell a tha t th e 'governmen t o f th e stronghold s whic h are
now i n the hands o f Spaniards have to be kept in Spanish hands when
they become vacant and in those which ar e newly captured, where it is
convenient, you should also appoint Spaniards'. 22 For a time this was the
policy adopted. WhenJulic h fell to the arms of Philip IV in January 1622,
for example , th e Infant a name d Dieg o Salced o a s th e town' s ne w
military governor . I t was als o laid down tha t as far as possible the ne w
royal armada o f Flander s whose ship s were no w unde r construction at
Dunkirk an d Ostend should be placed under Spanish commanders.23
Olivares was as determined a s any of the king's ministers to make the
partnership of Spain and the Spanish Netherlands more effective in every
way possible . Thi s relationshi p wa s th e strategi c lynch-pi n o f th e
empire. Bu t he was also extremely wary of trying to achieve this simply
by denyin g position s o f power t o non-Spaniard s and discriminating in
21
R . Delplanche , U n légiste anversois au service de l'Espagne, Pierre Roose, Chef-Président
du Conseil-Privé de s Pays-Bas (1586-1673) (Brussels , 1945) , 25 ; P . Janssens , 'D e
landvoogdij van Isabella , 1621-1633', Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden vi , 380 .
22
Archive s Générales du Royaume (hereafter AGR), Secrétairerie de'Etat et de Guerre
(SEG), 186 . Phili p to Isabella, Madrid, 23 October 1621.
23
AG R SEG 185, fo.184 . Archduk e Albert to Philip IV , Brussels, 3 0 April 1621.
military and administrative appointments against the local nobility. Th e

great danger in the policy advocated by the 'Spanish' party at Brussels, as
Olivares seem s t o hav e grasped , and take n t o heart , i n a wa y tha t hi s
colleagues at Madrid mostl y did not, wa s that nothing would.b e gained
by antagonizin g loca l opinio n i n th e Sout h Netherlands , Spinol a
included, b y foistin g o n th e countr y to o man y Spaniard s and Spanish
points of view. Olivares recognized Spinola's greatness as a commander
and refuse d t o undermin e hi s authorit y ove r th e arm y eve n afte r th e
disastrous failur e o f the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, durin g the summe r
of 1622 , an d hi s inexplicabl e (an d highly damaging ) inertia durin g th e
summer of 1623 when th e strategic situation in Germany, favourable to
Spain, force d th e Dutc h t o spli t thei r force s an d whe n criticis m of th e
great Italian amongst the Spanis h maestres de campo i n Flanders waxed t o
unprecedented levels. 24 One o f Olivares' earlies t direct interventions in
Netherlands affair s wa s t o rejec t pressur e fo r close r supervisio n o f
Spinola's conduct of the war from Madrid, arguing that many promising
enterprises i n th e pas t ha d bee n damage d i n th e Spanis h Monarch y
through failur e t o allo w thos e entruste d wit h thei r executio n enoug h
freedom o f action.25
Nor di d Olivares subscribe to the view that key military commands in
the Lo w Countrie s should , a s a matter of course, b e denied t o the loca l
nobility an d entrusted to Spaniards . By the mid 1620 s th e policy i n the
Spanish Netherland s wa s t o sho w ful l confidenc e i n th e loyalt y an d
military ability of local nobles. When Breda was captured in 1625, this, a
garrison of crucial significance, wa s entrusted to the baron d e Balançon
and hi s tercio o f Walloo n an d Burgundia n troops. 26 'S-Hertogenbosc h
(Bois-le-Duc), th e mos t crucia l o f al l th e Spanis h stronghold s unde r
threat i n th e lat e 1620 s i n th e Lo w Countries , a stronghol d whic h
commanded a large an d populou s region , wa s entruste d t o Anthonie ,
baron va n Grobbendonck . Stil l mor e strikin g wa s th e controversia l
decision t o plac e th e entir e arm y o f Flander s unde r th e suprem e
command o f coun t Hendri k va n de n Berg h a t th e tim e o f Spinola' s
departure fo r Spain , i n 1628 . Va n de n Berg h wa s a nobleman whos e
loyalty i t was important t o th e crow n t o retain , being governo r o f the
Overkwartier regio n o f Roermon d an d Venlo , a personag e o f grea t
influence in the Maas valley and considerable military experience. O f all
24
AC S Estado 2037 . Consult a 14Jun e 1623 .
25
AC S Estad o 2037 . Consult a 1 0 Ma y 1623 , 'voto ' o f Olivares : ' y estand o ta n
apartadas aquella s provincia s tendrí a po r ma s combinient e qu e s e prosiguies e e n l a
confianca que se ha hecho, sin acortar la mano po r ningún caso , pues es lo que mas obliga
a las personas de partes, por qu e la execucion y resolución pend e dellos co n lo qual no les
quede escusa ninguna como les quedaría en caso que se les mandase executar . . ."
26
V.A.M . Beerma n an d J.L.M. de Lepper, 'D e lotgevallen va n de stad', Geschiedenis
van Breda i i (Schiedam, 1977) , 57-8 .
the South Netherlande r entruste d wit h hig h military responsibility by

Olivares, h e and Jan va n Nassau were the most prominent . Bu t he was
also on lamentably bad terms with the senior Spanish officers of the army
several of whom, a t a critical juncture in 1624 , had pointedl y refused t o
serve under him. Furthermore , hi s family was linked with th e House of
Orange and it was alleged tha t his sisters (wit h whom he was rumoured
to live in incestuous intimacy) held Protestant sympathies . It was thus no
small thing that the king, at Olivares' insistence , confirme d early in 1629
that va n de n Berg h wa s t o b e commander-in-chie f durin g Spinola' s
absence, expressly commanding tha t the senior Spanish maestres de campo
in the Netherlands, Francisc o de Medina and Juan Bravo, wer e to serve
under him. 27
This wa s a majo r Olivaris t initative . Va n de n Berg h wa s th e onl y
Netherlander eve r t o comman d th e arm y of Flanders. It was not lon g
though befor e a floo d o f criticis m o f hi s incompeten t conduc t o f th e
disastrous 1629 campaign shook eve n the Conde-Duque's confidence in
him. Bu t h e wa s lef t ostensibl y i n charg e fo r th e tim e being . Isabell a
being secretly instructed not to reveal that the king had lost confidence in
him, unti l h e wa s relieve d o f his command durin g 1630. 28 Two year s
later, durin g th e desperate military crisis of 1632, th e count betrayed his
monarch an d defected to the Dutch. Thi s fiasco wa s no doubt intensely
embarrassing fo r Olivare s personall y an d eliminated an y possibilit y o f
another Netherlander being appointed t o supreme command. Inevitabl y
this sorr y experienc e heightene d Olivares ' warines s o f th e Sout h
Netherlands nobility a s a whole. Bu t while van den Bergh's treaso n was
a bitter humilitation fo r Olivares' polic y of entrusting more key posts in
the empire to non-Castilians, and in the Spanish Netherlands that policy
was now modified , th e Conde Duqu e wa s by n o mean s ye t willing t o
abandon a polic y whic h h e sa w a s fundamental t o th e surviva l o f th e
Monarchy.
Olivares, immerse d in his schemes to achieve a greater integration of
the part s and peoples of the empire, continue d t o seek the trust and co-
operation o f th e loca l nobilit y a t an y rat e fo r a time. H e neede d thei r
military suppor t an d their services as garrison an d tercio commanders. H e
needed thei r backin g i n th e provincia l estate s withou t whos e
collaboration taxatio n could no t b e increased and recruiting , billeting,
and many other processe s directl y linked to the war-effort could not be
effectively organized . He also needed the consent and participation of the
local nobility if his Union o f Arms project was to have any real meaning
in the Spanish Netherland s context . Thi s meant that the Conde Duqu e
27
AG R SE G 200, fo.138 . Phili p IV to Isabella , Madrid, 5 April 1629 .
28
AG R SE G 201 , fo.265 . Phili p I V t o Isabella , Madrid , 9 Octobe r 1969 ; Archiv o
Histórico Nacional , Madrid , Estad o legaj o 727 . 'Vot o de l cond e m i seño r [Olivares ]
sobre cosa s de Flandes' (Septembe r 1629) , fo.l0. v .
was compelled t o set himself, as he had done from the outset, against the
preferences an d prejudices of the 'Spanish' party in the army of Flanders
and in the central government a t Brussels. The Conde Duque doubtles s
had littl e patienc e for th e persistent political demands of the provincial
estates such as their pleas for the government o f the country to revert to
that presided over, as in the days before the coming of the Duke of Alva,
by a powerfu l Conseil d'Etat staffe d b y th e 'principaul x seigneur s e t
officiers d e guerre naturels du pays'. 29 Nor ha d he the slighest intentio n
of permitting a further increase in the influence of the estates. But i f his
broad vision of the future of the Monarchy was to have any meaning he
had to listen and respond t o th e complaints about the paucity of senio r
military an d administrativ e position s bein g assigne d t o nativ e
Netherlanders no t only in the Spanish Netherlands proper but also in the
neighbouring Spanish-occupie d area s o f German y wher e th e mai n
Spanish stronghold s - Wesel , Rheinberg , Lingen , Jülich, an d Orsoy -
though partl y garrisone d b y Walloo n soldier y wer e exclusivel y unde r
Spanish commanders.30
The introduction of the Union o f Arms into the Spanish Netherland s
has hithert o receive d scan t attention fro m historians . Durin g th e mi d
1620s the essence of Olivares' policy in the Spanish Netherlands was to
change fundamentally the balance of cost of the war with th e Dutch b y
placing the army of Flanders on the defensive, as was done following the
Breda campaig n (1625) , an d reducin g th e army' s troo p strengt h
substantially while simultaneously boosting the proportion of the cost of
its upkeep paid by the 'loyal' provinces. 31 Meanwhile pressure was to be
kept u p o n th e Dutc h b y mean s o f th e wa r a t se a and a general rive r
embargo, designe d t o sto p th e traffi c o n al l the waterways linking th e
South Netherlands and Germany with Dutch territory. In the context of
the Union of Arms, Olivare s originall y hoped t o coax the provinces of
the Spanis h Netherland s int o assumin g responsibilit y fo r maintainin g
20,000 troops, hal f of the projected total force of infantry required under
the ne w strategy , leavin g 20,00 0 infantr y an d 4,00 0 cavalr y t o b e
provided b y the rest of the Monarchy. 32 However, neithe r Isabell a nor
Spinola prove d a t all responsive to th e scheme . Implementatio n o f th e
Union i n th e Spanis h Netherlands bega n only i n Septembe r 162 7 wit h
the arriva l o f Olivares ' kinsman , th e marqué s d e Leganés , wit h
29
Se e States of Artois to Philip IV, Arras , 8 March 1630 in Ch. Hirschaue r Les Etats
d'Artois d e leurs origines à l'occupation française, 1340-1640 (2 vols. Paris-Brussels, 1923) i,
352 and ii, 203 .
30
Ibid.; Britis h Library (hereafte r BL ) MS Add. 14007, fo.427; for similar complaints
about the lack of positions for 'gens de guerre de la nation', seeM. Gachard (éd.) Actes des
Etats Généraux de Í632 (Brussels, 1853) , 40-5.
31
Israel , Th e Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 162-6 .
32
Ibid. ; AGS Estado 2040 'El Conde Duque sobre la forma en que se podría encaminar
en Flande s lo de la Union'; Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, 271-7 .
instructions to put the Union t o the provincial assemblies.

Leganés lost no time in getting down t o business, laying the terms of
the propose d Unio n befor e th e estate s o f th e tw o mos t importan t
provinces, Brabant and Flanders, on 23 and 27 September respectively.33
It shoul d b e note d tha t Olivares ' Unio n o f Arm s i n th e Spanis h
Netherlands required a commitment fro m the 'loyal' provinces no t only
to shoulder more of the cost of the war, while Castile shouldered less, but
also a willingnes s t o g o o n indefinitel y wit h wha t th e Cond e Duqu e
envisaged as a long war of attrition. For both these reasons, Legané s put
great emphasi s o n thi s bein g a wa r i n th e interes t no t onl y o f th e
Monarchy as a whole but also of the 'loyal' Netherland s specifically . His
addresses t o th e Sout h Netherland s provincia l assemblie s ar e indee d
striking example s o f Olivaris t propaganda . I n Olivares ' statecraf t
genuine religious motivation played little (if any) role. But when i t came
to persuading the South Netherlanders that the Dutch war was their war,
and that they must take over a larger part of the burden of it, Olivares had
no inhibition s abou t depictin g th e conflict - whic h i n fac t wa s bein g
fought fo r reason s o f reputación, an d Spanis h and Portugues e maritim e
and colonia l interes t - a s essentiall y a struggl e t o safeguar d an d
consolidate Catholicism i n the Sout h Netherlands. Legané s argued that
the prolonge d conflic t wit h th e Dutc h wa s unavoidabl e becaus e the y
would only permit the public exercise of Catholicism in their territory if
the king allowe d Calvinis t preachin g in his 'loyal' provinces and this, i f
conceded, would , a s had been shown by the aftermath of the Pacification
of Ghent of 1576, lea d to the rapid disintegration of Catholic worship in
the southern provinces .
Whatever they thought of this argument, the southern provinces did ,
one by one, agre e to enter into 'Olivares' 'buena, perpetu a e ynseparable
union d e armas', o n conditio n tha t the rest o f the king's dominion s did
likewise, a s Aragon, Valencia , Sardini a an d Mallorc a already had, an d
provided als o that certain other condition s wer e met . I n particular, the
'loyal' province s demanded mor e militar y and administrativ e posts fo r
the loca l nobility. 34 By Decembe r 162 7 al l the souther n province s ha d
consented an d this was both represented a t the time, and has been since,
as a resounding success for Olivares' statecraft. 35 Bu t i s this view o f th e
matter correct ? How muc h substanc e was there to Olivares ' Unio n of
Arms in the Spanish Netherlands? The great seventeenth-century Dutc h
33
B L Ms. Add. 14007 , fos.365-7 ; Lieuw e van Aitzema, Historie ofverhael va n saken van
staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden (14 vols. The Hague , 1667-71 ) ii,
412-20.
34
B L MS Add, 14007 , fo.367 .
35
H . Lonchay.J . Cuvelie r andj . Lefèvr e (eds.) Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur
les affaires de s Pays-Bas au XVII e siècle (6 vols. Brussels , 1923-37) , ii, 525 , 530; Elliott, Th e
Count-Duke o f Olivares, 275 .
chronicler Lieuw e van Aitzema for one dismissed th e whole exercis e as a

dead lette r on account of the comparatively small number o f troops th e
'royal Netherlands' i n fact agreed to maintain - onl y 12,000 men, a mere
fifth of th e number s maintaine d at that time b y th e United Provinces ,
and also because of the conditions attache d and the southern provinces '
generally uncooperativ e attitude.36 Certainly i t is true that the ordinary
subsidies o f th e State s o f Flander s t o th e crown , havin g rise n
substantially i n th e earl y 1620s , di d no t ris e an y furthe r i n th e year s
following th e introduction of the Union o f Arms.37
In Olivares ' eye s the main point o f the exercise was t o secure a hefty
reduction i n th e proportio n o f th e arm y o f Flanders' s cost s bein g
shouldered b y Castile . I n fac t th e 12,00 0 me n pai d fo r b y th e 'loyal '
Netherlands did represent a sharply rising proportion o f the army in the
late 1620 s but thi s was only becaus e the Conde Duque insisted , agains t
the advice of other ministers, on cutting the army to the bone, indee d far
below th e leve l whic h Spinol a regarde d a s safe. 38 Thi s precipitate d a
series of bitter clashes with Spinola wh o now returne d to Spain, leavin g
responsibility for an army which di d indeed prove too weak to stand up
to the Dutch, t o others. Thu s i t was not onl y th e Mantuan war and the
loss o f th e Mexica n silve r fleet of 162 8 t o Pie t Hey n whic h s o gravely
weakened Spain' s position in the Netherlands i n the late 1620s, leadin g to
the disastrous defeats of 1629 and 1632. A t the root o f it all lay Olivares '
unrealistic Lo w Countrie s strategy . B y th e earl y 1630 s th e arm y o f
Flanders ha d onc e agai n t o b e greatl y expanded , th e burde n fallin g
principally on Spain and Spanish Italy.
The military disasters of 1629, especially the loss of's-Hertogenbosch,
the gateway and bastion of the whole of the Meierij , a region comprisin g
140 villages and fort y monasterie s a s wel l a s th e unfortifie d town s o f
Helmond and Eindhoven, transforme d the strategic situation, plunging
the Spanish Netherlands into profound crisis. In the 'loyal' provinces the
defeats precipitate d a powerful back-lash bot h agains t the wa r an d th e
Spaniards, wh o wer e universall y blamed fo r th e catastrophe . I n he r
panic, Isabell a informed th e king tha t there was now ope n tal k that the
provincial estates should tak e matters into their own hand s and 'to save
themselves' ope n peac e negotiation s wit h th e Dutc h which , sh e
remarked i n anticipatio n of Olivares ' an d th e king' s reaction , 'sería la
total ruina'. 39 Whil e th e cardina l de l a Cuev a emphasize d th e genera l
loathing o f the Sout h Netherlander s for 'ou r nation' , Isabell a identified
the cardinal as being especially detested by the people and nobility alike.
36
Aitzema , Historie ii, 420 .
37
J . Dhond t an d H . va n Houtt e (eds. ) Tafels va n d e resolutieboeken de r Staten va n
Vlaanderen (1580-1656) ( 2 vols. Brussels , 1936-41 ) i, 95, 107 , 112 .
M
39
AG R SE G 201. Isabell a to Philip IV, Brussels , 2 8 September 1629 .
She pleade d fo r a roya l settlemen t wit h th e Dutch , t o forestal l th e

southern provincial estates, on whatever terms could be secured.
There wa s indee d a marke d restlessnes s amon g th e Flemis h an d
Walloon nobilit y i n the autumn of 1629 as well as unmistakable signs of
popular agitation an d case s of Protestant sympathizers a t Antwerp an d
Ghent, arouse d b y th e prospec t o f furthe r Dutc h successes , hurlin g
stones at Catholic images. 40 In this tense situation the duke of Aerschot
and th e archbisho p o f Mechele n assume d th e rol e o f intermediarie s
between th e illega l gathering s o f noble s i n variou s province s an d th e
government i n Brussels. Philippe-Charles , duk e of Aerschot, governo r
of Namur and a member of the Conseil d'Etat, was the first of the noblesse
of Braban t an d hithert o ha d bee n a close supporte r o f Isabella . Now ,
albeit tentativel y an d discreetly , h e pu t himsel f a t th e hea d o f th e
moderate oppositio n t o roya l policy . Th e universa l moo d wa s on e of
bitter criticsm of the conduct of affairs in the South Netherlands since the
death o f th e Archduk e Albert . Despit e th e fac t tha t man y o f th e
Spaniards i n th e countr y ha d marrie d local noblewomen, 41 th e Sout h
Netherlands nobility' s mos t powerfu l grievanc e wa s thei r resentmen t
over th e rol e o f th e Spaniard s in thei r country . Th e nobles , i n thei r
petition t o Isabella , blame d th e Spaniard s fo r ever y militar y disaste r
reaching bac k t o th e battl e o f Nieuwpoor t (1600) , th e los s o f 's -
Hertogenbosch bein g expressly pinned on the Spanish administration in
Brussels, whic h ha d allegedl y neglecte d t o suppl y th e brav e baro n
Grobbendonck wit h sufficien t powder. 42 While the nobles 'of this land'
were fighting the war on behalf of the king 'risking their lives for little or
no reward' , the y complained , th e pic k o f th e post s i n th e arm y an d
administration wer e still being assigned to Spaniards who have come to
the Netherlands and are 'mostly ver y poor an d of no merit'. 43
But th e clamour was not just fo r more positions. Th e high nobless e
were no w stirrin g u p th e estates to resis t furthe r roya l fiscal demands ,
and t o pres s harde r fo r a n increased political rol e fo r th e provinces , a s
well a s fo r th e kin g t o rever t t o th e pre-Alv a syste m o f governmen t
through a Conseil d'état consitute d of th e 'principaul x seigneurs' of th e
country. 44 The deputies of the towns to the States of Hainault were called
on by a leading magnate, Albert de Ligne, prince de Barbançon, to refus e
further aides t o th e governmen t unti l the crow n agree d to conven e th e
States Genera l t o redres s th e provinces ' grievances. 43 Th e State s o f
40
AC S Estado 2322 . Cardina l de la Cueva t o Phili p IV, Brussels, 9 and 18 September
1629; M . Gachard , 'Philippe-Charles , prince-comt e d'Aremberg , due d'Arschot', i n his
Etudes et notices historiques concernant l'histoire des Pays Bas (3 vols. Brussels , 1890 ) ii, 165-6 .
41
J . Lefèvre , 'L a compénétration hispano-belg e au x Pays-Bas catholique s pendant le
XVIII e siècle', Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire xvi (1937) , 605-7 .
42
B L MS ADD. 14007, fos.427-8 .
43
Ibid., fo.428 .
Brabant refused fo r many months t o pay furthe r aides for the upkeep o f
the army . Ironically , a t leas t on e o f th e disaffecte d nobles , va n de n
Bergh, ha d just been named by th e king as one of those whom Isabella
was to consul t in her secret truce feelers to the Dutch, alon g wit h D e la
Cueva, Balançon , and the ultra loyal Hainault noble, Claud e de Lannoy,
comte de la Motterie and governor o f Maastricht.46
The crisis in the Spanish Netherlands in turn provoked dee p dismay at
Madrid. Aghas t the king resolved to go in person t o the Low Countries
to retrieve the situation and it was all the Conde Duque could do to hold
him back. Olivares himself, though seize d by severe bouts of depression,
adhered doggedl y t o th e view (whic h no w ha d fe w furthe r advocates )
that there could be no settlement with the Dutch 'rebels ' until Spain had
weakened the m sufficientl y t o extrac t 'condicione s razonables' . H e
insisted tha t the mai n facto r i n th e recen t militar y disasters and los s o f
reputación ha d bee n precisel y th e vai n hope s arouse d by th e lat e truce
contacts wit h Th e Hague . Fo r instead o f tensing itsel f to confront th e
enemy, the army of Flanders had dropped its guard, its officers attendin g
'banquets an d enjoying themselves in Brussels'.47 What was needed was
to pu t al l thought o f a settlement ou t of mind an d for both regime an d
army i n th e Sout h Netherland s t o regai n thei r effectivenes s an d
resilience.
Olivares remaine d determine d t o kee p th e Sout h Netherlander s i n
their place . Th e provincia l assemblie s wer e to have no role in the truce
negotiations with th e Dutch. No r wer e som e of their other demand s t o
be listene d to . Strongl y committe d a s he wa s t o th e Almirantazgo and
Spain's general embargo agains t Dutch shippin g an d goods, h e ignored
the protests of the South Netherlander s a t the appointment of a Spanish
official, Hurtuñ o d e Urizar, to the crucial new post of inspector-general
(veedor-general) o f commerce i n the South Netherlands. Fo r to appoint a
Netherlander t o supervis e th e checkin g o f cargoe s consigne d fro m
Flanders to the Iberian Peninsula would hav e been to invite evasion and
fraud. Ye t Olivares remaine d eager to cultivate the nobility and estates of
the 'loyal' Netherlands , bein g convince d that without thei r support and
co-operation th e situation coul d no t be restored. Th e detested Cardina l
de l a Cuev a wa s recalle d an d replace d b y th e marqué s d e Aytona , a
Catalan an d on e o f Philip' s mos t placator y an d skilfu l ministers . Th e
comte d e Solre , on e o f th e fe w reliabl y royalis t noble s o f th e Sout h
Netherlands, a man extensively employed b y the king as a diplomat, wa s
44
Hirschauer , Etats d'Artois, i , 35 2 an d ii , 203 ; A . Waddington , L a république des
provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols d e 1630à 1650 (2 vols. Paris, 1895) i, 147.
45
P . Henrard , Marie d e Médias dans les Pays-Bas (163-1-1638) (Brussels , 1876) , p.203 .
46
Lonchay , Correspondence ii , 454.
47
Archiv o Histórico Nacional , Madrid, Estado legajo 727 . 'Voto del conde mi señor
sobre cosas de Flandes' (September 1629), fos.5-6.
sent from Madrid t o Brussels bearing a batch of ostentatiously soothing

letters from the king to each of the provincial assemblies, assurin g them
of his esteem and affection an d assuring them of his attentiveness to their
grievances.48 The high noblesse of the Spanish Netherlands - Aerschot,
van d e Bergh, th e comt e d e Hennin (Alexandre , duc de Bournonville)
and th é princes of Barbançon, Espinoy , an d Chimay wer e assiduously
flattered. There were proposals to confer fres h title s and honours o n the
archbishops o f Mechelen an d Cambrai, on the bishop of Ghent, an d on
Balançon an d d e la Motterie. In July 1630 , Balanço n and d e la Motterie
were appointe d honorary member s of the Consejo d e Guerra (Counci l of
War) in Spain. 49
Don Francisc o d e Moneada, marqué s de Aytona (1586-1635) wa s in
many way s precisely th e ma n fo r the occasion . Owin g perhap s to his
own Catala n background, h e showed fro m the outset real sympathy for
the grudges and aspirations of the local aristocracy whom he proposed to
treat 'como a buenos hermanos'.50 In his hands the policy of fostering the
confidence an d loyalty of the South Netherland s nobles was more than
mere lip-service . On e moder n historia n has even writte n tha t 'Aytona
par un e conduit e tou t opposé e à cell e d e se s compatriotes, suivi t un e
politique de franche collaboration avec les gens du pays'.51 Writing to the
king i n December 1630 , Ayton a emphasized the danger, no w tha t van
den Bergh had been removed from comman d of the army, that the king
might see m t o hi s Netherland s subject s to b e lacking in confidenc e in
them an d to be unwilling to entrust their leading personages with major
military responsibilit y whe n i n fac t h e ha d suc h excellen t loca l
commanders a t his disposal as Jan van Nassau, Balançon, and the comt e
de l a Motterie. 52 Ayton a mad e a specia l point o f cultivatin g Jan va n
Nassau who m h e pu t i n comman d o f th e large-scal e (thoug h
unsuccessful) amphibiou s assaul t o n Thole n launche d i n Septembe r
1631.
The Conde Duque was determined to reform the administration and
the army in the Spanish Netherlands. 53 If he was firmly oppose d t o the
political aspiration s o f th e provincia l estates , h e wa s als o deepl y
dissatisfied, eve n scathing, about the performnce of the Spanish official s
and officer s i n th e countr y an d longed fo r a less corrupt, mor e reliable
political an d militar y organizatio n whic h woul d b e a n effectiv e
instrument fo r th e carryin g ou t o f his and th e king' s orders . I n 163 0 a
48
Gachard , 'Philippe-Charles , prince-comt e d'Aremberg' , 166 ; Hirschauer , Etats
d'Artoise, ii, 199 .
49
Lonchay , Correspondence ii , 525, 530.
50
Waddington , L a Rebublique des Provinces-Unies i , 103 ; H . Lonchay , L a rivalité de la
France et de l'Espagne au x Pays-Bas (Í635-Í700) (Brussels , 1896), 25-6 .
51
Hirschauer , Etats d'Artois i , 355 .
52
AG S Estado 2149. Ayton a to Philip IV, Brussels, 28 December 1630 .
53
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke of Olivares, 390-1, 405-6 .
special junta wa s forme d i n Madrid t o advis e on way s to improv e th e

machinery o f governmen t i n th e Spanis h Netherland s an d th e mos t
abrasively royalist of the native members o f Isabella's inner council, th e
Louvain-trained juris t Piete r Roos e wa s summone d fro m Brussel s t o
assist wit h it s deliberations . I n Madri d Roos e se t t o wor k wit h hi s
habitual zeal. In February 1631, he completed a forty-six page memoria l
on how t o undermine th e power of the provincial estates entitled 'De la
forme de subordonner le s Etats' and an assortment o f papers concernin g
the prunin g o f offices , check s o n bureaucrati c corruption , an d
reorganisation of provisioning and military finance.54 The Conde Duque
was thoroughl y impressed . Roos e struc k him a s being just th e ma n h e
needed to take the machinery of government in the South Netherlands in
hand. The jurist was promptly name d 'president ' o f the Conseil d'Etat at
Brussels and sent back armed wit h sweeping power s t o investigate, an d
reform, ever y are a of administration fro m th e enforcement o f the trade
embargoes agains t th e Dutc h t o th e accountin g o f militar y
expenditure.55
Aytona an d Roose , togethe r wit h th e capabl e ne w Castilia n
commander of the army, the marqués de Santa Cruz, initially succeeded
in restoring some semblance of stability to the Spanish Netherlands. But
scarcely ha d the y don e s o tha n th e Dutch , i n th e summe r o f 1632 ,
launched thei r mos t ambitiou s lan d offensiv e o f th e war , advancin g
rapidly u p th e Mas s valley , capturin g Venlo , Straele n Roermond ,
Maastricht an d Limbur g i n rapi d succession . Th e Spaniards , despit e
receiving assistanc e from th e Imperialists , proved unabl e t o ste m th e
advance. Th e entire Sout h Netherland s wa s plunged agai n in profound
turmoil. Th e defea t wa s no t just seriou s but th e mos t spectacula r and
humiliating suffere d b y Spanis h arm s in the Lo w Countrie s thu s far. 56
Furthermore, a t the start of the Dutch offensive, th e count van den Bergh
who, fo r som e time , ha d bee n i n treasonabl e contact wit h th e Dutc h
Stadholder, Frederic k Henry , ros e in open revol t takin g refug e a t Liège
where h e issued a series of printed manifestos calling on th e nobility o f
the South Netherlands to rise in armed rebellion against Spain.57 Van den
Bergh's proclamation s violentl y denounce d Spanis h despotis m an d
arrogance, accusin g the Castilians in the South Netherlands o f behaving
insufferably toward s th e local nobility.
Faced with incipient revolt , chroni c lack of funds, an d massive defeat
at Dutc h hands , Isabell a an d Ayton a no w gav e way t o th e eve r mor e
insistent pressur e of th e provincia l estate s fo r th e callin g o f th e State s
04
Delplanche , U n légiste ¡inversais, 28-30.
55
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke of Olivares, 406.
56
57
B L Add . 14007 , fos.433-40 ; J.J . Poelhekke , Frederik Hendrik. Prins va n Oranje
(Zutphen, 1978) , 373-4.
General i n order to open direct negotiations wit h the Dutch. Thi s was a
momentous step . Th e State s Genera l o f th e 'obedient ' province s ha d
now no t me t fo r over thre e decades an d it was one of the fundamental
tenets o f Olivares an d hi s colleagues tha t the y shoul d not , unde r any
circumstances, b e convened. Bu t no w th e regent at Brussels yielded in
the nam e o f th e king . Thos e provincia l assemblie s whic h wer e no t
already i n session gathered , delegate s for Brussel s were chosen , an d in
September 163 2 th e las t eve r gatherin g o f th e State s Genera l o f th e
southern Netherland s wa s convened . Somethin g o f th e moo d o f th e
country can be gauged from Aytona's lament 'el odio en que estamos los
españoles n o e s creíble'. 58 I n additio n t o th e instruction s o f thei r
provinces t o see k th e openin g o f formal negotiations wit h th e Dutch ,
with a vie w t o endin g th e wa r a s speedil y a s possible , th e delegate s
brought al l th e usua l complaint s o f th e province s abou t Spanis h
domination o f th e arm y an d administration. 59 Th e Brussel s State s
General, wit h th e duke of Aerschot at its head, lost no time in openin g
direct negotiations wit h th e Dutch State s General at The Hague , a t the
same time initiating a general propaganda drive in favou r o f peace, the
most eloquent manifestation of which was Eric Puteanus' pamphlet Des
Oorlogs e n Vredes Waegschaele, a passionate plea fo r a n en d t o th e strif e
dedicated to Aytona, addressed to the king and published a t The Hague!
The convenin g o f the Brussels States General, in the circumstances of
1632, was , i n Aytona' s view , a n unavoidabl e necessity . Olivares ,
however, profoundl y disapproved, being utterly convinced that nothing
but evi l woul d com e fro m it . H e repeatedl y expressed hi s amazement
that Ayton a shoul d hav e authorize d suc h a step. 60 Fo r eve n thos e
members of the States General at Brussels who were acting in good faith,
would, i n his view, still be guided by the interests of their own provinces
rather tha n by thos e o f the Monarch y a s a whole. I n a typical flight of
rhetoric, Olivare s declared in the Council of State, in March 1633 , tha t
'every hour [since direct talks, States to States, had commenced] that the
total loss of those provinces to the Dutch i s averted is one more miracle
that Ou r Lor d work s principall y by th e han d of thi s minister', tha t is
Pieter Roose. 61
But, for the moment, roya l authority in the Spanish Netherlands was
so weakene d tha t Olivare s an d th e kin g wer e compelle d t o dissembl e
their tru e feelings i n their public pronouncements and correspondence.
58
Lonchay , La Rivalité, 26
59
M . Gachar d (éd.) Actes des Etat Généraux de Í632 (Brussels, 1853), instructions to th e
delegates of Artois, Hainault, and Luxemburg, pp. 21-4, 33-4, 42.
60
AC S Estado 2151, consult a 29 May 163 3 'voto del señor Conde Duque', fos.3, 6 V
61
'E l negocio primero politico y mayor', exclaimed Don Gaspar, in June 1633, 'h a de
ser deshacer esta junta compuesta d e tantos infieles', AG S Estado 2151 , 'vot o del señor
Conde Duque sobr e las cartas del Presidente Roose', 25 June 1633 .
Rather king and Conde Duqu e publicly praised the States General for its
'wisdom' and 'loyalty', even while courteously rejecting their proposals.
Olivares' wors t suspicion s wer e confirme d whe n th e talk s becam e
deadlocked an d Aerschot tried to prevent thei r collapse by pressing for
Spanish concession s t o the Dutch i n the Indies . I f the Dutch agree d t o
evacuate Brazil, could not Philip , a s a quid pro quo, be moved t o legalize
their commerc e wit h Brazi l an d als o wit h som e o f th e Portugues e
conquests in Asia? 62 The roya l reply, o f July 1633 , t o this proposal i s a
classic instance of Olivarist politica l discourse. 63 The loyal Netherland s
could not secure a genuine peace for themselves, Phili p assured them, b y
sacrificing th e interests of Castile and Portugal; by that road they woul d
come onl y int o abject subservience t o the 'rebels'. The well-bein g and
security o f ever y par t o f th e Monarch y depende d o n th e unit y o f th e
whole, eac h part relying on, an d undertaking to assist the rest.
From th e outset Olivare s an d Roose worke d assiduousl y behin d th e
scenes t o sabotag e th e proceeding s a t Brussels an d Th e Hague , usin g
every expedien t t o hand. Th e Cond e Duque wa s ever mor e captivate d
with th e iro n resolutio n an d machiavellia n skill displayed by Roos e a t
this time. 64 Roose , fo r instance , categoricall y refuse d t o sig n ne w
pouvoirs fo r th e Brussel s State s General's negotiating team , pretendin g
that thei r credential s base d o n Philip' s authorizatio n fo r Isabell a t o
negotiate, o f 1629 , wer e sufficien t whil e i n fac t Phili p ha d secretl y
cancelled thi s authorizatio n i n a letter t o Roos e o f Novembe r 1632. 65
When Aerscho t travelle d to Madrid a t the end of 1633 in a last effort t o
save Th e Hagu e negotiations , Olivare s di d no t hesitat e t o arres t an d
harshly interrogat e th e figur e wh o ha d emerge d a s th e hea d o f th e
constitutional oppositio n t o roya l policy i n the souther n Netherlands .
The duke was held in captivity until he died si x years later.
Apart fro m th e comt e d e Warfusée , ver y fe w Sout h Netherland s
nobles went so far as to join van den Bergh in taking up arms, in collusion
with the Dutch, agains t the crown. Nevertheless , i t is totally misleading
to suggest that van den Bergh was 'supported b y only one or two mino r
nobles' an d tha t otherwis e th e Sout h Netherland s nobilit y remaine d
basically loyal. 66 O n th e new s o f va n de n Bergh' s defection , an d
summons t o the nobles of the South Netherlands to revolt against Spain,
the States of Flanders, Artois and Lille-Douai-Orchies (which were the n
62
63
AG R SE G 206, fos.361 v-2. Phili p IV to th e Brussel s States General's negotiating
team, Madrid, 19Jul y 1633 .
64
'Pedr o Roose' , enthuse d Do n Gaspar , 'e s d e los hombre s d e mas parte s qu e h e
conocido e n toda mi vida y de los mas enteros y realengos que es possible hallarse', AGS
Estado 2151, consulta 2 March 1633 .
65
M . G, d e Boer, Di e Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien undden Niederlanden i n
denjahren 1632 und 1633 (Groningen, 1898) , 54 .
66
Stradling , Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 186-7 .
all in session ) ha d n o choic e but t o denounc e his treason in categorical

terms and affirm thei r 'absolute loyalty' to the crown. 67 But in addition
to van den Bergh's treaso n involving the heretic Dutch rebels, there was
another, mor e widesprea d an d partially overlappin g conspiracy which
looked rather to France and in this conspiracy, orchestrated by Richelieu,
most o f th e leading nobles o f the Sout h Netherland s wer e involved. 68
Albert d e Ligne , Princ e d e Barbançon , a n intimat e frien d o f va n de n
Bergh, vigorousl y condemne d th e latte r i n a n (unsuccessful ) bi d t o
deflect suspicio n fro m himsel f bu t h e to o wa s u p t o hi s nec k i n anti -
government intrigue. 69 So was Louis, count o f Egmont, wh o now fled
to France, Guillaume de Melun, prince d'Espinoy (als o a member of the
Conseil d'Etat) , th e comt e d e Hennin , George s Carondelet , baro n d e
Noyelles an d governor o f Bouchain, th e baron de Crèvecoeur wh o was
governor o f d'Avesnes, the marquis de Tressigny wh o wa s governor o f
Philippeville, an d a whole assortmen t of othe r powerfu l personages. 70
By the spring of 1634 by when Roose - who m Olivare s had put in charge
of leadin g th e investigation s an d takin g th e appropriat e suppressiv e
measures - ha d most of the details, it was clear that the upper and middle
reaches o f th e Sout h Netherland s nobilit y wer e riddle d throug h an d
through wit h disloyalt y an d treason . Espino y an d Henni n followe d
Egmont's exampl e and fled to France, like him both subsequently being
condemned t o deat h i n thei r absence . Barbanço n wa s caugh t an d
incarcerated at Antwerp. The grands seigneurs of the Spanish Netherlands
were purged en masse from the Conseil d'Etat.
The conspiracies, unrest and constitutional agitation of the years 1632-
4 effectively destroye d Olivares' attempt s to forge a genuine partnership
between Castil e an d th e Sout h Netherlands . Ayton a an d Roos e
continued t o pu t i n a good wor d fo r th e occasiona l able Netherlander
who was free of suspicion such as the baron van Grobbendonck wh o was
cleared o f persona l responsibilit y fo r th e fal l o f 's-Hertogenbosc h an d
appointed governor of Louvain. But Olivares himself evidently now lost
all interest in seeking out an d fostering talented Netherlanders for royal
service. Th e king' s younge r brother , Do n Fernando , th e Cardinal -
Infante, wh o arrive d t o tak e over a s governor-genera l o f th e Spanis h
Netherlands in the autumn of 1634 was neither encouraged, nor showe d
the slightest inclination, to flatter the local nobility. O n th e contrary, he
declared himself distinctly unimpressed with Jan van Nassau, th e comte
de la Motterie, Jean de Maisières (the new governor o f Breda) and indeed
67
Henrard , Marie de Médias, 237-8.
68
Ibid., 203 , 241, 252-3; Waddington , La Republique des Provinces-Unies i, 146-8, 150,
203;Janssens, 'L'éche c des tentatives', 112-14.
69
Henrard , Maris d e Medias, 247 .
70
Gachard , Etudes ii , 380-3 ; Lonchay , Correspondence iii , 13 ; J. Cuvelier , 'Pierr e
Roose', Biographie Nationale d e Belgique xix, 58;Janssens, 'L'éche c des tentatives', 116.
all the senior Netherlande r serving i n the army.71 Jan van Nassau came
under suspicio n an d was eventually, i n 1637, ease d out of his command .
By the late 1630s, the military commanders who m the Cardinal-Infant e
regularly consulted consiste d of Prince Thomas of Savoy until he left in
1639, th e marqué s d e Fuentes, th e Neopolita n maestre de campo Andre a
Cantelmo, th e Portuguese Felip e de Silva who commande d th e cavalry
and wa s governo r o f Antwerp , an d othe r non-natives . Th e
Netherlanders ha d effectively bee n squeezed out .
But whilst th e standing of the South Netherland s nobilit y in the army
and local administratio n collapse d as a result of the events of 1632-4, th e
native elemen t amon g th e soldier y o f th e arm y o f Flander s greatl y
expanded bot h i n absolut e terms , an d a s a proportio n o f th e whole ,
which mean t tha t mor e an d mor e Walloo n an d Flemis h troop s wer e
serving under non-Netherlander s. For the arrival of the Cardinal-Infante
fresh fro m hi s triump h ove r th e Swede s a t Nördlinge n (1634) , wa s
followed, i n the spring of 1635, b y the the outbreak of the long-expecte d
war betwee n Franc e an d Spain . Th e Spanis h Netherland s no w face d
major enemie s o n bot h sides . I f Olivares' strateg y i n th e Netherland s
since 162 5 ha d involve d cuttin g bac k th e arm y t o a minimu m an d
keeping i t o n th e defensive , hi s strateg y no w wa s t o us e th e Sout h
Netherlands as both the anvil and the hammer of the Monarchy, t o turn
it int o a massivel y arme d bas e equippe d bot h t o diver t Frenc h effort s
away fro m Spai n an d Ital y and t o delive r th e blow s t o th e Dutc h an d
French with whic h the Conde Duque aspire d to extricate Spain from her
now terribl e predicament. Remittance s from Spain and Spanish Italy for
the arm y o f Flander s wer e dramaticall y increased . Th e army' s troo p
strength rose from under 50,000 in the late 1620s to around 90,000 in the
late 1630s . Meanwhile , whil e th e number o f Spanish and Italian troops
based i n th e Spanis h Netherland s ros e i n proportion , th e numbe r o f
German troops , Germa n mercenarie s being progressively harder to find
owing t o the escalation of the struggle in Germany, markedly decreased
both i n absolute and proportionate terms. To fill the gap the government
recruited more and more native troops.72
But it was not only in the sense that Olivares now strove to maximize
whereas previousl y h e ha d sough t t o minimiz e th e army' s siz e an d
striking power that his strategy in the Low Countries change d radically
from 1635 . Afte r 163 5 the Conde Duqu e also took t o intervening much
more tha n had been hi s wont i n the past in the actual use of the army.
But it is utterly wrong t o suppose that Olivares now launche d a 'great
offensive agains t France ' a s ha s bee n claimed. 73 R.A . Stradling' s
assertion that after 163 3 th e 'Spanish-Dutc h conflic t wa s fading into th e
71
Lonchay , Correspondence iii, 79 and 109 .
72
Parker , Army o f Flanders, appendi x A .
73
Stradling , Philip IV, 79.
background, ceasin g to be a "hot" wa r (excep t in the maritime theatre)

and tha t by defaul t condition s approximatin g to thos e of armistice held
sway unti l th e Treaty o f Munster' i s a total misconception.74 It may b e
true tha t Franc e wa s no w Spain' s mos t powerfu l enemy ; bu t i n th e
opening year s o f th e Franco-Spanis h wa r th e Frenc h armie s wer e stil l
rather disorganize d an d lacked comba t experience . Furthermor e Spai n
had n o territorial o r other objective s on the French side and none of the
major citie s o f the Spanis h Netherland s wer e immediately a t risk from
the French . B y contras t Olivare s considere d i t absolutel y essentia l t o
rebuild th e territoria l dept h an d strategi c viability o f Spain' s plaza de
armas on th e Dutch side and especially to recapture such major fortifie d
crossing-points over the rivers Maas and Rhine as Maastricht, Rheinberg
and Orsoy an d to buil d a new cordo n o f the defensive positions acros s
nothern Brabant t o link up with the Rhine.75 At the same time Antwerp,
Ghent an d Bruge s wer e al l immediatel y a t ris k fro m nearb y Dutc h
forces, a s was Breda which was precariously exposed but which was vital
to Spanis h interest s bot h fo r reason s of reputación an d becaus e it wa s
needed a s a bargaining counter in what th e Conde Duqu e hoped woul d
be th e pendin g negotiation s wit h th e Dutch . Anothe r poin t mad e by
various Spanis h minister s durin g th e year s 1635-4 0 wa s tha t th e
population o f the South Netherlands itself, an d certainly that of the two
politically mos t importan t provinces , Braban t an d Flanders , muc h
preferred guerra offensivaa against the Dutc h t o a n offensiv e agains t th e
French because the latter strategy would inevitabl y bring abou t the loss
of furthe r part s o f Braban t an d Flander s t o Protestan t contro l whil e
concentrating against the Dutch would prevent precisely that.76 Finally,
any town s capture d fro m th e Dutc h coul d b e reintegrate d int o th e
Spanish Netherland s whil e anythin g take n fro m th e Frenc h woul d
eventually have to be returned.
For these reasons there was no 'great offensive' agains t France nor any
intention of launching one, at least not with the Monarchy's main forces,
in the Spanish Netherlands. Far from the Spanish-Dutch struggle 'fading
into th e background ' i n th e year s afte r 163 5 i t no w flare d u p wit h
renewed intensity . Afte r fendin g of f th e ineffectiv e Frenc h attac k o f
1635, th e Cardinal-Infant e recaptured Genne p an d Limbur g and seized
the key Rhine fortress of Schenkenschans. At the same time, in line with
Olivares' policy, h e reopened truc e talks with the Dutch to see whether
74
R.A . Stradling, Europe and the Decline of Spain (London, 1981) , 103-4 .
75
AC S Estado 2153, 'Voto del conde duque' (16 November 1635) ; ACS Estado 2051.
'Voto del conde-duque' (1 7 June 1636); Israel, Th e Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World
251,253,258.
76
AC S Estad o 205 3 consult a o f th e junta d e estado, 7 Marc h 1638 , fo.7 . 'Vot o de l
marques de Villafranca'; B L MS 14007, fos.73-4. Phili p IV to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid,
30 August 1639.
they coul d no w b e induce d t o evacuat e Brazil. S o far was th e Cond e

Duque fro m preparing any 'great offensiv e against France in 1636-7' that
he admonished the Cardinal-Infante again and again through th e winter
of 1635-6 to expend ever y effort agains t the Dutch, fortifyin g Helmond
and Eindhoven a s well as Gennep, movin g u p all available forces to th e
Meierij, Cleves , and the Lower Rhine, an d above all to do his utmost t o
secure Schenkenschans which the Dutch (wh o were thoroughly alarme d
that Gelderland and Overijssel now la y virtually open t o the Spaniards)
were launchin g an unusual winter campaig n to retrieve. 77 All this was
vastly mor e importan t to the Conde Duque durin g the first half of 163 6
than any possible foray int o France which, indee d was then absent from
his mind. Whe n the Dutch recovered Schenkenschan s and Goch, earl y in
1636, Olivare s rage d uncontrollabl y bewailin g th e los s o f wha t h e
regarded as a crucial opportunity for extricating Spain from the strategic
trap in which she now foun d herself. 78 As late as June 1636 the Cardinal -
Infante was receiving orders from Madrid - not to invade France -but to
concentrate aroun d Helmon d an d Eindhove n an d t o tr y t o retak e
Schenkenschans.
The truth is that Olivares planned no great move against France in the
years 1636- 7 and the fora y t o Corbie , howeve r grea t th e pani c it ma y
have cause d i n Paris , wa s o f merel y secondar y significanc e within th e
context o f th e Conde-Duque' s strateg y o f th e lat e 1630s . I n 1637 , th e
plan, onc e again was to concentrate on the Dutch. The Cardinal-Infant e
succeeded in recapturing Venlo and Roermond, muc h t o the joy o f the
South Netherlands populace, and was about to besiege Grave or another
Dutch stronghol d whe n report s o f Frenc h incursion s int o Artoi s an d
Hainault caused him to turn back to face the French. This he did with the
support of his military subordinates but against the advice of Roose.79 As
a resul t th e Dutc h wer e abl e t o besieg e an d recaptur e Breda. 80 Fo r
months afte r Olivare s rage d ove r th e Cardinal-Infante' s 'disastrous '
mistake i n turnin g agains t th e Frenc h instea d of pressin g o n wit h th e
siege o f Grave, tightening the blockade of Maastricht, and persevering
with th e effort s t o re-establis h Spanis h power o n the lower Rhine, 81 In
77
AG R SE G 213 , fos.396-8 . Phili p I V t o Cardinal-Infante , Madrid , 1 1 December
1635: 'aquell o (Schenkenschans ) s e ha de mantener a qualquier precio . . .' ; AG S Estado
2153, 'vot o del Conde Duque, 1 6 November 1635 .
78
'Pue s veo señor qu e se ha perdido l a maior joia que el rey nuestro seño r tenía en esos
estados par a poder acomoda r sus cosas con gloria. . .' , BL Add. 14007, ib.57 . Olivares to
Cardinal-Infante, Madrid , 25 May 1636 .
79
AG R SEG 214, fo.565 . Phili p IV to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid , 13Jun e 1636 .
80
AG S Estado 2052. consult a 7 October 1637, 'vot o del Conde Duque mi señor sobre
despachos d e Flandes y Alemania'.
81
Ibid., AG R SE G 217 , fos.352-3 . Phili p I V t o Cardinal-Infante , Sa n Lorenzo, 2 0
October 1637; AGR SEG 217 fos.358-60 'Discurso que acá se ha hecho en la disputa sobre
atacar Grave o otra plaza de importancia, o Mastrique, o acudir a la frontera de Francia' .
January 1638 the Conde Duque again laid down that the Dutch front was
the main theatre of operations, th e French front secondary. 82 Even as late
as Augus t 1639 , whe n th e increasin g Frenc h pressure wa s compellin g
Spain t o assig n greate r priorit y t o th e French front, th e Conde Duqu e
was stil l urgin g th e Cardinal-Infant e nevertheles s t o kee p u p a s much
offensive pressure as possible on the Dutch side as it was vital for Spain to
recapture Maastricht , Rheinberg , Wese l an d als o Grave , fo r onl y b y
retaking these key strongholds coul d the Spanish grip on the great rivers,
and o n th e gateway s t o th e Nort h Netherland s an d German y b e
restored.83
During the last years of his ascendancy in Spain, Olivares' strategy in
the Lo w Countrie s wa s t o concentrat e th e bul k o f Spain' s militar y
strength ther e an d to use that strength a s a defensive bridle, protectin g
Italy an d Spai n as well a s the South Netherlands , agains t France, while
simultaneously waging offensiv e war against the Dutch. On e significant
result of the Conde Duque' s statecraft in the Netherlands afte r 163 5 was
the long-term reviva l of Spanis h power i n Limburg, Geldern , an d the
Roermond-Venlo area and more temporarily i n Cleves an d a large part
of th e Meierij , especiall y th e town s o f Helmon d an d Eindhoven . T o
accomplish hi s post-1635 goals in the Low Countries , Olivare s neede d
men an d mone y i n unprecedented , prodigiou s quantities . Bu t t o
administer thi s colossa l deploymen t o f resource s withou t excessiv e
waste an d inefficiency , i t wa s essentia l that th e Spanis h crow n shoul d
dispose in its Netherlands province s of a government machinery whic h
was reliable and effective at least in those sectors which had some bearing
on th e wa r effort . Fo r inevitabl y Olivare s wa s no w leanin g o n th e
Spanish Netherlands to a greater extent than ever. Recruiting, billeting,
procurement of horses and supplies, construction of new - and the repair
of old - fortifications , an d of course, taxation and maritime pivateering
were all now proceedin g on a considerably vaster scale than in the 1620 s
and earl y 1630s . Ye t thi s mor e efficien t extractio n o f resource s wa s
achieved not b y coaxin g local co-operation, showin g confidenc e in the
nobility, an d seeking to creat e a sense of partnership. Th e crow n no w
ignored th e nobilit y an d too k les s troubl e ove r it s dealing s wit h th e
provincial assemblies , exactin g the acquiescenc e require d b y mean s of
intimidation an d the use of more and more foreign officials an d officers ,
many of them Portuguese or Italian as well as Castilian. By the late 1630s
not only was the larger part of the payments system between Spai n and
Antwerp bein g handle d b y th e Portugues e Ne w Christia n banker s o f
Madrid an d thei r Portugues e factor s i n Antwer p bu t th e leadin g
Antwerp Portuguese, most notably Don García de Yllan, were also now
handling the provisioning, and especially the supply of bread, horses and
82
AC S Estado 2156, consultas 8 January and 9 March 1638, 'votos ' d e Olivares.
83
B L Add. 14007, fos.73-4 .
gunpowder, t o the army.84

Pieter Roos e wa s the lynch-pin of the administration, th e man who ,
more than any other, wa s the embodiment o f royal policy in the Spanish
Netherlands. Olivare s kne w perfectl y well tha t his Brabantine protég é
was heartil y deteste d b y virtuall y everyon e o f consequenc e i n th e
country. H e eve n regarde d thi s a s proo f o f hi s worth. 85 Th e Cond e
Duque's confidenc e remaine d unshakeabl e tha t i f anyon e coul d hol d
administrative abus e an d malpractic e i n chec k i n th e Spanis h
Netherlands, an d ensur e tha t th e resource s flowin g i n fro m Spai n an d
Spanish Ital y were not dissipate d uselessly through mismanagement , it
was th e cold , unbending , isolate d Piete r Roose . Agai n an d agai n
Olivares backe d up Roose's advic e and judgments i n the face of a hail of
hostile criticism . Wit h th e leading South Netherland s nobleme n cowe d
or i n exil e mos t o f the open oppositio n t o Roose' s auster e handling o f
affairs emanate d from th e southern European official s an d commanders .
But Olivares took no notice. Prince Thomas o f Savoy loathed Roose and
eventually left th e king's servic e in the Low Countries largel y because of
him.86 The Cardinal-Infante himself complaine d continuall y of Roose' s
meddling an d insolence bu t could do nothing to dislodge him .
In the final phase of the Olivares era, following the Catalan Revolt and
the secession of Portugal in December 1640, the Spanish Monarchy face d
its severest crisis yet. Desperate measures had to be taken to raise armies
in the Peninsula. The recruiting drive s in Castile were intensified. I t also
now becam e the practice to ferr y substantia l bodies o f Walloon troop s
from th e Netherlands to serve in the Peninsula using the royal armada de
Flandes, th e king' s warship s base d a t Dunkirk . Unde r thi s sor t o f
pressure th e Conde Duque an d the king had no choic e bu t t o swallo w
their prid e an d see k a t leas t a partia l rapprochemen t wit h th e Sout h
Netherlands magnate s including some of those implicated in the treason
of 1632-4. Overtures were made. Barbançon was released from prison in
June 1642 and commissioned t o serve as one of the Walloon commanders
in th e Peninsula , wit h presumabl y som e o f hi s confiscate d propert y
being returne d t o him . Ye t th e essentia l strateg y whic h Olivare s ha d
adhered t o i n th e Netherland s sinc e 163 5 remaine d intact . Despit e th e
desperate situatio n i n th e Peninsula , i t wa s decide d tha t th e arm y o f
Flanders shoul d remai n th e mai n fightin g forc e o f the Monarchy , tha t
Spain, i n othe r words , shoul d continu e t o concentrat e he r militar y
capability in the north. I n 1640 a total of 4,300,000 ducats, an extremely
high leve l o f remittances , wa s sen t fro m Madri d t o th e Spanis h
Netherlands and the flow continued at this very high level also following
84
Se e below pp.341-2; Hans Pohl, Di e Portugiesen i n Antwerpen (Wiesbaden , 1977) ,
236-9.
85
Lonchay , Correspondence iii , 200.
86
Delplanche , U n légiste anversois, 100-2 .
the secession of Portugal in December.87

In th e lon g ru n i t ma y b e that thi s crucia l decision wa s a disastrous
error fro m th e Spanis h poin t o f view. Certainl y i t mean t tha t Castile
fought th e Catalan and Portuguese insurgents in the Peninsula with ill -
trained, poorl y equipped and supplied, an d relatively small forces. The
reconquest of Catalonia, consequently , was to prove painfully slo w and
difficult whil e Portugues e independence , still precariou s i n th e 1640s ,
was no t seriousl y challenged unti l afte r 165 9 b y whic h tim e i t wa s
probably to o late . Ye t howeve r surprisin g i n moder n eyes , i n th e
circumstances of the time the decision was a perfectly logical one. For in
the Sout h Netherland s Spai n ha d no t onl y he r experienced , seasone d
troops bu t th e fortification s an d base s wit h whic h t o sustai n thei r
effectiveness, th e means to feed, cloth e and equip her soldiery, a highly
efficient transpor t syste m an d a smoothl y functionin g administratio n
geared to handling a major military effort. Th e Spanish Netherlands was
still a uniquely valuable strategic asset, still an effective bridle on France.
For despite the setbacks in Catalonia and Portugal, the French, with an
entrenched highl y traine d Spanis h arm y i n thei r rear , clos e t o Paris ,
could now n o more than before shift th e bulk of their forces southwards
for a n all-ou t attemp t eithe r o n Spai n or Italy . Militarily , th e Spanish
Netherlands wer e stil l th e Monarchy' s trum p car d an d suc h the y
remained down to the Peace of the Pyrenees.
To conclude w e ma y asser t tha t Olivares ' polic y i n th e Spanis h
Netherlands does show important element s of continuity with the past.
The tendenc y t o regar d th e Spanis h Netherlands a s Spain' s bridl e o n
France, the plaza de armas of the Monarchy, neither began nor ended with
Olivares thoug h h e wa s th e foremos t exponen t o f th e concept . Th e
decision to base a royal armada in Flanders and turn the Flemish sea-ports
into a majo r privateerin g bas e goe s bac k t o th e year s o f th e Zúñig a
regime. Ye t a t th e sam e time , ther e is no denyin g tha t a distinctively
Olivarist approac h to th e governmen t o f th e Spanis h Netherlands di d
evolve during the 1620s. It is an approach which ca n be said to have had
two distinc t phases. I n the first phase, down to 1632, th e essence of the
policy was to try to create an authentic partnership between Castile and
the Spanis h Netherland s by cultivatin g the local nobles an d provincial
estates and, at the same time, to render Spain's main military base less of a
burden to Castile not only in terms of cost but als o in terms of numbers
of Spanis h troops transferre d to the Low Countries . Thi s policy broke
down under the weight o f the Netherlanders' grievances against Spain,
the discontent of the South Netherlands nobles, an d the growing threa t
from France . After 163 5 Olivares ' polic y in the South Netherlands was
very different in a number of respects. His strategy now was to maximize
instead of minimize Spain's military build-up in the Spanish Netherlands
87
See, for instance, ACS Estado 2056, consulta 1 June 1641.
and to do without the good wil l and support of the South Netherland s
provinces, swampin g the administration an d the higher echelons o f the
army wit h Spaniards , Portuguese , an d Italians . Ye t eve n afte r 163 5
certain feature s o f the former Olivaris t approac h to the government o f
the Spanis h Netherland s persiste d an d eve n receive d adde d emphasis.
Olivares redouble d hi s effort s t o forc e a n administrative machiner y i n
the country which would be under the thumb neither of the local nobility
nor of the Spaniards based in the country, and thanks to the tireless zeal of
Pieter Roose , b y n o mean s wholl y withou t success . Furthermore ,
despite th e brea k wit h th e Walloo n magnates , th e administratio n an d
army in the Spanish Netherlands after 163 5 did in some respects come to
reflect Olivares ' idea l of a more integrated monarchy to a greater exten t
than ha d bee n th e cas e i n th e 1620s . Th e ol d dependenc e o n larg e
numbers of extraneous, mostly German , mercenarie s ended. By the late
1630s the army of Flanders consisted overwhelmingly o f the king's ow n
subjects wit h unprecedentedl y larg e Spanis h an d Italia n contingent s
stationed in the country as well as greatly increased numbers of Walloon
and Flemis h troop s unde r arms . Th e rol e o f th e Genoes e banker s i n
handling th e asiento payments to Antwer p wa s markedl y reduced, th e
main responsibilit y no w bein g assigne d t o th e Portugues e Ne w
Christians who wer e the king's subjects. In as far as outsiders secured th e
pick of the military and civil posts in the Spanish Netherlands, thes e now
included a n appreciabl e numbe r o f Italian s and Portugues e a s well a s
Castilians. Take n together , th e two phase s of Olivares' statecraf t i n the
Spanish Netherlands are among the most important manifestations of his
political career.
7
SPAIN, THE SPANISH EMBARGOES, AND THE STRUGGLE

FOR THE MASTERY OF WORLD TRADE, 1585-166 0
Much ha s bee n writte n abou t th e economi c weaknes s o f Habsbur g

Spain. S o much s o that it is easy to forget that Spain at the close of th e
sixteenth century , an d during th e first half o f the seventeenth , wa s in
some respects much the greatest economic power on earth.1 The Spanish
crown had, by the 1570s, largel y sealed off Spanish America from non-
hispanic Europe, securin g a vast captive market which afforde d Castil e
the bulk of the world silve r supply and of tropical America's output o f
indigo, cochineal, tobacco, an d dye-woods. Thi s in itself was no small
bureaucratic an d economi c feat . Bu t ther e wa s more . When , i n 15,80 ,
Portugal and the Portugese overseas empire were joined t o the Spanish
crown, Spai n suddenl y foun d hersel f i n a n unrivalle d positio n fro m
which t o dominat e worl d trad e routes , market s an d resources . Th e
Spanish crow n wa s b y fa r th e world' s larges t handle r o f bullion ,
American an d Guine a gol d a s well a s silver. Castile , Valencia , Ibiza ,
Portugal, an d the salt-pans of the Spanish Caribbean together accounted
for nearl y al l of th e world' s the n accessibl e deposits o f goo d qualit y
marine salt, a product vital for the Dutch fisheries and those of Norwa y
and the Baltic. Portugal's colonies of Brazil and Sâo Thome provided the
bulk of Europe's suga r supply. By the 1590 s Lisbo n had for a century
been Europe' s leadin g emporiu m for pepper, fine spices and other East
India commodities . Castile , furthermore , wa s th e sol e sourc e o f th e
high-grade merin o woo l whic h ha d lon g been , an d unti l th e lat e
eighteenth centur y continued t o be, the mainstay of Europe's fine cloth
industry.
Seeing such vast economic leverage accumulated in their hands, it was
natural tha t afte r 158 0 Spanis h minister s shoul d hav e begu n t o giv e
serious attention to schemes for mobilizing Spain's enormous economi c
power against her European rivals and enemies;2 and if the first attempts
to impos e embargoe s o n th e trad e an d shipping o f Spain' s enemie s
1
Antoni o Domínguez Ortiz , 'Guerr a económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado
de Felipe IV', Hispania xxii i (1962), 70 .
2
Felip e Rui z Martín, 'L a etap a marítim a d e la s Guerra s d e Religión . Bloqueo s y
contrabloqueos', Estudios de Historia Moderna (Universit y of Barcelona) III (1953), 183-6.
showed tha t ther e wer e man y difficultie s t o b e overcom e befor e such

action coul d b e effective , i t shoul d caus e n o surpris e tha t Spanis h
ministers shoul d hav e continue d fo r man y decade s afte r t o b e
mesmerized by the possibilities offered b y the embargo as an instrument
of state. Bu t ho w importan t a factor i n Spanis h and world histor y was
this endurin g Spanis h preoccupatio n wit h th e embargo ? Althoug h a
considerable amoun t o f evidenc e ha s bee n adduce d t o sho w tha t thi s
aspect o f Spanis h statecraf t wa s indee d o f fundamenta l importance, 3
most historian s hav e tended , an d stil l tend , t o de-emphasize ,
marginalize, o r eve n ignore it. I t would be hard t o guess , fo r instance,
from th e brie f reference s t o thi s topi c i n th e outlin e work s o n earl y
modern Spai n b y Henry Kame n and R.A. Stradlin g tha t the imposin g
and maintainin g o f th e economi c embargoes , an d th e diplomati c
campaigns to back them up, wer e one of the most fundamental and far-
reaching aspects of Spain's role in the wider world from the zenith of her
power until far into the period of her decline. 4
Nor i s thi s universa l tendenc y t o marginaliz e Spain' s wagin g o f
economic warfare against her European opponents at all surprising when
one considers the weight o f scholarly authority o n which it rests. It was
one of the central contentions o f Fernand Braudel that this type of state
action in the early modern context, whether attempte d by Spain, France,
or any other power, di d not and could not substantially affect, o r divert,
the eb b an d flo w o f material life , th e underlyin g interactio n betwee n
markets.5 Braudel's dismissing of the Spanish embargoes as a secondary
phenomenon subsequentl y receive d emphati c suppor t fro m a whol e
array of historians including José Alcalá-Zamora, Henr y Kamen, James
Casey, R.A . Stradling , Pauline Croft and most recently Carlos Gómez -
Centurión.6 Al l thes e writer s insiste d tha t th e variou s embargoe s
imposed b y th e Spanish crow n agains t the Dutch, English , and French
were base d on unrealisti c assumptions an d represent an overestimation
of what the bureaucratic apparatus of the time could achieve. Dismissing
Philip IV' s embarg o o f 1621-4 7 agains t the Dutc h a s so muc h wasted
effort, Alcalá-Zamor a insiste d tha t the 'Dutch merchant fleet instead of
being reduced to inactivity, overcame without difficult y th e obstacles to
3
J.I. Israel, Th e Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford, 1982) 134-
43 et seq.
4
Henr y Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714. A Society of Conflict (London , 1983), 207-8 ; R.A .
Stradling, Europe an d the Decline of Spain (London , 1981), 58 , 63-4 .
5
Fernan d Braudel, La Méditerranée e t le monde méditerranéen à l'époque d e Philippe I I ( 2
vols. Paris , 1966) , 569-74 ; Fernand Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme
XV''-XVIIIe siècle (3 vols. Paris, 1979 ) iii , 175 , 218 .
6
Jos é Alcalá-Zamora , España, Flandes y e l Ma r del Norte (1618-1639) (Barcelona ,
1975), 178-86 ; Carlo s Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II , l a empresa d e Inglaterra y e l comercio
septentrional (1566-1609) (Madrid, 1988), 362 .
Spain an d the Mastery o f World Trade 19 1
their trade imposed b y the Spanish crown.'7

The Braudelia n vie w o f th e Spanis h embargoe s fit s wel l wit h th e
wider tren d i n early modern historica l studies to play down the capacity
of the early modern state to intervene with effec t i n economic an d social
life. I t also appears to accord with th e numerous contemporary Spanish
statements to the effect tha t the embargoes were often circumvente d and
were evaded on a massive scale. This is what Henry Kamen meant when
asserting tha t 'ther e i s substantia l contrar y evidence ' agains t m y
argument tha t th e embargoe s exerte d a dee p an d endurin g impact. 8
Certainly contemporar y Spanis h minister s frequentl y observed , a s a
member o f the Council of State put it, in August 1605, tha t 'we hear on
all side s tha t grea t quantitie s o f Dutc h goods ente r thes e realm s i n
violation o f th e roya l prohibitio n wit h fals e document s an d throug h
other ruse s . . . an d th e lac k o f diligenc e show n b y th e ordinar y
magistrates in punishing an d suppressing such activity'.9
Given tha t s o many historian s have argued for th e ineffectiveness of
the embargoes, an d the contemporary testimony a s to the prevalence of
evasive practices, i t is understandable that Braudel's stanc e on the issue
should continu e to command widesprea d acceptance. Yet, fo r all that, it
seems to me vital that his view of the matter be strongly challenged. For
not onl y doe s th e Braudel-Kame n view , a s I shal l cal l it , rende r i t
impossible t o understan d wh y th e embarg o polic y becam e a centra l
preoccupation o f the Spanish crown, a s it most certainly was, for over a
century; but i t also obscures, I shall argue, som e of the most importan t
changes in European commerce and shipping of the early modern era. If,
in wha t follows , I depic t th e Braudel-Kame n vie w o f th e Spanis h
embargoes a s one of the great errors of modern historiograph y I do not
mean merely that it is a mistake which is frequently repeated but that it is
a basi c misconceptio n whic h conceal s an d confuse s a whole serie s o f
fundamental shift s and changes on the early modern Europea n scene.
There is little doub t tha t th e first general embargo , impose d agains t
both th e English an d the Dutch i n 158 5 was haphazard and ill-planne d
and wa s widel y evade d throug h al l manne r o f subterfuges . Larg e
numbers of Dutch vessels took to sailing first to Hanseatic ports to obtain
Hanseatic paper s before sailing on t o th e Iberia n Peninsula where the y
frequently succeeded , a t leas t a t first , i n passin g themselve s of f a s
'Hanseatic'.10 Eve n s o th e initia l arres t decree d b y th e crow n nette d
7
Alcala-Zamora , op. cit., 183-4 .
8
Se e Henry Kamen' s review of my Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World i n the Times
Higher Education Supplement o f 1 9 November 1982 .
9
Quote d in Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II , 362 .
10
Fernan d Braudel , L a Méditerranée e t le monde méditerranéen à ¡'époque d e Philippe I I
(Paris, 1949) , 492-5 ; Gómez-Centurión , Felipe H , 211-15 ; Carlo s Gómez-Centurión ,
'Las relacione s hispano-hanseática s durante el reinad o d e Felip e II', Revista d e Historia
Naval XV (1986) , 70-9 .
around on e hundre d Dutc h ship s i n Portuga l a s wel l a s a substantial

number in the ports of Castile. Furthermore , i t is scarcely valid to point
out th e subterfuges the Dutch resorte d t o without als o mentioning th e
subsequent crack-down o n supposedly 'neutral ' vessels in Iberian ports.
The mos t dramati c coup wa s th e general arres t and searc h of 'neutral '
ships carried out by the duke of Medina Sidonia in the ports of Andalusia
in Januar y 1587 . Thi s wel l co-ordinate d swee p nette d thirty-on e
disguised Dutc h vessel s i n Cadi z alone , th e tota l fo r th e whol e o f
Andalusia amountin g t o ninety-four ship s manne d by 1,60 0 seamen. 11
Ships, cargoe s and the 868 cannon foun d on board wer e all seized. Th e
idea that Dutch merchant s could simply shrug off such losses as if they
were nothin g is , o f course , absurd . Rathe r Dutc h busines s suffere d a
stinging blo w a s we se e from th e sudde n drop , a s fro m 1587 , i n th e
number o f Dutc h ship s sailin g t o th e Iberia n Peninsula an d the n on ,
direct to the Baltic. Compare d wit h the numbers of Dutch ship s whic h
made thi s voyag e befor e 1587 , an d agai n between 159 0 an d 1597 , th e
totals for 1587-9, after a sharp drop in 1586, represent a virtual collapse. It
is perhaps just possible that the Danish officials wh o kept the Sound toll
registers entere d i n thei r list s ship s whic h the y kne w wer e Dutc h a s
sailing from 'Hamburg ' o r 'Lübeck' . Bu t there is no indication that this
did happe n whil e there is incontrovertible proof that during these years
there wa s a vigorou s boo m i n th e Hanseati c Spanienfahrt, a boom ,
moreover, whic h wa s concentrate d more o n Lübec k than on th e Elb e
estuary ports. 12 Eve n i f som e o f th e Hanseati c vessel s sailin g t o th e
Iberian Peninsul a an d the n listed , o n passin g eastward s throug h th e
Sound, as 'Hanseatic' were really Dutch, th e numbers can not have been
enough t o matc h th e massiv e contractio n i n shippin g sailin g from th e
Peninsula t o th e Balti c liste d a s 'Dutch' . Eve n thoug h ver y fe w
Amsterdam freigh t contract s (th e mos t conclusiv e evidenc e fo r th e
effectiveness o f the Spanish embargoes afte r 1598 ) have survived for th e
1580s, ther e is reason enough, particularl y in the light of what happened
later, t o infe r tha t eve n th e comparativel y short-live d an d inefficien t
embargo of 1585-90 against the Dutch had an appreciable impact and was
one o f th e factor s contributin g t o wha t wa s unquestionabl y a rather
serious economi c depressio n i n th e northern Netherlands durin g these
years.13
11
Archiv o General de Simancas (hereafter ACS ) E-Flandes, legajo 2218-120 'Lo qu e
ay en el embargo de las urcas que se han detenido en el Andaluzia por el Duque de Medina
Sidonia' (I am indebted to Captain José Ignacio González-Aller Hierro for making a copy
of this document available to me); Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II , 215.
12
B . Hagedorn , Ostfrieslands Handel unâ Schiffahrt vont Ausgang des íó.Jahrhunderts bis
zum Westfálischen Frieden (1580-1648) (Berlin , 1912) , 228-9; Ellinger Bang, Tabelleri, 86-
363.
13
Erns t Baasch, Hollàndische Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Jena , 1927) , 256-7.
Spain an d th e Mastery o f World Trade 19 3
Table 7 Dutch and Hanseatic Shipping sailing from Spain and

Portugal direct through the Sound to the Baltic, 1581-90
(ships per year)
Year Dutch Hanseatic Year Dutch Hanseatic

1581 9 25 8 158 62 25 2
1582 7 64 5 158 71 28 2
1583 7 84 6 158 84 8 7
1584 9 34 8 158 93 8 3
1585 7 16 4 159 0 10 1 12 8
Source: N . Ellinge r Bang, Tabeller over skibfart og varetransport gennem Oresund,

1497-1660 (3 vols. Copenhagen 1906-33) i, 86-363.
In 1590 Philip II decided to lift the embargo on the Dutch, doubtles s to

help reliev e th e acut e shortage s o f masts , ropes , pitc h an d othe r vita l
naval stores which developed i n the Peninsula in the wake of the failure of
the Armada, while retaining the prohibition o n trade with th e English.
This ne w situatio n wit h th e Dutch bein g allowe d t o trad e (albeit wit h
occasional interruptions , a s in 1595) while the English wer e kept out was
certainly one of the main factors in the spectacular growth o f the Dutc h
'rich' trades during the 1590s. Spanis h policy had the effect of locking the
English int o stagnatio n whils t (inadvertently ) helping t o prope l th e
Dutch entrepo t int o it s post-159 0 phas e o f unprecedente d rapi d
expansion. Historian s have often assumed that the tremendous impetu s
which characterize d the Dutch tradin g system in the 1590s wa s a direct
result of the Spanish recapture of Antwerp in 1585 and the closing of the
Scheldt t o maritim e traffic. Bu t thi s is an oversimplification of a more
complex process . Fo r mos t o f th e majo r Antwer p emigr é merchant s
importing spices , suga r an d othe r high-valu e ware s fro m souther n
Europe tended to migrate first to north-western German y rather than to
the norther n Netherlands. 14 I n the immediat e aftermath of 1585 , wit h
the norther n Netherland s grippe d b y recession , i t wa s Hamburg ,
Cologne an d the other commercia l centre s of north-western German y
rather tha n th e Dutc h maritim e town s whic h inherite d Antwerp' s
mantle as Europe's centra l storehouse fo r th e 'rich ' trades , albei t onl y
briefly.15 Although Hamburg's primac y in the distribution of spices and
14
Herman n Kellenbenz , 'De r Pfeffermark t u m 160 0 und die Hansestadte', Hansische
Geschichtsblatter Ixxiv (1956) , 33-6 ; G.S. Gramulla , Handelsbeziehungen Kelner Kaufleute
zwischen 1500 und 1650 (Cologne, 1972 ) 205-7; J.I. Israel , Dutch Primacy i n World Trade
1585-1740 (Oxford, 1989) , 32-5 .
15
Israel, Dutch Primacy, 41-2 ; Herman n Kellenbenz , Unternehmerkrafte im Hamburger
Portugal-und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625 (Hamburg, 1954) , 47 .
sugar to northern Europe persisted until the mid 1590s, the shift toward s
Dutch hegemony, an d the movement o f Antwerp emigré merchants and
sugar refiner s from German y t o Holland , bega n with th e lifting o f the
depression i n th e norther n Netherlands , i n 1590 , an d th e onse t o f a n
astonishingly vigorou s boom . Th e sudde n recover y an d tremendou s
expansion ha d severa l causes . Strategi c factors , especiall y Philip' s
decision t o switc h his main military effort i n the north fro m th e Dutc h
provinces t o Franc e and the subsequent Dutch counter-offensiv e of the
years 1590-9 7 whic h cleare d th e Spaniard s from al l the river s linking
Holland with Germany playe d a major part. But there can be little doubt
that one of the most crucial factors behind the unprecedented impetus of
Dutch long-distanc e commerc e fro m 1590 was the lifting of the Spanish
embargo agains t thei r cargoe s an d products , includin g textil e
manufactures, whils t England remained under Philip H' s ban. 15*It ma y
be tru e tha t English merchant s did no t easil y relinquish thei r lucrativ e
traffic wit h th e Iberia n Peninsul a and , b y a variet y o f subterfuge s
continued t o send some merchandis e to Spain. 16 But the point is not that
remitting English goods to th e Peninsula wa s impossible, o r anythin g
like it , bu t simpl y tha t i t wa s no w muc h easier , cheaper , an d mor e
convenient t o ship in Dutch cargoes .
On the accessio n of Phili p HI in 1598 , Spanis h ministers decide d to
revert t o a policy of embargo agains t the Dutch. 17 They did so because
they wer e convince d (quit e rightly) tha t th e recen t rapi d expansio n o f
Dutch commerc e an d shippin g ha d ver y appreciabl y strengthened th e
United Province s and provided th e rebel Dutch state with the means not
only t o keep up the struggle against Spain but greatl y to improve thei r
forces an d fortifications . Philip' s minister s wer e als o convince d tha t
Iberian sal t was indispensibl e t o th e Dutch herrin g fishery , on e of the
pillars o f thei r trade , an d tha t high-grad e sal t an d othe r souther n
European goods , togethe r wit h silve r an d colonial products , wer e th e
motor o f the recent Dutch conques t of the 'rich' trades of the Baltic and
northern part s generally an d here too they were right. 18 The Conde d e
Chinchón's formul a expressed i n the Council o f State, in 1605, tha t the
'rebels sustai n the war with th e proceeds of the trade with the Peninsula,
and fro m thei r fisheries' , wa s somethin g o f a n exaggeration bu t ha d a
15* Israel, Dutch Primacy, 39-41, 49-51; see also Braudel, La Méditerranée (1949) , 495-6 ;
M. Ulloa , L a hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe U (Madrid, 1977) , 269-70, 278 -
9.
16
Paulin e Croft , Th e Spanish Company (London , 1977) , p.xxix.
17
Teófil o Guiar d y Larrauri , Historia del consulado y casa de contratación de Bilbao y de l
comercio d e l a villa ( 2 vols . Bilbao , 1913 ) i , 244 ; E . Stols , D e Spaanse Brabanders o f de
handelsbetrekkingen de r zuidelijke Nederlanden me t d e Iberische wereld, 1598-1648 (Brussels,
1971) i , 8-9 .
18
W . Brûlez , 'D e zoutinvoe r i n d e Nederlande n i n d e 16 C eeuw' , Tijdschrift voor
Geschiedenis Ixviii (1955), 184-5 ; Israël, loc. cit .
considerable core of truth.19

That ther e woul d b e subterfug e and evasio n on a massive scale was
obvious t o Spanis h ministers fro m th e outset . Fro m al l sides streamed
reports o f Dutc h merchant s resortin g t o th e us e of Hanseati c papers,
certificates and ships and crews, to camouflage their Iberian commerce.20
The Sephard i Jewish communit y o f Amsterda m switched , fro m 159 8
until the lifting of the new general embargo in 1608, to the systematic use
of Nort h Germa n i n plac e o f Dutc h ship s an d crew s an d too k t o
importing a larg e par t o f thei r Iberia n produc e vi a Emde n wher e a
subsidiary Portugues e Jewis h communit y too k roo t fo r th e interim. 21
Large quantities of Dutch merchandis e als o began entering Spai n from
1598 vi a L a Rochelle an d othe r wes t coas t Frenc h ports i n al l kinds of
small French craft. 22 Yet , extensive though th e evidence of evasion is, it
does no t mea n tha t th e embarg o wa s essentiall y ineffectiv e o r tha t
Spanish minister s showe d themselves , b y thei r persistenc e in going o n
with it , t o b e blind t o th e facts o r lacking in realism. O n th e contrary,
such ke y minister s (an d undoubted realists ) as the cond e d e Chinchó n
and Balthasa r d e Zúñig a ha d ver y goo d reason s fo r repeatedl y
reaffirming thei r commitmen t t o th e embargoes agains t the Dutch and
English an d their determination to tighten up their implementation.23
Except fo r a period i n 1603-4 when th e embargoes wer e modifie d -
against Zúñiga's advice - to an across-the-board 30 % duty on all imports
and exports not certifie d as coming from, o r destined for, the Habsburg
Netherlands,24 a device which it s instigator, the Basque official Juan de
Gauna, ha d assured Lerma an d the king would d o more damag e to the
Dutch tha n a blanket prohibition, the policy of shutting the Dutch out of
the trade of Spain and Portugal was rigidly adhered to from the autumn
of 159 8 dow n t o 1608 . Th e ful l embarg o wa s reimposed , o n th e
recommendation o f Chinchón and other leading ministers in September
1604.25 A variet y o f expedient s wer e foun d t o tighte n it s
implementation. Prodde d b y Zúñiga , th e Archduk e Alber t wa s
19
M . Alcoce r y Martíne z (éd. ) Consultas del Consejo d e Estado, (1600-1606) ( 2 vols .
Madrid, 1930-2 ) ii, 207. consulta 10 May 1605 .
20
C . Fernánde z Duro, Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Leon (9
vols. Madrid, 1895-1903 ) iii, 229 ; Alcoce r y Martínez, Consultas i, 19-23 .
21
E.M . Koen , 'Amsterda m notaria l deed s pertainin g t o th e Portugues e Jews i n
Amsterdam up to 1639', Stadia Rosenthaliana ii, pp.120, 124 , 258-9, 263, 27 0 and iii, 114 ,
118, 119 , 121 , 123 , 235 , 246 .
22
Alcoce r y Martínez, Consultas i, 21; A. Girard , L e commerce français à Seville et Cadiz
au temps des Habsbourg (Paris , 1932) , 54 .
23
Alcoce r y Martínez, Consultas i, 264-5, and ii, 87, 207, 241 .
24
J . d e Sturler, 'U n épisode de la politique douanière de s Archiducs: l'expérienc e de
Juan d e Gaun a (1603-5) ' Revue d e l'Université d e Bruxelles xli i (1936/7) , 369 ; M.A .
Echevarría Bacigalupe , 'U n episodi o e n l a guerr a económic a hispano-holandesa : e l
Decreto Gauna (1603)', Híspanla xlv i (1986), 58 , 66-8 .
25
Alcoce r y Martínez, Consultas ii, 81, 87, 90.
compelled, fro m 1599 , t o enforc e th e embarg o als o i n th e Habsbur g

Netherlands.26 Inspector s o r veedores o f commerc e wer e poste d i n
various Spanis h ports . Iberia n merchant s wer e subjecte d t o a n
increasingly elaborat e system o f check s an d certificates . The embarg o
was eventually extended t o include Emden. 27
But perhaps the most tellin g proof of the crown's commitmen t t o the
embargo polic y wa s th e intensiv e diplomati c campaig n undertake n t o
back i t up . Historian s hav e thu s fa r take n little not e o f the length s t o
which Spanis h ministers were prepared to go to underpin their embargo
policy. S o it is worth emphasizing that from the late 1590s onwards, th e
embargoes were , fo r decade s o n end , on e o f the principl e concerns o f
Spain's European diplomacy. Major clauses of the Anglo-Spanish peac e
of 1604, fo r example, were devoted t o ensuring that English merchants
and ships woul d not , wit h England now a t peace with Spain , cover for
the Dutch. 28 James I undertook no t onl y tha t hi s subject s would no t
supply o r sel l Dutch-owne d cargoes , o r products , i n Spain , Portugal ,
Flanders 'o r othe r realm s o f th e kin g o f Spain ' bu t tha t al l Englis h
consignments t o the Peninsula had to be accompanied by certificates and
seals affixed a t the place of provenance; and that any goods shipped from
England 'qua e ne e registrata e ne e segillat a fuerint , cadan t i n
confiscationem e t sun t u t dicitu r d e bon a preda'. 29 Spanis h an d
Portuguese officials , i n othe r words , di d no t nee d t o prov e tha t
merchandise arrivin g o n Englis h vessel s wa s actuall y Dutch. I t wa s
enough fo r th e certificates to be pronounced unsatisfactory for Englis h
cargoes t o b e seized without th e merchant s having an y recourse to th e
English crown. This same sweeping provision was then inserted into the
Franco-Spanish trad e agreement of October 1604. 30 As for the Spanish -
Hanseatic treaty of November 1607 , mos t o f this accord was concerned
with procedures for eradicating Dutch participation from trade between
Germany an d th e Peninsula . Agai n i t wa s laid dow n tha t cargoe s no t
accompanied b y satisfactor y certificate s an d seal s woul d b e subject t o
confiscation o n suspicion of being Dutch. 31
Adherents o f th e Braudel-Kame n vie w o f th e Spanis h embargoe s
26
Stols , Spaanse Brabanders i, 8, 13.
27
Phili p III to duke of Medina Sidonia, Madrid, 5 April 1607 in Colección de documentos
inéditos para l a historia de España (hereafte r CODOIN) (113 vols. Madrid, 1842-95 ) Ixxxi
(1883), 351.
28
Joseph Antoni o d e Abre u y Bertodano , Colección d e los tratados d e paz, alianza,
neutralidad, garantía, etc. (12 vols. Madrid, 1740-52), sectio n 'Reynado del señor Rey D.
Phelipe III' , vol.l, 256-8 ; Jaime Carrera Pujal, Historia d e la economía española ( 5 vols.
Barcelona, 1943-4 ) i, 327-8; Croft, Th e Spanish Company, 12 .
29
Abre u y Bertodano, Colección, section 'Reynado del señor Rey D. Phelipe III' i, 257.
30
Ibid., i, 288-90; Echevarría Bacigalupe, 'Episodi o en la guerra económica hispano-
holandesa', 85.
31
Abre u y Bertodano, Colección, section 'Reynado del señor Rey D. Phelipe III' i, 384 -
9.
contend tha t al l this ha d littl e effec t an d tha t Spanis h minister s wer e

wasting thei r time. 32 But t o subscrib e to thi s approach is to mis s (o r in
Braudel's cas e thoroughly misconstrue ) some of the most dramati c shifts
in internationa l commerc e o f th e earl y seventeent h century . Th e
evidence of the Amsterdam freight-contract s - whic h represent betwee n
one third and half of the total Dutch navigation to the Peninsula - sho w
that Dutch navigatio n to Castile collapsed in 1599 and remained at a very
low level in subsequent years (se e Table 8). It is true that the impact was
less overwhelming wit h respect to Valencia and especially Portugal. Th e
Council o f State at Madrid frequentl y complained that the enforcement
of the embargoes was markedly more lax in Portugal than in Castile and
the Dutc h evidenc e confirm s tha t thi s wa s so. 33 Nevertheless, th e fac t
remains tha t th e large r par t o f Dutc h navigatio n t o Portuga l wa s als o
eradicated a t thi s time. 34 Furthermor e in a s far as the Dutc h continue d
sailing to Portugal the y were compelled, b y the embargo, to divert away
from th e mai n centres , Lisbo n an d Setubal , an d concentrat e o n suc h
northern port s a s Aveiro an d Vian a where th e chance s o f evading th e
embargo wer e best. 35 Spanish minister s wer e therefor e correct i n their
conclusion that , despit e th e highl y imperfec t implementatio n o f th e
embargo i n Portugal , it s effect s o n th e Dutc h tradin g syste m wer e
nevertheless far-reaching.
Table 8 Surviving Freight Contracts for Voyages

from Amsterdam to the Iberian Peninsula, 1597-1602
(ships per year)
Dutch ships Dutch ships Dutch ships
to to to Valencia Hanseatic
Year Castile Portugal and Mallorca ships
1597 6 5 11 71 01
1598 4 4 14 98 4
1599 1 1 22 8
1600 4 4 94 1 0
1601 8 5 22 1 0
1602 5 2 54 9
Source: J.W. Ijzerman, 'Amsterdamsch e bevrachtingscontracten 1591-1602, 1.
de vaart op Spanj e en Portugal', Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek xvi i (1931), 163 -
291.
32
Echevarrí a Bacigalupe, 'Episodio e n la guerra económica hispano-holandesa' , 86;
Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II, 361-7.
33
See , for instance, Alcocer y Martínez, Consultas ii, 204-5.
34
Virgini a Rau, Estados sobre a historia do sal portugués (Lisbon, 1984), 163 , 173-5 .
35
Rijksarchie f in Zeeland, Middelburg, Archiv e of the State s of Zeelan d vol. 209 1
'Deductie van de redenen' (January 1622), fos.l v-2.
The Soun d toll registers tell the same dramatic story (se e Table 9) . In
1599 th e Dutc h traffi c direc t betwee n th e Iberia n Peninsul a an d th e
Baltic, an d vic e versa , wa s no t merel y damage d o r depressed : i t
collapsed. Afte r 159 9 the Dutch direc t trade between th e Peninsula and
the Balti c remaine d severel y depresse d dow n t o 1609 , languishin g a t
extraordinarily low levels in the years 1605-7. The slack, and with it the
connections an d profits, wer e taken up by the Hanseatic towns, Emde n
(until 1607 ) and , t o a lesser exten t Denmar k an d Norway. 36 It may be
that som e o f thes e ship s wer e actuall y Dutc h masqueradin g a s
'Hanseatic'; bu t ther e is no doub t tha t there was actually a tremendous
boom, base d o n th e suddenl y flourishin g Spanienfahrt i n th e Nort h
German ports between 159 8 and 160 9 and that a great deal of traffic wa s
diverted away from Hollan d and Zeeland. I n the case of those ostensibly
'Hanseatic' ship s hire d fo r voyage s t o th e Peninsula at Amsterdam w e
can se e fro m th e notaria l deed s an d freigh t contract s tha t the y wer e
Table 9 Voyages from the Iberian peninsula

direct to the Baltic, 1596-1609
(ships per year)
Danish/
Year Total* Dutch North German Norwegian
1596 17 3 13 32 81 1
1598 167 107 54 6
1599 166 12 130 20
1600 213 26 153 31
1601 171 42 103 25
1602 97 10 80 7
1603 115 28 73 14
1604 128 27 84 17
1605 101 1 80 16
1606 96 0 79 14
1607 Í23 0 98 24
1608 151 19 105 18
1609 131 68 50 11
*The total includes a small number of English, Scottis h and French vessels.
Source: Bang, Tabelleri, 146-206.
36
Herman n Kellenbenz , 'Spanien , di e nördliche n Niederland e un d de r
skandinavisch-baltische Rau m i n de r Weltwirtschaf t un d di e Politi k u m 1600' ,
Vierteljahrschriftfúr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte xl i (1954), 306-8; Rau, Estudos, 175-7 ;
Adolf Jürgens, Zur Schleswig-Hohteinischen Handelsgeschichle de s 16. und 17.Jahrhunderts
(Berlin, 1914) , 196-7 .
actually North German ships. 37 It is true that the Emden entrepot which
flourished exceedingl y betwee n 159 9 an d 160 7 wa s essentiall y just a
transit centr e fo r th e Dutc h marke t an d emporium . Bu t th e evidenc e
shows that it was a transit centre which, i n the main, employed Germa n
ships an d crew s rathe r tha n Dutc h vessel s supplie d wit h Emde n
certificates and that it was therefore an entrepot which was syphoning off
freightage an d wor k fo r seame n a s well a s drawing awa y commercia l
profits an d rendering Holland's links with southern Europe indirect.38
We see then that the impact of the Spanish embargoes of 1598-1608 on
Dutch an d everyon e else' s trad e within Europ e wa s in fac t enormous .
The bulk of the Dutch traffi c wit h the Iberian Peninsula was eliminated;
Dutch carrying between the Peninsula and the Baltic was prostrated, the
Dutch were hit by a serious shortage of high-grade salt for their fisheries
and Baltic trade; and Zeeland's previousl y flourishing transit trade with
the Habsburg Netherlands wa s effectively ruined. 39 All this, combine d
with the intensified raidin g campaig n which th e embargo polic y mad e
possible - fo r how could the Spanish attack Dutch merchant ships at sea
when the y admitte d the m t o their ports? - als o seriously impeded the
progress o f Dutc h Mediterranea n trade. 40 Ye t th e impac t goe s muc h
further tha n this and it was precisely the unforeseen consequences of the
embargo strateg y whic h ultimatel y cancelled ou t it s prejudicial impact
on the Dutch Europea n trading system.
For the Dutch reaction to the Spanish embargo of 1598 was to embark
on a vast and totally unprecedented expansio n of their traffic outsid e of
Europe. Spanis h minister s sa w thi s a s a direc t respons e t o Spam' s
measures and, i n my view , the y were absolutel y right. I t is remarkable
how reluctan t modern historian s have been to accept what was not only
the commonplac e Spanis h an d Portuguese explanatio n fo r th e sudden ,
explosive Dutc h penetratio n o f th e Indie s at the clos e of th e sixteent h
century,41 but also that of the Dutch. But what are the facts? Before 1598
there had been only a handful o f tentative exploratory Dutch voyages to
the Indie s east and west. Then , quit e suddenly, from 159 9 - no t a year
earlier and not a year later - grea t numbers of Dutch ships took to sailing
each yea r to th e Caribbean , Eas t Indies and West Africa. Th e standard
explanation give n i n earl y seventeenth-centur y Hollan d fo r thi s
astounding phenomeno n i n worl d histor y wa s this : in 159 9 the Dutc h
were barred by the Spanish crown from obtaining the salt, spices, sugar,
37
Koen , 'Amsterdam notarial deeds', Studia Rosenthaliana ii, 120, 12 4 et. seq.
38
Hagedorn , Ostfrieslands Handel and Schiffahrt, 228-9 , 406 , 409 ; Kellenbenz ,
'Spanien, die nördlichen Niederlande', 307-8 .
39
F . Snapper , Oorlogsinvloeden o p d e overseese handel va n Holland, 1551-1719
(Amsterdam, 1959 ) 53.
40
Israel , Dutch Primacy, 53-61.
41
Wit h the Portuguese secession from Spain in 1640, thi s became part of Portugal's
anti-Spanish propaganda, see Fernández Duro, Armada española IV , 274 .
other colonial goods and bullion which they required for their European
trade; thei r respons e wa s t o voyag e i n grea t numbers t o th e Indie s t o
procure wha t the y neede d a t source . Chroniclers , th e grea t schola r
Grotius, th e West Afric a merchants , the East India Company director s
all explaine d th e matte r in thes e terms. 42 Wha t i s more it remain s th e
most convincin g explanatio n as to why the Dutch break-through i n the
Indies occurre d s o suddenly , o n suc h a scal e an d a t thi s particula r
moment, howeve r much anyone influenced by the Braudel-Kamen view
of the Spanish embargoes might fight shy of it.
The scal e of the Dutch maritim e expansion outsid e of Europe i n the
decade 1599-1608 is certainly staggering. Befor e 1598 only two o r thre e
Dutch ship s per yea r had venture d a s far as West Africa. In the decad e
1599-1608 aroun d 20 0 Dutc h vessel s saile d t o th e Guine a coast , a n
average of about twenty per year.43 The first Dutch fleet to sail out to the
Caribbean for salt made the voyage - the reader should not be surprised -
in the year 1599.44 Between the summer of 1599 and the end of of 1605 no
less tha n 76 8 Dutch ship s saile d t o th e shore s o f Venezuel a and Ne w
Granada fo r sal t an d to trade. 45 In just fou r years , fro m 159 8 t o 1601 ,
thirteen Dutc h fleets, amounting to some sixty vessels, sailed for spices
and peppe r t o th e Eas t Indies. 46 Th e cumulativ e impact o f al l this o n
world commerc e an d worl d politic s wa s overwhelming . Bu t doe s i t
mean tha t th e Spanis h embargo policy , fo r all its effect withi n Europe ,
was a disastrous fiasco whic h brought Spai n and Portugal only setbacks
and humiliation? Not entirely . B y 160 3 minister s a t Madrid kne w tha t
everything no w depende d o n thei r capacit y to chec k and , i f possible ,
suppress Dutch navigation outside Europe .
Was thi s feasible ? I n th e Spanis h Indies at least it would seem tha t it
was. I n the years 1603-9 Spain mounted a vigorous counter-offensiv e in
the Caribbean no t just attacking the Dutch salt ships at Punta d e Araya
but extendin g th e embarg o polic y albei t i n a peculiarly drasti c form .
Besides sal t an d bullio n th e Dutc h wer e obtainin g larg e quantitie s o f
tobacco from the Venezuela coast and also hides from western Española.
In a bid to break this traffic, minister s at Madrid ordered an end to cattle-
ranching i n wester n Español a an d sen t i n troop s t o suppres s th e
42
Th . Velius , Chronyk va n Hoorn (4t h edn . Hoorn , 1740) , 505-6 ; J.I. Pontanus ,
Historische beschrijvinghe de r seer wijt beroemde coop-stadt Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1614) ,
181, 267; Israel , Dutch Primacy, 61-3, 68 .
42
Kroniek va n het Historische Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht (31 vols. Utrecht, 1846-75)
xxvii(1871), 262 .
44
Velius , Chronyk va n Hoorn, 505 .
45
E . Sluiter , 'Dutch-Spanis h Rivalr y i n th e Caribbea n Area , 1595-1609' , Hispanic
American Historical Review xxviii (1948), 178 .
46
J.G . va n Dillen , He t oudste aandeelhoudersregister va n de Kamer Amsterdam de r Oost-
Indische Compagnie (Th e Hague, 1958) , 11 .
opposition, bur n th e ranche s an d scatte r th e settler s wh o ha d bee n

trading wit h th e Dutch. 47 I n 160 6 th e crow n als o impose d a ba n o n
tobacco growin g i n Venezuela. The combine d effec t o f these measures,
and th e attack s o n th e Dutc h sal t flee t a t Punt a d e Araya , wa s
considerable. Th e evidence suggests that Dutch activity in the Caribbean
was in fact drastically curtailed during the last few years of the embargo,
after 1606, 48 as it was to be'again later from 1622 to 1647 .
Some of the effects of the Spanish embargo agains t the Dutch of1598-
1608 were abundantly evident at the time. But the full significance of the
embargo, an d the accompanyin g Spanis h maritim e raiding campaign ,
only became apparent with the lifting of the embargo and suspension o f
the raidin g campaig n wit h th e signing o f the Twelve Years ' Truce, i n
April 1609. Th e signing o f the Truce is not just a major landmark in the
history o f th e politica l struggl e betwee n th e Spanis h crow n an d th e
Dutch bu t mark s a fundamenta l watershed no t onl y i n Spanis h an d
Dutch bu t i n al l maritime an d trad e history. Fo r al l at once th e Dutc h
were fre e t o retur n t o th e port s o f Spain , Portugal , an d Flander s an d
exempt from attack by Spanis h warship s an d privateers. Thi s meant i n
the firs t plac e tha t th e Dutc h coul d no w agai n participate fully i n th e
carrying traffic betwee n th e Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic, on the one
hand, an d betwee n th e Peninsul a an d Italy , o n th e other . Bu t i t als o
meant, afte r year s of relatively high freigh t an d insurance charges, that
Dutch shippin g cost s fo r al l routes suddenl y fel l precipitatel y as from
1609 an d continue d a t exceptionall y lo w levels , placin g al l rivals ,
including th e English, i n a hopelessly uncompetitive position, dow n t o
1621.49 Thi s fal l i n Dutc h freigh t rate s was , o f course , particularl y
marked in the case of voyages to Spain and Portugal (see Table 10).
The consequences of all this for the Dutch, their trade rivals, and Spain
were extremel y far-reaching . Almost a t once the Dutch resume d thei r
former dominanc e of the carrying traffic betwee n the Peninsula and the
Baltic (see Table 1 l).Hanseatic, English , Danis h an d Norwegia n trad e
with Spai n and Portuga l wer e al l drastically cut back. 50 I t is indeed n o
accident that it was precisely during the Truce years that the Dutch were
at the zenith of their ascendancy over the commerce of the Baltic. At the
same time the lowere d freigh t charges , safe r navigation , an d resume d
access to Spanish silver - thei r main means of exchange in the Levant -
lent major new impetus to Dutch Mediterranean enterprise. 51 Down to
47
Duart e Gomes Solis , Disursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias (Madrid , 1622), 88;
Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanis h Rivalry' , 188-90.
48
Sluiter , 'Dutch-Spanis h Rivalry' , 192-3.
49
P.J . Blo k (éd. ) 'Koopmansadvienze n aangaand e he t pla n to t oprichtin g eene r
compagnie va n assuranti e (1629-1635)' , Bijdragen e n Mededelingen va n he t Historische
Genootschap gevestigd t e Utrecht xxi (1900) , 4 7 et seq .
50
Israel, Dutch Primacy, 87-93.
TablelODutch Freight Rates for voyages to Portugal for salt

and back to the Dutch entrepot, 1600-1620
(guilders pe r last of salt)
Date Ship (lasts) Rate

April 1600 D e Sloep (70) 3 7
July 1601 D e Moeriaan (5.0) 2 9
October 1604 ' t Paradijs (60) ' 29. 5
May 1609 D e Boschieter (80) 12.7 5
July 1610 DePelicaen(114 ) 9. 5
June 1611 DeWaterhont(105 ) 9. 5
April 1612 DeWitteValck(90 )1 1
April 1618 DeSwarteRaven(150 ) 9. 5
September 162 0 D e Schuijr (120) 9
Source: Gemeentearchie f Amsterdam , car d inde x t o th e Notaria l

Archive, sectio n 'Soutvaart' .
1609 the Dutch had played only a marginal role in the Mediterranean rich
trades, having been a factor of some importance only in the shipping in of
cheap Baltic grain. From 160 9 - tha t is, as the Venetian consul at Aleppo
made careful note, fro m 160 9 precisely52 - th e Dutch move d strongl y in
to the high-value commerc e o f Venice, Livorno , Nort h Africa, Cypru s
and Aleppo an d rapidly outstripped the English who down to 160 9 had
had a considerably larger Levant trade than the Dutch. Th e lifting of the
Spanish embargoe s mad e th e Dutch , fo r a short time , a major tradin g
power i n the Levant and, indeed, in some areas of the Near East, notably
Cyprus an d Egypt, the leading trading power. 53
It was not therefor e obstinacy, blindnes s t o reality, or a refusal to fac e
facts whic h le d Spanis h ministers , heade d b y Balthasa r d e Zúñiga , t o
reimpose thei r embargo agains t the Dutch i n Portugal, Spanis h Italy and
Flanders as well as Spain in April 1621. Rathe r the decision was made in
the ful l knowledg e o f wha t ha d transpire d befor e 160 9 an d al l th e
difficulties whic h a polic y o f full-scal e embarg o involved . Spanis h
ministers kne w tha t their new embargo woul d b e partially evaded, tha t
they woul d mee t wit h obstructio n particularl y in Portugal, tha t Iberian
salt export s - thos e of Ibiza and Valencia as well as those of Portugal -
51
J.G . va n Dillen Va n rijkdom e n regenten (The Hague , 1970), 71-2, 87;J.I . Israel, 'Th e
Dutch Merchan t Colonie s i n th e Mediterranea n durin g th e seventeent h century' ,
Renaissance and Modern Studies xxx (1986) , 90-4 .
52
Guglielm o Berchet, Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria (Turin, 1866), 151 .
53
Relaciones de Pedro Teixeira (Antwerp , 1610) , 198 ; K . Heering a (ed. ) Bronnen tot de
geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel ( 3 vols. Th e Hague , 1910-17 ) i, 463, 481 .
Table 11 Voyages from the Iberian Peninsula direct

to the Baltic through the Danish Sound, 1618-41
(ships per year)
North Danish/
Year Total Dutch German Norwegian
1618 18 1 16 81 12
1619 13 5 11 91 50
1620 10 59 11 04
1621 6 13 62 22
1622 5 62 4 11 2
1623 9 93 6 23 1
1624 8 62 6 51 6
1625 4 00 3 18
1626 3 60 3 51
1627 2 21 2 10
1628 9 0 72
1629 1 40 1 13
1630 2 83 2 23
1631 6 41 04 29
1632 3 06 2 03
1634 5 52 52 81
1636 4 31 82 22
1637 3 91 02 81
1638 6 62 73 54
1639 6 44 12 02
1640 3 01 41 51
1641 5 63 41 74
Source: Bang , Tabelleri, 218-340.
would collapse , tha t the crow n woul d suffe r appreciabl e financial loss
through los t custom s revenue, 54 tha t shortage s o f vita l nava l store s
would soo n develop, 55 an d tha t th e checkin g o f 'neutral' ship s woul d
lead t o diplomati c frictio n wit h th e English , Frenc h and Hanseatic s as
well a s a n assortmen t o f lesse r maritim e powers . Th e embarg o wa s
reimposed becaus e Spain's most experienced an d influential ministers -
Zúñiga, th e duque del Infantado, the marqués de Aytona, and the conde
de Olivares - considere d that for Spain it was a vital expedient of state,
the likeliest method o f putting suc h pressure on the Dutch as to reduc e
54
Alcoce r y Martínez, Consultas ii, 90.
55
Antoni o Domíngue z Ortiz , 'Guerr a económica y comercio extranjer o en el reinado
de Felipe IV', Hispania xxii i (1963), 73.
them to a condition i n which they would be prepared to make the sort of

concessions t o Spai n whic h minister s judge d indispensabl e fo r an y
acceptable, honourable and secure settlement. 56
The Spanis h embarg o agains t th e Dutc h o f 1621-4 7 wa s th e mos t
sustained an d elaborat e o f al l the embargoe s impose d b y th e Spanis h
crown durin g th e Habsbur g era . I n thes e year s th e Spanis h embarg o
reached its point of fullest developmen t a s an instrument of state and of
economic warfare . The principle that the embargoes could not be trusted
to, o r implemente d wit h sufficien t efficienc y excep t b y removin g al l
responsibility for trade regulation and inspection from the hands of local
magistrates and municipalities was now taken much further than before.
This le d to seriou s clashes over loca l privileges, or fueros, i n the Basque
provinces,57 Galicia, Navarre and above all Portugal. But the crown was
adamant. Ministers no longer had any intention of relying on Portuguese
officials to impose the embargoes on Portugal. Even before the extension
of th e jurisdictio n o f th e Almirantazgo t o cove r Portuga l i n 1628 ,
Castilian officials , unde r th e supervisio n o f th e Consejo d e Guerra i n
Madrid wer e sent in to take charge in the Portuguese ports and, as far as
possible, eliminat e contact with the Dutch. Thi s wa s done in the years
1622-4 a t Lisbo n an d Setubal; 58 and , late r als o i n Oport o an d Faro .
Inevitably thi s polic y arouse d intens e resentmen t locally . Th e Lisbo n
city counci l regarde d th e us e o f Castilia n official s t o impos e th e
embargoes a s a major facto r in th e deepenin g trad e depressio n which ,
from 1621 , extende d it s grip over the country. I n February 1622 Lisbon
complained to the king that the main cause of the lack of trade and grain
shortage afflictin g th e cit y wa s th e harassmen t o f 'neutral ' ship s an d
crews cause d b y th e king' s official s 'qu e aqu i reside m pel o coro a d e
Castella'.59 Protesting again about the effect of using Castilian officials t o
implement th e embargoes in Portugal in February 1625, Lisbo n put it to
the kin g tha t 'nativ e Portuguese ' ough t t o b e handlin g th e king' s
investigations into trade irregularities.60
The Almirantazgo - on e o f th e mos t importan t institutiona l
innovations o f th e Olivare s er a i n Spai n - wa s institute d i n 162 4
originally only in the ports of Andalusia. It failed to develop, as ministers
had hope d int o a Europea n equivalen t o f th e Spanis h trans-Atlanti c
convoy system, organizing armed convoys to sail to Flanders and North
56
AC S Estado 2036 consulta, Madrid , 6 July 162 2 fos. lv and 5, votos of the duque del
Infantado and marqués d e Aytona; AG S Estado 2037, consult a 14Jun e 1623, fo.4 , 'voto '
of Olivares .
57
Guíar d y Larrauri, Historia de l consulado i, 271-3, 284-5.
58
AG S Guerra 895 . Dieg o López de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 7Januar y and 19 May
1623.
59
E . Freir é d e Oliveir a (éd. ) Elementos para a historia d o municipio d e Lisboa (1 9 vols.
Lisbon, 1882-1943 ) iii, 31.
60
Ibid., iii, 154 .
Germany. But as a trade inspectorate and system of commercial courts, a

sort o f Inquisitio n o f commerce , i t achieve d a thoroughnes s an d
stringency whic h soon mad e it the most feared institutio n in Spain after
the Inquisition itself. Once it had proved itself more effective than earlier
arrangements as an instrument for checking and regulating activity in the
ports, th e crown graduall y transferred not just th e inspecting o f ships,
cargoes an d warehouses throughou t Castile , th e Basque provinces, and
Navarre t o thi s organizatio n but als o the judging an d settlemen t of all
cases arisin g ou t o f th e embarg o decrees. 61 A Tribunal Mayor de l
Almirantazgo wa s se t u p a t Madri d i n 162 5 to functio n rathe r like th e
Suprema o f th e Inquisitio n wit h respec t t o heresy , a s a cour t o f fina l
appeal, a supervisor y bod y an d a s a counci l t o advis e th e kin g o n
everything concernin g th e regulation of trade and shipping. I n August
1628 i t wa s decide d t o exten d th e authorit y o f th e Almirantazgo t o
Portugal; and the Castilian apparatus of trade control in the Portuguese
ports was brought under its remit.62 Also in 1628, the jurisdiction of the
Almirantazgo was extended to the realms of the crown of Aragon as well.
That ther e wa s stron g oppositio n t o th e Almirantazgo in Valencia , as
elsewhere, i s no t surprising . Bu t whethe r th e remova l o f th e mos t
energetic of the Almirantazgo's judges at Alicante in 1642 for applying the
Almirantazgo's directive s 'to o rigorously ' i s reall y a sig n tha t th e
organisation had little impact in Valencia, as has been suggested, ma y be
doubted.
If the bureaucratic effort tha t went into implementing the embargo of
1621-47 wen t furthe r tha n i n th e past , th e sam e i s tru e o f Spain' s
European diplomati c driv e t o bac k it up . Ther e wa s i n fact muc h that
Spain coul d d o b y diplomati c mean s t o reinforc e the embargo policy .
Having imposed th e embargo on the Spanish possessions in Italy as well
as in the Peninsula, heavy pressure was brought to bear on the Republic
of Geno a t o ceas e importing grai n and Balti c stores fro m th e Unite d
Provinces.63 Historians habitually question whether such pressure, in the
early moder n context , coul d possibl y hav e bee n effective . But , a s it
happens, w e hav e several very specifi c piece s of evidence which prove
the efficacy o f this pressure not fo r a year or two bu t for the whole of the
next quarte r o f a century. Ther e i s an Amsterdam admiralty repor t o f
61
Domíngue z Ortiz , 'Guerr a económic a y comerci o extranjero' , 80 , 85 , 94; Israel,
The Dutch Republic and th e Hispanic World, 205-9 ; th e clai m tha t 'th e inspector s an d
officials o f the Almirantazgo had always been refused entr y into Vizcaya on the grounds
that their activitie s would infring e the province's/wmw' inJ.H. Elliott, Th e Count-Duke of
Olivares (New Have n an d London, 1986) , p.45 , i s not strictl y correct as its officials wer e
certainly seizin g cargoe s an d ship s i n Bilba o i n th e earl y 1630s , se e Israel, Th e Dutch
Republic an d the Hispanic World, 208-9 .
62
P.T . Rooney , 'Th e Habsbur g Governmen t o f Portugal i n the reig n o f Philip I V
(1621-40)' (unpublishe d Universit y o f Keele Ph.d. thesis , 1988) , pp.140-1, 173 .
63
AC S Estado 1884 . Phili p I V to viceroy of Naples, Madrid , 2 2 January 1622 .
1627, for instance, which states that, owing to Genoa's reluctance to deal
with th e Dutch, ver y few Dutch vessels any longer calle d there.64 It was
estimated that at that time eight time s as many Dutch ships were calling
at Livorn o a s at Genoa. Nor , apar t from th e Dutch consul , wer e ther e
any longe r an y Dutc h factor s residin g i n Genoa . A late r Englis h
document tell s u s tha t i t wa s no t unti l afte r 164 7 tha t th e Genoes e
Republic switched bac k as far as official purchase s on behalf of the state
were concerned , fro m buying grai n and stores from the Hanseatics and
English to dealing with th e Dutch.65
One o f th e centra l Spanis h diplomati c objective s linke d t o th e
embargo polic y wa s to mobiliz e th e Empero r t o hel p pu t pressur e on
Hamburg an d Liibec k t o admi t a Spanish residen t t o chec k an d certif y
cargoes for the Peninsula on behalf of the Almirantazgo. 66 Th e Empero r
gave som e suppor t t o thi s initiativ e an d appointe d th e Walloo n
nobleman Gabrie l de Roy who m Phili p I V had selecte d to co-ordinat e
the embargo policy in the north as well as the projected Spanish-Austrian
Baltic armada (wit h whic h th e Habsburg s planne d t o asser t thei r
hegemony ove r th e Baltic ) a s 'General-Kommissar de r Baltischen un d
Ozeanischen See' . A t th e assembl y o f th e Hanseati c Leagu e whic h
gathered at Liibeck, in April 1628, th e Austrian minister Schwarzenberg,
with d e Ro y a t hi s side , formall y propose d th e 'establishmen t o f a
Hanseatic Compan y fo r th e Spanis h trade ' t o interloc k wit h th e
Almirantazgo.67 Bu t th e Hans a town s tenaciousl y resiste d th e Spanish
and Austria n pressure that they admi t d e Roy o n behal f o f the king o f
Spain to check cargoes for the Peninsula, having no wish to compromise
their independenc e o r antagoniz e the Dutch. Eventually , however , th e
Spanish crow n go t roun d thi s difficult y b y signin g a n anti-Dutc h
commercial agreemen t w.it h Denmar k whic h enable d Phili p IV to pos t
de Roy as his resident in the Elbe port of Glückstadt which, conveniently
for th e Almirantazgo, i s located betwee n Hambur g an d th e open sea. 68
Thus, i n the early 1630s the Almirantazgo was able to impose a stringent
checking syste m whereb y al l cargoe s dispatche d fro m anywher e i n
northern German y t o th e Iberia n Peninsula had t o b e certifie d a s being
non-Dutch b y Gabrie l d e Roy . Cargoe s whic h lacke d d e Roy' s
64
Heeringa , Bronnen i, 112 ; se e als o E . Grendi , ' I Nordic i e il traffic o de l port o d i
Genova, 1590-1665' , Rivista Storica Italiana Ixxxii i (1971) , 34 , 55 , 67.
65
Joh n Thurloe, A Collection of State Papers ( 1 vols. London , 1742 ) ii , 144-5 .
66
M . E. H. N. Mout , 'Holendische Propositiones : een Habsburgs pla n tot vernietiging
van handel , visserij e n scheepvaart de r Republie k (ca . 1625)', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis
xcv (1982) , 351-6 .
67
R . Hâpke , Niederldndische Akten un d Urkunde zur Geschichte de r Hanse un d zur
deutschen Seegeschichte (2 vols. Munich-Leipzig , 1913-23 ) ii, 406-8.
68
AC S Estad o 2332 . Gabrie l d e Ro y t o Phili p IV , Wismar , 2 Decembe r 1630 ; L .
Laursen, Danmark-Norges Traktater, 1523-1750 IV (1626-Í649) (Copenhagen , 1917) , 87 -
8.
certificates were subject to automatic confiscation, on suspicion of being

Dutch, o n arriva l i n Spain . Th e increasingl y tens e relation s betwee n
Denmark an d th e Unite d Province s i n the perio d 1630-4 5 ensured th e
continuance o f Danish backin g for Spain's embargo policy in the north.
The joint Spanish-Danis h checkin g an d confiscatio n procedures wer e
subsequently furthe r extende d an d refine d unde r th e Spanish-Danis h
treaty o f Marc h 1641. 69 Almos t th e whol e o f this treaty , incidentally,
was concerne d wit h differen t aspect s o f Spain' s embarg o agains t th e
Dutch.
Another key component of Spain's economic war against th e Dutc h
through diplomac y wa s th e Anglo-Spanis h peac e treaty of 1630 . Thi s
repeated th e clause s o f th e 160 4 treat y requirin g Englis h cargoe s fo r
Spain and Portugal to be covered by certificates and seals from their place
of provenance , givin g Spai n th e automati c right t o confiscat e English
cargoes (an d a s i t prove d als o ships ) whic h wer e no t satisfactoril y
authorized.70 English merchants whose ships and cargoes were seized by
the Almirantazgo after 163 0 for violating the embargo decrees - one of the
English consignment s seize d a t Bilba o containe d Silesia n line n whic h
merely lacked a certificate from Gabriel de Roy - tried to enlist the help of
the Englis h governmen t agains t th e Almirantazgo bu t t o n o avail. 71
Charles I' s policy wa s to see k a harmonious working relationshi p wit h
Spain whic h mean t acquiescenc e i n th e embarg o policy . Englis h
merchants were simply told by their own minister s that under the terms
of the 163 0 treaty there was no recourse against the Almirantazgo.
The Spanis h embarg o o f 1621-4 7 agains t th e Dutc h wa s th e mos t
sustained, intensiv e an d carefull y planne d of the Spanis h embargoe s o f
the sixteenth an d seventeenth centuries and it was the one which exerted
the greates t effect. I f José Alcalá-Zamora (muc h praised by Kame n and
Stradling for the reliability of his views!) held that the Spanish measures
were completel y ineffective, 72 i n realit y this embarg o wa s on e o f th e
most decisiv e factor s in the whole o f early modern maritim e and trade
history. Vas t an d extremel y wide-rangin g shift s i n internationa l
exchange an d commerc e resulte d from it. 73 Th e grea t bulk o f Dutc h
navigation t o th e Iberian Peninsula , certainly more tha n three-quarters
and, unti l th e Portugues e secessio n o f 1640 , probabl y over ninet y pe r
cent, wa s suppressed . Th e Dutc h carryin g traffi c direc t betwee n th e
69
Laursen , TraktaterlV, 280-311 ; O. A. Johnsen, 'Les relations commerciales entre la
Norvège e t l'Espagne dans les temps modernes', Revue Historique Iv (1930) , 79-81 .
70
Abre u y Bertodano, Colección, section 'Reynad o d e Phelipe IV ' ii, 218-20.
71
Britis h Library MS. Eg. 1820 , fos . 13V, 24; British Library MS. Add , 36448, fo . 13 et.
seq.
72
Alcalá-Zamora , España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, 183-4.
73
Israel , Dutch Primacy, 121-96 .
Peninsula and th e Baltic, an d vice versa, almost totall y collapsed in th e

1620s and achieved onl y a very modest recover y during the 1630s when
restricted number s o f passes wer e sold t o th e Dutch from Brussel s fo r
Dutch vessel s to b e used to ship in grain and fetch sal t (see Tab. 12) . At
the sam e tim e Dutc h freigh t an d insuranc e charge s wer e force d u p
sufficiently drasticall y to erode som e o f the Dutch competitiv e edg e in
northern Europea n water s and al l of it i n southern Europea n waters. 74
Indeed the Dutch Levan t trade almost completel y collapse d in 1621 and
was no t t o reviv e until afte r 1647. 75 The Dutc h trad e to Ital y was also
seriously damaged albeit the traffi c t o Livorno and Venice survived at a
reduced level. 76 The consequence s o f all this for the rivals of the Dutch
were immense. Havin g slumped disastrously in 1609, th e Spanienfahrt o f
the Hanseatics, Dane s and Norwegians recovered spectacularly a s from
Table 12The Rise in Dutch Freight Rates forVoyages

to Portugal to fetch salt for the Dutch Entrepot, 1618-36
(guilders per last)
Date Ship (lasts) Rate

April 1618 D e Swarte Raven (150) 9. 5
May 161 9 De n Coninck Davidt (105 ) 1 0
May 1619 D e Witte Leeuw (125) 9
September 1620 DeSchuij r (120) 9
September 1622 DeMakreel(170 ) 21. 5
October 1622 D e Landman (l 60) 2 0
April 1623 (hire d French vessel) 6 0
April 1624 (hire d Hanseatic vessel) 3 4
April 1630* D e Vergulde Snoeck (120) 3 0
May 1630 * D e geele Pynas (150) 3 2
March 1635* D e Nooteboom (90) 28.7 5
March 1636* D e Hoope ( 140) 4 2
*These ship s ha d bee n issue d wit h (expensive ) passe s b y th e authoritie s i n

Brussels.
Source: Gemeentearchie f Amsterdam N Á 241, fo.85 an d NÁ 670, fo.16, N Á
1041, fo.22 7 and card index to the Notarial Archive, section 'Soutvaart'.
74
J . Schreiner , Nederland og Norge, 1625-Í650. Trelastutfersel og handelspolitik (Oslo ,
1933), 48-50 ; P.H . Winkelma n (éd. ) Bronnen voor d e geschiedenis va n d e Nederlandse
oostzeehandel i n de zeventiende eeuw VI (1617-25) , 81, 191 , 19 7 et seq.
75
Israel , 'Dutc h Merchant Colonies', 94-6 .
76
Heeringa , Bronnen l, 497-8, 505-6 .
1621 precisely.77 Between 162 1 and 1647 Hamburg not Amsterda m was
the main pivot of commercial interaction between the Iberian Peninsula
and the Baltic.78 But the greatest gains at Dutch expense were made after
1630 by England. Between 163 0 and 164 7 the English reigned supreme
not only in Iberian but in all Mediterranean commerce. 79 So total was the
English ascendanc y ove r norther n Europe' s trad e wit h Ital y an d th e
Levant in these years that Amsterdam merchants thought of this sector of
world trad e as a complete write-of f fro m thei r poin t o f view, a traffi c
which had fallen wholly into English hands.80
Perhaps no better example can be found to demonstrate Spain's basic
success in cutting the Dutch of f from direc t access to the Iberian market
than the English grip over Spam's wool and colonial dyestuff exports.81
From the 1630s onwards Spanish merino wool was of vital importance to
the Dutch cloth industry owing to Leiden's shift over to the manufacture
of high-quality clot h based on Spanish wool. But how did Spanish wool
and dyestuffs reach the Dutch market in the period 1630-47? The answer
is that these vital commodities wer e bought up by the English in Spain,
in exchange fo r English textiles , shippe d i n English vessel s to Englan d
and then re-shipped, often via the Dover entrepot, to Holland where the
English sol d the m fo r hig h prices . 'Whe n tha t stat e [th e Unite d
Provinces] were at wars with the Spaniards', noted an English observer
some years later, [the wool sacks] 'were carryed to them by the English,
one onl y o f this nation residen t in Madrid sending 500 baggs to the m
yearly, proceeded from the effects o f English commodities.'82
The Spanis h embargoes against the Dutch and French (1635-59) wer e
in fact , th e mai n basi s o f th e extraordinar y prosperit y o f Englis h
commerce wit h Spai n an d th e Mediterranea n world generall y i n th e
1630s and early and mid 1640s. Th e steady growth of English cloth sales
in Spai n and Turke y mor e tha n compensated fo r th e stead y decay of
English clot h sales , unde r th e pressur e of Dutc h competition , i n th e
Baltic. Bu t England' s succes s a s a trading powe r i n souther n Europ e
proved to be built, in large part, on precarious foundations. Contrary to
what ha s sometime s bee n alleged , ther e were n o inheren t strengths in
77
Ch . F . Wurm, Über de s Lebensschicksale de s Foppius va n Aitzema (Hamburg , 1854) ,
32; Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkrafte, 60-4 .
78
E . Baasch , 'Hamburg s Seeschiffahr t und Warenhandel vom End e de s 16. bis zur
Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts', Zeitschriftfur Hamburgische GeschichtelX (1894) , 310-31.
79
Israël , Dutch Primacy, 150-6 .
80
Heeringa , Bronnen 1, 1075; Blok, 'Koopmansadviezen' , 51 , 65.
81
H . Taylor , 'Trade , Neutralit y an d th e "Englis h Road" , 1630-1648' , Economic
History Review 2n d ser . xx v (1972) , 250 ; J.I . Israel , 'Spanis h Woo l Export s an d th e
European Economy , 1610-40' , Economic History Review 2n d ser . xxxii i (1980) , 205-6 ,
208-9.
82
A Brief Narration o f the Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade (London ? 1650?), 9 .
English trade and shipping such as could sustain her trade primacy in the
south onc e th e politica l framewor k whic h mad e i t possibl e wa s
transformed. N o sooner were the Spanish embargoes against th e Dutch
lifted, i n th e summe r o f 1647 , tha n th e hollownes s o f England' s
ascendancy i n souther n Europea n trad e wa s revealed . Indeed , Englis h
trade with Spai n an d th e Mediterranea n decline d s o rapidl y in th e lat e
1640s tha t i t i s no exaggeratio n t o sa y tha t withi n a yea r o r tw o he r
former primac y wa s i n ruins . Th e fal l i n Dutc h freigh t an d insuranc e
charges fo r souther n Europea n destination s eliminate d England' s
previous competitiv e edge . Spanis h goods , includin g th e win e o f th e
Canary Islands , and the products o f Italy and the Levant began to pou r
into Englan d indirectl y vi a th e Dutc h entrepo t whic h i s wha t mad e
necessary th e introduction o f the Navigation Act, i n 1651 . Th e Dutc h
began to outd o th e English i n the selling o f good quality cloth in Spain
and Turke y and , bein g abl e to affor d t o offe r highe r prices, soon eased
the Spanis h woo l trad e out o f Englis h hands. 83 'Th e commoditie s o f
Spaine are so enhanced and bought up, ' lamented one English onlooker,
and the cloathing of Holland within these few years so thriveth and increaseth
that wherea s we formerl y brough t home four e o r fiv e thousan d bagg s of
cloth wooll and the Hollanders scarce a thousand, which they had then by re-
shipping, theirs being prohibited, they now carr y away five or six thousand
and wee bring not pas t 12 or 1500 in the yeare at most.
By 165 0 th e Dutc h wer e alread y as dominant i n the Spanis h trade as

the English had been five years earlier. But the balance was yet to be still
further tilte d against the English. Afte r th e treaty of Munster (1648 ) and
the Spanish-Dutc h maritim e agreemen t o f 1650 , Spain' s leverag e over
the mechanism s o f international trad e wa s substantiall y reduced. Th e
great period o f Spain's impact o n international trade relations was no w
over. Th e Almirantazgo was barre d b y th e term s o f thes e agreements
from demandin g certificate s of the Dutch, o r searchin g their ships and
warehouses i n Spai n wit h th e rigou r wit h whic h the y ha d previousl y
searched English an d Hanseatic ships and warehouses in quest of Dutch
goods. Afte r 164 8 i t was , therefore , difficul t fo r th e Spanis h crown t o
enforce it s ban agains t French goods (whic h ha d bee n prohibite d sinc e
1635) or its new embargo o f the years 1655-60 against the English. These
changes, togethe r wit h Spain' s los s o f contro l ove r Portuga l sinc e
December 1640 , placed the Spanish crown i n a relatively weak position.
83
Thurloe , State Papers 1 , 200; B. Worsley, Th e Advocate, or a Narrative of the Stale and
Condition of things between the English and Dutch Nation, in relation to Trade (London , 1652) ,
5, 7 , 9 ; J.E. Farnell , 'Th e Navigatio n Ac t o f 1651 . Th e Firs t Wa r an d th e Londo n
Merchant Community', Economic History Review 2nd ser. XV I (1963/4) , 450 .
84
A Brief Narration of the Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade, fo.2 .
We know , furthermore , fro m th e constan t complaint s o f Spanis h

ministers durin g th e late 1650 s tha t th e Dutc h too k advantag e of thei r
now privilege d situatio n t o smuggle larg e quantities of both French and
English goods not only int o Spai n itself but als o now, althoug h no t yet
on s o large a scale as subsequently, throug h th e Caribbea n port s of th e
Spanish Indies. 85
But thi s doe s no t mea n tha t th e Spanish embargo o f 1655-60 against
the Englis h shoul d b e regarde d a s ineffective o r unimportant . O n th e
contrary, al l the sign s ar e that i t furthe r weakene d wha t wa s alread y a
much reduce d Englis h rol e i n Spanis h trad e an d furthe r damage d
England's positio n i n the Mediterranean. Th e exclusion of English ships
and merchants , i f not o f thei r goods , fro m th e Spanis h marke t wa s in
itself o f grea t advantag e t o th e Dutc h wh o wer e a t th e pea k o f thei r
ascendancy ove r th e Spanish trade and, via Cadiz, th e traffic t o Spanish
America, durin g th e late 1650s. I n Spanish southern Ital y and Sicily, the
one part of the Mediterranean world wher e English trade primacy seems
to hav e survive d intac t in the years 1647-55, th e English gri p was no w
(temporarily) broke n an d Dutc h firm s base d i n Naple s an d especially
Messina took ove r th e traffic. 86
The lifting of Spain's embargoes against France, in 1659, an d England,
in 1660 , ar e not ye t quit e th e en d o f th e story . I n th e lat e seventeent h
century a series of Spanish embargoes against French trade and shipping
did much damage to the French role in the Spanish and Spanish America
trade and strengthened tha t of the Dutch an d English. 87 But thes e later
embargoes, an d mos t notabl y tha t o f 1689-9 7 durin g th e Nin e Years '
War, wer e i n par t foiste d o n Spai n b y he r Englis h an d Dutc h allies .
Moreover, followin g th e abolitio n o f th e Almirantazgo (unde r Dutc h
pressure) i n 166 1 an d th e increasingl y enfeeble d gri p o f th e Spanis h
crown ove r custom s procedure s a t Cadi z an d th e flo w o f traffi c t o
Spanish America, these later embargoes wer e somewhat pal e reflections
of thos e impose d b y Spai n wit h suc h determinatio n durin g he r ag e of
greatness.
We may sa y by wa y o f conclusion tha t Braudel's contention tha t the
Spanish embargoes wer e ineffective and essentially marginal phenomena
is completel y wrong . Henr y Kamen' s defenc e o f Braudel' s position ,
claiming tha t eve n i f ther e ar e sign s tha t th e Dutc h suffere d som e
85
AC S Estado 2089. Esteba n d e Gamarra t o Philip IV , The Hague , 3 1 August 1656 ;
Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague , SG 704/-Ü. Gamarra t o States General, Th e Hague,
17 November 1655 .
86
Th e thre e Englis h merchan t house s at Messina were shut down in November 1655
and al l Englis h stoc k seized , leavin g th e trad e i n th e hand s o f th e Dutch , Algemee n
Rijksarchief, Th e Hague , S G 7047-ii . Dutc h consu l t o State s General , Messina , 1 6
November 1655 .
87
Girard , Commerce français, 273-5 , 529-30 .
disruption ther e i s 'contrar y evidence ' whic h show s th e basi c

ineffectiveness o f Spain's embargoe s proves , o n close consideration, t o
be groundless. Yet the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes is
constantly repeate d an d ha s bee n categoricall y subscribe d t o b y a
remarkably long list of historians. Th e fact that this view is wrong and is
constantly repeated, however, i s less important tha n the fact tha t it is so
utterly misleading. For to subscribe to it is to miss some of the most basic
shifts i n earl y modern maritim e an d trad e history . I t i s this abov e all
which qualifies the Braudel-Kamen vie w of the Spanish embargoes to be
classified a s one of the fundamental mistakes of early modern historica l
studies.
8
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAD E RIVALR Y

DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: GABRIEL DE ROY
AND OLIVARES' MERCANTILIS T PROJECTS , 1621-164 5
AMONG THE MAIN strategic aims of the Spanis h monarch y during th e ag e

of Olivare s non e wa s mor e relentlessl y pursued , a t al l stages , tha n th e
effort t o curtai l an d undermin e Dutc h economi c powe r bot h i n Europ e
and i n th e res t o f th e world . B y th e late r year s o f th e Twelv e Year s
Truce (1609-21) , the Dutch wer e seen in Madrid no t jus t as rebels an d
heretics bu t a s subverter s o f th e worl d economi c orde r an d colonia l
system. Th e continue d blockin g o f th e Scheldt , paralysin g th e sea -
borne trad e o f th e Spanis h Netherlands ; Dutc h dominanc e o f Balti c
commerce an d o f th e suppl y o f norther n product s t o Spain , Portugal ,
and Italy ; Dutc h colonia l expansio n i n th e Fa r East , Caribbean , an d
Africa: al l thi s wa s see n a s a n affron t an d a n insidiou s dange r t o th e
monarchy, a drai n o n it s resources which coul d n o longe r b e tolerated. 1
From th e momen t Dutc h ship s an d good s wer e banned b y roya l decree
from Spain , Portugal , an d Spanis h souther n Ital y i n Apri l 1621 , Phili p
IV's ministers set to wor k to extend , refine , an d intensif y thei r grandios e
programme o f economi c war agains t th e Dutch . Thi s vast proces s com-
prised no t onl y a syste m o f interlockin g embargoes o n Dutc h product s
and Dutch-owne d merchandis e o f an y sor t throughou t th e Spanis h
empire; a new customs machinery in Spain, Portugal , and Flanders ; an d
the rive r blockade of the Dutc h Republi c mounted i n th e year s 1625-9 ;
but als o a serie s of measures designe d t o replac e th e Dutc h a s the mai n
trading partner s o f th e monarch y wit h th e Hans a town s o f Nort h
Germany (togethe r wit h th e commercia l an d industria l town s o f th e
Spanish Netherlands ) an d t o regenerat e Spain's own colonia l trad e an d
that o f Portugal. 2 Together , th e tota l packag e o f Spanis h mercantilis t
1
Jonatha n I . Israel , ' A Conflic t o f Empires: Spai n an d th e Netherlands ,
1618-1648', Past an d Present, Ixxv i (1977) , 34 , 37- 9 ; see above, 1,4-6.
2
Jonatha n I . Israel , Th e Dutch Republic an d th e Hispanic World, 1606-1661
(Oxford, 1982) , pp . 205-16 , 285-92 .
measures in the 1620 5 and 1630 5 represents on e o f the mos t fundamenta l
and decisiv e factors shaping th e developmen t o f th e worl d econom y i n
the seventeenth century.
Among thes e Spanis h mercantilis t measures , on e whic h wa s t o hav e
particularly wid e ramification s wa s th e settin g u p o f th e Almirantazgo
of Sevill e i n 1624 . Th e purpos e o f thi s presen t articl e i s t o revie w th e
evolution o f Spanis h mercantilis t policy in thi s period , an d i n particula r
trace the rise of the Almirantazgo a s a major forc e in Europea n economi c
life, b y focusin g on th e caree r o f Gabriel d e Roy , th e Walloon noblema n
who becam e Spain' s leadin g exper t o n norther n trade , wh o ha s bee n
called th e 'movin g spirit ' behin d th e Almirantazgo, 3 an d wh o wa s more
responsible than anyon e else for implementing Spanish mercantilis t policy
in northern Europ e
Gabriel d e Roy , seigneu r d e Chanterais e an d o f Popernol , wa s bor n
around 157 0 i n th e provinc e o f Artois in th e Spanis h Netherlands , t o a
distinguished militar y family. 4 Leavin g the ancestra l hom e i n 159 0 'wit h
the intentio n o f seeing th e world' , h e wa s taken firs t int o th e servic e of
Pedro Coloma , a frien d o f hi s fathe r an d a senio r Spanis h financia l
official i n Brussels , wh o wa s late r dismisse d fo r fraud . Afte r a time ,
anxious to see more of the world , h e lef t Brussel s and se t out o n a Euro -
pean tour , travellin g firs t t o th e Imperia l cour t a t Pragu e an d the n t o
several lesser princely courts of Germany. From th e Holy Roman Empire ,
he planne d t o procee d t o Constantinopl e but , prevente d b y th e 'war s of
Hungary', travelle d instead , vi a Bratislava , t o Craco w wher e h e staye d
for som e tim e a s a visitin g nobleman a t th e Polis h court . Fro m Poland ,
he journeye d acros s Lithuani a an d Courlan d an d the n too k passag e o n
a shi p fro m Rig a t o Stockholm . After tourin g Sweden, h e sailed bac k t o
Königsberg from wher e he continued, at a leisurely pace, visiting Danzig ,
Liibeck, severa l part s o f Denmark , Hamburg , Bremen , Emden , an d
finally Cologne . Th e exceptiona l comman d o f French , Spanish , Dutch ,
and Germa n which he had b y this time acquired, and hi s easy familiarity
with bot h matter s Spanis h an d wit h norther n Europe , wer e t o b e th e
foundation o f hi s career .
At Cologn e h e joine d force s wit h a n Augustinia n fria r wh o ha d bee n
entrusted by Philip I I wit h a very special commission. This was to obtai n
for th e king a holy relic, the 'skul l of the glorious martyr Sain t Lawrence '
3
S.H . Steinberg , The 'Thirty Years' War' an d the Conflict fo r European
Hegemony, 1600-1660 (London , 1977) , pp . 46-7 .
4
Se e 'Relació n sumari a de l precede r y actiones d e Gabrie l d e Roy ' (1617) ,
A[rchivo] G[enera l de ] S[imancas ] Estad o 2847 ; se e als o Edd y Stols ,
De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der zuidelijke Nederlanden
met d e Iberische wereld, 1598-1648 (Brussels , 1971) , p . 18 .
Gabriel de Roy 21 5
from a monaster y i n Gladbac h i n th e duch y o f Jiilich , an d brin g i t t o
Madrid.5 The fria r employe d de Roy to buy up a quantit y o f additiona l
holy relics both fro m ecclesiastica l establishments and fro m dealer s i n an d
around Cologne . H e the n sen t d e Ro y t o Madri d t o rende r th e kin g a
first-hand accoun t o f the stat e o f th e thu s far fruitles s negotiations ove r
the skull . As zealou s a s eve r t o obtai n th e relic , Phili p sen t d e Ro y t o
Rome wit h order s fo r th e Spanis h ambassado r there . D e Ro y waite d
four month s a t Rom e whil e th e ambassado r extracte d a bul l fro m th e
Pope commandin g the monks of Gladbach t o surrender th e skull. Armed
with thi s bull, de Roy returned t o Cologne. Bu t although th e monk s now
complied, th e duk e of Julich-Cleves refuse d t o allo w th e reli c ou t o f hi s
territory, s o that d e Ro y an d th e fria r wer e force d t o retur n t o Spai n
without th e skul l but wit h a 'ver y larg e quantity' o f other hol y relics for
the king. 'His Majesty, having inspected and venerate d every one of them,
commanded tha t the y b e deposite d a t Sa n Lorenz o e l Rea l [Th e
Escorial].'6 Thanke d and rewarde d by the king , de Roy returne d to
Flanders.
He nex t found employmen t as a secretary at the cour t o f the Archduke
Albert, a t Brussels , the n a s secretar y i n th e fiel d t o th e commande r of
the Spanis h arm y in Flanders , th e admira l o f Aragon, Don Francisc o d e
Mendoza. De Roy was captured with the admira l a t the battle o f Nieuw-
poort in 1600 , and remaine d sporadicall y in his company throughout th e
latter's captivit y i n Holland. 7 'Sporadically ' becaus e d e Roy' s obviou s
usefulness a s a n intermediar y soo n cam e t o th e notic e o f th e Dutc h
stadtholder, Prince Maurice, who sent him on several missions to Brussel s
to help arrange ransom s for Spanish prisoner s held by the Dutch. O n th e
admiral's releas e i n 1602 , d e Ro y accompanie d hi m bac k t o Spain ,
remaining i n hi s servic e fo r si x mor e years . I n Novembe r 1606 , th e
admiral, a n enem y o f Phili p Ill' s favourite , th e duk e o f Lerma , wa s
arrested and locke d up. D e Roy remained i n contact wit h him fo r a time
but the n suddenl y returned t o Flander s i n 1608 . H e himsel f wa s the n
arrested i n Brussels on the king' s orders, an d brough t bac k to Spain . Hi s
subsequent treatment , whic h include d torture , succeede d apparentl y i n
extracting informatio n to th e detrimen t o f th e admiral , fo r th e latter' s
lawyers then tried to nullif y hi s evidence by vilifying hi m a s corrupt an d
3
Philip' s obsessio n wit h th e cul t o f St. Lawrenc e arose fro m th e fac t tha t th e victor y
over th e Frenc h a t St . Quenti n wa s won o n St . Lawrence' s da y (1 0 Aug. ) ; a
principal dut y o f th e monk s a t Th e Escoria l wa s t o offe r perpetua l thank s fo r
this victory , se e Geoffrey Parker , Philip I I (Boston , 1978) , p . 171 .
6
Se e 'Relación sumaria' .
7
Se e 'Relació n sumaria ' an d Resolution de r Staten Generaal XI I (1602-3),
éd. H.H.P. Rijperma n (Th e Hague , 1950) , p. 312 .
8
a drunkard. De Roy remained i n priso n a t Madri d fo r nearly two years
before bein g allowed to return to Brussels.
Soon thoug h h e wa s back i n roya l service. In Jun e 1613 , he wa s sent
by Ambrogio Spinola, the ne w commander o f the arm y in Flanders, o n a
secret missio n t o Th e Hague . B y thi s tim e th e Brussel s administratio n
considered hi m s o expert i n Dutc h affair s tha t i t wa s decide d t o mak e
him Phili p Ill' s residen t a t Cologne , a pos t largel y concerne d wit h
monitoring Dutc h activity . I n August 1616 , he was sent back to Holland,
this time at th e reques t of the Counci l o f the Indie s in Madrid, t o gathe r
information abou t Dutc h plan s for furthe r colonia l expansion. Ther e h e
made contac t with th e Dutch admiral , Va n Spilbergen , wh o had raide d
the Pacifi c coas t o f Spanis h Sout h Americ a i n 1615 , a s wel l a s wit h a
member o f the States-General. 9 Evidently , h e di d gathe r a goo d dea l of
information o n Dutc h shippin g an d manpowe r especiall y i n th e Fa r
East.10 Afte r severa l successfu l month s discoverin g the 'presen t stat e of
their navigatio n an d commerc e with th e Indie s eas t an d west' , h e saile d
back fro m Rotterda m t o Spain . A t Madrid , h e compile d report s o n
Dutch activity , wa s listene d t o b y th e duke s of Lerm a an d Infantado ,
and wa s presented to Phili p III . H e wa s now considere d on e o f Spain' s
foremost expert s on the Dutc h i n genera l an d Spain' s leadin g exper t o n
Dutch colonia l matters. 11 A t th e sam e time , Dutc h intelligenc e pin -
pointed d e Ro y a s on e o f th e mos t extrem e an d voca l advocate s o f a n
anti-Dutch polic y i n Spain. 12 I n 1617 , h e returne d t o Cologne , fro m
which h e apparentl y remaine d i n contac t wit h severa l personage s i n
Holland.
During th e openin g years o f th e Thirt y Year s War , d e Ro y supplied
regular report s t o Brussel s and Madrid , detailin g th e movement s of th e
armies an d unfailingl y castigatin g th e Dutc h a s th e prim e instigators of
anti-Habsburg activity in the empire. 13 Whether he was filled with genu-
8
Antoni o Rodrigue z Villa , 'D . Francisc o d e Mendoza . Almirant e d e Aragon' ,
in Homenaje a Menéndez y Pelayo. Estudios d e erudición española, éd . J . Valer a
(2 vols. , Madrid , 1899) , ii. 605-8.
9
J.C.M . Warnsinck , D e reis o m d e wereld va n Joris va n Spilbergen, 1614-1617
(a vols. , Th e Hague , 1943) , i . 169-70 .
w Ibid.
11
Ibid.
a2
'Rappor t va n Care l va n Cracou w al s commissaris naa r Spanj e gezonden ' ( 1618),
Bijdragen e n mededeelingen va n he t Historisch Genootschap, i i (1879) , 103 .
13
See , i n particular , d e Ro y t o Jua n d e Ciriza , 2 5 Marc h an d 2 Ma y 1619 ,
AGS Estado 2306 ; d e Roy to Ciriza, 2 8 Nov. an d t o Pedr o d e Sa n Juan, 5 Marc h
1620, AGS Estado 2307 ; an d d e Ro y to Phili p IV , 8 June 1620 , AG S Estado 2308 .
On hi s dealing s wit h th e papa l nunci o a t Cologne , se e Nuntiaturberichte aus
Deutschland nebst ergânzenden Aktenstücken. Die Kölner Nuntiatur VI,
ed. K. Jaitne r (Munich , 1977) , pp . 43 , 221 , 241 , e t passim.
Gabriel de Roy 21 7
ine animosity , o r whethe r h e merel y sense d tha t ther e wa s a lon g an d
rewarding career to be made out of feeding Madrid' s paranoi a regardin g
the Dutch , i t i s difficul t t o say . I n an y case , h e los t n o opportunit y t o
depict th e Dutch a s a seditious forc e underminin g the political , religious,
and economi c peace o f th e world . On e o f his principa l task s a s Spanis h
resident at Cologn e wa s to pro d th e elector , Archbishop Ferdinand , int o
a mor e activel y pro-Habsbur g polic y an d int o aligning , a t leas t diplo -
matically, with Spain agains t th e Dutch . The elector , whils t showin g a
strong inclination toward s neutrality in the Spanish-Dutch conflict , found
himself pushe d int o sidin g wit h Spai n temporaril y whe n Dutc h troops ,
in retaliation fo r the elector's support o f the Catholi c Leagu e agains t th e
German Protestants , occupie d hi s fortres s o f Pfaffenmiitze , situate d o n
the Rhine between Cologne an d Bonn. 14 D e Roy was especially activ e in
the electorat e o f Cologn e durin g th e perio d o f th e successfu l Spanis h
siege o f Pfaffenmiitz e i n 1623 , fo r whic h h e provide d loca l politica l
support.
De Roy' s perio d a t Cologn e ende d i n Novembe r 162 3 whe n h e re -
turned, via Flanders, to Spain, having been summoned back to Madrid t o
advise Phili p IV' s new Junta d e Comercio on Dutc h trade an d colonia l
affairs.15 Th e Junta d e Comercio, se t u p earlie r tha t year , unde r th e
presidency o f th e marqué s d e Montesclaros , ha d a s it s mai n tas k th e
supervision an d intensificatio n o f Spain' s economi c wa r agains t th e
Dutch. Durin g th e month s followin g hi s return t o Madrid , d e Ro y wa s
involved i n day-to-da y discussion , bot h wit h minister s an d wit h non -
ministerial advisers , o f a grea t man y differen t economi c scheme s an d
projects. Bu t the most important wa s that for a n Almirantazgo d e Com-
ercio (Admiralt y o f Commerce). 16 Thi s wa s t o b e th e centrepiec e o f
Spain's mercantilist system during th e ag e o f Olivares. 17 Originally , th e
Almirantazgo o f Sevill e (a s i t wa s know n in th e earl y years) , wa s con -
ceived as a Dutch-style joint-stock company to be modelled on the Dutch
East an d Wes t Indi a Companies , excep t that it s purpose wa s to reshape
14
Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, i a Nov . 1620 , AG S Estad o 2034 ; Jürgen
Kessel, Spanten und di e geistlichen Kurstaaten a m Rhein wâhrend de r
Regierungszeit de r Infantin Isabella (1631-1633) (Frankfurt , 1979) , pp. 66-8 , 386.
15
Memoria l of Gabriel de Roy , AGS Estado 2334 , fo. 53 .
16
O n Phili p IV's Junta d e Comercio, see Israel, Th e Dutch Republic, pp. 138-42 .
17
Rafae l Rodena s Vilar, 'U n gra n proyect o anti-holandes en tiemp o de Felipe IV :
la destrucción del comercio rebelde en Europa', Hispania, xxi i (1962) .
Antonio Domíngue z Ortiz, 'Guerr a económic a y comerci o extranjero en e l
reinado d e Felipe IV' , Hispania, xxii i (1963) , 71-113 ; se e also M.E.H.N. Mout,
'Holendische Propositione s : Ee n Habsburgs pla n to t vernietigin g van handel ,
visserij e n scheepvaar t de r Republie k (c . 1625)' , Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,
xcv (1982) , 345-62 .
European, no t Asiatic or New World, commerce . I t wa s intended tha t i t
should attrac t capita l fro m man y quarter s bu t tha t thos e wh o woul d
chiefly inves t an d participat e i n i t woul d b e th e thrivin g colonie s o f
Flemish an d Germa n merchant s who , a t th e time , wer e th e tw o majo r
elements makin g u p th e merchan t communit y o f souther n Spai n an d
dominating trad e betwee n th e Andalusia n port s an d norther n Europe ,
the Hollander s havin g been eliminate d fro m th e scene. The Flemis h an d
Hanseatic merchan t colonie s o f Andalusia , heade d b y th e venerabl e
'confraternity o f San André s o f th e cit y of Seville , know n a s the Flemis h
and Germa n nation' , togethe r wit h thei r partner s an d associate s i n th e
Spanish Netherland s an d i n German y wer e t o b e give n th e monopol y
over al l trad e betwee n Andalusi a an d norther n Europe . I f th e ne w
company proved successful , it woul d als o rapidly transform the structure
of Spain's trans-Atlanti c trade, a s products from norther n Europe shipped
out t o th e Indie s o n th e officia l convoy s sailing from wester n Andalusia
would, i n future , onl y b e legall y imported b y th e Almirantazgo. Th e
company wa s t o b e governe d b y a boar d o f directors , lik e th e Dutc h
colonial companies, and wa s intended to operate a convo y of twenty-fou r
heavily arme d merchan t vessel s o f a tota l o f betwee n si x an d seve n
thousand tons. 18 Eventually, it was hoped, th e Almirantazgo woul d inter-
lock wit h a projecte d ne w Portugues e Eas t Indi a Compan y an d othe r
monopoly companies , includin g possibl y a Spanis h Wes t Indi a Com -
pany.19 Th e ultimat e objectiv e wa s a world-wid e networ k of monopol y
systems based i n the Iberia n Peninsula .
The mercantilis t adviser s who assiste d Olivare s an d hi s colleague s in
the secret deliberations accompanying the settin g up o f the Almirantazgo
were a remarkable, if motley group. Among them were Agustín Bredimus,
a Germa n exper t o n economi c affair s wh o cam e originall y fro m Trie r
but ha d live d for many years in Spai n ; a Dutch Catholi c failed merchan t
and informan t o n Dutc h commerc e b y th e nam e o f Francisc o Retama ,
of Jerez ; a renegad e Englis h Catholic nobleman , Si r Thoma s Shirley ;
and tw o Portugues e Ne w Christians , Duart e Gome s Sou s an d Manue l
Lopes Pereira , th e latte r o f whom, perhaps th e mos t prolifi c o f al l thes e
18
Roya l cédula o f 4 Oct . 1624 , AC S Estad o 2847 ; Lieuw e va n Aitzema , Historie
of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde
Nederlanden (1 4 vols. , Th e Hague , 1667-71) , ii . 7 9
19
O n th e plan s fo r othe r monopol y companies , se e A.R. Disney , 'Th e Firs t
Portuguese Indi a Company , 1628-33' , Economic History Review, xxx ( i 9 7 7 ) >
245, G.D. Winius , 'Tw o Lusitanian Variation s o n a Dutch Theme : Portugues e
Companies i n Time s o f Crisis , 1628-1662' , i n Companies an d Trade, éd . L . Eluss e
and F . Gaastra (Leiden , 1981) , pp. 120-5 ; Jonathan T . Israel, 'Manue l Lópe z
Pereira o f Amsterdam , Antwer p an d Madrid : Jew , Ne w Christia n an d Advise r
to th e Conde-Duqu e d e Olivares', below, 258-9.
Gabriel d e Roy 21 9
compilers o f secre t economi c project s fo r th e Spanis h crown , ha d onc e
been a membe r o f th e Sephard i Jewis h communit y o f Amsterdam. 20
These wer e the n joine d b y thre e governmen t official s wit h lon g ex -
perience o f commercia l matter s an d o f the Lo w Countrie s : Hortuñ o d e
Urizar, a Basque ; Jan Wouwer , a Fleming ; and last but not least de Roy,
who as late as 1625 was si^ styled 'Agent of His Majesty at Cologne'.
The essentia l concep t o f the Almirantazgo, clearly , evolved during 1623 ,
before d e Roy arrive d bac k i n Spain, 21 and ther e i s no evidenc e that h e
played a specia l rol e i n th e subsequen t elaboratio n o f th e schem e a t
Madrid. Bu t when i t cam e t o layin g th e foundation s and implementin g
the project , d e Roy wa s fro m th e outse t th e principa l government nego-
tiator involved. 22 I t wa s d e Ro y wh o wa s sen t i n Februar y 162 4 t o
Seville t o presen t th e government' s plan s an d t o wi n ove r th e Flemis h
and Germa n merchant s wh o controlle d Andalusia' s trad e wit h northern
Europe.23 It wa s de Roy who persuade d ke y Flemish merchant s livin g in
Seville suc h a s Guillerm o Bequer , Pedr o François , an d Francisc o d e
Smidt t o participat e i n th e ne w company. 24 An d afte r Seville , i t wa s d e
Roy who was sent to Lisbon o n the king' s behalf to win over the Flemis h
and German merchant s base d there. From Lisbon , he returned to Madri d
but was then sent back to Seville in May 162 4 'to complete the arranging
of th e said Almirantazgo'. During thes e busy months, he negotiated wit h
some of the mos t influentia l me n o f business to be foun d anywher e in th e
Hispanic worl d an d presumabl y ha d a fai r measur e o f succes s for , i n
October 1624 , Phili p I V wen t ahea d an d officiall y se t up th e Almiran-
tazgo o f Seville. Year s later , d e Ro y claime d t o hav e spen t 3,00 0 ducat s
on his missions to Sevill e and Lisbo n o n behalf o f the crow n i n 162 4 an d
to have received back onl y 500 ducats in expenses.
The Almirantazgo o f Seville , se t u p b y Phili p I V i n Octobe r 1624 ,
never had muc h success as a commercial organization. It di d fit out some
ships, recruit German, Scandinavian , and Flemish seamen, an d send some
20
O n thes e personalities , se e Stols , pp . 18-2 2 e t passim; Jos é Alcalá-Zamor a y
Queipo d e Llano , España, Flandes y e l ma r del Norte, (1618-1639) (Barcelona ,
'975), PP - 178-80 , 480-90; Israel, 'Manue l López Pereira' , below, 247-8.
21
Ibid., pp. 257-62. .
22
'Relació n sumaria', - Correspondance d u Nonce Giovanni-Francesco Guidi d i
Bagno (1631-1627), éd . B . d e Meeste r ( a vols. , Brussels-Rome , 1938) , ii .
837-8; Stols ; Mout , p. 350 .
23
Se e 'Relación sumaria' .
24
Stols , pp. 18 , 22 ; o n th e hous e o f Beque r an d o n Pedr o Françoi s o f Tiel t a s
exporters of wool fro m Sevill e t o Flanders , se e Jonathan I . Israel , 'Spanis h
Wool Export s an d th e Europea n Economy , 1610-1640' , Economic History
Review, xxxiii (1980) , 198 .
cargoes to the north, but these operations never amounted t o very much.25
The crew s of two Almirantazgo vessel s actually mutinied an d defecte d t o
the Dutch . Fro m th e outse t th e rea l importanc e o f the Almirantazgo la y
in th e secon d functio n whic h Phili p I V assigne d t o i t i n hi s roya l proc -
lamation o f Octobe r 1624 : i n settin g u p th e organization , th e kin g an d
his ministers ha d transferre d t o i t 'jurisdictio n civi l an d crimina l i n al l
cases concerning the said Almirantazgo, it s commerce an d traffic , jus t a s
is the practic e wit h th e Casa d e Contratación d e la s Indias'.62 Thi s las t
was a reference to the way Spanish trad e with the Spanish colonie s in the
New Worl d wa s organized , th e Casa d e Contratación i n Sevill e havin g
full jurisdictio n ove r ever y aspec t o f navigatio n t o an d from , an d trad e
with, th e Spanis h Ne w World. Th e ne w body, lik e the Casa d e Contra-
tación, wa s a combinatio n o f monopol y compan y headquarters , com -
mercial court, and government customs organization. However, wher e the
activities an d jurisdictio n o f th e Casa d e Contratación wer e confine d t o
Seville an d a coupl e o f outports , th e Almirantazgo wa s assigne d juris -
diction an d contro l ove r al l trade with norther n Europ e firs t fro m al l the
ports of 'Andalusia an d th e real m of Granada'. Later, i n 1628 , thi s tota l
jurisdiction an d custom s contro l ove r trad e wit h norther n Europ e wa s
extended t o th e Castilia n nort h coast , Portugal , Navarre , Valencia , an d
the res t of Spain." The prosecutio n and punishmen t o f persons violating
the royal ban on trade with the Dutch, i n Dutch products , or with Dutch -
built ships, was now transferred from th e slow-movin g ordinary court s of
the land t o the new special court s of the Almirantazgo. Th e Almirantazgo
recruited it s ow n inspectorate , firs t i n Andalusi a an d the n i n th e port s
of th e res t o f Spai n an d Portugal. 28 T o encourag e stringenc y an d nu -
merous confiscation s a crucia l operatin g principl e wa s borrowe d fro m
the all-too-effectiv e Inquisitio n : th e salarie s o f it s official s were , a t leas t
in part , t o be paid ou t o f confiscations. To co-ordinat e th e activit y of the
local Almirantazgo inspectorates , an d a t th e sam e tim e provid e th e kin g
25
Israel , Dutch Republic, p . 205 .
26
Se e ACS Estad o 2847 , fo . 2 ; Antoni o Domíngue z Ortiz, 'E l Almirantazg o d e los
países septentrionale s y l a política económic a d e Felip e IV' , Hispania, vi l ( 1947),
272-90.
27
O n th e extensio n o f Almirantazgo jurisdiction , se e Consulta o f th e Consejo d e
Estado, 3 Oct. 1628 , AGS Estado 4126; Domínguez Ortiz , 'Guerr a económica' ,
pp. 8o , 9 0 ; James Casey , Th e Kingdom o f Valencia i n th e Seventeenth Century
(Cambridge, 1979) , pp. 97-8 ; o n th e confiscatio n o f English ship s and cargoe s
by th e Almirantazgo o n th e Basqu e coas t i n 1631- 3 (fo r breakin g th e ba n o n
bringing in Dutch products) se e [British Library] Egerto n MSS 1820 , fos . i3v-2 4
and Add . MS S 36448 , fos . 12-14 .
28
B y March 1626 , th e Almirantazgo ha d a staf f o f sixty-si x inspector s throughou t
Andalusia, see Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerr a económica' , p. 105 .
Gabriel de Roy 22 1
with a permanen t new council to advis e o n European trad e in Madrid ,
Philip I V als o set up a centra l commercia l cour t t o govern th e Almiran-
tazgo i n th e peninsula , rathe r a s th e Suprem a di d i n th e Inquisition ,
except tha t afte r 162 8 this Junta d e Almirantazgo, a s it wa s called, ha d
jurisdiction ove r th e entir e peninsula , whil e th e Suprem a governe d th e
Inquisition onl y in Castil e and th e realm s o f Aragon .
But th e Almirantazgo i n th e peninsul a wa s never intende d t o ac t in -
dependently o f the complementar y organizatio n whic h Olivare s an d hi s
colleagues desire d t o set up i n norther n Europe . Hi s work in Spai n com -
pleted, Gabriel de Roy was dispatched to Flanders at the end of 162 4 to
set up th e Almirantazgo i n th e north . Th e objectiv e no w wa s t o cajol e
the administration o f the Spanish Netherlands , th e provincial estates , an d
the municipalitie s t o co-operat e with , an d participat e in , al l aspect s of
the grandios e ne w syste m o f imperia l commerc e within Europe . Durin g
the nex t tw o an d a hal f year s (excep t fo r ye t anothe r officia l tri p t o
Madrid an d Sevill e early i n 162 6 whic h cos t 2,80 0 ducat s in expenses) ,
de Ro y worke d assiduously , 'negotiatin g fo r th e establishmen t o f th e
Almirantazgo i n Flanders' , that is, trying to convince the merchant s an d
the representative s of the province s an d town s tha t th e whol e elaborat e
scheme coul d b e mad e t o wor k i n thei r interest. 29 Bu t th e Antwer p
merchant community , sceptica l fro m th e outset , wa s exasperate d b y th e
mounting stringenc y o f th e Almirantazgo i n souther n Spai n an d in -
censed b y th e confiscatio n of two shipload s o f their good s i n Galici a lat e
in i626. 30 D e Roy , wit h patch y hel p fro m king' s minister s i n Brussels ,
urged tha t the king guarantee th e safety fro m Dutc h attac k o f the arme d
convoys whic h woul d sai l betwee n Flander s an d th e peninsula , an d
argued tha t th e eliminatio n o f Dutc h good s fro m Flemis h trad e wit h
Spain would , i n th e lon g run , b e t o th e soli d advantag e o f Flanders. 31
But the business community o f the southern Netherland s remaine d unco -
operative, eve n hostile . Som e lesse r province s initiall y expresse d thei r
willingness t o participat e i n th e ne w compan y i f Braban t an d Flander s
agreed also . Bu t th e State s o f Braban t an d Flander s wer e unmoveable .
Philip IV' s 'Admiralt y o f commerc e betwee n hi s obedien t land s o f
Flanders, an d othe r norther n provinces , wit h Andalusi a an d th e real m
29
AG S Estad o 3334, fo. 53 ; Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne su r le s affaires
des Pays-Bas a u xviie siècle, éd. H. Lonchay , J. Cuvelier , and J . Lefèvr e ( 6 vols. ,
Brussels, 1923-37) , ii. 260 .
30
Phili p IV to Infant a Isabella , Madrid , 4 May 1627 , A[rchives ] Générale s du]
R[oyaume, Brussels], SEG 196 , fo. 368 ; Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne,
»• 329 , 3 3 « -a.
31
Ibid.
of Granada' , excludin g ever y for m o f Dutc h participation , proclaime d
at Dunkirk on 20 August i625, 32 remained a lifeless torso.
By 1627 , whe n d e Ro y wa s sen t o n t o th e Hanseati c town s o f th e
North Germa n coast , Phili p an d hi s minister s ha d effectivel y give n u p
trying to form a joint-stock compan y for Spanis h trad e in Flanders . Bu t
they continued to press, despite the campaign o f obstruction, for a Conseil
de Commerce i n Brussels which woul d liaise wit h the Junta d e Almiran-
tazgo in Madrid, a new government inspectorate o f commerce in Flander s
to matc h tha t operatin g i n Spai n an d Portugal , an d a ne w syste m of
certificates to replace thos e hitherto issued in Flander s b y local municipa l
officials.33 I n on e o f hi s fe w direc t intervention s i n th e spher e o f com -
mercial policy , Olivare s himsel f urge d hi s mos t truste d confidan t a t
Brussels, Pierre Roose , t o assis t d e Roy' s efforts , o n behal f o f the govern -
ment, t o revive commerc e between all the king' s realms cuttin g ou t tha t
of th e 'rebels ' (i.e. , th e Dutch). 34 I n th e year s 1628-3 0 on e deadlin e
after anothe r wa s se t afte r whic h th e Almirantazgo i n Spai n woul d
confiscate al l cargoe s arrivin g fro m Flander s no t covere d b y th e ne w
certificates issued by the government inspectorate in Dunkirk. 35 But again
and agai n thi s deadlin e ha d t o b e pu t bac k owin g t o obstructio n an d
opposition. I n 1630-1 , the Almirantazgo di d seize several batches of goods
from Flander s no t covere d b y th e ne w certificates , provoking a furiou s
outcry from Antwerp , Lille, Bruges, and Dunkirk. 36 Pierre Roos e was put
to wor k t o overcom e th e obstruction . I n th e end , th e governmen t di d
have it s way, a t leas t i n th e matte r o f certificates , an d th e merchant s of
the souther n Netherland s tradin g wit h th e Iberia n Peninsula ha d t o
submit to increased governmen t control. 37
To understan d wh y it was that Spanis h minister s went to such length s
to impos e more rigorou s checkin g procedures on Flemish , German , an d
(later) Danish-Norwegia n commerc e wit h th e Iberia n Peninsul a whils t
merchandise fro m Franc e (unti l 1635 ) an ^ fr° m Englan d (afte r 1630 )
were admitte d b y th e Almirantazgo i f accompanie d onl y b y certificates
issued b y ordinary loca l Frenc h an d Englis h officials , w e must tak e not e
32
Aitzema , ii. 79-8 8 gives al l th e article s an d provisions ; Stols, pp . a 1-2; d e Ro y
accused th e merchant s o f Antwer p o f deliberatel y tryin g t o sabotag e hi s effort s
so tha t the y coul d procee d wit h thei r illici t trad e i n Dutc h goods .
33
Isabell a t o Philip , 1 0 Marc h 1628 , AG R SE G 198 , fo . 127 ; Consulta o f th e
Consejo d e Estado, 6 April 1628 , AGS Estado 204 2 ; Correspondance d e la Cour
d'Espagne, ii . 329 , 363 , 456, 578 .
84
Olivare s t o Roose , Madrid , 1 8 Dec. 1628 , ibid., vi . 302 .
35
Ibid., vi . 305-7 .
s8 Ibid., ii . 575 , 577-8 .
37
Consultas of the Consejo d e Estado, 3 0 April an d 2 0 May 1631 , AGS Estado 2045 .
of wha t becam e on e o f th e fundamenta l doctrine s o f Spanis h strategi c
thinking i n th e iGaos . Thi s wa s the notio n tha t wherea s Dutc h textile s
could an d di d see p throug h th e ne t int o Spai n mixe d u p wit h Flemis h
and Germa n textiles , owing to the similarity in the type s of fabrics manu -
factured i n thes e countries , ther e wa s littl e likelihoo d tha t rebe l clot h
could be smuggled into the peninsula intermingled with French or English
products, fo r thes e wer e o f ver y differen t types. 38 Similarl y wit h nava l
stores from th e Baltic, i t wa s assumed tha t whil e Dutch-owned consign -
ments migh t becom e mixe d i n wit h suc h munition s shippe d fro m Ger -
many, Flanders , o r Calai s to th e peninsula , ther e wa s little or n o ris k of
this in the case of England an d mos t of France fro m wher e there were n o
regular shipment s of Balti c product s t o Spai n an d Portugal . Thi s con -
viction tha t rigorou s control s i n Flander s an d German y would suffic e t o
enable th e Almirantazgo t o achiev e it s basi c ai m o f eliminatin g Dutc h
trade with the peninsul a altogether la y therefore at th e hear t o f Spanis h
mercantilist thinking . Thi s wa s th e logi c behin d Phili p IV' s decre e of
September 163 0 whereb y the Almirantazgo woul d hencefort h no longe r
admit any Flemis h or Germa n merchandise reaching the peninsul a fro m
France unles s such merchandise (unlik e other foreig n good s coming fro m
France) wer e covere d b y specia l certificate s issue d a t thei r place s o f
origin.88
Meanwhile, despite the shelving of efforts to bring Spanish Netherland s
trade wit h th e peninsul a withi n th e projecte d monopol y company, Oli -
vares an d hi s colleague s presse d o n wit h thei r schem e fo r a n affiliate d
Hanseatic branc h o f th e Almirantazgo. Proposal s fo r suc h a n extensio n
of th e Almirantazgo system had bee n energetically propagated amon g th e
German merchant s i n th e peninsul a and i n th e Hans a town s themselves
from th e outset, fro m 1624 , and i t was then that Olivare s firs t sough t t o
persuade th e Austria n minister , Coun t Schwarzenberg , o f th e benefit s
of th e projec t fo r the Empero r as well as for Spain. 40 If Spai n neede d th e
Emperor's assistanc e i f she were to bring an y real pressure to bea r o n th e
38
'Relació n d e lo apuntado entr e e l Presidente de India s y Juan d e Pedros o para
lo del comercio', AGS Estado 284.7 , fos. 4v-5 ; Israel, 'Manue l Lópe z Pereira' ,
below, pp. 256, 2634.
38
Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne, ii . 553-4 .
40
Hans-Christop h Messow , Die Hansestâdte und di e Ha'usburgische Ostseepolitik
im 30 jâhrigen Kriege (¡637-1638) (Berlin , 1935) , p. 12 ; F . Mares, 'Di e maritim e
Politik de r Habsburge r in de n Jahre n 1625-1628' , Mitteilungen de s Instituts
fur Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung, i (1880) , 573-6 ; A . Gindely , 'Di e
maritimen Plan e de r Habsburger und die Antheilnahme Kaisers Ferdinand I I a m
polnisch-schwedischen Krieg e wàhren d de r Jahr e 1627-1629' , Denkschriften
der kaiserlichen Akademie de r Wissenschaften, xxxii i (1890) , 2-3 ; E . Freir é d e
Oliveira, Elementos para a historia do municipio de Lisboa (6 vols. , Lisbon ,
1882-91), iii . 278 .
North Germa n ports , th e Empero r too , Olivare s assure d Schwarzenberg.
had muc h t o gai n fro m assertin g hi s authorit y ove r th e Hansa. 41 Bu t i t
was no t unti l afte r th e defea t o f Denmar k b y th e Habsbur g armie s
in German y i n 1626- 7 tha t th e wa y wa s cleare d fo r Spai n an d th e
Emperor t o bargai n wit h th e Hans a fro m a positio n o f strength . A t
this point , th e projec t fo r a Hanseati c Iberia n Compan y becam e
closely linke d a t al l level s wit h Olivares ' n o les s grandios e schem e
for a join t Austro-Spaninsh-Polis h armada i n th e Baltic . Thi s arm-
ada wa s designe d t o fulfi l severa l functions . I t wa s intende d t o giv e
the Empero r contro l ove r th e Nort h Germa n coas t an d co w Den -
mark, an d t o provid e a buffe r betwee n Polan d an d he r enem y
Sweden. Bu t fo r Spanis h minister s th e mai n poin t o f th e excercis e
was t o disrup t Dutc h Balti c trade , th e chie f pilla r o f Dutc h eco -
nomic strength , an d a t th e sam e tim e creat e a secur e framewor k
within whic h Spai n coul d effectivel y contro l the carryin g trade betwee n
the peninsul a an d norther n Europ e an d thereb y creat e a Europea n
trading system. 42
To exer t pressur e o n th e Hans a town s an d represen t Spai n i n th e
Baltic, Olivare s an d hi s colleague s decide d tha t Gabrie l d e Ro y wa s
the obviou s choice . N o on e els e clos e t o th e regim e i n Madri d an d
Brussels coul d matc h hi s knowledg e o f languages , hi s acceptabilit y
at Centra l Europea n courts , an d hi s knowledg e o f th e Balti c area .
In Ma y 1627 , d e Ro y receive d instruction s t o procee d fro m Brussel s
to Vienn a wher e h e wa s t o confe r wit h th e Austrian court. 43 Fro m
Austria, h e wen t o n t o th e Balti c coas t arme d wit h a whol e assort -
ment o f commission s an d instruction s fro m Madrid , Brussels , an d
Vienna, no t t o mentio n bankers ' draft s o n Lübec k fo r larg e sum s
of Spanis h cash . H e ha d a mos t complicate d tas k befor e him . H e
was entruste d bot h wit h organizin g th e ne w armada an d wit h pro -
moting th e projecte d Hanseati c Iberia n Compan y whil e Jiaisin g wit h
three distan t capital s a s wel l a s wit h th e Baro n d e Auchy , Phili p
IV's ministe r i n Poland. 4* A t th e en d o f 1627 , Phili p IV' s regen t a t
Brussels, th e Infant a Isabella , arrange d wit h th e Empero r tha t h e
should besto w upo n Gabrie l d e Ro y a high-soundin g titl e o f com -
41
Schwarzenber g doe s see m t o hav e bee n convince d tha t i t wa s in th e emperor' s
interest t o curtail Dutc h economi c powe r i n Germany: se e Mares, pp . 573-5 ; Mout ,
PP- 353-6 -
42
Consulta junta d e estado, Madrid, 3 Jan. 1628 , AC S Estad o 2328 , fos . 11-12 .
43
Gabrie l d e Roy to Phili p IV , Vienna, 1 4 Jul y 1627 , AG R SE G 126 , fos . 2?3-v.
44
'L o qu e vo s Gabriel d e Ro y aveys de haze r e n l a Jornada qu e po r m i mand o
hazeis a las villas anseáticas' (2 3 Apri l 1627) , AGS Estado 2510 ; Consulta junta
de estado, 28 Sept. 1627 , AG S Estado 2328 , fos . 5-sv.
Gabriel de Roy 22 5
mand ove r th e projecte d armada. 45 I n Apri l o f th e followin g year ,
the Empero r dul y proclaime d d e Ro y 'General-Kommissa r de r Bal -
tischen un d Ozeanische n See' , a t th e sam e tim e appointin g his principa l
commander i n Nort h Germany , Coun t Wallenstein , generalissim o of th e
armada, an d Coun t Phili p vo n Mansfel d actua l admira l o f th e fleet. 48
On arrivin g i n th e Balti c area , d e Ro y wen t firs t t o th e grea t por t
of Danzig . Althoug h h e subsequentl y portraye d hi s effort s ther e i n th e
best possible light, and wa s warmly congratulated b y ministers in Madrid,
his actua l achievement s in Danzi g appea r t o hav e bee n slight . No r wa s
the atmospher e particularl y conduciv e t o th e succes s o f hi s comple x
mission. Th e burgomaster s wer e highl y annoye d b y th e activitie s o f th e
Spanish Almirantazgo, whic h ha d recentl y seize d severa l Danzi g ship s
and confiscate d thei r cargoe s fo r breaking the embargoe s o n the Dutch. 47
The Danzi g cit y counci l wa s in n o moo d t o liste n t o d e Roy' s proposa l
that a Spanis h 'consul ' shoul d no w b e poste d i n Danzi g t o monito r
trade betwee n th e Balti c an d th e Iberia n Peninsula , an d tol d hi m tha t
they di d no t believ e tha t th e schem e fo r a Hanseati c Iberia n Company ,
with monopol y right s ove r Balti c grai n shipment s t o th e peninsula , wa s
feasible. However , the y di d no t rejec t i t outrigh t an d aske d whethe r
Philip I V woul d now , fo r thi s purpose , permi t th e us e o f vessel s buil t
in Holland ; fo r withou t Dutch-buil t ship s th e Danzi g burgomaster s
could see no hope of handling so large a volume of traffic. D e Roy replie d
that h e thought th e kin g woul d agre e to this for a limite d tim e until th e
Hanseatics ha d ha d a chance t o increase their shipbuilding capacity.
With nothin g accomplishe d a t Danzig , d e Ro y move d o n t o Liibec k
where he arrived i n Octobe r 1627 . He no w had t o organize matters wit h
the Liibec k cit y counci l an d wit h Wallenstei n wh o wa s no w rapidl y
bearing down on the Balti c coast, fo r the setting up o f the Austro-Spanish
armada. A t thi s stage, Phili p I V an d th e Empero r wer e expectin g t o b e
able t o hir e a larg e numbe r o f Hanseatic vessels , recrui t seamen , gathe r
up artillery , an d for m a n effectiv e Balti c forc e withi n a shor t spac e of
time.48 I t wa s thought tha t i t might soon be possible to launch a n attac k
on th e fortresse s commandin g th e Danis h Sound . D e Roy' s arriva l a t
Liibeck wa s time d t o coincid e wit h tha t o f Coun t Schwarzenber g an d
his staff , i t bein g thei r tas k officiall y t o propos e th e settin g u p o f a
Hanseatic Iberia n Compan y t o monopoliz e th e shippin g o f Balti c pro -
ducts t o th e peninsula , a s well a s t o arrang e th e hirin g o f a n adequat e
45
Correspondance de l a COUT d'Espagne, ii . 356 .
48
Messow , pp. 77-8 .
47
Consulta de l junta d e estado, 3 Jan. 1628 , AG S Estado 2328 ; Messow , pp . 32-40 .
48
Rafae l Rodena s Vilar, La política europa de España durante la guerra de Treinta
Años (1634-1630) (Madrid , 1967) , pp. 125-6 ; Alcalá-Zamora, pp . 65 , 241.
number of large ships for the Austro-Spanish armada, in th e nam e o f th e
Emperor an d a s essentiall y Imperial projects. 49 Th e Spanis h rol e i n in -
spiring, organizing , and financing the proceedings was deliberately playe d
down, d e Ro y havin g previousl y impresse d upo n Olivare s an d hi s col -
leagues th e difficult y o f 'overcomin g th e blin d an d ignoran t aversio n
which, generall y speaking , the y hav e fo r Spain'. 50 D e Ro y playe d a n
active diplomati c rol e behin d th e scenes , though , strivin g to comba t th e
tide o f Dutch , Danish , an d Swedis h counter-pressur e o n th e Liibec k
burgomasters.
But Liibec k prove d n o mor e amenabl e t o Olivares ' scheme s tha n ha d
Danzig. Th e Liibec k cit y counci l als o perceive d numerou s practica l
difficulties i n th e projec t fo r a Hanseati c Iberia n Compan y an d wa s
distinctly reluctant t o arouse the ire of Denmark, Sweden, and th e Dutch .
Once again , however , ther e wa s n o outrigh t rejectio n o f th e proposal s
and initiall y d e Ro y wa s abl e t o pu t a n optimisti c glos s o n hi s report s
to Madrid. 51 Matter s wer e simpl y deferre d fo r som e month s unti l a
gathering o f the Hanseati c Leagu e coul d b e convened at Lübec k in April
1628.52 O n 5 April , Schwarzenberg , wit h d e Ro y a t hi s side , formall y
outlined befor e th e assemble d delegate s o f Liibeck , Hamburg , Danzig ,
Stettin, Rostock , Wismar , and othe r town s th e schem e for th e 'establish -
ment o f a Hanseati c Compan y fo r th e Spanis h trade ' whic h woul d
collaborate an d interloc k wit h th e Almirantazgo. 53 Thi s wa s followe d
by intensiv e discussio n bu t n o conclusion . A t length , th e matte r wa s
deferred ye t agai n unti l th e nex t meetin g o f the Hanseati c Diet , i n Sep -
tember. A t th e Septembe r gathering , th e leagu e politel y bu t firml y
rejected th e proposals. 84 Meanwhil e a t bot h meeting s o f the league , th e
delegates o f th e town s complaine d bitterl y ove r th e despoti c doing s of
the Almirantazgo i n Spai n an d i n particula r th e proclamatio n b y th e
Junta d e Almirantazgo i n Januar y 1627 , tha t hencefort h neutra l vessel s
49
Bu t it was Philip I V wh o originally aske d th e Empero r t o sen d a representativ e
to Lübeck, th e Empero r havin g agreed t o what wa s in effec t Olivares ' reques t
back in August , Gabriel de Roy to Olivares , Vienna, 1 1 Aug . 1627 , AGR SEG
126, fos . 267-8; Gindely, pp . 18-19 .
50
AG R SE G 126 , fo. 273v ; Messow , pp . 50-1 , 57.
51
Gabrie l d e Ro y to Pedr o d e Sa n Juan, Liibeck , 2 0 Dec. 1627 , AG S Estado 2321 .
52
Gabrie l d e Roy to Juan d e Villela, Lübeck, 8 Feb. 1628 , AG S Estado 2510 ;
Gindely, pp . 24-6 .
53
Rudol f Hâpke , Niederlandische Akten und Urkunde zur Geschichte de r Hanse
und zur deutschen Seegaschichte ( 2 vols. , Munich-Leipzig , 1913-23) , ii . 406-8 ;
Erwin Wiskemann , Hamburg un d di e Welthandelspolitik vo n de n Anfdngen bi s
zur Gegenwart (Hamburg , 1929) , pp. 84-5 .
54
Mirosla v Hroch , 'Wallenstein s Beziehunge n z u den wendische n Hansestâdten' ,
Hansische Studiën. Heinrich Sproemberg zum Jo , Geburtstag (Berlin , 1961) ,
p. 147 ; Messow , p . 86 .
leaving Spanis h port s ha d t o leav e cautio n mone y a s a guarante e tha t
they woul d no t delive r thei r cargoe s i n Dutc h ports , mone y refundabl e
by th e Almirantazgo onl y o n presentatio n o f signe d affidavit s fro m th e
authorities i n port s o f destinatio n t o th e effec t tha t cargoe s ha d i n fac t
been delivere d wher e specified . Th e outcr y fro m th e Hans a towns ,
coupled wit h th e protest s o f the cit y council s o f Sevill e an d Málag a le d
to the cancellin g of this much resented measur e in th e summe r o f iGaS. 55
Meanwhile th e settin g u p o f th e Balti c armada wa s makin g slo w
progress. After months of delay, Auchy and d e Roy passed o n t o Madri d
a reques t fro m th e kin g o f Polan d tha t unit s o f th e Flander s armada
should b e sent t o th e Balti c to assis t hi m i n a n attac k o n th e Swede s a t
Pillau. Olivares explode d in exasperation. 50 It ha d been made abundantl y
clear t o Warsaw, a s to Vienna, that th e Flander s armada wa s needed a t
all time s i n th e wes t an d simpl y coul d no t b e transferre d t o th e Balti c
for howeve r brie f a time. 57 Spai n wante d t o establis h a n armada o f
twenty-four warship s i n th e Baltic , a s the marqué s d e Montesclaro s pu t
it, 'so that, with the maritime force s raised by the kin g of Poland an d th e
Hansa towns , a powerfu l armada coul d b e assembled , strong enoug h to
deprive th e Dutc h o f thei r trad e an d remov e th e tyran t o f Swede n
[Gustavus Adolphus ] fro m th e port s h e ha s capture d i n Prussi a an d
Pomerania'.58 Montesclaro s reminde d hi s colleagues on th e specia l junta
'which deals with the affair s of the Balti c sea' tha t the king had entrusted
de Ro y wit h 200,00 0 ducat s fo r th e acquisitio n o f ships , stores , guns ,
and crew s fro m th e Hans a towns . Wha t exactl y ha d Gabrie l d e Ro y
done wit h th e 200,00 0 ducats ? Where wa s the king' s armada? Another
minister suggeste d tha t Gabrie l d e Ro y an d Baro n Auch y b e reminde d
that their influenc e o n the genesi s of the Balti c armada project ha d bee n
considerable an d tha t whe n the y ha d originall y advocate d th e schem e
they ha d assure d th e kin g tha t ships , stores , guns , an d crew s wer e al l
readily a t han d i n th e Hans a ports .
De Ro y di d i n fac t hir e a few ships, an d recrui t som e men i n Liibec k
but th e burgomasters , determine d t o avoi d antagonizin g th e Dutc h an d
Swedes, wer e beginning actively to obstruct th e progres s of the armada.™
As the months passe d d e Roy had littl e alternative bu t t o switch fro m a
55
Consultas o f th e Consejo d e Estado 1 4 May , 1 4 June , an d 2 4 Oct . 162 8 an d o f
the Junta d e Almirantazgo o f 3 1 Ma y an d 1 2 Jul y 1628 , AC S Estad o 2328 .
56
Auch y to Gabrie l d e Roy , Warsaw , 5 April 1628 , AG S Estado 2328 : an d consulta
of th e Junta qu e trata la s materias de l Ma r Báltico, 24 Ma y 1628 .
5T
Ibid. ; E. Straub , Pa x e t Imperium, Spaniens Kampf um seine Priedensordnung
in Europa zwischen 1617 un d 1635 (Paderborn , 1980) , pp . 293-303 .
58
Se e the consulta o f 2 4 May 1628 .
59
Rodena s Vilar , p . 145 .
policy of persuasion to one of ill-concealed threat s based o n the proximit y
of Wallenstein . Moreover th e relationshi p betwee n d e Ro y an d Wallen -
stein was most unfortunate from th e Spanis h poin t o f view. At thei r first
meeting, a t Itzeho e i n Holstein , i n Octobe r 1627 , Wallenstei n seem s t o
have forme d a poo r opinio n o f d e Ro y an d fro m the n o n mad e littl e
attempt t o co-operat e wit h him. 00 Th e marqué s d e Ayton a reporte d t o
Madrid fro m Pragu e i n Ma y 1628 , tha t thu s fa r Wallenstei n ha d don e
more t o obstruc t tha n t o advanc e th e progres s o f th e Austro-Spanis h
armada, mainl y becaus e d e Ro y rathe r tha n h e himsel f wa s t o hav e
immediate control over it.61 Progress was speeded up somewhat , however,
following th e meetin g betwee n d e Ro y an d Wallenstei n i n th e summe r
of 162 8 a t Prenzlau , o n th e Brandenburg-Mecklenbur g border . A t
Prenzlau, Wallenstei n an d d e Ro y agree d t o prepar e a tota l o f fort y
vessels fo r actio n b y th e sprin g o f 1629 : thi s forc e wa s t o b e calle d th e
'Imperial Armada' an d would be divided into two fleets to be based eithe r
side o f Denmark , i n th e Balti c and - the Nort h Sea . A divisio n o f labou r
was agreed on whereby the Emperor , tha t is Wallenstein, would provid e
the necessar y troops , munitions , an d stores , an d th e Spanis h monarch ,
that is , de Roy , pa y fo r th e hiring , building , an d maintenanc e o f ships ,
the guns , an d th e recruitmen t o f seamen . The y agree d tha t th e fort y
vessels shoul d amoun t t o a tota l o f 9,10 0 tons , an d moun t 95 8 guns ,
costing 450,00 0 ducat s fo r th e ship s an d 350,00 0 ducat s fo r th e guns. 02
To thi s were to be added 240,00 0 ducat s yearly for the crews ' wages and
other running costs.
The por t of Wismar was chosen as the headquarters of the ne w armada
and ther e d e Ro y an d hi s staf f no w transferred . By June 1628 , d e Ro y
had spen t 50,00 0 ducat s fitting out th e six ships he ha d hire d a t Liibec k
and on copper and othe r materials for the castin g of his guns. He reported
to Madrid that he would spend the remaining 150,00 0 ducats with which
he ha d bee n provide d buildin g anothe r twelv e warships i n an d aroun d
Wismar an d payin g th e wage s o f hi s workme n an d seame n dow n t o
September 1628 . Fro m Octobe r onwards , h e wrote , h e woul d nee d a
further 40,00 0 ducats monthly to keep the armada in being. By the spring
of 162 9 Wismar was a veritable hiv e of activity, de Roy having attracte d
60
'De n Gabrie l de Ro y belangend', wrote Wallenstein , i n Apri l 1628 , 'ic h sehe , das s
er ei n besti a is t .. . den n de r ande r [Schwarzenberg ] ha t ih n gant z inficirt' ,
Hroch, p. 142 ; H. Gunter , Die Habsburger-Liga, 1625-1635. Brief e und Akten
aus de n General-Archiv zu Simancas (Berlin , 1908) , pp . 29-30 .
61
Ayton a t o Phili p IV , Prague , 2 Ma y 1628 , Add . MS S 36320 , fo . 63 .
02
Gabrie l d e Roy t o Phili p IV , Lubeck , 1 7 Jul y 1628 , AGS Estad o 2328 , fos. 259-60 ;
Consulta, 1 8 Sept . 1628 , ibid., fo . 272 ; Alcala-Zamora, pp . 269-70 .
Gabriel de Roy 22 9
sail an d rope-maker s fro m Hambur g an d Lübeck , an d seame n fro m al l
round th e Baltic an d Nort h Se a and a s far awa y as Genoa an d Venice. 63
De Roy' s ships , storehouses , workshops , an d massiv e gun-foundr y were
the sight s o f th e tow n which , i n 1630 , boaste d som e 2,00 0 inhabite d
houses.
Olivares was greatly annoye d b y what he judged de Roy's subservience
to Wallenstein , considerin g that a t Prenzla u d e Roy had diverge d signifi -
cantly from hi s instructions.64 Olivare s was deeply suspiciou s o f the grea t
general an d wa s now increasingly sceptica l as to whethe r anythin g much
could b e hope d fo r i n th e wa y o f effectiv e imperialis t hel p fo r th e se a
campaign agains t th e Dutch. It seem s that wha t the Consejo d e Estado in
Madrid would hav e preferred wa s a smaller, essentiall y Spanish , armada
at Wismar which could then ac t in the Emperor's nam e together with th e
Poles agains t th e Dutch an d Swedes . But as the months passed it became
increasingly obviou s tha t Wallenstei n wa s tightening his gri p ove r bot h
Gabriel d e Roy and th e 'Imperia l Armada' . Eve n so, Olivares continue d
to hope for at leas t some strategic gain s for Spain i n th e Baltic , rejectin g
Spinola's gloom y assessmen t tha t th e whol e enterpris e wa s a disastrou s
fiasco 'fro m whic h littl e benefi t wil l b e gained'. 65 Disagreemen t abou t
Baltic strateg y merge d wit h th e wide r confrontatio n betwee n Olivare s
and Spinol a ove r virtuall y ever y strategic dilemm a facin g Spai n whic h
overshadowed th e deliberation s o f th e Consejo d e Estado i n Madri d
throughout the years 1638-9 .
Meanwhile, ye t anothe r stran d ha d bee n adde d t o Spain' s norther n
strategy a t d e Roy' s promptin g i n th e autum n o f 1628 . S o fa r th e on e
solid succes s fo r th e pla n t o creat e a Spanish-controlle d commercia l
system i n norther n Europ e ha d bee n th e commercia l treat y whic h th e
Infanta Isabell a ha d signe d with Duke Frederick III o f Hoistein-Gottorp.
The duk e wa s kee n t o promot e hi s por t o f Friedrichstad t o n th e wes t
coast of Schleswig and ha d eagerl y agreed t o Spanis h proposal s to turn i t
into an emporium for Iberian trad e on condition that he strictly excluded
Dutch involvemen t an d tha t o f th e Sephard i Jews.* 6 Th e duk e als o
accepted th e postin g o f a 'Spanish ' agen t i n Friedrichstad t t o monito r
the conduct of trade there, so that durin g 162 8 a certain Quiri n Janssens,
sent fro m Flanders , becam e th e firs t o f Phili p IV' s residen t 'agents ' fo r
63
Hâpke , ii . 408-11; Karl-Friedric h Olechnowitz , Handel und Seeschiffahrt de r
spâten Hanse (Weimar , 1965) , pp . 58-9 .
64
Consulta of th e Balti c junta, fo. 7 , AGS Estad o 2328 , fo. 272.
65
Consulta of Baltic junta, 1 9 Feb. 1629 , AGS Estad o 2329 .
66
Duk e Frederick t o Philip IV , Gottorf, 6 Jan. 1628 , AGS Estado 3510; A Jiirgens,
Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts
(Berlin, 1914) , pp. 208-9 .
the controllin g o f trade i n norther n Europ e outsid e th e Spanis h Nether -
lands.67 Then in the summer of 1628 , the duk e wrote to d e Roy pointing
out tha t his island of Sylt, with its protected landward-facing bay, off th e
west coas t o f Schleswig , woul d mak e a n idea l nava l bas e fo r a Spanis h
armada operatin g agains t th e Dutch , an d a perfec t anchorag e fo r th e
projected arme d convoy s whic h woul d carr y futur e trad e betwee n th e
peninsula an d norther n Europe . D e Ro y travelle d t o Syl t t o se e fo r
himself, an d then sent an enthusiastic report to Madrid. 68 On Philip IV's
orders, tw o expert s were then sen t fro m Flander s t o Syl t an d thes e con-
firmed d e Roy' s assessmen t tha t Spai n woul d dra w muc h benefi t fro m
occupying thi s remote , wind-swep t island. 89 Olivare s himsel f no w gre w
enthusiastic. But de Roy, having first aroused expectations with his overly-
confident origina l assurance s tha t a mer e doze n o r s o warship s woul d
suffice t o take and hol d th e island, now became alarmed a t th e prospec t
of a probabl e Dutc h counter-attac k an d drasticall y raise d hi s estimat e
of th e numbe r o f warships that woul d be neede d to secur e the ne w bas e
to thirty-six , thre e time s what h e had originall y advised . Eve n then , th e
Consejo d e Estado seriousl y considere d pushin g ahea d wit h th e plan ,
using a large part of the Cadi z armada. But it was soon realized that th e
ships simpl y coul d no t b e spare d i f th e Andalusia n coas t wa s t o b e
protected an d Spain' s trans-Atlanti c convoys properly escorted. The kin g
wrote t o Brussel s i n Apri l 162 9 shelvin g th e Syl t schem e indefinitely. 70
It wa s never revived.
Meanwhile, a t Wisma r th e Austro-Spanis h armada continue d slowly
to take shape. In December 1628 , de Roy reported that he had now spent
149,000 o f his original 200,00 0 ducats. 71 He ha d s o far constructe d five
new warship s which , adde d t o th e si x he ha d hire d a t Liibeck , mad e a
total o f eleven , mountin g betwee n the m 10 8 guns . Beside s these , a
further eleve n warships had arrive d at Wismar sent by the king of Poland .
De Ro y no w ha d t o pa y fo r th e upkee p of the whol e o f thi s substantia l
fleet o f twenty-tw o vessels and th e mone y was runnin g ou t fast . Wage s
alone, he reported, were consuming 800 ducats per day. But if the armada
was provin g costl y i t wa s also inactive . Wallenstein , who wa s immerse d
in intricate negotiations with bot h th e Dane s an d th e Dutch , insiste d on
67
Correspondance de l a Cour d'Espagne, ii . 404 ; Isabell a t o Phili p IV , Brussels,
27 Apri l 1629 , AG S Estad o 2146 .
68
Consulta, 26 Nov. 1628 , AGS Estado 2328 ; Alcalá-Zamora, pp . 276-8 .
69
Isabell a t o Philip , Brussels , 6 Jan . 1629 , AG R SE G 220 , fo . 7 .
70
Phili p t o Isabella , Madrid , 5 April 1629 , AG R SE G 200 , fo. 144.
71
'Punto s d e lo contienen la s cartas de Gabriel d e Roy' , Madrid , 2 8 Dec. 1628 ,
AGS Estad o 2510 , fo. 47 .
this, and Wisma r was garrisoned with hi s soldiery. If a s late a s February
1629, Olivare s stil l entertaine d som e hop e o f a satisfactor y return o n
Spain's Balti c investment, b y May h e ha d totall y lost fait h i n th e under -
taking, blamin g Wallenstei n fo r th e fiasco. 72 I t i s no t clea r ho w muc h
Spanish minister s actuall y kne w o f Wallenstein' s negotiation s wit h th e
Dutch State s Genera l throug h th e Dutc h residen t a t Hamburg , Foppiu s
van Aitzema , bu t i t ha d b y no w becom e crysta l clea r tha t a s lon g a s
Wallenstein controlle d th e Pomerania n coas t th e armada coul d no t b e
used agains t th e Dutch . Nevertheless , at th e meetin g of the Balti c affair s
junta in Madrid on 5 May 1629 , the Conde-Duqu e urge d hi s colleagues
to sen d th e additiona l 100,00 0 ducat s fo r whic h Gabrie l d e Ro y wa s
asking, s o that th e wor k a t Wisma r coul d continu e and th e armada b e
kept i n being . Th e pla n no w wa s tha t whe n th e ship s presentl y unde r
construction an d bein g fitted out wer e ready, the y should all at onc e sail
to Spain for use in the west. In th e meantime, Olivares urged , Wallenstein
should be kept in the dar k about this , i t being necessary to deal wit h 'hi m
and wit h everyon e wit h much dissimulatio n an d secrecy' . However , onl y
another 50,000 ducats were actually sent to de Roy at Wismar .
As the emperor's 'General-Kommissa r der Baltischen und Ozeanische n
See', d e Roy was determined t o show at leas t some trace of independence
from Wallenstei n an d a smal l numbe r o f Dutch , Danish , an d Swedis h
vessels were in fact captured b y his raiders during the spring and summe r
of 1629 . Then, in August , ther e wa s a successfu l clas h with the Swedis h
navy of f Wismar . Amon g th e prisoner s capture d an d interrogate d b y
de Ro y wa s th e Dutc h mercantilis t writer, Wille m Usselinx , on e o f th e
inspirers of the Dutc h Wes t Indi a Company . But he, alon g with th e res t
of th e prisoner s an d th e capture d ships , wer e soo n release d a t Wallen -
stein's command an d al l raiding ceased. De Roy and vo n Mansfel d wer e
placed unde r th e strictes t order s t o keep thei r ship s i n por t a t Wisma r
on the pretext that th e armada was not t o venture out unti l it reache d its
stipulated strengt h o f forty ships. 73 Though stron g enough in fac t b y th e
summer o f 162 9 t o fac e u p t o th e Swedis h navy , th e Wisma r armada
under Wallenstein's control was a phantom force, lackin g all reality apart
from it s mountin g cost . Tire d o f thi s useles s procrastination, th e Polis h
king warne d Madri d i n Januar y 163 0 tha t whils t h e ha d bee n willin g
both to post his navy indefinitely a t Wisma r an d plac e i t unde r d e Roy's
control an d tha t o f the emperor , h e no w wante d hi s ships bac k fo r 'no t
72
Consulta of th e Junta de l Mar Báltico, 5 May 1629 , "Vot o de l Gonde-Duque' ,
ACS Estado 2329.
73
'Punto s d e uno s papeles d e Gabrie l d e Roy' , AG S Estado 2510 , fo . no ; Hroch ,
PP- 94 , 97-8 .
only are they idle but they are poorly maintained and are deteriorating'. 74
It woul d seem , though , tha t Kin g Sigismun d wa s aske d t o b e patien t
for, a s late as March 1631 , the entire Wismar armada, including its Polish
contingent, was still intact. I t wa s not unti l the summe r o f 163 1 tha t th e
victorious Swedes , wh o no w controlle d mos t o f th e coastlin e o f Pomer -
ania an d Mecklenburg , close d i n t o blockad e Wismar b y lan d an d sea .
General-Kommissar d e Ro y seem s t o hav e departe d th e cit y just befor e
the sieg e began , leavin g a subordinat e i n charge. 75 Whe n Gustavu s
Adolphus finally too k Wisma r i n Januar y 1632 , h e capture d th e whol e
armada, a vas t arra y o f stores , an d th e 30 0 gun s whic h d e Ro y ha d
amassed.76
While th e sorr y tal e o f th e Wisma r armada woun d t o it s conclusion,
de Ro y continue d hi s struggle wit h th e Hanseati c Leagu e ove r th e pro -
jected control s on Nort h Germa n commerc e with th e Iberia n Peninsula .
Following th e rejectio n i n Septembe r 162 8 o f th e schem e fo r a Han -
seatic Iberia n Company , d e Ro y fel l bac k o n insistin g tha t th e Nort h
German ports , i n retur n fo r th e commercia l advantage s tha t Phili p I V
was offering , mus t allo w Spai n t o pos t agent s whos e tas k woul d b e t o
issue certificate s authenticatin g cargoe s shippe d fro m German y t o th e
Iberian Peninsula. 77 Thi s networ k o f Spanis h resident s which , Olivare s
and hi s colleague s hoped , woul d effectivel y interloc k wit h th e Almiran-
tazgo t o ensure the elimination of Dutch participatio n i n Hanseati c trad e
with Spai n an d Portugal , an d thu s indirectl y wit h th e Spanis h Ne w
World, bu t whic h thu s far comprise d onl y the on e resident a t Friedrich -
stadt, was to come under the overall supervision of de Roy who had bee n
appointed Phili p IV' s veedor, o r genera l inspector , o f Nort h Germa n
commerce with the peninsula, in September 1628.™ I t seem s clear, more -
over, fro m late r evidence , tha t th e empero r mus t a t thi s poin t hav e
officially sanctione d the arrangemen t whereb y Spai n wa s t o hav e office s
of commerc e in th e Nort h Germa n port s t o monito r an d hel p regulat e
the trad e o f th e Hans a wit h th e peninsula. 78 Bu t Hambur g whic h ac -
counted fo r th e lion' s shar e o f th e newly-revive d Hanseati c trad e wit h
T
* Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, 12 Jun e 1630 , AC S Estad o 233 1 ; Consulta,
8 Marc h 1631 , ibid., AGS Estado 2329.
75
Consulta o f the Consejo d e Estado, 1 9 Apri l 164 5 an d enclosures , AGS Estad o 2064 .
7
« Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, 2 6 Aug . 1632 , AG S Estad o 2333 .
77
Consulta of the Consejo de Estado, 29 Marc h 1629 , AGS Estad o 2064 .
78
Thi s commission was issued a t Brussels , se e AGR SE G 201 , fo. 97.
79
Fo r instanc e th e Emperor' s confirmatio n o f th e appointmen t o f a successo r t o
de Ro y t o issu e certificate s fo r Hanseati c trad e wit h Spai n date d Linz , 2 4 Ma y
1646, se e Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne, iii . 577 .
Gabriel de Roy 23 3
80
Spain, an d Liibec k whic h wa s the secon d mos t importan t participant ,
were utterl y oppose d t o allowin g Spai n an d th e empero r an y influenc e
over their economic life an d maritim e policies and refuse d t o admi t either
de Roy himself, or a subordinate, a s a resident agent of Spain. Hambur g
and Lübec k coul d not , however , preven t th e Almirantazgo fro m issuin g
a proclamation in Spain, as it did early in 1629, tnat fr°m tm's time on
only such Hanseati c cargoes , or goods arriving on Hanseatic ships , would
be admitte d t o Spai n an d Portuga l a s wer e authenticate d b y d e Roy' s
certificates. I f Nort h Germa n merchant s refuse d t o com e to d e Ro y with
itemized lists of their shipments, they would not b e allowed to trad e with
the peninsula .
There wa s an immediat e outcr y fro m th e merchants . Th e Hanseati c
League proteste d bot h t o Madri d an d t o Vienna. Wha t particularl y out-
raged the Hamburg and Liibeck senates was that the French an d even the
English - Englan d stil l being officially a t war with Spai n - wer e allowed,
as before , t o shi p good s t o th e peninsul a covere d onl y b y certificate s
issued b y thei r ow n loca l authorities . Hanseati c representative s were
totally unmoved by the Spanish argument that seepage of Dutch products,
or goods owned by Dutch merchants , into Spain an d Portuga l could take
place o n a significant scal e onl y throug h Flander s o r els e throug h Nort h
Germany. I n Septembe r 1629 , wit h som e fifty ships read y a t Hambur g
to sai l aroun d Scotlan d an d Irelan d t o Spai n an d Portugal , th e Han -
seatic Leagu e delivere d a threat , throug h th e imperia l ambassado r i n
Madrid, t o dismantl e it s Iberia n trad e altogethe r i f th e orde r 'tha t al l
ships fro m th e Hans a town s that com e without certificates from Gabrie l
de Roy would b e considere d contraband ' wa s not rescinde d forthwith. 81
The Hans a towns threatened t o move their busines s to Holland , France ,
and Englan d wher e they were assured of a bette r reception. Spain could
not affor d an y interruptio n in th e flo w o f masts, ropes, pitch , an d othe r
vital naval an d militar y stores from Scandinavi a and th e Baltic , and wit h
the Dutc h shu t ou t o f the trade , th e Hans a wer e the onl y possibl e alter -
native source o f transport for these indispensable supplies . Th e lon g an d
the short of it was that Spai n ha d to avoid an open break wit h the Hansa .
The Almirantazgo wa s instructed to lift it s order o n cargoe s coming fro m
North German y for th e tim e bein g until th e politica l obstacle s had bee n
removed. Thi s bitterl y fough t ove r orde r wa s i n fac t the n re-imposed ,
on th e king' s instructions , th e followin g year; bu t followin g a renewe d
80
Herman n Kellenbenz , Unternehmerkrafte im Hamburger Portugal und
Spanienhandel, 1590-162 5 (Hamburg , 1954) , pp . 61-3 .
81
Consultas of the Consejo de Estado, i Sept . an d 3 0 Oct. 1629 , ACS Estado 2329 ;
Alcalá-Zamora, p. 279 .
torrent o f Hanseatic protest, postpone d again ; th e same thing happenin g
yet again in 1631, 82
In all , th e Almirantazgo'& proclamatio n requirin g al l cargoe s fro m
North German y t o be covered by de Roy's certificate s was published an d
suspended a t leas t fou r time s betwee n 162 9 anc * the en d o f 163 2 whe n
it wa s finall y enforced. 83 A s th e argumen t develope d betwee n th e
thoroughgoing mercantilist s a t th e Spanis h court , determine d t o follo w
through th e programm e o f economi c warfar e agains t th e Dutch , an d
those ministers who judged tha t imposin g de Roy and hi s certificates wa s
not wort h the cos t in terms of losing Hanseatic goodwill , de Roy himself,
writing fro m Wismar , becam e increasingl y caught u p i n th e debate . I n
particular h e became embroile d i n a bitte r feu d wit h Agustín Bredimus
who wa s no w actin g a s th e representativ e o f th e Hans a a t Madrid . I n
letters sent from Wisma r i n June an d Jul y 1630 , d e Roy accuse d Bredi -
mus o f seeking to undermine Spain' s mercantilis t programme an d o f en -
couraging th e burgomaster s o f Hambur g an d Lübec k t o thin k tha t h e
had sufficien t influenc e wit h Spanis h minister s to 'fulfi l thei r desir e fo r
the abolitio n of the register s an d certificate s of merchandise fo r Spain'. 84
De Roy's advice was that Bredimu s should b e expelle d fro m Spain . Thi s
advice was first accepted b y the kin g and hi s ministers and the n set aside,
presumably to avoid making matters even worse, regarding relations with
the Hansa . Durin g hi s visit to Madri d i n th e autum n o f 1632 , d e Ro y
again urge d th e expulsio n o f Bredimu s and agai n hi s advic e wa s firs t
accepted an d then , apparently , se t aside.
For hi s par t Bredimu s insiste d tha t th e polic y o f imposin g resident s
and certificate s had 'cause d commerc e t o ceas e an d man y fleet s whic h
had bee n mad e read y for trad e no t t o b e sen t les t thei r cargoe s be con -
fiscated'.85 A decad e an d a hal f later , aroun d 1645 , eithe r Bredimu s
himself o r a n associat e summe d u p th e Hanseati c merchants ' criticis m
of th e Almirantazgo an d everythin g connecte d wit h i t i n a n anonymou s
pamphlet entitled Cavsas por Donde credo el comercio de Olanda. This
vehement trac t indignantl y accuse d th e Almirantazgo, alon g wit h d e
Roy an d hi s registers , o f underminin g an d al l bu t destroyin g Hanseati c
commerce with Spain , clearin g th e pat h fo r an inevitabl e Dutch 'mono -
poly' o f Spanis h trade. 86 D e Roy' s repl y t o suc h criticis m wa s tha t th e
Hansa's trad e wit h Spai n migh t hav e suffere d som e initia l dislocatio n
82
Consultas of th e Consejo d e Estado, 1 2 Aug . 1630 , ACS Estad o 233 1 ; de Ro y t o
Philip IV , Madrid , 1 3 Sept . 1632 , AG S Estado 4126 .
83
Ibid.
S4
Consulta o f the Consejo d e Estado, 2 5 Oct . 1632 , AG S Estado 2333 .
85
AG S Estado 2331 , fo . 124 ; Alcalá-Zamora , p . 281 .
86
Cavsas por Donde creció el comercio d e Olanda, (Madrid , 1645?) , fos . 2V-3 -
Gabriel de Roy 23 5
whilst mor e stringen t checkin g procedure s wer e bein g introduced , an d
Dutch participatio n weede d out , bu t tha t i n th e lon g ru n Hanseati c
interests coul d onl y benefit , an d suc h remaine d th e prevailin g vie w a t
court.
It i s significant tha t neithe r sid e i n thi s debat e suggeste d tha t Spain' s
new control s ove r norther n Europea n trad e wit h th e peninsul a wer e in -
operable o r ineffective . Fernan d Braudel , th e Frenc h grand maître,
several time s asserted tha t Spain's embargoes agains t the Dutch had little
effect,87 placin g some emphasis o n this because his entire, widely-admired
vision o f th e developmen t of earl y moder n Europea n trad e wa s under -
pinned by his premise that a changing balance o f primary material needs,
and no t event s or politica l factors , wa s predominantl y responsibl e fo r
shaping it s main phase s and structure . Th e Braudelia n conceptio n o f th e
ineffectiveness o f th e Spanis h embargoe s agains t th e Dutc h ha s subse -
quently bee n vigorousl y championed - wit h assertions , no t evidenc e — by
Alcalá-Zamora and Henry Kamen. 88 But no participant Spanish , Flemish,
German, o r Scandinavia n t o th e debat e abou t th e Almirantazgo's driv e
against Dutc h commerc e i n th e 1630 3 an d 1640 3 though t tha t i t wa s
inoperable, ineffective , o r faile d t o hav e a drasti c effec t o n th e overal l
pattern o f European trade . Nor, on present evidence , is there any reason-
able basi s fo r supportin g th e view s o f thos e wh o asser t tha t Spain' s
measures agains t th e Dutc h ha d littl e effect . I f th e gran d concep t o f
Europe's patter n o f trade's being determined b y primar y materia l needs
cannot surviv e onc e i t i s concede d tha t th e patter n coul d be , an d was ,
radically transforme d b y state-action , i t i s time w e di d dismis s views of
Europe's economi c history which fai l t o tak e prope r accoun t o f th e rol e
of the state in an age permeated wit h mercantilist ideas .
No one who has studied Nort h Germa n trad e with the Iberia n Penin -
sula betwee n 162 1 an d 164 1 (whe n th e Dutc h returne d t o th e port s of
Portugal ) dispute s that this was the 'Zei t der Hochblüte der Iberienfahrt '
or tha t thi s massiv e upsurg e o f Hanseati c activit y was pai d fo r b y th e
Dutch i n man y hundred s o f lost shiploads. 89 I t i s true that th e hig h leve l
87
Fernan d Braudel, La Méditerranée e t l e monde mediterranean à l'époque d e
Philippe I I ( 2 vols. , Paris , 1966) , i . 568-9 , 572-3 ; Fernan d Braudel , Civilisation
matérielle, économie e t capitalisme XVe-XVIHe siècle ( 3 vols. , Paris , 1979) ,
iii. 175 .
88
Alcalá-Zamora , pp . 182-5 ; 'n hi s frequen t criticism s o f m y The Dutch Republic
and th e Hispanic World, Henr y Kamen speak s o f 'contrar y evidence ' withou t ye t
having cite d any ; fo r a furthe r critiqu e o f th e Braudelia n approach , se e Jonathan
I. Israel , 'Th e Phase s of the Dutc h straatvaart (1590-1713) , a Chapte r i n th e
economic histor y o f th e Mediterranean' , Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis xcv i (1986) ,
PP- '-3 0 ; see above, 133-62 .
89
C.F . Wurm , Studiën .. . über di e Lebensschicksale de s Foppius va n Aitzema, ersten
niederlöndischen Residenten be i den Hansestâdten (Hamburg , 1854) , pp. 32-3 ; W .
of traffi c fro m Nort h German y to th e peninsul a i n the earl y 16205 - 156
ships fo m Hambur g alon e i n 162 3 an d 13 8 i n 1624-wa s no t full y
sustained in and afte r i625. 90 But when we take account o f the post-i624
campaign i n bot h Spai n an d Portuga l t o eliminat e disguise d Dutc h
shipping from thi s traffic, 91 an d th e effect s o f the Polish-Swedis h wa r o n
grain shipment s fro m th e Balti c i n th e lat e 16203 , i t ca n b e see n tha t
Hanseatic trad e wit h th e peninsul a i n fac t hel d u p remarkabl y well . I n
the secon d hal f o f the 16203 , between fifty and on e hundre d ships saile d
yearly from Hambur g t o the peninsula , another twenty or so yearly from
Liibeck, an d smalle r convoy s fro m Danzig. 92 Thes e figure s wer e stil l
greatly i n exces s o f anythin g attaine d b y th e Hans a durin g th e Twelv e
Years Truce. S o central wa s the Iberienfahrt i n Hanseati c commerc e i n
the 1621-41 period that even in 1625, a l°w point when only fifty-one
ships saile d fro m Hambur g fo r Spai n an d Portugal , Iberia n trad e stil l
accounted fo r twent y pe r cen t o f al l shippin g sailin g fro m Hamburg ,
being by far th e mos t importan t stran d i n Hamburg' s trad e (excep t fo r
the traffi c wit h the Dutc h Republi c whic h was mainly carried i n Dutc h
vessels) dwarfin g Hamburg' s commerc e wit h Scandinavia , France , o r
Britain.93 By 1629, tne number of vessels sailing from Hambur g alone , t o
the peninsula , ha d rise n agai n t o ninety-nine . Becaus e n o Dutch-buil t
vessels coul d b e employe d i n th e Iberienfahrt, th e entir e Nort h Germa n
coastline now experienced a boom in th e building of large ships expressly
for the voyage 'northabout' - t o avoid the Dutch nav y - aroun d Scotlan d
and Ireland , t o th e peninsula. 94 Certainly , there i s evidence of a furthe r
contraction in the scal e of the traffic , if not at Lubcc k where the Iberien-
fahrt wa s at it s height i n th e 16303 , the n certainl y a t Hamburg. 95 I t i s
likely tha t thi s was partl y du e t o d e Roy' s activities . Bu t on e mus t als o
remember tha t afte r 163 0 th e Englis h wer e allowe d bac k int o th e port s
of Spai n an d Portuga l and , fro m the n on , compete d with the Hans a fo r
Vogel, 'Beitrag e zu r Statisti k der deutsche n Seeschiffahr t i m 17 . und 18 .

Jahrhundert', Hansische Geschichtsblâtter, lu i (1928) , 135-41 ; Ludwi g Beutin ,
Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebeit bis zu den Napoleonischen Kriegen
(Neumünster, 1933) , pp . 44-5 ; Kellenbenz , pp . 61-3 ; Karl-Friedric h Olechnowitz ,
Der Schiffbau der Hansischen Spâtzeit (Weimar , 1960) , p. 50 ; Israel , Th e Dutch
Republic, pp . 93-5 .
90
Erns t Baasch , 'Hamburg s Seeschiffahr t un d Waarenhande l vo m End e de s 16 .
bis zur Mitt e de s 17 . Jahrhunderts' , Zeitschrift fur Hamburgische Geschichte, i x
(1894), 33' -
91
Israel , The Dutch Republic, pp . 135-40 .
92
Baasch ; Wurm , p . 33 ; Vogel , pp . 135-41 .
93
Baasch , pp . 316 , 332 .
94
Olechnowitz , Handel un d Seeschiffahrt, pp . 31-2 .
95
Baasch .
Gabriel de Roy 23 7
control o f Iberia n trade . Th e secessio n o f Portuga l whic h fro m 164 1
allowed th e Dutc h bac k int o Portugues e ports , thereb y strippin g th e
Hansa o f muc h o f their previousl y large shar e o f Portugal' s sal t export s
to northern Europe , was a further blow. After 1641 , th e buildin g o f large
ships fo r th e Iberienfahrt i n Nort h German y practicall y ceased. 90 Eve n
so, the Hans a stil l plie d a sizeabl e trad e wit h Spain . A s late a s 1646 , a s
we see from th e register s o f the 'directors ' o f the Dutc h Levantse Handel
who represented the interests of Dutch merchants involved in both Levan t
and wes t Mediterranean trade , the grea t bul k o f southern Spanish good s
reaching Amsterda m wa s stil l arrivin g o n Hanseati c ship s manne d b y
German crews. 97
By th e autum n o f 1630 , d e Ro y ha d com e t o th e conclusio n tha t h e
was neve r goin g t o succee d i n persuadin g th e Hambur g an d Lübec k
senates t o admi t hi m a s Spain' s residen t o r permi t Spanis h supervision
of their thrivin g trad e wit h th e peninsula . I n a lette r t o Madri d o n
December 1630 , d e Roy , replyin g to roya l order s o f tw o month s befor e
requiring hi m t o spare n o effor t t o disabus e th e Hanseati c leadershi p of
the 'ide a the y hav e tha t I hav e com e t o restric t thei r commerc e an d
interfere in their councils' , explained that the obstruction he had me t with
was not due to any misapprehension about hi s role but t o a firm resolution
to prevent the introductio n of the new certificate s syste m 'since there is an
understanding betwee n the m an d th e Dutc h rebel s tha t the y should no t
agree t o anythin g prejudicia l t o th e latter' . 'An d seeing' , h e continued ,
how meagr e i s th e outcom e o f m y repeate d efforts , an d thos e tha t I hav e
made throug h m y confidant s i n thei r magistracies , t o ge t the m t o accep t
the registers and certificate s that Your Majest y desires for th e administratio n
of thei r merchandise i n Spain, I have concluded the enclosed agreement with
the Kin g o f Denmark i n consultatio n with, an d wit h th e concurrenc e o f th e
marqués d e Leganés 3 who m You r Majest y ha s commande d t o tak e charg e
of thes e matters. 98
Judging from th e surprise and annoyanc e this revelation caused amon g
the Consejo d e Estado i n Madrid , Legané s in fac t kne w very little abou t
it. Onc e again , a s at Prenzla u i n 1628 , de Ro y ha d take n th e libert y of
going beyond hi s orders. Th e draf t treat y ha d i n fac t bee n signe d b y d e
96
Piete r Meyer s to Gabrie l d e Roy , Lübeck, 5 Dec . 1644 , AGR SE G 232 , fo. 332.
97
Algemee n Rijksarchief , Th e Hague , Levants e Handel, vol . 264 , fos. 21, 88, ig4v ;
Herman Watjen , Di e Niederldnder im Mittelmeergebiet zu r Zeit ihrer höchsten
Machtstellung (Berlin , 1909) , pp . 221-6 ; o f th e fourtee n ship s arrivin g i n
Amsterdam carryin g wine, wool, olive oil , syrup , raisins, an d colonia l goods fro m
southern Spai n betwee n Ma y 164 6 and Apri l 1647 , no les s tha n twelv e were
specified b y th e Dutc h authoritie s a s bein g Nort h German .
08
Gabrie l de Ro y to Phili p IV , Wismar , a Dec . 1630 , AG S Estado 2332 .
Roy an d a representativ e o f Christia n I V o f Denmark , a t Wismar , o n
22 Octobe r 1630 , nearl y si x week s befor e d e Ro y wrot e t o Madri d
explaining wha t h e ha d done . Bu t th e draf t treat y wa s itsel f th e resul t
of contact s betwee n Wismar an d th e Danis h cour t fo r a t leas t a yea r
before that. " De Ro y had bee n negotiatin g with a cour t Je w o f Portu -
guese extraction, Alvaro Dinis of Gluckstadt, who had serve d the Danis h
crown o n th e Lowe r Elbe fo r man y year s an d was , in effect , Denmark' s
chief exper t o n everything concerning Iberian commerce. 100 The Danis h
monarch ha d lon g been on th e look-out for mean s t o diver t some o f th e
burgeoning wartim e trade o f Hambur g t o hi s ow n ne w tow n o f Gluck -
stadt, fort y mile s further dow n the Elbe , which he ha d founde d i n 161 6
and whic h h e ha d settle d wit h a considerabl e numbe r o f foreigners ,
including Mennonites, Dutch Remonstrants , and a communit y of Portu-
guese Jews. 101 Thu s fa r Gluckstad t ha d bee n largel y a failure , th e Jew s
liking t o jok e tha t i t wa s neithe r a stáát no r ha d muc h glück, bu t
Christian IV' s withdrawa l fro m the anti-Habsbur g coalition , afte r his
defeat i n the Germa n war, no w presented a real opportunit y to establish
a thrivin g Iberian trad e under Danish control . The treaty , whic h Alvaro
Dinis an d d e Ro y negotiated , stipulate d i n ponderou s Latin tha t owing
to seepag e o f Dutc h product s 'b y frau d an d dissimulation ' int o Han -
seatic trade wit h the Iberia n Peninsula , and th e refusa l o f Hamburg an d
Liibeck to accept the posting of Spanish agents to monitor trade, the kings
of Spai n an d Denmar k agree d tha t a Spanis h resident (d e Roy ) should
now b e poste d in th e Danis h monarch' s por t o f Gluckstad t on th e Elb e
estuary. From there he was to register, authenticate, and certif y al l cargoes
shipped t o th e Iberia n Peninsul a whethe r fro m th e Elb e (Hamburg) ,
Weser (Bremen) , o r neighbourin g estuaries. 102 Subject s o f th e Danis h
crown tradin g fro m Gluckstadt , but no t subject s o f th e Hans a towns ,
99
L . Laursen , Danmark-Norges Traktater, 1523-1750, Vol . I V (1626-1649 )
(Copenhagen, 1917) , 87-8 .
100
O n Dini s whos e synagogu e nam e wa s Samue l Yachi e an d wh o wa s style d i n
diplomatic document s (h e als o negotiate d wit h Wallenstein ) a s Albertu s
Dionysius, se e H . Kellenbenz , Sephardim a n de r unieren Elbe (Wiesbaden ,
1958), pp . 62-3 .
101
O n th e Jew s o f Gluckstadt, se e ibid., pp. 64-5 ; Balslev , D e danske jfiders historie
(Copenhagen, 1932) , pp. 4-5 ; Jonatha n I . Israel , European Jewry i n th e Ag e
of Mercantilism, 7550-175 0 (Oxford , 1985) , pp . 65-6 , 91-3 .
102
'Consu l hi e stabilietu r a persona , a d i d autorizat a a reg e Hispaniaru m etc. , cu m
potestate tabula s e t registr a conficiendi , supe r omnibu s mercibu s e x emporii s
vel alu s civitatibu s a d Albi m ve l Visurgi m siti s versu s Hispaniaru m regn a e t
provincias mittendi s medi o jurament o cora m ips o declarandi s e t specification e
onerationis navi s juxt a instructione m ...' , Laursen , iv . 91 ; se e also O.A . Johnsen ,
'Les relation s commerciale s entr e l e Norvèg e e t l'Espagn e dan s le s temp s
modernes', Revue Historique, clxv (1930) , 70 .
Gabriel de Roy 23 9
were to hav e th e privileg e o f being allowe d by the Spanis h crown t o use
ships built in Holland to carry their goods to and fro m th e Iberian Penin -
sula fo r fou r years bu t n o longer . N o on e wh o wa s no t a subjec t o f th e
Danish crow n was to be permitted t o trade with the peninsula using ships
purchased fro m th e Dutch . A s word o f this treaty got about, ther e was a
distinct rise in tension between Denmark and Hamburg a s well as between
Denmark an d th e Dutch. 103 Th e Swedes , too , eye d d e Roy' s contact s
with the Danish crow n with intense suspicion. 104
In hi s letter o f December 1630 , d e Ro y urged Phili p I V t o ratif y th e
commercial treat y with Denmark a s speedily as possible. Olivares, fo r his
part, wa s bot h annoye d b y d e Roy' s goin g beyon d hi s instruction s an d
deeply reluctant t o abandon al l hope of an agreemen t with the Hanseati c
towns by signing such a treaty, discriminating against Hanseati c interests ,
with thei r traditiona l enemy , Denmark . Th e Junta d e Almirantazgo
which wa s aske d t o examin e d e Roy' s draf t treat y als o ha d it s reserva -
tions.105 I n addition , Bredimus' indignant protests on behalf of Hambur g
and Lübec k also had som e impact. D e Roy's recal l to Spai n durin g 163 1
was mainly to help resolve what turned ou t to be an uncommonl y thorny
issue a t court . D e Roy , bac k i n Spain , los t n o tim e i n protestin g at th e
delay an d a t Bredimus ' rol e i n particular. 106
It wa s not unti l Decembe r 1632 , more than tw o years after th e draf t
treaty wa s negotiated , tha t d e Ro y wa s officiall y appointe d 'resident ' o f
the Spanis h crow n a t Gluckstad t an d tha t h e prepare d t o retur n t o
North Germany. After delayin g for two years, it was at the meeting of the
Consejo d e Estado, on 2 1 December 1632 , that Olivare s finally made u p
his mind, urgin g hi s colleagues that th e treat y shoul d no w be ratifie d s o
as no t t o jeopardiz e th e growin g collaboratio n wit h th e Danis h crown.
Even so , de Roy was to b e instructed to pres s to th e utmos t fo r deletio n
of the claus e permitting Danish subject s to use Dutch-built ships for fou r
years. Olivares wishe d to remove all suggestion that Danis h subjects were
to b e speciall y favoured a t th e expens e o f Hanseati c merchants. 107 I t i s
striking, though, that i n contras t t o th e 162 7 commercial treat y with th e
duke o f Holstein-Gottor p whic h expressl y excluded Jew s fro m partici -
pating, th e Spanish crow n made no such stipulation i n 1632 , even though
103
Kellenbenz , p. ag.
104
Svenska Riksrddets Protokoll me d understöd a f statsmedel i tryck utgifvet a f
Kongl. Riks Archivet I (1621-1629) , ed . N.A . Kullber g (Stockholm , 1878) ,
pp. 162-3 .
105
Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, 2 1 Jan. 1631 , AGS Estad o 2332 .
106
Consulta, 5 Oct. 1631 , AGS Estado 2333 .
107
Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, 5 Oct . 1632 , 'Vot o de l Conde-Duque' ,
AGS Estad o 2333 .
Christian I V had just issued a charter allocating more generous privileges
to the Jews i n Glückstad t than the y had ha d before , and i t wa s obvious,
not leas t t o Olivares , tha t the y ha d th e closes t link s wit h Spai n an d
Portugal.108
The fina l arrangement s for d e Roy's missio n to Glückstad t wer e made
in Februar y 163 3 whe n hi s previous pay an d expense s were reviewed to
see if any increas e was justified. 109 H e the n lef t fo r Glückstad t where h e
took u p hi s new post and bega n monitorin g both Danis h an d Hanseati c
commerce wit h th e peninsula . A s applie d i n 1633 , th e ne w syste m of
certificates coverin g cargoes sent from German y to th e peninsul a affecte d
even Germa n product s shippe d t o th e peninsul a vi a Englan d an d i n
English ships . Th e Almirantazgo seize d a t Málag a a consignmen t o f
Silesian linens sent on an Englis h vessel from Londo n i n September 1633 ,
simply o n the ground s that th e line n ha d com e fro m German y an d wa s
not covere d by on e o f d e Roy' s certificates . Referrin g to thi s seizure, th e
English residen t i n Madri d reporte d bac k t o Londo n (slightl y inaccura-
tely) tha t th e 'Spanis h kin g ha d ordaine d tha t n o forrain e commodit y
shall b e brough t int o hi s kingdom s bu t wit h certificat e tha t the y com e
from a contr y that i s a friend , an d t o tha t purpos e h e place d a n office r
in Hamburg t o giv e certificates withou t which no trade i s admitted fro m
the sai d city'. 110 Wherea s Braudel , Alcalá-Zamora , an d Henr y Kame n
claim tha t th e Almirantazgo an d it s machinery i n norther n Europ e ha d
little or n o effect , Bredimu s and hi s associates protested that d e Ro y an d
his staff wer e fulfilling thei r function s i n a corrup t and despoti c manner,
tyrannizing ove r Hanseati c trad e wit h th e peninsul a an d causin g grea t
harm t o it ; bu t a t n o poin t di d the y sugges t tha t Spain' s method s of
controlling international trade lacked bite or impact. According to Danish
merchants trading wit h Spain , th e Almirantazgo wa s so eager t o confis -
cate cargoes that it sometimes even seized goods that were covered by de
Roy's certificates. 111
During the cours e of the nex t decade , de Roy and his staff, operatin g
from Glückstadt , kep t registers , issued certificates , an d generall y super-
vised th e flo w o f trad e fro m bot h Nort h German y an d th e Danis h
monarchy t o Spai n an d (unti l 1641 ) Portugal . I t ha d bee n n o par t of
the purpos e of Olivare s an d hi s colleague s to cu t bac k Hanseati c trad e
with the peninsul a to the advantag e of the Danis h monarch y (Denmark-
108
Balslev , p . 5; Kellenbenz , Sephardim, p . 64.
109
D e Ro y receive d a n annua l salar y a s 'comisari o d e finanzas ' a t Brussel s wort h
10,000 reales plus 3,60 0 reales i n trave l expenses , Consultas o f th e Consejo d e
Estado, 3 1 Jan. an d 1 5 Feb. 1633 , AG S Estad o 2334 .
110
Israel , Dutch Republic, pp . 208-9 .
111
Johnsen , pp. 80-1 .
Gabriel de Roy 24 1
Norway-Holstein) bu t th e locatio n o f de Roy' s offic e a t Gluckstad t an d
the increasingl y clos e collaboratio n betwee n Spai n an d Denmar k i n th e
diplomatic spher e inevitabl y ha d thi s result . Especiall y i n th e year s
1637-43, there was a marked upsurge in commercial an d shipping activity
at Gluckstad t whic h wa s the n cu t shor t b y th e Danish-Swedis h wa r o f
1643-5 -112 At the same time, masts and othe r supplies began t o be shipped
to Spai n direc t fro m Norwa y an d ther e began a programm e o f buildin g
large ships for the Spanis h trade in Norway's ports, especially Bergen and
Trondheim.113 This entr y o f Norwa y int o direc t trad e link s with Spai n
continued unti l 164 8 whe n Dutc h ship s wer e finall y readmitte d t o
Spanish ports. But while the Danish monarchy profited from th e situation,
and Hanseati c merchant s complained , d e Ro y consistentl y defended his
system o f register s an d certificates , arguin g tha t th e driv e t o eradicat e
Dutch involvemen t benefite d both Denmar k an d th e Hans a towns. 1"
As th e year s passed , d e Ro y becam e increasingl y enmeshe d i n th e
Danish context . H e appear s to have bee n a frequen t visitor t o th e roya l
palace a t Gluckstad t wher e th e Danis h monarc h frequentl y staye d an d
where one of the principa l adornment s wa s a set of portraits o f pas t an d
present member s o f th e Hous e o f Habsbur g brough t b y d e Ro y fro m
Spain as a gift fro m Phili p IV. 116 Needless to say, de Roy was also closely
involved i n the negotiation s whic h le d to Hanniba l Sehested' s missio n to
Spain i n 1640- 1 an d th e signin g of the ne w Spanish-Danis h commercia l
treaty of March 1641 , one of the mos t elaborate an d refine d example s of
mercantilist politic s to be found in the mid-seventeent h century . De Roy
evidently came to believe that the Danish monarchy was the one northern
state wit h whic h Spai n coul d safel y an d profitabl y expan d he r tradin g
links. Not onl y was Denmark-Norway-Holstein abl e t o suppl y shipbuild-
ing timber an d othe r supplies Spain neede d but th e Danish monarchy, in
contrast t o England, the Dutch Republic, and Nort h Germany, produced
no textile s o r othe r manufacture s and di d no t compet e wit h Spai n a s a
supplier of colonial good s to the European marke t as a whole. As a result,
he explained, 110 th e traffi c betwee n Spain an d th e Danish monarch y was,
and woul d remain, nothing more than a straightforward exchange of raw
112
G . Kohn, 'Ostfriesen und Niederlánde r in der Neugründun g Gluckstadt von 1620
bis 1652' , Hansische Geschichtsbldtter, xc (1972) , 82-3.
113
Johnsen , pp. 80-1 .
114
Gabrie l de Roy to Lázaro de Ríos, Gluckstadt, 2 1 June 1636 , AGS Estado 2156.
115
Emi l Gigas, Grev Bernardino de Rebolledo, Spansk Gesandt i Kjfibenhavn,
1648-1659 (Copenhagen , 1883) , p. 21 .
116
Thi s a t leas t is the argumen t of the anonymou s tract o n Spanish-Danis h trade , of
1641, at th e Britis h Library which I tak e t o hav e been th e wor k of de Roy , see
Add. MS S (4Oto , fos . 221-2.
materials — salt, wine , an d oliv e oi l fo r timber , gunpowder , an d Balti c
stores - whic h woul d neithe r drai n Spai n o f silver nor flood the Spanish
market wit h unwante d manufacture s t o th e detrimen t o f Spain's indus -
tries. Developin g close r link s wit h Denmark-Norway-Holstein , d e Ro y
argued, would thus help counteract th e enervating, insidious consequences
of Spanis h trad e wit h othe r part s o f north-wester n Europe. 117
The Spanish-Danis h commercia l treat y of March 1641 , drawn u p thi s
time i n paralle l Spanis h an d German , an d signe d b y Olivare s an d
Sehested i n Madrid , wa s essentiall y a n elaboratio n o f d e Roy' s earlie r
monitoring system. 118 I t stipulate d tha t merchant s leavin g th e Dutc h
Republic coul d participate i n Spanis h trad e i f they settled i n Gluckstadt ,
or elsewher e in th e Danis h monarchy , ha d thei r name s pu t o n a specia l
register, and pai d a fee either to Brussels or in Spain. I t authorized Phili p
IV t o pos t Spanis h consul s in an y Danis h o r Norwegia n port s h e chos e
and spelt out in greater detail than befor e exactl y how the registerin g an d
authenticating o f Danis h cargoe s fo r Spai n wa s t o b e done . T o obtai n
the requisit e certificates , merchant s intendin g t o sen d cargoe s t o Spai n
had t o swea r o n oat h tha t th e good s bein g shippe d t o Spai n wer e 'no t
made i n Holland , no r belon g t o an y person , grou p o r compan y i n thos e
provinces', nor to anyone connected with such persons or companies either
'directly o r indirectly' . Wher e an d wheneve r violatio n o f thi s rul e wa s
detected, the Danish monarch agree d t o the automatic confiscation o f th e
cargoes concerned by the Almirantazgo i n Spain . Furthermore , the Dan -
ish crown agreed tha t fro m no w on Danis h an d Norwegia n ships leaving
Spanish port s woul d hav e t o stipulat e wher e the y wer e sailin g t o an d
were to incur a penalty o f thirty per cen t of the valu e of the cargoe s the y
shipped fro m Spai n shoul d the y fai l t o delive r their cargoe s a t thes e
authorized destinations . Merchant s woul d b e automaticall y liabl e t o pa y
this penalt y shoul d the y fai l t o sen d certificate s signe d b y th e relevan t
local authorit y to the Almirantazgo i n Spai n withi n a yea r an d a da y of
the departur e o f th e ship . Non-paymen t o f th e penalt y wa s t o incu r
automatic confiscatio n of the entir e value o f the carg o eithe r i n Spai n o r
in th e Danis h monarchy . Th e proceed s fro m thes e penaltie s an d con -
fiscations specified unde r th e new treaty were to be split three ways: 30 %
was to go to Phili p IV' s treasury , 35 % t o the Danis h treasury , an d th e
117
O n th e rol e o f foreig n manufacturer s i n th e declin e o f Spain , se e Israel , Th e
Dutch Republic, pp . 53-5 .
118
O n th e background o f the treaty , se e C.O. B0ggild-Andersen , Hannibal Sehested.
En dansk statsmand (Copenhagen , 1946) , pp. 39-41 ; for the text , see Add. MS S
14010, 'Assient o capitulado entr e lo s dos inagestades d e Philipp e I V Re y d e las
Españas i Ghristian o II I Re y de Dinamarca ' an d Laursen , pp . 280-311 .
Gabriel de Roy 24 3
remaining 35 % t o th e officia l o r informe r instrumenta l i n bringin g th e
deception to light.
The initiativ e fo r thi s mor e elaborat e syste m o f contro l cam e fro m
Spain, an d i n particula r fro m th e Almirantazgo, whil e d e Ro y himsel f
continued t o b e seen a t cour t i n Madri d a s indispensable t o th e further -
ance of Spain's mercantilist policy. 119 Periodically h e was sent instructions
from Madri d an d Brussel s concerning change s an d modification s that th e
Spanish crow n required i n the workin g of the system . Thus, for instance ,
shortly afte r th e signin g o f th e ne w treaty , Phili p I V prohibite d al l
foreign trade with hi s rebellious territorie s of Catalonia an d Portuga l an d
besides issuing an edic t t o thi s effect i n Flanders , an d licensin g th e Dun -
kirk privateer s t o intercep t cargoe s e n route to , an d from , thos e destina -
tions, d e Ro y wa s sen t order s t o tak e al l possibl e step s t o eliminat e
Danish trad e wit h those regions. 120
But whils t d e Ro y continue d t o b e see n a s indispensabl e t o Spain' s
mercantilist policy, Spanis h minister s were a t th e sam e tim e increasingl y
prey t o doubts abou t hi s financial probity. Question s abou t hi s handlin g
of th e 250,00 0 ducat s wit h whic h h e ha d bee n furnishe d fo r th e Balti c
armada ha d surface d durin g hi s sta y i n Spai n i n 1631-2 . Thi s wa s no t
allowed t o interfer e wit h hi s rol e a s intermediar y betwee n Spai n an d
Denmark, o r hi s takin g u p hi s pos t a s Spanis h residen t a t Gliickstadt .
Olivares himsel f declared a t a meeting of the Consejo d e Estado i n Mad -
rid i n Octobe r 1632 , tha t whil e i t woul d eventuall y b e necessar y t o
extract som e proper accoun t of his expenditure fro m de Roy , it was not
possible to insist on this for the tim e being because i t would seriously delay
his departur e fo r Denmar k a t th e ver y leas t an d 'becaus e w e hav e no -
one els e so expert concernin g that kin g and kingdom'. 121 Si x years later ,
however, orders wer e sent to Brussels to bring d e Ro y t o account . Whilst
de Ro y wa s o n a visi t t o Cologn e i n th e summe r o f 1638 , h e receive d
orders fro m Phili p IV' s governo r of the Spanis h Netherlands , th e Cardi -
nal-Infante, t o come at onc e to Brussels. De Roy disobeyed this order an d
returned instead to Gliickstadt, sendin g a letter to Brussels explaining that
he had urgen t roya l busines s to atten d t o there. 122 Th e Cardinal-Infant e
assumed tha t thes e were 'frivolou s excuses ' an d place d d e Roy's propert y
in th e Netherland s unde r distraint , threatenin g t o sel l i t of f i f d e Ro y
failed t o appea r promptl y to give account of himself. He reporte d this to
119
Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne, iii . 295-6 , 357 .
120
Correspondance d e l a Cour d'Espagne, iii . 439 .
121
Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, 2 2 Oct . 1632 , 'Vot o de l Conde-Duque' ,
AGS Estad o 2334 .
122
Gabrie l d e Ro y t o Francisc o d e Galarreta , Gluckstadt , 7 Jun e 163 8 an d
Cardinal-Infante to Phili p IV, Brussels , 30 June 1638 , AGR SEG 219 , fo. 280 .
Madrid onl y t o learn tha t d e Roy ha d indee d bee n entruste d wit h vita l
new negotiation s a t th e Danis h court . Onc e agai n th e pressur e wa s off.
During th e year s 1639-4 1 whils t d e Ro y wa s dealin g wit h th e ne w
Spanish-Danish commercia l treaty , Philip' s minister s ha d t o conten t
themselves wit h d e Roy' s explanatio n tha t al l hi s receipt s an d detaile d
accounts had bee n left a t Wismar, deposite d wit h the city treasurer, whe n
the Swede s had close d in. 123
It wa s not unti l 164 4 tha t the roya l administratio n wa s at las t abl e t o
get d e Ro y to com e t o Brussels an d submi t t o detaile d questionin g a s t o
his use of royal funds i n 1627-31 . A statement wa s drawn u p an d sen t t o
Madrid fo r perusal. 12* Th e king' s auditor s wer e dismayed b y wha t the y
found. De Roy had compile d an itemized list of expenditure for the perio d
of hi s stay at Wisma r bu t wa s able to provid e scarcel y any corroboratin g
evidence a s t o it s veracity . D e Ro y claime d t o hav e mad e effort s t o
retrieve hi s paper s fro m Wismar , employin g th e service s o f a Lübec k
notary, bu t withou t success. 125 Hi s clai m t o hav e spen t 248,59 8 Reichs-
thaler o n ships , guns , an d material s seeme d plausibl e enoug h bu t th e
royal auditors were taken aback by the 34,893 Reichsthaler allocated to a
category o f expense s th e bul k o f whic h turne d ou t t o consis t o f hi s ow n
salary an d trave l costs . D e Ro y ha d eve n allocate d sum s t o cove r hi s
alleged unrepaid expense s incurred durin g hi s journey to Madrid, Seville ,
and Lisbo n i n the year s 1623-4 .
The Consejo d e Estado was now in a quandary. De Roy petitioned th e
king from Brussel s asking to b e allowe d t o resum e hi s post an d salar y as
comisario de finanzas ther e 'lest his reputation suffer , h e being well-known
to th e whol e of Europe'. 126 Th e the n governo r i n Brussels , th e marqué s
de Castel-Rodrigo , recommende d tha t h e shoul d b e restore d t o hi s titles
and positio n i n vie w of his 'lon g an d goo d services ' an d 'skil l an d zeal' .
There wer e prolonge d deliberation s ove r thi s thorn y issu e a t Madri d
during Marc h an d Apri l 164 5 which , however , faile d t o lea d t o hi s
rehabilitation.127 I n Decembe r 1645 , d e Ro y was arreste d a t Brussel s on
the king' s orders. Shortly afterwards he died .
The memor y o f d e Ro y an d hi s certificate s lingere d o n i n norther n
Europe. Fo r ove r thirt y year s d e Ro y ha d bee n on e o f Spain' s leadin g
«s AG R SE G 219 , fo. 487 an d SE G 220 , fo. 316 .
124
'Copi a d e pape l d e lo s contadores d e l a sal a d e quenta s e n esto s estado s ... en
razón d e l a quent a de l comisari o Gabrie l d e Roy' , Brussels , 2 0 Oct . 1644 ,
AGS Estad o 2064 .
125
Consultas of th e Consejo d e Estado, a i Marc h an d 1 9 April 1645 , AG S Estad o
2064.
126
Consulta o f th e Consejo d e Estado, a i Marc h 1645 , AG S Estad o 2064 .
127
Consultas of 2 1 Feb., 2 1 March , an d 1 9 April 1645 , ibid.
Gabriel de Roy 24 5
advocates an d practitioner s o f economi c wa r agains t th e Dutch . Whe n
the decisio n wa s made i n Novembe r 164 5 tto o
replac e hi m wit h a new
Spanish residen t a t Glückstadt , i t i s significant tha t hi s successor was t o
continue not only de Roy's function withi n the Danish monarch y but als o
his function as supervisor of Hanseatic commerc e with Spain. 128 An d thi s
continuation of Spanish attempts to ensure the exclusion of Dutch partici -
pation i n Hanseati c trad e wit h Spai n wa s expressl y sanctione d b y th e
emperor.129 D e Roy' s lon g residenc y a t Glückstad t wa s thu s a ke y
precedent, model , an d symbo l of the whole mercantilist notion of govern-
ment regulation o f international trad e i n the interest of the state. In 1667 ,
during th e Wa r o f Devolution , whe n Loui s XI V attacke d th e Spanis h
Netherlands, Spain' s Jewish 'Agent ' i n Amsterdam, Manue l de Belmonte,
compiled an advisory paper for the Consejo d e Estado i n Madrid o n how
to wage economic war o n France, citin g de Roy and hi s activities as the
classic exampl e o f ho w t o proceed . Hi s advic e wa s tha t Spai n mus t
rigorously ban Frenc h ship s an d good s fro m Spanis h port s and , a t th e
same time , t o preven t Franc e tradin g wit h Spai n indirectly , vi a th e
Dutch, empowe r himself to issu e certificates t o cove r al l cargoes shipped
from th e Dutch Republic t o Spain . H e believed that th e Dutc h coul d be
persuaded t o agree to this because 'bot h Hollan d an d th e [Spanish ] Lo w
Countries have an interes t in ensuring that n o manufactures reach Spai n
other tha n thei r ow n an d thi s shoul d b e don e followin g th e exampl e of
what wa s don e i n Hambur g durin g th e tim e o f th e wa r wit h Hollan d
when nothin g wa s allowed throug h unles s accompanied b y a pas s fro m
Gabriel d e Roy'.130
128
Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne, iii . 547-8 .
129
Decre e o f Empero r Ferdinan d III , Linz , 2 4 Ma y 1646 , ibid., iii . 577 .
130
Manue l d e Belmonte , 'Lo s remedio s d e qu e s e podran usa r par a estorva r l a
navegación y comercio de francesses en los puertos de la Monarchia' (Aug . 1667) ,
Biblioteca Naciona l (Madrid ) M S 899 , fo . 243 ; o n Belmonte , see Israel ,
European Jewry, pp . 134 , 136 , 142 , 246.
9
MANUEL LOPE Z PEREIRA O F AMSTERDAM, ANTWER P

AND MADRID: JEW , NE W CHRISTIAN,
AND ADVISE R \T O THE CONDE-DUQU E D E OLIVARE S
While th e mai n tren d i n Portuges e Ne w Christia n migration i n th e earl y seventeent h

century was from Portuga l and Spain to the Low Countries, o r Italy , there was always a
small trickl e passin g i n th e opposit e direction , fro m land s wher e th e ope n practic e o f
Judaism was permitted, back to Spain and Portugal. In most cases, we can only speculate
as t o th e motive s o f thos e wh o returne d t o a lif e o f apparen t Catholi c orthodoxy .
Frequently difficultie s i n integratin g int o Sephardi life , o r som e fro m o f estrangemen t
from, o r rancour against, the leadership of the Portugues e Jewis h communities played a
part. I n some cases it was simply a matter of business opportunities or even just plain bad
luck, a transient visi t leadin g to entanglement with the Inquisition . It may be that ther e
were als o Sephard i Jew s who reverte d t o Catholicis m i n the Peninsul a out o f religious
conviction.
Among those Portuguese who did return from Holland to the Peninsula, one of the most
intriguing, i f hitherto a somewhat shadowy figure, wa s Manuel López Pereira , a former
member of the Amsterda m Sephardi community who became a senior financial official in
Madrid. This in itself is remarkable enough but, in addition to the possibly unique cours e
of his career, López Pereira was one of the most important of the small group of experts on
foreign trad e gathere d a t th e Spanis h cour t i n th e 1620s , advisor s whos e tract s an d
memoranda o n internationa l trade rivalry , an d Spain' s worsenin g economi c problems ,
played a major role in the framing of Olivares' ambitious programme for the commercial,
industrial, and financia l regeneratio n o f Spain.
This group of authors of mercantilist projects gathered at Madrid in the 1620s included a
German from Trier, b y the same of Agustín Bredimus,1 a Walloon nobleman, Gabriel d e
Roy,2 the Dutchman Francisco Retama, who became a citizen of Jerez,3 th e Englishman
Thomas Shirley, and two Portuguese New Christians, one of whom, Duarte Gomes Soli's,
already has an established place in historical literature as one of the more notable Iberian
*I should like to thank most warmly for their extensive assistance wit h this article Professor J. H . Ellio t of the
Institute fo r Advance d Stud y o f Princeto n University ; my colleagu e Ange l Garcia , of Universit y College
London, an d Jesús Bouza Alvarez , o f the Universit y of Madrid.
1
O n Bredimus, who, by the lat e 1620s , was acting as agent of the Hanseatic towns in Madrid, see José Alcalá-
Zamora, España, Flandes y e l mar del Norte (1618-39), (Barcelona, 1975 ) 180 , 281 , 415 .
2
Ibid. 239-42,274-79 ; E . Stols , De Spaanse Brabanders o f d e handelsbetrekkingen de r zuidelijke Nederlanden
met d e Iberische wereld, 1598-1648, (2 vols. Brussels , 1971 ) i , 18-21 .
3
Retama' s trac t "Consideracione s en rraco n de passa r el trat o a las provinzias ovediente s de Flandes " is
printed i n Alcalá-Zamora, op cit., 480-90 .
mercantilist writer s o f th e seventeent h century. 4 The othe r Portuguese , Manue l Lópe z
Pereira, i s much less well known then Gomes Soli's , presumably because mos t of his tracts
to this day remain unpublished. He was, however, even more prolific than Gomes Sou' s in
the rang e o f hi s schemes , perhap s indee d th e mos t prolifi c o f an y o f thes e author s o f
projects. And while in several cases he was probably merely drawing on a common fund of
ideas, rathe r tha n puttin g forward ne w idea s o f hi s own, Lópe z Pereira' s proposal s i n
several respect s approximat e mor e closel y t o th e actua l line s of Olivares ' mercantilis t
initiatives than those of virtually any other mercantilist writer, or arbitrista, of the time. It
is thus with some confidence that we can say that he was an influence of some consequenc e
in th e formulatio n of Olivares' policies .
Manuel López Pereira seem s to have settled definitivel y in Spain in 1619, livin g first as a
merchant in Seville but then moving, within a year or two to Madrid. Around the time he
moved to the Spanish capital he began compiling and submitting to Philip IV's minister s a
hefty series of at least nine or ten economic tracts and possibly even more. These were well
received an d i t i s clear tha t h e mus t have foun d favour (a s well as protection fro m th e
Inquisition) a t the highes t leve l for it evidently seeped out a t court tha t he ha d relative s
living as Jews i n Holland. W e hav e no specifi c comment b y Olivares' himsel f on López
Pereira, but , i n 1624 , a junta o f lesse r minister s judge d hi m t o b e a ma n o f "much a
inteligencia" an d "mu y bue n zelo" whose wor k was to b e encouraged. 5 H e wa s recom -
mended for a royal grant, was naturalised as a Castilian subject pending further favours,6
and subsequently became a royal contador (auditor). In the early 1630s, he was in charge of
the accounts of the revenues from Olivares' new salt tax.7 Clearly he proved his worth as an
official. Fro m a letter writte n in Madri d i n November 1636 , w e lear n tha t h e wa s the n
promoted (w e may assume on Olivares' reecommendation) t o the senior post of contador
de relaciones with a seat in the royal Council of Finance.8 Thus, López Pereira spent a great
many years in the day-to-day company of Spain's principal ministers. Thi s promotion t o a
highly prestigiou s pos t i n th e highe r echelon s o f th e cour t bureaucracy , w e ar e told ,
provoked widespread scandal at court for not only was López Pereira publicly known to be
a Portugues e Ne w Christian , bu t als o (i t wa s rumoured) ha d i n early lif e bee n publicl y
condemned as a "judaiser", in an Auto-da-fé in Portugal, and now had a brother living as a
professing Jew in Amsterdam. Althoug h the writer of this letter says that he does not know
whether these rumours were true or not, we know today that this was indeed the situation .
4
Gome s Solis ' mai n work was his Discursos sobre lo s comercios de la s dos Indias published in 162 2 where,
among numerou s othe r projects , h e suggeste d tha t th e Spanis h crow n shoul d allo w professin g Jew s t o
establish ghettoes in the Portuguese East Indies as a way of undermining Dutch and English trade with the Far
East; see loc.at. 14 15; Leon Bourdon (ed. ) Mémoires inédits de Duurte Gomes Solís (Lisbon , 1955 ) an d th e
extensive relevan t section s o f C.A . Hanson , Economy an d Society i n Baroque Portugal 1668-1703 (Min-
nesota, 1981) .
5
Fo r this information, I am indebted to J. H . Elliot t for communicating to me the content o f a consulta in an
unnumbered volum e o f th e Montesclaro s paper s i n th e privat e archiv e o f th e duque s de l Infantado , i n
Madrid.
6
Actas d e las Cortes de Castilla xl, 266, sessio n o f 8 Jan. 1624 .
1
Ibid., vol. xlix (1632 ) 393 .
8
Antoni o Rodriguez Villa, L a Corte y monarquía d e España en los años de 1636 y 1637 (Madrid, 1886 ) 65 .
Manuel López Pereira 24 9
In fact, Manuel had two younger brothers - Antoni o and Francisco López Pereira - livin g
as professin g Jew s i n Amsterdam ; an d Antonio , whos e Jewis h nam e wa s apparently
Joseph Israel Pereira, ' was a man of some prominenc e i n synagogue affairs. H e several
times served as a member of the governing board of the Neveh Shalom synagogue and was
a founding membe r of the Santa Companhia de dotar orfans e dómelas pobres, (1615) a
Portuguese Jewis h organisatio n base d i n Amsterdam, wit h secret branches i n Antwerp,
Rouen, S t Jean d e Luz, and even in Brazil, dedicated t o providing marriage portions fo r
poor Portugues e Jewis h girl s (an d fo r poo r Ne w Christian girl s in countries wher e th e
practice o f Judaism was not allowed) who were willing to abandon Christianity and marry
in synagogue in Holland o r in Hamburg.10
The legen d o f the Sephard i Je w wh o migrated bac k fro m Hollan d t o th e Peninsula,
reverting t o a t leas t nomina l Christianity , and wh o ultimatel y became a n adviso r and
confident of Olivares lived on among Dutch Sephardi Jewry through the late seventeenth
and eighteenth centurie s albei t i n a slightly confused form. Daniel Lev i de Barrios, who
published a chronicle of the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam, in 1683, name s
the one-time Dutch Jew who made good in Spain becoming, as he put it, contador mayor of
the king of Spain and valido of the Conde Duque not as "Manuel" but as "Antonio" Lopes
Pereira.11 Apart from the confusion of first names as between Manuel and Antonio Lópe z
Pereira, it may be that Levi de Barrios' designation o f López Pereira as "valido", that is a
favourite an d confidant, o f Olivares somewhat overstates th e case. However, w e can be
fairly sure tha t Manue l López Pereira was personally close to Olivares, and was in some
sense his protogé, as we know that at the time of the Conde-Duque's death , Manuel López
Pereira, who was evidently still in Madrid, was named in Olivares' will as one of his (fairly
numerous) executors. 12 Th e stor y a s tol d b y Lev i d e Barrio s wa s later repeate d i n th e
eighteenth centur y b y th e Amsterda m Portugues e Jewis h chronicle r Davi d Franc o
Mendes.13
9
I
t seems clear that Antonio Lope s Pereira usually used the name Joseph Israe l Pereira i n synagogue record s
and that he was several time s treasurer o f the Neve h Shalom synagogue , bu t that he also later claimed th e
ancient patronymi c "Abendana" styling himself from 162 2 "Joseph Abendana". Rather confusingly, there is
also one reference i n the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish records to "Izaq Israel Perejra que he Antonio Lopes
Pereira" which I take to be a mistake for "Francisco Lopes Pereira", se e Llvro de Bet Haim do Kahal Kudos
de Bet Yahacob ed. Wilhelmina C. Pieterse (Assen, 1970 ) 3, 8,15-16,22-4, 37 , 51-3; H. P. Salomon, Portrait
of a New Christian. Fernáo Alvares Meló (1569-1632) (Paris , 1982 ) 51 .
10
I . S . Revah, 'Le premie r reglemen t imprimé de la "Santa Companhia d e dotar orfan s e donzelas pobres",
Boletim internacional de bibliografía luso-brasileira, IV (1963) 659 .
11
Danie l Lev i de Barrios , Triumpho de l govierno popular y d e l a antigüedad holandesa (Amsterdam, 1683 )
section "Casa de lacob" p. 9; Levi de Barrios' mistake in turn led the historian A. M. Vaz Dias astray, for the
latter foun d it hard t o believe tha t a Dutch Jew born of a family victimize d by the Inquisition, should have
reverted t o Christianit y in th e Peninsul a an d suppose d tha t th e continue d reference s t o Antoni o Lope s
Pereira i n Amsterdam showe d that the story was in fact untrue, see A. M. Vaz Dias, "Losse bijdragen tot de
geschiedenis de r Joden in Amsterdam", D e Vrijdagavond VII I (1931) 23; for more information on Antoni o
López Pereira, se e Livro de Bet Haim, 181 .
12
Memorial Histórico Español xi x 131 .
13
Davi d Franco Mendes , "Memorias do estabelecimento e progresso dos judeus portugueses e espanoes nesta
famosa citad e d e Amsterdam " i n Studio Rosenthaliana (henceforward SR), I X (1975) 7-8 .
But if Manuel Lopez Pereira's later life became entwine d in legend his early life figures
in an even more intriguing story and, once again, one that can be shown to be substantially
true. On e o f th e principa l account s preserve d b y th e Portugues e Jew s o f Amsterda m
concerning the origins of their community centred aroun d a renowned beauty of Lisbon by
the nam e o f Mari a Nune s wh o fle d Portuga l i n th e lat e 1590s , togethe r wit h he r tw o
brothers, a sister , Just a Pereira , an d a n uncle , afte r he r parent s wer e seize d b y th e
Inquisition as "judaisers". According to this story, she was on a ship together with her four
relatives (he r brother s being none other tha n Manuel and Antonio Lópe z Pereira), whe n
the vessel wa s intercepted b y the English and brought into an English port. According to
Levi de Barrios, a n English duke fell in love with Manuel's beautiful sister; and sought he r
love with such ardour tha t Queen Elizabeth, hearin g of this, summoned the girl to appea r
before he r s o as to judg e her beaut y fo r herself . Th e Quee n wa s so impressed tha t sh e
reportedly took Maria Nune s wit h her in the royal carriage for a ride through London to
show off her beauty to the English. But despite all the efforts of the duke to marry her, and
make her his duchess, Mari a Nunes, wishing to remain true to her secret faith, insisted on
leaving England togethe r with her relatives an d proceeding t o Amsterdam. 14
In the 1920s, the Dutch Jewish historian Sigmun d Seeligmann came upon a letter sent to
The Hague b y Noel de Carón, the Dutch States General's agent in London, whic h appears
to refer t o this episode. The lette r is dated 2 7 April 159 7 an d relates tha t amon g severa l
Dutch ship s intercepte d b y the English , e n route fro m Spai n an d Portugal , wa s a vesse l
from Flushin g which had on board a group of five Portuguese passenger s wh o were fleeing
from Inquisition , one o f whom, he mentions , wa s a young "noble lady" dresse d i n male
attire.15 Thes e Portugues e wer e take n t o London . D e Carró n als o specificall y mention s
that the group were on their way to Amsterdam where the girl was to be married. While we
can not be certain that this passage refer s to the beautiful Maria Nunes and her relatives, it
does seem likely; and we do know that the marriage of Maria Nunes to her cousin, Manuel
Lopes Homem, wa s entered in the city registers at Amsterdam on 28 November 1598. 16 At
that dat e he r parent s wer e stil l languishin g in the Inquisitio n gaols i n Lisbon . Manue l
López Pereira' s ow n marriage , o r firs t marriage , wa s registere d i n Amsterda m o n 9
14
Ibid. ; Lev i de Barrios, loc. cit. 5; J. S. Silva Rosa, Geschiedenis der Ponugeesche Joden te Amsterdam, 1593-
1925 (Amsterdam, 1925) 2,6,8; Wïlhelmina C. Pieterse, Daniel Levi de Barrios als geschiedschrijver va n de
portugees-israelietische gemeente te Amsterdam i n zijn "Triumpho de l Govierno Popular" (Amsterdam, 1968 )
44-5; Mozes Gans, Memorboek. Platenatlas van het leven der joden in Nederland van de middeleeuwen tot 1940
(Baarn, 1971) 20-1; the parallel between the story of Maria Nunes and her secret loyalt y to Judaism with the
paragon o f beauty and Catholi c loyalty show n off at th e Englis h court b y Queen Elizabeth , embodied i n
Cervantes' famou s story L a española inglesa was pointed ou t t o m e b y m y colleague Ange l Garci a wh o
expects t o develo p thi s theme i n a forthcomin g article. I a m muc h indebted t o hi m fo r pointin g out thi s
remarkable aspect of the subject.
15
Sigmun d Seeligmann, Bibliographie en Historie. Bijdrage to t de geschiedenis der eerste Sephardim in Amster-
dam (Amsterdam , 1927 ) 15-18 ; J. d'Ancona , "Koms t de r Marrane n in Noord-Nederland ; d e Portuges e
gemeenten te Amsterdam tot de vereniging (1639)", in Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland ed. H. Brugmans
and A. Fran k (Amsterdam, 1940 ) 204-5.
16
Seeligmann , Bibliographie, 15 ; Gans reproduces a photo of the contract signed b y Maria Nunes and Manuel
Lopes Homem, Gans , Memorboek, 21 .
September 1605 , b y whic h date hi s parent s wer e als o securel y ensconce d i n th e city .
Manuel is stated a s being then age d twenty-three years old and having been bor n on th e
island o f Madeira, albei t of a Lisbon family. 17 Hi s bride, Breti s Nunes of Oporto, was a
daughter o f hi s father's brother , Pedr o Homem , th e uncl e wh o ha d bee n wit h hi m in
England, an d a sister o f Manuel Lopes Homem. Just a Pereir a marrie d anothe r cousin,
Francisco Nunes Homem, als o in 1605. Thu s Manuel, Maria, and Justa would all seem to
have married thei r first cousins .
Manuel López Pereira's Jewish name has yet to be identified. As we have seen, Antonio
Lopes Pereira wa s originally styled in the synagogu e Joseph Israe l Pereir a bu t later , in
1622, he and his cousin, Francisco Nunes Homem, adopted, or discovered, the patronymic
"Abendana".18 Historians disagre e ove r whether the adoptio n o f such medieval Spanish
Jewish name s b y Portuguese Marranos returning to Judaism in the seventeent h century
indicates a genuine continuity, a recollection o f that family' s ow n pre-1492 surname, o r
whether it was simply a fashionable means of enhancing one's standing in the new milieu to
assume patronymics which had once been, and in the Levant still were, prestigious Spanish
Jewish names.19 According to Antonio López Pereira and Nunes Homem the y discovered
what wa s their ow n ancien t name, in 1622 , learnin g this fro m certai n relative s "d e sua
mispaha emjudesmo", presumabl y in the Levant. This would then seem to be something of
an i n betwee n case . Undeniably , though, th e famil y di d enjoy high status among early
seventeenth-century Dutc h Sephard i Jewry . A s evidenc e o f this , i t i s significan t tha t
Antonio Lópe z Pereir a marrie d Mari a Pimente l (Judic a Abendana) , daughte r o f th e
"noble" Garcia de Pimentel, the Pimentel (Abeniacar) clan of Venice, Amsterdam, and
Constantinople - on e of Garcia's brother s wa s arabbi in the Turkish capita l - bein g
universally acknowledge d a s on e o f th e mos t select , a s wel l a s wealthiest , Sephard i
lineages in early modern Europe.20 Garcia PimentePs brother, Manuel Pimentel, is known
to have staye d a t the French cour t in 1607, shortl y before revertin g t o ope n Judais m in
Venice, was accepted a s a nobleman and caused a sensation with his skill at cards. Despite
his deliberately losing to the king on occasion, Henr i IV is reputed to have remarked "I am
the kin g of France bu t yo u ar e th e kin g of gamblers". 21 I t i s evident tha t th e Pimentel-
Abeniacar famil y als o cam e t o play a certain rol e in Manuel López Pereira' s own life.
A number of notarial deeds concerning Manuel López Pereira' s busines s activity in the
years afte r hi s marriag e hav e bee n preserve d i n th e Amsterda m cit y archive . In hi s
twenties, he participate d as a junio r partne r in a wide-rangin g family concer n chiefl y
17
Seeligmann, Bibliographic, 22; Pieterse, Daniel Levi d e Barrios, 45.
18
Livro de Bel Haim, 181; d'Ancona , "Koms t de r Marranen", 205 ; Salomon, Portrait of a New Christian, 51.
19
Ibid.; Jean Denucé, "De afkomst van Anna de Milan (ca. 1548-1613) , stammoeder va n het geslacht Teixeir a
de Mattos", Anlwerpsch Archievenblad ser. 2 , no. 3 (Jan. 1928), 28; J. C . Boyajian, 'Th e ne w Christians
reconsidered: evidence from Lisbon' s Portugues e Bankers , 1497-1647" , S.R., XII I (1979 ) 150-51 .
20 Franco Mendes, Memorias, 13 , 21; E. M . Koen a.o. , ed . "Notaria l Record s i n Amsterdam relating to the
Portuguese Jew s in that Town up to 1639 " (i n instalments in SR) SR , xi i (1978) 173 .
21
Francois de Bassompierre, Mémoires du Marechal d e Bassompierre (4 vols. Amsterdam, 1723 ) i, 206-8, the
story is retold i n Levi de Barrios .
involved i n importin g suga r fro m Brazi l an d Madeira , vi a Portugal , t o Holland. 22 In
August 1604 , Manuel together with his cousin and brother-in-law, Manuel Lopes Homem,
bought a quarter share in a large, 240 ton, ship, the Jaeger, for 2,000 guilders. But the older
man, Lopes Homem , wa s clearly the senior participant. I n January 1605, Manue l Lopes
Homem wa s on e o f severa l leadin g Portugues e Jewis h merchant s who petitione d th e
States Genera l t o be allowed to continue trading with the Iberian Peninsula despite th e
growing pressure for Dutc h retaliatio n against Spanish attempts, since 1598 , t o exclude
Dutch shippin g and good s fro m th e port s of Spai n an d Portugal. 23 One carg o of sugar
belonging to the family , o n board a Portuguese shi p sailing from Bahi a to Portugal, was
seized in 1605 in mid-Atlantic by a Zeeland privateer which involved the family in trying to
retrieve their sugar from th e admiralty authorities in Zeeland.24 In August 1608, Manue l
López Pereira was accused b y an Amsterdam confectioner of having sold him two chests of
defective Madeira sugar. 25
Manuel López Pereira wa s still living in Amsterdam in July 1609 when he chartered a
Dutch ship on behalf of a Lisbon merchant to deliver cargo in Portugal and return with figs
to Holland. 26 Bu t a t som e poin t betwee n 160 9 an d 1612 , probabl y quite soon afte r th e
signing of the Twelv e Years ' Truce, h e move d t o Antwer p where he now acted a s the
family's agent. 27 In August 1612, th e widow of Garcia Pimentel, in Amsterdam, assigned
to Manue l Lópe z Pereira , i n Antwerp , 10,00 0 guilders out o f th e larg e su m of 30,75 0
guilders which came to her apparently from the fortune of Manuel Pimentel, the "king of
gamblers".28 I t is not explained in the document why this large sum was paid over; but as
Garcia Pimentel's wido w seemingly refers to Manuel López Pereira as her "son-in-law", it
may be that his first wif e had died an d that in choosing a second wif e he had followed his
brother's example and chosen a daughter of Garcia Pimentel; the money would then be the
dowry. Alternatively, th e money may have been Maria Pimentel's dowry and was simply
being paid over fro m Antwerp , wher e it was deposited, t o Antonio López Pereira b y his
brother.
Another key document of 1612 details something of the family's commercial organiza-
tion following the death of Manuel's father, Gaspar Lope s Homem , in November 1612. 29
This deed indicate s tha t hi s mother, Mayo r Rodrigues , an d hi s brothers, Antoni o an d
Francisco López Pereira, all in Amsterdam, agree d t o continue the procedures followe d
during their father's life-time in collaboration with Manuel Lopes Homem who is stated t o
have moved from Holland to Lisbon, and latterly to Seville, with Manuel López Pereira, in
22
"Notaria l records" nos. 152, 153, 188, 270.
23
Resaluden der Staten-Generaal, XIII (1604-1606) ed. H. H. P. Rijperman (The Hague, 1957) 226, 490,494.
24
"Notaria l Records" no. 188
25
Ibid. no . 282.
M
Ibid. no . 357.
27
A certain "Emanuel Loupes" figures in the list of Antwerp Portuguese drawn up in 1611 but this may not have
Manuel López Pereira, see I. S. Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Marranes á Anvers: recensements de la "Nation
Portugaise" de 1571 a 1666", Revue des Etudes Juives, CXXII (1963) 142.
28
"Notaria l records" no. 565.
» Ibid. no . 599.
Antwerp, an d with Francisco Nune s Homem (late r Davi d Avendana), Manuel's cousin
and brother-in-law, i n Amsterdam. Th e name of the company was changed from "Gaspar
and Manuel Lopes Homem' to the "Heirs of Gaspar Lope s Homem an d Francisco Nune s
Homem". Th e fac t tha t Manue l Lope s Home m wa s no w i n Sevill e sugges t tha t hi s
beautiful wife, Maria Nunes, was there also, which, to say the least, would be highly ironic
in view of the Sephardi legen d centering on her religious constancy and highly intriguing as
Seville was a city much frequented b y the autho r of la Española inglesa.
For the next six or seven years Manuel López Pereira continued as the family's agent in
Antwerp trading, we may surmise, mor e with Seville than with Lisbon. Fro m an Amster-
dam deed, dated 13 November 1617 , we learn that Francisco López Pereira, "merchan t in
Amsterdam", owe s "his brothe r Manoe l Lopes Pereira, merchant in Antwerp", th e sum
of 1,500 pounds Flemish fo r cash raised by Manuel in payment of merchandise bough t on
credit b y Francisco, i n Amsterdam , an d shippe d t o th e latter' s father-in-law , Manoel
Pereira d a Cost a (alia s Francisc o Nune s d'Alcobaca), describe d a s presently staying in
Trujillo "i n Andalusia". 30 Paymen t was due fro m Spai n for nine consignments o f goods
which had bee n shippe d t o Málag a an d Sa n Sebastian, th e arrangemen t being that th e
father-in-law would remit the cash to Manuel López Pereira i n Antwerp. Antonio Lópe z
Pereira, wh o owned shares in two or three ships, was also involved in Spanish trade and in
February 161 8 participate d for one third share in a cargo of grain shipped t o the family's
agent in Málaga, a certain Simá o Francisco, th e return cargo to Amsterdam to consist of
wine, almonds, raisins, and wool.31 It is clear that the family were also dealing in products
from the Spanish Indies for, in 1615, we find Manuel Lopes Homem, in Seville, taking out
insurance o n tw o Spanis h ship s du e t o sai l bac k wit h carg o o n hi s accoun t fro m th e
Carribean island of Puerto Rico .32 Clearly one of the commodities on board were hides; for
later tha t yea r w e fin d Manue l Lópe z Pereir a importin g 80 0 Wes t India n hide s t o
Anrwem.33
It seems fro m on e source that Manuel López Pereira was in Seville in 1617. M I f so, his
stay there on that occasion wa s brief; for in an Amsterdam deed o f August 1618 we read
that Manuel López Pereira "ha s come from Antwerp to settle his affairs here". 35 This 161 8
visit t o Holland , however , di d prelude his final departur e fro m th e Lo w Countries an d
permanent mov e t o Spain . In , o r around , 161 9 h e joine d hi s cousin , Manue l Lope s
Homem, in Seville. Although he did not stay long there, it is clear that whilst in Seville he
continued i n business a s a merchant. Judging from tw o notaria l deed s preserve d i n th e
Antwerp city archive, his activity during his initial period i n Spain centered o n importing
costly wares from the Spanish Netherlands of a sort apt to be sold to a discriminating noble
30
Ibid. no . 1271 ; from th e deeds no. 1197 , we learn that in February 1614, Francisco Lopes Pereira (b. 1586)
married Beatris Rodrigues, daughter of Francisco Nunes d'Alcobaca, paying 960 guilders to his mistress of
many years standing, a Dutch woman named as "Grietgen" by whom he had two children.
31
"Notaria l records" no. 1342.
32
Stols , De Spaanse Brabanders ü, 162-63 .
33
Han s Pohl, Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648) (Wiesbaden , 1977) 164.
34
D'Ancona , "Komst der Mammen" , 205.
35
. "Notaria l records", nos. 1500, 1505, and 1516.
clientèle or else at court i n Madrid. W e hear, for instance, of a consignment of pearls sen t
out to him from Antwerp (presumably originating in the East Indies and brought back firs t
to Amsterdam) an d of a large tapestry, woven in, and sent out from, Antwerp, depictin g a
story from the lif e of the Roman genera l Scipio, decidedl y the kind of thing to appeal to a
man o f Olivares' tastes. 36 From thi s evidence, i t may not b e too farfetche d t o infer that
López Pereira gained his original entree a t court, either through Olivares himsel f or some
other prominen t figure , a s a purveyo r o f jeweller y an d choic e objets fro m th e Sout h
Netherlands.
But howeve r Lópe z Pereir a gaine d hi s origina l introductio n a t cour t h e wa s wel l
established ther e by the summer of 1623 as an acknowledged expert on international trade
in general and Low Countries commerc e in particular. His initial batch of tracts seem to
date from th e yea r 162 1 an d in that year , o r shortly after, he withdrew definitively from
trade an d devote d himsel f wholeheartedly t o hi s new career a s a proposer o f economi c
projects, o r arbitrios. B y 1624 , apparently , h e ha d spen t a length y period a t Madri d
without returnin g t o Sevill e (where h e ha d lef t hi s wife an d children ) an d wa s allegedly
subsisting at court i n a state o f "necessidad y empeño".37 In view of the fac t tha t he ha d
previously bee n handlin g costly merchandise , an d larg e sum s o f money , thi s ma y well
indicate that his own business affairs had collapsed. Alternatively, or possibly additionally,
it may also imply that, for whateve r reason, h e had broke n of f relations wit h his family.
The papers which López Pereir a submitte d a t court i n 1621 alread y reveal that preoc -
cupation with a very wide range of economic issues characteristic of his later tracts of 1623-
4. A t thi s time , shortly afte r th e settin g u p o f th e Junta d e Reformación, i n Madrid , a
government committe e charge d wit h findin g solution s fo r Spain' s worsenin g economi c
problems, th e Spanish cour t wa s bein g floode d wit h discourse s o n commercia l an d
monetary matters and López Pereira clearl y had to fight for attention throug h a veritable
crowd o f Castilia n a s wel l a s would-b e foreig n arbitristas. Hi s initia l submission s
discoursed o n Spain' s monetar y problems, 38 on the questio n o f foreign imports enterin g
Spain,39 an d o n th e strageti c questio n o f ho w bes t t o figh t th e Dutc h "rebels " i n th e
Netherlands. Many of his ideas were clearly not original and merely echoed what other and
better know n arbitristas had alread y written . Thus , hi s arguments i n favour of stringent
restrictions and prohibitions to curb the influx of foreign manufactures pouring into Spain
were substantiall y the sam e a s thos e o f Pedr o Hurtad o d e Alcoze r an d Sanch o d e
36
Stadsarchief, Antwerpen , Notaria l Archiv e no . 3619 , fos . 132-132 v an d 489-489v ; Poní , Portugiesen in
Antwerpen, 173 , 188 , 207 .
37 Again, I am indebted to Professor J . H . Elliot t for this information.
38 López Pereira' s mai n submission i n 162 1 is the piec e preserved in Archivo Histórico Nacional , Sección d e
Consejos, libr o 1428, fos. 263-74; López Pereira's tract "Medio para la reducción y consumo del vellón" in the
Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) MS. 6731. "Arbitrio s sobre moneda" is undated bu t ma y also b e one o f the
early pieces, from 1621 ; López Pereira's initial batch of tracts was discussed in a report from Juan de Hoces to
the king , dated Madri d 1 7 November 1621 ' which is printed in Angel González Falenci a (ed.) , La Junta de
Reformación (1618-1625). Documentos procedentes del Archivo Histórico Nacional y del General de Simancas
(Valladolid, 1932 ) 162-66 .
39 See the repor t b y Juan de Hoces, p. 166 .
40
Moneada, thoug h given the crucial role of Dutch, Flemish, French and English textiles
and other manufacture s in undermining Spain's economic vitality at this time, this should
not count a s a criticism agains t him. 41 Lopez Pereira's 1621 paper o n the Low Countries'
war argued tha t Spai n should not try to resume a land offensive agains t the Dutch in the
Low Countries but strive to weaken the "rebels" by means of naval and economic pressure
alone. This argument had already been put forward by various writers.42 Indeed, this was a
point of view with a considerable followin g in Spain. Even so, López Pereira was judged to
have argue d th e point i n a way that had to b e taken seriously "dando mucho s y buenos
fundamentos e n su proposición". But what chiefly caught the attention o f Spanish minis-
ters i n Lópe z Pereira' s initia l batc h o f memorand a wa s th e detaile d knowledg e h e
possessed o f commerc e an d industr y i n th e Lo w Countrie s an d al l aspect s o f Dutc h
economic activit y in Spain and its empire. Thus, was "digna de ser leyda la proposición del
dicho Manuel López Pereyra , porqu e della se conoce e l trato y estado d e los Olandeses y
quanto importa el impedilles por todas maneras la saca de plata destos reynos". 43 In 1621 ,
the yea r i n whic h Spai n resume d he r Eight y Years' Wa r agains t th e Dutch , thi s wa s
precisely the aspec t of matters which Philip IV's minister s were most preoccupied with .
López Pereira' s tract s see m t o hav e bee n esteemed , then , fo r th e ligh t they cast o n
Spain's highly problematic economi c relationshi p wit h the Low Countries rathe r than for
what they say on Spain's domestic economic difficulties, though of course in some respect s
the two things were inextricable. By 1623, López Pereir a had graduated to the inner circle
of favoured experts, mostl y foreigners, who were assisting the newl y instituted Junta de
Comercio, unde r th e chairmanshi p of the Marqué s de Montesclaros, i n its twin tasks of
finding means to regenerate Spain' s ailing economy and waging economic warfare against
the Dutch. 44 He was now formulating proposals which were discussed ami d great secrecy .
The tracts which López Pereira submitte d in 1623-4 include the paper on how to eradicate
Dutch merchandis e fro m Spain , publishe d here for th e firs t tim e a s an appendix t o thi s
article, a discourse on the waging of maritime warfare against the Dutch from th e Spanish
Netherlands, a tract recommending the setting up of an East India Company in the Spanish
Netherlands, presumably to be based at Antwerp, and another recommending the setting
up o f a joint stoc k compan y t o tak e ove r th e monopol y of Spain' s trad e wit h Spanis h
America, a company to be organized on the same lines as the Dutch colonial companies .
Yet, whil e compiling thes e pieces , h e continue d writing othe r memorand a o n Spanis h
domestic issues . A t leas t tw o of these, a paper arguing in favour o f erarios, public loan-
banks o n th e mode l o f th e Italia n monti d i pietá which Olivares wanted to establis h in
Spain, and another o n the inadvisability of the Cortes taxin g bread an d other basic food-
stuffs wer e printed. 45
« Ibid.
41
Jonatha n I. Israel , Th e Dutch Republic an d the Hispanic World, 1606-1661, (Oxford, 1982 ) 54-5.
42
See , for instance, the memorandu m by Hurtuño de Urizar of 3 Feb. 1618 in Archivo General de Simancas
(hereafter AGS ) Estado 2847.
43
Se e again the report by Juan de Hoces in González Falencia op. cit. p. 164.
44
O n th e Junta d e comercio, see Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 134-42.
45
Se e Manuel López Pereira, Papel referente a la institución de erarios (Madrid, 1623) in Biblioteca Nacional
(Madrid) V.E. 211/18 and the tract on taxation by Manuel López Pereira in Biblioteca Nacional V.E. 211/19.
Of th e (a t least ) fou r paper s b y Lópe z Pereir a relatin g t o Spain' s programm e o f
economic warfare against the United Provinces, th e tract "Sobre arajar l a entrada de las
mercadurías de reveldes", of 1623, was possibly the earliest. It is also a good example of
the intimate connection between certain key ideas formulated in López Pereira's tracts and
the actual mercantilis t schemes embarked upo n b y Olivares i n the mid 1620s, But while
López Pereira doe s clearly foreshadow what was to emerge as royal policy, it is extremely
difficult t o know how far he was actually influencing the proceedings an d how far he was
merely echoin g an d reiteratin g idea s whic h wer e alread y circulatin g amon g Philip' s
ministers and advisors. In this tract he explores ways of making the royal prohibition on the
entry of Dutch manufacture s more effective. 4* T o sto p u p the loopholes , argue s Lópe z
Pereira, th e crown must fix clearer criteri a by which officials i n the ports can identify an d
eradicate contraban d good s wher e thes e wer e conceale d amon g cargoes comin g fro m
neutral lands and disguised by false seals and papers. Lópe z Pereira then lists all the major
manufactures importe d int o Spain from, i n turn, Germany, the "rebel provinces" o f the
Netherlands, th e "obedien t provinces " (ie . th e Spanis h Netherlands) , France , an d
England. Th e chie f problem , h e claimed, wa s that th e mai n sea-ports o f Flanders -
Dunkirk and Ostend - were now blockaded by the Dutch navy so that most merchandise
being sent from the Spanish Netherlands t o Spain was having to be exported through th e
neighbouring Frenc h por t o f Calais. 47 This, h e believed , wa s the roo t o f the difficultie s
confronting the king's strategy. For there was much similarlity between the manufactures
produced i n the two parts of the Netherlands so that it was possible to camouflage "Dutch"
as "Flemish" products in a way that was not possible with manufactures from Franc e an d
England. Th e Dutc h would have no opportunity to mix their goods in with those of th e
South Netherlands were it still possible t o ship merchandise direct from th e Flemish sea-
ports to Spain. But whilst this could only be done through Calais, the Dutch had the perfect
opportunity to subvert Philip IV's ban. "To this port of Calais", wrote López Pereira, "th e
Dutch brin g their manufacture s and these the n reach these realm s mixed up with thos e
produced i n the obedient provinces". 48
Apart from Flemish manufactures, maintained López Pereira, only linens and woollens
from German y could be confused with Dutch products, at any rate once a detailed lis t of
types an d categorie s wa s drawn up. S o different were the manufacture s o f France an d
England fro m thos e o f the Lo w Countries tha t there wa s little or n o risk of seepage o f
contraband Dutch goods into Spain through either of those two countries. To prevent the
penetration of Dutch manufactures into the Spanish realms, according to López Pereira, it
sufficed t o bring in new controls in Flanders and in North Germany. What the king had to
do was forbid th e importin g to Spain of Flemish goods fro m an y English or French por t
other tha n Calais ; an d stop the mixin g in of Dutch with Flemish products a t Calai s by
decreeing that, henceforward, all goods exported fro m the loyal Netherlands to Spain and
* Se e the text from the AGS Estado vol 2847 printed in the appendix below; on Philip IV's prohibition against
Dutch goods and shipping, see Israel, Th e Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 134-42 .
47
Se e ibid. pp. 87 , 90; Stols, Spaanse Brabanders i, 13 , 16, 24,121.
48
Seep . 261 .
Portugal would have to be registered b y a specially appointed officia l who would remit the
lists of registered export s separately to Spain , so that the goods coul d be checked of f on
arrival. Any supposedly "Flemish" goods which did not figure on the prepared list s in this
way should b e automatically subject to confiscation. Exactly the sam e shoul d hencefor -
ward apply to any supposedly "German" linens or woollens shippe d to Spain fro m either
England o r France . Fo r an y genuin e manufacture s of German y woul d invariabl y be
exported direct from Hamburg, Lübeck, or another Hanseatic port and not via England or
France. Beside s excludin g Dutc h good s fro m Spai n mor e effectively , Lópe z Pereir a
pointed ou t tha t al l thi s woul d serv e t o stimulat e industria l activit y i n th e Spanis h
Netherlands.
What is perhaps mos t significant abou t this tract is that it was precisely the thinking set
out here which determined Olivares' decision to post special agents to register and contro l
exports t o Spai n in Flanders an d North Germany even though no such controls could be
imposed i n England or France. 49 Here w e see a particularly close parallel between Lópe z
Pereira's proposals an d what was actually implemented by the crown. It is also significant
that López Pereira states that even the flow of Flemish wares through Calais should only be
tolerated b y the king until the projected "Company" t o handle Netherlands trade, with its
heavily arme d convoy s sailin g t o Dunkirk , bega n t o operate . Her e Lópe z Pereir a i s
referring t o th e so-calle d Almirantazgo whic h Philip IV se t u p a few months late r an d
which wa s indeed intende d t o control and defend trade between Spai n and Flander s by
means of powerfully arme d convoys. 50 López Pereira's reference to it in this tract may be
evidence that he was one of the originators of the scheme which seems highly likely. At the
very least , i t shows tha t h e wa s privy a t a n earl y stage t o secre t an d highl y important
matters o f state.
One furthe r featur e o f thi s trac t deserve s mention . López Pereir a assert s tha t ther e
should b e a total ban on the entry of English "black bays" into the Iberian Peninsula. 51 For
while these draperies were woven in England, they were dyed and finished in Holland due
to the fact that dyeing techniques were rather backward in England. Thus, this product was
a partial Dutc h manufacture and should be banned . The autho r did not expect tha t th e
English would take offense at such a ban as long as no hindrance was offered t o the entry
into the Peninsula of English "white", or undyed bays. These, h e recommended, should
henceforth be dyed in Seville where, according to him, there was already a dyeing industry
expert enough to handle the task and which could be developed. It is striking that exactly
the same point about English bays had already been made by the Marqués de Montesclaros
4
' Gabrie l de Roy was appointed Spain's "Agent" in North Germany and eventually succeeded in the 1630s ,
with the aid of the Danish crown in imposing an elaborate system of certificates on all goods shipped between
Germany and the Iberian Peninsula; on De Roy and the controls in Flanders, see Israel, The Dutch Republic
and the Hispanic World, 205 , 207.
50
O n the Almirantazgo, see ibid. 204-13; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Guerra económica y comercio extran-
jero en el reinado de Felipe IV", Hispania, xxii i (1963) 71-113.
51
"Bays " wer e a light woolle n clot h made chiefly i n and around Colchester where there was a "Dutch Bay-
hall"; th e Englis h i s a renderin g o f th e Dutc h "baai" , thi s clot h havin g originate d i n sixteenth-centur y
Flanders.
52
himself in a consulta of October 1622. This may mean that here Lópe z Pereira is merely
reiterating idea s whic h ha d alread y bee n i n circulatio n fo r som e tim e amon g Philip' s
economic experts. O n the other hand, it is clear that Montesclaros was not the originator of
the idea for he says in the same consulta that he learnt about this matter whilst serving as
the king' s assitente in Seville . I t i s therefore jus t possibl e tha t Montesclaro s originall y
conceived thi s ide a from Lópe z Pereir a whils t th e latte r was living in Seville. If so, thi s
would suggest that López Pereira' s first contact wit h the Spanish government came abou t
through his meeting this well-connected noblema n in Seville.
López Pereira's other tracts dealing with aspects of the Dutch-Spanish economic conflict
are als o of considerable interest . Hi s piece o n the war at sea, discussed in the Counci l of
State, in Madrid, in February 1624, is probably not one of the earliest statements of Spain's
need to switch to a purely defensive strategy on land - th e army was then bogged dow n
before Breda - an d to a much expanded effort a t sea from Spain's ports in Flanders.53 The
council showed interest, though, in his idea, which does seem to have been new, that once
Spain had a powerful enough fleet at Dunkirk, part o f it could be used to ferry sal t from
Setúbal t o Flander s wher e th e sal t coul d b e exchange d fo r nava l store s sen t fro m th e
Hanseatic towns . This would, he pointed out, sav e the king from hi s present need to pay
for expensive naval munitions in hard cash and would deal a heavy blow to the Dutch salt
trade with northern Europe .
López Pereira' s recommendation , alon g wit h tha t o f Retama , tha t a n Eas t Indi a
Company, with the right to trade with a large part of the Portuguese empire in Asia, should
be set up in the South Netherlands was discussed by the Junta de Comercio, in Madrid, in
March 1624. 54 The essence of López Pereira's ide a here was that such a South Netherlands
East Indi a Company, backe d b y th e commercia l and distributio n facilities of th e Lo w
Countries, authorise d by the king to trade with parts of Asia from whic h the Dutch were
excluded, would be bound to draw off capital from th e Dutc h East Indi a Company, if it
were advertised that Dutch investment would be accepted; and in this way the Portugues e
"estado da India " would be revive d from it s present languishin g state whil e the Dutc h
company would be substantially weakened. The junta, however, rejected th e scheme on
the ground s tha t i t ra n counte r t o th e essentia l drif t o f the king' s commercial strategy ,
which wa s t o eradicat e Dutc h involvemen t fro m th e Spanis h an d Portugues e colonia l
empires, no t encourag e it . The junta preferred a different scheme , fo r a new East Indi a
Company, t o operat e o n a joint-stock basis, to b e set up in Lisbon an d this is what was
eventually tried. Minister s also rejected López Pereira's schem e for a Spanish West Indi a
Company, to be modelled o n the Dutch colonial companies, which he envisaged as having
a joint starting capital of several million ducats and a board of thirty directors which would
52 AGS Estad o 2036. Consulta o f the Consejo d e Estado, 6 Oct. 1622 , fo . 2.

53 For thi s tract, see AGS Estad o 203 8 expediente no. 87; see also AG S Estad o 203 8 no. 86. Consulta o f th e
Consejo d e Estado, 8 Feb. 1624 ; o n the shift in strategic thinkin g at Madrid i n 1623-4, se e Israel, Th e Dutch
Republic an d th e Hispanic World, 103-109 .
54
See AGS Estado 2847. Manue l López Pereira, "Sobre que se hagan Compañías de obedientes par a contratar
en l a India oriental" and th e consulta of the Junta d e Comercio o f 13 March 1624 .
55
draw fund s an d good s fo r th e Indie s trad e fro m th e whol e o f Spain. There wa s little
desire, it would seem, t o tamper with the existing system.
To conclude , i t i s evident tha t Manue l López Pereira , a former Jew o f Amsterdam ,
succeeded in forging a successful an d remarkable career at the court of Philip IV of Spain.
While we do not kno w what consideration s move d him to leav e the Lo w Countries an d
settle permanentl y i n Spain , hi s tract s sugges t a deep-seate d hostilit y t o th e Dutc h
Republic and a decided preferenc e for Antwerp and the Spanish Netherlands. Althoug h
he ha d t o confor m outwardly to Catholicis m i n Antwer p an d Spain , an d i n th e latte r
country needed officia l protectio n fro m the Inquisition, there seem to be no indications at
all in his tracts as to hi s religious attitudes and beliefs . Th e natur e of his career at th e
Spanish court, and his rise to the Consejo d e Hacienda, show that like the Pimentel family
and other Portugues e Marran o lineages of his day, he must have had the refinement and
manners normally associated wit h members of the nobility. Finally, it is clear that he was
the mos t prolific, and one of the mos t influential, o f the foreign advisors on trade whom
Olivares gathered around him in the 1620s and that his tracts had an appreciable bearing on
the conception an d implementation of the Conde-Duque's mercantilis t projects.
APPENDIX
"Sobre atajar la entrada de lass mercaderías de reueldes en estos reynos " (1623) 56
Manuel Lópe z Pereir a e n prosignicio n de l o prometido diz e qu e l a maior fuerca de los

reinos comsiste en el común comercio de sus abitadores pue s mediante su contratación
engruesan su s caudales y se acresienta n lo s derechos de lo s prinsipes co n qu e s e hazen
poderosos y ricos no solo para defenssa y comservacion de sus prouincias sino para ofenca
de las contrarias de que tenemos espiriencia costosa e n los paizes rebeldes que siendo su
tierra ta n limitad a y breu e s e a n ech o poderoso s y conquistadore s po r medi o d e su s
frequentes contratos y negosiaciones en todas las partes que se conosen y supuesto que en
los prensipios se pudiera remedia r este dañ o no permitiendo que supiesen otra s qu e las
destos reinos escuzandose la s proibiciones pasadas, contodo oy están tan adelante con las
que tiene n entablada s qu e combien e lleva r otr o asuntt o precurand o enflaquese r sus
fuercas minorándoles l a parte que fuere posible de que resultara delibitar (s¿c)su poder y
compelerles po r nesesidad apresta r la obediencia a V.Magd. cuya es -
Los prensipales comercios que tienen los rebeldes son sinco el primero la negociación de
las partes setentrionales el segdo el de Levante, el tersero la sal que pertenden asentar en la
55 AGS Estad o 2847 . "Manuel López Pereira dize que l a esperiencia muestra que e l comercio, negociación y
trato de las Yndias ocsidentales se va cada dia deteriorando. . ." ; and ibid, consulta of the Junta de Comercio,
16 March 1624 .
56
This text is to be found unpaginated in AGS Estado 2847; I would like to record my thanks to the archivists at
Simancas for providing me with a photocopy of the complete text and for permission for it to be published as
well as for copies of the other Manuel López Pereira tracts dealing with aspects of the Dutch-Spanish conflict.
a) a
punta de raia, el quarto l a comp de la Yndia oriental, el quinto las comrespondencia s
despaña. D e lo s tres primeros se a tratado e n papel y descurso que se a dado sobre la
desposicion d e l a guerr a qu e s e deu e haze r a lo s dho s rebelde s mostrándos e com o
asistiendo l a armada d e galione s en lo s puertos d e dunquerque , ostende y en e l nuevo
descubiertob) le s inquietaran e infestara n todo s su s puertos y ynpidiran l a pesca d e los
arencones y demás negociaciones de l septentrión; y como el negó de la punta de raia se
enflaquesera y acabara con la sal que los galiones an de licuar despaña a los dichos puertos
para vendersse por quenta de V.Magd, y que el de Levante lo aran con muy grande riesgo y
costa respet o d e qu e a l a salid a d e su s yslas y pasar po r e l estrecho d e gibralta r and e
encontrar con dos armadas reales y los que se escaparen de la primera pereseran a manos
de l a segund a o po r l o meno s qu e dare n ta n detiriorada s su s fuercas qu e n o pederá n
consigir efecto considerable. Po r manera que resta tratar del quarto comercio de la yndia
oriental que tiene tratado particula r a que se remite y del ultimo que son las comrespon-
dencias despana sobr e que se dize lo siguiente.
El medio que se a tomado para quitárselas a sido la proibicion general echa contra los
dichos rebeldes de que no entren ellos ni sus mercederias en los puertos despana. Y como
es notorio oy se alian en ellos mas géneros suios que quando tenían premicion de meterlos
de modo qu e manifestament e surte efecto de la dha proibicion y se el asunto es que n o
entren combiene se procure otros diuersos caminos enderesados al consecución deste fin y
para que se puedan dar los que combienen sera ness ro ante todas cosas mostrar por menor
los prensipales géneros que se labran en todos los paizes del norte y lo originarios de cada
prouincia y los puertos qu e dellas mas frequentan l a negociación destos reino s para qu e
com partticular cuidado se venga en conosimiento de lo que se pertende qu e sera en esta
forma —
Alemania — los puertos qu e d e las prouincias de alemania mas frequentan l a negocia-
ción despana son los de dansich, lubeck y amburgo y de todos ellos el prensipal es el de la
siudad de amburgo por estar mas propinco a este mar océano y porque abunda de cantidad
de mercaderes ricos y poderosos que con sus comercios y entiligencias an traido a ella todas
las manifaturas d e las demás prouincias de alemania. De los dichos puertos lo prensipal
que s e trae de dansich y lubeck es el trigo y de amburgo vienen las manifeturas seg tes — la
sera, cobre, azero de toda suerte, estulins, bocasíes , lenseria por nombre aneag e grega
cruda y curada, paño de amburgo, mitones, fustanes, plomo, lino de toda suerte, coxillos
que llaman camiseros, clavos de hierro, escritorios, y toda suerte de latón labrado y otras
menudencias d e poc a ymportanci a conossida s po r manifetura s daquella s partte s d e
alemania.
Paizes rebeldes - d e las dichas prouincias rebeldes los prensipales puertos que comer-
ciavan co n espan a era n lo s d e oland a y gelanda c) y ante s d e la s guerra s n o tenia n
manifecturas de ymporíancia lo prensipal en que se ocupavan eran en sus pescarías mateca
a That is, "Punta de Araya", the great salt-pa n in the Caribbean o n the coast of Venezuela .
b Presumably, Lópe z Pereira means Nieuwpoort .
c "Gelanda" was the usua l Spanis h for m fo r Zeeland .
y quezos tanbien fabricavan algunas olandasd) en leiden sarges que llama n dallave y com
ello venía n a esto s reino s traiend o juntamente el trig o cobre y sera qu e adqueria n d e
alemania. Despué s d e la s dha s gerra s s e le s passaron mucha s naciones co n la s quale s
yntroduzieron todas las manifeturas y géneros de las prouincias de alemania y otros reinos
que lo an senttido arto en sus comrespondencias. Labran oy los dichos rebeldes las olandas
cambrai, telillas de toda suerte, tapesarias, sarges de leiden, sarges de señoría, catalufase)
de lana, telas de lino y algodón mesclado, picotes0 de lana, selicios*', transaderash>, puntas
blancas y d e colores , pano s qu e llama n gingaos, poluo s asules , terciopeles' * de sed a y
contraechos d e tripa, media s de lana, hilo de toda suert e y colores, bomasines,^ y otros
géneros de poca ymportancia. Demás de los referidos traen a estos reinos todos los géneros
de amburgo y las baetas de ymgalaterra que llevan a teñir en sus prouincias por que no es
buena la tinta negra del dicho reino. Tanbien meten las espesiarias y panos de algodón que
traen d e l a yndia oriental d e mod o questodo la s dichas manifeturas e géneros se an d e
proibir que no entren en estos reino s como se dirá adelante -
Paizes obedientes - lo s puertos de los paizes obedientes que negocian con espana es el
de dunquerqua y ostende que oy están serrados y se paso el comercio a cales de francia que
es el mas propinco a los dichos paizes obedientes, en los quales se fabrican todos los dichos
géneros que vienen de los rebeldes y son tan paresidos unos a ottros que defecultosamente
sse pueden destingir. A este puerto de Cales como tanbien les hes propicio a los rebeldes p
la pa z qu e tiene n co n el re y cristianisimo traen su s manifeturas y vienen a estos reinos
mesclados co n las fabricadas en lo s estados obediente s co n que le s hes muy fácil trans -
portarlas a ellos para cuyo remedio se apuntara lo nessrio.
Reino de francia - lo s puertos de francia mas ymportantes que tienen conrespondencia
con estos reinos son el de cales referido, rúan, sámalo, nantes, bordeaux, rochela y san
yuan da luz y por todos estos precuran meter los olandeses sus manifeturas y el prensipal
por donde entra mas cantidad es el de san yuan da luz q como comfina con espana las meten
p tierra con mucha facilidad. Son los ruendes,k) creas nabales," bramantes,™' bunes lanas,
puntas y otros géneros d e lemseria conosidos p daquel reino de francia .
" "holanda " i s given in the eighteenth-centur y Diccionario de Autoridades of the Rea l Academi a Española
(reprinted in 3 vols Madrid, 1969) as a "tela de lienzo mui fina"; see also J. Coraminas, Diccionario crítico de
la lengua castellana ( 4 vols. Madrid, 1954) which likewis e gives "holanda" as a "lienzo fino" .
c
Ter m deriving from th e Italia n cataluffa denotin g a woollen cloth worked to resemble plush or velvet which
was originally manufactured i n Venice.
' Accordin g to Corominas, picote (from th e French picot) was a "tela áspera y basta probablemente derivado
de picar porque es tan áspera que pica al tocarla".
s "selicios" , presumably cilicio given in the Diccionario de Autoridades as a "vestidura corta, texida de cerda,
por cuy a aspereza la usan immediate al cuerpo las personas penitentes".
h
Tha t is tranzadera given in the Diccionario de Autoridades as a "lazo que se forma trenzando alguna cuerda.
' "terciopelos" : Martí n Alonso, in his Enciclopedia de l Idioma (3 vols. Madrid. 1958) gives terciopelo as "tela
velluda y tupida de seda , formada po r do s urdimbres y una trama " and also imitations made from inferio r
materials.
i "Bombasines" : a type of sil k cloth of Italia n origin.
k
"Ruanes" : Normand y linens.
1
Tha t is , nava l canvas.
m
Coromina s gives bramante as an alternative to brabante or "clas e d e lienzo fabricado en dicha provincia".
Reino de Ymgalaterra - lo s puertos que negocian deste reino de Ymgalaterra con estos
reinos el prensipal es el de la suidad de londres. Por este entra tanbien mucha canttidad de
manifeturas de los rebeldes, las originarias que se fabrican en el son las baetasn) blancas,
cariseas,o) tod a suert e d e prepetuanes,P > arge s ympriales,'' ' pano s d e londres , pano s d e
bristol, panos redin,r) panos sofocas, 5' cordélales,' ' baetas angostas de colores, tamaletes ,
bresuates, frisas, media s de lana, estaño, toda s mercaderías conosidas por daquel reino.
Por manera que coniforme a los géneros de cada prouincia solamente los que vienen de
amburgo y los que se fabrican en los paizes obedientes pueden uenir de los rebeldes y traer
las armas y sertificaciones de que son echos y fabricados en las dichas partes por que como
se a mostrado lo s de franci a y ynglaterra no tiene n semilitud con los demás y son buen
conosidos y para qu e s e pueda aplica r el remedio que combiene e evitar en gran p te los
engaños y motious que por este camino hazen los rebeldes para meter en estos reinos sus
manifeturas se a de mandar publicar lo seguiente - qu e ningunas de las manifeturas de
amburgo aunque traigan la s armas de la dicha siudad puedan ueni r a espana por vía de
francia y ingalaterra sino derechamentte y que las que vinieren por sy solas o mescladas con
las demás manifeturas de los dichos reino s sean comfiscada s por que es imdubbitable q
todas las dichas manifeturas de amburgo y alemania que uienen p las uias referidas son de
olandezes o compradas en los dichos paizes rebeldes y se uerifica esta uerdad con que se
fueran pertenecientes a los moradores de amburgo o compratas en la dicha suidad no las
nauegaran po r la s dicho s reino s sin o derechamentt e e n su s nao s pue s la s tiene n e n
abundancia y con mas comodidad y menos costa podrían uenir en ellas.
Juntamente se a de publicar que ningunas de las manifeturas d e los paizes obediente s
puedan ueni r po r ningú n puert o de yngalaterr a ni francia salu o por e l de cales ast a s e
entable l o prepuest o sobr e l a armad a qu e a d e asesti r e n lo s puerto s referido s qu e
estandolo se escuzara pues uendran por ellos. Y esto p respecto de que todas las que vienen
por fuera del dicho puerto de cales son echas em los paizes rebeldes los quales las meten en
estos reinos por la s dichas uias de francia y imgalaterra con nombre de fabricadas en los
obedientes y por qu e s e podrían ayunta r en este puertto de cales las mercaderías de los
rebeldes com o est a referid o y demesclarss e una s co n otra s aueri a comfucio n po r l a
similitud omnímoda que entre sy tienen se mandara que sean obligados los mercanderes de
los paizes obedientes a traer sertificacion de los cabildos y regimientos de las uillas donde
n The Spanis h bayeta presumabl y derives fro m th e Frenc h baiette but it is used i n the seventeenth century to
refer t o English "bays".
o Coriseas: this is the Spanish fo r the Englis h kerseys, a type of "new drapery " the name for which seemingly
derives from th e villag e of Kersey in Suffolk .
P The Oxford English Dictionary gives perpetuaría as a "durable, wool fabric manufactured in England since
the sixteent h century" .
q According to the Diccionario de Autoridades "ha i sarg a imperial y de Ingleterra, cuyos apellidos toman de la
parte d e donde vienen" bu t thi s would not seem t o fit in this instance.
r Presumably "cloth of Reading" .
s Panos sofocas: tha t is cloth of Suffolk .
t Cordellale: th e Diccionario d e Autoridades describe s thi s a s a "ciert o gener o d e pañ o delgad o com o
estameña. Llamóse assi por e! cordoncillo que hace la trama.
se labran y de la cantidad que cada persona manifesta y con la dicha sertificacion se otorge
reguistro en el puerto de cales o en la parte que paresiere mejor serca del dicho puerto que
como se a plac a d e lo s paizes obediente s y p dond e a n d e pasa r la s dichas mercadería s
bastara d e modo que en qualquiera de las dichas ptes a de assestir una persona comfidente
nombrada p su alteza e n brusela s que tom e relación de l reguistr o y sertificaciones y las
remita por tierra y mar a los administradores de las aduanas de los puertos donde hizieren
los navios su derecha descarg a d e que resultara cobrar po r imter o U Magd sus derecho s
reales y sera de gran comodidad y vtilidad a los obedientes por que ellos solos vendrán a
estos reino s co n su s mercaderia s y enrequesera n y podran mayo r serui r a U Mag d y
auiendo ma l despach o y salida d e la s manifetura s d e lo s rebelde s todo s lo s oficiale s y
manifetores se ausentaran de los dichos estados y se pasaran a los obedientes co m que se
hiran acabando su s fuercas.
Y para que esto se execute en las aduanas se dará memoria a los administradores de las
de mar y tierra destos reinos de los géneros de los estados rebeldes para que uesiten y abran
todas las pacas de mercaderias de los reinos referidos y aliando en ella algunos de los dichos
géneros d e los rebeldes lo s tomen por perdidos si n despensacion algun a aunque traigan
sertificacion d e que son labrados en los obedientes y en amburgo y asymismo que tome n
por perdido s todo s los demás que vinieren enpacados con ellos.
Y por que las baetas blancas se fabrican en yngalaterra y com queda dicho se transporten
a olanda para se teñir de negro y vienen por el dicho reino se a de publicar que no puedan
entrar en estos reinos baetas negras y que todas las que vinieren aunque traigan sertifica-
cion de que son tenidas en yngalaterra serán confiscadas por que se suelen dar alli y entran
muchos p e l dich o respect o y pues a lo s moradores de l dich o reino s e les permite qu e
puedan traer las dichas baetas blancas no se les haze agrauio y aqua se podran teñir (como
se haz e e n Sevilla ) y s e entroduzira n las tintura s caso bie n important e po r mucho s
respectos q se dexan bien considerar.
Asymismo se mande que todos los géneros de drogas y paños de la yndia oriental que se
truxeren de las partes del septentrión se tomen por perdidos por ser daquella conquista y
pertenecientes a esta corona con que se escuzaran las grandes cantidades que los olandezes
y inglezes meten en estos reinos que e s causa de sustentar los dhos comercios.
Y par a qu e s e pued a co m distinció n poner e n efect o tod o l o referid o s e mandar a
despachar todas las pacas y mercaderias que ubiere en las pacas aduanas y vinieren a ellas
tres meses dispues de la publicación deste bando y proibicion y no alegen ynorancia ni se
mesclen la s mercaderías antiguas con las proibidas de nueuo.
Y qu e e n la s aduana s aj a aposento s separado s dond e s e pongan y guarden la s mer-
caderias que entraren de cada uno de los dhos reinos para que com mas facilidad a la vista
se conosquan los géneros de primicion o priobidos y tanbien sera de consideración que se
tenga quenta con lo que entr a de cada prouincia y de l o que sal e p a cada un a della s por
cargo y descargo que es de muy gran consideración sabersse para todas ocaziones y pa otras
dependencias de materia destado qu e pueden suseder.
Y aunque paresse que coniforme lo apuntado se podra consigir y dañar en gran parte los
negocios y tratos de los abitantes de los dichos paizes rebeldes por que se les quita las
ocaziones y motiuous que tomaua n para negocia r en esto s reino s s e aduiert e qu e tod o
comsiste e n pone r e n las aduanas personas d e buena comsiencia y berdad po r qu e poc o
aprovecha preueni r si la qu e l o a d e executa r no mir a a otr a coss a qu e a s u prouech o
particular de que se vertía11' asegir que en lugar de se proibir lo que se pertende recambiara
todo en benef 0 de los comtrarios que sin pagar derechos metran sus mercaderías y harán
maiores ganancias como sosedia en tienpo de los 30 p 100 que ni pagauan el dicho derecho
ni los demás.
Y porque podra ser que no se pueda remediar este incobeniente paresse que auiendose
de segir sera menor premetir que puedan entrar libremente en sus proprias naos y pa que
no paresse a qu e ser a hi r contr a l a reputació n y mostra r flaqueza , consentiendolo , s e
preponderan medio s con que, haziendose, s e remedie y alcanse muy maiores vtilidades
que ueniendo las dichas manifeturas de los rebeldes como oy vienen sin se poder remediar
con lo apuntado en este papel .
u "Se verna": a colloquialism for "se vendra".

10
OLIVARES AND THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE SPANISH INDIES, 1621-164 3
It i s strikin g tha t a goo d dea l o f recen t commen t abou t th e lif e an d

achievements o f th e Cond e Duqu e d e Olivares , stimulate d b y th e
publication o f John Elliott' s masterl y and imposing volum e Th e Count-
Duke of Olivares, has tended to emphasize th e great Spanis h statesman' s
limitations an d failures . Severa l o f th e reviewer s hav e take n th e
opportunity t o underlin e wha t the y regar d a s Olivares ' basi c lack o f
originality an d his general ineffectiveness. What after al l was the lasting
impact of his policies? The view is rapidly gaining currency that not only
did Olivares' policies for Spai n and its empire not diffe r markedl y fro m
those of earlier Spanish statesmen but that by and large the results of his
manifold endeavours were both few and modest. 'A s a reformer', one of
the mos t authoritativ e of the reviewers summe d i t up, 'Olivare s wa s a
failure'.1 Ye t before such conclusions - whic h John Elliott himsel f was
reluctant to draw - harde n into a new orthodoxy, i t is necessary to ask
whether th e Cond e Duque' s impac t ha s reall y ye t bee n sufficientl y
explored. Olivare s bein g a herculea n figur e a t th e hel m o f a worl d
empire, facin g problem s an d involved i n initiatives which spanne d the
globe, i t i s not t o b e expected tha t an y singl e volume shoul d ente r i n
detail into all of his vast concerns and we must establish whether thos e
dimensions o f hi s activit y whic h hav e hithert o no t receive d a s much
attention a s they might possibly deserve, d o not yield evidence for very
different conclusions . Certainl y on e aspec t o f th e Cond e Duque' s
statecraft whic h scarcel y figure s i n recen t wor k (an d stil l les s i n th e
reviews of John Elliott's masterpiece) but which, at least in my view, is of
far-reaching importanc e i s Olivares ' endurin g preoccupatio n wit h
Spain's American possessions. Fo r not only did Spanish America furnish
an appreciabl e proportio n o f th e resource s o n whic h th e Monarchy' s
continued greatnes s an d Olivares ' Europea n initiative s depende d bu t
Spain's America n dependencie s wer e als o directl y enmeshe d i n th e
political an d militar y conflict s whic h resulte d fro m hi s Europea n
statecraft.
1
Se e I.A.A. Thompson' s thought-provoking review in the English Historical Review
ciii (1988), 680 .
In contrast to the extensive coverage given to most aspects of Olivares'

political activity , Joh n Elliott , i n hi s Count-Duke o f Olivares say s
relatively little about his involvement with Spanish America. Almost the
only componen t o f Olivares ' wor k whic h i s presented a s having ha d
major consequence s fo r the Americas is his 'Union of Arms' projec t for
the Monarchy , an d even here the Ne w Worl d aspec t is dealt with onl y
very cursorily. 2 Elsewher e John Elliot t ha s show n tha t th e 'Unio n o f
Arms' episode was not th e only occasion during the Olivares era for the
introduction o f major new fisca l initiative s in the Spanish New World. 3
But thi s wide r phenomeno n need s t o b e looke d a t mor e closel y and,
above all , place d in th e broader contex t o f the Cond e Duque's overal l
impact on the Spanish Indies.
Historians hav e tende d t o assum e tha t Olivare s di d no t personall y
supervise or concern himsel f with th e government o f the Spanish Ne w
World. Describin g Olivares ' appointmen t a s Grand Chancello r o f th e
Indies, i n Jul y 1623 , Joh n Elliot t consider s th e pos t essentiall y a
perquisite, a n honou r bestowe d ou t o f regar d fo r achievement s
unconnected wit h the government o f the Spanish Indies: 'althoug h th e
Grand Chancellorship carrie d with it a seat in the Council of the Indies',
he writes, Olivares, 'doe s not seem to have attended its sessions and there
is n o sig n i n hi s survivin g paper s o f persona l interventio n i n th e
government o f th e America n viceroyalties'. 4 Th e impressio n give n i s
that the government o f the Spanish Indies was left 'o n automatic' during
the Olivare s er a and remaine d largel y outsid e th e scop e o f th e Conde
Duque's grea t initiatives.
In what follow s th e reader will encounte r a very different view , on e
already largely formed in the late 1960s whilst I was researching for m y
book o n seventeenth-centur y Ne w Spain, 5 a view accordin g to whic h
Olivares inspire d an d activel y promote d a whole se t of wide-ranging ,
interlocking policie s whic h fundamentall y influence d th e genera l
development o f the Spanish New Worl d not only during the quarter of a
century o r s o followin g 162 1 bu t als o fo r decade s after . I n some
instances, thes e policie s amounte d t o a basi c chang e o f direction . I n
others Spain' s post-162 1 initiative s i n th e Ne w Worl d ca n rightl y b e
2
J.H . Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares. Th e Statesman in an Age o f Decline (Ne w
Haven, 1986) , 274 .
3
J.H . Elliott , 'Spai n an d America i n the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' , in Leslie
Bethell (ed.) Th e Cambridge History o f Latin America, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1984), 330, 332 ;
J.H. Elliott , 'Améric a y e l problem a d e l a decadenci a española' , Anuario d e Estudios
Americanos xxvii i (1971) , 1-23 ; se e als o Antoni o Domíngue z Ortiz , 'Lo s caudale s d e
Indias y la política exterio r d e Felipe 'IV', Anuario de Estudios Americanos xiii (1956), 318 -
21, 378-9.
4
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares, 156 .
5
J.I . Israel , Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico 16W-1670 (Oxford , 1975) , 135- 6
et seq.
Olivares an d the Spanish Indies 26 7
classified a s a continuatio n o f th e tradition s o f previou s Spanis h

government i n America. Bu t eve n in the latter case they wer e adopte d
with a determination and in a concerted way which were essentially new.
Nor wer e thes e wide-ranging, Ne w Worl d initiative s incidental to the
Conde Duque's principa l goals in Europe. Rather , his American policies,
for tha t i s wha t the y were , spran g directl y from , an d wer e closel y
connected with , hi s main undertakings in Spain and Europe.
Firstly ther e wa s th e sustaine d fisca l drive . Thi s ha d n o paralle l in
intensity o r scope in any other perio d of the history o f Spanish Americ a
under the Habsburgs. It did have its parallel though in the simultaneous
fiscal programmes initiated by the Olivares regim e in Castile and also in
southern Italy and the Spanish Netherlands.6 This tax push in the Spanish
New Worl d commence d no t wit h th e 'Union of Arms' project , i n the
late 1620s, but with the accession of Philip IV, in April 1621, and arose in
the firs t instanc e from th e resumptio n o f wa r wit h th e Dutch. Withi n
days of the accessio n of the new king , a new vicero y bein g neede d fo r
New Spain , th e marqués de Gel ves, wh o ha d proved himsel f energeti c
and unyielding in the king's interest as viceroy of Aragón, was appointed
to th e post. O n arrivin g in Mexico, i n the autumn, h e set in motio n a
vigorous campaig n o f revisin g ta x register s an d crackin g dow n o n
administrative inefficienc y an d abuse. 7 N o les s promptl y a specia l
'visitor-general' arme d with sweepin g powers , wa s dispatched to Per u
to spur the new viceroy there on to comparable measures.8 The frui t o f
these effort s i n th e earl y 1620 s wa s a sudden an d spectacula r jump i n
silver remittance s t o th e crow n no t onl y fro m Ne w Spai n an d Peru ,
though thes e territorie s continue d t o provid e th e grea t bul k o f th e
resources whic h th e Spanis h crow n extracte d fro m it s Ne w Worl d
possessions, bu t als o fro m Ne w Granada , Centra l America , Bueno s
Aires and the islands of the Caribbean. 9 I n Peru the trend in remittances
to Spain during the six years down t o 1621 had been downwards an d by
1620 th e annua l tota l ha d sun k belo w on e millio n pesos . Bu t b y 162 2
Peru's annua l remittance had recovered t o 1,180,00 0 pesos and by 162 3
to 1,760,000, i n subsequent years the figure climbing still higher. In both
Peru an d Mexico muc h of the new money wa s obtained by revising the
alcabala assessments, some of the increases being quite hefty. Gelves , for
6
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares, 415, 438 , 447 ; J.I. Israel , Th e Dutch Republic and
the Hispanic World (Oxford , 1982 ) 222 , 297 .
7
Israel , Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 13 8
8
M.E . Rodrigue z Vincente , E l tribunal del Consulado de Lima en la primera mitad del sigh
XVII (Madrid , 1960) , 178 ; F . Muro Romero , 'L a reforma de l pacto colonia l e n Indias' ,
Jahrbuchjur Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft, un d Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas xix (1982) , 54 -
7.
9
Domíngue z Ortiz , 'Caudale s d e Indias' , 378-9 ; J.B . Rui z Rivera , 'Remesa s d e
caudales de l Nuevo Reino d e Granad a e n el siglo XVII' , Anuario d e Estudios Americanos
xxiv (1977) 13 , 30.
instance, raise d th e assessmen t fo r Zacateca s in 162 2 from four to nin e

thousand pesos yearly.
The 'Union of Arms' did, however , mark the onset of a new phase in
the build-u p o f fisca l pressur e i n th e Spanis h Ne w Worl d durin g th e
Olivares era . Th e 'Union ' wa s Olivares ' ow n persona l projec t and ,
following hi s partial success with i t in Aragón and Valencia in 1626, h e
was no mor e likel y t o neglect it s extension t o Spanis h America tha n to
the Italian possessions an d the 'loyal' Netherlands. I t may have been th e
Council o f th e Indie s whic h issue d th e instruction s t o th e America n
viceroys an d governor s requirin g th e impositio n o f ne w package s o f
taxation sufficien t t o rea p a furthe r 350,00 0 ducat s yearl y fro m th e
viceroyalty of Peru, including small amounts from New Granada , Chil e
and Buenos Aires, an d 250,000 ducats more yearly from New Spai n and
Central America. 10 But th e Council wa s merely followin g order s fro m
above and the policy which it sought to implement wa s that of the Conde
Duque. I t wa s no t th e Counci l whic h selecte d ne w viceroy s an d
governors and the fact that the new viceroy chosen in 1627 to impose th e
'Union' i n Peru wa s none othe r tha n th e conde d e Chinchón wh o th e
year before had worked with Olivares, a s treasurer-general of the crow n
of Aragó n i n securin g th e adoptio n o f th e 'Union ' i n Aragó n an d
Valencia speak s fo r itself. 11 I t i s clea r enoug h fro m wher e th e
introduction o f the 'Union of Arms' int o the Spanish Indies derived it s
essential impetus.
The new taxation raised under the terms of the 'Union of Arms' was ,
by definition , required for purposes of imperial defence. It was decide d
in Madrid that the money should be used to pay for new fighting galleons
in part for the main Spanish battle fleet, the armada del mar océano, based at
Cadiz, an d in par t fo r th e trans-Atlanti c flotas which saile d ou t t o th e
New Worl d each year and then back carrying the licensed, official trade .
Both fleets had now to be strengthened as a result of the increasing Dutch
challenge to Spanish sea-power, t o protect th e sea-lanes and trade and to
bolster confidenc e among th e merchant s an d financier s of Sevill e an d
Madrid.
The introduction of the 'Union of Arms' into the Spanish New World
required a major further administrativ e effort. I t was not enough just t o
send detaile d instructions explainin g th e purpose o f the scheme and the
general lines of the fiscal strategy to be adopted both in Mexico and Peru
and i n the various outlying area s - Ne w Granada , Venezuela, Buenos
10
J.L . Muquiz de Miguel, E l conde de Chinchón. Virrey de l Peru (Madrid, 1945) , 127-8;
R. Varga s Ugarte, Historia del Peru. Virreinato (Siglo XVII) (Bueno s Aires, 1954) , 224-8 ;
Israel, Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 178-80.
11
Fre d Bronner , 'L a Unió n d e la s Armas en e l Peru', Anuario de Estudios Americanos
xxiv (1967) , 1133-40.
Olivares and the Spanish Indies 26 9
Aires an d Centra l America. 12 Th e viceroy s an d governor s ha d t o b e

galvanized into action and there was opposition fro m the 'Spanish' tow n
councils of the New World to be overcome. Gelves' successor a s viceroy
of New Spain , th e marqués d e Cerralvo ha d to engage in a good deal of
arm-twisting before Mexico Cit y and Puebla de los Angeles, th e second
city o f Ne w Spain , agree d t o accep t a doublin g o f th e rat e a t whic h
alcabala was assessed from 2% t o 4% fro m 1632. 13 It was estimated that
this woul d rais e 200,00 0 ducat s yearly . Th e remainin g 50,00 0 ducat s
yearly was to be found through a combination of new excises. In Peru the
strategy adopted wa s broadly similar , th e alcabala rate being raised there
also t o 4 % a s fro m 1632 . Amon g th e ne w excise s introduce d i n th e
Spanish New Worl d durin g th e early and mid 1630s were several of the
new device s whic h Olivare s impose d o n Castil e wit h th e objec t o f
extracting mor e fro m thos e wh o coul d affor d t o pa y whils t no t
increasing further th e burden o n the poorer section s o f society, notabl y
the tax on the proceeds of office-holding, th e media anata, and papel sellado
(stamp duty), the duty on legal transactions. 14
The final phase of the Olivarist fisca l driv e in the Spanish Indies, tha t
of the late 1630s, wa s the result of the decision taken at Madrid to set up a
permanent standin g naval force statione d i n the Caribbea n t o be called
the armada d e Barlovento. Th e ide a a s such ha d bee n i n th e ai r since th e
beginning o f th e century . Bu t i t wa s onl y followin g th e Dutc h
occupation of Curasao (1634 ) and the entry of France into the war against
Spain (1635 ) tha t the political wil l an d resources wer e foun d to turn th e
concept int o reality . The impetus for this derived no t from the Counci l
of the Indies but fro m the highest level, i n effect fro m Olivares wh o o n
occasion personall y chaire d th e junta d e guerra d e Indias a s th e specia l
committee fo r determinin g Spain' s genera l strateg y i n th e Indie s wa s
called. Th e Counci l o f th e Indie s wa s directe d t o fin d 500,00 0 peso s
yearly i n Ne w Spain , Centra l Americ a an d th e Spanis h island s o f th e
Caribbean an d determin e th e arrangement s an d bases for the building ,
arming an d maintenance of fourteen heavy galleons. 15 Obviousl y mos t
of th e mone y fo r thi s woul d hav e t o com e fro m Ne w Spain . Bu t th e
crown wa s als o quit e seriou s abou t raisin g smalle r sum s i n Ne w
12
Archiv o Genera l de Indias (hereafter AGÍ), Audiencia de Santa Fe, ramo 3. Philip IV
to Donjuán d e Borja, presiden t o f the Audiencia of New Granad a at Bogatá, Madrid , 1 7
July 1627 ; Muzqui z d e Miguel, Conde de Chinchón, 128 .
13
R . Torre s Gaytá n (ed. ) Documentos relativos a l arrendamiento de l impuesto o renta de
alcabala d e la ciudad d e México y distritos circundantes (Méxic o City , 1945) , p.iv ; M . Gante s
Trellez, 'Aspecto s socio-económico s de Puebla d e los Angele s (1624-1650)' , Anuario de
Estudios Americanos xl (1983), 109 .
14
Rodrigue z Vincente , E l tribunal del Consulado de Lima, 180; Varga s Ugarte, Historia
del Perú, 224-9.
15
Israel , Race, Class and Politics, 193-8.
Granada, Cuba , an d Santo Domingo.16 The inevitable opposition o f the

cabildos of Mexico City and Puebla de los Angeles was overcome with the
usual mixtur e o f coaxing an d menaces . I t was promise d tha t not onl y
would th e armada be largely manned and supplied from New Spai n but
that a proportion o f its officers woul d be Mexican Creoles . T o fin d th e
money, Ne w Spai n was forced to swallow a further rise of 2% in the rate
at which alcabala was assessed. Puebla's assessmen t having been raised in
1632 from 25,000 to 50,000 pesos was now raised to the astronomic level
of 75,000 pesos. 17
A dramati c further escalatio n of fisca l pressur e in Mexico i n the late
1630s was achieved in theory but not in practice.18 The drive to raise this
additional revenue was undermined b y the economic depressio n whic h
had grippe d Mexic o eve r since the war wit h th e Dutch, and the rises in
royal revenue , ha d begun, i n 1621. However , elsewher e i n the Spanish
Indies th e increas e bot h i n revenu e an d i n remittance s to Spai n wa s
sustained right down to the end of the Olivares era. Despite the decline in
silver production i n Peru, the viceregal administration at Lima sent back
larger an d large r annua l remittance s t o Spain , reachin g a pea k o f
2,600,000 peso s i n 1642. 19 I n Ne w Granad a als o a stead y increas e in
remittances to Spain was sustained down to the early 1640s.20
Closely linke d to the sustained fiscal driv e was the Olivares regime' s
assault o n administrativ e corruption an d abuse . Durin g th e reig n o f
Philip H I (1598-1621) supervisio n o f th e administratio n i n th e Spanis h
New Worl d from Madrid had been lax and maladministration in Spanish
America wa s widel y hel d t o hav e grow n t o unprecedente d levels. 21
Confronting a not dissimilar challenge in Castile itself, Zúñiga, Olivare s
and their adherents set out t o attack the problem hea d on and 'create the
impression o f purificatio n and renewal'. 22 I t is true that the moralisti c
fervour o f th e openin g year s o f Phili p IV' s reig n di d no t last .
Nevertheless something o f the initial reforming zea l did persist in Spain
and th e Spanis h Netherland s dow n t o th e en d o f th e Olivare s era .
Historians migh t b e tempted t o dismis s Gelves ' puritanica l drive as an
16
AG Í Audiencia de México, legajo 31 , ramo 4. Marqués de Cadereita to Council o f
the Indies, Mexico City , 1 6 July 1636 .
17
Gante s Trellez, 'Aspectos socio-económicos de Puebla', 110-12 .
18
G . Garcí a (ed.) , Documentos inéditos o muy raros para l a historia d e México (3 6 vols .
México City , 1905-11 ) vii , 42-4 ; R . Boyer , 'Méxic o i n th e Seventeent h Century :
Transition of a Colonial Society', Hispanic American Historical Review Ivii (1977), 476; J.I.
Israel, 'The Seventeenth-centur y Crisis in New Spain : Myth or Reality?', Past and Present
xcvii (November 1982), 153 .
19
C . Bancora , 'Las remesas de metales preciosas desde Callao a España en la primera
mitad del siglo XVII', Revista de Indias xi x (1959) , 69-70.
20
Rui z Rivera, 'Remesas' , 13.
21
AG Í Audiencia de México, legaj o 29, ramo 4. Marqués de Gelves to Council of the
Indies, Mexico City, 1 4 November 1621 ; Israel, Race, Class and Politics, 35-6 .
22
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke of Olivares, 103-15.
exception altogethe r untypica l of Spanis h American administratio n i n

the age of Olivares. Bu t in my view it is more convincing to see it as part,
albeit an extreme instance, of a wider refor m programme inspired from
Madrid and affecting mor e or less the whole of the Spanish Indies. Given
that so much depended on the success of the crown's effort s t o boost its
American revenues, there is no reason to suppose that the crown was less
serious abou t tacklin g maladministratio n i n Americ a tha n i t wa s i n
Castile or the Spanish Netherlands .
The metho d whic h th e crown , throug h th e Counci l o f the Indies ,
employed to tighten its grip on Spanish America administratively as well
as militarily in the wake of the resumption of global war with the Dutch,
in 1621 , wa s t o fil l ke y post s i n th e Indie s wit h highl y experience d
soldiers characterised by a high sense of responsibility. Clearl y there was
a conscious effort t o find such men. Th e first governor o f Buenos Aire s
appointed under the new regime, Don Francisc o de Céspedes (1623-31 )
was a Flanders veteran who significantl y strengthened th e defences and
launched a n energeti c crack-dow n o n bureaucrati c peculatio n an d
customs fraud. 23 His successor , Pedro Esteban Dávila , als o a Flanders
veteran, showe d simila r vigou r bot h a s a soldie r an d a s a reforme r
earning the unusual reputation of being 'incorruptible'. T o help raise the
general level, the Council o f the Indies over the next two decade s sent a
succession o f visitadores t o investigat e and suppress maladministration ,
especially practice s ap t t o sypho n of f resource s fro m governmen t
coffers.24 On e o f thes e visitadores, Do n Pedr o d e Quiroga , expire d o f
fever whils t investigatin g bureaucratic fraud a t Acapulco in 1637 . Th e
most famou s was Don Juan de Palafox wh o wa s sent to New Spai n as
visitador general, armed with sweeping powers to initiate reform in every
sphere o f Mexica n administration , i n 1640. 25 I t i s wort h notin g tha t
Palafox wa s a highly ideological, as well a s fervent, moralis t who sa w
himself as an znu-politique political philosopher as well as man o f action,
with a mission to refute Machiavelli and Bodin and forge a truly Catholic
philosophy ofraison e'état based on the idea that moral reform is the key
to politica l efficacy. 26 Palafox , furthermore , wa s unquestionabl y a n
Olivares man. An Aragonese who first showed his zeal for royal service
in Olivares ' presenc e at th e Aragones e Cortes o f 1626 , h e ha d bee n
summoned t o Madrid , an d advance d to a sea t o n th e Counci l o f th e
Indies, by the conde Duque and the latter's brother-in-law, th e Conde de
Monterrey.27 An Aragonese, a puritan, and an expert on the government
23
R . Tiscornia , L a política económica rioplatense a mediados de l siglo XVIH (Bueno s
Aires, 1983) , 23-4, 30-1 , 37-8 .
24
Israel , Race, Class and Politics, 170-6, 191-3, 200-1.
25
Israel , Race, Class and Politics, 170-6, 191-3 , 200-1 .
26
F . Sánchez-Castañer, Donjuán d e Palafox. Virrey d e Nueva España (Zaragoza 1964 )
20-2.
27
Jua n de Palafox y Mendoza, Obras (12 vols. Madrid, 1762 ) i, 293 .
of the Indies, Palafox was an exceptionally highly motivated personalit y

dedicated to the moral and political regeneration of the Monarchy.
The fisca l an d refor m programme s wer e designe d t o extrac t mor e
resources for the crown. Bot h wer e bound to provide opposition just as
they di d i n th e Spanis h Netherland s an d Spain' s othe r Europea n
possessions. Olivare s kne w thi s an d ha d littl e choic e bu t t o concer n
himself wit h th e obstructio n an d resistanc e to th e America n policie s
which aros e fro m hi s Europea n statecraft . Broa d issue s affectin g th e
Monarchy a s a whol e wer e involve d whic h coul d no t simpl y b e
delegated to the bureaucrats of the Council of the Indies. Gelves' reforms
in Mexico precipitate d a storm of opposition, culminatin g in the riots in
Mexico Cit y o f 1 5 January 1624 when th e mo b storme d th e viceregal
palace an d overthre w th e viceroy. 28 This was a setback with wid e an d
menacing implications, a n example which the crown could not affor d t o
allow t o b e set . Th e new s provoke d consternatio n a t Madrid . Whe n
Gelves' principa l adversary, Archbishop Pérez d e la Serna, returned t o
Spain to try to justify hi s own opposition , an d that of the judges of the
audiencia of Mexico, he was conveyed directly to the Conde Duqu e wh o
questioned hi m a t considerable length on what had transpired, carefull y
dissimulating hi s ow n opinio n o f th e archbishop' s role. 29 Th e Cond e
Duque als o pondere d lon g an d har d befor e choosin g a s successo r t o
Gelves a man wh o ha d recentl y proven hi s competence an d astuteness
implementing th e roya l embarg o agains t th e Dutc h i n th e real m o f
Galicia, th e marqués de Cerralvo. Cerralv o succeeded in restoring quiet
in New Spain . But much of the previous tension remained and Olivares
continued t o kee p a n ey e o n wha t potentiall y wa s a troublesom e
situation. Hi s worrie s ove r th e continue d rumbling s i n Mexic o ar e
reflected i n the voto which h e delivered to the junta de estado in Madrid in
February 1631 , followin g report s of a worsening o f the feud whic h ha d
developed betwee n Cerralv o an d th e ne w archbisho p o f Mexico ,
Francisco d e Mans o y Zúñiga . Olivare s urge d th e junt a tha t th e
principles o f buen govierno require d th e immediat e remova l o f
Archbishop Manso from New Spai n irrespective of whether it was he or
the vicero y wh o wa s a t faul t ove r th e jurisdictiona l issue s unde r
dispute.30 I t is significant tha t Olivares based his fears tha t the situation
might be a threat to the stability of the viceroy ál ty on his recollections of
28
Ros a Feijoo, 'E l tumult o d e 1624', Historia Mexicana xi v (1964), 42-70; Israel Race,
Class and Politics, 136-60.
29
AG Í Patronato Real, legajo 223, ram o 1. Archishop Pérez de la Serna to audiencia of
Mexico, Madrid , 22 June 1624 .
30
Archiv o General de Simancas, Estado 2649. consult a of the junta de estado, Madrid,
21 February 1631, fo.l v . 'voto del conde duque de Olivares'; this consulta was in response
to a consulta of the Council of the Indies of 18 February 1631 calling the king's attention to
the potentially dangerou s situatio n in Mexico, se e AGÍ Audiencia de México, legaj o 3,
ramo 4, exp. 140 .
the trouble s o f 1624 , remindin g hi s colleague s o f 'l o qu e pas o co n el

marques de Gelves y el arzobispo pasado, dividiéndose la audiencia en los
dos partes'.
Besides demanding the removal of Archbishop Manso - a royal cédula
ordering th e latter's recal l was issued soo n afte r - Olivare s urge d th e
adoption o f a mor e calculate d strateg y t o contro l th e judges o f th e
audiencia of Mexico :
El escarmentar a los de la audiencia no es lo que meno s import a ass i para el

reparo d e l o presente , com o par a qu e e n adelant e n o suceda n semejantes
inconvenientes. Po r esto es el Conde Duque de parezer que se les reprehenda
el dividirse y abanderizarse, y no esta r muy pendiente s siempr e del virrey,
pues esta es su obligación preciss a y no hazerse de la parte de los arzobispos,
daño que conviene repararlo eficazmente sirviéndose Vuestra Magestad que a
los que manifiestament e se huviesen mostrado parciale s del arcobispo s e les
mude a plazas que no sea n ventaxosas de las que tienen, conqu e este punto
quedara reprimido y prevenido como conviene. 31
The junta and the king adopted Olivares' advice on the audiencia judges
as they did on the archbishop. Orders wer e sent out recalling one of the
anti-Cerralvo judges of the audiencia of Mexico to Spain and transferring
two mor e to other posts in South America .
Extracting mor e resources , reformin g th e colonial bureaucracy , and
forestalling loca l oppositio n i n Spanis h Americ a wer e objective s
inherently linke d t o the interest of the wider Monarch y a s a whole. Bu t
there were also other Olivarist objectives in the Indies which were no less
closely linked to the dynamic of the Conde Duque's statecraf t in Europe.
One of Olivares' central preoccupations was with the economic declin e
of Castil e an d thi s worryin g phenomeno n wa s see n t o b e inseparably
linked t o th e growing difficultie s o f the Spanish monopoly traffi c wit h
the America n dependencies . No t onl y di d Olivare s sho w a 'deep an d
continuing preoccupation with the fortunes of Spain's American trade' 32
but his proposed remedie s fo r its ills were fundamentally mercantilist in
character, requirin g a hig h degre e o f governmen t interventio n an d
control. Th e essenc e o f Olivares ' answe r t o th e economi c declin e o f
Spain was t o strengthen the monopol y traffi c throug h a programme o f
state action designed t o curb fraud, contraband , and foreign penetration,
while a t th e sam e tim e establishin g a paralle l organisatio n calle d th e
Almirantazgo which was also based at Seville and which was intended to
ply a heavily-defended convo y traffi c wit h Flander s and th e Hanseatic
towns, by-passing the Dutch entrepot. The latter monopoly syste m was
intended t o suppl y th e Balti c timbe r an d nava l store s a s wel l a s th e
31
AC S Estad o 2469 consulta 21 February 1631 , fo.2 .
32
Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares, 156.
Flemish textile s withou t whic h a Spanis h monopol y trad e t o th e

Americas coul d no t function. 33 A s a convo y syste m th e Almirantazgo
failed. Bu t thi s institution did develop into a highly effective Inquisitio n
of trade which cut out most of the flow of Dutch, and later also of French,
consignments t o Castile , laying the basi s for a northern traffi c service d
by th e Hanseatic s and , afte r 1630 , als o b y th e English . I t wa s thi s
controlled northern trade which linked up in Seville and its outports with
Spain's monopoly America n traffic .
The Spanis h America trad e was checked, taxe d and regulated b y the
body known a s the Casa de Contratación long established at Seville. In the
view o f th e Casa d e Contratación an d th e principa l Indie s merchants,
Spain's monopoly traffic with the New Worl d was being eroded by four
main factors. 34 Firstl y ther e wer e th e irregularitie s and frau d i n th e
registration and checking of goods passing on the official trans-Atlanti c
convoys themselves . Secondly , ther e wa s (sinc e th e 1580s ) th e
contraband route plied chiefl y by Portuguese New Christia n merchants
- vi a Brazil and Buenos Aires and up the River Plate - t o Potosí from
where unregistered silver was being smuggled back via Buenos Aires to
Brazil an d Portugal . Thirdly , ther e wa s anothe r Portugues e Ne w
Christian contraban d syste m base d o n th e license d Portugues e slav e
ships which were permitted to sail direct from Africa to Spanish America
and which , i n theory , brough t onl y slave s bu t which , i n practice ,
brought othe r merchandis e a s well. Finally , ther e wa s a n appreciable
seepage o f bot h Peruvia n an d Mexica n silver , vi a Acapulco , o n th e
Manila galleons to the Philippines where the bullion was sold to Chinese
and Portugues e merchant s in exchange for Chines e silk s and other Far
Eastern products . Ther e wa s not , i t i s wort h noting , an y significant
Dutch contraband traffic with Spanish America at this time even after th e
West India Company occupie d Curasao in 1634. 35 The period of major
Dutch penetratio n o f th e Spanis h America n marke t bega n onl y afte r
1647. Spanis h mercantilism in th e Indie s in th e ag e of Olivares wa s in
essence a bureaucratic drive to close the four loop-holes i n the hope that
success woul d restor e th e officia l monopol y traffi c t o healt h an d
prosperity and that this, in turn, would help revive the Spanish domestic
economy.
The Cond e Duque took a keen personal interest in the investigations
33
J.I . Israel , Th e Dutch Republic an d the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford, 1982) ,
205-9, 285-6.
34
Pierr e and Huguette Chaunu , Seville et I'Atlantique, 1504-1650 ( 8 vols. Paris, 1955 -
60) viii, bk.2 , pt.2 , pp . 1523-60; Israel , Race, Class an d Politics, 99-102; Enriqueta Vil a
Vilar, 'La s ferias d e Portobelo', Anuario de Estudios Americanos xxxix (1982) , 32-4 .
35
S . van Brakel, 'Bescheide n ove r den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie' ,
Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek i v (1918) , 49-50 ; W.R. Menkman , D e Nederlanders i n het
Caraïbische zeegebied (Amsterdam , 1942), 44-5 .
into fraudulen t registratio n o f good s a t Seville. 36 Despit e al l the usua l

difficulties attendin g suc h initiative s in th e earl y moder n context , th e
crown di d manag e t o pu t th e Indie s merchant s unde r considerabl e
pressure and, in January 1627, at a time of desperate financial emergency,
the merchant s prove d willin g t o di g dee p int o thei r pocket s t o pa y a
206,000 ducat indemnity i n return for having the enquiries temporarily
suspended.37 Afte r 162 7 Olivares continue d with a mixture of sporadic
investigations combine d wit h th e indemnities and forced loans.
The crow n als o too k measure s to rectif y th e situatio n o n th e Rive r
Plate. Althoug h th e decisio n t o establis h bette r safeguard s a t Bueno s
Aires and a puerto seco (dry port) to act as a barrier at Córdoba, i n what is
today north-wester n Argentina , wa s take n som e year s earlier ,
enforcement o f the new measures , and the breaking o f the River Plate
contraband system , too k plac e i n th e year s 1621-4. 38 Tha t ther e wa s
actually a marked fallin g of f in th e flo w o f contraban d traffi c betwee n
Potosí and Brazil via the River Plate is not in dispute.39 It would probably
be a mistake , though , t o attribut e th e whol e o f thi s effec t t o th e
endeavours of Spanish bureaucrats at Buenos Aires and Córdoba. Part of
it mus t certainl y hav e bee n du e t o th e Dutc h Wes t Indi a Company's
vigorous campaig n i n th e Sout h Atlantic ; for th e Company' s raidin g
parties captured vast quantities of Portuguese shipping ove r the quarter
of a century following the resumption of the Dutch-Spanish war in 1621.
Ironically enough this worked t o the advantage of Olivares' mercantilist
system; fo r i t rendere d th e officia l trans-Atlanti c flotas sailing fro m
Seville under heav y guard safer an d therefore, despite the heavy cost o f
using them , mor e attractiv e to th e Castilia n an d Portugues e busines s
elites than the traffic to, an d via, Brazil.
With respec t t o th e Pacifi c commerc e th e crow n resorte d t o muc h
more drastic measures during the Olivares era than it had in the past. The
coastal traffi c betwee n Per u an d th e Pacifi c coas t o f Mexic o wa s
deliberately suppresse d in the interests of the Monarchy as a whole. After
several earlie r measures cutting it back , Phili p IV , i n Novembe r 1634 ,
issued a decree completely forbiddin g this commerce in an effort t o halt
the percolation of Peruvian bullion to the Far East on the Manila galleons
and th e swampin g o f th e Peruvia n textil e marke t wit h Chines e silk s
shipped from Manila via Acapulco.40 This uncompromisin g exercis e in
mercantilist economic managemen t met wit h bitter resistanc e from the
36
Vil a Vilar, 'Ferias de Portobelo', 34.
37
Ibid., 55-8; Elliott , Th e Count-Duke o f Olivares, 157-8.
38
Tiscornia , 'Polític a económic a rioplatense' , 21-4, 305 ; Mur o Romero, 'L a reforma
del pacto colonial e n Indias', 54-5 .
39
Tiscornia , loc . cit. ; A.P . Canabra\a , O Comercio portugués n o Ri o d a Praia (Sa o
Paulo, 1944) , 143-9 .
40
Israel , Race, Class and Politics, 100-2 , 196-7 .
city councils of Mexico Cit y and Puebla de los Angeles.41 Bu t the crown,
strongly backe d b y th e Casa an d th e Indie s merchant s a t Seville ,
remained adamant . It is doubtless true that the bureaucratic controls set
up to enforce the prohibition wer e to some extent by-passed. Ther e now
arose a busy contraban d traffi c betwee n Per u an d a number o f ports o n
the Pacifi c coas t o f Centra l America , especiall y Realejo, i n Nicaragua,
from wher e bullio n an d Peruvian win e - th e importing o f which int o
New Spai n th e governmen t ha d previousl y banne d i n orde r t o boos t
exports of Andalusian wine - wer e transported by mule train to Mexico
City.42 Even so there are plentiful signs that the policy nevertheless had a
considerable effect . Th e Mexic o Cit y an d Puebl a cit y council s
complained incessantl y about the prohibition whic h for some years was
the number on e Mexican grievanc e against royal policy .
A ke y featur e o f th e Spanis h mercantilis t programm e i n th e Ne w
World a t th e outse t o f th e Olivare s era , albei t a phenomeno n whic h
cannot b e calle d Olivarist , wa s th e driv e t o suppres s th e commercia l
activity of the Portuguese Ne w Christians . I n the years around 162 1 the
Portuguese residen t in Castile and Spanish America still played little part
in th e officia l Indie s trade . Thei r speciality , a s Amsterdam merchant s
realised as earl y as the 1590s , was contraban d and the evasio n of the
crown's controls . Thos e i n th e Ne w Worl d wer e generall y illega l
immigrants havin g i n many cases arrived i n the Spanish colonies o n the
licensed Portugues e slav e ships coming fro m Wes t Africa. 43 They wer e
looked o n wit h aversio n an d hostility , coloure d b y dee p suspicio n o f
their religiou s proclivities , b y th e establishe d Indie s merchant s an d
colonial officials . Bu t whatever th e role of prejudice and religious hatred
there is no question that the Portuguese New Christian s were the driving
force behind th e illicit trade of the Spanish Indies, from Buenos Aires to
the Caribbea n a t an y rat e since th e 1580s . Durin g th e 1620 s measure s
aimed at suppressing the commercial activit y of this group were taken at
Buenos Aires , Cartagena, Potosí, an d also in New Spai n where Gelves
expelled th e 'Portuguese ' fro m th e silver-minin g centre s o f Zacateca s
and Sa n Luis Potosí and imprisoned a number of them at Veracruz.44
Yet eve n i n th e earl y 1620 s th e governmen t di d no t attemp t t o
repatriate the growing Portuguese New Christia n element in the Spanish
41
Ibid.', Relación délos fundamentos,informes y pareceres . sohre si se ha de abrir el comercio
que solía aver entre el Perú i Nueva España (Madrid , 1644) , fos . 1-10 .
42
Josep h Ferriol, E n nombre del prior y cónsules y comercio de la ciudad de México (Madrid ,
1646), fos.5 v-7.
43
Lucí a García de Proodian, Lo s judíos en América (Madrid, 1966) , 27-8 .
44
J . Goncalve s Salvador , O í cristaos-novos e o comercio n o Atlántico meridional (Sa o
Paulo, 1978) , 363 ; P . Feliciano Velazquez, Historia de San Luis Potosí (2 vols. Mexico City,
1947) ii , 115-6 ; M. Fernánde z de Echeverría y Veitia (ed.) Documentos relativos al tumulto de
1624 (2 vols. Mexico City, 1855 ) ii , 215 .
Indies.45 B y 1622, th e 'Portuguese' mad e up something lik e a quarter of

the whit e polulatio n o f Bueno s Aires. 46 Th e registratio n o f foreig n
residents carrie d ou t a t Cartagen a d e Indias in th e 1620 s reveale d tha t
there were 15 4 'Portuguese' i n the city, almost ten per cent of the whit e
population.47 Ther e were also substantial communities at Lima, Potosí,
Mexico City, Veracru z and many othe r places . Furthermore, th e influx
of Portuguese Ne w Christians now tended to gain momentum due to the
economic recession affecting both Portugal and Brazil resulting from the
Spanish embargoe s agains t the Dutch an d the Dutch onslaugh t against
Portuguese shipping .
It wa s a t thi s juncture tha t Olivares ' statecraf t ha d on e o f it s mos t
crucial consequence s fo r Spanis h America . A s a resul t o f th e Cond e
Duque's reorganisation o f the Spanish state finances in the years 1626- 7
the share of the Genoese banker s who in the past had utterly dominated
the crown' s foreig n payment s wa s reduce d an d a consortiu m o f
Portuguese Ne w Christia n financiers , brought fro m Lisbon to Madrid,
was fo r th e firs t tim e assigne d a majo r role. 48 This , i n turn , rapidl y
transformed th e positio n o f th e Portugues e Ne w Christian s an d al l
finance and commerce throughout Castile and its American empire. For
if the Portuguese wer e to sustain their new role of advancing cash for the
upkeep o f the Spanis h armie s i n Europe, the y ha d t o b e permitted th e
same opportunities a s the Genoese in the American trade, in military and
naval contractin g an d als o i n Castilia n tax-farmin g wit h whic h t o
generate th e necessar y resources . Fro m bein g a n essentiall y margina l
group activ e aroun d th e fringe s o f th e Spanis h financia l an d tradin g
systems, th e Conde Duque mad e them a n integral part of the privileged
business establishmen t which dominate d the economic lif e of Spain and
its New Worl d possessions .
The Portugues e Ne w Christia n leadershi p i n Madri d an d Sevill e
obtained letter s of naturalization and permission t o enter th e American
trade for their sons, brothers, and nephews.49 Thos e who set themselves
up as official Indies merchants at Seville, in turn, established contact with
the leadin g Portugues e merchant s i n th e mai n busines s empori a o f
Spanish Americ a wh o no w becam e thei r factor s an d correspondents .
Then, the leading factors i n America, men such as Simon Váez Sevilla in
45
Rathe r th e crown preferred to 'compose' on payment o f fines, see Israel, Race, Class
and Politics, 119-20.
46
R . de Lafuente Machain, Lo s Portugueses en Buenos Aires, Siglo XVII (Madrid , 1931 )
p.86; Goncalve s Salvador , O s cristaos-novos, 362 .
47
Enriquet a Vila Vilar, 'Extranjeros e n Cartagena (1593-1630)' , Jahrbuchfur Geschichte
. . . Lateinamerikas xvi (1979) , 155-6 .
48
J.C . Boyajian , Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650 (New Brunswic k
N.J. 1983) , chap . 2.
49
Boyajian , Portuguese Bankers, 20, 32, 121 .
Mexico City , an d Manuel Baptista Peres in Lima - th e latter a relative of

at leas t tw o o f the Madri d Portugues e banker s - se t up distributiv e
networks i n provincia l towns an d localities , employin g a considerabl e
number of lesser men as dealers and store-keepers.50 At the same time the
increasing acceptanc e o f Portugues e Ne w Christian s a s militar y an d
naval suppliers in Spain and Flanders was also reflected, if only for a short
time, i n the Indies . Sebastia n Váez de Acebedo, fo r instance, a crypto-
Jew late r arrested and severel y deal t with b y th e Mexica n Inquisition ,
was i n 164 0 appointe d purveyo r general , i n charg e of supplying bot h
provisions and munitions, of the Armada de Barlovento. 51
Olivares forge d a framewor k withi n whic h th e Portugues e Ne w
Christians i n Spanis h Americ a rapidl y achieve d considerabl e
prominence.52 B y the early 1630s they dominated business life, includin g
the distribution o f textiles imported fro m Seville, from Buenos Aires to
Zacatecas where Simo n Váez Sevilla had one of his stores. Jewish praye r
gatherings were taking place in the privacy of their homes in many parts
of the Spanish New World , includin g some very remote localities . But
the one thing which was largely outsid e th e Conde Duque's power was
to protect them from the long arm of the Inquisition which, a s far as the
New Christian s wer e concerned , remaine d a s a ruthles s an d bruta l
organisation in Spanish America as it was soon again to be in Spain itself.
In Castile Olivare s was in a position t o help restrain the Inquisition. A t
any rate the leading Portuguese o f Madrid an d Seville remained outside
the reach of the Inquisition (for the most part) until after his downfall. It
may be that Olivares, whose sympathy for the New Christian s was well
known, als o ha d a hand in blockin g th e repeate d attempt s to se t up a
fourth New World Inquisition tribunal - th e other three were at Mexico
City, Lim a an d Cartagen a - a t Bueno s Aire s durin g th e 1620 s and
1630s.53 But however tha t may be the Inquisition broke the back of the
crypto-Jewish communit y a t Lim a wit h it s carefull y organize d mas s
arrests o f 1635 , whil e i n 163 6 th e principa l factor s o f th e Portugues e
Indies merchant s a t Cartagen a wer e seize d b y th e tribuna l there. 54 I n
New Spai n the Portuguese crypto-Jewish busines s élite survived a little
longer. Bu t i n the years 1642-3 they too wer e rounded up , imprisone d
50
Garcí a de Proodian, Lo s Judíos e n América (Madrid , 1966) , 69-84 ; o n Simo n Váez
Sevilla, see E. Uchmany, 'Simon Váe z Sevilla', Michael, Th e Diaspora Research Institute of
the University o f Tel Aviv viii (1983), 126-60 .
51
Archiv o General de la Nación, Mexico City , Inquisició n 489, fos.93-6 .
52
P . Collad o Villalta , 'E l embargo de bienes de los portugueses en la flota de Tierra
Firme de 1641', Anuario de Estudios Americanos xxxvi (1979), 8-9, 39 .
53
Tiscornia , 'Polític a económic a rioplatense' , 72 ; R . Milla r Corbacho , 'La s
confiscaciones de la Inquisición de Lima a los comerciantes de origen judeo-portugues de
la "gran complicidad" de 1635' , Revista de Indias xliii (1983), 37.
54
Ibid., 37-42.
and strippe d o f thei r possessions. 5555Mos t o f th e severa l hundre d

Portuguese Ne w Christian s arreste d b y th e Inquisitio n i n Spanis h
America between 163 5 and 1643 were tortured, imprisone d fo r years on
end an d generall y treate d ver y harshly , man y o f the m dyin g i n thei r
Inquisition cells . Everythin g belongin g t o them that could be found the
Inquisition confiscated.
The Conde Duque deepl y influenced the development o f the Spanish
Indies for more than a quarter of a century. But at no point did he concern
himself wit h th e affair s o f th e America s mor e intensivel y tha n i n th e
determining o f th e Monarchy' s Ne w Worl d defensiv e strategy . Thi s
became a central issue after 162 1 becaus e of the renewe d wa r wit h th e
Dutch an d the unleashing of the Dutch West India Company's sustaine d
offensive against the Spanish Caribbean and Brazil, a threat compounde d
in 1635 wit h the outbreak o f war with France . With s o many American
territories an d route s t o defend , Spai n coul d no t simpl y settl e fo r a
passive stance, leaving it to official s o n the spot t o decid e how t o react.
On th e contrary, Olivare s had definite and rather drastic ideas as to ho w
the war i n the Americas should be fought and through the junta de guerra
de Indias, th e high-leve l governmen t committe e whic h h e himsel f a t
times chaired in person, h e insisted on determining Spain's New Worl d
strategy himself.
Before 1621 Spanish policy in the Americas had been to maintain fixed
garrisons only a t a few points, thos e that were strategically most crucia l
such a s Cartagena , Veracruz , Calla o an d Acapulco , wher e majo r
maritime trad e route s converge d an d whic h woul d otherwis e b e
particularly vulnerabl e t o attack . Afte r 1621 , however , foreig n an d
especially Dutc h penetratio n coul d b e prevente d onl y i f a much mor e
ambitious polic y wa s adopte d an d thi s ne w polic y Olivare s too k up ,
developed an d made his own .
During th e Olivares era Spain's central objective in the Americas was
to establis h a cordon o f strong-points furthe r forward , righ t acros s the
Caribbean, t o seal off the Spanish Indies from Dutc h an d French attack,
and t o provid e base s for rapi d deploymen t o f forces i n th e area s mos t
exposed t o foreign encroachment. Withou t thi s grandiose new policy it
would indee d hav e been impossibl e t o preven t th e Dutc h Wes t Indies
Company, wit h it s massiv e sea-power an d substantial troop strength ,
from capturin g a large number o f Caribbea n islands , includin g som e
major ones , an d establishing settlements an d bases astride the principal
maritime trad e arteries . I t would als o have been impossibl e t o preven t
the Dutc h exploitin g th e variou s Caribbea n salt-pan s whic h the y ha d
previously used, before the Twelve Years ' Truce, t o cancel out much of
the effect o f Philip Ill's genera l embargo against them of 1598-1608; and
55
Israel , Race, Class and Politics, 214-15.
280 Olivares and the Spanish Indies
this woul d hav e undermined Phili p IV' s ne w genera l embargo agains t

the Dutch of 1621-47.
The new Spanish strategy was extremely costly in men and resources,
involving a heavy drain on the royal treasuries at Mexico City and Lima.
It als o require d a good dea l of complicated co-ordinatio n i n the Indie s
and o f clos e supervisio n fro m Madrid . Ye t al l i n al l th e polic y wa s
remarkably successful . I n reply t o th e Dutch harrassmen t of Cuba, th e
crown strengthene d both th e garrisons and the fortifications o f Havana
and Santiago, a t an annual cost during the 1630s of over 100,000 pesos.56
When the Dutch, shu t out of the salt-pans of Portugal and Spain, arrived
in great numbers to fetch high-grade sal t from Punta de Araya, the great
salt lagoo n o n th e coas t o f easter n Venezuela , minister s a t Madri d
decided t o sea l off thi s poin t also . Firs t a temporary woode n for t wa s
erected, and a fixed garrison moved in, which kept the Dutch out during
1622. Then a major stone fortress was constructed, designed by two o f
Spain's to p militar y engineers, Juan Bautista Antoneli and Cristóbal d e
Roda. Thi s fortress , officiall y know n a s th e Castill o d e Santiag o de l
Arroyo d e Araya , wa s the n manne d continuousl y b y a substantia l
garrison down to , an d beyond, 1648. 57 At the same time, following th e
repulse of the Dutch from Puerto Rico, in 1625, major new fortification s
were constructed there, at Madrid's insistence, at a cost of 110,000 peso s
paid ou t fro m th e treasur y a t Mexic o City. 58 I n repl y t o th e Dutc h
occupation o f Sa n Martin, on e o f the Virgi n Islands where ther e wer e
salt-pans, i n 1630, Olivare s an d his colleagues planned a major counter -
attack,59 th e commande r o f th e expeditio n bein g give n instruction s
which marke d a n importan t chang e i n Madrid' s polic y o n Dutc h
prisoners taken in the Indies: he was ordered to execute all his prisoners
on the spot. Thi s idea , which originate d wit h Olivare s personally , was
intended t o inject a n element of psychological terror into the Caribbean
conflict which , i t wa s hoped , woul d weake n o r undermin e Dutc h
resolve. Th e expedition eventuall y succeeded in ejecting the Dutch from
San Martin in 1633. Thankfull y the prisoners were not i n fact massacred
but th e Spanis h did rebuild the fortres s an d established a fixed garrison
there which the crown continued to maintain, at a cost of a further 70,00 0
pesos yearly, down t o the end of the war with the Dutch.60 Nor di d this
garrison while awa y its time in idleness. Beside s repulsing a major new
Dutch attac k in 1644, led by Pieter Stuyvesant, the Spaniards organized
56
I . A. Wright , Historia documentada d e San Cristóbal de la Havana en la primera mitad del
siglo XVII (Havana , 1930), 9-11, 123-4 , 180-1 .
57
Carlo s Felic e Cardot , Curazao hispánico, Antagonismo flamenco-español (Caracas,
1973), p.lll.
58
Enriquet a Vila Vilar, Historia d e Puerto Rico, Í600-1650 (Seville, 1974), 40-1 .
59
Th . G . Mathews , 'Th e Spanis h Domination o f Saint Martin', Caribbean Studies ix
(1969), 6-9 .
60
Mathews , 'Spanis h Domination o f Saint Martin', 9 , 18-19.
regular naval patrols around the Virgin Islands in order to keep the Dutch
and French away. It was only after 1648 that the Spaniards withdrew and
the Dutch an d French began to colonize San Martin undisturbed .
In 163 4 th e Dutch occupie d Curacao and the neighbouring island s of
Bonaire an d Aruba , a n event whic h cause d acute anxiety a t Madrid. I n
January 1635 , th e presiden t of the Counci l o f the Indies , th e cond e d e
Castrillo, an d th e ordinar y members o f the junta de guerra de Indias were
summoned t o a grand junta to review Spanis h strategy in the Caribbean
attended by members of the Councils of State and War and presided over
by Olivares. 61 Olivares explained at some length his fears that the Dutch
capture of Curacao with its excellent harbour might delay the sailing of
the 163 5 treasur e fleet for Spai n and serv e as a spring-board fo r further
Dutch breakthrough s i n the Caribbean area . He discoursed als o on the
Union of Arms in the Americas and the need to mobilise more support in
the Indie s fo r Spain' s efforts , maintainin g that th e projecte d armada de
Barlovento woul d no t b e sufficien t a s a Caribbean strike force and that
four mor e galleon s shoul d b e adde d t o th e fourtee n alread y planned .
Characteristically, h e concluded b y blaming th e loss of Curasao o n the
failure o f the king's commanders i n the Indies to carry out their orders.
He reminded his colleagues that, contrary to instructions, the lives of the
prisoners taken at San Martin ha d been spared.
Another gran d junta me t i n Olivares ' room s t o discus s Caribbea n
strategy on 8 March 1635 . The Conde Duque was at his most belligerent,
insisting
Que e n la forma de hazer guerra, entiende [el Conde Duque] se deve Vuestra
Magestad servi r de tomar resolución , porqu e d e no haver usado todo rigor
con lo s d e la s islas de Sa n Cristóbal, la s Nieves , y Sa n Martin , s e sigue el
atreverse el enemigo a ocupar nuevos puestos cada dia. Y e s muy verisími l
que s i entendiere n se r degollado s e n qualquier a parte qu e s e hallasen , n o
yntentarian co n tant a facilida d esta s ocupaciones, y quedars e de asiento en
ellas; y asi lo tiene por punto muy esencial. 62
Needless t o sa y neithe r th e Inquisitor-General , Fra y Antoni o d e

Sotomayor (1632-43) , no r th e othe r senio r ecclesiasti c present , th e
elderly former Inquisitor-General , Cardina l Zapat a (Inquisitor-General
1627-32) sa w an y difficult y wit h this . I t was th e militar y men presen t
who objected though even they professed, at least, to see nothing against
the Conde Duque's contention in principle. The Dutch were 'rebels' and
'heretics' an d could therefore justly be slaughtered. Their worry was that
61
Th e tex t o f thi s consulta, fro m AG S Guerr a Antigu a legaj o 316 4 i s extensively
quoted fro m i n Cardot, Curazao hispánico, 244-7 .
62
Th e tex t o f thi s consulta i s printe d i n I . A. Wrigh t an d C.F.A . va n Da m (eds. )
Nederlandsche zeevaarders op de eilanden in de Caraibische Zee en aan de kust van Columbia en
Venezuela gedurende dejaren U28-1648 ( 2 vols. Utrecht , 1934 ) 1 , 206-7.
the Dutc h woul d simpl y retaliat e by massacrin g the crew s o f Spanish

vessels they incercepted i n the Caribbean, paralysin g Spain's navigation
in the area. This argument persuade d Olivare s t o relent with respec t to
Dutch prisoner s taken in the New Worl d at sea . . .
pero e n tierra entiend e . . . qu e desde luego se deve mandar executar todo

rigor co n los enemigos que s e hallaren en ella, ocupand o puestos, para qu e
comienzan de escarmentar y sepan que no les ha de salir tan varato como hasta
aqui.63
Olivares thu s persiste d wit h hi s advocac y o f th e deliberat e mas s

execution o f Dutc h prisoner s take n i n th e America s on land . I t wa s a
considered polic y no t somethin g uttere d i n th e hea t o f th e moment ,
pressed over the objections o f colleagues at successive meetings of senior
ministers at Madrid wit h th e deliberate intention o f using this expedient
to curtai l Dutc h infiltratio n of Spain' s Caribbea n possessions . Briefly ,
moreover, thi s harsh expedient wa s adopted despit e the evident distaste
of th e commander s o n th e spot . Th e expeditio n mounte d fro m
Venezuela in 1636 to remove the colony o f Zeelanders established on the
island o f Tobag o wipe d th e settlemen t out , slaughterin g ever y man ,
woman an d child. 64 Happily , though , thi s would see m t o b e th e onl y
case where the Conde Duque's polic y wa s implemented.
The forward , dynamic approach adopte d i n th e Caribbean , lik e th e
massive Castilian assistance extended t o the Portuguese in their struggle
against th e Dutc h i n Brazi l durin g th e 1630s , impose d a n enormou s
strain on Spain's imperial finances. But without it it is hard to see how th e
Dutch West India Company coul d have been prevented from taking over
a considerabl e numbe r o f Caribbea n islands , consolidatin g it s hol d o n
what, with Bahia, would hav e been the larger part of Brazil, and gaining
control o f the salt-pans of Punta de Araya. The vas t military effort an d
the heav y expenditur e involve d wer e closel y linked , clearly , t o th e
sustained fisca l driv e mounte d simultaneousl y throughou t Spain' s
American possessions ; and al l these policies nee d to be seen as part of a
grand strategy for the Monarchy a s a whole which emanated from, an d
was co-ordinated by , th e Conde Duque personally.
In view of all this our conclusio n ha s to be that it is a mistake to vie w
Olivares a s bein g onl y marginall y concerne d wit h th e affair s o f th e
Indies. In reality the Americas were one of his major preoccupations, no t
just in the sense that they were crucia l to his efforts t o mobilize Spanish
resources in Europe mor e efficiently tha n had been done in the past, but
as a ke y aren a fo r hi s activ e interventio n an d supervision . Finally ,
63
M
Ibid.
C.K . Kessler , 'Tobago. Ee n vergete n Nederlandsch e kolonie', West Indische Gids TÍ
(1928), 530-1.
Olivares' statecraf t i n the New Worl d can be seen to have had a number
of long-ter m effects , a s wel l a s som e interestin g short-ter m
consequences suc h a s th e brie f penetratio n o f th e Portugues e Ne w
Christians int o th e hear t o f Spanis h colonia l life . Th e fisca l drive , th e
strengthening o f bureaucrati c checks , an d th e expansio n o f Spain' s
network o f Ne w Worl d fortification s certainl y ha d som e advers e
economic consequence s and added to the depression which gripped New
Spain and the Spanish Caribbean for many decades to come. But it has to
be appreciate d tha t thes e programme s als o strengthene d Spam' s gri p
around th e edge s o f it s America n empir e an d contribute d i n n o smal l
measure t o th e creatin g o f a barrie r whic h continue d t o sho w grea t
resilience, and , on the whole, kep t out th e English and French as well as
the Dutch, durin g th e second hal f of the seventeenth century.
11
MEXICO AND THE 'GENERAL CRISIS' OF
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
THE CONTROVERS Y OVE R TH E "GENERA L CRISIS " O F TH E SEVENTEENT H

century ha s now been in progress fo r nearly two decades. 1 Despit e
this lengt h o f time , an d th e effor t an d ingenuit y tha t hav e bee n
devoted t o th e question , i t doe s no t appea r tha t ther e i s an y mor e
agreement yet regarding the nature and even the existence of a general
crisis tha n ther e wa s a t th e beginning . I f som e historian s hav e
sought t o explai n at leas t some aspects o f the trouble s o f the perio d
1620-80 i n term s o f general factors applying over much o f Europe ,
others hav e concede d onl y a coincidenc e o f individua l crise s i n
different part s of the continent. Eve n so, in recent years, those of the
latter camp have had to allow not only for increasing evidence as to the
gravity of the individual crises but more and more for the evidence of
important connection s betwee n them . O n balance , i n th e vie w o f
many, there has emerged a formidable case for a Europe-wide reversal
in th e decade s 1620-8 0 o f severa l o f th e ke y trend s characterizin g
European developmen t i n th e lon g perio d o f stead y growt h an d
expansion, 1450-1620 .
If th e disruptio n o f much of central an d easter n Europ e in thes e
decades can be attributed t o the appallingly destructive Thirt y Years
War an d th e devastatin g rebellio n o f Chmielnicki , i t ha s becom e
increasingly clea r that these great set-backs must, a t least in part, be
viewed i n a wide r contex t o f economic collaps e in th e seventeent h
century eviden t especiall y i n Spain , Ital y an d th e Ottoma n
Empire.2 I f the marked population decline of Germany , Spai n and
1
Beginning with the publication o f R. Mousnier, Le s XVI" e t XVII' siècles
(Paris, 1954) 3 an d E . J . Hobsbawm , "Th e Genera l Crisi s o f th e Europea n
Economy i n the Seventeent h Century" , pt . i . Past an d Present, no. 5 (Ma y
I954)j PP- 33"53j and pt. 2 , ibid., no. 6 (Nov. 1954) , pp. 44-65; the scope of the
discussion broadened with the appearance of H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Th e Genera l
Crisis of the Seventeent h Century" , Past and Present, no. 1 6 (Nov. 1959), and
the symposiu m on Professor Trevor-Roper's "general crisis " essay in Past and
Present, no. 1 8 (Nov. 1960) , with contribution s b y variou s scholars, som e of
which, includin g thos e o f R. Mousnie r an d J . H . Elliott , wer e subsequently
republished
1
in Trevor Asto n (ed.), Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660 (London, 1965) .
H. Kamen , "Th e Economi c and Socia l Consequences of the Thirty Years
War", Past and Present, no. 3 9 (Apr. 1968) , pp . 44-61 ; W . E . D . Allen , Th e
Ukraine: A History (Ne w York , 1963) , pp . 104-19 ; C . M . Cipolla , "Th e
Decline of Italty", Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd ser., v (1952); J. Lynch , Spain Under
The Habsburgs, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965-9), ii, pp. 126-84 ; B- Lewis, "Some Reflec-
tions on the Declin e of the Ottoma n Empire", Studio Islámica, ix (1948).
Poland can be explained largely in terms of local catastrophes} never-
theless thes e separat e disaster s hav e increasingl y com e t o b e see n
against a backgroun d of general demographi c reversa l als o affectin g
Italy, part s of France, th e Balkans , Denmark, Hungary , the Spanis h
Netherlands an d elsewhere , and gentl y reflected eve n in the cas e of
England.3 I f the many revolts and disturbances of the middle decades
of th e centur y arguabl y show mor e difference s tha n similarities , a t
least few deny the seriousness of the simultaneous social and political
crises i n Spain , Germany , England , Turke y an d Poland . Finally ,
many eve n of those wh o have been critica l o f the ide a of a "genera l
crisis" a s such hav e found i t har d t o den y tha t thi s wa s an ag e in
which th e vitalit y o f man y o f th e traditiona l centre s o f European
wealth an d cultur e withere d an d ther e occurre d a vas t shif t i n th e
centre o f economi c an d cultura l gravit y fro m sout h an d centra l
Europe to the north-western fringe s of the continent. *
Into thi s picture, exceedingly comple x and uncertain thoug h it is,
there are several reasons for introducing the questio n of seventeenth-
century Mexico . Possibl y n o featur e o f th e firs t grea t phas e o f
modern Europe' s expansion , 1450-1620 , drive n principall y b y th e
energies o f Spain, Italy , souther n German y an d Portugal , wa s more
important tha n th e ascendanc y tha t Europe , o r rathe r souther n
Europe, gained during that time over the Americas, Asia an d Africa .
Europe, le d b y a n increasingl y ric h an d powerfu l Spain , becam e
during that epoc h o f expansion the dominan t worl d culture. Ther e
is accordingl y ever y reaso n t o postulat e tha t th e wanin g o f th e
overseas supremacy of Spain and Portugal in the seventeenth century
and the passing of the initiative, gradually, to the Dutch , Frenc h and
English, i s a majo r ramificatio n o f Europe' s seventeenth-centur y
crisis. Thi s i n turn, considerin g the grea t rol e o f Spain' s overseas
empire in generating Spanis h wealth and power, and considering the
degree to which the disintegratio n o f Spanish wealth and powe r was
a factor of disturbance in seventeenth-century Europe, inevitably leads
»K. F . Helleiner , "Th e Populatio n o f Europe fro m th e Black Death to the
Eve of the Vital Revolution", i n E. Rich and C. H. Wilson (eds.), Th e Cambridge
Economic History o f Europe, iv (Cambridge, 1967) : for German y an d Bohemia ,
pp. 41-3 , Flanders , p . 45 , Italy, pp . 50-2 , England , pp . 52-4 , an d Hungary ,
PP- 57- 8 J fo r Spain , se e Lynch , op . at., pp . 126-30 ; fo r th e Balkans , se e
T. Stoianovich , "Lan d Tenur e an d relate d Sector s o f the Balka n Economy,
1600-1800", Jl. o f Econ. Hist., xii i (i953) > PP - 398-411J see also P . Goubert ,
Beauvais e t l e Beauvaisis d e 1600 á 1730 (Paris, 1960) , pp . 599-617 , 62 2 if. ;
and E . L e Ro y Ladurie , Le s Paysans d e Languedoc, 2 vols . (Paris , 1966) , i ,
pp. 428, 569-70.
* For instance , I . Schöffer , "Di d Holland' s Golde n Ag e co-incid e wit h a
Period o f Crisis?", Acta Historias Neerlandica, i (1966), pp. 9 8 ff.
Mexico an d the 'General Crisis' 28 7
the historia n t o examin e the lin k between Spain' s colonia l problem s
and th e en d o f th e Spanis h ascendanc y bot h insid e an d outsid e
Europe. Thi s conclusio n lead s naturall y t o th e focusin g o f
attention o n the two principal sources of Spanish wealth, Mexico and
Peru, an d i n vie w o f th e ver y importan t conclusio n o f Pierr e an d
Huguette Chaun u tha t th e rapi d declin e o f th e Spanis h Atlanti c
trading system from 162 0 was caused chiefly by the deterioration fro m
1620 in Spanish-Mexica n trade, 6 to consideratio n o f the positio n o f
Mexico. Thi s proposa l gain s furthe r justificatio n whe n it i s note d
that ther e i s considerable evidence, whic h will be examined in some
detail furthe r o n i n thi s paper , o f a partia l paralysi s o f Spanis h
power in Mexico (the viceroyalty of New Spain) dating from the early
seventeenth century , whic h ma y wel l hav e adversel y affecte d th e
process o f Spanis h exploitatio n o f Mexica n resource s an d impaire d
the abilit y o f th e vicerega l authoritie s t o hel p counte r th e Dutch ,
French an d Englis h challeng e i n th e Caribbea n area . Th e ver y
efficient exercis e o f Spanis h powe r i n Mexic o achieve d durin g th e
reign o f Philip II , alread y deterioratin g accordin g to the report s o f
Philip Ill' s visitor-genera l t o Ne w Spai n b y th e year s 1607-9, '
received a serie s o f additiona l majo r set-back s afte r 1620 , beginning
with the overthro w of Viceroy Gelves with the popula r insurrectio n
of 1624 in Mexico City. I n the course of this paper it will be argued
that th e crisi s in seventeenth-century Mexic o wa s an integral part of
a two-wa y proces s i n whic h problem s arisin g i n Mexic o affecte d
Spain, an d throug h Spai n Europe , an d i n whic h Spain , locke d i n
conflict with her enemie s for the hegemon y of Europe, was driven to
intensify her exploitation of the empire which in turn exacerbated the
problems arising in Mexico .
The evidenc e gathered by Pierre and Huguette Chaun u indicating
that the rapid decline of Spanish Atlantic trade after 162 0 was chiefly
caused by a very serious slump in Spanish-Mexica n trade , raises the
question a s t o whethe r ther e wa s a majo r economi c recessio n i n
seventeenth-century Mexico . Th e Chaunu s assumed that there was
and sought to explain this supposed recession by adapting the earlie r
thesis o f Professor W. Borah. 7 Professo r Borah had argued that th e
•Pierre an d Huguett e Chaunu , Seville e t I'Atlantique, 1504-1650, 8 vols .
(Paris, 1955-60) , viii, bk. 2 , pt. 2 , pp. 1,523-60 .
• Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter A.G.I.) , Indiferente d e Nueva
España, leg[ajo] 77 , fos. 5V-6 : Landeras de Velasco t o Counci l (of the Indies) ,
24 June 1608.
7
Chaunu, op. at., viii, bk . 2 , pt . 2 , pp. 1,558-60 ; W . Borah , Ne w Spain's
Century o f Depression (Ibero-Americana , xxxv , Berkeley , Calif. , an d Lo s
Angeles, 1951); P. Chaunu, "Pour un Tableau triste du Mexique au milieu du
XVIIe siècle" , Ármales. E.S.C., x (1955), pp. 79-85 .
seventeenth centur y was New Spain' s centur y of depression and tha t
this depressio n wa s cause d b y a chroni c labour-shortag e resultin g
from th e disastrou s declin e o f th e India n populatio n o f Mexico .
He ha d demonstrate d beyon d doub t tha t i n th e sixteent h centur y
Mexico ha d suffere d on e o f th e greates t demographi c catastrophe s
known t o histor y an d tha t th e Indian s ha d decline d fro m roughl y
twenty million on the ev e of the Spanis h Conquest to a wretched two
million o r s o b y i6io. 8 Th e on e par t o f th e Bora h thesi s tha t
seemed unacceptabl e t o th e Chaunu s wa s that h e ha d place d th e
beginning o f th e grea t Mexica n recessio n a s earl y a s 1580 . Thi s
seemed unacceptable because it emerged clearly from their figures for
trade between Spai n an d Mexico i n the period 1580-162 0 that these
four decade s were in fact th e heyda y of the Spanis h Atlantic system
as regards volume of shipping, trade, and returns. Recen t research
has confirmed that thes e forty years were indeed the year s of a great
Mexican boom. Silve r production at Zacatecas, the leading Mexican
silver-muiing centre, did not reach its highest levels until afte r i6o6. 9
San Lui s Potosi , the secon d mos t important , founde d only in 1586 ,
also entered its period of highest production only after 1600 , reaching
its highest point, according to Diego Basalenque,10 in the years around
1612. Trad e betwee n Mexic o an d th e Spanis h Philippines , an d
between Mexico and Peru, was also at its high-point during these very
decades, wit h grea t sum s o f silve r an d quantitie s o f silk s crossin g
the Pacifi c i n a triangula r motio n betwee n Mexico , Manil a an d
Peru.11 I n addition, th e signs are, these wer e the best years for the
central Mexica n textil e industry , whic h ha d attaine d a mos t
impressive leve l b y 160 4 with , accordin g to Vicero y Montesclaros ,
some eighty textile workshop s (obrajes) i n the thre e citie s o f Mexico ,
Puebla an d Tlaxcal a alon e wit h a n averag e work-forc e of fift y o r
sixty, an d th e larges t employin g on e hundred an d twent y workers ,
a very considerable numbe r fo r an industrial enterprise at that time. 12
Agriculture in the fertile region of the Bajio , the granary of the silver-
8
W. Borah and S . F . Cook , Th e Aboriginal Population o f Central Mexico o n
the Ev e o f th e Spanish Conquest (Ibero-Americana , xiv , Berkele y an d Lo s
Angeles,
9
1963) 5 PP- 4 > 88 .
P. J . Bakewell , Silver Mining an d Society i n Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas,
1546-1700
10
(Cambridge , 1971) , pp. 242 , 246.
Diego Basalenque , Historia d e la Provincia d e Sa n Nicolas d e Tolentino d e
Michoacdn de l Orden de N.P.S. Agustin [& work of the mid-seventeenth century ]
(Mexico,
11
1963) , p. 225.
W. Borah , Early Colonial Trade an d Navigation between Mexico an d Peru
(Ibero-Americana,
11
xxxvi , Berkele y an d Lo s Angeles , 1954) , pp . 116-27 .
A.G.I.j [Audiencia de] Mexico, leg . 26: Montesclaros t o Council, 20 May
1604 ("obrajes").
mining towns, began to expand dramatically after th e end of the fierce
Chichimec wa r i n th e 15905 , an d alon g wit h th e rapi d sprea d o f
Spanish estates an d risin g grain productio n a number o f new towns
were founded i n the are a at this time .
But if the Chaunus were right in claiming that there was no Mexican
depression befor e 1620 , wer e they als o righ t i n claimin g tha t ther e
was a prolonged Mexica n depressio n afte r 162 0 and tha t i t wa s this
that di d suc h serious damag e to th e commerc e o f Spain? Recentl y
this hypothesis of the Chaunus , and the elements of the arguments of
Professor Bora h use d t o suppor t it , hav e bee n subjecte d t o som e
searching criticism. Professo r J. Lynch, using some of the Chaunus'
own data , ha s argue d tha t th e perio d afte r 162 0 i n Mexic o wa s
marked b y a "crisi s o f chang e rathe r tha n stagnation". 13 Th e
revenue of the centra l treasury in Mexico, he pointed out , ros e until
1625 and then fell only slightly, while the dcabala, the tax on internal
sales, increased until 163 8 and eve n after tha t dat e fell onl y slightly ,
and th e almojarifazgo, a n impost o n maritime trade , also continued
to increase until 1638 . H e also argued that the prohibition on trade
between Mexic o an d Per u afte r 163 1 wa s "no t take n seriously" 14
and pointe d ou t tha t certai n sector s o f Mexican commerce, notably
the trad e i n caca o wit h Venezuela, 15 wer e expandin g durin g th e
middle decade s o f th e century . Th e "change " envisage d b y
Professor Lync h wa s a fundamenta l restructuring o f th e Mexica n
economy marke d by a certai n shif t o f emphasi s awa y fro m silver ,
a diversificatio n o f enterprise especiall y into agriculture, and growing
independence, economicall y speaking, of Spain.16 P . J. Bakewell , in
his study of silver-mining at Zacatecas , has very ably seconded these
conclusions. Havin g show n tha t silve r productio n a t Zacateca s
continued to increase after 162 0 until 1636 before falling back to levels
that wer e no t muc h differen t t o thos e registere d i n th e 1580 5 an d
15905, h e wen t o n t o question , wit h considerabl e justification ,
whether th e rapi d declin e i n Spanish-Mexica n trad e demonstrate d
by th e Chaunu s nee d i n an y sens e b e indicativ e o f a recessio n i n
Mexico itself. 17 H e argue d tha t th e slum p i n Atlantic trad e fro m
1620 might well be explained in terms of a New Spain becoming more
self-sufficient wit h respect to many commodities, especially foodstuff s
13
11
Lynch, op. cit., ii, p. 212 .
15
Ibid., p. 226.
Ibid., p. 227; E. Arcila Farias, Comercio entre Venezuelay Mexico en lossiglos
XVII
ls
y XVIII (Mexico , 1950), pp. 51-61 .
Lynch, op. cit., ii, pp. 195 , 209, 212.
~~ Bakewell, op. cit., pp. 227-30 , 242-3 .
and textiles, the retention of more of the king' s silve r i n Mexico fo r
purposes of imperial defence, and the retention of more private silver
in Mexic o owin g t o structura l change s i n th e Mexica n economy .
Spain's loss , i n othe r words , migh t wel l hav e bee n Mexico' s gain .
Dr. Bakewel l als o pointed out , again with considerable justification,
that the Chaunus' adaptation o f Professor Borah's thesi s with respect
to th e labour-shortag e i s quit e unsatisfactory : b y th e 16205 , th e
period o f rapid populatio n decreas e in Mexico was long past, having
in fact preceded the boom, and although there was still a very gradual
decline i n th e number s o f Indians i n Ne w Spai n i n th e i6ao s an d
16305, an d althoug h ther e i s n o denyin g tha t ther e wa s a labour -
shortage i n seventeenth-centur y Mexico , th e Chaunus ' argumen t
that ther e wa s such a thing a s a critical level, or floor, of about tw o
million Indian s beneat h whic h the labou r supply could suddenly n o
longer cope with the need s of enterprise in Mexic o is too vague and
arbitrary to be at all convincing.18
And yet, though no historian ca n now accept th e notio n of a long
Mexican depressio n cause d b y th e fallin g o f the India n populatio n
below som e hypothetical minimu m leve l around 1620 , and despit e
the undoubte d significanc e o f th e point s mad e b y Lync h an d
Bakewell regardin g ta x return s an d retentio n o f silver i n Mexico , a
good cas e fo r a prolonge d Mexica n depressio n afte r 162 0 doe s
arguably still remain. I f Zacateca s continued t o expand productio n
until 163 6 an d the n entere d a perio d o f recessio n whic h wa s no t
excessively severe , i t shoul d b e remembered tha t Zacateca s wa s the
site of the riches t vein s of ore in Mexico where the factor s reducin g
the profitabilit y o f minin g i n seventeenth-centur y Ne w Spain , a s
identified by Dr. Bakewell , can be supposed to have been operating at
minimum severity . Sa n Lui s Patosf , th e secon d mos t productiv e
mining centre, went into declin e befor e Zacatecas, i n the 16205 , and
was apparently hi t harder. 19 Th e lat e boom at Parral beginning i n
the 1630 5 wa s mor e tha n offse t b y th e recessio n i n silver-minin g
around Durang o and the res t o f New Biscay and in Ne w Galicia. 20
Furthermore, th e slum p i n silver , fa r fro m causin g a diversio n o f
investment int o agriculture , cause d a majo r agricultura l recessio n
around Celay a an d Salamanc a an d throughou t th e Bajio , fo r th e
heartland o f north-central Mexic o which had flourished so spectacu-
18
19
Ibid., p. 227.
Basalenque, op . cit., p. 225 ; Primo Felician o VelazqueZ j Historia d e Sa n
Luis Potosl, 2 vols. (Mexico, i947) > ii, p. 166 ; Bakewell, op . cit., p. 61.
'"A.G.I., Mexico , leg . 34 , fos . 81-2 : Vicero y Cadereit a t o Council ,
12 July 163 8 ("hacienda").
larly in the decades 1590-162 0 had prospered o n the supply of food to
Zacatecas an d Sa n Lui s an d accordingl y suffere d fro m a crisi s o f
over-production whe n th e populatio n o f th e silve r town s bega n t o
melt away. 21 Similarly , th e silve r slum p adversel y affecte d cattle -
ranching in New Biscay.28 Indee d i t may very well be that the driv e
to acquire Indian lands by Spaniards, whic h was so marked a feature
of th e perio d 1580-1620 , slackene d appreciabl y afte r 1620 .
Admittedly, Professo r Lynch' s clai m tha t th e progressivel y mor e
stringent restriction s o n the Peru trade culminatin g in the prohibitio n
of 1631 were "not taken seriously" i s by no means without force: it is
well know n tha t muc h sil k an d bullio n smugglin g wa s organize d
through Centra l America n port s suc h as Realejo as well as Acapulco.
But i t i s clea r fro m th e man y bitte r Mexica n protest s o f the 1630 5
and 1640$ 23 that th e disruption , an d probabl e reduction, o f the ol d
legal trad e wit h Peru , and als o the progressivel y tighte r control s o n
trade wit h th e Spanis h Philippines , ha d a seriou s advers e effec t o n
Mexico City, the hub of New Spain's economy, at a time when Mexico
City merchant s wer e suffering fro m th e slum p in Atlanti c trade an d
the loss of the entire Mexican silver fleet of 1628 to the Dutch. I t also
had an adverse effect o n the textile manufacturers of Puebla, Mexico' s
second larges t city , wh o no w found thei r expor t channel s t o Sout h
America seriously impeded; 24 indeed there ar e various signs that the
once vaunte d Mexica n textil e industr y share d full y i n th e genera l
down-turn o f the Mexica n econom y afte r 162 0 no t onl y a t Puebl a
but als o a t Mexic o Cit y an d mos t disastrousl y a t Tlaxcala. 28 A t
Mexico City, one of the main causes of this set-back wa s the disastrou s
floods of 1629-34 , whic h disrupte d al l economic lif e i n th e capital 88
and cause d a serious loss o f population, especiall y white population ,
21
Basalenque, op. cit., pp. 296, 314-15 .
"A.G.I., Mexico , leg . 34, fos . 81-2 : Cadereit a t o Council , 1 2 Jul y 163 8
("hacienda").
* 3 There are many of these; fo r a summary, see Relazion de lo s fundamentos,
informes, y pareceres que par una y otra pane se han deduzido y visto en el consejo
real de las Indias sobre si se ha de abrir el comercio que solia aver entre el Peru
y la Nueva Esparto, o contimiarse l a suspension o prohibition que del corre (Madrid,
1644).
" Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de Puebla de los Angeles (hereafter A.C.P.),
microfilm i n th e Institut e d e Antropologia e Historia, Mexic o City (hereafte r
I.A.H.),
85
vol. xviii, fos. 256-62.
Jan Bazant, "Evoluci6n de la industria textil poblana, i544-i845"3 Historia
Mexicana, xiii (1963-4), pp. 48 8 ff.; Biblioteca Nacional de Mexico, MS. 1066 ,
fos. iv , 53V-54 .
"A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3 , rfamo] 4 : Archbisho p Manso t o Council , 8 Nov .
1629; Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, MS . 2396 , fo. 267r-v.
which apparentl y ha d stil l not bee n mad e good two decade s later i n
1654."
But th e questio n remains, if there was a prolonged depressio n i n
Mexico afte r 1620 , ho w doe s on e accoun t fo r th e continuin g hig h
level o f tax return s i n th e viceroyalty ? This , i t seem s t o me , i s a
question of the greatest significance not merely regarding seventeenth -
century Mexica n history, but regardin g th e whole problem of Spain's
relation t o her empire in the "genera l crisis" period and Spain' s bi d
to prolon g he r ascendancy , an d th e religiou s an d socia l form s sh e
favoured, i n a n increasingl y embattle d an d disturbe d Europe . I n
the years 1618-25, the Spanish armies in Europe took up new positions
in th e Alpin e passe s an d o n th e Rhin e an d resume d th e offensiv e
against the United Province s fro m th e Spanis h Netherlands. I n the
years 1628-30 , th e Spaniards ' attemp t t o tighte n thei r gri p o n
northern Ital y misfired , Spai n becam e involve d i n a preliminar y
struggle wit h he r potentiall y greates t enemy , France , an d ha d t o
commit grea t resource s t o retai n he r hol d o n Milan . I n 1633-4 ,
Spain poure d force s int o German y t o counte r th e sudde n ris e of
Swedish powe r and creat e th e condition s whic h mad e possibl e th e
crushing o f th e Swedis h force s a t Nordlinge n an d th e clearin g o f
southern German y fo r th e Habsburgs . Finally , fro m 163 5 Spai n
became involved in her great war with France, a war of unprecedented
scope fought in the Lo w Countries, i n parts of France an d Germany ,
Switzerland an d Ital y an d i n th e Pyrenees , an d whic h was to lead
eventually to the crippling of Spanish power and, after the suppression
of the Frondes, the Frenc h ascendancy i n Europe . Simultaneously ,
until 1648 , Spain was engaged in a vast and costly naval war with the
Dutch i n the Atlantic , th e Caribbean , th e Englis h Channe l an d the
Pacific. Th e immens e cos t an d strai n o f thi s effor t pu t a n
enormous, an d eventuall y overwhelming , pressur e o n Spai n and ,
through Spain, on the whole Spanish empire . Madrid , in so far as it
could, involve d al l its dependencie s i n it s desperat e struggl e and i n
many, and very clearly in the cas e of Mexico, introduced an exacting
programme o f ta x increases , tighte r regulatio n o f trade , an d
strengthening of fiscal machinery. I t is for this reason that it may be
denied tha t th e leve l o f tax returns i n seventeenth-centur y Mexico ,
as indeed in Peru in this period, 28 is in any sense an index of economic
performance. Rathe r it is an index of the pressur e exerted by Spain
on Mexic o an d Per u a t a ver y crucia l stag e i n th e histor y o f th e
European balance o f power.
"
28
I.A.H. , Archive Hist6rico, MS . 101 ant., "Itinerario" , p. 14 .
Lynch, op . cit., ii3 p. 222.
In 162 1 Olivares set to work to improve the financial position o f the
Spanish monarchy, and to curb wasteful expenditure, and at the same
time h e too k measure s t o ensur e tha t hi s refor m programm e wa s
carried wel l beyon d th e confine s o f Spai n itself : a specia l visitor -
general was despatched to Peru, whil e to Mexico was sent as viceroy,
armed wit h special commissions,28 to clamp down on tax evasion and
to refor m th e custom s machiner y o f th e colony , th e marque s d e
Gelves, former viceroy of Aragon and a very zealous promoter o f the
king's interests . Gelve s carrie d ou t hi s instruction s wit h great ,
indeed a s events wer e to show , excessiv e determination . Althoug h
there ar e sign s tha t Mexica n commerc e wa s then i n a n unhealth y
state,30 ta x returns withi n Mexic o an d publi c remittance s to Spai n
shot u p dramatically. 31 Moreover , despit e Gelves' s overthrow ,
remittances unde r hi s successor, the marque s de Cerralvo (1624-34),
remained ver y high despit e the cost of fighting off th e Dutc h attemp t
to seize Acapulco in 1624, of maintaining troops in Mexico City in the
aftermath o f the insurrectio n o f i624, 32 and the increase of Mexican
consignments t o th e Philippine s t o hel p counte r th e Dutc h threa t
in th e Fa r East . I t wa s Cerralvo who introduced th e ne w taxation
associated wit h Olivares's "Union o f Arms", the conde-duque's mos t
ambitious attempt to force the dependencies to contribute mor e to the
Spanish wa r effor t i n Europe , th e schem e tha t me t wit h suc h
strenuous resistance from Aragon and Catalonia; under the "Union of
Arms", 250,00 0 ducat s wer e adde d t o annua l ta x burde n o f Ne w
Spain in the fac e o f objections from th e cit y councils of Mexico City
and Puebla. 33 Vicero y Cadereit a (1635-40) , anothe r vigorou s
collector of taxes, while maintaining the stringency of his predecessors ,
forced throug h additiona l taxatio n t o pa y fo r th e Armad a o f
Barlovento, the battl e squadro n then bein g forme d i n the Caribbea n
by th e Spaniard s t o counte r th e Dutch , addin g anothe r 400,00 0
29
A.G.I., Mexico , leg . 2, r. 4 : Counci l memorandu m on Gelves ; A.G.I. ,
Mexico, leg. 29, r. 4: Gelves to council, 14 Nov. 1621; Relation del estado en que
el marques de Gelves hallo el Reyno de la Nueva Espana ( ? Madrid, ? 1627; copy
in Bancrof
30
t Lib. , Berkeley, Calif.).
A.G.I., Mexico, leg . 29 , r. 5 : Sern a to Council , 1 2 Jun e 1622 .
" A.G.I., Mexico, leg, 29, r. 5: Gelves to Council, 1 6 June 1622 ; Gelve s to
Council, 7 June 1623 , i n Anuario d e Estudios Americanos, xiii (1956) , p . 378 ;
Juan Gutierre z Flore s and Jua n de Lormendi, Relation sumaria y puntual del
tumultoy sedition que hubo en Mexico ... (Mexico, 1625 ; copy in Bodleian Lib.,
Oxford), fos. r-2v.
"A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 3 : Mans o to Council , 3 July 1628 .
33
For th e oppositio n o f the cit y councils of Mexico and Puebla , see A.G.I.,
Mexico, leg. 30 , r. i: Cerralvo to Council, 9 May 1629 and 25 May 1629.
pesos per annum to the Mexica n tax burden. 34 I t i s true tha t afte r
the fal l o f Olivares in 1643 , the ta x driv e in Mexic o lost som e of its
intensity, bu t ther e wa s at leas t on e renewe d bou t o f intense fisca l
pressure under th e young duke of Albuquerque (1653-60) , one of the
heroes o f the Spanis h wa r against the French .
Increased taxatio n however , wa s no t th e onl y for m o f Spanis h
pressure on Mexico in the perio d 1620-60 . Madri d als o required of
Mexico certain other majo r concession s in the interests o f the Spanis h
imperial comple x a s a whole , o r rathe r o f Spai n itself . Th e
suppression o f Mexico' s Per u trad e i n 1631 , fo r example , arouse d
more opposition in the viceroyalty than di d the "Union of Arms" and
may be regarded, in view of the importanc e of the Per u trad e i n th e
Mexican economy, as a very drastic measure indeed.35 It s purpos e
was to aid Seville , and th e ailin g textile manufacturer s of Castile, b y
reducing Mexica n textil e export s t o Sout h Americ a whil e a t th e
same tim e reducin g th e flo w o f America n silve r t o th e Fa r Eas t
through Manil a an d Maca o wher e Mexica n merchant s wer e
obtaining their Chinese silks and brocades.S6 Th e measure provoked
a stor m o f protes t i n Ne w Spai n an d i n Manila , an d a mos t
acrimonious exchang e betwee n th e Mexic o Cit y counci l an d th e
merchant consulado o f Seville. 37 N o les s damagin g to th e Mexica n
economy was the decision of Madrid in the 1630 5 to lower the priorit y
of th e Mexica n silver-minin g industr y wit h respec t t o mercur y
supplies fo r th e processin g o f silve r ore , i n relatio n t o th e mor e
productive silve r industry o f Peru. 38 B y 1630 , th e insufficienc y o f
mercury supplies to Peru from other sources caused a large part of the
mercury output of AlmadSn in Spain , an output traditionally exporte d
to Mexico , t o b e diverte d t o Peru . Thi s cause d a severe mercur y
shortage i n Ne w Spai n fo r severa l year s an d a n inevitabl e fal l i n
Mexican silve r production . Thi s blo w was followed b y anothe r i n
1634 whe n Madrid, desperat e fo r fund s an d awar e of the declinin g
34
A.G.I, Mexico, leg. 33 , fo. 185 : Cadereita t o Council, 22 Jul y 1637; an d
ibid.i fo. 194: Cadereita to Council, 22 July 1637; A.C.P., xviii, fos. 252,256-625
Consulta de la ciudad de Mexico al excelentisimo senor virey marques de Cadereyta
sobre quatropuntos que miran a la conservation deste reyno (Mexico, 1636 ; copy in
Brit.
56
Mus.).
Consulta d e l a ciudad d e Mexico a l excelentisimo senor virey marques d e
Cadereyta sobre que se abra la contratacion del Piru (Mexico, 1636 ; copy in Brit .
Mus.); Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad d e Mexico [titl e varies], 5 4 vols. (Mexico ,
1889-1916),
36
xxx, p. 212 , and xxi, p. 70.
37
Borah, Early Colonial Trade, pp . 124-7 .
Relazion de los fundamentos, informes,y pareceres ... ; see also both printe d
consultas
38
of the Mexic o Cit y counci l t o Vicero y Cadereita.
Bakewell, op . cit., p. 163 .
profitability o f Mexican mining in relation to costs, refused to supply
mercury an y longer unde r th e eas y credit term s tha t ha d prevaile d
previously an d starte d t o cal l i n th e hard-presse d mine-owners '
mercury debts. 39
In vie w of the exten t o f Spanis h demand s o n Mexic o durin g th e
years o f Spain' s lon g wa r agains t he r Europea n adversaries , th e
question arise s a s to ho w far the constan t an d marke d instability o f
the vicerega l administratio n i n Mexico during these decade s was the
result o f Madrid's pressure . Unde r Phili p I I the grip of the colonial
bureaucracy o n Mexic o ha d become , b y th e standard s o f the time ,
remarkably tigh t an d efficient . Fa r fro m haltin g th e progressiv e
centralization o f power in sixteenth-centur y Mexico , th e conspirac y
of the leaders of the Mexican-born Spaniard s (Creoles) headed by the
Avila brothers i n the year s 1565-7 , led only to the further humblin g
of the descendant s o f the Conquistadore s and , especiall y unde r th e
formidable fourt h viceroy , do n Martin Enrique z d e Almansa (1568-
80), a furthe r strengthenin g o f roya l an d vicerega l authority. 40
Enriquez's successors , i n the main , me t with littl e resistanc e t o th e
firm exercis e o f thei r authorit y an d th e fou r decade s o f th e grea t
Mexican boom , 1580-1620 , coincided wit h a period o f undisturbed ,
if increasingl y corrupt , colonia l administration . Th e seventeenth -
century proces s o f the weakenin g of viceregal authority, a s Viceroy
Cerralvo note d i n 163 0 i n letter s t o th e Counci l o f th e Indie s i n
Madrid,*1 began wit h th e difficultie s o f Viceroy Guadalcazar (1612 -
21) in th e year s 1620-1 , leading to hi s departure t o take up offic e i n
Peru in somewhat chaotic circumstances, 42 continued with the violent
overthrow o f Gelve s i n th e insurrectio n o f Januar y 1624 , an d wa s
resumed from 162 8 with the success of Cerralvo's enemy, Archbishop
Manso o f Mexico , i n gatherin g muc h Creol e suppor t fo r hi s policy
of oppositio n t o th e viceroy. 43 Cerralvo' s successor , Cadereit a
(1635-40), as has bee n mentioned , me t wit h a storm o f protest an d
left offic e i n circumstance s threatenin g enoug h fo r hi m t o infor m
Madrid tha t h e feare d anothe r popula r outbreak. 44 Hi s successor ,
»• Ibid., pp. 165 , 177 , 203-9.

40
41
L. B. Simpson, Many Mexicos (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 125-6 .
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 30, r. 3: Cerralyo to Council, 24 Jan. 16395 and ibid.,
leg.4S3 , r. 4 , no . 140 : Cerralvo to Council , 25 Aug. 1630.
A.G.I., Mexico , leg. 74 , r. I : Audienci a (o f Mexico) to Council , 4 Jan.
1620;
48
A.G.I.j Patronat o real, leg. 222, fos. 1,294 and i,3i2v .
A.G.L, Patronato real, leg . 225, r. i : Cerralvo to Council, 4 Jan. 1628 5
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 74, r. 4 : Gonzale z Penafie l t o Council (undated).
"A.G.I., Mexico , leg . 35 , r. 2 : Cadereit a to Council , 1 6 Sept . 164 0 an d
25 Nov. 1640 .
Escalona (1640-2), quickly became involve d in two major imbroglio s
and wa s throw n fro m powe r b y hi s adversar y Bisho p Palafo x o f
Puebla. Salvatierr a (1642-8 ) face d seriou s disturbance s an d wa s
removed from his post by Madrid for his failure to control the colony,
while th e cond e d e Bano s (1660-4 ) als o me t wit h suc h intens e
opposition tha t Madri d though t i t politi c t o remov e him befor e th e
end of his term.
Detailed analysi s of the politica l disturbance s o f the year s 1620-64
in New Spain suggests strongly the following conclusion: in part, the
difficulties o f th e viceroys , lik e th e economi c depression , wa s th e
consequence o f th e pressur e emanatin g fro m Madrid , bu t onl y i n
part. Th e political crisis of 1623-4, culminating in Gelves's downfall,
one gather s fro m th e informatio n amasse d afte r th e uprisin g b y
Madrid's special investigator, Marti n d e Carrillo, and the correspon-
dence of Gelves and his opponents preserve d i n the Archivo de Indias
in Seville, 45 wa s cause d b y th e combinatio n agains t th e vicero y o f
three important element s in Mexican society: white colonists resentin g
the sudde n intensification of fiscal pressure;46 office-holders resenting
Gelves's puritanical driv e agains t officia l corruption; 47 and colonist s
and secula r clerg y objectin g to Gelves' s staunc h defence of the tradi-
tional segregatio n polic y of the Spanis h crow n an d religiou s orders ,
which sough t t o separat e th e India n communitie s fro m th e white ,
mixed an d negr o population. 48 Investigatio n o f the oppositio n t o
Cerralvo suggest s tha t i t derive d fro m tw o principa l sources : onc e
more reaction agains t intens e fiscal pressure and , onc e again, Creol e
hostility t o th e segregatio n polic y an d th e contro l o f th e viceroy' s
officers ove r the labour supply that attended it; 49 this tim e however ,
office-holders stood aside, for Cerralvo, who was evidently exceedingly
corrupt himself , had droppe d Gelves' s polic y o f attackin g officia l
corruption. Th e opposition to Cadereita, it appears, stemmed mainly
*5
48
See especially the five books of papers: A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 221-5.
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 4: Gelves to Council, 26 Feb. 1622 ; Antonio de
Brambila y Arriaga , Relation e n favor del marques d e Gelves, i n Documentos
relatives al tumulto d e 1624, vols. i i an d ii i o f 2n d ser . o f Documentos para l a
Historia d e Mexico, i i (Mexico, 1855) , pp. 213-90 .
"A.G.I., Patronat o real , leg . 223 , r . 5 : "Declaracione s de l marque s d e
Gelves"; A.G.I. , Patronat o real, leg. 221 , r . 13 : Gelve s to Council s 8 Nov.
1622.
48
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 5: Serna to Council, 1 2 June 1622; Relation del
estado, fo . 5 ; Bibl . Nac . d e Madrid , MS . 2354 : "Principi o d e la s disen -
ciones ...", fo. 191.
"A.G.I., Patronato real, leg . 225, r. 2 : Mans o t o Council , 1 0 Ma y 1628 ;
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 4: Manso to Council, 26 May 162 8 and 8 Nov. 1629 ;
A.G.I., Mexico , leg. 30, r. i : Cerralv o to Council , 9 May 1629 .
from renewe d fisca l pressur e an d als o fro m Cadereita' s stringen t
application o f Madrid' s restriction s o n Mexica n trade. 80 Th e fal l
of Escalon a i s a rathe r specia l cas e bein g complicate d b y th e
ramifications i n Mexic o o f th e grea t revolt s o f 1640- 1 o f Portuga l
and Brazi l agains t Spain , fo r th e presenc e o f a wealth y Portuguese
trading communit y i n Ne w Spai n cause d a wav e of uneas e among
the Mexica n Spaniard s whic h enabled Escalona' s enemy , Palafox , t o
capitalize o n th e viceroy' s famil y connectio n wit h th e duk e o f
Braganza, th e leade r o f th e Portugues e secession , an d thereb y
undermine th e viceroy' s positio n a t Madrid; 51 nevertheless ,
Palafox's feu d wit h Escalona had risen in no small degree firstly from
Escalona's resistanc e to Palafox' s judicia l driv e agains t bureaucrati c
corruption53 an d secondl y fro m Palafox' s sympath y fo r th e Creol e
party an d especiall y Creol e dislik e o f th e segregatio n policy. 53
Regarding th e politica l crisi s o f 1645-5 0 whic h wil l be discusse d i n
some detail below, it seems very clear that following the fall of Olivares
fiscal pressure playe d a lesse r rol e tha n previousl y an d tha t Creol e
hostility to the viceregal segregation policy and its various adminstra-
tive implications wa s in fact the principal reason for the disturbances .
In th e cas e o f th e oppositio n t o Baftos , th e phenomeno n ma y b e
ascribed t o a combination of a worsening of the economic depression ,
food shortag e an d hig h prices , an d continue d oppositio n t o th e
segregation policy. 54
In view of the indications tha t the discontent tha t so disturbed th e
functioning o f viceregal power in Mexic o i n th e year s 1620-6 4 was
due a s muc h t o Creol e dislik e of the segregatio n polic y as to fiscal
pressure, i t becomes necessary to examine the segregatio n policy and
consider why it became so potent a source of contention in seventeenth-
century Mexico . Arguabl y no feature of sixteenth-century Mexica n
history i s mor e strikin g o r significan t tha n th e failur e o f th e
60
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 2: Cadereita to Council, 16 Sept. 1640; Archive
de los Duques de l Infantado , Madrid, Palafo x paper s (hereafter A.D.I. , Pal.),
xxxvii, fos. 21-2: Cadereit a to cond e d e Castrillo , 27 Sept. 1638 .
"Archive Genera l d e l a Nacidn , Mexic o Cit y (hereafte r A.G.N.) ,
Inquisici6n, leg. 489, fos. 85-1045 A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 43 r. 6, exp[ediente] 281:
Palafox t o Council, 1 9 June 1641.
48
A.D.I., Pal., xlix, fos. 198-9 : "Auto secreto sobre lo s impedimientos que
puso a la vissit a e l senor marques de Villena" (1 4 Feb. 1642).
"A.D.I., Pal., Ixiii , fo . 836 5 A.G.N. , cedula s originales , vol . i : crow n t o
Escalona, 1 0 Feb. 1642.
"A.G.I., Mexico , leg. 77: Gine s Morot e t o Council , 2 5 Aug. 1664 , an d
Audiencia to Council, 1 4 July 1664,4 June 1663,8 June 1663, and Gines Morote
to Council , 2 6 May 1663 5 ibid., leg. 39, r. 2 : Osori o d e Escoba r t o Council ,
20 July 1664 .
conquistadores, an d th e settler s wh o cam e i n thei r wake , t o retai n
control over the India n communities , th e India n market , an d India n
labour, crops , and lands. Ha d the settler s wo n the politica l due l of
the sixteent h centur y an d defeate d th e effort s o f the king' s officers ,
doubtless by 162 0 traditional India n communit y lif e an d agricultur e
would have largely disintegrated an d most of the Indian s woul d have
been absorbe d int o th e growin g comple x o f Spanis h enterprises ,
estates an d mines . Fo r th e Spanis h deman d fo r labou r an d
resources, and the vulnerability of the Indians wer e great. However ,
powerful force s ha d acte d t o stri p th e colonist s o f their supremac y
over th e Indian s i n th e mid - and late sixteenth century , th e India n
population, o r the larger part of it, was to a considerable exten t fenced
off fro m th e white s an d half-castes , an d th e institutio n o f th e
repanimiento ha d bee n introduced t o provide for the labou r need s of
Spanish entrepreneur s withou t givin g the m direc t acces s t o th e
Indian labour force.55 Certainl y many Indians, especiall y in areas of
heavy concentratio n suc h a s th e inne r section s o f th e larg e cities ,
slipped th e ne t o f wha t wa s called th e "India n republic" , becam e
ladino, or Spanish-speakin g Indians , too k t o dressin g lik e the half -
castes, cu t thei r tie s wit h th e traditiona l India n communitie s an d
worked directly for the colonists. 58 Bu t most, even in Mexico City ,
Puebla an d Zacatecas , wher e th e oute r o r "Indian " ward s wer e
separated fro m the inner city and kept under the religious administra -
tion o f th e friars , continue d t o liv e i n specificall y India n com -
munities.67 Moreover , i t i s becomin g increasingl y clea r t o
historians that a great deal of Indian land remained in Indian hands in
the seventeenth century, and hi many areas, such was the effectivenes s
of th e protectio n afforde d b y th e vicerega l authorities , th e Indian s
retained mor e land tha n the y coul d effectivel y use. 88 I n th e valley
of Mexic o itself , accordin g t o Professo r Gibson , th e India n village s
and townships possessed about a third o f the cultivabl e land in 1620,
which suggests , give n that th e India n populatio n o f the valle y was
then ver y much les s tha n a third o f what it ha d bee n i n 1520 , that
55
C. Gibson and M. Morner, "Diego Munoz Camargp and the Segregatio n
Policy o f th e Spanis h Crown" , Hispanic American Hist. Rev., xlii i (1963) ,
pp. 558-68 ; C . Gibson , Th e Aztecs under Spanish Rule (Stanford , Calif. , an d
Oxford, 1964) , pp. 81-97 .
" On the cultural gap between th e two categories of Indians, se e A.G.N.,
Historia, vol. ccccxiii , fos. 11-21 .
"
88
Gibson, Th e Aztecs, pp. 370-7; Bakewell, op. cit., pp. no-ii.
W. B. Taylor, Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford , Calif. ,
1972), pp . 108 , 149 , 163 , 195 ; W . S . Osborn , "India n Lan d Retentio n i n
Colonial Metztitlan" , Hispanic American Hist. Rev., liii (1973), pp. 23 3 ff.
there wa s actually mor e lan d pe r India n i n India n possessio n the n
than there had been before the Conquest. 69
But although the protective fences around Indian society in Mexico
had been erected at the bidding of Madrid and the viceroys, and with
the blessing of the friars, the actual guardians of the barriers separatin g
Indian fro m colonis t wer e th e ne w clas s o f officer s an d distric t
governors, especially the corregidores an d alcaldes mayores, that arose
in th e secon d hal f o f the sixteent h centur y and becam e die basis of
viceregal authorit y i n th e Mexica n countryside . Thes e officer s ha d
their ow n ver y particula r reason s fo r takin g th e segregatio n polic y
seriously. A s Vicero y Cerralvo remarke d in hi s repor t o f 163 6 t o
Madrid, th e corregidores and other district officer s wer e paid onl y the
most trifling salaries ye t they eagerly competed an d sought afte r their
offices, suc h wer e the financia l reward s that pertaine d t o th e jo b of
collecting th e king's tribute , implementing roya l and viceregal orders ,
and "protecting" the Indians from the Spaniards.60 Th e corregidores,
as i s wel l known, 61 regularl y mad e larg e fortune s b y thei r variou s
methods o f extortion includin g th e force d purchas e o f Indian crop s
at minima l price s i n orde r t o sel l a t grea t profi t i n th e towns ,
conducting compulsor y sale s o f good s a t exorbitan t prices , takin g
fees fo r favour s fro m Spaniards , an d makin g astut e us e o f th e
repartimiento o r "India n share-out". Th e repartimiento,™ i t shoul d
be emphasized, wa s a means of raising force d labour b y the viceroy' s
officers, operatin g i n co-operatio n wit h the India n tow n councils or
cabildos, whic h provide d labou r t o Spaniard s withou t givin g the m
control o f the workers . Employer s ha d to abide b y fixed rules, pay
a standard wage , retain the worker s for onl y a stipulated and usually
short period , and then return th e Indian s to their communitie s an d
the supervision of the Indian and Spanish officers. Thu s the Indians
were in effect supportin g two separate economies, that of the Spanish
settlers on the on e hand an d that of the India n district s functionin g
chiefly i n the interes t of the corregidores, friars, an d India n hierarchy
on the other .
This dual system, and the wasteful and inefficient us e of labour that
it involved, worked tolerably well as long as the increasing shortage of
69
B0
Gibson, Th e Aztecs, p. 277.
See Cerralvo's report in Description d e la Nueva Espana e n el Siglo XVII,
ed. M . Cueva s (Mexico , 1944) , pp. 231-2 .
" Gibson, Th e Aztecs, pp . 93-4 ; C . H . Haring , Th e Spanish Empire i n
America (1947 ; New York , 196 3 edn.) 3 pp. 132-4 .
"Haring, op . tit. , p . 59 ; C . Gibson , Spain i n America (Ne w York, 1967) ,
pp. 143-4 .
labour was not too pressing and as long as the mining, industrial, and
commercial boom of the decade s 1580-1620 sufficiently diverte d th e
colonists' thoughts from the possibilities posed by the Indian market,
Indian crop s an d lands , an d th e ver y rapi d easin g o f th e
labour-shortage tha t coul d readil y b e achieve d b y dissolvin g th e
framework o f th e "India n republic" . However , fro m 1620 , a s
depression se t in, a s fiscal pressure mounted, an d a s the siz e of th e
total India n population continued , eve n if only slightly, to shrink, 63
there was a very marked heightening of tension between the Spanish
settlers an d th e "parasiti c bureaucracy" , t o us e Professo r Trevor -
Roper's apt phrase, which was exploiting the resources of the "India n
republic". Alread y befor e 1620 , Creole s suc h a s Gonzal o Gome z
de Cervantes , writing in 1599 , had complaine d of the advers e effects
of bureaucratic control of the Indians on the settlers,64 but from about
1620, wit h th e publicatio n i n Madri d o f th e trac t o f the Mexica n
Creole Herna n Carrill o Altamiran o calling fo r th e abolitio n o f th e
repanimiento,*6 writte n an d sometime s printe d attack s o n th e
repartimiento i n particular, an d mor e importantly, on the corregidores
and bureaucrati c contro l ove r th e Indian s i n general , becam e
increasingly frequent.68 Creol e authors asserted that the corregidores
were systematically subordinating all economic activity in "Indian",
that i s to sa y in most areas of central and southern , Mexic o to their
own interest s an d intimidating , an d ofte n seriousl y harming, Creol e
employers. Moreover , a s this literar y campaign, whic h was closely
linked wit h the politica l campaign against viceregal power being led
by suc h men a s Archbishop Manso and Bisho p Palafox, bot h grea t
enemies of the corregidores, gained momentum, tile scope of the attack
on th e bureaucrati c structure i n Mexic o progressivel y broadened.
In Ma y 1628 Manso, who had made himself spokesman of the Creole
interest, advise d Madri d t o forc e th e viceroy s t o abolis h th e
63
The first increase i n Indian tribut e return s wa s noted i n 1671 ] see A.G.I.,
Mexico, leg. 45, r. i: Mancera to Council, 5 Apr. 1671; and ibid., leg. 46, r. 2:
Mancera to Council , 1 5 Apr. 1672.
14
Gonzalo Gome z d e Cervantes , La Vida Economica y Social d e la Nueva
Espana
64
al Finalizar el Siglo XVI, ed . A. M. Carreno (Mexico, 1944), pp. 121-4 .
El Doctor Hernan Carrillo Altamirano vezino y natural de l a Ciudad d e
Mexico .. . dize ... (? Madrid, ? 1620; copy in Brit. Mus.) .
'• Three majo r example s are : th e Informe que presenta a . . . Felipe I V
Christobal de Molina, regidor de la ciudad de Mexico, sobre el sistema de
repartimientos y servicio personal d e los indios... (Madrid, 1625 ; cop y i n
Archive Historic o National , Madrid , MS . 307) ; th e blisterin g attac k o n th e
segregation policy, i n an appeal to King Philip I V over the head of the viceroy ,
of Juan Fernandez d e Vivero, Creole of Tlaxcala: Brit. Mus., Add. MS. I3974 >
doc. 33; and the critique o f the corregidores by Luis Garci a de Najera, a wealthy
hacienda-ovmer o f the Puebl a district : A.D.I. , Pal., liv , fos. 521-4.
repartimiento i n all its forms, to reduce the power s of the corregidores
over th e Indian s an d therefor e ove r whol e sector s o f the economy ,
and to leave the Indians "free to work as they please at whatever work
they choose , an d t o g o t o thos e employer s wh o offe r th e bes t
conditions".67 B y Novembe r 1629 , Mans o wante d Madri d t o
abolish the corregidores altogethe r except for a mere four o r five in th e
regional capitals who should be paid large salaries so as to remove the
necessity o f corruptio n an d wh o shoul d b e appointe d i n Madrid ,
rather tha n Mexic o Cit y wher e th e grea t majorit y o f existin g
corregidores wer e appointed, s o as to weake n the lin k betwee n thes e
remaining officer s an d th e viceroys ; fo r th e rest , h e argued , loca l
administration should be left to the Creole town councils.w Palafox ,
the mos t outstanding leade r of the Creole party in the epoch 1620-6 4
and th e mos t relentles s fo e o f the corregidores a s well as of two vice -
roys, stil l mor e vigorousl y advocated , i n hi s report s t o Madrid ,
abolition of the corregimientos and the assignment of local power to the
Creole cit y and town councils. 69
The rif t betwee n officer s an d colonist s wa s widene d somewha t
further b y a n additiona l facto r whic h adde d overtone s o f socia l
snobbery t o the quarrel . Th e viceroys , who were never of Mexican
origin themselves, tende d t o appoint as corregidores an d othe r officer s
men unconnecte d wit h loca l interest s an d therefor e usuall y no t
Creoles. I n th e main , the y preferre d associate s and relative s who
would b e dependen t fo r thei r loca l powe r o n th e vicero y alone .
Thus in general th e corregidores wer e peninsulars or, as the colonist s
called Europea n Spaniards , gachupines.™ Moreover , ther e i s n o
doubt that by 1600, and even before, the relationship between Creoles
and gachupines distinguishe d b y difference s o f background , manners
and accent , wa s already marre d b y a measur e o f rivalr y which le d
frequently t o virulen t verba l exchange s an d no t infrequentl y t o
violence.71 Certainl y on e should no t mak e too much of this factor ,
for individua l Creole s an d gachupines wer e perfectl y capabl e o f
crossing th e line s o f the conflic t betwee n colonists an d bureaucracy
where thi s suite d thei r individua l interest , bu t equall y clearly suc h
67
A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 225, r. 2: Manso to Council, 26 May 1628.
*" A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3 , r. 4 : Mans o to Council , 8 Nov. 1629.
"A.D.I., Pal. , ix , fos . 56-62 , an d xxxv , fos . 71-80: Palafo x t o cond e d e
Castrillo, j Sept . and 7 Oct. 1646 ; A.D.I., Pal, ix, fo. 51: Palafo x t o Council,
i Dec
70
. 1646 .
See Palafox' s observation s printed i n Boletin de l Archive General d e l a
Nacion,
71
ist ser., i i (1931), pp. 814-19.
For the heightening of Cieole-gachupin tension in 1618 , see: Bancroft Lib.,
MS. M- M 149 , "Mexic o y sus Disturbios", vol. i, pp. 121-9 .
differences di d ad d to the bitternes s an d intensit y o f the underlying
conflict.
Inevitably, the increased pressure of the Creoles on the bureaucrati c
complex of the "Indian republic" had the effect of closing the ranks of
those wh o benefite d fro m th e existin g syste m — Spanis h officers ,
Indian officers , an d friars . Befor e 1620 , i t appear s tha t th e
beneficiaries o f th e segregatio n polic y wer e a s ap t t o b e rival s a s
accomplices i n extortion . I n particular , relation s betwee n corregi-
dores an d the Franciscan, Dominican an d Augustinia n friars who had
converted th e Indian s t o Catholicis m in th e earl y sixteent h centur y
and continue d t o administe r th e bul k o f the India n parishe s i n th e
seventeenth, ha d bee n bad . Vicero y Montesclaro s (1603-7) , k'k e
Viceroy Enrique z befor e him , regarde d th e mendicant s a s virtua l
enemies of his officers an d sharply criticized the m for the avarice they
betrayed i n th e administratio n o f thei r India n parishes. 72 Afte r
1620 or thereabouts, however , there was a marked change. N o more
do w e hea r o f frictio n betwee n corregidores an d friar s o r vicerega l
diatribes agains t th e latter . Rathe r th e friar s becam e th e
staunchest allie s o f the corregidores i n thei r resistanc e to th e Creol e
offensive. Th e secula r clergy , whic h a t it s lowe r level s wa s
overwhelmingly Creol e i n compositio n an d therefore predisposed t o
join wit h th e Creol e lait y i n an y case , wa s also extremel y eage r t o
wrest the Indian parishes from the friars and for this reason the latter,
especially afte r Archbisho p Serna' s campaig n agains t the m i n th e
years i6i8-24, 73 now had even more need for the corregidores' suppor t
than the corregidores had need of theirs. Ever y viceroy between 162 0
and 166 4 engaged in imbroglios wit h th e secula r clerg y on behalf o f
the friars , wit h th e singl e an d ver y brie f exceptio n o f Palafox , an d
indeed i t wa s the viceroys , with respect t o both th e interna l politic s
of New Spai n an d th e pressure s the y applie d i n Madrid , wh o were
chiefly responsibl e fo r keepin g th e bul k o f th e India n parishe s i n
Mexico out of the hands of the secular clergy during the seventeent h
century. Creol e writers , fo r thei r part , vehementl y criticize d th e
religious orders , includin g the Jesuit s afte r thei r switc h fro m a pro -
Creole t o a n anti-Creol e stanc e i n th e late r i620s, 74 an d no t onl y
78
Coleccidn d e Documentos ineditos para l a Historia d e Espana, ed .
M. Fernande z Navarret e e t al., 11 2 vols . (Madrid , 1842-95) , xvi, p . 379 , an d
xxvi,
78
pp. 174-5 -
Cedulario d e los Siglos XVI y XVII, ed . A. M. Carrefi o (Mexico , 1947) ,
pp. 232-3 , 263 5 Memorial d e lo s Sucedido e n l a ciudad d e Mexico desde e l dia
primero de Noviembre d e 1623 asta quince de enero de 1624 (Mexico, 1624 ; copy
in Bodleia
71
n Lib.) , fo. 6v.
Bancroft Lib. , MSS. M- M 149 , p. 651; Relation de l estado, fo. 6; A.G.I.,
Mexico, leg. 3 , r. 4 , exp. 166 , fo. 7.
supported th e bishop s an d secula r clergy against the friars , bu t full y
expected that victory for the latter in the fight for the Indian parishe s
would b e accompanie d b y a shar p movemen t i n favou r o f Creol e
interests i n India n district s i n general. 75 I n thi s connectio n i t i s
noteworthy tha t jus t a s th e corregidores accuse d th e secula r clergy ,
with good reason,76 in those districts wher e the secular clergy did hold
Indian parishes, of sending Indian s awa y from thei r village s to wor k
on the haciendas o f their Creol e relatives an d friends , s o the Creole s
accused th e friars , wit h equa l justification, " o f helping corregidores
and Indian officials t o remove Indians from Creole estates and sending
them back to their villages .
Probably n o personag e involve d in the commotion s o f 1620-6 4 in
Mexico looms larger and none has greater claim s to be regarded as an
archetypal "genera l crisis " figur e tha n Jua n d e Palafox . Lik e th e
views an d action s o f Gelves , thos e o f this remarkabl e Aragones e ar e
a prime example of that "general , non-doctrinal, mora l Puritanism "
that Professo r Trevor-Rope r closel y associate d wit h th e numerou s
reform movement s of the "genera l crisis " era. 78 Palafox' s extensiv e
political writings centre around the question of how the dissolution of
the Europe o f his day could be halted and the powe r of Spain which
he saw as the key to European stability and the re-assertion o f intellec-
tual unity of outlook on the basi s of counter-reformation Catholicism
and southern Europea n baroqu e values, be revived.79 I n his political
career, he had been a protege of Olivares, distinguishe d himself in the
service of the Spanis h monarchy , show n an intense interes t in every
aspect of the global struggle between Spain and her adversarie s from
Brazil t o Germany , an d consistentl y stresse d th e nee d t o buil d u p
Spanish royal and imperial power. I t i s accordingly a strange irony ,
and at first sight rathe r puzzling , tha t Palafo x shoul d hav e been th e
principal autho r o f disturbance s tha t impaire d th e functionin g o f
viceregal powe r i n Mexic o an d splintere d th e authorit y o f Viceroy
"Juan Fernande z d e Vivero , "Discurso" : Brit . Mus. , Add . MS . 13974 ,

fos. 158-9 ; Luis de la Palma y Freites, Par las religiones de Santo Domingo, Sa n
Francisco y Sa n Agustin (Madrid , 1644 ; cop y i n Newberr y Lib. , Chicago) ,
pp.7814-16 .
A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 3, fo. 6: Alcalde mayor of Tlaxcala to Salvatierra,
29 77Nov. 1643 ; ibid., fos. 97-11: report of corregidor o f Huejotzingo .
Fuentes para l a Historia de l Trabajo e n Nueva Espaha, ed . S . A . Zavala
and78M . Castel o (Mexico, 1939-46), vii, pp. 4-5 , 137-8 .
79
Trevor-Roper, "Th e Genera l Crisis", Past and Present, no. 16, pp. 49-50 .
See, for instance, his Dialogo politico del estado de Alemania y Comparacidn
de Espana co n las demos Naciones, in Obras, 12 vols. (Madrid, 1762), x, pp. 56 -
83; an d th e Juicio politico d e los Danos y Reparos d e qualquiera Monarquia,
ibid., x, pp. 36-52 .
Salvatierra (1642-8 ) a s effectivel y a s Sern a ha d helpe d shatte r th e
authority o f Gelves an d Bisho p Osori o d e Escoba r was to brea k th e
conde d e Bafios .
It seem s clear , however , tha t Palafo x launche d hi s attac k o n
Salvatierra, a s h e ha d launche d hi s attac k o n Escalon a in 1641-2 ,
only afte r dee p an d searchin g consideration. 80 I n hi s capacit y a s
visitor-general o f New Spain , h e ha d bee n speciall y empowered by
a Madri d increasingl y worrie d b y th e deterioratio n o f authorit y i n
Mexico, t o investigat e ever y aspec t o f administratio n i n th e vice -
royalty an d pu t forwar d comprehensiv e proposal s fo r reform. 81
After a thorough stud y o f conditions, 82 Palafo x cam e indignantly to
the conclusio n tha t a n appallin g loosenin g o f Madrid' s gri p o n
Mexico had taken place owing largely to the pressure of a corrupt and
embattled bureaucrac y whic h mor e an d mor e wa s enclosin g an d
predetermining th e viceroy' s fiel d o f action . Self-interes t an d a
natural inclinatio n t o abide by the logi c of the bureaucratic structur e
in Mexico was causing the viceroys to evade and neglect their principal
duty, that of serving the interest s o f the Spanis h crown. A s Palafox
put it, the decrees of Madrid coul d not have been taken less notice of
in Mexico had they been issued by the king of France.83 Full y aware
of it s dept h an d disruptiv e implications , Palafo x viewe d th e spli t
between bureaucracy and colonist s in Mexic o with dismay and came
to believe that only in a Creole victory, the destruction of the power of
the corregidores an d th e religiou s orders , an d th e reconstitutio n o f
viceregal power on a new basis was there any rea l prospect o f viable
solution. Onl y thus, a s h e sa w it, coul d th e Creole s b e genuinely
integrated int o the structur e o f the empir e and the paralysi s of royal
power in Mexico cured. Thi s is the logi c of his political formula fo r
New Spain: more power to the Creoles and more power to Madrid .
Yet neithe r Palafo x no r Salvatierra , whateve r th e difference s
between them, wanted matters to reach the point of a serious political
conflict. Jus t as Palafox an d Escalon a had hun g back in 1640- 1 bu t
ultimately been drawn into conflict b y the inexorabl e logic of the rif t
in th e Mexica n body politic, s o Palafox an d Salvatierr a were force d
into a situatio n which probably both woul d hav e preferred t o hav e
avoided. Littl e b y little , a t a loca l level , Palafo x wa s draw n int o
supporting his lower clergy and th e Creole s of his diocese in a series
80
81
A.D.I., Pal. , xlix, fos. 198-9, and liv , fo. 233.
68
A.D.I., Pal., Ixxx , fos. 35-8: Palafox t o Council , 1 0 July 1641.
83
A.D.I., Pal., ix, fos. 56-62.
A.D.I., Pal. , xxxv , "Carta s sobr e l a Visita", fo. 75 : Palafo x t o cond e de
Castrillo, 7 Oct. 1646.
of smal l incident s whic h graduall y embroile d hi m wit h th e
corregidores o f Tlaxcala , Cholul a an d Huejotzing o an d thei r
deputies,84 and then wit h a progressively wider circle of the viceroy' s
officers, som e antagonized b y the erosio n of their loca l power, other s
threatened b y the judicia l inquiries linked with Palafox's visita, while
Salvatierra wa s slowl y draw n int o th e figh t b y hi s corregidores a s
a counter-weigh t t o th e visitor-general ; th e hig h cour t (audiencia)
of Mexico was hopelessly split, and the ground wa s prepared for full -
scale conflict . A s th e strif e developed , Salvatierra , compelle d t o
conceal a s muc h a s h e coul d o f the tru e backgroun d t o th e breac h
between himself and the visitor-general, which did hi m littl e credit ,
and ye t compelle d t o counte r Palafox' s report s t o Madrid , wa s
driven to try to discredit Palafox , to intimidate the Creole city councils
of Mexic o Cit y an d Puebl a int o denouncin g Palafox' s visita wit h
which the y wer e i n fac t i n complet e sympathy, 85 t o mobiliz e th e
Mexican inquisitio n agains t Palafox , and t o mak e maximum use of
the smoke-screen throw n u p for him by the Jesuits an d Dominicans,
who i n orde r t o hel p th e vicero y resume d a furiou s squabbl e ove r
points o f ecclesiastica l jurisdictio n whic h ha d previousl y lapsed. 86
The consequenc e wa s the grea t tension o f 1647, the temporary flight
of Palafo x into th e sierra , a string o f popular demonstration s i n th e
bishop's favour , and the join t military an d inquisitio n occupatio n of
Puebla an d som e fift y politica l arrest s o f th e summe r o f i64y. 87
These events le d in turn to the chronic instability of New Spain of the
next thre e years , marke d b y a see-sa w movemen t in th e balanc e of
power between the opposing parties and a series of administrative and
ecclesiastical purge s an d counter-purges. 88
84
Brit. Mus. j Add . MS . 13976 , doc . 47 ; A.G.I. , Mexico , leg . 35 , r . 3 :
"Informes
86
echo s al virrey por la s justicias".
Copia d e la s Cartas que la s Ciudades d e Mexico y d e l a Puebla escrivieron
a la real persona y sus consejos ... informando de la verdad de lo que sucedio en la
Nueva Espana (Mexico , 1648 ; cop y in Bibl . Nac . d e Mexico) ; A.D.I., Pal.,
vii.89
A.D.I., Pal., xxxv, fo. 80: Palafox t o Castrillo, 6 June 1646; Palafox, Carta
al Padre
87
Caroche, in Obras, ix, p . 143 .
Univ. of Texas Lib., Austin, Texas, dept . o f Latin American MSS., MS .
G-ios, "Relacio n veridic a d e lo acaecido en Puebla" ; and ibid., MS . G-io6 ,
"Relacion de lo occurido en la Puebla de los Angeles"; Brit . Mus., Add . MS .
13976, "Relacion sucinta"; Bibl. Nac. de Mexico, MS. 1216 : Palafox, "Quejas
contra Salvatierra" ; th e accoun t o f Leonard o d e Saldana , ibid., MS . 890 ;
Carta del venerable sieruo de Dies d. Juan de Palafoxy Mendoza al sumo Ponttfice
Inocencio Decimo (Jan. 1649) , 3r d edn . (Madrid , 1768) ; A.G.N., Inquisici6n,
vols. 424 and 429.
88
Gregorio M. de Guijo, Diario, 1648-64, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1952), i, pp. 6-17,
59-60, 68-9 ; A.G.I. , Mexico , leg . 76, r. 3 : Pedro Melian to Council , 23 May
1649.
Such the n wa s the stat e int o whic h administratio n ha d sun k i n
Mexico at the time of the most chronic phase of disturbance (1647-53)
of the "genera l crisis" period i n Europe , th e time of the Frondes i n
France, Cromwell's revolution in England , th e revolt s o f Sicily and
Naples against Spain , Chmielnicki' s revolt and the greatest massacr e
of th e Jew s i n easter n Europ e befor e Nazism , an d variou s othe r
assorted commotions across the continent. Admittedly , a great deal
of th e frictio n i n seventeenth-centur y Mexico , a s identified i n thi s
paper, ca n be said to have been typical of the stresses that tended t o
develop betwee n colonia l bureaucracie s an d colonists i n man y part s
of the globe at all periods of the history of early European colonialism.
In Mexico , th e disturbance s o f 1620-6 4 wer e indeed , i n certai n
respects, foreshadowe d b y th e struggl e o f 1522-6 7 whe n th e
conquistadores and their heirs fought a losing battle against the officer s
of Charles V and Phili p II . Tension s betwee n settlers and colonial
administration arisin g from fiscal pressures, bureaucrati c corruption,
and rivalr y between locally-born an d European-bor n ar e a familia r
part of the background to the independenc e of the whol e of Spanish
America an d Brazil, 89 and ar e to b e seen also in othe r earl y colonial
contexts suc h a s in Dutc h Sout h Afric a i n th e eighteent h centur y
where th e Afrikane r wa s findin g himsel f increasingl y ou t o f
sympathy with the bureaucrat s sent ou t to administer the colony by
the Dutc h Eas t India Company. 90 Bu t the commotion s of 1620-64
in Mexico can be related to these general problems of early colonialism
only u p t o a point. I n general , i n early colonialism, there wer e no
significant disturbance s intervenin g betwee n th e initia l stag e
comprising th e assertio n o f bureaucratic contro l ove r the Europea n
settlers, a stage completed in the case of the Spanis h overseas empire
early in the reign of Philip II, an d the final stage, not reached in many
cases unti l th e earl y nineteent h century , o f th e independenc e
movements agains t the colonia l powers. Th e specia l importanc e of
the commotions of 1620-64 in Mexico, irrespective of whether parallel
occurrences i n othe r part s o f th e Spanis h colonia l empir e ar e
encountered o r not, lie s precisely in this: that the y took place at an
intermediate stage in the history of early colonialism — being followed
by a lon g perio d o f comparativel y stable colonia l administratio n —
and as a result of a combination of factors inseparable from th e grea t
88
R. A. Humphreys, "The Developmen t of the American Communitie s out -
side British Rule", The New Cambridge Modern History, viii (Cambridge, 1965),
pp. 40 6 ff.; C. R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825 (London,
1969)5
M PP- 198-9 .
C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800 (London, 1965), p. 266.
crisis o f th e Spanis h monarch y o f th e middl e decade s o f th e
seventeenth centur y whic h i s i n tur n inseparable , i n vie w o f th e
virtually preponderan t positio n o f Spai n i n th e Europ e o f the earl y
seventeenth century, 91 fro m th e "genera l crisis " o f seventeenth -
century Europe .
The relation of the Mexican disturbances o f 1620-64 to the tensions
implicit i n earl y colonialism i n general , however , doe s significantly
affect th e theoretical proble m o f relating the Mexica n commotions to
the variou s hypothese s tha t hav e bee n advance d b y historian s i n
explanation o f the "general crisis" of the seventeent h century . Th e
friction o f th e year s 1620-6 4 i n Mexic o betwee n bureaucrac y an d
colonists, complicate d b y variou s othe r factors , ha s feature s whic h
are readil y compatibl e wit h virtuall y al l o f the differin g theoretica l
approaches t o the "general crisis" in Europe arguably partly because
these different theorie s are somewhat less exclusive of each other than
is sometimes suggested , but certainl y also because of the wid e range
of stresse s implici t i n th e colonia l situatio n itself . Accordingly ,
Professor Trevor-Roper' s "general crisis " theory, when related to the
Mexican case , bears up well, for it is impossible to deny that a major
ingredient o f th e Mexica n crisi s wa s a stron g reactio n agains t a
virtually unsalaried , wasteful, an d parasiti c bureaucracy b y a broa d
combination o f groups whic h ca n be fairl y describe d a s the popular
party hi Mexican politics, and which was supported by the mob in the
rising of 1624 and i n the demonstration s o f 1647 and 166 4 in Mexico
City and Pueblaj moreover, there was indubitably als o a movement of
non-doctrinal puritanis m against bureaucratic corruption and wastefu l
use o f resources . Equally , however , thos e wh o argu e tha t th e
tremendous cos t o f wa r wa s th e crucia l factor, 93 seein g th e
intensification of fiscal pressure as the chief cause of the rising tension
in Europe , hold thei r ground ; fo r ther e ca n b e n o doub t a s to th e
importance, i n the Mexica n crisis, o f a sharp rise in taxation and an
effective tightening-u p o f tax-collectin g machiner y arisin g fro m th e
immense cost of Spain's militar y undertakings. Similarly , those who
regard the general crisis as being essentially a vast shift in the balance
of resources, power and culture in Europe due to a purely coincidental
combination o f th e disruptio n o f muc h o f centra l an d easter n
81
For a recen t assessmen t o f th e positio n o f Spai n i n Europ e durin g th e
reign of Philip III, see H. R . Trevor-Roper, "Spain and Europe 1598-1621" ,
in J . P . Coope r (ed.) , Th e Ne w Cambridge Modern History, i v (Cambridge ,
I970)> PP - 260-82.
•» See Professor Elliott's contribution t o th e symposiu m on Trevor-Roper's
"general crisis" essay in Past and Present, no. 1 8 (Nov. 1960) .
Europe wit h the crumbling o f the Mediterranea n economie s o f Italy,
Turkey an d Spai n com e ou t well , fo r Mexic o arguabl y wa s
inescapably involved in the declin e o f Spain. An d last but no t least,
the Marxis t analysi s of E. J. Hobsbaw m is by no means lef t withou t
room fo r manoeuvre ; fo r th e sign s ar e tha t Mexic o experience d a
serious economi c crisi s i n th e seventeent h century , that leadin g en -
trepreneurs—mine-owners, textile manufacturers, wealthy merchants,
and farmers producin g fo r th e urba n marke t — wer e experiencin g
increasing difficulties , tha t thes e difficultie s wer e a t leas t partl y
caused b y their havin g to operate withi n a social and political frame -
work that was basically unfavourabl e t o their interests , and that they
supported i f the y di d no t lead , a s i s show n b y th e attitud e o f th e
Creole cit y council s an d th e bi g landowners, 93 th e part y tha t
sought t o chang e th e prevailin g syste m i n way s whic h woul d hav e
favoured thei r interests . A s regard s th e searc h fo r fundamenta l
causes o f the "genera l crisis " o f the seventeent h centur y therefore ,
the circumstance s o f th e Mexica n commotion s o f 1620-6 4 woul d
seem to be either wholl y unhelpful o r t o encourage, i n so far a s th e
tensions i n seventeenth-centur y Mexic o ca n b e detache d fro m th e
early colonial context, a complex approach incorporating elements of
all th e theorie s tha t hav e so far bee n advanced .
The Mexica n disturbances of 1620-64,to conclude, are linked with
the Europea n crisi s o f the seventeent h centur y i n severa l importan t
respects. Firstly , economi c recession , fallin g deman d fo r Spanis h
goods, and the retention of silver for imperial defence in the Caribbean
and Pacific , contribute d largel y t o th e Spanis h Atlanti c trad e
depression tha t bega n i n th e 1620 5 and , eventually , t o th e fallin g
value of Mexican remittances t o Spai n i n a period whe n the Spanis h
monarchy face d it s greates t militar y an d financia l emergenc y i n
Europe. Secondly , Madrid' s effort s t o maintai n th e Spanis h
preponderance i n western Europe i n the fac e o f mounting difficultie s
and oppositio n le d t o a marke d escalatio n o f fisca l pressur e i n
Mexico an d interferenc e i n Mexica n trad e whic h ha d th e effec t o f
heightening th e tension s i n th e Mexica n bod y politi c and , ver y
probably, contribute d t o th e economi c slump . Thirdly , th e
campaign to restrain official corruptio n launche d in Spain by Olivares,
and parallele d elsewher e i n Europe , wa s carrie d t o Mexic o wit h
important consequence s b y suc h notabl e standard-bearer s o f th e
Spanish imperia l missio n a s Gelves , Palafo x an d Albuquerque .
And fourth and finally, the cumulative effects o f these three factors —
83
A.G.I., Patronato real , leg. 225, r. 2: Manso to Council, 10 May 1628.
economic crisis , fisca l pressure , an d non-doctrina l puritanis m —
caused a prolonged politica l instabilit y i n the viceroyalt y resembling
in severa l significan t ways, an d particularl y a s regard s th e frictio n
between administratio n an d element s o f society , variou s o f th e
individual politica l crise s i n seventeenth-centur y Europe .
12
THE PORTUGUESE I N SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MEXIC O
Historians hav e lon g been aware tha t a sizeabl e Portuguese settle -

ment too k plac e i n Spanish America during the perio d 1580-164 0 in
which th e crown s of Spain an d Portuga l wer e united i n th e hands of
the Spanis h Habsburg s despit e th e continue d lega l separatio n o f th e
Spanish an d Portugues e empires and th e continue d restrictio n o f th e
right t o settl e i n th e Spanis h colonie s to "Ol d Christian " subject s of
the crow n o f Castile J. I t ha s als o lon g been known tha t ther e wer e
widespread fear s o f Portuguese sedition i n certain area s of th e Span -
ish Indie s i n th e wak e o f th e secessio n o f Portuga l fro m Spai n i n
1640, notably i n the regio n of the Rive r Plate , a t Cartagen a d e Indi-
as, and i n th e viceroyalt y o f Mexico 2. I t ha s furthermor e lon g been
apparent tha t Spanis h suspicio n of th e Portugues e immigrants in th e
Spanish Indies , both before and afte r 1640 , wa s coloured b y th e ten -
dency i n bot h th e Spanis h colonia l an d th e Spanis h administrativ e
mind t o identif y migrant s fro m Portuga l wit h th e Portugues e Cra-
taos novos an d Portugues e crypto-Judaism 3. Nevertheless , a s fe w
1) Se e A . P. C a n a b r a v a , O Come'rci o Portugu£ s n o Ri o d a Praia , 1580 -

1640 (Sa o Paulo , 1944) , pp . 126-30 ; R. R i c a r d , Lo s Portugueses e n la s India s
Espanolas, in : R(evista ) (de ) H(istoria ) (de ) A(me"rica ) no . 34, 1952; L . H a n k e ,
The Portugues e i n Spanis h Americ a wit h specia l referenc e t o th e Vill a Imperia l d e
Potosf, in : RH A no . 5 1 (1961); J . L y n c h , Spai n unde r th e Habsburg s ( 2 vols.
Oxford, 1965-9 ) vol. 2 , pp. 58-59, 112-113,170,179,195, 218 .
2) See , fo r instance , C . R. B o x e r , Salvado r d e S d an d th e Struggl e fo r Brazi l
and Angola , 1602-1686 (London, 1952 ) pp . 171-173; R. P a 1 m a , Anales d e la In-
quisicidn de Lima, Estudio Hist6rico (Lima, 1863) , p. 13 ; Diego B a r r o s A r e n a,
Historia General de Chile (16 vols, Santiago, 1884-1902), vol. IV , pp. 370-371.
3
) B o x e r , op . cit. , pp . 15, 72; the lette r o f th e Inquisitor s Verdug o an d Gay -
tan to the Inquisitor-General (Lima, 4 May 1622), in:L . G a r c i a d e P r o o d i a n ,
Los Judfo s e n Americ a (Madrid, 1966), pp. 272-274; Infonn e del Ilmo. Sr. D. Juan de
Palafox, obisp o de Puebla, al Exmo . Sr. Cond e d e Salvatierra, Virre y d e la Nuev a
Espafia, 164 2 in : G . G a r c i a an d C . P e r e y r a (eds.) , Documento s ine'dito s o
muy raro s para l a Historia d e Mexico (3 6 vols. Mexico, 1905-1911 ) VI I (1906) , pp .
26-89, especially pp. 33-34 in which Palafo x advise s Salvatierr a ".. . tener atencion
con los Portugueses de estas Provincias, no dandoles puestos militares, ni jurisdic-
tion, ni consintiendoles armas de juego; pues no solo ban dado cuidado desde el
levantimiento de Portugal y traiciones de aquella corona, sino que aun antes tenian
prevenido las cedulas reales un punto tan importante y que no conviene descuidar.
would deny , th e genera l picture a s to th e circumstance s an d signifi -
cance of the Portuguese settlement in the Spanish Indie s i n the seven -
teenth centur y remain s unsatisfyingl y vagu e an d ill-defined . Thi s
present essay , based partly on manuscrip t source s preserved i n Mexi -
co an d Spain , attempt s t o delineat e i n a littl e mor e detai l tha n ha s
been don e i n th e pas t th e exten t an d natur e o f th e Portugues e pres -
ence i n Ne w Spai n i n th e seventeent h centur y an d especiall y th e
half-century 1600-50 .
The tensio n betwee n th e Castilia n an d Portugues e communitie s
that aros e i n th e wak e o f th e Portugues e secessio n an d th e politica l
confrontation betwee n the residin g vicero y o f Mexico , th e Duque d e
Escalona, an d th e visitador-general, Don Jua n d e Palafox, bisho p of
Puebla, ove r th e presenc e o f th e Portugues e i n Mexico , develope d
only gradually . Escalon a was informed of the revolution i n Lisbon by a
cedula fro m Madri d o f 7 January 1641 4, and wa s instructed t o carr y
out certai n precautionar y measure s though i t wa s establishe d a t th e
same time , a s a genera l principle , tha t th e Spanis h governmen t ha d
no intentio n o f expellin g fro m th e Spanis h colonie s those o f it s Por -
tuguese subject s that ha d "composed " wit h th e authoritie s an d wh o
gave n o specia l reaso n fo r thei r loyalt y t o th e Spanis h crow n t o b e
questioned. N o mor e Portugues e wer e t o b e admitte d int o Mexico .
Recent Portugues e arrivals wer e to b e carefully questioned an d thei r
papers an d letter s investigated . Portuguese ships were, fro m the n on ,
prohibited fro m Mexica n a s fro m othe r Spanish-America n ports .
Otherwise Escalon a wa s urge d t o maintai n maximu m vigilanc e an d
it wa s lef t t o hi s discretio n t o decid e whethe r o r no t mor e drasti c
action suc h as the force d transfe r of al l Portugues e residing i n Vera -
cruz and other port s twent y league s inland should be taken. An d tha t
was all . I t wa s only, i t appear s fro m copie s of th e letters exchange d
by Escalon a an d Palafo x o n th e subjec t o f th e Mexica n Portuguese
preserved i n th e Mexica n Inquisition files i n th e Archivo General de
la Nation i n Mexico City, in the autumn of 1641 , nearl y a year afte r
Y aii es sumamente necesario para el comercio y para la segttridad, tetter las costas
de entrambos mares limpias de este genera de gente y apartarlos de las minus; por-
que son tan sutiles en adelantar el caudal, como en sustentar sus correspondents
con Holanda y Lisboa, que es el centra unico a donde tiran sus lineas, aborreciendo
a nuestra fe la mayor parte de ellos, como hebreos, y a nosotros, como Portugueses."
*) A(rdiivo) G(eneral ) (de ) (la ) N(aci6n) , (Mexic o City) , (ramo ) (de )
Inq(uisici6n), vol. 489 , ff . 97-98 .
The Portuguese in Seventeenth-Century Mexico 31 3
the Lisbon coup d'etat, that the Portuguese question becam e a serious
issue i n th e Mexica n administration . Thi s wa s principall y owin g t o
the perculation int o Mexico through the summer and autum n of 164 1
of report s o f fres h Portugues e risings, the revolt o f Madeir a an d Bra -
zil agains t Spanis h authority , wil d rumour s tellin g o f th e slaughte r
of thre e thousan d Castilian s i n Brazil , an d wildl y exaggerate d re -
ports of the so-called Portuguese conspirac y at Cartagena , the relati-
vely nearb y Spanis h stronghol d i n the Caribbean 5. According to Pa -
lafox, b y th e autum n of 1641 , New Spai n wa s confronte d b y a rea l
danger of Portuguese subversion for th e Portuguese were numerous in
the viceroyalty , wealthy , fire d b y th e exampl e o f thei r compatriot s
in Brazil and Cartagena , well-know n for thei r finess e an d subtlet y i n
all illici t an d secre t dealings , "... y estan llenos d e esclavos y otros
dependientes y finalmente no solo en esta ciudad sino en la tierra
adentro tienen todo el poder que basta para hazer embarazo a la se-
guridad d e estos reynos ..." 6. Palafo x als o mentione d report s tha t
the Mexica n Portugues e wer e stockpilin g firearm s an d ammunitio n
and spok e o f th e fear s o f th e Castilia n population . "Los vezinos cas-
tellanos d e esta ciudad", h e assure d th e viceroy , "m e dicen a cada
passo que andan muy recelossos de los Portugueses" 7.
The apprehensio n o f th e Castilian s wa s b y n o mean s denie d b y
Escalona in his reply t o Palafox an d th e fac t tha t ther e wa s a rise in
tension betwee n th e Castilian s an d Portugues e i n Mexic o i n 164 1 i s
independently atteste d b y a n Inquisitio n repor t o f lat e 164 1 8, s o
that ther e i s no reaso n t o doub t th e fac t itself . Professo r W . Bo -
r a h , i n a recent article, has spoken o f the "apprehension an d hyste-
ria that arose i n Mexico upon the news of the revolt of 1640 " 9 . How -
ever, Escalona' s clai m tha t Palafo x wa s seriousl y exaggeratin g th e
degree of th e apprehension i n Mexico and hi s observation tha t fairl y
numerous an d wealth y toug h th e Portugues e wer e i n Mexic o the y
were considerably more so in the viceroyalt y o f Peru, s o that if ther e
was as yet little sign of Portuguese subversion in Peru ther e was little
B) AGN , Inq., vol. 489 , ff . 85-88 . Palafox t o Escalona, 20 Nov. 1641 .

6) Ibid. , f. 85.
7) Ibid. , f. 88.
8) AGN , Inq. , vol. 489 , ff. 99-v .
9) W . B o r a h , Th e Portugues e o f Tulancing o an d th e Specia l Donativ o o f
1642-43, in: Jahrbud i fur Geschicht e vo n Staat, Wirtschaft un d Gesellschaf t Lateiti -
amerikas, vol. I V (1967) , pp. 386-98 , 394 .
reason t o expec t an y i n Mexico , deserve s carefu l consideration 10. I t
is clear that Escalon a an d Palafo x wer e alread y o n bad terms , irre -
spective o f th e Portugues e question , over dispute s arisin g from Pala -
fox's visita an d als o certai n ecclesiastica l matters 11, s o tha t ther e i s
good reaso n t o suspec t that Palafo x wa s deliberately exaggeratin g in
his assessmen t o f th e Portugues e threa t i n orde r t o len d forc e t o hi s
reports t o Madri d tha t Escalon a wa s not doin g enoug h t o guarantee
the securit y o f the viceroyalt y an d hi s reminder that Escalona's dea d
wife ha d bee n a relativ e o f th e ne w rebe l kin g o f Portugal , Joa o
IV12. Palafox's purpose , i t ma y b e suggested, was t o undermin e con-
fidence i n Escalon a i n Madrid , fo r reason s tha t fo r th e mos t par t
were unconnecte d wit h th e Portuguese , an d i f thi s wa s hi s purpose ,
then h e was soon t o b e triumphantly successful . Moreover , th e possi -
bility tha t Palafo x wa s indeed wilfully , or a t an y rat e considerably ,
exaggerating i s furthe r suggeste d b y th e meagrenes s o f independen t
evidence indicating tha t there was a major build-u p of tensio n apar t
from th e already mentioned an d rather subdued , even hesitant, repor t
of th e Inquisitio n an d a numbe r of testimonie s fro m witnesse s speci-
fically collecte d o n Palafox' s orders 13. Professo r B o r a h supplie s
no evidence with which to support his use of the term "hysteria".
But i f th e Portuguese-Castilia n tensio n i n Mexic o i n 1641- 2 wa s
in fac t mor e of a pretext fo r politica l actio n b y Palafo x tha n a rea l
threat describing whic h on e could justifiabl y us e the term "hysteria" ,
the pretex t wa s undeniabl y well-chosen . Escalon a himsel f ha d signi -
ficant Portugues e connections ; h e belonged t o a n aristocrati c famil y
of Jewis h origin 14; h e ha d appointe d severa l Portugues e Cristiaos
10) AGN , Inq., vol. 489, f. 95 v. Escalona to Palafox, 2 0 Nov. 1641 .

U) A(rchivo ) (de ) (los)D(uques ) (del ) I(nfantado) , (Madrid), Palafox papers , vol .
49, ff . 198-9, "Aut o secret o sobr e lo s impedimiento s que pus o a l a visit a e l seno r
marques de Villena" (1 4 Feb. 1642) ; ibid . vol. 43 , f. 836; Villena wa s the alternative
title by which Escalona was known . See also AGN, ce"dula s originales, vol 1 , f. 531 .
Crown t o Escalona , 10 Feb. 1642 .
12) A(rchivo ) G(eneral ) (de ) I(ndias), (Seville) , (Audiencia) (de) Mexico , Leg(ajo )
4, exp(ediente) 281 . Palafox t o Consej o (d e Indias) , 1 9 June 1641 ; AGN , Inq. , vol .
489, ff. 102-104 . Palafox to Mex. Inq., 16 Jan. 1642 ; AGN, reales ce"dulas dupl., vol .
62, f. 3 v. Crown t o Palafox, 1 8 Feb . 1642.
13) ADI , Palafo x papers , vol. 65 , ff. 31 0 V.-318.
14) Escalon a o r Villena , Do n Dieg o L6pe z Pachec o y Bobadill a grande e o f
Spain, belonged t o a famil y descende d fro m converse s includin g the Je w Ru y Ca -
pon, see H. K a m e n, The Spanish Inquisition (London, 1965), p. 20.
novos such as the judaizing Captain Sebastia n Vaez de Acevedo, pro-
veedor-general o f th e Armad a o f Barlovento , t o position s of respon -
sibility i n Mexico 15, an d i n genera l appear s t o hav e show n a toler -
ance t o person s o f Jewis h descen t an d connection s i n th e spiri t o f
that of Philip IV' s chief minister , th e Conde-duqu e d e Olivares. It i s
also noteworth y tha t ther e wa s n o significan t Inquisitio n driv e
against th e Portuguese crypto-Jews in Mexico until afte r th e remova l
of Escalona , largely owin g to Palafox' s representation s t o Madrid , i n
June 1642 16. Furthermore , eve n acceptin g th e viceroy' s poin t tha t
the Portugues e wer e less strong i n New Spai n tha n Tierra Firme, the
fact remain s that the y wer e a comparativel y newly-entrenche d an d
increasingly importan t grou p i n Ne w Spai n too . Withou t doub t th e
wealth an d number s o f th e Mexica n Portugues e wer e substantia l
enough to serve as a convincing, aptly-selected, pretext .
Professor B o r a h , i n th e articl e cite d above , ha s suggeste d tha t
the Portuguese immigratio n int o Mexico between 158 0 an d 164 0 wa s
significantly large r tha n historian s hav e tende d t o assume . Citin g
evidence relatin g t o th e raisin g o f th e specia l donativ e o f 1642- 3 i n
the distric t o f Tulancingo , a mainl y India n distric t t o th e eas t o f
Pachuca wit h onl y a smal l uppe r stratu m o f Europea n settlers , h e
found tha t there were in 164 3 nine adult mal e Portuguese in the area .
"Unfortunately", wrot e Professo r B o r a h , "ther e ar e n o count s
(of the total white populatio n of th e district) available, but one may
guess that the Portugues e were fro m 10 % t o 15 % o f th e adul t mal e
(white) population " 17 . Tulancingo , o f course , represent s to o smal l
an area an d too small a sample of the white population t o hav e much
statistical significanc e in itself , bu t i f on e consider s in relatio n t o i t
available evidence 18 fo r th e neighbourin g district s o f th e alcaldia
mayor o f Pachuc a an d th e corregimiento o f Huauchinango , whic h
Professor B o r a h surprisingl y omitte d t o mention , the n a some -
what mor e significan t picture begin s to emerge . In th e silver-minin g
16) Gregorio M a r t i n d e G u i j o , Diario , 1648-1664 ( 2 vols.Mexico, 1952),

vol. 1 , p. 92 .
16) AGN , Inq. , vol. 416, ff. 445-9 v .
") B o r a h , op . cit., p. 394.
I8) Coleccid n d e documento s in£dito s relative s a l descubrimiento , conquist a y
organizaci6n d e la s antigua s posesiones espanolas d e Americ a y Oceania , sacado s
de los archives de l reino, y muy especialmente del de Indias, per D. Luis T o r r es
d e M e n d o z a ( 4 2 vols. Madrid, 1864-84), vol. I X (1869), ff. 194-202.
town o f Pachuc a itself , i n th e yea r 1609 , ther e wer e on e hundre d
European familie s of whic h eigh t wer e non-Spanish, on e bein g Gen -
oese and seve n Portuguese; thi s is to sa y that th e Portugues e alread y
constituted roughl y 7 % o f th e whit e populatio n o f Pachuc a onl y a
few year s afte r th e large-scal e emigration fro m Portugal , whic h be -
gan early i n the reign o f Philip III , ha d commenced . Almost beyon d
doubt, th e proportion b y 1640 was significantly greater; indee d 10% ,
possibly eve n 15 % ca n reasonabl y b e accounted a conservativ e esti -
mate. However, taking the white population o f the alcaldia mayor of
Pachuca a s a whole, including that is Pachuca's thre e smaller satellit e
mining settlements, th e Portuguese constitute d 5 % o f th e white pop -
ulation i n 1609 , indee d a reasonabl e basi s fo r proposin g 10 % b y
1640. A t Huauchinango, a predominantly India n tow n situate d som e
forty-five mile s east o f Pachuca, beyon d th e corregimiento o f Tulan -
cingo, ther e wer e thirty-tw o Europea n men , women, and childre n i n
the yea r 1609 19 o f who m eigh t wer e Portugues e - seve n belonging
to one family - thu s placing th e Portuguese at 25% of the total. Of
course, Huauchinango, lik e Tulancingo, represents too smal l a sample
to b e of an y rea l significanc e i n itself , bu t wit h Tulancing o i t doe s
underscore th e ver y importan t informatio n abou t Pachuc a b y dem -
onstrating tha t eve n i n remot e districts , furthe r int o th e interio r
than suc h importan t centre s a s Pachuca , th e Portugues e forme d a
large minority even at a very early date in the century.
Pachuca, Tulancingo, an d Huauchinango are of course neighbouring
districts situate d i n a particula r geographica l zon e t o th e north-eas t
of Mexic o City . Th e possibilit y mus t b e reckone d wit h tha t ther e
was, fo r whateve r reason , mor e Portugues e settlemen t i n thi s regio n
than elsewher e i n Mexico . A t an y rate , withou t furthe r evidence ,
there i s not sufficien t reaso n t o suppos e tha t th e Portugues e forme d
a minorit y o f comparabl e siz e t o tha t o f Pachuc a an d it s hinterlan d
in th e res t o f New Spain . Bisho p M o t a y E s c o b a r ' s referenc e
to Portugues e i n Zacateca s i s unfortunately o f littl e hel p i n thi s re -
gard20. Hi s statemen t tha t i n a tota l whit e populatio n o f approxi -
mately 120 0 there were, to hi s knowledge, som e ten o r twelv e (adul t
19) Ibid. , pp. 123-4 .

20) Alons o d e l a M o t a y E s c o b a r , Descripci6 n geogrdfic a d e lo s reynos
de Nueva Galicia, Nueva Vizcaya, y Nuevo Le6n (Guadalajara , Jalisco, 1966), pp.
65-6.
male?) Portugues e an d Italians refers to th e yea r 1602 , tha t i s to th e
period immediatel y precedin g th e mas s emigratio n fro m Portugal ,
and i n an y cas e fail s t o tel l u s ho w man y o f th e twelv e foreigner s
mentioned wer e Portuguese. However , of ver y considerabl e valu e for
adding to the evidence of the Pachuca-Tulancingo-Huauchinango area
is th e informatio n conveye d i n a repor t o f Vicero y Escalon a t o th e
Consejo de Indias i n Madri d o f 3 0 Decembe r 164 1 21. Thi s repor t
mentions a registe r o f th e Portugues e communit y i n Mexic o City ,
supplied b y the corregidor of the capital to die viceroy an d drawn u p
in respons e t o a printe d edic t issue d b y th e vicero y a wee k after hi s
exchange of letters wit h Bishop Palafox, a n edict date d 2 7 Novembe r
1641 K ordering al l Portuguese, an d al l Creol e son s of Portuguese, i n
Mexico City , t o registe r wit h th e corregidor's deputie s an d t o sur -
render al l firearm s in thei r possessio n withi n thre e days . Fou r hun -
dred an d ninetee n Portugues e an d Mexican-born adul t son s of Portu -
guese were listed as a result and sixteen gun s delivered up. Four hun -
dred an d ninetee n Portugues e vecinos woul d indicate , i f on e accept s
D i e z d e l a C a l l e ' s estimate of 8000 white vecinos for the total
in Mexico City i n the mid 1640's 23, a Portuguese proportion amount -
ing to a little ove r 5°/ o of the white population o f the capital; shoul d
it als o b e though t tha t i t i s unlikely , i n vie w o f th e ba d odou r i n
which th e Portuguese then found themselves, that quite all the Portu -
guese in the city di d register , tha t som e failed to d o so, then on e may
well be inclined to accept , i n the light o f Escalona's information , 6 %
or 7 % a s a reasonabl e estimate . I n an y case , th e statisti c 41 9 i s a
notable on e for i t is a positive indicatio n o f the siz e of the Portuguese
minority i n what wa s the largest city i n New Spai n an d indeed prob-
ably i n th e America s and , countin g women an d children , suggest s a
total popula$ao lusitana of roughl y 100 0 to 1500 . Although th e Por -
tuguese consequentl y forme d a muc h smaller proportion o f th e tota l
white populatio n o f Mexic o Cit y tha n o f Bueno s Aires at thi s time ,
it is a highly significant fact that measured in absolute term s the Por -
21
) AGI , Mexico, leg. 4, ramo 6, exp. 306, ff. 4-6 v., Escalona to Consejo, 30 Dec.
1641.
22) AGI , Mexico , leg . 4, ram o 6, exp . 305. Th e sam e orde r wa s apparentl y sent
out t o th e corregidores fo r genera l implementatio n throughout New Spain , see also
AGN, ramo de civil, vol. 76 , exp. 3.
23) Juan D i e z d e l a C a l l e , Memoria l y Noticia s sacra s y reale s de l Im-
perio de las Indias Occidentales (1 st edn. Madrid, 1646), f. 43 v.
tuguese community of the capital o f New Spai n was no less than four
times tha t o f tha t celebrate d centr e o f Portugues e settlemen t o n th e
River Plate 24.
In th e ligh t o f th e informatio n pertaining t o Mexico City, it seem s
possible to propose with som e assurance that although Portuguese mi-
norities i n exces s of 10°/ o of th e tota l whit e population, suc h a s tha t
of Pachuca , wer e perhap s exceptional , Portugues e minorities i n th e
region o f 6 % wer e th e nor m throughou t th e viceroyalty . Neverthe -
less, there i s good reaso n t o postulat e tha t amon g the exceptions , t o
be classed with Pachuca , were some of th e mos t important centre s in
New Spain . I n Veracruz , described by Palafox i n his above-mention-
ed lette r t o Escanlon a a s "l a Have principal de estos reynos", ther e
were in 1641 , accordin g to the bishop , "hay ma s Portugueses que cas-
tellanos". Thi s i s surel y a wil d exaggeration . Bu t ther e seem s littl e
doubt, i n view o f th e numerou s contemporary reference s t o th e acti -
vities o f th e Portugues e i n th e port , tha t th e proportio n wa s ver y
high indeed. Th e Portuguese judaizantes alone , resident s of Veracruz,
tried b y th e Mexica n Inquisition fo r judaizin g i n th e decade s 1620-
1650, include d twenty-fou r adul t males 25 whic h indicates , i f on e
employs D i e z d e l a C a l l e ' s estimat e of ove r 50 0 vecinos for
Veracruz i n th e 1640's 26, tha t th e Portugues e crypto-Jew s eve n
without th e res t o f th e Cristaos novos le t alon e th e Cristaos velhos,
constituted 4°/ o o f th e tota l whit e populatio n o f th e city . Guadala -
jara, capita l o f Ne w Galici a an d a majo r tradin g centr e i n wester n
Mexico, wa s th e thir d larges t centr e o f crypto-Judais m i n seven -
teenth-century i n Mexico , afte r Mexic o Cit y an d Veracruz , seven -
teen adul t mal e Portugues e judaizer s being arreste d b y th e Inquisi -
tion betwee n 162 0 an d 1650 , a figur e agai n constitutin g perhaps 4*/o
of th e total . Almost beyon d doubt , bot h Veracru z an d Guadalajar a
had Portuguese minorities in the region of 10% or more of their tota l
white population .
The difficultie s in th e pat h o f estimatin g wha t proportio n o f th e
Portuguese in New Spai n live d in Mexico City in 164 1 would appear
24) A . P. C a n a b r a v a , O Come>ci o Portugues , p . 140; R . de L a f u e n t e

M a c h a i n , Lo s Portugueses en Buenos Aires, siglo XVII (Madrid , 1931), p. 86.
25) AGN , Inq. , vol . 399 , doc . 1 2 an d case-book s of trial s o f jttdaizantes fo r
1620-50.
26) D i ez d e l a C a l l e , op . cit., f . 68.
insuperable a t leas t unti l detail s ar e availabl e relatin g t o th e mas s
composition o f Portuguese illegally resident in New Spai n conducte d
in th e year s 1595-6 ^ an d 1641-3 . But at leas t i t ha s come t o ligh t
that th e numbe r of Portugues e who regularize d their positio n i n th e
area under the jurisdiction o f the audiencia of Mexico - tha t is exclu-
sive of New Galicia , Ne w Vizcaya , New Leon , Chiapas, an d th e Yu-
catan-Tabasco M regio n - an d paid thei r fine s unde r th e mass com-
posiciones conducte d b y th e officer s o f Viceroy s Guadalcaza r an d
Cerralvo i n 1617-1 9 and 162 5 appear s t o hav e been 17 1 and 5 1 re -
spectively, o r 22 2 i n all 29. Ou t o f thi s sampl e o f 22 2 compuestos
born in Portugal, th e Portuguese colonies, or of Portuguese parents i n
Spain, only 17% , or les s tha n on e fifth , live d i n Mexic o City . Ac-
cordingly, wer e it t o prov e th e cas e that thi s proportion i n fac t cor-
responds, at least approximately, to the overall pattern of Portugues e
settlement i n Ne w Spain , tha t i s t o sa y tha t th e composiciones o f
1595-6 an d 1641- 3 an d th e distributio n o f thos e Portugues e wh o
either successfull y avoide d composition an d bein g fine d o r wer e
individually compose d an d penalized , paralle l th e composiciones of
1617-19 an d 1625 , then th e 41 9 adul t mal e Portugues e i n Mexic o
City in 1641 woul d represent roughly 17% of the total numbe r in the
area unde r th e jurisdictio n o f th e audienda o f Mexico , tha t i s th e
provinces of Mexico, Puebla, Oaxaca, an d Michoacan. It i s quite con-
ceivable therefor e tha t ther e wer e approximatel y 240 0 adul t mal e
Portuguese in the fou r province s of inner Mexico in 1641 . This would
suggest a total populafao lusitana in excess of 800 0 for inne r Mexic o
and perhaps 1 1 000 or 1 2 000 for Mexic o as a whole.
One of the most interestin g facts to emerg e from a scrutiny o f th e
lists o f 161 9 and 1625 , and th e informatio n assemble d by th e Inqui -
sition regardin g th e Portugues e judaizantes, i s tha t th e Portuguese ,
whether converse o r non-converso, showed no perceptible preference
for th e silver-minin g town s and certainl y no t fo r silver-mining . Th e
87) Colecci6 n de documento s inidito s (ed . T o r r es d e M e n d o z a ), pp . 194,

198;Mota y E s c o b a r , DescripciiSn geografica, p. 66.
28
) I t i s clear that ther e was quite a n importan t group o f Portugues e converses
in Campeche , a s Captai n Jer6nim o Ferninde z Correa , a n importan t judaizante,
and Diego L6pez Cos6n, Pedro de Campos, and othe r Portuguese crypto-Jew s were
residents of that port.
39) AGI , Mexico , leg . 29, ram o 2 . Guadalcdza r t o Consejo , 2 7 Sept . 1619;
AGN, reales ce"dulas dupl., vol. 50, ff. 122-139 .
Portuguese, includin g the crypto-Jews, were indeed active i n Zacate -
cas, Sa n Luis Potosi, Pachuca, an d othe r centres , bu t apparentl y no t
to any greater exten t tha n they were active in the rest of the countr y
and possibl y less. It i s true tha t th e list s of 161 9 and 1625 , excluding
as they d o Portuguese composed in Zacatecas and th e silver towns be-
yond sinc e those towns were situated i n Ne w Galici a an d Ne w Viz -
caya, giv e a distorte d picture ; nevertheless, in vie w o f th e fac t tha t
San Luis Potosi, th e secon d most important silver-minin g centre after
Zacatecas and othe r leading silver towns such a s Pachuca, Guanajua -
to, an d Xichu , fel l withi n th e boundarie s o f th e fou r provinces , i t i s
surely significan t that only twelve of th e 17 1 of th e Portuguese com-
puestos o f 1617-19 , an d seve n o f th e 5 1 compuestos o f 1625 , wer e
vecinos o f silve r towns . O f nearl y 20 0 Portugues e judaizantes, me n
and women , arreste d b y th e Inquisitio n fo r judaizin g i n Mexic o be -
tween 162 0 an d 1650 , an d thi s tim e Zacateca s an d th e norther n
towns d o ente r th e calculation , a mer e 12°/ o reside d i n th e silver -
mining towns.
Of th e 17 1 Portugues e male s liste d i n 1619 , beside s th e twelv e
from th e silve r towns , onl y a furthe r forty-fiv e o r s o live d i n th e
other mai n town s o f inner Mexic o - Mexic o City, Puebla , Oaxaca ,
and Veracruz . Exactl y two-third s o f th e Portugues e "composed" b y
Viceroy Guadalcaza r farmed , traded , an d dwel t i n th e countrysid e
and smal l towns mainl y of th e Bajio , Oaxaca , an d th e fertil e Tlax-
cala-Atlixco-Tecamachalco triangle . O f th e fifty-on e Portugues e
compuestos liste d i n 1625 , beside s the seve n in the silve r towns, onl y
a furthe r twelve live d i n th e capita l o r th e mai n towns ; thirty-tw o
dwelt i n th e countrysid e an d th e smalle r centres . Th e Portugues e
crypto-Jews, o n th e other hand , were distribute d i n a quite differen t
way an d wer e much more concentrated. I n thei r vas t majority , the y
lived i n three mai n centre s - Mexic o City , Veracruz , an d Guadala -
jara. Thi s differenc e woul d appea r t o correspon d t o a fundamental
difference o f socia l structur e a s betwee n th e non-Jewis h an d th e
Jewish group s (th e latte r bein g defined a s the crypto-Jew s an d non -
judaizing converses together) . I n th e main, it ma y be fairly said , th e
Old Christia n Portugues e wh o settle d i n Mexic o cam e fro m a peas -
ant, artisan , an d small-tradin g backgroun d and , o n settlin g i n Ne w
Spain, tende d to live by farming, craft skills , and small-town tradin g
or els e i n th e arid , undeveloped , frontie r area s o f th e fa r nort h a s
soldiers, explorers , an d small-traders 30. Th e Cristaos novos, on th e
other hand , wh o were , contrar y t o th e belie f o f Palafo x an d numer -
ous o f hi s contemporaries , almos t certainl y th e smalle r group , wer e
predominantly fro m a non-artisa n urba n backgroun d - mos t o f the
Portuguese crypto-Jew s i n seventheenth-centur y Mexic o ha d bee n
born i n Lisbon, Sevill e (of Portuguese parents) , and Castelobranco -
and naturall y gravitate d toward s th e Mexica n commercia l rathe r
than silver-minin g cities and the ports.
The registe r o f 1619 , beside s givin g a n ide a o f th e distributio n o f
the Portugues e communit y does also throw som e welcome light o n it s
occupation-structure. Man y o f th e settlers , a s ha s bee n said , wer e
farmers, ranchers , an d soldiers ; a considerable group, usually resident
in the smaller towns , made its living by transportin g crop s an d goods
by train s o f packmules . Perhap s mor e strikin g though , i s th e larg e
number o f artisan s listed , residen t bot h i n th e smal l town s an d th e
large cities, especially cobblers, barbers , carpinters , dyers, an d leathe r
workers. A t th e bottom o f the social-scale, there was a small group of
Portuguese marrie d t o India n wome n - a sur e sig n o f povert y an d
lowly statio n i n Mexica n Colonia l lif e — and nea r destitut e vaga -
bonds, suc h a s th e young , unmarried , Francisc o Led o wh o wa s i n
Huauchinango i n 1609 , me n of n o fixe d occupation ; t o thi s group ,
though no t include d i n th e list s o f compuestos, migh t b e adde d th e
community o f half-Portugues e mulatos an d mestizos representative s
of which , including a Portuguese morisco born i n th e Portugues e col -
ony o f Tangie r accuse d of engagin g in sorcery , ar e sometime s to b e
encountered i n the Inquisitio n files . Further u p the scale , som e of th e
Portuguese artisan s i n Mexic o were highl y skille d men . Whe n Vice -
roy Gelve s (1621—4) , th e mos t intoleran t o f th e seventeenth-centur y
viceroys regardin g th e Portuguese , launched his grea t driv e t o expe l
the Portugues e fro m th e silver-minin g towns 31, th e corregidor o f
San Lui s Potos i entere d a n urgen t thoug h fruitles s reques t fo r tw o
Portuguese bellows-maker s o f Sa n Lui s t o b e exempte d o n th e
3°) Lui s N a v a r r o G a r c i a , Sonor a y Sinalo a e n e l sigl o XVI I (Sevilla ,

1967), pp. 23, 43, 52-3 .
31) Antoni o B r a m b i l a y A r r i a g a , Relaci6 n e n favo r de l marque s d e
Gelves, Vire y que fiie " d e est a Nuev a Espana, in:M . F e r n a n d e z d e E c h e -
v e r r { a (ed) , Documentos par a l a Historia d e Mexico, 2nd series , vol. Ill (Mexico,
1855), pp. 213-291, especially pp. 215, 255.
grounds tha t the y wer e irreplaceable . Durin g Gelves ' ter m o f office ,
the numbe r o f Portugues e vagrant s i n Mexic o City , enormousl y
swelled by the addition o f those, including artisans and entrepreneurs ,
who had been driven from th e silver towns, were among the most un-
ruly an d combustibl e element s in th e capita l an d i t i s clear tha t th e
Portuguese playe d a conspicuou s role , an d wer e on e o f th e firs t
groups t o becom e involved, i n th e insurrectio n in Mexic o City o f 1 5
January 162 4 whic h resulte d i n th e sackin g o f th e vicerega l palac e
and th e residence s o f a numbe r o f official s an d th e overthro w o f
Gelves32.
The Portuguese Jew s however , thoug h fallin g int o thre e quit e dis -
tinct categories 33 - firstly , th e judaizantes; secondly , thos e wh o
though the y wer e non-judaizin g Cristaos novos wer e unable fo r va -
rious reasons to escap e effective inclusio n in th e New Christia n cast e
in Mexica n society ; an d thirdly , effectivel y assimilate d Cristaos no-
vos - ha d a quit e differen t occupation-structure . Th e judaizantes
showed a stron g tendenc y t o gravitate , i n thei r socio-economi c a s
well a s religious relations, aroun d th e handful l of bi g Jewish capital -
ists an d import-expor t merchant s men lik e Sim6 n Vae z Sevill a an d
Matias Rodrigue z d e Oliver a i n Mexic o Cit y an d tha t remarkabl e
slave-factor, textil e importer , an d genera l contrabandist o f Veracruz ,
Don Francisc o d e Tejoso 34; th e judaizantes, dealin g i n expensiv e
cloths, silks , slaves , cacao , an d othe r merchandise , wer e mainl y big -
city subsidiaries an d retailer s workin g fo r thos e fe w o f thei r numbe r
who ha d mad e larg e fortunes . Slaving , i t i s wort h mentioning , wa s
engaged in by Jewish entrepreneur s usuall y only initially , i n order t o
gain entr y int o Mexic o and a financial foothold; man y of th e leaders
of th e Mexican communit y ha d com e to the Ne w Worl d vi a Angol a
32) AGI , Patronat o real , leg . 223, ram o 5 , f . 109 v.; Jua n Gutierre z Flore s an d
Juan d e Lorraendi, Relacio n sumari a y puntua l de l tumulto y sedicio n qu e hubo e n
Mexico (Mexico , 1625) , ff. 8 v.-9 v .
33) Categorizatio n o f Jew s an d Jewishnes s remain s o f cours e a largel y unresolv -
ed historiographical and indee d political problem ; doubtles s ther e are othe r way s of
categorizing th e Mexica n Jew s o f Portugues e descen t an d furthe r categorie s tha t
could b e drawn ; fo r a discussio n o f th e varyin g standard s o f religiou s observanc e
among th e judaizantes, see : S . B . L i e b m a n , Th e Jew s i n Ne w Spai n (Miami ,
1970).
34) AGN , Inq. , vol . 399 , doc . 12; ibid. vol. 426 , ff . 544-5 v.; vol . 488 , ff . 586-v.;
vol. 409, f . 579-v.; vol. 489, ff. 383-4 v.
and built u p from small beginnings; subsequently, there was a marke d
tendency t o switc h fro m slave s t o textiles 35. Th e non-judaizin g
Cristaos novos, it i s safe t o say , similarl y tended t o follo w th e vari -
ous non-artisan urba n pursuits in which the y ha d specialize d i n Por -
tugal, Spain, and in several case s Italy and France: that is to say they
entered commerc e and th e professions . I t wa s largel y becaus e of thi s
striking differenc e i n th e occupation-structur e an d socia l locatio n a s
between Cristaos velhos and Cristaos novos, it may be suggested, that
the latte r group , thoug h almos t certainl y th e minority , loome d s o
large in seventeenth-century Spanish-American minds.
The Portuguese converses who were non-judaizing but whos e Jew -
ishness nevertheles s impinge d strongl y o n thei r careers , ar e i n som e
respects th e mos t interestin g o f th e thre e Jewis h categories . A s s o
often wit h Jew s i n history , a grea t dea l i s misse d i f on e fixe s one' s
attention only on those who were, or who tried to be, observant Jews .
In Spanis h an d Portugues e society , Jewishnes s a s well a s being asso -
ciated wit h Judais m wa s also somethin g quite apart, a socia l cast e or
racial categor y define d b y th e limpieza d e sangre concept , statutes ,
and certificates , a fac t whic h exerte d a powerfu l influenc e ove r th e
lives o f man y Cristaos novos wh o fel t n o particula r allegianc e t o
Judaism. Me n lik e th e Bachiller Do n Bernard o Guerrero , a lawye r
attached t o th e audiencia o f Mexic o wh o ha d change d hi s surname ,
whose fathe r ha d bee n reconcile d fo r judaizin g b y th e Peruvia n In -
quisition, who became involved i n Bishop Palafox's struggl e with th e
Mexican Inquisitor s i n 164 7 an d wa s arreste d fo r utterin g a n angr y
outburst abou t th e Inquisitio n an d sayin g o f Vicero y Salvatierra ,
Archbishop Manozca , an d th e Inquisitor s "son todos muy lindos la -
drones" m, were no t judaizantes bu t figure d prominantl y i n the soci-
al an d psychologica l tensio n betwee n th e Ol d an d Ne w Christia n
groupings i n seventeenth-centur y Mexica n society . Amon g th e ins -
tances o f thi s typ e tha t migh t b e cited , on e o f th e mos t importan t
was Bishop Palafox's politica l secretary, Melchor Juarez, an eminent
figure i n Mexican politics in th e 1640' s who playe d a leadin g rol e i n
the lega l proces s o f Palafox' s visita, headin g investigation s int o th e
85) AGN , Inq. , vol. 399 , doc . 12 ; vol. 395 , do c 3 "proceso contra Melchio r Ro -
driguez L6pez" ; vol. 409 , ff. 203-6 v.
3«) AGN , Inq., vol. 429, ff . 406-v.
conduct o f various corregidores an d othe r roya l officer s an d remain -
ing one of Palafox's chie f aide s during the latter' s brief ter m a s vice-
roy (June-October , 1642 ) and subsequently . He wa s commonl y hel d
to b e Portuguese thoug h Palafox himsel f denie d tha t h e wa s Portu -
guese and referre d t o hi m as a native o f Badajo z 87 ; he was probabl y
born i n Badajoz of Portuguese parents. Afte r the Inquisitio n launch-
ed it s grea t driv e agains t th e judaizantes i n th e summe r o f 1642 ,
Juarez name cropped u p repeatedly i n connection with various of th e
judaizers. Th e Mexica n Inquisitio n reporte d t o th e Suprema i n Ma -
drid tha t althoug h there was no evidence of judaizing in Juarez' case,
it was clear that h e was closely linked socially with Portugues e Jew s
and ha d staye d fo r a perio d wit h a grou p o f them , had ha d sexua l
relations ove r a perio d wit h on e o f th e Portuguese-Jewis h wome n
arrested i n 1642 , an d tha t i t understood tha t severa l of Juarez' rela -
tives in the peninsula had bee n taken for judaizing by the Inquisitio n
of Llerena , includin g hi s brother , Th e Inquisitio n spok e o f him , o n
these ground s alone , a s "«» ministro traydor" an d aske d wha t pros -
pect ther e wa s o f havin g hi m remove d fro m hi s positio n o f powe r
and responsibility w. Juarez ' caree r wa s no t howeve r cu t short .
When Bisho p Palafo x wa s n o longe r abl e t o protec t him , owin g t o
the vicissitude s o f Mexica n politic s i n th e 1640' s Juare z seem s t o
have betraye d hi s forme r patron , possibl y bein g blackmailed by th e
Inquisition, an d t o hav e becom e secretary t o non e othe r tha n Pala -
fox's fierces t opponent, Archbisho p Mafiozca , visitador o f th e Mexi -
can Inquisition.
As a rule , i t ma y b e sai d tha t thos e Portugues e tha t successfully
penetrated int o th e uppe r reache s o f Mexica n societ y i n th e seven -
teenth-century wer e either observan t o r els e non-observant Jews . Re-
search ha s show n tha t h e leading Portuguese mentioned i n Palafox' s
papers i n connectio n wit h th e Portuguese-Castilia n tensio n o f 1641 /
1642 were , apprentl y withou t a singl e exception , - thoug h thi s was
not known a t th e time - o f Jewish background 39. Sebastian Vaez de
37) ADI , Palafo x papers , vol. 64, ff. 225-6.

88) AGN , Inq. , vol. 416, ff. 427-v., 466.
89) Se e th e "Ynformacio n fech a co n ocasio n d e la s Nueba s qu e biniero n d e
Castilla d e Levantimiento d e Portugal, de la provencio n qu e iban haciend o lo s por -
tugueses dest a Nuev a Espan a y d e l o qu e s e ha averiguad o e n est a razon" . ADI ,
Palafox papers , vol. 65, ff. 310 v.-15 v . and vol . 66, ff. 11 4 v.-5 v .
Acevedo, the proveedor-general of th e Armada o f Barlovento , hold s
a prominen t plac e o n th e list : "tiene lugar", we ar e told , "entre los
ricos de primera classe, llego a la mayor opulencia con el trato de los
negros que rescatava de Angola y otras partes de Africa asi como
Simon Vaez Sevilla, Antonio Mendez Chilon, y otros... y despues
la dexaron ocupandose e n otros gruesos tratos". Antoni o Vae z d e
Acevedo, a brother of Sebastian, commanded a n infantry detachmen t
in Mexico Cit y and hel d othe r offices , subsequentl y becoming alcalde
mayor o f Pampanga i n the Philippines befor e being seized b y th e In -
quisition a s a jtidaizante. Matias Rodriguez de Olivera i s described as
a Portugues e and "hombre opulento co n mucha estimadon e n toda la
cittdad, agasajavanle los virreyes; comunicava con las personas mas
nobles y lucidos co n meritos de rico solamente*. Sim6n Montero, an -
other o n Palafox's lis t of leadin g Portuguese, late r turne d ou t t o b e a
Jew o f Castelobranco , wh o ha d spen t som e tim e i n th e ghetto s o f
Rome, Livorno , an d Pis a befor e makin g hi s wa y t o Ne w Spai n t o
make his fortune. Francisc o d e Tejoso, thoug h estimate d on Palafox' s
list to b e worth a mere 7 0 000 pesos, is mentioned, a s he had bee n on
a special audiencia report on smuggling drawn u p in 1621 , a s a lead-
ing merchant an d personalit y o f Veracruz 40. Gregori o d e Guij o tell s
us, writing of the grea t Auto de fe o f 164 9 i n Mexico City , "entre los
de Sanbenito perpetuo, fue uno el capitan Simon Vaez Sevilla perso-
na que el y su mujer dona Juana de Rivera mandaron esta ciudad, y
eran visitados por los oidores y oidoras, regalados y respectados como
si fueran los mas nobles del reino; ftte su padre de dicho capitan car-
nicero en Casteloblanco, de donde fue natural, y falta de verdugo
hizo el oficio: su padre de dicho capitan Sebastian Vaez de Acevedo
fue costalero, y tenia por oficio alquilar en su tierra costales y hacer
talegas" 41.
But althoug h al l th e Portugues e notable s liste d b y Bisho p Palafo x
in 164 1 were in fact Jewish, ther e are at leas t two cases of Portugues e
notables i n Mexico , o f a slightl y earlie r period , wh o ma y hav e bee n
Cristaos velhos, thoug h thi s i s b y n o mean s certain . O f particula r
interest i s Sim6 n Enriquez , regidor an d depositario general o f th e
4
") AGI , Mexico, leg. 74, ramo 2. Pedro d e Vergara to Consejo, 2 0 March 1621 .
«) Gregori o M. d e G u i j o , Diario , 1648-166 4 ( 2 vols. Mexico , 1953) , vol .
I, pp. 46-7.
Mexico City cabildo in the early 1620' s whose certificate of limpieza
de sangre declaring him t o b e fre e o f th e tain t o f Mooris h o r Jewis h
blood, a fidalgo d e cota de armas and "fillo legitimo de Antonio En -
riquez e de Ana Bus sua moller... naturaes e moradores que foraon
na ciudad de Tangera pesoas nobres decendentes de nobre linage dos
Enriquez qu e en este reino saon fidalgos . ..", apart fro m bein g curi -
ously vague , i s quit e possibl y th e onl y documen t i n th e Portugues e
language to be found in all the records of the Mexico City council42.
Another Portuguese personality o f some eminence in New Spain wa s
Fray Pedro de Santa Maria , a n Augustinian fria r sen t fro m Rom e t o
serve, much t o th e displeasur e o f hi s brethren , a s Provincia l o f th e
troubled Augustinia n provinc e o f Michoaca n i n th e year s 1629-34 ;
it ha d bee n hoped , vainly a s it turne d out , tha t a Portuguese woul d
succeed where others ha d faile d in reducin g the bitte r mutua l resent -
ment tha t had arise n betwee n th e Creole an d peninsular friar s o f th e
province48.
The pre-eminenc e o f th e Jew s amon g thos e Portugues e wh o ros e
into the uppe r reache s of Mexica n society in th e seventeent h century
is perhaps mos t convincingly an d readil y explicabl e in term s of thei r
particular socio-economi c background . Ol d Christia n Portugues e o f
comparable abilit y t o Melchor Juarez, Simd n Vaez Sevilla, o r Matias
Rodriguez d e Olivera would scarcel y hav e had muc h reason t o b e in
Mexico; ther e would hav e been opportunities enoug h for suc h men of
talent nearer hom e or in the Portuguese colonies. The Cristaos velhos,
the farmers and artisans wh o made up the bulk of the populagao lusi-
tana in New Spai n ha d doubtles s come to the Spanish Ne w Worl d i n
search o f bette r opportunitie s too , bu t i n thei r cas e i t wa s mainl y
their rural background an d lack of capital, literacy , an d career exper -
tise that had blocked their path in Portugal, not the effects of genera l
discrimination agains t th e converse population . Th e Portuguese Jew s
in Mexico, lik e the Cristaos novos generally i n the Portuguese-speak -
ing world , wer e essentiall y bourgeoi s i n character , enterprisin g an d
42) Acta s de Cabildo de la Ciudad d e Mexico (54 vols. Mexico, 1889-1916) , vol .
XXII, p. 246 .
43) Dieg o B a s a l e n q u e , Histori a d e la Provinci a d e Sa n Nicolas d e Tolen-
tino de Michoacan del Orden d e N.P.S. Augustin (Mexico , 1963) , pp. 387-90 , 398 -
402.
literate and eve n where their father s had occupie d the humblest posi-
tions i n Portugal , a s evidently i n th e cas e o f suc h leading figure s a s
Sim6n Vae z d e Sevilla an d th e Vae z d e Acevedo brothers , wer e suf -
ficiently adep t a t acquirin g th e socia l grace s t o gai n entr y t o th e
society of viceroys, oidores, and regional governors .
It i s perhaps significan t i n thi s connectio n tha t th e leadin g mem -
bers o f th e Portuguese-Jewish communit y i n Ne w Spai n ha d widel y
scattered socia l an d busines s connection s i n souther n an d centra l
Spain, Peru , th e Philippines, Centra l America , Venezuela, and, intri -
guJngly, to a certain degree in Italy, but scarcel y at al l in Portugal o r
Brazil: t o a considerable extent evidentl y the y ha d broke n thei r links
with Portugal . Th e connections with th e Philippines, Peru , an d Vene -
zuela wil l caus e littl e surpris e for i n th e specifi c contex t o f Mexica n
commercial developmen t i n th e seventeent h century , i t i s t o b e ex -
pected tha t th e Cristaos novos playe d a prominen t rol e i n Pacifi c
trade an d i n openin g u p th e ne w an d highl y successfu l caca o trad e
with Venezuela 44; mor e strikin g perhaps , especiall y i n vie w o f th e
traditional bia s i n Jewis h historiograph y stressin g th e emigratio n o f
converses fro m th e Spanis h an d Portugues e speakin g worl d i n th e
seventeenth century , i s the weigh t o f evidenc e pointing t o migratio n
of Portugues e Jew s fro m France , Holland , Marocco , an d especiall y
Italy int o Spai n an d Spanis h Americ a durin g the reig n o f Phili p II I
and th e year s of the ascendancy o f the Conde-duqu e d e Olivares. A t
least a scor e o f th e judaizantes o f Portugues e backgroun d take n b y
the Mexica n Inquisitio n betwee n 162 0 an d 165 0 ha d live d i n Ital y
and France - particularl y Livorno , Pisa , Ferrara , Bordeaux and Rou-
en - an d other countrie s wher e Portugues e Jew s wer e activ e durin g
this period 45. Th e pressur e t o emigrat e fro m Italy , i t i s apparent ,
**) Sim6 n Vae z Sevill a an d Antoni o V£e z d e Aceved o wer e plainl y no t th e

only Mexican-Portugues e Jewish entrepreneur s closel y connected with th e Philippi -
nes, see AGN, Inq., vol. 399 , docs. 12 and 13 , vol. 416, ff. 413 , 539; se e also vol. 430 ,
f. 53 2 v., informatio n o n Pedr o d e Campo s a Portuguese-Je w o f Caraca s an d ex -
porter o f caca o to Mexico.
45) Detail s o f som e o f thes e link s ar e given , i n A . W i z n i t z e r , "Crypto -
Jews i n Mexic o during the Seventeent h Century" , in : Th e America n Jewish Histo -
rical Quaterly , vol . 5 1 (1961), pp . 223 , 227, 242, 243, 257; fo r others , omitte d fro m
W i z n i t z e r ' s list , se e AGN, Inq. , vol.489 , f . 384 v.; vol.463 , ff . 380-3, 57 9
V.-80, 583; vol . 378 , ff . 287-8; vol. 416 , ff. 519-20 v.; vol. 431 , proces o no . 3, Julian
Alvarez o f Amsterdam . On e interestin g exampl e i s tha t o f Dieg o PeVe z d e Albu -
caused b y th e shar p down-tur n o f th e Italia n econom y i n th e earl y
seventeenth centur y an d th e deterioratio n i n th e genera l positio n o f
the Jew s i n Italy , combine d wit h th e manifol d socia l an d economi c
attractions of th e Spanis h empir e in th e period 1600-1640 , wer e of -
ten mor e tha n enoug h to counterac t fea r o f th e Inquisitio n an d th e
statutes agains t New Christians .
But i f i t i s granted that th e mor e prominent sectors of th e popula-
$ao lusitana in seventeenth-century Mexico were Jewish an d tha t th e
Jewish sectio n o f th e Portugues e populatio n i n Mexic o ha d fe w re -
maining link s wit h Portugal , th e questio n arise s a s t o ho w fa r thi s
group wa s i n fact consciousl y Portuguese. Plainl y Palafox , lik e most
other Spaniard s o f hi s time , tende d t o se e the Portuguese , Jew s an d
non-Jews, as being both deepl y committe d t o th e caus e of th e Portu-
guese restoration an d militant Portugues e nationalism; Spanish inqui-
sitors ha d lon g been suggestin g that bot h kind s o f Portuguese , Cra -
taos novos and Cristaos velhos, were prone to co-operate especiall y at
the expens e o f Spaniards 4fi. Th e Mexica n Inquisition , i n it s lette r t o
the Suprema o f Septembe r 164 3 deliberating th e pros and con s of ex -
pelling it s Jewis h reconciliados t o Spai n o r th e Philippine s pointe d
out tha t "son todos Portugueses, o descendientes dellos, y s i passassen
desterrados a Espana se podrian comunicar con los traidores de Por-
tugal, y si a las Filipinas alii a unirse con los de la. India, y ser causa
de grandes danos"* 1. However , i t i s equall y clea r tha t th e Portu -
guese Cristaos velhos similarly tended to regard the Cristaos novos as
political traitor s deepl y implicate d i n th e Dutc h successe s i n Brazi l
and othe r form s o f subversio n agains t Portugal 48. I n fact , thoug h
the matter i s far fro m clear-cut , recent research has suggested that th e
prospect o f religiou s toleration unde r the Dutc h was muc h less entic -
ing in the eye s of Brazilian Cristaos novos than is often suppose d an d
it i s important t o bear i n mind that th e Portuguese restoration di d i n
querque who wa s brought u p a s a Je w i n Bordeau x an d reside d in various part s of

France, includin g Rouen , befor e enterin g Spai n an d deciding , "for se r tanto stt
pobreza", to emigrat e to th e Indie s which h e did i n 1618 ; in Puebla, h e joined wit h
a smal l grou p o f Portugues e Jew s o f predominantl y Frenc h background . Subse -
quently, he became a vecino of Zacatecas; AGN, Inq., vol. 348, ff. 167-549 .
46
) Th e letter o f Inquisitors Verdug o and Gay tan in: P r o o d i a n , op. cit., 273 .
« AGN , Inq. , vol. 416, f. 445.
48
) Joa o Luci o d ' A z e v e d o , Hist6ri a do s Cristaos Novo s Portuguese s (Lis -
bon, 1921) , pp . 236-7.
fact lea d t o important instance s of Jewish participation i n the Portu-
guese nationa l movemen t includin g i n th e bitte r colonia l wa r wit h
the Dutch 49. While there i s not a trace o f evidence tha t the so-calle d
complicidad grande uncovered by th e Mexican Inquisition in the lat -
ter month s o f 1642 , was, despite th e confusio n of certai n historians ,
anything mor e than a secret , non-political , socia l an d religiou s asso-
ciation o f essentiall y passiv e nature 50, ther e ar e a fe w sign s that a t
least som e of th e Portugues e Jew s in Mexico did sympathiz e to some
degree with th e Portugues e national movement . Luis Nunez Perez , a
Portuguese-Jewish peanut-seller who arrive d i n Mexico in 164 1 after
passing fro m Sevill e an d th e Canarie s throug h Angola , Portugues e
Brazil, Netherland s Brazi l an d Venezuel a as wel l a s Cartagen a an d
Havana wa s found by the Inquisition to have upon his person politi-
cal papers revealin g hi m to b e a ferven t supporte r o f Portuga l eve n
against th e United Provinces . Th e documents, we are told, "contenia
los acuerdos entre la corona de Portugal, y estados de Holanda, de
que dio traslado a otros tres Portugueses, que con el se lamentaron
que dichos acuerdos mas eran en fahor de los de Holanda que en pro-
vecko d e Portugal ..." 8I. Th e Inquisitors , interestingly , als o attri -
buted t o Lui s Nunez PeVe z th e belie f "d e qu e venia un a gruessa ar -
mada de Portugueses contra esta tierra".
The fac t tha t th e Ne w Christian backgroun d o f th e Portugues e
conversos i n Mexic o wa s generall y concealed , especiall y befor e th e
wave o f arrest s o f 1642 , tende d t o tighte n th e rathe r comple x bon d
between th e Cristaos velhos an d Cristaos novos an d therefor e
strengthen th e tendenc y o f th e Portugues e i n Spanish-Americ a t o
seek eachothers company , thoug h i t i s also true that sudden suspicion
of Jewishnes s sometime s occasione d violen t rupture s betwee n previ -
ously close Portuguese families.
Portuguese settlemen t i n seventeenth-centur y Ne w Spain , i t ma y

be sai d i n conclusion , wa s widespread , complex , an d sizeable . An y
49) Eduard o d ' O l i v e i r a F r a n j a , U m Problema : A Trai9a o do s Cris-
taos Novos em 1624, in: Revist a d e Hist6ri a (Sa o Paulo) XLI (1970) , pp. 21-71 ;
Anita N o v i n s k y , O s Cristaos Novos na Bahi a (Sao Paulo, 1972), pp. 142-143,
160-162; C. R. B o x e r, A Great Luso-Brazilia n Figure: Padre Antonio Vieira, in:
The Fourth Canning House Annual Lecture, 1957 (London, 1963), p. 17.
80) AGN, Inq., vol. 416 , ff . 445-44 9 v. ; se e also S. B. L i e b m a n n, The Great
Conspiracy in New Spain, in: The Americas, XXX (1973) , pp. 18-31.
51
) AGN , Inq., vol. 412. Proceso contra Luis Nunez Pe>ez, ff. 416-543.
notion tha t th e Portugues e who entere d th e viceroyalt y wer e mainl y
merchants, o r mainl y Ne w Christians , o r tha t the y settle d onl y i n
certain specifi c place s suc h a s th e leadin g commercia l centre s o r th e
silver-mining towns would, i t appears , b e ill-founded. Bot h Cristaos
velhos and Cristaos novos, persons of rural an d of urban background,
farmers an d artisans , vagrant s an d capitalists , wer e strongl y repre -
sented. Th e Cristaos novos tende d t o concentrat e i n th e mai n town s
where thei r leaders , th e uppe r stratu m o f th e populagao lusitana i n
Mexico, figure d prominently , i f onl y briefly , i n th e mos t influentia l
circles o f th e viceroyalty . Th e Cristaos velhos o n th e othe r hand ,
with a rather differen t distributio n and occupation-structure wer e t o
be found i n al l area s fro m th e tropica l lowland s of Centra l Americ a
to the arid frontie r region s of northern Mexic o and i n a wide variety
of activities . Only i n th e roya l administratio n an d possibl y amon g
the clergy were they thinl y represented . A reasonable gues s would b e
that by 164 1 th e whole Portuguese communit y in Mexico constituted
approximately 7 % of the total white population .
Despite the very real differences between Cristaos velhos and Cris-
taos novos, differences o f background , occupation-structure, an d reli -
gious an d racia l attitudes , nevertheless , prio r t o 164 2 whe n a larg e
part o f th e Portugues e uppe r stratu m wa s show n t o b e Jewish , th e
two group s wer e on e i n som e degree especially wit h respec t t o thei r
common Portugues e nationalit y an d idiom , th e Cristaos novos hav -
ing a veste d interest , insofa r a s the y coul d no t represen t themselve s
as Castilian s o r Creoles , i n stressin g that aspec t o f themselve s tha t
was Portuguese. This elemen t of unity was reflected especially sharp-
ly in the attitude toward the Portuguese o f the Spaniards. The latter
almost invariabl y brackete d th e tw o group s of Portuguese , Jew s an d
non-Jews, together treatin g the m equall y with a somewha t mistrust -
ful tolerance , a n attitud e b y whic h th e Cristaos velhos suffere d per -
haps but the Cristaos novos, at least for a time, gained.
Finally, i t is clear, a s Viceroy Escalona emphasized, that th e Portu-
guese immigratio n int o Mexic o i n th e firs t hal f o f th e seventeent h
century was merely part of a much wider phenomeno n embracing the
whole o f the Spanish Indies . Taken togethe r wit h th e Portugues e im-
migration int o th e viceroyalt y o f Peru , th e Caribbea n islands , an d
indeed Brazi l i n thi s period , i t i s evident , whe n th e man y ten s o f
thousands involved ar e see n i n relatio n t o Portugal' s modes t popula -
tion o f a littl e mor e tha n on e million, tha t th e settlemen t i n Mexic o
was part of a truly massive exodus from Portugal. I n th e seventeent h
century, th e ag e of th e genera l crisis , Portugal b y n o mean s escape d
the effect s o f economi c decay and advers e change s in socia l structure
that effected so much of Europe. Bu t th e Portugues e crisis, which ap -
parently involve d a drift fro m the countryside an d fal l i n agricultur -
al productio n a s well a s commercial difficulties 52, wa s distinctiv e i n
that th e demographi c stagnatio n tha t attende d i t wa s th e resul t no t
of populatio n declin e o r lac k o f growt h a s in Germany , Spain , Po -
land, Italy , or th e Balkans , but o f massiv e emigratio n t o th e Ameri -
cas, emigration o f ver y mixe d socia l composition . Thu s th e extensiv e
Portuguese settlemen t i n Mexic o i n th e seventeent h centur y ma y b e
regarded a s being partly a manifestation of the "Genera l Crisi s of th e
Seventeenth Century " bot h i n tha t i t reflecte d th e drif t o f popula -
tion fro m th e Portugues e countrysid e an d smal l town s an d th e fligh t
of Portugues e entrepreneur s fro m a depresse d Portugal , a declinin g
Spain, an d a stricken Italy.
52) F . M a u r o, L e Portugal e t 1'Atlantique a u XVII e Sikl e (1570-1670) . Etu -

de Economique (Paris, 1960) , pp. 500-3; A. H. de O l i v e i r a M a r q u e s , His -
tory of Portugal (2 vols., New York and London, 1972), vol. I, pp. 323-4.
13
DUARTE NUNES D A COSTA (JACOB CURIEL) OF HAMBURG ,

SEPHARDI NOBLEMAN AN D COMMUNAL LEADER , 1585-166 4
Among the handful of western Sephardi patricians ennobled by European monarchs in the
seventeenth century, one of the most remarkable in the secular sphere, as well as one of the
most active in synagogue affairs, wa s the former Marrano Duarte Nunes da Costa, known
in the synagogue as Jacob Curiel, the man who served as "Agent" of the Crown of Portugal
at Hamburg from 164 1 down to his death in 1664. I n 1641, King John IV of Portugal made
him a knight of his royal household (cavaleirofidalgo), th e same rank as was subsequently
bestowed, i n 1645 , o n Duarte' s eldes t son , Jeronim o Nune s d a Costa , wh o serve d a s
"Agent" of the Crow n o f Portugal in the Unite d Province s fro m 164 5 until his death in
1697.' Although Duarte himself spent only a few years in Holland, in the early 1620s, his
life and career were linked in all sorts of ways with the rise and progress of Dutch Sephardi
Jewry. In some respect s he was a typical representative of an elite. But, when compared
with othe r wealthy western Sephardi patricians, he does seem t o hav e shown an except-
ionally strong commitment to Judaism and th e furtherance of Sephardi communal life.
According to the well-know n geneaeological narratio n compile d b y Isaac de Mattati a
Aboab, Duart e Nunes da Costa wa s born on 26 September 158 7 and was the eldest son of
the Lisbo n physicia n Dr Jeronim o Nune s Ramires (1545-1609 ) an d hi s wife, Mari a da
Fonseca.2 Thus , i n accordance wit h Sephardi namin g practice, Duart e named hi s eldest
son after his own father. Jeronimo Nunes Ramires was in turn the son of a certain Duarte
Nunes of Coimbra afte r who m Duarte Nune s da Costa himsel f wa s named. Thi s Duarte
Nunes, we know, was a moderately well-to-do cloth merchant and was almost certainly a
crypto-Jew as a letter which mentions him, dating from 156 0 tells us that he carried on a
correspondence wit h a brother, Ferna o Nunes who had fled to the Ottoman Empire an d
reverted to open Judaism in Constantinople,3 and since most of his children can be shown,
* Th e researc h o n whic h thi s articl e is base d wa s greatl y assiste d b y Marce l Curiel , o f Caracas , a direc t
descendant o f Duarte's , b y Edga r Samuel , directo r o f th e Jewis h Museu m i n London , an d Antoni o d e
Vasconcelos Sima o who located all the material found in Portuguese archives. I am immensely grateful t o all
three.
1
Th e exac t dat e o f Duarte's ennoblemen t wa s 1 4 June 1641 , se e Britis h Library MS.Add. 46912 , fos.llr-v ;
Jonathan I . Israel, "Th e Diplomati c Caree r o f Jeronim o Nune s da Costa" , Bijdragen e n Mededelingen
betreffende d e Geschiedenis de r Nederlanden vol . 98, pp. 167-68 .
1
I.S . Revah, "Pour 1'histoire des Nouveaux-Chretiens Portugais. La relation genealogique d'l. de M. Aboab",
Boletim International de Bibliografia Luso-Brasileira II (1961), 30 see also the extensive notes on the Nunes
da Costa family i n Hermann Kellenbenz , Sephardim a n der unteren Elbe (Wiesbaden, 1958).
3
Se e th e minut e of th e lette r sen t t o th e Inquisitor s from Constantinopl e b y Fathe r Joa o Dia s i n 156 0 in
Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (= ANTT ) Santo Officio , Papei s avulsos M 7-2608 .
from a wide variety of Inquisition evidence, to have been crypto-Jews. Among these, one
of Duart e Nunes da Costa' s mor e notabl e uncles , was Diogo Pere s da Costa who spen t
over twent y years as an itinerant merchant in various parts of the Spanis h viceroyalt y of
Peru before being denounced by the Peruvian Inquisitiors and searched fo r unsuccessfully
in Potosi, Lima, and Cuzco where his name was publicly called out in the churches. He is
known to have escaped (vi a Seville) to Venice and, from there, migrated to the Holy Land ,
where he settled i n Safed, and reportedly took a s his surname what we may infer was the
family's lat e medieva l Spanis h patronymi c - "Curiel". * While living the lif e o f a Jew in
Safed, this Curiel was burnt in effigy in the Auto-da-Fe at Lima in March 1605.5 One child
of Duarte Nune s who did become a sincere Christian, however, was Bishop Francisco d e
Victoria (1540-92 ) wh o wa s perhaps th e onl y Portugues e Ne w Christia n t o becom e a
Catholic bisho p i n the sixteent h centur y and wa s certainly the firs t bisho p o n the soil of
what i s today Argentina , bein g raised t o th e dioces e o f Tucuman, th e firs t Argentinia n
diocese, b y Philip II o f Spai n i n 1577. 6 Bu t unlik e othe r bishops , Bisho p Francisc o d e
Vitoria seem s t o have had an inordinate interes t i n trade an d was effectively th e firs t t o
establish th e contraband commerc e fro m souther n Brazi l via Buenos Aires and the river
Plate t o Potosi. 7
Dr Jeronimo Nune s Ramires himself showe d muc h less zest for travel than most of his
brothers an d is mainly noted fo r his long Latin treatise o n blood-letting.8 Shortly after his
death, in 1609, hi s brother-in-law, Thomas d a Fonseca, wa s seized by the Lisbon Inquisi -
tion for judaizing. This placed other s o f the famil y i n such danger tha t a sizeable group ,
including Duarte' s mother , Maria , Duart e himself , an d hi s younge r brother , Lop o
Ramires (late r a prominent Jewish figure a t Amsterdam) move d from Lisbo n to Madrid
where the y were t o remai n fo r nearl y two years. 9 But, then, the Inquisitio n tribunal of
Toledo were alerte d t o the presence o f at least one membe r of this judaizing group an d
orders were signed in Toledo, on 26 June 1611 , fo r the arrest of the lawyer Duarte Nunes
Vitoria who was both Duart e Nune s da Costa's cousin (bein g a son of another o f Duart e
Nunes" sons, Lui s Nunes Vitoria) an d his brother-in-law, bein g the husban d o f Duart e
Nunes d a Costa' s elde r sister , Guioma r d a Costa. 10 Once agai n i n peril, Duart e Nune s
Vitoria, returne d t o Lisbon (probabl y in order t o brin g out Guiomar an d their children,
4
Revah , "Pou r 1'histoir e de s Nouveaux-Chretien s Portugais", 298 ; L . Garci a d e Proodian , Lo s Judios e n
America.
5
Ibid. ; Ricardo Palma, Anales de la Inquisition d e Lima (Lima , 1863), 6.
6
Gi l Gonzalez Davila, Teatro Eclesiastico de laprimitiva iglesia de de las Indicts Occidentals (Madrid, 1655) ii ,
fos. 52-v ; I . de M. Aboab states incorrectly that Francisco also became Archbishop of Mexico, a report which
is based on a confusion o f names.
7
A.P . Canabrava, O comercio portugues no Rio da Praia (1580-1640 (Sa o Paulo , 1944) 61-3,87 ; C.R. Boxer ,
Salvador d e Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686 (London , 1952 ) 75 .
8
Se e Jeronimo Nunes Ramires, De Ratione Curandiper Sanguinis Missionem (1s t ed n Lisbon, 1608 an d 2nd
edn. Antwerp , 1610) ; se e als o Diog o Barbos a Machado , Bibliotheca Lusitana Histories, Critica e Cro-
nologica (Lisbon , 1747) , 509-10.
9
ANT T Inquisicao de Lisboa torn. 6172, "Proces o de Duarte Nunes Vitoria", fos. 23 , 38, 40, 44.'
10
Archiv e Historico Nacional, Madrid Inquisition legajo 169 , no . 5 .
Duarte Nunes d a Costa 33 5
who seem to have remained in Lisbon) while the rest beat a hasty retreat acros s norther n
Spain, crossin g the Frenc h frontie r and settling at St Jean d e Luz.
While Duarte, hi s mother an d others o f the famil y escape d safel y fro m Spain , Duart e
Nunes Vitoria, Guioma r d a Costa, and tw o others o f Duarte's sister s were seized by the
Inquisition in Lisbon, interrogated, tortured, imprisoned, and finally publicly exhibited in
autos-da-fe before eventually being able to escape Portugal for freedom and a Jewish life in
Holland. I n their confessions befor e th e Inquisitors, they disclosed various details abou t
the crypto-Jewis h religiou s gathering s whic h had taken plac e i n the hom e o f the lat e D r
Jeronimo Nune s Ramires. The y revealed, amon g others things, that the familiy's spiritual
guide in Lisbon ha d been non e othe r than Dr Felipe Rodrigue s Montalto , th e same who
later gaine d fam e throughout th e Sephard i world under the nam e Eliahu Montalt o and
who, i n 1612 , wa s called t o th e Frenc h court , b y the Frenc h Queen-Mothe r wh o wa s
desirous o f hi s medica l service s an d wh o conferre d upo n hi m th e uniqu e privilege o f
permitting him to practice Judais m openly in France. It has not hitherto been realise d by
historians that even before he left Portugal, Montalto was a zealous proselytizer among the
Marranos. One of Duarte's sisters describes him in his Lisbon days as "grande letrado nas
cossas da Le y de Moyses". 1' Thi s piece o f testimony together wit h th e eviden t fact tha t
Montalto proved t o b e one o f the most determine d and vehemently anti-Christian of all
early seventeenth-centur y Jewis h polemicist s demonstrate s no t onl y th e presenc e o f
genuine crypto-Jewish sentiment among New Christian circles in Lisbon at the end of the
sixteenth century , bu t als o tha t resentmen t a t th e crueltie s of th e Inquisitio n readily
developed, i n som e individuals , into a mor e genera l aversio n t o th e Churc h an d it s
teachings.12 Indeed, i t is my contention tha t something of this anti-Christian fervour, so
evident i n Montalto, also lef t it s mark o n Duart e Nune s da Costa, Lopo Ramires, and
others o f their circle .
Montalto's intimacy with Duarte's famil y arose in the first instance from the fact that his
wife, Jeronim a da Fonseca, was a sister of Duarte's mother. 13 He an d Jeronimo Nune s
Ramires ha d bot h marrie d daughter s of th e famou s Dr Lop o d a Fonseca . Moreover ,
Montalto was not only a central figure in the family gatherings in Lisbon, we also know that
he remained i n correspondence wit h Maria da Fonseca an d her children after he migrated
to Italy to live first as a New Christian in Tuscany and then openly as a Jew at Venice. From
Venice, he kept in touch with Duarte's famil y whilst they were in Lisbon and subsequently
whilst they lived in Madrid and St Jean de Luz as well as afterwards. Thus he knew all about
the perilous "occurrence s of Lisbon and Madrid" and , in a letter which he sent to St Jean,
in August 1611 , describes th e great joy fel t i n his household in Venice on learning of the
family's successful flight from Madrid to St Jean.'" He goes on to remonstrate with the one
member o f th e group , Per o Rodrigues , husban d of on e o f Duarte' s aunts , who fel t n o
11
ANT T Inquisi$ao de Lisboa torn. 7192, "Proces o de Duart e Nune s da Costa", fos. 9, 12v .
12
O n Montalto's ferven t anti-Christianity , see Cecil Roth , "Quatre Lettres d'Elie de Montalto: contributio n a
1'histoire des Marranes", Revue des Etudes Juives LXXXVII (1929), 137-168; Cecil Roth, History of the Jews
in Venice (ne w edn New York, 1975) , 242-44.
13
Revah , "Pour 1'histoire des Nouveaux-Chretiens Portugais", 302 .
14
Roth , "Quatr e lettres", 148 .
particular allegianc e t o Judaism and preferred t o remain Christia n than revert t o semi -
concealed Jewish practice in France a s the rest were doing. This immediate reversion to a
semi-concealed Judaism in a country where Judaism was officially prohibited is, it seems to
me, one of the strongest pieces of evidence undermining the arguments of those scholars
who clai m that by the earl y seventeenth centur y there wa s no authenti c crypto-Jewish
tradition in Portugal.
If Duart e Nune s da Costa's father had bee n a physician and his grandfather an inland
cloth merchant, several of his uncles had, as we have seen, entered the exhilerating spher e
of colonial trade and travelled widely, as did so many of the new generation of Portugues e
New Christian s afte r 1570 . Wit h the ris e o f th e Brazilia n sugar plantations i n th e las t
quarter o f th e sixteent h century , and th e rapi d expansio n o f Spanis h American silver-
mining, a s wel l as th e accompanyin g increased deman d i n Ibero-Americ a fo r Africa n
slaves, an unprecedented wealt h of new opportunities ha d arisen. A vibrant trans-Atlantic
commercial syste m ha d com e int o bein g and , fo r th e moment , wa s base d firml y o n
Portugal an d Spain . Beside s Diog o Pere s d a Cost a an d Francisco d e Vitoria , mentio n
should als o be made of Duarte's oldest paterna l uncle, Fernáo Louremj o Ramires , who
was activ e i n Lisbo n i n th e 1570 s a s a "Guine a merchant " an d wh o subsequentl y also
migrated to the Ottoman Empire where he too reverted to open Judaism and adopted the
name "Curiel".15 He is reported to have died at Tripoli in Lebanon. Duarte thus grew up in
a Lisbon effervescing wit h a first wave of Marrano colonial entrepreneurs, and the exotic
expertise they had acquired , as well as in a milieu suffused wit h vibrant crypto-Judaism.
There is no reason to doubt, therefore, that the expertise Duarte exhibited throughout his
long career i n the Brazi l trade, the East Indi a trade and , in particular, in diamonds was
acquired i n his birth-place, Lisbon, before hi s flight from th e Inquisition.
The testimony of his sisters before the Lisbon Inquisitors shows that Duarte had already
made several business trips to Madrid, or had moved there, some time before his mother
and other relatives fled Lisbon.16 Probably, h e was selling diamonds o r other Portuguese
colonial ware s in the Spanis h capital . After departin g Madrid, w e lose sigh t of him fo r
several years so that we do not know whether he moved directly from Spai n to Florenc e
where he was living some years later or whether he too spent some time at St Jean before
moving on to Italy. Either way, he certainly remained in close contact with his family, at St
Jean, and, after his mother's death, in 1614 (when Lopo Ramires took his youngest sister
and othe r relative s to Amsterdam ) wit h Lop o i n Holland. 17 Indeed, Duarte' s busines s
activity in Tuscany was clearly carried on in co-operation with Lopo at Amsterdam, as well
as with correspondents i n Lisbon. In 1617 , for example, merchandise sent by Lopo fro m
Amsterdam, was loaded together wit h other goods, o n Duarte's instructions, at Livorno,
onto a ship bound for Tunisia which, unfortunately, sank off Sardinia.18 Duarte's involve-
15
Revah , "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 298 .
16
ANT T Inquisigao de Lisboa torn. 7192, "Proces o de Duarte Nunes da Costa", fos. 3 , lOv , 15v .
17
Mari a da Fonseca died at St Jean in February 1614, an d Lopo arrived in Amsterdam from S t Jean, with hi s
youngest sister , Isobel , in March.
18
E.M . Koen , "Amsterda m notaria l deed s pertaining to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam u p to 1630" , in
instalments in Stadia Rosenthaliana, nos. 767 , 1027 , 1449 , 1470 .
Duurte Nunes d a Costa 33 7
ment i n th e Barbar y trad e (whic h was to continue , a s we shall see, afte r h e move d t o
Amsterdam) wa s presumably connected wit h the increasing demand at Lisbon for supplies
of Mediterranean re d coral which was needed fo r the trade with India.19 Much of the re d
coral shipped ou t to Goa from Lisbo n came originally from th e Tunisian coast. No doubt,
Duarte, like Lopo imported India n diamonds fro m Lisbon , alon g with othe r Portugues e
colonial merchandise , and , lik e Lopo, he might well, through his agents in Lisbon, have
sent good s on the Portugues e Eas t Indi a carracks to Goa .
But throughout hi s long life, Duarte showed great zest for other thing s besides trade. In
view of the prominent role he played in communal life in Amsterdam from the moment he
arrived there , i n 1621 , i t seems clea r tha t h e mus t have gained extensiv e experience o f
synagogue affair s whils t i n Tuscany . A piec e o f evidenc e whic h vividly illustrate s hi s
interest i n Judaica i s his acquisition , i n 1618 , whils t in Pisa , o f a beautifull y decorate d
medieval Iberia n Hebrew bibl e which he purchased from a member of the Rosilho family ,
from Fez. A s Duarte himsel f inscribed on the inside of its cover, he bought this venerable
bible for its beauty and rarity with a view to keeping it as a treasured famil y possession. 20
And w e know that it did stay in the possession o f the Curiéi s in Amsterdam dow n to th e
early nineteenth century . After Duarte's death , i t came int o the possession o f Jerónimo
Nunes d a Cost a who evidently pu t thi s bible, a s it was known as being one o f the mos t
ancient possessed by Dutch Sephardi Jewry, at the disposal of Joseph Athias whilst he was
preparing his historic Biblia Hebraica of 1667, the "most famous publication to issue fro m
among us in this city" as David Franc o Mende s calle d it .
Duarte, unmarried apparently whilst at Madrid, was married to Ynes Lopes Jorge (Lea h
Abaz) a t some point betwee n 161 1 an d 1617. T o marry an heiress from amon g the élite of
the Antwer p Portugues e New Christian communit y indicates that h e must alread y have
had considerable wealt h an d statu s o f hi s own . W e d o no t kno w the date s o f birt h of
Duarte's tw o eldes t daughters , bu t w e d o kno w tha t hi s thir d chil d an d eldes t son ,
Jerónimo Nune s da Costa, was born at Florence o n 29 May 1620.21 Duarte an d his family
were stil l i n Florence for a short tim e afte r Apri l 1621 , th e mont h in which th e Twelv e
Years" Truce betwee n Spai n an d th e Unite d Province s expired, disruptin g so many of
western Sephard i Jewry' s trade links; 22 but the expiry of the truce, with the banning of all
Dutch ship s an d good s fro m Portugal , a s wel l a s Spain , an d th e haltin g o f th e Dutc h
carrying trade between th e Iberian Peninsul a an d Italy, would have put a virtual stop t o
Lopo's an d Duarte' s previou s method s o f collaboration . O n 3 0 June 1621 , Lopo , a t
Amsterdam, dre w u p a notaria l dee d authorizin g "Duart e an d Lui s Nune s d a Costa ,
merchants at Florence" to collect his share o f a debt owed to them by Abraham Cohen d e
Lucena, a t Pisa. 23 Luis, Duarte' s nephew , bein g th e eldes t so n o f hi s sister, Guiomar ,
19
O n th e rol e of coral in th e diamon d trade , see G . Yogev , Diamonds an d Coral. Anglo-Dutch Jews an d
Eighteenth-century Trade (Leicester , 1978) , 102-4.
20
Catalogue de vente de la succession de feu M.D. Henriques de Castro (Amsterdam, 1899), pp. 44-5; I am told
that thi s bible is today in the collection of the Hispanic Society of America, in New York.
21
Revah , "Pour I'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 305.
22
Jonatha n I. Israel, "Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660", below, pp. 371-6.
23
Koen , "Amsterdam notarial deeds" no. 2445.
seems to have been brought up in Duarte's household after the seizure of the boy's parents
in Lisbon and to have remained with him subsequently. Thus, it is very likely that Duarte
was still in Tuscany at the time of a sensational sale of diamonds in 1621. A large stock of
diamonds looted b y Algerian pirates from a Portuguese vessel was sold off at Livorno and
Florence at rock-bottom prices. Wit h this sale, according to the source use d b y Braudel,
"all Italy became rich". 24 If still present, Duarte wa s well placed to take advantage of the
coup.
Duarte arrive d i n Amsterdam probabl y lat e i n 162 1 an d los t n o tim e i n establishing
himself sociall y an d commerciall y i n hi s ne w milieu . Naturall y h e joine d th e sam e
synagogue that hi s brother wa s active in - th e Beth Ya'acov. Th e fact tha t he was then
already a man of means is shown by his relatively high/into assessment (2 6 guilders), and
by hi s purchase o f a larg e hous e fro m a Dutc h book-binder o n th e Jodenbreestraat, i n
March 1622, for 5,900 guilders. From Amsterdam, he resumed trading both with Tuscany
and North Afric a as well as, by surreptitious means , with Lisbon. In March 1622 , taking
advantage of high food prices in Italy, Duarte an d Lopo jointly freighted a vessel loaded
with grain and beans to Livorno.25 More riskily, in the years 1623-4 they chartered severa l
North German ships and crews, provided with false Hanseatic papers, to sail to Setubal to
load salt ostensibly fo r a Hanseatic port but in fact for the Dutch market. 26 In 1624, Duarte
was on e o f eleve n Amsterda m Portugues e Jew s wh o petitione d th e Amsterda m cit y
council to press th e States Genera l to send letters to several North African potentates t o
assure th e latte r tha t the y wer e Dutc h an d no t Iberia n subjects. 27 Unlik e mos t othe r
Sephardi merchants in Holland, Duarte Nunes da Costa also took an interest in the newly
set u p Dutc h Wes t Indi a Compan y an d it s ambitiou s plans fo r expansio n i n Hispani c
America, investing 4,000 guilders in the company, an amount surpassed by only one other
Jewish investor, namely Bento Osorio, wh o invested 6,000 guilders, and equalled b y only
one other, namel y Francisco Coutinho, both o f whom, like Duarte, als o had commercial
connections in Italy. 28
Meanwhile, within a very short space of time, Duarte mad e a notable impact on Dutch
Sephardi communal life. Where his brother, Lopo , was of rather abrasive disposition and
was on e o f th e perpetrator s o f th e bitte r spli t which had take n plac e withi n th e Beth
Ya'acov community in 1618,29 leading to the formation of a break-away congregation, Beth
Israel, whic h brought th e tota l o f Sephard i congregation s i n Amsterda m u p t o three ,
Duarte prided himself on his skill as a peacemaker and conciliator. What his exact role was
in th e comple x communa l negotiations o f 162 2 w e ca n perhap s neve r kno w fo r sure .
24
Fernan d Braudel, The Mediterranean an d th e Mediterranean World i n the Age o f Philip I I ( 2 vols. London,
1973) ii, 889 .
25
Gemeentearchie f (hereafter GA) Amsterdam , Notarial Archive (=NA) 628, pp. 472-73.
26
G A Bo x Index, Portugeese Joden, Soutvaart 1623-4 .
27
Les Sources Inedites de I'histoire du Maroc ed. Henri de Castries 1st. ser. vol. IV (Paris-The Hague, 1913), p.
29n.
28
H . Watjen , Da s Judentum und die Anfdnge de r modernen Kolonisation (Berlin , 1913) , 32-3.
29
J . D'Ancona , "Koms t der Marrane n in Noord-Nederland", in Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland ed . H .
Brugmans and A. Fran k (Amsterdam, 1940) 22-30.
Duarte Nunes da Costa 33 9
According t o th e chronicle r an d poe t Danie l Lev i de Barrios , writin g some sixt y years
later, from secon d han d information, it was Duarte, or as he calls him Jacob Curiel , who
played the leading part in bringing the wrangling to an end and in reconciling the estranged
communities. It is quite true that in 1622 the basis was laid for future co-operation betwee n
the thre e synagogue s in Amsterdam alon g radically new lines. Followin g th e collaps e of
Dutch trad e wit h the Iberia n Peninsula , in 1621, the entir e economic positio n o f Dutch
Sephardi Jewr y bega n t o deteriorat e an d th e thre e synagogue s were face d by a sudde n
crisis compounded of mounting demand for poor relief and diminishing income. Duarte, it
seems, played a key role in the talks which led (in February 1622 ) t o the setting up of the
Imposta boar d which was the centrepiece o f a new communal strategy. The purpose of the
Imposta wa s to tackl e th e sudde n acut e proble m o f poor relie f and , mor e generall y to
"discuss matters general and necessary to the nation and its preservation".30 The intention
was that the board would collect a common tax, or Imposta, on all commercial and financial
transactions engaged in by the membership of the three congregations with which to meet
the sharpl y rising cost o f poor relief . A t th e same time, the board actively promoted th e
re-emigration o f poor Jews , particularly to Ital y an d th e Islami c countries where, it was
considered, ther e wer e bette r prospect s fo r settlin g and employin g them. A t th e sam e
time, great stress was laid in the board's regulations on the continuing need to assist poor
New Christian refugees who wished to leave the Iberian Peninsula, o r France, and revert
to open Judaism in Holland. The emergency was not to be allowed to dilute the proselytiz-
ing zeal of the community. In general terms, the Imposta wa s a success. As time went on,
the board graduall y acquired additional tasks and continued, down to 1639, to serve as the
co-ordinating steerin g committe e o f Amsterda m Sephard i Jewry an d it s mouthpiece in
dealings with the cit y authorities.
Duarte, Lopo , an d thei r cousin , Duart e Nune s Vitoria (Abraha m Curiel) , wer e al l
voted onto the six-member Imposta board at various times during the 1620s. Duarte Nunes
da Cost a wa s elected a parnas of the Beth Ya'acov communit y in 162 4 and i t was in that
year tha t h e als o serve d a s a membe r of th e Imposta. On e o f th e resolution s which h e
signed in that capacity authorised the sendin g of 200 guilders to Palermo as a ransom for a
rabbi's mother and children reportedly held in captivity there by the Spaniards. The report
proved t o be untrue, however, and the remittance was cancelled.
According to Levi de Barrios, Duarte's second son, Manoel, was born in Amsterdam at
the tim e of the negotiations which led to the reconciling of the three communities; and it
was to perpetuate th e memor y of this reconciliation that Duarte decided to give him the
Hebrew nam e Selomoh, a name deriving, the chronicler implies , from th e Hebrew word
shalom.^ This rather charming story as to how Duarte came to call Manoel Selomoh, Levi
30
G A Amsterdam , Portugee s Joodse Gemeente no. 1 3 "Libro dos termos da ymposta da nacjio", foundin g
articles.
31
Danie l Levi de Barrios, "Vida de Ishac Huziel", p. 4 in Triumpho de l govierno popular en la Casa de Jacob
(Amsterdam, 1683): "Echo la pasion' writes our author , la manc.ana de la discordia entre las cabec.as de las
tres congregraciones de Be t Yahacob , Nev e Shalom , y Bet Israel , en e l ano de 1619 , y el cuerdo y solicito
lacob Curiel (que despues fue Regente del Rey Don luan Quarto de Portugal en Hamburgo) por la dicha que
tuvo de deponerlos en paz, llamo en la circuncion a su segundo hijo Selomoh que signific a Pacifico".
de Barrios presumabl y heard man y years later fro m Duarte' s eldes t son , Jeronimo. T o
further celebrat e Duarte' s rol e a s a communal peacemaker, an d perhaps at Jeronimo's
suggestion, Levi de Barrios compose d th e followin g sonnet:
Lo discorde aruin a la conciencia 32

y dividiendo el pueblo l o enflaquece ,
con la venganca al animo envilece,
y con l a ira e s landre de la ciencia.
Enciende quie n lo apaga, a la clemencia,

aclara a la salud quien lo obscurece,
da a la agudeza luz quien lo entorpece ,
y quien lo abate, enxalt a a la opulencia.
Marchit6 en Amsterdam Hebrea plant a

calor discorde d e maestros sabios :
revivela Curie l con la paz santa:
Un Salomon alcann a en sus victorias:
y borrand o e l papel de los agravios,
haze escrivir s u nombre en las Memorias.
By the mid 1620s, the Spanish embargoes against Dutch trade were biting harder than
ever. More and more of Amsterdam's former commerce with the Spanish and Portuguese
empires was being diverted to Hamburg . This i s the backgroun d against which w e must
place Duarte's decision, after roughly five years in Amsterdam, t o emigrate to the Lower
Elbe, followin g i n th e footstep s o f numerou s othe r Amsterda m Sephardi m wh o ha d
migrated to north-west Germany since 1620. 33 Duarte was still in Amsterdam in May 1626
when, together wit h Lopo an d two other Sephard i merchants , he arranged a cargo to be
shipped to the corsair base of Saleh, in Morocco,34 but he left Holland with his family and
belongings shortly after, settling first no t i n Hamburg but i n Gliickstadt. However , this
time Duart e time d matter s badly , his arrival in Gliickstadt co-incidin g with Denmark' s
entry into The Thirty Years" War and the consequent advance of the Habsburg armies into
North Germany. The defeat of the Danish army at Lutter, on 27 August 1626, spelt the end
of Gliickstadt' s period o f prosperity and, when it became clear tha t Gliickstadt , being a
Danish possession , wa s about t o b e besieged , man y of the Sephard i merchant s settle d
there, including Duarte, move d hastil y to Hamburg. During 1627 Duarte re-establishe d
himself once more both in Jewish community life and in commerce.35 From 162 7 down to
32
Ibid , p. 5.
33
Se e below, 370-1.
34
G A Amsterda m NA vol. 633, fo. 58.
35
Staatsarchi v Hamburg (= SAH) , Reichskammersgerichtsakten L60, fo. 75; the earliest reference to Duarte
in Hambur g whic h I foun d i n th e Staatsarchi v ther e concerne d a carg o of suga r consigne d t o hi m fro m
Portugal, see SAH Admiralitatskollegium F4/3, p. 2.
the earl y 1640s , h e wa s to b e on e o f th e mos t activ e Portugues e Jewis h merchant s i n
Hamburg, dealing mainly with Lisbon an d Amsterdam an d i n a wide range of products ,
though with a particular emphasis on sugar and especially diamonds. Through most of this
period, down to the secession of Portugal from Spain, in December 1640 , Duarte collabor -
ated closel y with his brother an d other Sephardi merchants in Amsterdam in circumvent-
ing the Spanis h embargoe s agains t Dutc h trad e with Portugal. H e wa s thus frequentl y
acting on behalf of his Amsterdam correspondents. I n the autumn of 1630, for example, a
Hamburg ship, th e S t Pieter, returned from Lisbo n to Hambur g with various packets of
diamonds and pearls from th e Portuguese East Indies all marked "DNdC" and consigned
to Duarte Nune s da Costa; bu t the bulk was actually for his brother and wealthy cousins,
Francisco and Manoel Ramire s Pina , and others living in Amsterdam.36 The brothers also
had connections wit h Portuguese Ne w Christians in Antwerp and, despite th e war, were
able to effect a number of transactions in the Spanish Netherlands. In November 1631, a
London merchant was empowered to act for Duarte and Lopo in recovering a consignment
of Hondschoote say s which had bee n loade d o n their joint account a t Calais onto a ship
bound fo r Oporto but which had been seize d b y the English. 37
Besides collaboratin g with his relatives in Holland, Duarte conducted a fair amoun t of
routine trad e wit h Lisbon , exportin g rye , wheat , an d textile s o f variou s kinds , an d
importing chiefly Brazil sugar and Indian diamonds. 38 He occasionally sent consignments
of textile s an d othe r manifacture s to othe r part s o f Portugal , includin g Madeira , an d
sometimes als o to Spanish port s such as Malaga and San Lucar. 39
In the lat e 1630s , a new and rather mor e political phase o f Duarte's caree r bega n as a
result of his contacts with the man Lopo late r to referred to as "our goo d friend Garci a de
Yllan", a Portugues e Ne w Christian merchant o f Antwerp wit h clos e tie s with Spanish
ministers in Brussels.40 Don Garcia de Yllan, as he was known, stood in high regard a t the
court of the Cardinal-Infante , younger brother o f Philip IV of Spain and governor of th e
Spanish Netherland s i n th e year s 1635-41 . B y mean s o f hi s courtl y connections , hi s
business acumen , an d hi s wide network of contacts spannin g much of western Europe ,
Yllan obtained th e contracts to supply bread, gunpowder and other essentia l supplies to
the Spanish Arm y of Flanders over a period of years. Probabl y through Garci a de Yllan,
Duarte and Lopo also formed a link with the naval contractors supplying the main Spanish
battle flee t a t Cadiz . Th e thre e year s 1636-39 , whe n Olivare s wa s preparing hi s grea t
armada which was eventually to be destroyed by Tromp at the Downs, in 1639, were th e
peak period fo r shipments of naval stores and munitions from Hambur g to Cadiz, Lisbon
and Corunn a an d reliabl e contact s wer e neede d t o hel p co-ordinat e th e flow of thes e
supplies on the Hanseati c convoys which sailed each yea r "northabout" (ie. roun d Scot-
land and Ireland) - to avoid the Dutch navy - to the Peninsula. The two most prominent of
36
G A Amsterda m NA vol. 257, fos. 703-4v.
37
G A Amsterda m NA vol. 941, fo. 410.
38
O n Duarte's grain shipments to Lisbon, see Admiralitatskollegium F3/5, pp. 28, 76, 79, 84.
39
Ibid . Admiralitatskollegium F4/5, p. 8 and F4/9. fo. 25.
40
Se e the reference s t o Yllan in Kellenbenz's Sephardim.
these munition s dealer s amon g th e Hambur g Jew s were , evidently , Silvi o de l Mont e
(Selomoh Cohen ) an d Duarte Nune s da Costa. Several letters are extent, bot h in the city
archive, at Hamburg, and in the Archives Generates du Royaume, at Brussels, which show
Duarte's central role as a supplier of gunpowder and other munitions both to the Spanish
navy and to the Army of Flanders during this period.41 Duarte's name began to appear in
government correspondence. In the summer of 1639,200,000 Ib of gunpowder consigned
by Duarte to the Spanis h Netherlands for the Arm y of Flanders wa s held u p by Danish
officials at Gliickstadt, which prompted the Cardinal-Infante to write to King Christian IV
of Denmark, who was then on friendly terms with Spain, to assure him that Duarte Nunes
da Costa and del Monte were acting on behalf of Spain. Christian thereupon release d th e
powder consignmen t a t whic h th e Cardinal-Infant e wrot e agai n thankin g the Danis h
monarch fo r hi s courtesy "i n th e matte r o f Duarte Nune s da Costa". 42 Indeed, Duart e
seems t o hav e continue d sendin g larg e quantitie s o f munition s both t o Spai n an d th e
Spanish Netherland s unti l a fe w months afte r th e Portugues e secessio n fro m Spai n i n
December 1640 . Ther e survive s in Brussels a n undate d draf t bu t clearl y written i n th e
spring of 1641, from th e context, of a letter from th e Cardinal-Infante to King Christian,
referring t o anothe r consignmen t of gunpowder which was to be shipped vi a Gliickstad t
and Dove r (t o avoi d th e Dutc h navy ) to th e Spanis h bas e a t Dunkirk. 43 Bu t thi s was
Duarte's last undertaking for Spain. Hi s first munition s contract wit h the ne w regime in
Portugal i s dated 3 August 1641. "
News of the Lisbon coup d'etat of December 1640 , we know, caused intense excitement
among the Portugues e Jewis h and New Christian diasporas. The proclaiming of the duke
of Braganza King John IV of Portugal in place of the Spanish monarch and the start of what
was to be a long and bitter struggle for independence from Spain elicited - at least initially -
a goo d dea l o f sympathy among the exiles . A s the oppressio n o f the Ne w Christians in
Portugal ha d becom e muc h more relentles s an d systematic than previously from aroun d
1580, thu s roughly co-inciding with the beginning s of the Spanis h regime, and since th e
Inquisition was the one Portuguese institution which opposed th e break-away from Spain ,
there seem s t o hav e bee n amon g the exile s a n expectatio n tha t independenc e unde r a
native Portuguese kin g would lead to a weakening of the Inquisition and some mitigation
of the persecution. Indeed , amon g some Portuguese New Christians abroad the events of
December 164 0 were soon invested with distinctly messianic overtones as we see from th e
testimony o f several allege d judaiser s interrogated b y the Inquisitio n in Mexico City in
1642.45 Duart e Nune s d a Cost a wa s on e o f thos e wh o responde d t o th e new s o f th e
Portuguese revol t agains t Spain with what can only be described a s genuine zeal.
An envoy from th e new Portuguese king, a nobleman, arrived in Hamburg a few weeks
after th e coup d'etat, in January 1641, bearing news of the secession, letter s of credit with
41
Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 146 , 168,178, 265, 352.
42
Archive s Gdnerales du Royaume, Brussels, SEA 558, fos. 92-3, 98-v, 102 .
43
Ibid . fo. 207.
44
Frederi c Mauro, Le PortugaletI'AtlantiqueauXVlIesitcle (1570-1670). Etudetconomique (Paris, 1960), 46.
45
Jonatha n I . Israel , "The Portugues e in Seventeenth-century Mexico", Jahrbuch fur Geschichte vo n Staat,
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas vol. 1 1 (1974) pp. 29-3 0 ; see above, 328-9.
which to buy munitions, and a warning for the king's younger brother, Do m Duarte, who
was then i n command o f a cavalry regiment i n the service o f the Austria n Emperor, a t
Regensburg.46 N o doub t th e fac t tha t Duart e Nune s da Cost a wa s already one o f th e
principal munition s dealers o f Hamburg , and tha t h e was Portuguese, wer e tw o majo r
reasons why he wa s chosen, o r asked , t o undertak e th e rol e o f actin g a s agen t o f th e
Portuguese crow n i n North Germany . Bu t there wa s clearly also anothe r reason . Fo r i t
seems that he had already for some time been acting as Dom Duarte's banker and postal
agent an d tha t thi s arm y office r an d membe r o f th e hig h Portugues e nobilit y no w
proclaimed a roya l princ e i n Lisbo n ha d stayed fo r som e tim e i n Duarte' s house , i n
Hamburg, i n 1639. 47 It would be interesting to know whether Dom Duarte, whilst staying
in the house of the Nunes da Costa was aware that the Inquisition back home had recentl y
completed it s file o n Duarte, satisfie d itsel f that h e was a flagrant judaise r and ha d hi m
publicly burned in effigy i n an Lisbon Auto-da-fe. I t was because Duarte Nunes da Costa
was in contact with Dom Duarte, as well as the fact that he was a munitions supplier, tha t
the Portugues e envo y was eager t o make use of his services .
Whether the warning reached Do m Duarte too late, or he was too slow in acting on it, he
was arrested on the Emperor's orders , a t Spanish request, and imprisoned firs t at Passau,
then Graz and, finally, after having been handed over to the Spaniards, at Milan. The long
imprisonment o f Do m Duart e a t Mila n unti l his deat h i n th e roya l fortres s there , i n
September 1649 , becam e somethin g of a European cause celebre, numerous potentates,
including Quee n Christin a o f Sweden , takin g a kee n interes t i n it . Ther e wer e t o b e
numerous royal and princely requests for his release o n grounds of courtly compassion,
none o f whic h was ever acte d on . Duart e Nune s da Costa , fo r hi s part , succeede d i n
re-establishing contac t with the prince through his correspondent i n Nuremberg whilst he
was being held at Graz; and throughout the time he was held at Milan, Duarte remained his
chief mean s o f communicatio n with Lisbon an d th e outsid e worl d generally . Fro m th e
moment contact was restored, Duarte began remitting the prince money, books, and other
necessaries. The hapless prince replied from Graz , thanking him for 3,000 florins he ha d
thus far received, sending his compliments to the Nunes da Costa household, an d express -
ing the hope tha t he would one day be able to repay what Duarte had done for him. 48
The three main strands of Duarte Nunes da Costa's involvement with Portugal's struggle
for indepenc e wer e a s a munitions supplier, a s the main channel of communication with
Dom Duarte, at Milan, and as a sort of auxiliary to the Portugues e diplomati c offensive
which now took place in northern Europe. On occasion, this latter gave Duarte scope for a
role in politics itself. Thus, for instance, after John IV's first envoy to Sweden, Francisco de
Sousa Coutinho , ha d succeede d i n gaining Swedish recognition for the ne w Portugues e
Monarchy, h e consulted Duarte, o n the king' s orders, i n the summer of 1641, a s to how
46
Lettres de M.J. d e Wicquefort (2n d edn, Utrecht, 1712), pp. 130-131 .
47
ANT T Miscellanea da Grac.a cel a O, caix a 17 , tomo 4B, pp. 552-53 . Duarte Nunes da Costa to Conde de
Vidigueira, Hamburg, 27 June 1643; Jos6 Ramos-Coelho, Historia do Infante D . Duarte irmdo de el-rei D .
Joao IV ( 2 vols. Lisbon, 1889) i, 267.
« ANT T Misc. da Graga, loc. cit. pp. 609-11. Dom Duarte to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Graz, 14 July 1642.
best t o protes t befor e th e Imperia l Die t o f th e Hol y Roma n Empire , gathere d a t
Regensburg, at the Emperor's seizur e of the king's brother. Duarte advise d that it would
be neithe r saf e no r dignifie d fo r Sous a Coutinho , hi s secretary , o r an y Portugues e
representative t o risk entering Germany without a safe-conduct from th e Emperor wh o
had aligned himsel f with Spain agains t Portugal. 49 Sousa Coutinho ha d to content himself
with publishing and distributing in Germany, with Duarte's assistance , a Latin manifesto
appealing to the Diet for Dom Duarte's release. In the early 1640s, Duarte Nunes da Costa
was, in effect, unofficia l Portugues e charge d'affaires i n Germany .
From August 1642, the co-ordination of Portuguese diplomacy in northern Europe (and
the effort s t o effec t Do m Duarte' s release ) wer e entruste d t o John IV' s ambassador a t
Paris, th e Cond e d e Vidigueira , late r know n as th e Marque s d e Niza . Whil e Duart e
continued correspondin g fairl y regularl y both wit h minister s i n Lisbo n an d wit h Por -
tuguese diplomats in Holland, Swede n and, later, at Osnabriick, his main official corres -
pondence fro m that date onwards was with Vidigueira, at Paris. This correspondence, like
much or most of Vidigueira's mail, passed through the hands of Duarte's nephew, Duart e
Rodrigues Lamego , a prominen t Portugues e Ne w Christia n merchan t o f Rouen. 50
Although h e stil l hel d n o forma l titl e a s "Agent" , Duarte' s positio n i n th e fledglin g
Portuguese diplomatic network wa s fully recognize d and regularized . H e ha d been en -
nobled by the king in June 1641 and entered in the secret Portuguese diplomatic cipher as
number "14". Undoubtedly , he was trusted with a good many secrets, especially matters
concerning Portuguese relation s with Germany and Sweden and the Dom Duarte affair .
When Sous a Coutinh o arrive d i n Th e Hague , i n Jul y 1643 , t o tak e u p hi s pos t a s
ambassador there, Vidigueira wrote to him from Paris, among other things assuring him of
the reliability of Duarte Nunes da Costa and his son Jeronimo. Sousa Coutinho replied that
"Your Excellency anticipated me in recommending Duarte Nunes da Costa and his

son, for I would have written likewise to you as a result o f my long knowing these
men, bot h o n accoun t o f th e genera l deb t tha t th e real m owe s t o the m an d my
particular obligation towards them, and thus it is most willingly that I acknowledg e
Your Excellency's recommendation". 51
After settling in Hamburg late in 1626, Duarte Nunes da Costa seems to have led a much
more sedentar y life tha n previousl y and onl y very rarely left th e city . However, h e di d
make a tri p t o Amsterda m an d Th e Hagu e i n Augus t 1643. 52 Besides visiting his son ,
friends an d relatives who, he recounts, made quite a fuss of him, he spent a good dea l of
•" ANT T Misc. da Graca, loc. cit. p. 652 ; Ramos Coelho, Historia do Infante i , 411; Kellenbenz, Sephardim,
354.
50
Duart e was the eldest son of a younger sister of Duarte's, Beatriz Henriquez (Sarah Rodrigues Lamego), wife
of the well-known judaising merchant of Rouen, Antonio Rodrigues Lamego.
51
CorrespondSncia diplomdtica d e Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixada e m Holanda, ed. E .
Prestage, e.a. ( 3 vols. Coimbra-Lisbon, 1920-55 ) i , 21.
52
ANT T Misc. da Graca, loc. cit. pp. 497-500,649-53. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, The Hague, 17 and
31 August 1643.
time at th e Portugues e embass y i n The Hagu e conferrin g with Sousa Coutinh o an d D r
Botelho d e Moraes , th e envo y who wa s then e n route between Lisbo n an d Stockhol m
charged wit h gainin g Queen Christina' s support an d protectio n fo r th e projecte d Por -
tuguese delegation t o the European peac e conference shortly due to open at Munster and
Osnabriick. N o doub t h e wa s asked t o brie f hi s superiors o n politica l circumstances i n
Germany. H e wa s also brough t into a new and picturesque plo t to effec t Do m Duarte' s
escape from the royal fortress at Milan by disguising him as one of the wagoners who came
and wen t on the dail y food wagons. This, lik e all the other schemes , prove d i n vain.
Dr Botelho succeeded in the first part of his mission, in Stockholm, and then went on to
Germany, landing at Wismar, on the Baltic coast. Duart e sent his younger sons, Manoe l
and Jorge Nunes da Costa to meet him there.53 And, indeed, he was in urgent need of their
assistance, fo r h e wa s i n poo r healt h an d whil e fluen t i n Lati n spok e n o German .
Moreover, h e and Duarte's sons, were marooned at Wismar for many weeks owing to the
outbreak of war between Sweden and Denmark and the movement of Swedish troops from
North German y towards Jutland. Dr Botelh o finall y reache d Hambur g in February 164 4
and spen t th e nex t tw o month s recuperatin g i n th e comfor t o f th e Nune s d a Cost a
household. Whils t h e wa s ther e th e hous e wa s naturall y the focu s o f a grea t dea l o f
attention. Th e Hambur g burgomasters cam e severa l time s t o pa y their respect s and t o
discuss problems encountere d b y Hamburg shipping in Portugal. Botelho finall y se t out
from Hamburg for Osnabriick on 11 April 1644. As no cash had reached hi m from Lisbon,
Duarte spent nearly 5,000 cruzados in equipping him with coach, horses, servants and suits
befitting hi s status as Portugal's chie f envoy to th e Europea n peac e congress. 54 He was
escorted fro m th e wall s of Hamburg to Osnabriic k b y Swedish troops. However, befor e
any progress ha d been made , Botelho die d a t Osnabruck i n December 164 4 and Duart e
had to arrange the return of his body, papers and possessions first to Hamburg and then to
Portugal.
A necessary ingredient in all Duarte's functions on behalf of Portugal was his wealth and
financial expertise. Duart e was the Hamburg correspondent o f the Lisbon New Christian
bankers, Balthasa r Rodrigue s d e Matto s an d Manoe l Garci a Franco , wh o handled the
Portuguese crown' s foreig n payments . But, in general, Duart e di d no t ac t as a regular
banker for the Portuguese crown , except in the relatively minor case of his remittances to
Dom Duart e i n Milan. Amsterdam no t Hambur g was the centre wit h whic h the Lisbo n
bankers preferred to deal and even the remittances from Lisbon to the Portuguese resident
in Stockholm normall y passed through the hand s of Duarte's brother , Lopo , at Amster-
dam rather than his own, despite the fact tha t Portuguese diplomatic mail for Sweden did
pass throug h hi s hands. 55 Bu t whil e Duarte ha d n o regula r part i n Portugal' s foreig n
payments system , h e certainl y did pla y a n importan t back-u p rol e i n th e financin g o f
53
Ibid . pp. 441 , 447-49; Ramos-Coelho, Historic do Infante i , 430-31.
54
ANT T Misc. da Graca loc. tit . p . 422; Ramos-Coelho, Hist6ria d o Infante ii , 186.
55
Duart e also handled Portuguese diplomatic mail passing between Stockholm and Osnabruck, see "Relacoes
diplomaticas entre Portugal e a Suecia (1644-1650)" in Revista de Historia (Lisbon) XIV (1925) pp. 267,269,
274, 277 , 278.
Portugal's undertaking s in norther n Europe . Schedule d remittances from Lisbo n wer e
frequently delayed and it was not infrequently only Duarte's willingness to advance cash in
the expectation that the hard-pressed king would find some means of repaying him sooner
or later which prevented acute difficulties an d embarrassment. The case o f Dr Botelho's
coach and horses has already been mentioned. Another such instance was the predicamen t
of Dr Joao de Guimaraes, Portuguese residen t at Stockhol m from 164 3 to 165 0 who had
the importan t tas k o f helpin g preserv e th e Portuguese-Swedis h allianc e agains t th e
Habsburgs but payment of whose salary and expenses was so slow that at one point he had
received nothin g from Lisbo n for over two years. 56 By March 1649 , already due t o leave
Sweden, Guimaraes was in despair, believing that he would be prevented from leaving on
account o f hi s debts . H e wrot e t o Botelho' s successo r a t Osnabriick , Lui s Pereir a d e
Castro, tha t he di d not "dar e ask Duarte Nune s da Costa t o extricate me from thi s as I
already ow e hi m 3,00 0 thaler s which he advance d m e ou t o f friendshi p an d hi s innate
goodness".57 But i t was Duarte wh o rescued hi m and b y the tim e Guimaraes finall y lef t
Sweden an d arrive d for a stay at Hamburg in the Nunes da Costa househol d (where , he
told his colleagues, he was most lavishly entertained), his debt to Duarte had risen to 6,000
thalers. Even before this latest episode, in February 1649, Guimaraes wrote to Pereira de
Castro, at Osnabriick, that he considered Duarte a "noble, truthful and courteous man
and extremely zealous for the service of His Majesty, such that it seems to me in him Your
Excellency has a true friend." 58
As a n entrepo t fo r arms , gunpowde r and nava l store s fo r countrie s suc h as Portugal
which were unable to produce such materiel in any quantity, Hamburg in the mi d seven-
teenth century came second only to Amsterdam. In the early 1640s, Duarte did play a part
of som e significanc e but o n a n appreciabl y smaller scale tha n did his brother, Lopo , a t
Amsterdam. I n the opening phase o f the Portugues e struggl e for independence, Duart e
dispatched soms 30,000 cruzados worth of military and naval stores to Portugal whereas
Lopo, wh o wa s supplying muskets, artillery and sieg e equipment as well a s stores an d
supplies, serviced a contract for 100,000 cruzados worth of arms and munitions in the same
period.59 In any case, i n the early stages of the Portuguese revolt, whilst Portugal and th e
United Province s remaine d o n friendl y terms , thos e non-Jewis h Dutc h dealer s wh o
ordinarily dominate d th e arms market but had no particular link s with Portugal encoun-
tered no difficulty i n obtaining licenses from th e State s General to export arm s there. In
1641, for instance, Jan van der Straeten dispatched 4,000 muskets, 2,000 pikes, fifty larg e
guns and 50,000 musket shot to Lisbon.60 In these early years, Hamburg's role was dwarfed
56
ANT T Misc. da Graga, loc. cit. pp. 495-96 . Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, Hamburg, 2 Jan. 1649 .
57
Se e Guimaraes' letter in "Relagoes diplomaticas" part ii , Revisla de Historia X V (1926) p. 29.
58
Ibi d p. 28; in an earlier letter (p. 6), Guimaraes describes Duarte as "homem de muita verdade e mais que
ordinario primor".
59
G A Amsterdam NA 1555B, pp. 1103-4 ; Virginia Rau, "A embaixada de Tristao de Mendonc,a Furtado e os
arquivos notariais holandeses", Anais da Academia Portuguese da Historia 2nd ser. VIII (1958), 115-116;
ANTT Misc. da Grac.a, loc. cit. pp. 534-36 , 401-4.
60
Algemee n Rijksarchief , Th e Hague , Verzameling Bisdom vol. 68, pp. 44 , 55, 68.
by that of Amsterdam. Only in the late 1640s and 1650s, for a variety of reasons, including
the steady deterioration i n Dutch-Portuguese relations owing to the struggle in Brazil, did
Hamburg's share of the trade become more important.
Duarte's initial round o f munition s purchases in 1641- 3 include d gunpowder, masts,
ropes, pitch and, in one case, an entire ship, the St Pieter which he hired, manned , fitted
out as a warship and sent to Lisbon. But while the king was at pains to pay for his purchases
in Holland, he showed not the slightest haste in paying his bills in Hamburg and from 164 3
until 1646 Duarte refraine d fro m sendin g any more materiel, concentrating his efforts o n
securing repayment for what he had dispatched already. And, indeed, he had taken quite a
risk for at the tim e it must have seemed tha t the still precarious new regime in Portugal
might collaps e unde r the weigh t of Spanish pressure i n which case Duart e woul d never
have retrieved a penny. In 1645, he was formally proclaimed "Agent" of the Portugues e
crown a t Hamburg but stil l sent no money. He complaine d over this repeatedly t o both
Sousa Coutinho and Niza (Vidigueira). It was not until 1646, on Niza's prompting, that a
ship-load of 40,000 cruzados worth of East India pepper was sent to Duarte at Hamburg to
clear th e royal debt.
Duarte mad e hi s most vita l contribution a s a supplier in 164 8 when John I V and hi s
ministers were engaged in setting up the new Portuguese Brazil Company. 61 This was the
organisation which in the early 1650s put Portugal's trade with southern Brazil back on its
feet, despite increasing Dutc h privateering a t Portuguese expens e i n the South Atlantic .
But its success depended on forming convoys with powerful nava l escorts which, in turn,
depended o n Joh n IV' s capacity to attrac t sufficien t investmen t and acquir e additiona l
warships and supplies of naval stores. The king's confidant, the great Jesuit statesman and
writer Antdnio Vieira was sent to Holland both to woo Portuguese Jewish investment by
advertising th e king' s forthcoming guarantee tha t al l money investe d i n th e Compan y
should be exempt from confiscatio n by the Inquisition and to supervise the acquisition of
new ships, stores and seamen. Prospect s for large munitions purchases in Holland b y the
Portuguese wer e les s good tha n previously but th e wa y still seemed t o b e open . Wha t
largely paralysed the effort s i n Holland wa s the sudde n arrest in December 164 7 by the
Inquisition in Lisbon of the banker Duarte da Silva who had issued the letters of credit with
which the purchases were to be made. 62 Lopo Ramires (who was much less zealous in his
support for Portugal than his brother) and other leading Portuguese Jewish merchants in
Holland, notabl y Bento Osorio , refused to step into the gap and advance the necessar y
funds, an d Jeronimo a t that time did not possess the means.
When Vieira, Sousa Coutinho, and his son, Jeronimo, all sent letters asking him to take
the matter in hand, Duarte a t once agreed . Withi n a few weeks Duarte had bought two
large ships, of 220 and 180 lasts, and was fitting them with guns, and was negotiating both at
Hamburg an d Lubeck , an d throug h hi s agen t i n Liibeck , Henri k Bremer , als o i n
61
O n the Brazil Company, see C.R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654 (2nd edn. Hamden, Conn., 1973)
208-13; an d C.R . Boxer , "Antoni o Vieira S.J . an d th e Institutio n o f th e Brazi l Company" , Hispanic
American Historical Review XXIX (1949), 474-97.
62
J . Luci o de Azevedo, Histdria dos Cristaos Novos Portugueses (2nd edn. 1975), 265.
Stockholm, with a view to purchasing more.63 Several times his sons, Manoel an d Jorge ,
travelled bac k an d fort h betwee n Hambur g an d Liibec k a s the y scoured th e port s fo r
gunners, surgeons, and other trained personnel willing to serve the king of Portugal at sea
against the Dutch. By mid-April, Duarte had bought and was equipping a third vessel. All
this activity in the ports of Hamburg and Liibeck naturally caused quite a stirr.64 Manoel
Bocarro Frances (Jaco b Rosales), Spain' s Jewish agent in Hamburg, and thus a political
rival of Duarte's, wrote to the Spanish minister, the Conde de Penaranda, at Brussels, that
"in Lisbo n th e merchant s hav e formed a company for Brazil which is intended t o
operate thirty-six well-armed warships to Brazil in two squadrons and protect their
merchant ships. Th e ship s an d supplies they must procure i n these parts, fo r they
have no other recourse an d already Duarte Nunes da Costa, Agent of Portugal, has
bought three good vessels and looks for another three, and will search for more, and
has purchased larg e quantities of munitions". 65
In Lisbon , th e kin g had promise d t o remi t fund s promptl y but wit h his finances in a
chaotic stat e thi s wa s easier sai d than done . B y mid April , b y which time Duart e ha d
incurred debts an d expenditures approaching 100,000 cruzados, not a cruzado had bee n
received fro m Portugal . Vieira , a t The Hague , following closely what was happening a t
Hamburg, became seriously concerned. He wrote to the Marques de Niza at Paris that he
was filled wit h anxiety "out o f regard fo r Duart e Nune s who is courting disaste r an d I
reproach mysel f for having urged him to do this."66 Fortunately for Duarte and his family,
a few days after Vieir a penned these lines two ships out from Lisbon docked a t Hamburg
bearing letter s o f exchang e an d peppe r consigne d t o "Duart e Nune s d a Costa " o f a
combined valu e of 100,000 cruzados. 67
As Agent of the King of Portugal in Hamburg, Duarte also played a notable part in the
propaganda war against the Habsburgs. A variety of manifestos and tracts were printed by
the Portugues e outsid e Portuga l during the 1640' s as part of the wider campaign against
Philip IV of Spain and his allies. We have already noted the case of the Latin tract Duart e
had circulated in Germany in 1641. This was followed by a series of others. O n Botelho's
instructions, Duarte ha d anothe r Lati n tract , presumably denouncin g the Spaniards for
trying t o preven t th e Portugues e delegatio n takin g par t i n th e peac e congres s a t
Osnabruck, published at Hamburg in August 1644. 68 In June 1645, Pereir a d e Castro sen t
Duarte th e tex t o f anothe r propagand a shee t fro m Osnabruck , askin g him to hav e i t
printed and then distributed not just throughout Germany but in Scandinavia, Poland and
Italy as well. 69 As part of the propagand a war , Duarte als o had a number of engravings
63
Carlos do Padre Antonio Vieira ed . J. Luci o de Azevedo (3 vols. Coimbra, 1925-8), i, 161-68; Kellenbenz,
Sephardim, 151 .
64
Archi v der Hansestad t Liibeck, Nachlass Hagedor n 6, minut e of lette r from Duarte Nunes da Cost a to
Liibeck city council, Hamburg, 24 May 1648.
65
Archive s Generates du Royaume, Brussels, SEG 604, fos. 179r-v.
66
Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira i, 183; see also Bibliotheca municipal de Evora MS VI/2-11, fo. 229. Marques
de Niza to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Paris, 28 March 1648.
67
Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira i , 187.
68
ANT T Misc. da Grac,a, loc. cit., p. 419. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644.
69
Ibid . pp. 691-92. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 1 7 June 1645.
made o f portrait s o f variou s Portugues e dignitarie s an d diplomat s fo r distributio n
throughout Europe an d the Portugues e colonia l empire. The technique of engraving, so
typical of north-west Europe i n the seventeent h century, and so central to th e publicity
methods of the time, was apparently virtually unknown in Portugal. Duarte, it seems, was
especially prou d o f th e engravin g which he .had mad e o f Dom Duart e i n 1643. ™ Whe n
Botelho staye d at his house earl y in 1644, Duart e had his portrait engraved, publishin g it
alongside an engraving of Queen Christin a as a means of publicising Sweden's support fo r
Portugal's aspiration s at Osnabriick. 71
While Duarte showed great constancy and zeal on behalf of Portugal and, on occasion,
risked large sums of money where other great merchants were unwilling to do so, it would
be wrong to infer that he was unbusinesslike in his approach to his undertakings on behalf
of the Portuguese crown . Duarte was an idealist in the sense that he acted largely on trust
and had faith in the ultimate success of the House of Braganza, putting up with long delays
in recovering his expenses. Bu t his whole attitude was nevertheless infused wit h a shrewd
awareness o f th e longer-ter m possibilitie s an d opportunitie s whic h hi s agenc y dutie s
offered a s well as of the highe r social status which they afforded. I n the autumn of 1644 ,
after year s o f procrastination, the kin g finally honoure d Duart e b y openly and publicly
proclaiming him his "Agent" in Hamburg. And this securing of a public title undoubtedly
opened up a whole range of new commercial and social opportunitie s for the Nunes da
Costa family. In thanking Niza for interceding with the king on his behalf, Duarte observed
that he would be unable to serve the king as he would wish until he was reimbursed for what
he had already spent on the king's behalf out of his own pocket and until he was allocated a
salary appropriate t o his new title:
"To correspon d wit h the honour whic h His Majesty has now conferred upon me ,
Your Excellency well knows that it is necessary that I affect th e same ostentation a s
do the agents and residents o f other crowns in this city and thus I must ensure that I
am respected as they are and keep a carriage with two horses. For we must not show
lack of means which would corroborate wha t our enemies say about the precarious -
ness of our realm." 72
Duarte did in fact raise his life style appreciably late in 1644, acquiring a carriage which
was possibly th e firs t t o b e owne d among the Jew s of Hamburg, an d addin g tw o mal e
servants to his household. He was still an active merchant. In February of that year a ship
arrived fro m Lisbo n carryin g forty chest s of Brazil sugar, a substantial quantity, for hi s
account.73 But from aroun d the end of that year, he ceased t o frequent the exchange and
other business places of Hamburg in the way that he had formerly, doubtless considering
that this was incompatible with his new dignity. After 1645 , we find cargoes of sugar and
70
Ibid . pp. 457 , 598.
71
Ibid . p. 416. Duarte da Costa to Niza , Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644 .
72
ANT T Misc. da Graâ, loc. cit., p. 673. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 7 Feb. 1645.
73
SA H Admiralitatskollegiu m F4/13, fo. 2.
pepper consigned to him from Portuga l but outward bound cargoes are usually registered
in the names of his sons which suggests that he now left the day-to-day details of business to
them. I n 1647 , afte r receivin g hi s bumpe r reimbursemen t o f 100,00 0 cruzados fro m
Lisbon, Duarte moved into an imposing new house on the Krayenkamp. As Jews were not
allowed to own real estate in Hamburg, he had to lease the premises from a Christian.74 It
was in this princely mansion that Duart e spen t hi s last years and lavishl y entertained D r
Guimaraes in 1650. Afte r Duarte' s death, i t briefly belonge d t o his second son , Manoel
Nunes da Costa; but h e seems to hav e moved out i n 1666 a t the tim e of the Shabbatia n
turmoil, perhaps momentaril y intending in the intoxicatio n of the moment to emigrate t o
the Holy Land, and the house was put at the disposal of Queen Christina who was then on
one of her length y visits to the city. The house was finally sold to the Queen, i n 1668, fo r
17,000 thaler. 75
In 1648 Duarte ha d taken a very considerable ris k but it is clear that all along he had his
eye on a commensurate reward. In May 1649, still in the midst of his munitions purchases
for th e Brazi l Company , Duart e wrot e t o Pereir a d e Castro , remindin g him o f hi s
knowledge of the sugar trade, and asking him to help persuade the king to nominate him
"general factor " o f the Brazil Company in northern Europe. This was a sweeping request
and the kin g did not meet it in full. Bu t while Duarte and his sons acquired no rights over
the sale of Portuguese suga r and Brazil-woo d in England and France, he did become th e
Company's factor for German y and hi s son, Jeronimo, fo r the Unite d Provinces . Thes e
commercial agencies were certainly very lucrative and may be seen as the ultimate reward
for Duarte' s effort s an d thos e o f his sons.
John IV's hesitation abou t conferring public honours on Duarte Nunes da Costa arose ,
of course, from th e family' s open allegiance to Judaism. The new Portuguese king was an
exponent of raison d'etat and apolitique; but, being king of Portugal, he felt that he had to
preserve hi s image as an impeccabl y Catholic monarc h and persecutor o f Jews. O n on e
occasion, Sousa Coutinho remarked of Duarte and his sons that "were they not Jews, I do
not know how His Majesty would be able to repay what he owes them."76 Eventually the
king did appoint Duart e hi s Agent in Hamburg, but, ha d h e no t bee n a Jew, h e would
obviously have received muc h higher honours. By a special patent o f 1646, the kin g also
declared tha t Duarte' s secon d son , Manoe l Nune s d a Costa , shoul d succee d t o th e
Hamburg agency , on th e deat h o f his father, as a matte r of righ t an d receiv e th e sam e
annual stipend o f 650 cruzados, 11
By 1650, the difficult earl y phase of the Portuguese struggle for independence was over,
the Brazi l Compan y wa s establishe d and , i n Septembe r 1649 , Do m Duart e died .
Moreover, with the end of the Thirty Years" War, in 1648, and peace between Sweden and
74
Hug o Valentin, Judarnas historia i Sverige (Stockholm, 1924), 51; Hermann Kellenbenz, "Konigin Christine
und ihre Beziehungen zu Hamburg", in Analecta Reginensia 1: Queen Christina of Sweden. Documents and
Studies (Stockholm , 1966), 190.
75
Kellenbenz , "Konigin Christine", 190.
76
Correspondgncia diplomdtica d e Francisco de Sousa Coutinho 1, 14.
77
Se e patent in favour of Manoel Nunes da Costa, in ANTT livros das matriculas dos moradores da casa real VI
unpaginated.
the Emperor , th e Portuguese-Swedis h allianc e los t it s forme r centralit y in Portugues e
diplomacy. Al l this , inevitably , tended t o diminis h the forme r role o f the Agen t o f th e
Portuguese crow n in Hamburg. Duart e stil l performed on e or two notable functions . In
1650, o n the king's orders, he organised the recruitment and dispatch to Portugal of some
2,500 Germa n troop s made redundan t by the en d o f the Thirt y Years " War wh o were
needed to reinforce the defence of the Portuguese frontiers against Spain.78 Occasionally,
one o f Duarte' s report s woul d b e discusse d i n th e roya l council o f stat e i n Lisbon , a s
occurred i n February 1652 , whe n he reported detail s of Swedish plans to found colonie s
along the Guinea coast where the Portuguese had traditionally claimed to rule. This led to
the lodging of a Portuguese diplomatic protest in Stockholm. Duarte also undertook some
notable transactions on behalf of the Brazil Company. Thus, when, in 1650, Duke Jacob of
Courland, a n eage r mercantilis t an d connoisseu r o f commercia l projects , sough t a n
arrangement with the Company whereby he could invest and participate i n the trade via
Lisbon wit h Portuguese Brazil , the agreemen t wa s arranged b y Duarte wh o may indeed
have been the originator of the whole idea.79 But, broadly speaking, in the 1650 s Duarte' s
agency duties settled down into an undramatic, largely newsgathering routine. I n the last
years of his life, Duart e i s again most notable for his role in Jewish community affairs .
There is little direct evidence concerning Duarte's role in the communal negotiations in
Hamburg in the early 1650s which led to the merging of the three original congregations -
Talmud Tora, Keter Tora and Neve Shalom - into one single united community, under the
name Beth Israel, and the even more difficult proces s of persuading a reluctant Hamburg
Senate t o allow , for the firs t time , the buildin g of a public synagogue in Hamburg. 80 We
know tha t ther e wa s muc h stronge r ecclesiastica l an d popula r oppositio n t o thi s i n
Hamburg than had been the case at Amsterdam in 1639. And we also know that a few key
personalities fro m amon g th e twenty-tw o Portuguese Jewis h head s o f househol d wh o
signed the founding hascamoth (who included, besides Jacob Curiel, Agent of the Crown
of Portugal, David and Mosseh de Lima, who had links with the Danish court, and Jacob
Resales, Agen t o f Spai n an d therefor e a n ope n politica l riva l o f Duarte's ) playe d a
disportionately preponderant rol e in the proceedings. Th e three separate congregations
had each been strongly identified wit h particular patrician families and cliques. The Neve
Shalom, for instance, had been founded by Mosseh de Lima, and was presided over by the
de Lima family.81 The formin g of a united congregation involved establishing an intricate
balance of status and influenc e betwee n the leading families. And this was largely but not
wholly successful. From subsequent reactions, it seems that Jacob Curiel did play a central
role and that while this was applauded by many, his ascendancy was also resented by some
78
"Rela$6e s diplomiiticas" part ii , Revistade Historia XV, 33.
79
O.H . Mattiesen, Di e Kolonial- and Uberseepolitik tier kurlandischen Herzoge im 17. and 18 . Jahrhundert
(Stuttgart, 1940) , pp. 97-100 .
80
A . Feilchenfeld , "Anfan g un d Bliithezei t de r Portugiesengemeind e i n Hamburg" , Zeitschrift fu r Ham-
burgische Geschichte X (1899), pp. 220-22; Max Grunwald, Portugiesengraber aufdeutscher Erde (Hamburg,
1902), 18-19 .
81
Lev i de Barrios, "Vida de Ishac Huziel", p. 12.
and, in particular, b y the d e Lima clan. Before lon g the underlying tension between th e
Curiel and de Lima families was to threaten th e entire community with a new split.
While, as always, motivated by the ideals of reconciliation an d unity, Duarte had at the
same tim e furthe r advance d hi s family' s standin g an d prestige . Bot h element s wer e
present. I n th e 165 4 Spanis h edition o f his description o f Solomon's Temple which h e
dedicated t o "Jaco b Curiel of Hamburg", th e Dutch Sephard i rabbi Jacob Judah Leo n
Templo refer s t o Duarte' s glowin g reputation as a communa l peacemake r an d thi s i s
hardly likely to allude only to the distant events of 1622 in Amsterdam.82 But at the sam e
time, the ne w Hamburg synagogue, the place of worship of some seven to eight hundred
Sephardi Jews, was filled wit h emblems and reminders of the Curie l family. Th e eterna l
lamp, the Ner Tamid, was provided by Duarte, as was the oil for keeping the lamp burning.
And so was the bimah that stood a t the centre of the synagogue, the shelves which lined it
being reserved fo r the use of Duarte and his family.83 It seems that these vital accessorie s
were no t outrigh t gifts bu t o n loa n t o th e community , remaining in a sense th e privat e
property of the Curiel family. Duarte, naturally, was also a central figure in the communal
administration, serving a number of times on the Mohamad.
The simmering feud betwee n Duarte an d the de Limas finally erupte d in open scanda l
on the eve of Simchat Torah, in 1662. I t began in synagogue, durin g service, when Duarte,
in that year the presiding parnas, asked Mosseh de Lima to stop talking during prayers at
which de Lima had told Duarte to "go to the devil". 84 At this, Duarte's son, Manoel, had
set upo n d e Lim a an d punche d hi m in th e mouth , causing blood t o flow . Severa l con -
gregants rushed forward to pull Manoel away . De Lima then walked out, precipitatin g a
boycott o f the main congregation by the entire de Lima clan and their allies. Nex t day, a
rival service was held in the home of Jacob de Lima. Fearful at the prospect o f a permanent
split, the Mahamad aske d Duart e to step down from hi s presiding chair for the time being
and imposed publi c penances o n Manoel; but this did not suffice t o heal the rift. Negotia -
tions began which revealed an undercurrent of pressure for some diminution in the role of
the Curiel s in the community . As thei r pric e fo r rejoinin g the mai n community, the d e
Limas demande d thre e concessions : firstly , reform s i n th e metho d o f electin g th e
Mahamad; secondly, that the Ner Tamid and the oil to keep it burning should no longer be
the property o f the Curiels ; and , thirdly , that the shelves aroun d the bimah should no t
longer b e reserved fo r the Curiels, or any particular family.
To consider these demands, the Mahamad convened a special gathering of elders. Th e
community's problem s wer e give n a thoroug h airing . Finally, it wa s resolved tha t th e
procedures for Mahamad election s shoul d be changed and that under th e new rules the
outgoing Mahamad woul d eac h yea r nominat e th e membershi p of its successor fro m a
82
Se e Jacob Judah Leon Templo, Retrato del Tabemaculo de Moseh (Amsterdam, 1654) dedicated to the "muy
noble y magnifico senor laacob Curiel".
83
SA H Judische Gemeinden 993/i, p. 235.
84
Ibid , p. 231; see also "Aus dem altesten Protokollbuch der Portugiesisch-Jiidischen Gemeinde in Hamburg",
Jahrbuch der judisch-literarischen Gesellschaft X (1912) , 226-28 .
85
short-list of candidates elected b y all the house-holders of the community. Turning to the
question of the Ner Tamid, the council asked Duarte for his opinion, at which he observed
that he "could argu e for retaining it (in his family) as it was a very old possession", but that
he ha d nevertheless decide d t o donat e it outright to the community as a gift. 86 Thi s was
followed by a long and inconclusive debate about the bimah and its shelves and possession
of th e key s whic h opene d th e latter . T o resolv e matters , th e counci l turne d agai n t o
Duarte. He replied b y offering mos t of the shelving for general communal use, reservin g
only a small section for the exclusive use of his family. The bimah itself, he announced, h e
was donating to th e communit y as a gift .
Everyone was deeply impressed, it seems, and on this basis the Beth Israel congregatio n
of Hambur g was re-united. I t wa s a fittin g postscrip t t o th e caree r o f on e o f the mos t
outstanding figures o f seventeenth centur y western Sephard i Jewry. Duarte ha d indee d
sealed his reputation as a restorer of harmony with a seigneurial touch. In relief, and out of
gratitude for his grand gesture, the Mohamad thereupo n resolved to enter a special clause
commemorating hi s generosity in the community records where it survives, in the Ham -
burg city archives, to this day. This codicil ends with the remarkable words "e para que a
todo o tempo const e d o primor co m que neste caz o ouvr o Jacob Curiel , paresseo justo
fazer este termo no livro da nassao, em Hamburgo, 1 3 de Sebat 5423.' >87
85
SA H Jiidisch e Gemeinde n 993/i , pp . 233-3 4 an d 993/ii , pp . 151-53 ; the Hambur g Sephard i communit y
retained this somewhat more democratic method of electing itsparnasim fro m 166 2 down to 1678 when th e
community reverted to the older system in line with practice at Amsterdam. It is perhaps not without irony
that in 1678, the presidingparnas wa s Manoel Nunes da Costa.
86
SA H Judische Gemeinden 993/i, pp. 234-35 .
87
SA H Judische Gemeinden 993/i, p. 236.
14
SPAIN AN D THE DUTC H SEPHARDIM , 1609-166 0
The materia l progres s o f th e Dutc h Sephardi m i n th e seventeent h centur y wa s by n o

means a steady , cumulativ e process. I t wa s in fac t extremel y sporadic, marke d b y tw o
short spurts of spectacular advance in numbers and resources , during the Spanish-Dutc h
truce o f 1609-21 , and i n th e decad e followin g the secon d Spanish-Dutc h war , 1646-55 ,
with a quarter of a century of much slower immigration an d actual declin e in wealth an d
economic importanc e intervening . After 1655 , there di d no t agai n occu r an y dramatic ,
explosive expansion. I n material terms, the making of Dutch Sephardi Jewr y was, by the
1660s, largely complete. The violent turns in the pattern of growth until the 1660s , which
had appreciabl e effect s o n Dutc h Jewis h lif e i n al l it s aspects, can no t b e attribute d t o
either the changing social context in which Dutch Jews lived, since conditions for the Jews
in Hollan d wer e consistentl y favourabl e an d steadil y improving , no r t o th e rhyth m o f
Dutch economi c development generall y durin g th e golden age , fo r its movements wer e
different an d considerabl y les s abrupt . Remarkabl y enough , th e explanatio n lie s in th e
policies o f th e powe r that , unti l Decembe r 1640 , controlled th e thre e majo r source s o f
Sephardi migratio n t o Hollan d — Spain, Portuga l an d th e Spanis h Netherlands , whic h
were also the regions with which the Dutch Sephardi m principall y traded , and afte r tha t
date controlled Spai n an d th e Southern Netherlands. Mor e tha n an y other factor , it was
the Spanis h crown , o r rathe r th e considerabl e shift s i n Spanish-Dutc h relation s tha t i t
initiated, whic h determine d th e patter n o f growth o f Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y durin g its
formative period .
The continuing pre-occupation o f the Spanish authorities with the Dutch republic afte r
Spain recognized it, with the truce of 1609, "as if i t were an independent, sovereign state
extended als o t o th e Dutc h Sephardim. Indeed , Spanis h concer n regardin g th e ne w
Jerusalem a t Amsterdam fro m 1609 , or rathe r 1605, 1 marks the firs t instanc e i n moder n
* The research on which this study is based forms part of a larger project on Spanish-Dutch relations in the
seventeenth century supported by the British Social Science Research Council.
1
Peninsul a writers subsequently tended to trace back the rise of Dutch Jewry as a significant force to the
perdon general of 160 5 which considerably eased th e restriction s on th e movemen t of converses an d
their capital from Portugal, Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg(erton) 344 , "Trahe V. Magd. tanto en los ojos las cosas
de la fee catholica " (1621) fos . 64v-5; Duarte Gome s Solis . Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos
Indias(l622) ed . Moses Bensabat Amzalak (Lisbon, 1943) pp. 12-13 .
history tha t th e Jew s becam e a majo r issu e betwee n tw o Europea n powers . Spanis h
dissatisfaction wit h the truc e stemmed chiefl y fro m th e adverse economic consequence s
which i t wa s considere d t o hav e ha d fo r Spai n and , i n thi s connection, th e Jew s wer e
identified a s a ke y facto r bot h i n Dutc h Europea n carrying , th e foundatio n o f Dutc h
prosperity, and, though perhaps with less justification,2 in Dutch colonial expansion. The
links an d contact s o f th e Dutc h Sephardi m wit h th e converses o f th e peninsul a wer e
considered, wit h th e utmos t seriousness , t o constitute a highly dangerous instrumen t of
economic an d politica l subversion. The Inquisitio n and othe r Spanish clerg y involved in
the question, suc h a s Diego d e Cisneros, a priest activ e in the drive, during the 1630s , to
bring bac k Portugues e converses fro m Franc e t o Spain , becam e a s accustomed , i n thi s
classic ag e o f Spanis h mercantilism , a s th e consejo d e estado (counci l o f State ) an d
economic writer s such as Duarte Gomes Solis , to present and describe the alleged threat to
Spain, posed b y Dutch Jewry, essentiall y i n term s o f maritime an d commercia l conflict .
"With th e hel p o f the Jews of these synagogue s (o f Amsterdam)", wrote Cisneros, i n an
important memoria l t o Philip IV , in 1637 , in the midst of the second Spanish-Dutc h war ,
"the Dutc h rebel s hav e raise d thei r hea d an d increase d thei r power , th e Jews assistin g
them i n thei r wars , conquests , negotiation s an d othe r pretension s an d becomin g i n th e
lands o f Your Majesty , spies o f the said rebels , penetratin g th e centres of trade, adminis -
tration o f the armadas, convoys an d revenue s of Your Majesty. . .suckin g out th e core of
wealth (from Spain an d Portugal ) and sapping th e resolutions of state".3
The dissatisfaction o f Spanish minister s with the Twelve Years Truce, and their growing
concern a t th e rise o f the Dutch Sephardim , spran g primaril y fro m thei r conviction tha t
the terms ha d utterl y upset th e balance o f economic powe r in Europe, weakenin g Spain ,
strengthening the republic, an d lendin g vastly increased momentu m t o Dutch expansio n
in Asia, Africa and th e Americas. "I t has always been understood", wrote the secretary to
the consejo de estado, in 1618 , "that the truce wa s very favourable t o the Dutch and tha t
since it was signed, the y fin d themselve s unhindered , wit h excessive wealth, while thes e
realms (Spain , Portugal , Flanders , Naple s an d Sicily ) ar e muc h diminished , sinc e th e
Dutch hav e take n thei r commerce, an d tha t thi s damage, if not remedied , will becom e
daily worse". 4 Besides colonial expansion , wha t chiefly trouble d th e Spanis h council s o f
2
Th e anonymou s tract, probably b y a hig h Inquisitio n official, cite d above , fo r example , states that
Amsterdam Jew s investe d s o heavil y i n th e Dutc h Eas t Indi a Compan y a t a tim e whe n i t wa s i n
difficulties, aroun d 1611 , that they saved it, though in fact ther e is very little evidence to support such
claims, loc. cit., fos. 75v-6.
3
Brit . Mus. Mss. Eg. 343, "El \do Diego de Cisneros, sacerdote y theologo,... haze saber a V. Magd...",
fo. 258 : "Co n l a assistenci a d e lo s Judio s desta s sinagoga s ha n levantad o lo s rebelde s d e Holand a
cabeza y engrandecid o s u potentia , ayudandole s lo s Judio s e n la s guerra s y e n la s conquista s y
negotiationes y demas pretentiones suyas y haziendose en las tierras de V. Magd. espias de lo s dichos
rebeldes entremetiendos e e n la s plaza s d e negotios , e n l a administratio n de la s armadas , flotas , y
hazienda d e V . Magd. . .chupando l a substanti a d e l a haziend a y sorbiendos e la s resolutione s d e
estado..."
4
Archiv e Genera l d e Simanca s (hereafte r AGS ) Est(ado ) leg . 634, fo. 318, memorandu m o f Juan d e
Ciriza, 2 Mar. 1618 : "Tambien se a entendido siempre que la tregua fue muy favorable para olandeses ,
y desde qu e se hizo se allan desempenados y con hazienda sobrada , y estos reynos muy menoscabados
por haver tirade asi olandeses el comercio, y que est e daftb, sin o se remedia, crecera cada di a mas..."
Spain an d the Dutch Sephardim 35 7
State, Finance , War , "Portugal " an d "Italy " wa s tha t Spai n ha d los t al l contro l ove r
Europe's north-south carrying trade, for under the truce terms the river Scheldt remained
closed, leaving Antwerp blockaded, while London and Hamburg were unable to compete
effectively wit h Amsterda m an d Rotterda m makin g Hollan d th e majo r entrepo t fo r
peninsula an d Italia n commerce . I n consequence , th e vas t majorit y o f foreig n ship s
entering Iberian port s during the truce, more tha n 82 1 annually accordin g t o Francisc o
Retama,5 were Dutch, suc h tha t Hollan d completely dominated the supply of the Balti c
grain, timbe r an d copper , tha t Spai n coul d no t d o without , t o th e peninsul a an d th e
carrying o f wool, sugar , salt, dyestuffs , an d othe r Iberia n an d Ibero-America n exports ,
valued at thirteen to fourteen millio n ducats annually,6 to northern Europe. Spain had to
import Balti c product s an d expor t it s ow n t o norther n Europe , bu t wit h th e Dutc h
dominating th e trade, there was no way of preventing a highly advers e balance with great
quantities o f manufactures and othe r merchandis e pourin g int o th e peninsul a drainin g
silver fro m Spai n t o Holland . I t wa s this rapid accumulatio n o f Spanish bullio n i n th e
republic which Spanis h minister s saw as the fundamenta l cause of the massiv e enlarge-
ment of the Dutch lan d an d nava l forces durin g the truce, the alarming spread o f Dutch
influence an d subsidie s i n German y an d Italy , an d th e intolerabl e impetu s o f Dutc h
colonial investmen t and enterprise . Moreover , th e consejo d e estado was convinced that
the trade balance was being made still more unequal by means of various illegal method s
such a s abuse o f grain-importing licenses, evasion of customs duties, and th e smuggling
into Spain, in return for silver, of counterfeit Spanis h copper coinage forged in Holland.7
The consejo d e estado, moved by such considerations, had resolve d by 1621 , the year of
the expiry of the truce, that it would be better for Spain to go to war rather than renew the
truce o n th e term s o f 1609 . Afte r length y consultation s a t Madri d an d Brussels , i t was
resolved tha t Spai n would onl y assen t to a fres h truc e i f at least two of three condition s
were met: namely, freedom for Dutch Catholics to practice their faith publicly; the liftin g
of th e blockad e o f Antwerp , th e mai n por t an d commercia l centr e o f th e Spanis h
Netherlands; an d majo r concessions i n colonial navigatio n includin g tota l withdrawa l
from th e Americas and cancellation of steps to establish the West India Company and a
large measure o f withdrawal also fro m th e Eas t Indies. 8 Toleration fo r Dutch Catholic s
was deeme d t o b e a usefu l mean s o f enhancin g Spanis h prestig e internationally ,
weakening th e republi c — for the Catholi c minorit y was extremely large, and extendin g
Spanish influenc e within th e Unite d Provinces ; nevertheless , th e firs t deman d wa s o f
5
AG S Est. 2847, Francisco R6tama , "Conssideraciones" of 27 Oct. 1623 , fo. 4; the anonymous author of
the valuable tract on Dutch commerce of the truce period publishe d by P. J. Blok gives a much higher
figure (2,000) , bu t i s in accor d wit h Retam a tha t befor e 162 1 approximately two-fifth s o f al l Dutc h
sea-born trade , measured in terms of tonnage, was with Spain an d territorie s under Spanish rule , P. J.
Blok, "Een merkwaardig aarivalsplan gericht tegen visscherij en handel der vereenigde Nederlanden in
de eerst e helf t de r 17d e eeuw", Bijdragen e n Mededeelingen va n het Historisch Genootschap xix (1898)
pp. 15-16,21-3 .
6
Brit . Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fo. 72; Retama, "Conssideraciones", fo . 3.
7
AG S Est . 2309. Memorandum of conde de Benavente, 12 Sep. 1620 .
8
Piete r Geyl. Th e Netherlands Divided (London, 1936 ) p. 84; J. J. Poelhekke. T Uytgaen va n den Treves.
Spanje e n de Nederlanden in 1621 (Groningen, 1960 ) pp. 40-2.
rather lower priority than the other two relating to the Scheldt and the Indies. 9 But while
insisting on new terms, and in some cases preferring war even to such concessions, neither
Spanish minister s no r arm y leader s a t an y poin t envisage d a wa r o f reconques t and ,
indeed, followin g the ruinousl y costly failur e o f th e sieg e of Bergen-op-Zoom , i n 1622 ,
discarded al l though t o f makin g extensiv e use o f th e Spanis h arm y o f Flander s a s a n
offensive weapon. 10 Neithe r i n Brussel s or Madri d wer e ther e an y illusion s abou t th e
strength of the Dutch land defences. There were only four invasions of Dutch territory by
Spanish troop s afte r 1622 , those of 1624-5 , 1629, 1635, and 1637 , all of which had strictl y
limited aims . Th e Spanis h objectiv e all along wa s to wear down and reduc e the Dutch ,
disrupting thei r shippin g an d ruinin g thei r trade , usin g nava l force s an d a n elaborat e
system o f embargoes . Indeed , befor e 1621 , ther e wer e officials , suc h a s Hortun o d e
Urizar,11 who pressed for a Spanish-Dutch wa r in which the army of Flanders would not
be utilized at all and the republic overwhelmed b y means of economic pressure alone.
Although undoubtedl y a goo d dea l o f exaggeratio n entere d int o mos t Spanis h app -
raisals of the role of the Dutch Sephardi m in the rapid ris e of the United Province s to its
position a s th e world' s foremos t maritim e power , o n th e par t o f bot h wha t migh t b e
termed th e philo - an d anti-semiti c groups i n th e Spanis h councils , i t remain s tru e tha t
during th e truc e years they began t o play a substantial par t i n carrying to and fro m th e
peninsula and that this trade formed the great bulk of their commercial activity.12 Martin
de Cellorigo, a leading economic writer, asserted in his tract of 1619, which is sympathetic
to the converses, that "if those (Jews) that are in the rebel states came to Spain and cease d
to live there, th e rebel s woul d hav e les s power agains t Spain , fo r it is certain tha t sinc e
those of this nation have gone to those states, their power has increased and will continue
to increase fo r since all those of this nation who have contact with them are rich peopl e
and powerful , an d a s the y d o no t oppres s them , th e rebels , b y thei r regar d an d th e
advantages that they obtain from them , become ric h and strong". 13 Sir Anthony Shirley,
who submitte d numerou s memorand a a t th e Spanis h cour t i n thes e years , an d wh o
likewise favoured attracting the Jews back from Norther n Europe to Spain to live as New
Christians, advise d Olivares that this was a way to "break th e chief strand of the trade of
both nations" 14 meaning th e Englis h an d Dutch . No les s excessive was the claim o f the
9
ibidp.4\.
10
AG S Est . 2037, consulta, 17 Jun. 1623 ; ibid, 2038. Cueva t o Philip IV, Bruss. 4 Jan. 162 4 and Isabella to
Philip, Bruss . 7 Jan. 1624 .
11
AG S Est . 2847 , memoria l o f Hortun o d e Urizar , Madrid , 3 Feb . 1618 , i n whic h h e refer s t o th e
"esfuercos ynfrutuoso s de los exercitos por tierra".
12
Thi s i s abundantly clea r from , amon g othe r sources , th e large numbe r o f freigh t contracts tha t hav e
been studied ; i t must b e conceded tha t a s far a s the seventeent h centur y i s concerned, Bloo m wa s as
wrong a s could be in his claim that "although Dutch Jewis h traffi c wit h Spain and Portuga l wa s never
entirely abandoned , Jewish merchant s applie d mos t o f their efforts t o other fields". H . I. Bloom. Th e
Economic Activities of th e Jews o f Amsterdam i n th e Seventeenth an d Eighteenth Centuries (William -
sport, Penn., 1937 ) p. 96.
13
Marti n d e Cellorigo. Alegacion e n qve sefvnda l a ivsticiay mercedqve algvonosparticvlares delreyno de
Portvgal.. .piden y suplican (Madrid, 1619 ) fo. 22v.
14
Quote d in Jose Alcala-Zamora. Espaha, Flandesy el Mar del Norte (1618-39) (Barcelona, 1975 ) p. 250n .
duke del liifantado, in the consejo de estado, that "of the principal merchants and trader s
that resid e i n Holland , mos t ar e "Portuguese " (ie . Jews) 15 or th e statement s o f Agustin
Messia a t th e same meeting . A more balance d view , though perhap s slightly out-of-date
by th e latter years of the truce , was put forwar d by Francisco Rdtama , a merchant fro m
J6rez d e l a Frontera , who , despit e havin g tried unsuccessfull y to sel l a consignmen t of
oranges a t Amsterda m i n 1614 , subsequently becam e a leadin g economi c advise r a t
Madrid. H e pointed ou t in his lengthy treatise o n Dutch-Iberia n trade , presented to the
consejo d e estado in 1619 , that mos t o f th e si x hundre d Jewis h head s o f families 16 a t
Amsterdam an d Rotterdam were poor and that there were a mere dozen Dutch Jews who
were o f an y accoun t in trade . Nevertheless , he suggeste d tha t Spai n shoul d fomen t th e
ill-feeling tha t existe d i n Hollan d agains t th e Jew s s o a s t o obtai n thei r expulsio n t o
Germany o r Polan d "i n orde r t o tak e awa y th e trad e whic h the y conduct b y mean s of
contacts wit h other Jews (i.e. converses).. .wit h which they defraud Your Mastest y of his
duties an d depriv e man y businessmen of these realms of their profits and s o as to divert
this trade , an d th e contact s i n Spai n tha t accompan y it , t o Flander s s o tha t everything
should b e to the advantage of the subjects of Your Majesty".17 Retama claimed tha t even
the riches t o f the Dutc h Jews , a referenc e presumably t o Bento Osorio, 18 had les s tha n
60,000 Castilia n ducat s which was by no means a huge fortune by the standards of several
non-Jews of Amsterdam and a number of conversos of Lisbon, Madrid and Antwerp.
Retama wa s close t o th e mar k i n holding tha t ther e were scarcely more tha n a doze n
Dutch Sephardi m who were trading with the peninsula o n any scale during the latter years
of the truce, though their number and resources were growing rapidly. Certainly the most
important wa s Bento (Baruch) Osorio, factor of Andres Lopes Pint o of Lisbon, for whom
he chartered som e two hundred Dutc h ships between 161 5 and 161 8 to carry Setuba l salt
to Flanders, Hollan d an d th e Baltic; he also imported suga r from Portugal and exporte d
timber t o Ceut a an d Tangiers . Amon g th e others , wer e Duart e Fernande s (Joshu a
Habilho)19 who had various interests in the peninsula but principally shipped Balti c grain
to Oporto, Viana and Pontevedra , Jeronimo Rodrigues da Sousa 20 (Samuel Abrabanel) ,
15
AG S Est . 2036 , consulta 6 Jul. 1622 : "porque los principals mercaderes y tratantes qu e ay en Olanda
los mas dellos son Portugueses".
16
J . G. van Dillen, following Cecil Roth , estimate s th e number o f Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam in 161 7
at abou t 500 ; undoubtedly , thi s i s much to o lo w though mos t historians would stil l regar d Retama' s
estimate, implying a a total of about 2,400 a s too high, Cecil Roth , "Het Vreemde Geval van Hecto r
Mendes Bravo" , Nieuw Israelietisch Weekbladl Aug . 1931 , p. 8 ; E. M. Koen, "The Earlies t Sources
Relating t o th e Portugues e Jew s i n th e Municipa l Archive s o f Amsterda m u p t o 1620" , Studio
Rosenthaliana iv (1970) pp. 39-41 .
17
AG S Est . 634, exp . 322 , fos. 13-14 .
18
E . M . Koen, "Notaria l Record s i n Amsterdam Relatin g t o the Portugues e Jews i n tha t Tow n u p t o
1639", Studio Rosenthaliana v (1971 ) p . 219n ; i n 1631 , Osorio's fortun e wa s assesse d fo r taxatio n a t
40,000 guilder s thoug h thi s ma y hav e bee n a n underestimate , se e A . M . Vaz Dias , "Ove r de n ver -
mogenstQestand der Amsterdamsch e Joden i n de 17 e en de 18 e eeuw", Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis l i
(1936) p . 166 .
19
E . M . Koen , "Duart e Fernandes , Koopma n va n d e Portugees e Nati e t e Amsterdam" , Studio
Rosenthaliana ii (1968)
20
Koen , "Notarial Records", Studio Rosenlh. ii, 263n.
later a parnas o f th e Bet h Israe l congregatio n wh o likewis e exported grain , chiefly t o
Aveiro, an d Sebastia n Nunez 21 (Isaac Israe l Nunes) , undistinguished in communal lif e
but a n important , i f disreputable, trade r wit h Pontevedr a an d Vigo . Diogo d a Silva 22
(Tobiau Israe l d a Silva) , again somewha t disreputable, deal t mainly with Lisbo n as did
Duarte Esteve s d a Pina 23 (Isaac Milano ) wh o later organize d a synagogu e in hi s hom e
after movin g t o Hamburg , an d Toma s Nune s d a Pina 24 (Joshu a Sarfati) , a respecte d
communal leade r an d a founder of the Beth Ya'akov congregation, al l mainly dealers i n
Brazilian sugar. Diogo Nunes Belmonte25 (Ya'akov Israel Belmonte), an active member of
Beth Ya'akov, trade d i n sugar and slaves and ha d connection s i n the Spanish Caribbea n
as wel l a s Portugal . Antoni o Martin s Viegas 26 (Simeo n Viegas) , Francisc o Ribeir o d a
Costa27 (Mose s Gadelha ) wh o died i n 1616 , an d Jua n d e Haro 28 (Rafae l Jesurun) deal t
mainly wit h Far o an d th e Algarve , exportin g grai n an d othe r product s an d importin g
wine, figs, olive oil and wool. Duarte and Jorge Pereira29 had various connections in Spain
and amon g othe r activitie s shipped woo l from Alicante to Venice. Jer6nimo an d Duart e
Rodriguez Mendez, 30 who had recentl y emigrate d fro m Malaga , trade d especiall y wit h
that town . It is remarkable tha t not on e o f the leading Jewis h merchant s of Amsterdam,
before 1621 , seems to have been involve d in the most vital sector of the carrying trade to
and from the peninsula, tha t is with the ports of western Andalusia — Seville, Sanlucar an d
Cadiz, linked wit h the official trad e with the Spanish Indies .
Fundamentally, Spanis h pre-occupation with the Dutch Sephardi m derive d fro m thei r
economic r61e. Yet, this is not to say that Spanish policy was completely unconcerned wit h
the progres s o f Jewis h institution s an d th e organizatio n o f Jewish religiou s lif e i n th e
United Provinces. Indeed, a s far as Spain was concerned, the growth of organized Judaism
at Amsterdam an d elsewher e was an additona l economi c threat, for the more th e syna -
gogues succeede d i n establishing themselves securely and firml y on Dutch soil , the mor e
Holland woul d be likely to attract the thousands o f wealthy and enterprisin g converses in
the peninsula wh o dominate d Portuguese , an d ha d a large shar e in Spanis h an d Nort h
African trade , but who fel t highly insecure, as Cellorigo and others fearful o f such a flight
of merchant s an d capita l pointe d out , especially i n Portuga l wher e Inquisitio n activit y
during the truce years was very intense. Moreover , there was a widespread convictio n i n
21
ibid , vii,271n.
22
Livro de Bet Haim do Kahal Kudos de Bet Yahacob ed . W. C. Pieterse (Assen, 1970) p. 189 .
23
Keen , "Notarial Records" , Studio Rosenth. v, 244n.
24
ibid , iii, 248n; the fortune o f Nunes da Pina was assessed fo r taxation in 1631 , when he was the fourth
richest of the Amsterdam Jews, at 25,000 guilders, Vaz Dias, loc.cit., 166.
25
Koen , "Notarial Records", Studio Rosenth. vi, 236n.
26
ibid,x , 215n.
27
ibid,vi , 1 1 On.
28
ibid , v, 123n; though he seems to have traded mainly with the Algarve, Mendez Bravo says that he came
from Vizcaya.
29
Koen , "Notarial Records" , Studia Rosenth. x, deed nos, 884, 968 and p. 223n.
30
Livro d e Be t Haim, 190 ; Mende z Brav o lists Hieronim o and Duart e Roi z Mende z a s "Castilians" ,
originating, he thought, fro m Sanlucar ; here he clearly mean s the Rodriguez Mende z o f Malaga, C.
Roth, "The Strang e Case of Hector Mende z Bravo", Hebrew Union College Annual xviii (1944) p. 235.
the peninsul a tha t ther e ha d occurred , durin g th e firs t tw o decades o f th e seventeent h
century, a marke d reviva l o f Jewishness an d Jewis h observance s amon g th e peninsul a
converses31 and a development suc h as the emergence o f organized Jewis h communities in
Holland compose d largel y o f former converses, was bound t o b e regarde d a s extremely
undesireable. Upo n receivin g wor d fro m Amsterdam , i n 1612 , that th e Jews ther e wer e
constructing thei r first public synagogue, th e Spanish ministe r a t the archduke's cour t a t
Brussels, th e marque s d e Guadaleste, intervene d "b y secre t means " a t Amsterdam an d
The Hague to try to block the attempt. The contract fo r the synagogue was signed wit h the
builders i n January 161 2 by a group of leading Sephardi m includin g Duarte Fernandes. 32
By a resolutio n o f 8 May 1612 , the Amsterda m cit y administration , respondin g t o suc h
pressures a s fro m th e cit y kerkeraad o r churc h council , ordere d constructio n t o cease ,
forbidding publi c practic e o f Judaism i n Amsterdam . I n June , Guadalest e reporte d t o
Madrid tha t on realizing the significance of the synagogue, he had arranged fo r protests to
be mad e b y certain person s t o th e "States" representin g th e har m tha t woul d b e don e
should th e Jew s b e permitted t o practice thei r rite s and ceremonie s s o openly a t a time
when Catholics wer e so persecuted an d that although the pressure was not well received at
first, subsequently, the Dutch authorites had forbidden the synagogue.33 He was implying
that this was the result of his own intervention .
Although ther e wer e Spanis h official s wh o emphasized th e Jewishnes s o f the "Portu -
guese" i n Holland, takin g this to imply implacable hostility to the Spanish crow n and its
interests,34 a mor e usua l attitud e i n th e earl y seventeent h century , an d especiall y th e
period o f the ascendanc y o f Olivares (1621-43) , wa s to regard th e Dutc h Sephardi m a s
recoverable Ne w Christians who could be drawn back fro m the republic t o the peninsul a
or at least use d t o neutralize to some exten t those who were mor e strongl y committed t o
Judaism an d th e protectio n o f the Dutch . Undoubtedl y ther e wa s in Hollan d a pool of
New Christia n refugee s fro m th e Inquisition , sometimes highl y unsavour y personages ,
who covertly rejecte d thei r own Jewishness and eve n looke d wit h loathing o n Jewish life
and th e synagogues , wit h thei r relatively exacting demand s an d standards , an d woul d
have preferre d t o retur n t o th e peninsul a o r settle i n th e Spanis h Netherlands. 35 There
31
Brit . Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fos. 64-5; Gome s Solis, Discursos.
32
Koen , "Notarial Records" , Studio Rosenth., v, 241-3; J. Zwarts. De Eerste Rabbijnen e n Synagogen van
Amsterdam naar Archivalische Bronnen (Amsterdam, 1929 ) pp. 65-71, 116 .
33
AG S Est . 627 , consult a 7 Ju) . 1612: "en cart a d e 1 7 de Juni o escriv e e l marque s d e Guadalest e q
haviendole avisado de Amsterdam q los judios q alii residen han edificado agora una sinagoga adond e
acuden co n much a puntualidad , procur e po r medio s secreto s representa r a lo s Estado s l o ma l q
pareciera q e n tiemp o q ta n perseguido s so n lo s catolico s fuese n admitido s lo s judios co n tant a
publicidad a l us o d e su s ritos y ceremonias q aunqu e de principi o fue ma l admitida esta diligencia ,
despues le han avisad o q se ha mandado sobreseer e n la obra de la synagoga.. ,"
34
see , for instance , Juan de Mancicido r t o Phili p III, 1 Dec. 161 4 quoted i n V . Brants , "Un e pag e d e
semitisme diplomatique et commercial", Academie Royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres
(Bruss. 1905 ) no. vii, 576n.
35
Retam a report s i n hi s treatis e of 1619 , fo. 13 : "Y o entend i en Oland a qu e s e queria trata r co n su s
Altezas de traer los judios que han ydo huyendo de Portugal que estan en Amsterdam y Rotterdam.. ,
para qu e e n Ambere s entrassen e yciessen negocios para impedirl o a los olandeses".
were also others who while committed t o Jewish lif e wished, for different reasons , to enter
into dealing s wit h Spanis h officials . The desir e fo r increase d contac t wa s i n fac t quit e
strong o n both side s an d wa s sometimes t o be foun d even in somewha t unlikely circles .
"One o f the things with which the Dutch sustain with such force and obstinacy th e wars in
Brazil", a member o f the council of state was recorded a s stating in 1639 , in the midst of
the second Spanish-Dutc h war , "are th e contributions with which thos e o f the "Nation"
(ie. the Jews) help them, their expenditure in the war being of the greatest importance; he
(the speaker) ha d hear d i t deliberated o n other occasion s tha t th e "Portuguese" that ar e
here would be capable o f drawing off from Holland man y of those who have most capita l
there, i f som e concessio n wer e mad e t o the m concernin g a pardo n fo r pas t offences ,
should they undertake to live in future without offense t o the Catholic faith". 36 The author
of this proposal wa s none othe r tha n the king's confessor, the Inquisitor-General .
During th e truce years, several "Portuguese" resident in Holland wer e in contac t with
Spanish officials , notabl y Lui s Va z Pimentel , Manue l Mende s Cardoso , Duart e Fer -
nandes, his son Bento Enriques, Samuel Pallache, his nephew Moseh Pallache, Gabriel d a
Costa, Francisco Tomas de Miranda and Bartolom e Mendez Trancoso. Vaz Pimentel,37 a
merchant o f Rotterda m whos e father , Bent o Va z o f Evor a ha d bee n a victi m o f th e
Inquisition, perhap s bes t represent s th e typ e o f Ne w Christia n i n th e Unite d Province s
who rejected Judaism , stoo d at the fringes of Jewish life an d was prepared, fo r money, to
supply an y informatio n relatin g t o th e Jew s an d thei r converse correspondent s i n th e
peninsula. I n Jul y 1619 , havin g bee n approache d b y a n emissar y fro m Brussels , Va z
Pimentel agreed t o provide th e names of the leading exporters of forged coinage to Spain,
but demande d firs t paymen t o f 200 escudos whic h caused some displeasure i n Brussels.
"He claim s hi s rewar d befor e th e resul t o f hi s avisos ha s bee n seen" , reporte d th e
archduke's politica l secretar y t o Juan d e Ciriza , in Madrid , "which seeme d t o m e very
strange, but after all he is a Jew and in order not to be tricked, I have not given him the 200
escudos, especiall y sinc e yo u wrot e tha t n o benefi t resulted fro m th e avisos that h e sent
before".38 In October 1619 , Vaz Pimentel communicated t o Brussels, via an intermediary,
that the major exporters o f counterfeit coinage to the peninsula were Sebastian Nunez39
from Galici a wh o wa s sendin g copper , h e declared , conceale d i n grai n shipment s t o
36
AG S Est. 3860 consulta, 5 Apr. 1639: "Una d e la cosas con que los Holandeses sustentan con tanto peso
y porfi a esta s guerra s de l Brasi l so n lo s accidimi' 05(?) co n qu e lo s socorre n lo s d e l a nacion , cuyas
expensas son d e lo mas principal que e n el guerra se gasta. H a oid o trata r en otras occasiones que se
podria encamina r que los Portugueses de aqui serian poderoso s par a saca r d e Holanda mucho s de los
que ali i tienen mas caudal con ta l que s e les hiziese alguna comodidad, en orden a l perdon d e culpa s
pasadas asegurando ellos para lo future vivir sin offensa d e la fee cath™".
37
Va z Pimentel i s mentione d i n onl y on e Amsterda m notaria l dee d foun d s o far , Keen , "Notaria l
Records", Studio Rosenth. x , 224 ; curiously , he i s listed i n th e Dutc h bu t omitte d fro m th e English
version of Roth's "Hector Mendez Bravo", "He t Vreemde Geval", p. 11 .
38
AG S Est , 2037 doc. 157 , Pedro de San Juan to Juan de Cirica, Marimont, 31 Aug. 1619.
39
AG S Est. 2037, doc. 27, "Los qu e embian quartos de Olanda son las personas seg'es" enclosed wit h San
Juan t o Ciriza, Marimont, 30 Oct. 1619 ; there is independent evidence that Nunez was sending large
quantities of false copper to Galicia, see E. Stols. De Spaansche Brabanders ofde Handelsbetrekkingen
der Zuidelijke Nederlanden me t d e Iberische Wereld, 1598-164 8 (Bruss. 1971)pp. 15,71.
40 41
Pontevedra fo r Gonzal o Dia z Pato, Jua n Gon9alves, likewis e smugglin g throug h
Galicia, Diogo da Silva who was exporting copper t o Lisbon an d Francisco de Mezquit a
to San Sebastian. He mentioned only Jews. Soon after, Vaz Pimentel was paid 200 escudos
which he claimed t o need t o pay the ransom for his brother, Juan Vaz Pimentel, captured
by Barbar y pirate s an d take n t o Algier s whils t sailing t o Spain , in 1619 , bearing letter s
from Luis , and fro m Brussels, for officials i n Madrid. 42
During 1620 , Va z Pimente l remaine d i n contac t wit h Brussel s throug h th e coun t o f
Egmont wh o a t th e tim e wa s regularl y travelling betwee n th e Souther n an d Norther n
Netherlands in connection wit h family lands confiscated b y the republic. Besides adding
more detail s about th e forging and expor t t o Spain of coinage,43 he warned Madri d that
Ruy Lope s Homem, 44 wh o ha d recentl y been appointe d arrendador (tax-farmer ) of th e
royal dudes at Madeira, had relatives at Amsterdam and was planning to defraud the king
of hi s duties , i n collusio n wit h hi s relatives , an d the n fle e himsel f wit h hi s capita l t o
Holland an d denounce d Bia s Ruiz Hortuno, Portuguese merchan t o f Malaga, as a prin-
cipal trade r in false coinage an d importe r of Dutch Eas t Indi a spice s into the peninsula .
"This Ruiz Hortuno", he declared, "has com e man y times to Holland t o buy false copper
and ship it to Malaga and other ports". He also repeated an earlier offe r tha t he had made
to "name all the Portugues e an d Spaniard s o f the Nation tha t are in Hollan d an d hav e
brothers an d relative s in Spain an d Portugal" , includin g the latter, in return for suitabl e
payment.
The earlier avisos of Vaz Pimentel, referred to by the archduke's secretary ar e probabl y
the sam e a s a se t of anonymou s avisos that are enclose d wit h certai n letter s fro m th e
secretary t o Juan d e Ciriza o f 1618 . The informan t of 161 8 was clearly a Portuguese an d
more familia r with Rotterdam tha n Amsterdam ; almost certainly , h e an d Va z Pimente l
are the same. In them, he describes frauds in the Brazil trade from Hollan d via the island s
of Madeir a an d th e Azores whereb y Dutch ships , as many as te n yearly, avoided roya l
customs procedures at Oporto and Lisbon , awaited and loaded unregistere d merchandise
on the official Brazil ships sailing from thos e ports and late r collected unregistered sugar
and Brazi l wood a t th e same place s when they returned, defrauding th e king of his 10%
amounting to some 80,00 0 ducats. 45 He offered , fo r payment, to send detail s of all those
"who ar e circumcized " an d tradin g with th e peninsul a who m he estimate d t o numbe r
40
Va z Pimentel says of Diaz Pato "el qual ha ma s de quatro anos que trat a en este negocio que po r ser
muy rico , la justicia de l a tierra no le prende"; see also H. Kellenbenz. Sephardim an der unteren Elbe
(Wiesbaden, 1958) p. 130; subsequently, after 1623 , Diaz Pato fled t o Amsterdam where his fortune was
assessed fo r taxation in 163 1 at 20,000 guilders, Vaz Dias, loc. cit., p. 166.
41
Joa o Goncalves Valderde (Eliahu Israel Valverde) had been a leading Dutch-Jewish trader with Spain,
especially Malaga, but wen t bankrupt in 161 7 or 1618.
42
AC S Est. 2307 doc. 208, Vaz Pimentel to San Juan, Antwerp, Ilth Oct. 1619.
43
AC S Est. 2308, docs. 15-17 .
44
Mende z Brav o mentions two relatives of Ruy Lope s Homem who was from Lisbon , his son, Manoel
Homem Vieira , an d a brother , Miguel Lope s Homem who were residing in Amsterdam, Roth, "Th e
Strange Case", loc . cit .
45
AG S Est . 2305, anonymous "Papel" enclosed wit h Albert to Phili p III , Ghent 1 8 Aug. 1618: he states
that each o f the ten ships carried merchandise worth over 50,000 ducats.
46
more tha n tw o hundred, a highl y significant figure, specifie d severa l illegal shipment s
including one of forged coinage freighte d to Pontevedra b y Sebastian Nunez and anothe r
to Sanlucar with copper hidde n i n barrels of butter and illicit dealings in Brazil ginger a t
Lisbon by Manuel Ldpez de Leon of Amsterdam. He also warned tha t Antonio Dia z Pato
of Pontevedra , Francisc o Dias of Viana , an d Antoni o Sanches , a wealth y merchan t of
Lisbon, wer e plannin g t o fle e wit h thei r mone y t o Holland . Further , h e advise d tha t a
merchant had sailed fro m Rotterdam t o San Sebastian under an alias whom he described
and name d a s Isaa c d e Le6n , " a Portugues e bor n i n Malag a wh o ha d com e wit h hi s
parents and uncles to Holland thre e years ago, to live as Jews and are circumcized"47 who
was travelling with letters for Malaga an d Lisbo n wit h which t o realize the cash valu e of
goods bein g hel d fo r th e famil y i n thos e places , especiall y fo r hi s uncle , Jerdnim o
Rodriguez, goods forfeit t o the crown. He also specified that a certain Captain Francisc o
Ribeiro, a t Paraib a i n Brazil , had relative s living a s Jews a t Amsterda m an d ha d bee n
corresponding wit h Do m Manuel , pretende r t o th e thron e o f Portugal . Va z Pimentel' s
leads, evidently , wer e followe d up . Severa l ship s tha t h e identifie d wer e detaine d a t
Oporto, Sanluca r an d Pontevedr a an d carefull y searched thoug h apparentl y wit h littl e
result. Isaa c d e Le6 n wa s arrested i n Madrid . A warning was despatched t o th e gover -
nor-general o f Brazi l concernin g Francisc o Ribeir o who , a t som e poin t subsequently ,
seems to have fled to Holland; a t any rate, by 1623 , Amsterdam Jewry included a Captain
Ribeiro.48
Other "Portuguese" who stood at the fringe of Dutch Jewish life, rejected the synagogue
and were anxious to find favour with the Spanish crow n were Gabriel da Costa, Francisc o
Tomas de Mirand a an d Bartolom 6 Mende z Trancoso. Th e latte r particularl y desire d a
"safe-conduct s o that he, his wife, children an d family should not be punished by the Holy
Inquisition" upo n returnin g t o Spain. 49 H e promise d economi c informatio n of various
kinds tha t woul d b e o f great interes t t o th e Spanis h authoritie s and , t o eas e hi s path ,
named several New Christians in Spain whom he alleged to be receiving false coinage an d
46
ibid : "los qu e so n circuncidado s qu e viene n en lo s dicho s reyno s y los qu e trata n en ello s y tienen
haziendas son mas de doscientos"; in the same document, he adds" E l mayor negocio que aora tienen
los Judios en Olanda es la moneda de bellon que por todos los puertos meten en Espana y sacan plata y
oro."
47
AG S Est. 2305, "aviso" enclosed with San Juan to Ciriza, Ghent, 14 Aug. 1618 : "un Portugue s nacido
en Malag a q vino a Olanda tres anos ha con sus padres y tios a ser judios y estan circuncidados, lleva
doze fardos de lienzos de importancia y otra mucha hazienda de sus tios devaxo del nombre de un Juan
Perez d e Bero y vezino d e Sa n Sebastia n y mucho s papeles y carta s par a cobra r otr a cantida d d e
hazienda q ha dexado en Malaga q importa mucho. La principal hazienda q va devaxo el nombre del
dho Juan Pere z es de u n judio ti o del sobredh o q s e llama Geronimo Rodriguez muy conocid o e n
Malaga dond e aun tien e mucha haz d"; clearly , Isaac de Leo n wa s a nephe w of Jerdnimo Rodriguez
Mendez (Isaac Israel Mendes), others of the Malag a group that settled in Amsterdam around 161 5 or
1616. were Dr. Joseph Israel Mendes who was buried at Ouderkerk in 1618 , Abraham Israel Mendes
and Samue l de Leon , Livro de Bet Haim, 26, 71, 76, 93, 190.
48
A . Wiznitzer.Jetv.? in Colonial Brazi7(New York, 1960) p. 47; Livro de Bet Haim, 66, 106; A. Novinsky.
Cristaos Novos na Bahia (Sao Paulo, 1972), pp. 41 , 122-3 , 135.
49
AG S Est . 2308, doc. 113 , "Lo q e n sustancia resulta de los papeles q Bartholome Mende z Trancoso a
escrito".
engaging i n other illegal activity. These were Miguel de Lisboa, a "Portuguese" of Bilbao,
Pedro Lope z de Moreyr a a t Yanguas, Dieg o Pereir a an d hi s brothers o f whom on e was
married i n Sa n Sebastian , Bartolom 6 Lope z an d Pedr o Alvare z o f Valladoli d an d th e
converse arrendador o f th e peppe r dutie s a t Burgos . Mende z Trancos o succeede d i n
arousing the interest of Juan de Mancicidor, in Brussels, who passed o n his proposals to
Madrid, but there it was noticed that this converso had been identified as a leader in a ring,
active i n receiving copper from Holland i n the Basqu e country an d Norther n Castile, i n
1615, b y a morisc o informan t wh o ha d testifie d the n agains t Dieg o an d Doming o
Pereira.50 It ha d bee n th e investigations of 161 5 which had force d Mende z Trancoso t o
flee t o Hollan d an d associat e himself , albei t wit h n o religiou s motive , wit h th e Jews .
Gabriel da Costa, probably no t the famou s freethinker, but an older namesake, 51 visited
Antwerp i n Jul y 161 9 wher e h e contacte d Manue l Lope s Sueyro , so n o f Diego , th e
well-known Portuguese spy-maste r in the Spanish service who was then at Madrid.52 Soon
after, h e wrote t o Diego Lope s Sueyro , offering t o "show Hi s Majesty th e remedy so that
quartos (coppe r coinage ) shoul d no t b e brough t int o thes e realm s fro m whic h so many
inconveniences result" , reveal how grain prices in the peninsula might be kept more stabl e
and mean s o f increasing th e yiel d of various taxes in Portugal. 53 He explaine d howeve r
that he would only do this if he were first granted immunit y from the Inquisition enablin g
him to go to Madrid t o explain his points in person. Althoug h h e aroused Lope s Sueyro' s
interest, there was apparently n o other response. I t is curious that Vaz Pimentel, when he
learnt o f d a Costa' s activit y i n Antwerp , denounce d hi m an d hi s brother , "Francisc o
Thomas", a s utterl y untrustworthy persons who ha d themselve s been exportin g forge d
coinage t o the peninsula. 54 Though no t certain that this brother is the same person a s the
Francisco Toma s de Mirand a who contacte d Juan de Mancicidor i n 1617 , it is probable.
Tomas d e Mirand a offere d proposition s tha t would , h e declared , greatl y benefi t th e
Spanish treasur y and describe d himself as "residing in Holland where I live as a Catholic
50
ibid , doc. 114 : "E l an o 161 5 vino a esta corte Gabrie l de Carmona. . .aviso largament e de lo s malo s
medics y tratos de mucho s judios Portugueses q entraron y salian desto s reynos y los principals eran
Domingo y Dieg o Pereyra..." , th e documen t goes on t o implicate Mendez Trancoso; se e also Julio
Caro Baroja. Los Judios en l a Espana Moderna y Contemporaries 3 vols. (Madrid, 1962), ii, 55.
51
Accordin g t o Va z Dias, the freethinke r wa s probably in Hambur g at thi s dat e while ther e were two
other Gabriel da Costas i n Holland, neither of whom was active in Jewish life ; Va z Pimentel describes
the da Costa in question as "un hombre viejo" whereas the freethinker a t this time was only thirty-four;
see, A. M . Vaz Dias, "Uriel da Costa . Nieuwe Bijdrage to t diens Levensgeschiedenis", Mededeelingen
vanwege hel Spinozahuis i i (Leiden, 1936) p. 9.
52
Th e Sueyro s wer e business people based i n Antwer p presumably of converso origin; thei r singularl y
uninformative avisos, allegedly procured fro m highl y placed correspondents in th e republic , make no
mention of the activities of the Jews, see J. J. Poelhekke. Het Verraadvan de Pisiolettenl Verhandelingen
der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie va n Wetenschappen. afd . Letterkunde n. reeks, dl. Ixxxviii.
53
AC S Est. 2307, doc. 48. Gabriel da Costa to Diego Lopes Sueyro, Antwerp, 3 July 1619.
04
AG S Est . 2307, Vaz Pimentel to San Juan, Rotterdam, 24 Jul. 1619 ; no less curious is the statemen t of
Manuel Sueyro, who had n o contact with Vaz Pimentel until 1620 , when he received avisos from hi m on
the trade in false copper, that "pense que residra el que m e los dio en Rotterdam y que s e llamava Lui s
Mendes, pero passos e de aquel lugar a Delft y es su nombre Lui s Vaz, y segun he entendido despues el
mismo que lo s haze fundiendolo s par a qu e s e parezcan a lo s que havi a e n Espana , AGS Est . 2309.
Manuel Sueyro to Philip III, 1 Ith Dec. 1620 .
as is well-known and can be checked".55 Still, being compelled b y Dutch circumstances t o
pose outwardly as a Jew, he had no illusions about his status in the eyes of the Inquisition56
and requested a safe-conduct so that he would be able to go to Madrid. He elicited at least
some interes t i n Madrid thoug h no t enough evidentl y to procure hi m immunity from th e
Inquisition.
Manoel Mendes Cardoso, a former contractor for the duty on playing cards at Lisbon,57
represents a somewhat more substantial case. He formed links in Brussels, especially wit h
Spinola, commande r o f th e arm y o f Flanders , a t roughl y th e sam e tim e a s Duart e
Fernandes, i n 1614 . Spinola considere d th e avisos which he brought fro m Amsterdam i n
1614 and 161 5 to be of some merit. These deal t with various aspects of commercial policy ,
including suggeste d improvement s i n the metho d o f registering American silve r o n th e
Spanish Atlanti c convoys . I t i s unclear whethe r or not h e als o supplie d informatio n o n
Jews and converses, quite possibly not . Fro m 1615 , there was a lapse in his contacts wit h
Brussels until Februar y 161 9 when he again visited Spinola presenting a set of economic
propositions an d requestin g immunit y from th e Inquisition s o that h e could explai n hi s
points in person at Madrid.58 The reason fo r this sudden resumption of contact might wel l
have bee n Mende s Cardoso' s anxiet y a t th e approachin g expir y o f the Spanish-Dutc h
truce an d desir e t o avoi d it s likel y aftermat h b y returnin g t o th e peninsula . Spanis h
officials too k Mende s Cardoso seriousl y an d bot h Spinol a an d th e marques de Bedma r
wrote o n his behalf t o Madrid describin g hi m a s a "persona inteligente" an d urgin g tha t
the immunity be conceded since his proposals were likely to be of great benefit to the roya l
finances.59 The outlin e forwarded to the consejo d e estado deals with suggested savings i n
the provisioning of the Spanish garrison s in North Africa, mean s of ending the influx into
the peninsula of false coinage, fiscal improvements in Portugal and, still more grandiosely ,
the supplying of political information from the republic and the Ottoman Empire. 80 Philip
55
"Estant e em Olanda donde vivocatolicamente como he notorio e se podera emformar", ACS Est. 2305,
Mancicidor t o Philip III, 1 4 Feb. 1618 ; see also, ACS Est. 2303, Mancicidor to Philip III, 13 Nov. 1617
and enclose d "Relacion de los Arbitrios que Franc 0 Thomas de Miranda . .. offreze", i n which, amon g
other things, he offers t o show means "para q ningun estrangero meta cobre y saque plat a en q gana a
17(4%".
56
I n June 1618 , the Archduke Albert wrote to Philip III that "en carta de 3 abril deste afio di quenta a V.
Mag11, com o Francisc o Toma s d e Mirand a portugues residente en Oland a lleg o aqu i a trata r de su s
propuestas y que antes de declararlas desseava una cedula de V. Magd. prometiendole en ella la quinta
parte del beneficio qu e se siguiere a la R1 hazienda de V. Magd de sus arbitrios y perdon de lo que s e le
pudiesse acumula r d e s u vid a passada ; agor a h a acudid o a representarm e qu e supuest o n o have r
Uegado resoiucion.. .resuelve yr a essa corte a declarar los arbitrios", Archive s Generates du Royaume ,
Brussels. SEG 182.F.58 , letter undated.
57
Roth , "Th e Strang e Case", loc. cit., 237.
58
AG S Est. 2306. Spinola to Ciriza, 28 Feb. 1619.
58
ibid ; AGS Est . 2309. Bedmar to Philip III, 30 Jun. 1620.
60
AG S Est . 2306, doc. 11 , "Manuel Mende z Cardoso digo . ..", in return for his propositions, h e wante d
2% of all resulting improvements in the royal revenues for himself; Alcala-Zamora, without seeing this
document but only the memorandum about it by Ciriza, asserts that "los judios Portugueses residentes
en Holand a . . .por boc a d e Manue l Cardoso, propusiero n alguna s cosas d e importancia para l a rea l
hacienda", a quite unjustified inference , op. cit., 133 , 250.
Spain an d the Dutch Sephardini 36 7
III sen t Mende s Cardoso' s memoria l to th e Inquisitor-Genera l of Portuga l requesting
details on the person an d advic e as to how to proceed. By mistake however, the Inquisition
provided th e consejo d e estado wit h detail s not o n Mende s Cardoso bu t o n th e two othe r
Manoel Cardoso s then in Holland, Manoel Cardoso de Macedo, an Old Christian convert
to Judaism,61 and Manoel Cardoso de Millào, who had lived in Brazil and Londo n befor e
settling i n Amsterdam. 62 In any case, Philip was urged by the Portuguese Inquisitio n that
"it would b e most scandalous should baptize d Christians, living as Jews and circumcized ,
appear i n th e Catholi c cour t o f You r Majesty. 63 That , however , wa s no t th e en d o f th e
matter, for in March 1621 , the Archduke Albert wrote to Philip III that "Manuel Ménde z
Cardoso has fo r some year s bee n givin g various papers an d avisos here of importance t o
the roya l servic e o f You r Majest y whic h hav e bee n sen t o n t o Spai n b y th e marqui s
Spinola an d now, moved b y his honest zeal, he is going to that court (Madrid) to represent
what he ha s proposed until now and othe r matter s of which he will give account t o Your
Majesty t o whom I request tha t orders b e give n that he be heard an d tha t du e favou r be
shown t o him".64
Duarte Fernandes , formerl y of Oporto, deemed "inteligente y prudente" b y Guadalest e
and a "ma n o f integrity though a Jew", entere d th e Spanis h servic e i n 161 4 o r earl y in
1615. He, unlike the other Portuguese in Holland who formed link s with Spanish official s
in this period, was a committed Je w and activ e in Dutch Jewish life, having been involved
in the attempt to build the public synagogue in 161 2 and bein g a founding member of the
Santa Companhia d e Dotar whic h provide d marriag e portion s fo r orphane d an d
impoverished Portugues e Jewis h girls throughout th e European Sephard i diaspora. 65 He
made severa l visits to Brussels from Amsterda m taking "relaciones" wit h information on
various topics connecte d wit h the United Province s an d was paid severa l hundred ducats
by th e Spanis h crown , mainl y a s re-imbursemen t fo r expense s incurre d i n travellin g to
and fro m Brussels. 66 There i s no evidenc e that h e damage d an y fello w Je w i n thi s way,
though i t may b e tha t his activity was detrimental to the Republic . However , in th e lon g
run, h e faile d t o please official s i n th e Souther n Netherlands an d especiall y angered th e
ei se e B . N . Teensma . "D e levensgeschiedeni s van Abraha m Perengriao . alia s Manue l Cardoso d e
Macedo", Studia Rosenth., x, 1 (1976) pp. 1-36 .
62
Kellenbenz , Sephardim, \ 18. 143; Méndez Bravo lists all three Manuel Cardosos.
63
AC S Est . 2035. memorandum of Juan de Ciriza , 24 Oct. 162 0 and Inquisitor-Genera l of Portuga l t o
Philip III , 2 7 Dec . 1620 : "qu e ser a materi a d e muit o scandal o andar ness a cort e d e V.M . católica
christâos baptissados sendo públicos judeus circuncidos".
M
AGR . Bruss., SEG f . 135 . Albert lo Philip III. 31 Mar. 1621.
03
Koen , "Duart e Fernandes " Studia Rosenth., ii, 179, 180.
66
AG S est . 2300, "Pape l de l dinero dado a Fray Gregorio y a los judios". Fernandez's letter to the king
produced a n inquir y fro m Madri d to Brussels t o which Albert replied i n September 161 7 that "con l a
carta d e V . Magd . d e 2 9 d e May o h e recivid o lo s papele s d e Duart e Fernande z q trata n d e la s
propuestas q h a hecho , este negoci o se h a mirad o y considerado con atenció n y diversas vezes se h a
oydo al dho Duart e Fernandez, pero no se halla ni pareze q de sus propusiciones puede resultar cosa q
importe al servicio de V. Magd. por l o qual se lo ha dado d e mano y ordenadole q retire a su cassa q la
tiene en Olanda n o conviniendo q resida en Amberes por vivir en su secta judaicante de q no resultaría
servicio de Dio s sin o escándelo con su vida y mal exemple" , AGR Bruss. , SE G 181 , f. 361. Albert to
Philip III, 25 Sep. 1617.
bishop o f Antwerp , presumabl y fo r religiou s reasons , and , b y Januar y 1617 , h e wa s
writing to Madri d tha t fals e reports ha d bee n mad e abou t hi m i n th e Souther n Nether -
lands and tha t he wa s being rejecte d there. 67 This fact suggest s tha t Fernande s neve r in
fact imparted an y really significant information. Quite possibly, he had simply responde d
to the eagerness o f Spanish official s t o make contacts in the United Provinces , for his own
business purposes , withou t wishin g t o prejudic e eithe r th e Jewis h communit y o r th e
republic. He was especially involved in Spanish effort s t o win Samuel Pallache back into
the Spanish servic e before the latter's death in 1615 . Gondomar, th e Spanish ambassado r
in England , ha d sough t unsuccessfull y to recrui t Pallach e i n London , i n 1615, 68 as ha d
Gabriel d e Roy , Spanis h residen t a t Cologne, subsequently, whil e on a missio n i n Hol -
land. Fernande s convince d Guadaleste , afte r Samuel' s death , that h e ha d finall y succe -
eded wher e the other s ha d faile d i n inducin g Pallache , just befor e he died , t o serv e th e
crown again 69 i n connectio n wit h Nort h Africa n affair s an d afterward s persuade d
Samuel's nephew , Mose h Pallache, to follow the same path. 70 Shortly after, i n April 1616,
Moseh Pallache visited Brussels in the company o f Duarte Fernandes an d th e latter's son,
Bento Enriques , entere d int o talk s wit h Guadalest e an d Spinol a an d undertook , fo r
money, to reveal Dutch and Englis h plans in Morocco and t o secure the aid of the Jews of
Salé and Fedala should Philip III resolve to occupy those two ports, an eventuality whic h
seemed likel y at the time. 71 Spain had i n fact occupie d th e neighbouring ports of Larache
and L a Mamora , in 161 0 and 1614 , with the assistance of certain North African Jews and
the ambition o f completing the line of coastal plazas fuertes i n North Afric a as a barrie r
between Isla m an d th e Protestan t power s an d safe-guardin g the Straits of Gibraltar an d
the sea-lan e t o th e America s b y takin g Sal é wa s decidedl y i n th e air . However , Mose h
Pallache, fo r all the importanc e of his family, was an inexperience d youth of twenty-fiv e
and hi s offe r cause d a shar p spli t betwee n Guadalest e wh o was interested, and Spinol a
who was not inclined to take it seriously.72 The archduke, wh o disliked contacts with Jews,
supported Spinol a an d urge d Madri d tha t th e offe r shoul d b e ignored . I n Madrid ,
however, mor e interes t wa s shown thoug h eventually , in th e fac e of more pressin g busi-
ness, the whole question of Salé was dropped .
During th e truc e period, ther e was relatively little that th e Spanis h crown coul d d o to
regulate the Dutch an d Dutch-Jewis h carrying trade to and from th e peninsula and chec k
67
AG S Est. 2302 Duarte Fernandes to Philip III, 22 Jan. 1617 : "Ha do s anos que ando en servicio de V.M.
y por mis relaciones dy cuenta de lo que ahí a passado.. .Estando en Amberes se dieron al obispo contra
mi algunos reportes falços. pedille me oyesse para m i descargo que n o admitió..."
68
I t wa s a t Gondomar' s insistenc e tha t Pallach e wa s gaole d briefl y i n London , bu t equall y a t hi s
prompting tha t he was the n set free , AG S Est . 2302. "Parece r de l marque s d e Guadaleste" , 1 2 Apr.
1616.
69
Befor e entering into their links with the United Provinces, Samuel Pallache and his brother Joseph were
in Spanis h service for many years, until some unknown occurence caused them to flee fro m Madri d in
1608.
70
AG S Est . 2302, Duarte Fernandes, "Memoria d e la s cosas tratados y asentados con Samuel Pallache" .
71
ibid . "Memoria que yo Mosen Palach e dijo e n Bruselas a Duarte Fernandes en 28 Abril 1616" .
7
- ibid , consulta of Spinola to Albert, enclosed i n Spinola t o Philip III, Vintz, 28 Jun. 161 6 and Alber t to
Philip III. Marimont, 27 Jun. 1616 .
the evasion o f restrictions. Nevertheless, though the Spanish customs machinery was then
considerably less formidable tha n it afterwards became, the Spanish authorities did search
numerous Dutc h vessels , especially i n th e years 1616-1 9 and man y detentions an d con -
fiscations too k place . Th e pressur e too k variou s forms. Some Dutc h ships , especiall y i n
Sicily and Naples , wer e seized a s a means of political retaliation fo r Dutch hel p to Savoy
and Venice , Spain' s enemies i n Italy . I n th e peninsula , man y detention s resulte d fro m
suspicions o f fraud . Bu t a quit e frequen t occurrence , especiall y i n Portugal , wa s th e
detention o f ship s o n th e pretex t tha t the y were carryin g goods belongin g t o conversos
seized b y the Inquisition or refugees from th e Inquisition tha t had fled to Holland. Sinc e
both Iberia n conversos and Dutc h Jew s were heavily involved in Dutch commerce , it was
perhaps inevitabl e that such searches becam e a considerable nuisanc e t o Dutch shippin g
and merchants . Fo r thei r part, th e Dutc h authoritie s came t o see that th e protectio n o f
Dutch Jews as a distinctive group whose status in the eyes of the Spanish crow n was quite
different fro m that of other Dutch subjects, had become a Dutch national interest. Indeed,
the earliest efforts by the States-General to defend the Dutch Sephardim as a group, in the
sphere o f international relations , can b e specifically linked wit h Dutc h determination t o
safe-guard thei r burgeonin g trad e wit h th e peninsula . I n th e year s 1616-19 , repeate d
protests from Th e Hague were conveyed t o Madrid via Brussels73 and th e intervention on
behalf o f the Jews shoul d b e regarde d a s inherent in this process. Th e holding of Dutc h
vessels in Iberian port s became a principal irritan t in Spanish-Dutch relation s during the
truce an d ther e ca n b e n o doub t tha t i t was widely and bitterl y resented i n th e Unite d
Provinces. Indeed, i t was to be a stock answe r on th e part of propagandists of the Dutc h
war-party durin g the 1620 s and 1630s , to merchant s wh o complaine d tha t th e wa r wa s
disrupting trade , t o maintai n tha t trade had bee n impede d anyway , before 1621 , by th e
intolerable attitud e of the Spanish crow n to Dutch shipping and cargoes .
It had bee n obvious , from 160 9 onwards, that Madrid had no intention of including the
Dutch Jew s i n th e freedo m o f movemen t an d conscienc e i n Spai n an d th e Spanis h
European Empire , tha t th e crow n was bound, unde r th e term s of the truce , t o gran t t o
Dutch Protestant s and foreign-bor n Protestants resident in the republic. In October 1610 ,
at th e request o f the "Portugues e natio n o f Amsterdam", th e States-General presse d th e
archduke fo r th e releas e o f Simo n Mercado , a Dutc h "Portuguese " arreste d b y th e
municipal authoritie s of Antwer p fo r judaizing, o n th e groun d tha t hi s detention con -
flicted with articles four and seven of the truce. 74 There was no prospect however, that the
Spanish authorities would agree to treat the Dutch Jews on the same basis as other Dutch
subjects. Th e majo r inciden t of the truc e period fo r the Jews , occurred i n 161 8 with th e
arrest of an exceptionall y large number of conversos by th e Inquisitio n at Oporto , som e
twenty-six families, a n event which had repercussion s throughout Portugal, an d i n Spain
'3 See , fo r instance, the examples in Resolutiën der Staten Generaal, 1617-18 RGP 152 .
'4 Resolutiën der Staten Generaal, 1610-12, RGP 135 , p. 239.
3'U Empires and Entrepots
75
and Brazil , a s well as Holland. As several of the Oport o victim s were thei r correspon -
dents holdin g mone y an d good s fo r them , the Amsterda m Jew s appealed t o th e Dutc h
authorities fo r help . Th e States-Genera l responde d wit h a stron g protes t t o Brussel s
which, though i n it it referred onl y to its "Portuguese" an d no t specifically to its "Jewish"
subjects, nevertheless , stand s out as a remarkable and ver y early instanc e of a European
government applyin g pressur e i n th e internationa l aren a o n behal f o f it s Jews . Th e
document also mark s the beginning of a consistent an d definite Jewish policy on the par t
of th e Dutc h authorities. 76 The Unite d Province s refuse d t o accept tha t i t "Portugues e
citizens shoul d b e treate d differentl y tha n it s othe r subjects . Good s pertainin g t o
"marchons de la nation portugaise residens a Amsterdam", wen t th e text , had latel y bee n
seized a t Oport o an d Madeir a "sans que leurs facteurs, come estons soubs l'obéissance du
Roy d'Espagne, les osent défendre ou en procurer. . .la restitution par crainte de l'In-
quisition"; i t wa s urge d tha t thi s wa s contrar y t o th e term s o f th e truce , tha t th e kin g
promptly release the goods and money involved and tha t "durant la tresve, leurs marchons
ne soyent arrestes, detenus ou molestes en aucune manière que ce soyt en leurs personnes ou
biens".
Dutch-Iberian trade , whateve r Dutc h wa r propagandist s migh t clai m later , wa s stil l
expanding o n the eve of the expiry of the truce. Dutie s collected on goods passing throug h
the grea t nort h Spanis h port s o f Bilba o an d Sa n Sebastián , a t Vitoria , th e principa l
customs-house fo r th e nort h coast, ros e eac h yea r fro m 161 7 to 162 0 from just unde r 27
million maravedís to ove r 3 4 million, th e equivalen t of 272,000 guilders. 77 Nevertheless,
even befor e Augus t 1620 , when th e Dutch admiralt y college s began warning merchant s
that maritime communications were likely to be disrupted from Apri l 1621 78 adjustments
in preparation fo r a drastic dislocation of trade were being made and b y none mor e tha n
the Dutch Jews a group almost totally dependent on Iberian and Ibero-American activity.
They recollected , i n some cases from persona l experience , ho w Philip Ill's embargoes, i n
the years 1598-1606 , had paralyze d their commerce . Then , however , the effect ha d bee n
essentially marginal since the Dutch Sephardi m ha d bee n so few and thei r activity small.
The prospec t o f Spanis h embargoe s i n 162 1 was immeasurably mor e threatening . Bet -
ween 161 8 and 1623 , there occurred a considerable migratio n of Dutch Sephardim t o th e
Hanseatic town s of North German y an d especiall y Hamburg 79 whic h ma y perhaps b e
seen as a parrallel to the sudden inclination of such figures as Manuel Mendes Cardoso to
75
Cellorigo . Alegación, fo. 8; ACS Est. 2305, "Avissos de Amsterdam", 4 Oct. 1618 : "Los judíos de aquí
tienen avisso. . .de l a prission q s e ha hech o por l a Inquisició n d e veinte seis cassas (de Oporto ) en q
dicen avia mucha hazienda destos judios, el magistrado desta villa escrive a su Magd. suplicándole se la
mande bolber; en manos destos judios esta mucha hazienda de los q ay en Spaña"; probably there is a
connection betwee n this sweep in Portuga l and th e Inquisitio n visitation to Bahi a i n 1618-1 9 during
which ninety conversos were denounced, Wiznitzer, op. cit., 36-42.
76
AG S Est. 2306. Albert to Philip III. Terburen, 9 Nov. 1618; Resoluiiën der Staten Generaal, 1617-18, no.
3634, 20 Oct. 1618.
77
AG S Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, leg. 1950, section i, "Relación de los libros de las aduanas tocantes
a la quenta de los diezmos del mar de Castilla," (16Í7-26).
78
Resoluiiën van de Staten va n Holland, 1620 , p. 187 , 20 Aug. 1620.
79
Koen , "Notarial Deeds, " Stadia Rosenth., v. 120n, vii, 27In, x, 223n; Kellenbenz, Sephardim, 257-9.
Spain an d the Dutch Sephardirn 37 1
return to the peninsula. Duarte Fernandes ' son Gabriel Lopes settled in Hamburg in 161 8
and h e himself followed, with much of the rest of his family in 1620 . Sebastián Núñe z lef t
Amsterdam fo r Hamburg apparently in 1623 . Duarte Esteves da Pina moved to Hamburg
in 1618 , Pedro and Duart e Palacios in 161 9 and Manue l Mendes d e Castro between 161 9
and 1623 . Diogo da Silva took his capital and Lisbo n connections to Gliickstadt, where the
king of Denmark wa s offering th e Portuguese Jews favourable terms. Duarte Pereira lef t
Amsterdam in 1621 , though it is not known where to. Between 1619 , when the number was
already swollen by recent arrivals from Holland , an d 1623 , the list of Sephardi depositor s
with the Hamburg Ban k lengthened fro m twenty-eigh t to forty-three. 80
The setback , whe n i t came , wa s a s abrup t an d sever e a s ha d bee n feare d an d o f
unprecedented scope and duration . Wit h th e expiry o f the Spanish-Dutch truce , ende d
the first, and until 1646 , when the Spanish embargoe s bega n to be lifted, the only phase of
growth in the worldly activity of the Dutch Sephardirn. The Jewish year 538 1 marked the
commencement o f a socia l catastrophe . Althoug h th e lan d wa r i n th e Lo w Countrie s
began only in the late summer of 1621, the economic conflict began on the very day of the
expiry, 9 April. 81 During th e weeks before this date, ever y viceroy, captain-general an d
corregidor fro m Lisbo n t o Naples an d fro m Osten d t o Ora n wa s instructed to forc e th e
departure of Dutch ships and cargoe s by 9 April and seiz e every Dutc h asset that cam e
into thei r hands thereafter . Trade between th e United Provinces and th e Spanish empir e
in Europe and North Africa wa s totally prohibited except for inland river and canal traffi c
between th e Norther n an d Souther n Netherlands . O n an d aroun d 9 April , a massiv e
exodus of Dutch shipping from ports under Spanish rule took place. At San Sebastián, the
entire Dutc h contingen t lef t e n masse on 9 April. 82 Withi n thre e days , forty-one Dutc h
vessels departe d fro m th e coas t o f th e viceroyalt y o f Valenci a alone . Despit e ampl e
warning, severa l Dutc h Jewish merchant s wer e caugh t ou t b y the sudde n severanc e of
maritime links . The first Dutch ship that entered Sa n Sebastián afte r th e imposition of the
embargoes, seize d o n 1 4 April, was carrying good s despatche d b y Amsterdam Jew s for
Enrique Mendes , Francisc o d e Mezquit a an d othe r merchant s o f Madrid. 83 A Mon -
nikendam vessel , chartere d b y Amsterda m Jew s t o carr y grai n fro m Sicil y t o Lisbon ,
having taken on grai n in Sicily, missed th e dead-line owin g to contrary winds and, to the
consternation o f the charterers, returne d with its Sicilian cargo to the Zuider Zee.84
The obvious response to the Spanish embargoes was to seek to evade the m by diverting
Dutch Jewis h trad e throug h intermediarie s at Hamburg , London , Bayonn e an d othe r
ports. Th e mov e o f Dutc h Sephardi m t o Hambur g an d Gliickstad t indee d does no t
necessarily impl y loss of trade to Amsterdam and Rotterdam , for if they were to continue
their Iberia n an d Ibero-America n trad e a t all , an d the y had nothin g else o f any signifi -
cance, th e Dutc h Jew s wer e no w force d t o sprea d ou t a wid e ne t o f correspondents .
8(1
Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 258.
81
AG S Est . 2139. Philip IV to Fadrique de Toledo, 1 0 Apr. 1621.
82
AG S Guerr a 873 . Alcalde of San Sebastián to Philip III, 14 Apr. 1621.
83
ibid .
84
Algemee n Rijksarchief, Th e Hague , (hereafter ARA) (Admiraliteiten) (Verzameling) Bis(dom) vol. 48,
ii. fos. 93-5.
Hamburg moreover , wa s i n thi s respec t particularl y suitable , fo r i t wa s evidentl y th e
Spanish strateg y t o divert the carryin g trad e i n Balti c grain, timbe r and coppe r wit h th e
peninsula fro m Holland , t o the only feasible alternative , the Hanseatic towns . Except in
the cas e o f Emde n which , bein g unde r Dutc h occupation , wa s included i n th e embar -
goes,85 Hanseatic business with both Spai n an d Portuga l no w began t o increase specta -
cularly.86 Large convoys , usuall y of from fort y t o fifty vessels, sailed regularl y each yea r
from Hamburg, chiefly for Sanlúcar, Málaga and Lisbon, throughout the 1620 s and 1630s ,
and ther e wa s a substantia l additiona l traffi c fro m Lübeck , Glückstadt, Friedrichstadt ,
Stettin an d Danzi g itself . However , large thoug h thi s traffi c was , i t wa s nowher e nea r
adequate t o compensat e fo r th e absenc e o f th e Dutch , eve n a s regard s th e mos t vita l
materials, fo r th e Hanseati c town s simply di d no t posses s enoug h shipping , and sever e
shortages o f timber, copper an d grai n i n the peninsula an d souther n Ital y quickly deve -
loped. Despit e this , Amsterdam Jews, through their brethren in Hamburg, were in a good
position t o exploit th e opportunity and althoug h Madrid was demanding that all cargoe s
from Germany, as from Flanders , England an d France, be accompanied by testimonials,
signed b y magistrates o f the city administrations, certifying tha t those despatching goods
had validly sworn before them that such goods neither originated in, nor were owned by or
bought from persons resident in the republic, provision of these certificates, at least in th e
early years, was reassuringly lax.87 In 1622 , Jorge Rodrigues da Costa, a converso arrested
in Lisbon for violating the ban on trade with Holland, was found to have in his possession
a letter fro m Duart e Esteve s da Pin a a t Hambur g revealin g that th e latter had a n orde r
from th e Hamburg senate that the city's magistrates were to sign the necessary certificates
for him without an y oath being taken. 88 However, Spanish ministers , only too well awar e
of the deficiencies of their system, strove to tighten it. Observers were sent to the Hanseati c
towns. Fro m 1627 , ther e wa s increasin g Spanish-Danis h co-operation , especiall y a t
Glückstadt, which , becaus e o f the l a tier's location, als o affecte d Hamburg . From 1628 ,
Madrid insisted that cargoes from North Germany b e accompanied by testimonials issued
within a ne w framewor k o f check s supervise d b y th e Spanis h residen t o n th e Nort h
German coast , Gabrie l d e Roy. These additiona l restrictions were widely blamed i n th e
peninsula, b y critic s o f royal policy, 89 fo r th e furthe r contractio n i n Iberia n trad e afte r
85
Henc e th e virtua l absenc e of Sephardi m a t Emde n i n th e 1620 s whe n thei r activit y i n othe r North
German towns was growing so rapidly, AGS Est. 2645, consulta 27 Nov. 1621; B . Hagedorn. Ostfries-
lands Handel und Schiffahrt vom Ausgang des 16 Jahrhunderts bis zum Westfalischen f rieden
(1580-1648) (Berlin, 1912 ) pp. 435, 493, 500-4.
89
A.,]urg,ens.ZurSchleswig-HolsteinischenHandelsgeschichle. 16. und 17. Jahrhundens (Berlin, 1914 ) pp.
197,203-7.
87
AG S Est. 2036 consulta, 6 July 1622.
88
AG S Est . 2847. Fernando Alvia d e Castro to Philip III, Libón, 1 9 Sep. 1622 and enclose d copy of th e
letter fro m Esteve s d a Pina , sayin g tha t h e wa s sendin g good s despatche d b y a corresponden t in
Holland "aunqu e todo va e n m i nombre y en las certificaciones dicen lo mismo y certifican qu e y o lo
jure solemnemente , yo teng o orde n e n est e senado para m e ta s da r ans i si n l o jurar n i hace r ta l
juramento y aunque me costo algo aver esto..."
89
Fo r some bitter criticism of Spanish pressure in North Germany, see Brit. Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005, fo. 26
et seq, "Cavsas por donde creció el comercio de Olanda."
1627 an d althoug h Hambur g activit y in th e peninsul a remaine d a t a much highe r leve l
than i n th e perio d befor e 1621 , until th e 1640s , ther e wa s nevertheles s a recessio n
accompanied b y th e driftin g bac k o f a fe w Hambur g Sephardim , suc h a s Duart e d e
Palacios and Francisc o Gomes da Costa, to Amsterdam during the later 1620s. 90
Besides using intermediaries at, and dubious certificates from, Hamburg and elsewhere
outside th e republic , i t wa s stil l possible , afte r 1621 , to sustai n som e trad e wit h th e
peninsula fro m Holland, usin g Dutch ships, though only with a measure of disguise. The
carrying of Setubal salt by the Dutch to Holland an d the Baltic, which was especially vital
to the republic in view of the Spanish success in the early 1620 s in establishing forts in the
Caribbean whic h prevented th e Dutch from agai n exploiting the American salt-pan s that
they ha d turne d t o i n 1598 , was continued fo r a fe w years using French an d especiall y
Scottish crews and documents. 91 There were many lax officials i n the peninsula who could
be persuaded , wit h bribes , t o clos e thei r eye s t o suc h infiltration . Yet, her e again , a n
intensification i n the Spanis h pressur e is discernible, especially from 1623 . In November
1623, took place what was perhaps the most sensational step: i n an attempt to intimidate
neutral shippers and uncover th e secret correspondents of the Dutch in the peninsula, an
"embargo generaf wa s declared o n the same day, throughout Andalusia and Portugal , in
which 16 6 neutral ship s wer e seize d an d systematicall y searched. 92 Confiscation s an d
arrests followed and i n some cases seemed t o confirm the suspicions of ministers, such as
the duque del Infantado, that Dutch Jews and peninsula converses were playing a leading
part i n efforts t o evade th e Spanis h system . At Malaga , for example, two St Malo vessels
were found to have large consignments of Dutch cloth aboard and 20,000 reales in forged
coinage, remitted via St Malo by Jeronimo and Duart e Rodriguez Mendez of Amsterdam
while a Glawegian shi p was held for having brought timber from Amsterdam forwarded
by Antonio Cardoso. 93 Among four merchants arrested at thi s time at Malaga for having
had dealing s wit h th e Dutc h on e was Irish while three were Portuguese converse corre -
spondents of Cardoso an d other Amsterdam Jews.
Gradually, mor e stringen t boardin g an d inspectio n procedure s fo r neutra l shipping
were introduced, eve n in relatively remote areas such as Galicia94 and regions with strong
local privilege s suc h a s Valencia. I n 1624 , the crow n set up th e almirantazgo (admiralt y
college) of Seville with jurisdiction over all the Andalusian ports and a formidable body of
customs officers . Prosecution s fo r commercia l offense s wer e remove d fro m th e
competence of ordinary courts and placed unde r that of a new board whic h was far more
90
Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 259.
91
Le s Sources Inedites d e 1'Histoire du Maroc ser . ii. Archives des Pays-Ba s ed. H . d e Castrie s 6 vols.
(Paris-The Hague, 1906-23 ) iii, 261-4, 363.
92
Th e largest group in Andalusia, forty-four ships, were embargoed at Sanlucar, AGS Contaduria Mayor
2267, no. 1 0 "Instruction y orden"; V. Rau. A Exp!orat;ao e o Comercio do Salde Selubal(Lisbon, 1951 )
p. 165 ; H . Kellenbenz . Unternehmerkrafte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625
(Hamburg, 1954 ) p. 39.
93
AG S Guerra 890 . Pedro de Arze, undated memorandum, Malaga , Nov. 1623: ibid, 894. Pedro de Arze
to Olivares, Malaga, 2 Nov. 1623.
94
AG S Guerr a 898. Captain-general of Galicia to Philip III, Corunna, 26 May 1623 ; ibid, 901, captain-
general to Philip, 19 Feb. 1624.
95
stringent, know n a s th e junta d e almirantazgo, se t up a t Madrid . A larg e numbe r o f
protests were made by the city councils of such ports as Seville, Cádiz, and Málaga a t what
they considered t o be the disastrou s effect o f these measures o n trade, bu t th e crown was
not to be deflected from its course either by the fact that it could not hope to suppress illicit
activity completely, or by the disgruntlement in the ports, or by the massive fail in customs
revenues whic h wa s the inevitabl e consequenc e of its policy. Despit e a really enormous
increase i n th e numbe r o f English , Scottish, Frenc h an d Germa n ship s sailin g t o th e
Spanish nort h coast in the 1620s , receipts a t Vitoria fell fro m ove r 29 million maravedís in
1621 to onl y 1 7 million, or exactl y hal f the figur e fo r 1620 , b y 1628 , as Dutc h shipping ,
previously dominant all but disappeared fro m th e trade. 96
The result s o f th e embargo general, a s ha s bee n said , tende d t o confir m Spanis h
ministers in attributing a special rôle to the Dutch Jew s and thei r converso correspondents
in Dutc h effort s t o evade th e embargoes. I f the Dutc h Sephardi m wer e more dependen t
than Dutc h merchant s generall y o n Iberia n trade , the y were also thereb y compelled t o
strive harder t o salvage what they could an d undoubtedly ha d a bette r chanc e o f succe-
eding owing to their exceptionally elaborate, resilien t and well-concealed networ k of links
with the peninsula. Thi s applie d t o Andalusia, Portugal , Galicia and th e Atlantic islands
and also to north-east Castile where Spanish official s located on e of the most troublesome
contraband system s i n th e persisten t seepag e o f Dutc h textiles , East Indi a spice s an d
forged coinag e fro m the Frenc h borde r port s o f Bayonne and S t Jean d e Luz , overland
through th e viceroy ally of Navarre, where Spanish authority wa s markedly weaker tha n in
Castile, and via the puertos secos between Navarre and Castile, and Aragon an d Castile, to
Madrid, Segovia an d Valladolid . As early as May, the administrador of the customs dutie s
on the Basque coast alerte d th e consejo d e Guerra that Dutch cloth, unloaded at Bayonne,
was reaching Castile vi a Pamplon a an d th e puertos secos, but i t was in September 1621 ,
that thi s official firs t suggeste d tha t th e syste m wa s essentially th e wor k of "Portugues e
merchants i n Holland an d a t Bayonne", for it was they who had a n arrangement with the
arrendadores who collected the duties at Úiepuertos secos who were, as he pointed out , "of
the sam e nation". 97 Th e vicero y o f Navarr e confirme d tha t Pamplon a ha d becom e a
major loophol e i n th e embargoes. 98 I n 1622 , the counci l o f Financ e despatche d a com-
missioner to Navarre an d th e puertos secos who reporte d tha t between August 162 1 and
May 1622 , not les s that twenty-tw o Dutch vessel s had unloade d cargoe s fo r Castile, sen t
mainly by "Portuguese merchant s who reside at Amsterdam and Rotterdam" t o Bayonne
95
On e almirantazgo magistrate was said to have dealt with three hundred cases without once ever passing
judgment in favour o f the défendent, Brit . Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005 "Cavsas por donde", fo. 5.
96
AG S Contaduría Mayor, 1950, sec. i.
97
AG S Est . 2139. consulta of consejo d e guerra , 23 Jul. 162 1 an d Migue l d e Manchól a t o Phiii p IV , 24
Sep. 1621 ; see also Manchóla to Philip. 29 Oct. 1621 and 22 Apr. 1622 in which he touches on the same
theme, saying in the former , "ningú n genero de gente basallos de V. Magd. se atrevieran e n pasar las
dichas mercadurías sino es la nación portuguesa".
98
ibid , Viceroy of Navarre to Philip, Pamplona, 1 5 Sep. 1621 .
and S t Jea n wher e "Portuguese " correspondents , notabl y Alvar o an d Jacom e Luis, "
provided the m with the necessary false seals and papers and sent them t o Madrid throug h
Navarre an d the puertos secos, especially Logrono , Agreda an d Cervera, in collusion wit h
the "Portuguese " arrendador, Jua n Nune z d e Vega, 100 an d hi s brother-in-law , Manue l
Nunez de Olivera, who farmed the duties. Eight more Dutch ships were reported t o have
unloaded merchandis e fo r Castil e i n an d nea r Bayonn e betwee n Ma y an d Septembe r
1622.101 Prosecutions followe d th e investigations, officials were brought fro m the Basqu e
ports to check procedure s a t the puertos secos, 102 and the viceroys of Navarre and Arago n
were instructe d t o redoubl e thei r effort s t o clos e th e loophole . Neverthless , ther e i s
evidence tha t th e rout e fro m Bayonn e remaine d a ke y contraband channel . I n 1628 , a
valuable consignmen t o f Dutc h good s despatche d t o Fernand o Montezinos, 103 Jorg e
Enriquez and othe r converses of Madrid was seized b y almirantazgo officials in Navarr e
producing a cas e i n th e almirantazgo cour t i n Madri d wit h 100,00 0 ducat s wort h o f
merchandise a t stake. Montezinos and Enrique z successfully offered 20,000 ducats to the
crown a s a n indemnit y i n retur n fo r suspensio n o f th e case. 104 I n 1630 , th e junta d e
almirantazgo receive d a repor t statin g tha t fro m tw o t o thre e millio n ducat s wort h o f
Dutch good s wer e entering Castile yearly , via Navarre an d Vizcaya , causing a consider -
able loss of silver by the same route,105 an assertion made the more credible by news of the
sinking i n Februar y o f tha t year , b y roya l warships , o f a Dutc h vesse l sailin g fro m
Bayonne for Holland carryin g 100,00 0 ducat s i n silver and 400 sacks of Castilian wool. 106
Possibly eve n mor e crucia l fo r the Dutch Sephardi m tha n th e situation i n Spain itself
was that in Portugal, the very heart of their commercial world. Here, it must be concede d
99
Alvar o "Luiz" o f Bayonn e is mentioned as a corresponden t o f Amsterdam Jews in G . Nahon , "Les
Rapports de s Communaute s judeo-portugaises d e Franc e ave c celle d'Amsterda m a u 17 e et a u 18e
siecles", Sludia Rosenth., \ , 44 ; a questio n tha t Naho n doe s no t touc h on , bu t whic h i s raised i n
Manchola's despatches, is whether Dutch Jews were settling in and near Bayonne at this time especially
to by-pass the Spanish embargoes, it being highly likely that they were; Cisneros, in his valuable survey
of the Sephard i communities in France , shows how great was their concentration in the 1630 s on th e
Franco-Spanish frontier : h e estimates that there were then 60 converso families at Bayonne , over 40 at
Peyrehorade, 1 0 or 1 2 at Da x an d n o less than 80 at Labastide-Clairenc e while there were only 40 a t
Bordeaux, 1 0 or 1 2 at Paris , 20 at Roue n and les s than ten at Nantes, Cisneros, op. cit., Brit. Mus. Mss.
Eg. 343, fo. 259.
100
Nune z de Veg a had live d for many years in Vitoria when he receive d his contract in 162 0 to farm th e
puertos secos for the decade 162 1 -30 after considerabl e hesitation by the consejo d e hacienda due t o his
being a Portuguese converso, AGS Haciend a 592, consulta 24 Jul. 1622.
101
AG S Haciend a 592 consulta, 3 1 Oct. 1622.
102
ibid , "ultimamente se pussieron por mandado de V.M. en los dichos puertos secos aduanas de diezmos
de l a ma r co n qu e n o s e atrebe n co n tant a liberta d y desorden a mete r po r ali i la s mercaduria s de
contrabando".
103
se e Caro Baroja, LosJuctios, ii , 113 .
104
AG S Haciend a 656, consullas 1 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1629.
105
AG S Haciend a 664, consulta 1 5 Sep. 1630.
lm
AG S Est. 2044 consulta, 28 Feb. 1630 , "Hortuno de Urizar avisa.. .que algunas vezes ha representad o
a V. Mag. quan importante seria cerrar aquel passo a olandeses porque negocian por el muy en grueso
por medio de lo s Portugueses que reside n en Olanda los quales tienen hecha poblacion e n Francia d e
los de su nacion para y r metiendo de man o en mano en Espana las mercaderias de las islas rebeldes".
that administrative conditions were quite different fro m i n Castile or even southern Italy,
for Portugues e officials wer e notoriously slac k in implementing orders fro m Madrid . Yet,
in fact , a point which needs emphasis, developments i n Portugal did match those in Spain
and souther n Italy . Aware that it s economic strategy could no t work effectivel y withou t
disrupting Dutc h trad e with Portugal, and throug h Portugal with Brazil, the crown too k
the unprecedente d step , i n 1623 , of sending Castilia n commissioners t o th e Portugues e
ports placin g the m unde r th e jurisdictio n no t o f th e counci l o f Portugal , bu t o f th e
Castilian counci l o f War. Dieg o Lópe z d e Har o wh o introduced th e new boarding an d
inspection procedure s a t Lisbo n an d Setúba l reporte d b y Ma y 1623 , afte r a roun d o f
arrests and confiscations , tha t th e Dutch, wit h thei r false papers and Scottis h crews , ha d
been force d t o give up Lisbo n an d wer e abandoning th e salt-pans, though h e concede d
that in the north at Oporto, Vian a and Aveiro the situation was much less satisfactory.107 It
is probable tha t th e embargoes indee d remaine d a t their weakest i n Northern Portugal ,
and th e Azores and Madeira , though Castilian officier s wer e also used in those regions at
least at intervals. 108 At Lisbon and Setubal , on th e other hand , a severe depression se t in
which wa s t o las t fo r mor e tha n tw o decades , unti l afte r th e Portugues e secessio n i n
December 164 0 whic h cleare d th e wa y fo r a reviva l i n Dutch-Portugues e trade . Th e
Lisbon cit y counci l complaine d incessantl y abou t th e Castilia n custom s officer s who m
they blamed fo r the withering away of the city's trade with Northern Europe 109 and ther e
is no reason t o doubt tha t the catastrophic contractio n i n Lisbon's commerc e fro m 162 1
which accordin g t o on e accoun t produced a fal l i n th e dutie s collected a t th e Lisbo n
alfôndiga fro m 500,000 to 60,000 ducats annually,110 was largely due to the embargoes. At
Faro, the heart of the Algarve, Inquisition records show that there was almost a complete
absence o f Dutch shipping from th e port fo r two decades afte r 162 1 and althoug h ther e
was a large increase in neutral, especially Hanseatic shipping, this matched only a fractio n
of the Dutch traffic tha t was absent.111 Of course, contraband trade continued if it did no t
thrive. In July 1627 , word from Amsterdam disclosed that two ships were then being made
ready ther e fo r Faro , on e b y Juan d e Har o fo r his correspondent Manoe l Mendes , th e
other by Pedro Homem for Pedro Machado, both vessels being provided with false papers
of Danzig. 112 A t th e sam e time , Antoni o Martin s Vega was reported t o be charterin g a
Hamburg vessel likewise for the Algarve while in 1628 , Castilian officials discovere d tha t
Francisco d e Cáceres a t Oport o ha d fo r som e tim e bee n importin g quantities of Dutc h
bays. But obviously thi s activity amounted scarcely t o a trickle of what had gon e before.
Furthermore, wit h th e bulk of their Portuguese trade, the Dutch Jews also lost their main
1U7
AG S Guerr a 898 . López de Har o t o consejo, 1 9 May, 1 2 Aug. and 2 3 Sep. 1623 ; Brit. Mus . Mss. Eg .
1135, fo. 199v .
108
AG S Est . 2646 . consullas, 2 7 Jan, 24 Feb . an d 2 2 Mar . 1628 ; early i n 1628 , Castilian offciers wer e
investigating in the Oporto regio n and a t Faro simultaneously.
109
Elementos para a Historia de Lisboa éd. E. Freiré de Oliveira 6 vols. (Lisbon, 1882-91) iii, 154, 417,450,
525 567, iv, 145 ; Rau, A Explorac'ao, 174 .
110
Brit . Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005 , "Cavsas por donde" , fo . 4.
111
V . Rau, "Subsides para o estudo do movimento dos portos d e Faro e Lisboa durante o século xvii" ,
Anais da Academia Portuguesa de Historia 2n d ser . v (1954) pp. 219-27 .
112
AG S Est. 2319, "Aviso de Amsterdam de 21 Julio 1627" .
link with Brazil, for like other Dutch and Hamburg merchants they had trade d with Brazil
principally throug h Lisbo n an d Oporto . I n Holland , th e suga r trad e slumpe d whil e i n
Brazil, cu t off from th e Dutch refineries and market , the conversos were likewise severely
hit.113
The collaps e o f Dutch-Jewish trad e with Brazil was paralleled, o n a lesser scale , by the
setback elsewher e in th e Americas . Durin g th e truc e years , ther e ha d bee n a persisten t
interest in Spanish Americ a in the United Provinces, sometimes stimulate d b y Amsterdam
Jews with specific knowledge and experience o f the Spanish Colonies, an d from 1621 , with
the settin g u p o f th e Wes t Indi a Company , th e republi c openl y challenge d Spai n fo r
domination o f the Ne w World. The Spanis h repl y was a programme o f customs reform ,
tightening o f commercial controls, and construction effort s fro m Mexico to the Rio de la
Plata. If the 1620 s were characterized by a major effort t o strengthen administratio n i n the
peninsula, equally the y produce d a forceful attemp t t o increase the royal grip over th e
American empire an d reduce illicit commerce. In Mexico, the marqués de Gelves (viceroy,
1621-4), initiate d reform s wit h exceptiona l vigou r an d a particula r determinatio n t o
improve check s i n th e port s an d restric t th e rôl e o f th e Portugues e conversos. 11* I n th e
Caribbean, the scheme of fortifying th e salt-pans, to prevent th e Dutch from taking their
urgently-needed sal t from there, worked well especially at the key pans at Punta de Araya
on th e Venezuela n coast. 115 O n th e Ri o d e l a Plata , thoug h th e counci l o f th e Indie s
blocked the attemp t o f the supreme counci l of the Inquisition to establish an Inquisitio n
tribunal, as a check specifically to the "New Christian s of the Hebrew nation of the realms
of Portugal" , o n th e ground s tha t i t wa s unnecessar y an d woul d b e to o costly, 116 ne w
administrative an d fisca l machiner y wa s establishe d a t Bueno s Aires and , i n 1623 , a t
Córdoba, whic h blocke d muc h o f th e contraban d trad e betwee n Uppe r Per u an d th e
South Atlanti c pushin g Bueno s Aire s int o a shar p recession. 117 A s always , during th e
ascendancy o f Olivares , th e crow n wa s markedly more concerne d t o regulat e the com -
mercial tha n the religious activity of the conversos.
The Spanis h economi c warfar e against the republic reached its height during the years
1625-9 when th e syste m o f embargoe s wa s expande d furthe r t o includ e a ba n o n com -
munications an d trad e vi a th e inlan d waterways, the binnenstromen, linking Dutch ter -
ritory with th e Spanish Netherland s and th e adjoining areas of Germany under Spanis h
occupation. This include d a blockad e o n th e Lowe r Rhine, cut b y Spanish garrison s a t
Rheinberg and Wesel , on the Lippe, Ems and above all on the Scheldt.118 From July 1625,
fleets of barges were turned back fro m Antwer p causing utter disruption in the economi c
113
Evald o Cabrai de Mello . Olinda Restaurada. Guerra e Acucar no Nordeste, 1630-54 (Sao Paulo , 1975)
pp. 53-6 .
114
J . I . Israel. Race, Class and Polines in Colonial Mexico, 1610-1670 (Oxford, 1975 ) pp. 123 , 136-8.
115
C . Goslinga. Th e Dutch in the Caribbean andón th e WildCoast, 1580-1680( Assen, 1971 ) pp. 127-36 .
116
I n June 1623 , the Inquisitio n was pressing for a tribunal to "atacar (quant o fuera possible ) la entrada y
comunicación que los christianos nuevos de la nación hebrea de los reynos de Portugal hazen por via de
Buenos Aires", Brit . Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fo. 98.
117
A . P. Canabrava. O Comercio Portugués no Rio da Praia, 1580-1640 (Sao Paulo, 1944) pp. 144-9 .
118
Lieuw e van Aitzama. Historie of Verhael van Saken va n Staet en Oorlogh 1 4 vols. (The Hague, 1667-71 )
ii, 75-9; Alcalá-Zamora, op. cit., 184-6 .
life of the Lo w Countries an d dealin g ye t another damaging blow t o the Dutch Sephar -
dim, fo r busines s relation s betwee n th e Antwer p conversos and Jew s o f Hollan d ha d
flourished o n variou s levels . Sinc e 1621 , th e Antwer p Portugues e ha d bee n unabl e t o
charter Dutc h ship s throug h factor s i n Holland , no r could Dutc h ship s ente r Flemis h
ports, bu t vi a the binnenstromen the y could stil l import sugar, spices, wines and oliv e oil ,
engage in insurance dealings and remi t silver . Then suddenly , i n July 1625 , followin g a
decision i n Madrid, thi s trade collapsed. No t only could Antwer p no longer import fro m
and expor t t o th e republic , bu t eve n insuranc e an d bankin g transaction s an d ordinar y
correspondence wer e forbidde n an d considerabl y affected. 119 Th e importin g o f suga r
from Hollan d b y th e Antwer p Portuguese virtually ceased. 120 For nearl y five years, th e
Dutch Sephardim, already stripped of their Iberian and Ibero-America n commerce, ha d
also, at least partly, to do without their Antwerp connections.
The combine d impac t of the measures i n th e peninsula, southern Italy , North Africa ,
the Americas and the Spanish Netherlands from 162 1 was such that the economic rôle an d
resources o f the Dutch Sephardim wer e inevitably and for a long period severel y curtailed.
Between 162 0 and 1625 , th e numbe r o f Jewish depositor s wit h th e Amsterda m Wissel -
bank, Europe' s foremost financia l institution , fel l spectacularly, by more than 25%, fro m
106 to seventy-six.121 In the years 1625-7 , helped b y the deterioration in North Germany ,
there was a measure o f recovery t o ninety-two, but four years later, as the trade depression
deepened, th e figure was again lower at eighty-nine. By 1631, the proportion of deposits a t
Amsterdam held by Jews had fallen from nearly 9% to 7%.122 Furthermore, whil e the firs t
decade o f th e Spanish-Dutc h wa r cause d th e Dutc h Jew s a shar p setback , th e secon d
brought n o improvement i n nominal term s whatsoever and a furthe r declin e i n relativ e
importance i n whic h the proportio n o f Jewish account s fel l fro m 7 % to just unde r 6% .
Apart fro m th e liftin g o f th e rive r blockade i n th e Lo w Countries i n 1629 , the Spanis h
pressure wa s sustained relentlessly through th e 1630 s and th e outbrea k o f war betwee n
Spain and Franc e i n 1635 greatly added t o the difficulties o f the Dutch Jews by cutting all
links acros s th e frontera d e Francia. Two decade s afte r th e impositio n o f th e Spanis h
embargoes b y 1641 , the number of Jewish bank accounts at Amsterdam still stood a t only
eighty-nine, clea r testimon y to the continuing severit y o f the slump , but , b y then , ther e
was at least the promise of recovery in the recent breaking-away of Portugal from Spain .
Within a few years, a s the Dutch, with their lower freight rates, pushed asid e their English
and Hanseati c competitor s an d agai n crowde d th e port s o f Portugal , th e losse s o f th e
Dutch Sephardim sinc e 162 0 were mad e good . By 1646, the numbe r o f Jewish deposits ,
nearly all of which were still Sephardi, at last exceeded tha t for 1620 , standing at 126 . But
119
AC S Est. 2316. Cueva to Philip IV , 27 Mar and 23 Apr. 1626.
120
H . Pohl, "Die Zuckereinfuh r nac h Antwerpen duren portugiesische Kaufleute wàhrend des 80 jàhrigen
Krieges", Jahrbuchfür Geschichte von Slaat, Wiríschaft und Gesellschaft Laieinamerikas iv, 355-8; on e
large sugar consignment for Antwerp turned back on the Scheldt in 1625 was sent by Sebastian Mende s
Pimentel, ARA A t Zeeland 2455, 26 Nov. 1625.
m
J . G . va n Dillen , "Vreemdelinge n t e Amsterda m i n d e eerst e helf t de r zeventiend e eeuw . I : D e
Portugeese Joden" , Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 50 (1935) p. 14 ; Kellenbenz. Sephardim, 255 .
122
Va n Dillen, op. cit.; the total number of accounts at the Wisselbank increased by 14 6 from 120 2 to 134 8
in the perio d 1620-31 .
what coul d no t b e recovere d wa s th e los t quarte r o f a centur y an d th e innumerabl e
opportunities fo r growth of which Dutch Sephardi Jewry had bee n deprived .
During th e second Spanish-Dutc h war, the Dutch States-General , anxiou s at the eco -
nomic recession tha t resulted and th e attendant fall i n its own revenues,123 generally took
what actio n i t coul d t o mitigat e th e effect s o f th e Spanis h measure s eve n wher e thi s
conflicted wit h th e demand s o f war . Th e Dutc h authoritie s permitte d th e suppl y o f
foodstuffs, horse s an d timbe r t o th e Spanis h Netherlands , excep t a t relativel y brie f
intervals, during crucial sieges and campaigns. Restrictions on trade to the peninsula were
likewise kept to a minimum: under the ban of April 1622 , which repeated th e terms of the
edict of 1603 , only the supply of arms, munitions, copper, sails, masts larger than a certain
size, and Dutc h grai n t o Spain, Portuga l and southern Ital y was forbidden;124 th e expor t
of othe r manufactures , Baltic grain an d mos t timbe r wa s allowed . It wa s howeve r als o
forbidden to insure ships and cargoes belongin g to subjects of the king of Spain or freigh t
such cargoe s i n Dutc h vessels. 125 Despit e th e generall y helpfu l attitud e o f th e Dutc h
authorities, th e Jew s experienced certai n specia l difficultie s i n obtaining States-Genera l
support i n the face of Spanish pressur e precisely because of the exceptional degree of their
involvement in peninsula commerc e which meant that their needs tended t o conflict bot h
with necessitie s o f war and , n o les s important in th e Dutc h politica l arena , th e require -
ments of certain mor e powerfu l groups, notably the West India Company an d privateer -
ing interests. Shortly after the end of the truce, ten Amsterdam Portuguese appealed t o the
States of Holland tha t they had sent cargoes to Brazil and were expecting their returns via
Portugal requesting safe-guard s should their sugar and Brazil wood be captured by Dutch
warships or privateers. 126 The State s of Holland resolve d not to press th e States-Genera l
to lay down a guide-Line at that stage, but t o proceed a s cases arose. In January 1622 , the
Amsterdam cit y council approache d th e State s o f Holland and , throug h th e latter , th e
States-General o n behal f o f Toma s Nune s d a Pin a wh o wa s contestin g 12 4 chests o f
captured sugar which had been brought into Rotterdam.127 The future of the Dutch Brazil
trade vi a Portugal 128 wa s a t stak e an d becam e th e subjec t o f som e intens e discussio n
among th e Dutch authoritie s fo r some tim e with considerable sympath y bein g shown t o
the Jew s especiall y b y Amsterdam . However , interest s oppose d t o thos e o f th e Jew s
proved to o strong politically. Th e States-Genera l refuse d t o sanction trad e in Portugues e
123
O n th e fallin g yiel d of the duties on Dutc h trade in the 1620s , see F. Snapper. Oorlogsinvloeden op de
overzeese handel va n Holland, 1551-1719 (Amsterdam, 1959) pp. 70-1.
124
AR A Bis . 49i, fo. 64; Aitzema, Van Slael en Oorlogh, i, 374-5; th e forbidde n masts were "masten di k
zynde zestien palmen en daer boven" .
125
A s Aitzema puts it, "Item va n eenige Spaensche Goederen oft e koopmanschappe n d'Ondersate n van
de Co. van Spagnien toebehoorende in hare schepe n op vrachte ofte andersin s niet te mogen laden. .
.Desgelijcx i s verbode n alle n koopliede n end e ingesetene n deser Nederlande n nie t t e moghe n ver-
sekeren o f asseurere n o p goederen , Koopmanschappe n o f schepen toebehoorend e d e subjecte n van
den koning van Spagnien".
126
Resolutié'n van de Staten va n Holland, ¡621, p. 106.
127
ibid , 1622 , 6, 12 , 16, 56; ARA Bis . 49i, fos. 8-9.
128
Tha t i s "schepe n e n ingeladen e goedere n trafiquerend e ui t Portuga l o p Brazil " i n whic h Dutc h
merchants were interested.
shipping and Nunes da Pina's sugar, and subsequently other consignments, were left to be
declared forfei t b y th e admiralt y colleges. 129 I n Ma y 1622 , th e "coopluiden de r Por-
tugeesche Natie to t Amsterdam" mad e know n t o bot h th e State s o f Hollan d an d th e
States-General thei r anxiety concerning the April restrictions which seemed to them to be
highly unclear particularly with respect to the insurance of enemy goods carried in neutral
shipping, re-expor t o f Baltic grain fro m th e republic and th e carrying of Iberian product s
in Dutc h vessels. 130 Bot h assemblie s replie d tha t the y considere d th e plakkaat t o b e
definite enough ; nevertheless , the States-General ordere d tha t admiralty officials shoul d
re-examine it in case adjustments were needed. In fact, the position was somewhat unclear
and th e debat e wen t on fo r som e time . In Octobe r 1623 , a committe e o f th e admiralt y
staffs reporte d t o th e States-Genera l o n th e entire question o f the Dutc h Jews ' involve -
ment i n peninsul a coast-to-coas t trade , carryin g betwee n mainlan d Portuga l an d th e
Atlantic islands 131 and th e Portugues e Brazi l trade. I t is remarkable tha t they identified
Jewish merchant s a s a specia l grou p wit h quit e distinctiv e interest s withi n th e genera l
framework o f Dutc h commerce . Th e recommendatio n o f th e admiraltie s wa s tha t th e
restrictions prohibiting the activities in question should , despite the fact that they involved
some los s o f trade , remai n i n forc e so as t o prevent th e Spaniard s acquirin g munitions
through such contacts, so as not to give Spain opportunities for confiscations an d so as not
to impede or damage privateering.132 And thu s the matter was settled, very much agains t
the interest of the Jews.
During the long war, the mercantile towns of Holland, and especially Amsterdam, were
considerably more inclined to make peace with Spain, on moderate terms, than were other
parts o f the Unite d Provinces. One ma y safely assume tha t Dutc h Jewry , which suffered
still more fro m struggl e tha n othe r group s i n Holland, must have urgently desired peac e
and an end to the disruption o f communications an d trade . The Jewish interes t therefore
actually conflicte d wit h thos e o f th e dominan t coalitio n i n Dutc h politic s — of th e
stadhouder, the great colonial companie s and the militant provinces of Zeeland, Frieslan d
and Groninge n — although th e exigencies of war to some extent forced the Jews to adap t
to the changed structure of Dutch commerce, t o invest in the colonial companie s an d dea l
with th e newl y conquered Dutc h portio n o f Brazi l i n lie u o f Portugues e Brazil . Con -
129
Diog o Nunes Belmente challenged a decision of the Amsterdam admiralty court declaring a consign-
ment of his sugar "van goede prinse" i n August 1623, ARA Bis . 50, fos. 172v-3 .
130
AR A Bis. 49i, fos. 113v-14v; Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland, 1622 , 10 May, p. 90: "Is in deliberatie
gheleydt een requeste by eenighe Portugeesen aen de Heeren Staten Generael gepresenteert, nopende
het asseureren van's vyandts goederen gaende in neutrale schepen, nopende de uytlandtsche granen in
dése Landen gebracht, of die verstaen werden onder het verbodt van Binnenlandtsch e Granen; item,
nopende het aennemen op vracht van vyandts goederen by schippers en schepen van dése Landen".
131
"trafiqu e en negotiatie... op de havenen vanden Ko. van Spagnien réciproque namentlyk van Port a
Port, Vianen oft e ander e naer Madeira, Canarien en voorts op Fernabek , Bahías, Rio de Janeiro oft e
andere plaatsen, en van den vyand op vyand gedreven". Dutch traffic t o Madeira and Canaries during
the 1620 s wa s not onl y a mean s of continuing t o trade with Brazi l bu t a way of obtaining wines and
other Iberian products no longer obtainable from th e mainland, ACS Est. 2318. Cueva to Philip IV, 28
Aug. 1627.
132
AR A Bis . 50, fos. 198v-99v.
sequently there is some irony in the fact that one article of the terms put t o representatives
of th e States-Genera l o f th e Souther n Netherlands , and therefor e t o Spain , durin g th e
important thoug h abortiv e truc e talk s of 1632-3 , one o f a se t of term s intended b y th e
Dutch sid e to be very hard, an article which angered Spanis h ministers almost more tha n
any other,133 was that th e Portuguese Jews living in Holland should , if a truce were to be
agreed on , enjoy exactly the same concessions, includin g freedom of movement within the
European territorie s o f the Spanish king, as would Dutch Protestants. 134 Of course, such a
condition, i f ever it had been met, would have brought about a revolution in the life of the
European Sephard i diaspor a and , moreover , sinc e th e Jew s ha d bee n unilaterall y ex-
cluded b y Madrid fro m inclusio n i n th e term s of 1609 , in th e fac e o f Dutc h objections ,
their exclusion di d represen t a genuine politica l grievanc e o n th e part of the republic as
well as of the Sephardim themselves . Certainly article nine was exactly in accord with the
States-General's representation of 161 8 following the Oporto arrest s and indee d o f later
representations mad e afte r th e signing of the treaty of Munster in 1648 . Yet, it can not b e
said that , i n th e circumstance s o f 1632-3 , article nin e serve d Jewis h need s i n an y way.
Curious thoug h i t seems, i t may well be tha t th e initiative for this clause came no t fro m
Amsterdam o r an y tow n o f Holland, 135 but fro m group s i n th e republic whic h ha d fe w
links with the Jews and whic h were primarily concerned t o prevent a truce with Spain .
The Archduchess Isabella , governess of the Spanish Netherlands, when she learnt of the
Dutch terms , instructe d th e Flemis h delegate s t o the talks with respec t t o article nin e to
obstruct it , pointing ou t tha t it ra n counte r t o the fundamenta l laws of Spain "déclarant
néantmoins que son Altèze escriroit à sa Majesté, pour estre esclaircie de ses intentions".™
To thi s the Dutc h retorte d tha t th e "Portuguese" were subjects of the Unite d Province s
and shoul d therefor e b e include d i n th e term s o f th e truc e an d "converser et négocier
librement en Espaigne, n'y ayant en tout cas aucune raison de confisquer les marchandises et
denrées qu'ilz y envoyeroyent, sans y estre en personne, veu que la justice droicturière ne
permectoit aucunement que l'on procédait par voy de confiscation sur les denrées et
marchandises de personnes sur lesquelles l'on n'at aucun droict ou jurisdiction, outre ce que
les autres subjects desdictes provinces en pâtissoyent une infinité des molestations en leurs
propres denrées soubzprétexte de recherche qu'ellez appartenoyent à quelque Portugais".137
133
AG S Est . 2048, consulta 1 6 Mar. 1634 , fos. 4v-10v; th é marqué s de Legane s commented "que n o se
debe po r ningú n casso dar la s ventajas a Portuguese s que piden , pero bien s e ajustaría a que e n los
nabios donde van sus haziendas, no fues e confiscad o ma s de lo que le s pertenece, punto que seri a de
gran satisfacion para los rebeldes".
134
Aitzema , Va n Staet e n Oorlogh xii , 78, "Dat di e va n d e Portugeesch e Natie, Inwoonder s end e in -
gesetenen van d e vereenichde Provintien die zijn oft e naemal s sullen komen, van wat religie of geloof
die soude n moge n wesen, so wel als andere Ingesetene n van d e voorsz. Provintien he t effec t va n ' t
jegenwoordigen Tratae t so o i n Nederlandt , als i n Spaegnie n ende alomm e i n ' t Spaensch e gebiet ,
volkomentlick sullen genieten"; M. G. de Boer. Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien undden
Niederlanden i n den Jahren 1623 und 1633 (Groningen, 1898) pp. 67, 89-90.
135
Fro m th e publishe d resolution s it woul d see m tha t th e matte r wa s no t discusse d b y th e state s of
Holland.
136
Actes des Etats Généraux de ¡632. éd. M. Gachard (Brussels, 1853 ) pp. 95, 202.
137
ibid , 106,215 .
382 Em p ires and En trepáis
With this, the Dutch hinte d tha t the y might settle for assurances tha t the goods of Dutc h
Sephardim sent to the peninsula woul d no t longer be interfered with.
Predictably enough , Phili p IV' s respons e t o articl e nine wa s to rejec t i t altogethe r a s
"inplalicable".13S Subsequently , in th e talk s o f 26-29th Marc h 1633 , the Dutc h delegate s
considerably modifie d their positio n o n a numbe r o f points, including articl e nine , fol-
lowing heavy pressure in the States-General b y the peace party for dilution of the Dutc h
terms. The Dutch gav e up thei r insistence tha t Dutch Jews be able t o visit the peninsula,
on th e same basis a s other subject s o f the republic, demandin g onl y that "les biens de la
nation portugaise,. .. inhabitants des Provinces-Unies, de quelle religion ou créance qu'ilz
estoyent... seroyent réglez comme les biens des autres inhabitans desdictes provinces, sans
aucune distinction, mais quant à ce qui touchait les provinces obéissantes du Pays-Bas,
devroyent ceux de la nation portugaise, tant au regard de leurs personnes, que biens, y estre
traictez e t réglez comme le s autres inhabitans desdictes provinces".™ Isabell a di d i n fac t
authorize th e Flemis h delegates , i n Ma y 1633 , to concede tha t th e good s o f Dutch Jew s
found i n ships together with goods o f other subject s of the Republi c "qualifiez a jouir du
benefice d e l a tresve" woul d no t b e forfeit. 140 Th e poin t wa s no t actuall y conceded ,
however, for the truce talks broke up in June 163 3 in total disagreement over a number of
issues, especially Brazil and the future of Venlo and Maastricht. Afte r June 1633, although
there wer e man y furthe r round s o f talk s unti l th e break-throug h i n 164 6 which le d
eventually to the signin g of the treat y of Munste r in 1648 , the questio n of the Dutc h
Sephardim wa s no t agai n specificall y raised. Th e Dutc h Jew s were however firml y en -
trenched a s a factor in international politics .
The Dutc h peac e part y wa s overrule d i n 163 3 and agai n i n subsequen t talk s righ t
through unti l 164 6 and thu s the conflict , with it s serious drawbacks fo r Amsterdam an d
ruinous consequences for the Sephardim was prolonged. Despite the establishment o f a
thriving Jewish colony durin g the 1630 s in Dutch Brazil , and th e attendant reviva l of the
sugar trade , th e economi c positio n o f the Dutc h Jew s generally, as has bee n seen , con-
tinued t o deteriorat e unti l th e earl y 1640s . Th e subsequen t gains, followin g th e
resumption o f trad e wit h Portugal , i n th e perio d unti l 164 6 when a t las t th e Spanis h
embargoes began to be lifted, compensated fo r what had been lost since 1620 ; but this did
not in itself lay the foundation or open the way for the extraordinarily vigorous and rapi d
advance whic h bega n in 164 6 with th e retur n o f Dutch ship s to Spanish, Flemish an d
south Italian harbours. In the decade 1646-55 , despite the collapse o f Dutch Brazil and th e
evacuation o f its Jewish communit y in 1654 , despite th e blo w t o Dutc h commerc e a s a
whole dealt b y the Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-4 , circumstances which make the process all
the more remarkable, Dutch Sephardi Jewr y received, chiefly from the Spanish territories ,
an infusio n o f enterprising and wealth y immigrants so massive tha t i t dwarfed anythin g
that ha d gon e befor e o r cam e after . Indeed , th e transformatio n i n Spanish-Dutc h
relations, from 1646 , caused Dutc h Sephard i commerce to develop as much faste r tha n
138
AG S Est. 2240. Philip IV t o Pierre Roose , Madrid, 6 Mar. 1633.
139
Actes des Etats Généraux, 134 , 144 .
H0
ibid , 294.
Spain an d the Dutch Sepharditn 38 3
Dutch trad e generally, in fact eve n more, as the previous war had cause d it to grow more
slowly. In 1646 , the Jews constituted 8% of the depositors at Amsterdam, slightly less than
in 1620 . By 1661, there had bee n a considerable increase in the total number of accounts,
but th e number of Jewish depositors had sho t up fro m 12 6 to 243, nearly doubling, while
in proportion t o the total, they expanded fro m 8 % t o 12>/2%, 141 with an increase in capital
resources which was still more spectacular . Durin g the thir d quarter of the seventeenth
century, th e Dutc h Sephardi m wer e t o be at th e very peak of their influenc e on Dutch
economic life . However, the way in which this came about was complex.
II. 1640-166 0
The treat y of Munster, ending th e secon d Spanish-Dutc h war in January 1648 , marked
not onl y th e en d o f a prolonged struggle , bu t th e beginnin g o f a remarkabl e transfor -
mation o f Spanish-Dutch 142 relation s and , linke d wit h it , a decisiv e chang e i n th e
relationship betwee n Spai n an d Dutc h Jewry . Although a n almos t identica l threa t t o
Spanish interest s wa s pose d b y th e rapi d expansio n o f Dutc h trad e wit h Spain , it s
European dependencie s and, to some extent, its American colonies, from 164 6 onwards, as
during the Twelve Years Truce of 1609-21, 143 the entirely altered general circumstances of
the 1650 s led the Spanish crown to proceed i n a markedly different wa y in relation to the
United Province s tha n i t had don e i n 1621 . Threatened stil l more by the growin g power
and ambitions of Mazarin's Franc e an d Cromwell's England than by the effects o f Dutch
commercial supremacy , Phili p IV's ministers contrived a volte-face i n their Dutc h polic y
and, abandonin g confrontation , attempted , thoug h unti l th e 1670 s wit h onl y limite d
success, t o forge a special Spanish-Dutc h relationship . It was calculated in Madri d tha t
only b y thi s mean s coul d th e Souther n Netherland s b e defende d fro m th e French ,
Portugal weakened an d a European axi s forme d robus t enough t o check Anglo-Frenc h
aspirations an d prop up the waning Spanish empire. The price of this policy was a lenient
stand in relation to Dutch commercia l interests in Philip IV's European dominion s and a
muted reactio n eve n t o Dutch penetration o f Spain's American preserve. In large meas-
ure, Madri d deliberatel y gav e wa y t o th e republi c on matter s of trad e i n th e hop e o f
thereby gaining politica l rewards. This major shift i n Spanish-Dutch relation s co-incided
with what was by far the most crucial and rapid phas e of growth in wealth and number s
sustained b y th e Dutc h Sephardi m durin g th e seventeent h century . I n a mer e fiftee n
years, from 164 6 to 1661 , the numbe r of Jewish depositors with the Amsterda m Wissel-
bank jumped fro m 12 6 to 243 rising, at a tim e when the total number of depositors wa s
increasing appreciably faster than during the period of the war with Spain, from abou t 7%
to 12Vi % of the total. 144 By the 1660s , the Dutch Sephardi m wer e at the very peak of their
141
Va n Dillen, loc. cit., 14.
142
se e J. I. Israel, "A Conflict of Empires: Spain and th e Netherlands, 1618-1648", Past and Present Ixxv i
(Aug. 1977) , 73-4; see above, 40-1.
143
Se e above, 3-5,41.
144
J . G . va n Dillen , "Vreemdelinge n t e Amsterda m i n d e eerst e helf t de r zeventiend e eeuw I : D e
Portugeesche Joden", Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis Vol. 50 (1935) p. 14.
influence o n Dutc h an d Europea n economi c life . Ther e are , i t woul d seem , severa l
significant connection s betwee n the transformatio n in Spanish-Dutch relations and thi s
spectacular advance of the Dutch Sephardim and i t is the object of this part of the study to
throw some light on these.
Of course, ther e were at an y rat e two other majo r causes of the sudden expansio n in
resources of Dutch Jewry during the years 1640-6 0 — the resumption of Dutch-Portuguese
trade fro m 1641 , following th e secessio n o f Portugal from Spai n i n December 1640 , an d
the collapse an d los s of Dutch Brazil, in the years 1646-54 , which produced a large influ x
of Brazilian Jewry to Holland. Almost certainly, it was the loss of Portugal by the Spanish
king whic h actuall y reverse d th e proces s o f economi c declin e suffere d b y th e Dutc h
Sephardim fro m 162 1 onwards as a resul t o f the Spanis h embargoe s against the Dutc h
which were implemented i n Portugal a s in all parts o f the Spanish Monarchy . The year s
1641-6, the figure s for numbers of Jewish depositors a t Amsterdam suggest, were a perio d
of modes t bu t definit e recover y precedin g th e muc h faste r expansio n o f th e decad e
1646-55. In 1641 , the number of Jewish accounts a t the Wisselbank was only eighty-nine,
as compared with 106 in 1620 , the Jews having declined, as a proportion of the total, from
nearly 9% to about 6%. 145 The ending of Spanish rule in Portugal opened Lisbon and othe r
Portuguese port s t o Dutch shipping for the first time for two decades, enabling the Dutc h
to exploit th e very high prices fetched by Baltic grain, timber and copper in Portugal and
the urgent need for armaments an d naval stores with which the rebel king, Joâo IV, hoped
to fight off Spain an d reviv e Portuguese navigation with Brazil and Wes t Africa.
The Dutch , wit h their greater resource s in shippin g and lowe r freigh t rates , speedily
outstripped thei r Englis h an d Hanseati c competitor s wh o had dominate d th e carryin g
trade to Portugal from 162 1 to 1641 . In th e three years 1643-5 , the Dutch accounted fo r
over 50% of all foreign ships docking at Lisbon while in 1647 , forty-nine out of 10 7 foreign
vessels entering Lisbo n were Dutch. 146 In th e general carrying trade, the Dutch Sephar -
dim undoubtedl y playe d a n importan t par t an d althoug h mos t o f th e contract s fo r
weaponry an d ammunitio n fo r Portugal , lik e thos e fo r Catalonia , wer e handle d b y
non-Jews suc h a s Gerrit Trip , Ja n va n der Straaten , Pieter Outger s and Abraha m Har -
tooge,147 severa l Jews , notabl y Lop o Ramire s (Davi d Curiel) 148 an d hi s renowne d
145
ibid .
146
V . Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do movemento dos portos de Faro e Lisboa durante o século XVII",
A nais da Academia Portuguesa de Historia 2nd ser . vol, v (1954) p. 241.
147
Algemee n Rijksarchief , The Hague , verzameling Bisdom vol. Ixviii, 44-5, 55, 59, 112 , 232-3, 294, 436 ,
437.
148
Lop o da Fonseca Ramire s is well known as a leading figure in Dutch Jewry of this period, especially for
his various connections with the Iberian peninsula. From 1641 , he worked, if somewhat uneasily, with
the Portuguese , supplying timber and nava l stores and handlin g cash remittance s for the crown fro m
Manoel Rodrigue s d e Matto s o f Lisbon . I n th e middl e and late r 1640s , he acte d als o a s an agen t i n
Holland of the conde de Peñaranda, Spanish ministe r at the Munster negotiations, and resumed , if he
had i n fac t ceased , wha t h e ha d bee n doin g unofficiall y i n th e late r 1630 s an d possibl y earlier ,
despatching naval timber and supplies to Cádiz and Sanlúcar. This increasing involvement with Spai n
caused th e Portuguese ambassador i n Holland, Sousa Coutinho, to call him "o mais mao perro que h a
em toda a judearia". However , curiously, he playe d n o rea l rôle i n th e grea t expansio n o f contac t
nephew, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (Mose s Curiel), who served th e king of Portugal a s his
Amsterdam agen t over a long period, played a leading part in the supplying of naval stores
and munition s an d i n handlin g cas h payment s remitte d fro m Lisbo n t o Amsterdam o n
behalf o f th e crown . However , thoug h shippin g figure s for Lisbo n ar e lackin g fo r th e
period after 1648, it is reasonalby certai n tha t Dutch-Portuguese trad e contracted i n some
degree fo r there wa s a serious slum p i n th e Baltic grain trad e durin g the 1650s , much o f
which was geared t o the Portugues e market, 149 Portuguese-Dutch relation s deteriorate d
sharply as the Portugues e intensifie d th e pressure on Dutch Brazil , impeding the flow of
sugar to Holland, whil e finall y the English profited fro m th e tension to gain a larger slic e
of the Portuga l trad e for themselves. Also, since this period wa s a relatively good on e fo r
leading converses in Portugal, wit h a sustained effor t o n th e part ofJoa o IV , who was in
urgent nee d o f resource s wit h whic h t o fen d of f Spanis h attempt s t o reconque r th e
kingdom, to afford th e richer converses and thei r capital a measure of protection from the
Inquistion, a s is shown b y th e constitution s of th e Companhia Geral do Brasil set u p i n
1649, i t i s likel y tha t pressur e o n th e converse elit e t o emigrat e fro m Portuga l t o th e
Sephardi diaspor a i n Norther n Europe , o r transfe r major resources t o Amsterdam, wa s
generally slight.150
The collaps e o f Dutc h Brazi l wa s als o a ke y factor , one indee d tha t va n Dille n wa s
inclined t o thin k migh t b e th e mos t important. 151 Durin g th e year s 1646-55 , app -
roximately 20 0 Jewis h familie s returne d t o th e Unite d Province s fro m Brazi l and ,
although many then lef t again , the increase in numbers and resource s a t Amsterdam wa s
undoubtedly considerable. O f the twelve largest Dutch Sephardi bank accounts in 1661 , at
least two, and possibl y more , were of Brazilian origin.152 However, it is arguable that th e
between Dutch Jewry and Spai n after 1649 . His fortune declined markedly and i t seems that he was not
employed as an agent by either the first two Spanish ambassadors at The Hague, Brun or Gamarra, or
by the Spanish consul in Amsterdam. His omission from th e lis t of Jewish firms trading with Spain of
1655 (see appendix I) is perhaps less due to any desire by Spanish diplomatic staff in Holland to protect
him than to his having largely withdrawn from trad e with Spain. Though h e retained hi s account at the
Wisselbank, he seems to have spent much of his time, during the 1650s , at Antwerp; see, E. M. Keen,
"Notarial Records" , Stud. Rosenth. viii , 301n ; H. Kellenbenz . Sephardim a n der unteren Elbe (Wies-
baden 1958 ) pp. 167-9 ; Correspondencia diplomatics d e Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua
embaixada em Holanda ed . E. Prestage. 3 vols. (Coimbra-Lisbon, 1920-55) i, 165, ii, 47-8,265, iii, 10,26,
39,83.
149
J . A. Faber, "The declin e of the Baltic grain trade in the second haJ f of the seventeenth century", Ad a
Historiae Neerlandica, \ (1966) p. 117 , graph B.
150
A . Wiznitzer. Jews in Colonial Brazil (New York, 1960) pp. 120-1 ; Joao IV's stance caused a remarkable
friction t o develop between himself and the Portuguese Inquisition, see Anita Novinsky. Cristaos Novos
na Bahia (Sao Paulo , 1972 ) pp. 49-55 ; ther e was a discernible decline in th e number ofautos defe i n
Portugal i n the 1640 s (34), as compared wit h the 1620 s (46) and 1630 s (44), however, in the 1650s , the
number was much higher again (55), see E. N. Adler. Auto de Fe and Jew (Oxford, 1908) p. 165.
101
Va n Dillen, remarking on th e spectacular rise in the number of Jewish depositor s a t Amsterdam fro m
125 in 164 6 to 243 in 1661 , says that "deze gegevens vestigen den indruk , dat — hoewel het verlie s van
Brazilie menigeen groote verliezen heeft berokken d — over't algemeen de handel der Amsterdamsch e
Portugeezen zich op een behoorlijk peil heeft kunne n handhaven", loc. cit. p. 26.
lr>2
ibid , pp. 25-6, Wiznitzer, op, cit., 136-8 , viz. the joint account of Mosen and David Judah Leon and that
of Salomon Senior Coronel.
return o f the Brazilian Jews with their savings could no t possibly have co-incided wit h a
period o f sustained expansio n i n Dutc h Sephard i Europea n trad e ha d circumstance s i n
Europe no t altere d drastically . The remarkabl y rapid growt h of Brazilian Jewry, during
the 1630 s and earl y 1640s, must after al l have been essentially the result of the contraction
of, an d increasingl y sever e limitation s to , Dutc h Sephard i Europea n trade . Jew s ha d
migrated i n strengt h t o Brazi l becaus e ther e ha d bee n n o opportunitie s fo r the m i n
Holland o r anywher e in Europe . Thus , th e fal l o f Netherland s Brazi l which , as fa r a s
future opportunitie s were concerned, wa s a disaster fo r Dutch Jewr y rather tha n a gain,
can in no way have stimulated the economic growth of the Sephardi settlement in Holland
had the Portuguese secession, and the lifting o f the Spanish embargoe s against the Dutch
in the years 1646-7 , not taken place and transforme d prospects fo r European trade .
Without i n an y wa y denying th e importanc e o f the Brazilia n exodus o r the reviva l in
Dutch-Portuguese trade , the objec t i n thi s study i s to suggest that th e change s i n Span -
ish-Dutch relations during this period, and the accompanying movement of conversos and
their capita l fro m th e Spanis h territorie s t o Amsterda m an d Rotterda m i n th e year s
1646-55, firstl y gav e ris e t o th e mos t substantia l accumulation s o f Jewis h capita l i n
seventeenth century Holland an d secondl y provided a vital part o f the necessary frame -
work for the impressive flowering of Sephardi societ y and culture in the United Provinces
in the third quarter of the century by providing the Dutch Sephardim with what they had
conspicuously lacked before 1646 , a major rôle in Euopean commerce .
Part o f thi s crucial proces s wa s the recover y by th e Dutc h Sephardi m o f unimpeded
contact with Spain. During the protracted Spanish-Dutc h negotiation s of the 1640s , which
paved th e wa y t o th e signin g of th e treat y of Munster , there wa s no mentio n o f Dutch
Jewry b y either side despit e th e fac t tha t th e questio n o f the Jews had bee n a n issu e of
some importanc e durin g th e abortiv e Spanish-Dutc h talk s of 1632-3 . Nevertheless, the
Jews soon agai n becam e a point of contention betwee n The Hagu e and Madrid . Inevit-
ably, they were left in a state of uncertainty by the terms of 164 8 not only as to what might
now be their rights and privilege s in the Spanish territories , but als o as to their merchan-
dise intercepted b y Spanis h nava l forces in ships of France an d Portugal , both o f which
were stil l a t wa r wit h Spain , an d i n th e cas e o f seizur e o f thei r asset s foun d i n th e
possession of prisoners o f the Spanish Inquisition . Th e Jews consequently pu t pressure ,
through th e Amsterdam city council, on th e States of Holland153 which led in turn to the
matter bein g raise d wit h th e Spanis h ambassado r a t The Hagu e b y the States-General .
Antoine Brun , the Spanis h minister , was asked t o transmi t to Madrid the reques t of the
States-General "que de la part d u Roy d'Espagne soit accorde a u plustost u n Acte portant
déclaration que les Juifs inhabitants de cest estât puissent traffiquer en Espagne, et autres
lieux de l'obéissance de S.M te . soit par leurs facteurs ou autres personnes de leur party
153
Resolution va n de Sloten van Holland, 2 7 Jul, 1649 ; H . J. Koenen . Geschiedenis der Joden i n Nederland
(Utrecht, 1843 ) pp . 151-2 ; J . S . d a Silv a Rosa . Geschiedenis de r Portugeesche Joden t e Amsterdam,
1593-1925 (Amsterdam, 1925 ) pp. 84-5 .
154
etnployez" an d tha t if Dutch Jews should have, owing to storms or other mishaps a t sea,
to put int o Spanish port s the y would be treate d "de l a mesmefacón" a s other subject s of
the United Provinces. The missive, though somewhat vaguely worded, seems to imply that
the States-General wer e not then insisting that Dutch Jew s be treated in , and by, Spain as
exactly equivalen t t o othe r Dutc h subjects , bu t onl y almos t so . This first approac h wa s
evidently dealt with tardily in Madrid, fo r in February 1650 , Brun wrote to the council of
state tha t th e Dutch, who apparently had no t ye t received any reply, were pressing hi m
that the
"Jews who reside i n Amsterdam an d other town s of those provinces should b e able
to come to trade (in Spain) with the same facility and security as their other subjects,
in virtu e o f th e genera l provisio n containe d i n articl e tw o o f th e peac e treaty ,
insisting that the said ambassado r shoul d mak e a specific declaration o n this point
in the name of Your Majesty". 155
Brun suggested tha t the crown communicate to the States-General tha t the Jews living in
the republic could openly an d legitimately trade with Spain by means of factors of another
religion, tha t is Catholic o r Protestant, and als o that Dutch Jew s compelled b y tempest or
other misha p t o enter Spanish harbour s "shoul d receiv e no har m a s regards eithe r thei r
persons o r goods" . Brun' s proposal , thoug h meetin g less tha n th e whol e o f th e Dutc h
demand of February 1650 , would seem to correspond closel y enough with what had bee n
demanded i n Augus t 1649 . However, the crown , while willing to acknowledge formally
the righ t o f Jew s i n th e republi c t o trad e wit h Spain , includin g b y implicatio n forme r
subjects of the king, refused the concession concerning mishap s a t sea on the ground tha t
such occurence s coul d no t b e readil y checked. 156 Brun' s subsequen t statemen t t o thi s
effect to the States-General157 was not well recieved. He was confronted with a declaration
154
Archiv o General de Simancas (hereafter AGS), (Libros de la) Haya, vol. 284, "Copie de la lettre escrite
par le s Estats Gnaux. a M . L'Ambass r. d e Bru n a l a Hay e 12 e Aoust 164 9 en faveu r de s Juifs leur s
sujects a ce qu'ils puissent trafiquer e n Espagne".
155
AG S Estado 2072, consulta, 27 Jun. 1650: "Antonio Brun , en carta que ha escrito a Vuestra Magd. de 7
febrero dest e año , refier e las instancias que Olandese s le hazian para qu e lo s Judios que reside n e n
Amsterdam y demás villas de aquellas provincias pudiesen venir a comerciar con la misma facilidad y
seguridad que lo s demás burgeses dellas, en virtud de la generalidad que contiene el articulo segundo
del tratado de las pazes, insistiendo con el dicho embaxador para que en nombre de Vuestra Magd. les
diese declaración particula r en este punto, conforme a su intento, y juzga en este caso se podría declarar
que dichos judios pudiese n dirigi r las cosas d e su trafico por factore s de otra religió n y caso qu e po r
algún accidente de temporal arribasen a los puertos de Vuestra Magd. que no se les haria daño ni en sus
personas, ni en sus bienes, y que l a resolución que Vuestr a magd. se sirviese de tomar se le embiase en
claro para que pudiéndol a mostrar a los Estados pasase por declaración" .
156
AG S Haya xxxii, Philip IV to Brun, 9 July 1650 : "(los judios) pueden dirigir sus mercancias por factore s
de otra religión, y no de otra manera , sin que les pueda ser permitido el que entren en mis puertos por
ningún accident e d e tempora l qu e subced a porqu e la s provanza s del. . .en esto s caso s so n poc o
averiguables.".
157
Aitzem a records th e statemen t thus : "Ite m d'ords e di e de n koning h ha d gestel t da t d e Joden , In -
gesetenen deser Lande n i n de Rijcken end e Lande n van sijn Majestey t door Factore n soude n mogen
handelen end e blijve n va n soodanig e gelegenthey t als di e van d'ander e Ingesetene n dese r Landen ,
maer dat sy voor haer persoenen daer buyte n souden moeten blijven" , Va n Siaet en Oorlogh vii, 178.
that th e king's stand wa s in ope n violatio n o f articles two , four an d eleve n o f the peac e
treaty and wa s visited by a deputation from th e States that put hi m under some pressure .
"The pensionar y o f Amsterdam", Bru n reported t o Madrid
"began t o speak, defendin g the said Jews vigorously, maintaining that Christianity
was much i n thei r debt fo r their having been s o loyal a guardian o f Holy Scriptur e
and that to think of doing away with that nation was against the will of God who had
said throug h hi s prophets tha t remnants of that people shoul d b e converted a t th e
end of time, and tha t likewise Saint Augustine had taugh t in The City of God that th e
Jews worshipped on e God a s do Christians an d tha t believing in Moses and othe r
prophets they wer e tha t much mor e capable of receiving th e texts of the Christia n
faith."158
He concluded wit h pointing ou t that the authorities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam an d othe r
towns had receive d the m and regarde d the m as their own subjects and wer e well content
with them and that even the Pope, head of the Catholics, an d the Emperor admitte d Jews
into their territories.
To thi s Brun answered tha t each real m had it s own laws for its own particular reason s
and that , besides , th e Dutc h plenipotentiarie s a t Munste r ha d neve r onc e raise d th e
question o f th e Jews . I n addition , h e dre w attentio n t o th e States ' recen t additiona l
provisions agains t Catholi c ecclesiastic s i n th e republic which , among others , applie d t o
subjects o f th e kin g o f Spain . T o this , th e deputatio n replie d tha t i n th e provinc e o f
Holland where the Jews lived, the new plakkaat against Catholi c priests had neither bee n
ratified no r published . Followin g thi s encounter, Bru n suggested t o th e counci l of stat e
that some concessio n b e made an d i t was in fact conceded i n Madrid, b y Philip IV , that
thenceforward Jewis h subject s o f th e republic , force d b y ba d weathe r int o Spanis h o r
south Italian ports, would be treated a s would other Dutch subjects except when they had
been baptized o r were former vassals of the king. 159 The States-General, Amsterda m city
council and th e Jewish community all remained dissatisfie d with this,160 but a t this poin t
the matter stood an d n o further concessio n was obtained.
The questio n o f th e statu s of th e Dutc h Jew s o n Spanis h territor y aros e agai n i n a
different for m i n th e year s 1653- 4 i n connectio n wit h th e Spanis h Netherlands . I t wa s
brought to the attention of the council of state, in February 1654 , that Philip IV's governor
158
AG S Haya xxxii, Brun to Philip IV, 30 Sep. 1650: "y tomando la palabra el pensionario de Amsterdam
pleyteo mucho en favor de los dichos judíos diciendo que harto les devia la Cristiandad por haver hecho
tan fie l guardi a d e la s sagradas escrituras , y qu e pensa r perde r tod a aquell a nación , er a contr a l a
voluntad de Dios que decia por sus prophetas que las reliquias de aquella gente se convertirían al fin un
día, y que también lo enseñava San Agustín en su libro de la ciudad de Dios que los judíos adoravan un
solo Dios como lo s cristianos y que creyendo e n Moysen y otros prophetas tanto mas eran capaza s de
recibir los documentos de la religión cristiana" .
159
AG S Estad o 2076, consulta 30 Nov. 1650 ; AGS Estad o 2259, Philip I V to Brun , 4 Dec . 1650 : m e he
conformado como que los que aportaren a los puertos de mis reynos, tanto de España como de Italia, no
hayan sid o Christiano s bautizado s n i vasallos mios estand o advertid o qu e esto s judíos s e «echaron
destos reyno s desde lo s reyes Catholicos y desde este tienen prohibición d e entrar" .
160
AG S Hay a xxxiii , Bru n t o Phili p IV , 1 6 Sep. 165 1 :"No desiste n esto s señores" , wrot e Brun , "d e
apretarme sobre lo de los judíos".
at Brussels , th e Archduk e Leopold , ha d take n a remarkably independen t initiativ e and
negotiated wit h certain Dutc h Jew s over the re-admission o f the Jews into th e Souther n
Netherlands.161 The papal nuncio in Madrid represente d t o the council tha t discussion s
had taken place between Leopold an d Amsterdam Sephardim seekin g permission fo r the
establishment o f a community and erectio n of a synagogue a t Borgerhout near Antwerp.
The Pop e ha d learn t o f thi s throug h hi s nunci o i n Brussel s an d wishe d t o se e th e
proceedings stopped. 162 A royal letter was despatched to Brussels expressing surprise and
concern, an d requiring an explanation, to which the archduke replied that talks had taken
place, following an initiative by the Jews to Antoine Brun , with a substantial su m bein g
offered i n retur n fo r th e privileg e o f a synagogue. 163 I n th e extremel y harsh financia l
circumstances i n whic h h e foun d himself , Leopol d ha d suppose d tha t ever y mean s o f
obtaining money should be considered and had accordingly convened a council consisting
of th e archbisho p o f Mechelen , th e chancello r o f Brabant, th e treasurer-genera l o f th e
Southern Netherland s an d thre e additiona l councillors. 164 Thu s i t wa s tha t th e sam e
urgent pressur e o n th e Dutc h Jew s i n th e 1650 s to foun d offshoot communities outsid e
Holland, caused b y th e excessiv e influx o f refugees, resulting especially fro m th e fal l o f
Netherlands Brazil , th e same pressur e tha t produced th e various Caribbea n venture s of
these years and th e driv e t o gain re-admissio n int o England, gave rise to a secret con -
ference i n Brussel s whic h seriousl y deliberate d th e retur n o f th e Jew s int o Spanis h
Brabant. Moreover , th e Brussel s council conclude d tha t ther e wa s no fundamenta l law
barring Jewis h settlemen t i n Braban t an d advise d th e archduk e tha t the y shoul d b e
admitted, i n return for a large payment, but under the condition that they should live in a
tightly regulated ghetto modelle d o n those of Italy and Catholic Germany. The substanc e
of th e conferenc e wa s dul y transmitte d t o Madrid . Th e crow n soo n pu t a n en d t o th e
proceedings however and laid down that there could be no question of permitting Jewish
entry into Braban t o r anywhere in the Southern Netherlands, for money or on any basis ,
and tha t neither Leopold, his successors, nor th e Spanish diplomatic staff i n the republic
were to listen t o such proposals in the future. 165
Although i n general th e Spanish crow n wished to avoid friction wit h th e republic over
the Jew s a s ove r othe r issues , bot h durin g th e intricat e Munste r negotiation s an d sub -
sequently, and Spanis h officials at all levels were made well aware of this, some incidents
were bound to occur owing to Madrid's refusa l t o consider th e Jews as equivalent to other
161
AG S Estado 2185, consulta 7 Feb. 1654.
162
ibid : the consulta refers to a memorial "del nunci o de su Santidad residente en esta Corte, en que d a
quenta a Vra . Mgd. d e havers e avisado a s u Santida d po r e l internunci o d e Flande s qu e s e havi a
comenzado a trater en aquellos estados de abrir una sinagoga de Hebreos en un lugar llamado Burgero
pocas millas distante de Amberes , y supplica a Vra . Mgd. se sirva d e manda r se prohiba qualquiera
resolution sobre esto sino que se arranque y quite de echo todo tratado en esta materia como lo espera
de la rectitud y christiano celo de Vra. Mgd".
163
Mocatt a Library, University College London, Lucien Wolf Papers, Netherlands (hereafter LW Neths)
xi (transcripts from Archive s Generates, Brussels, SEG reg . 257), Philip to Leopold, 19 Feb. 165 4 and
Leopold t o Philip, 1 7 Apr. 1654.
164
ibid , "Protocole d'une jointe composee de 1'ArchevSque de Malines, etc. 11t h Dec. 1653" .
165
ibid , Philip to Leopold, 24 Jun. 1654.
Dutch subject s on Spanish territor y and t o Dutch Jewry's intimate and increasin g link s
with th e conversos in Spain, an d th e conversos an d Jew s in countrie s at war with Spain,
especially Portuga l an d France , bu t durin g the years 1655-166 0 also England . The mos t
serious occurence during the period o f the Munster talks arose from th e agreement of 1646
between Spai n an d th e republi c over the returning of prisoners. Under the term s of th e
exchange, a general order was issued in Spain, in July 1646, that all Dutch prisoners bein g
held in the Spanish territories were to be promptly released and most were. However, for
various reasons a small number were not handed over, causing considerable annoyance in
the United Provinces and at Munster, the most serious case being that of four Dutch Jew s
of Portguese origin , Jacob and Abraham Buen o and David and Moseh Cohen. 166 Several
reminders reached Madrid , both from Brussel s and fro m Peñaranda , at Munster, urgin g
that th e Dutch wer e determined t o retrieve th e fou r Jews , that the y kept o n raisin g th e
question due to the efforts of the Jews' relatives in Holland167 and that the States-Genera l
were holdin g Colone l Ambrosi o Mexi a an d thre e Spanis h cavalr y captain s unti l the y
should b e released . Th e crow n was willing enoug h t o produc e th e fou r wh o ha d bee n
captured a t sea some years before, but for some time was unable to locate them. At length,
having foun d tha t the y ha d bee n place d wit h Franciscan friar s i n Andalusi a an d late r
taken t o Ceuta to be exchanged for four friars being held by the Muslims at Tetuán, but,
following th e non-occurrenc e o f th e exchange , the n brough t bac k t o Gibraltar , th e
corregidor of that town was written to. 168 It was learnt that in January 1647 , Jacob Bueno ,
the principal of the four , a personage born at Lisbon and taken many years before by his
parents t o Amsterdam , havin g bee n subjecte d b y th e friar s t o ever y pressur e s o as t o
reduce him to Catholicism, had, "in despair and alway s constant in the error of the law of
Moses", committed suicid e a t Gibraltar. He had stabbed himself shouting ou t "ni ay mas
Dios qu e el Dios d e Israel" an d utterin g "man y fou l blasphemie s agains t Chris t ou r
redeemer" which had compelled th e Franciscans to place him in a box as he lay dying.169
The other three Jews had converted and n o longer wished to return to Amsterdam. Thu s
eventually, i t was communicated t o The Hague via Brussels that one of the four had die d
while the other three preferred t o remain in Spain.
In the sphere of Inquisition confiscation s of goods in the care of conversos belonging, or
allegedly belonging , t o Dutc h Jews , probabl y th e mos t delicate instance , politically ,
during thi s period , wa s the seizin g i n 165 5 of Manue l d e Aled o an d Manue l Jorg e d e
166
AG S Estado 2167, marqués d e Castel-Rodrigo t o Philip, Bruss., 28 Mar. 1647 : "he representado a Vra.
Mgd. repetidas veces quanto conviene n o diferir mas la soltura de los quatre judios llamados Jacob y
Abraham Bueno y David y Moisen Cohen, como se deve hazer según los tratados hechos".
16T
AG S Estad o 2167. Francisco de Galarreta to Pedro Coloma, 25 Sep. 1647 , refers to the urgent need t o
set free "esos honrrados judios pues tanto instan por su livertad los parientes que tiene n en Holanda" .
168
ibid , Andres Mari n t o Coloma, Gibraltar , 2 9 Mar. 1647 ; AG S Estad o 2257 , Phili p t o corregidor of
Gibraltar, ISJun . 1647 .
169
AG S Estado 2167, 'Relación verdadera del fin y muerte de Jacob Bueno en el convento de S. Pablo de
Labrena', 26 Jan. 1647 .
170
Acosta, "Portuguese " partner s i n th e Indie s trad e a t Seville. Afte r th e arrests , Isaa c
Swanenburg, th e Dutc h consu l a t Seville , petitioned th e council o f state tha t Aled o and
Acosta wer e factors of various Amsterdam merchants and tha t he was anxious lest Dutc h
interests b e harme d an d requeste d tha t th e Dutc h partie s shoul d hav e thei r good s
promptly restitute d b y the Inquisition. The council of state shared th e consul's concern to
shield Dutc h interest s an d followin g its discussion o f the matter , the king instructed th e
Inquisitor-General t o ensure that the Dutch merchant s concerned, tha t is by implication
the Jews concerned, fo r it was clear that the correspondents o f the arrested men were such,
had al l thei r possession s speedil y returned . Th e inquisitor s a t Seville , however , b y
arrangement wit h Aledo , Acost a an d thei r partner , Manue l d e Mercado , wh o ha d no t
been seized , ha d release d th e cloth consignmen t fo r shipment t o Mexico so as to prevent
deterioration o f the merchandise an d obtai n th e anticipated profits . Ther e was a consid -
erable delay before thi s was explained to the Dutch causin g mountin g annoyance to the
Amsterdam parties 171 who were named a s Manuel Centeno, Melchor Méndez Franco an d
Francisco Góme z Barbossa . Agai n th e Jews , throug h th e Dutc h consu l a t Seville , ha d
recourse t o th e counci l o f state , i n Madrid , i n Octobe r 1656 , and agai n the y receive d
assurance that the Inquisition would eventuall y restitut e al l that was due.
Several incidents aros e as a result of interception b y the Spaniards o f Portuguese an d
other enem y shippin g involvin g capture o f goods which were subsequentl y claime d b y
Jews a t Amsterdam . On e mino r bu t long-drawn-ou t disput e aros e fro m th e capture , in
June 1648 , o f a carg o o f sil k e n route fro m Livorn o t o Lisbo n claime d b y th e Jewis h
merchant Jerónim o Rodrigue s d a Sous a a t Amsterdam , a clai m presse d b y th e States -
General.172 Anothe r aros e fro m th e takin g i n 1658 , of a carg o o f suga r e n route fro m
Madeira to Amsterdam consigne d t o several Jews.173 One rather serious incident followe d
the capture , i n 1657 , by a n Iris h privatee r i n th e Spanis h service , o f th e vesse l Per el o r
Pearl which was brought i n to San Sebastián. The ship was carrying twenty-seven Jewish
emigrants fro m Amsterda m t o Barbados , merchandis e value d a t ƒ 1,295,400 , a ver y
valuable stock , belongin g evidentl y t o Amsterda m Jews , an d bot h Dutc h an d Englis h
papers. Spanis h almirantazgo official s wer e uncertai n whethe r t o classif y th e shi p a s
Dutch o r Englis h an d a s a result o f th e ensuin g delay , there was heavy pressur e b y th e
Jewish communit y on th e Dutc h authorities , including a n officia l visi t to The Hagu e b y
170
AG S Estado 2088, consulta, 1 8 Oct. 165 6 and enclosed consulta of the Inquisition suprema; these were,
possibly, two of the fou r referre d to in Barrionuevo' s entry for 1 7 April 1655 : "en Sevill a prendiero n
cuatro mercaderes portuguese s riquísimos a primeros de Abril", A visos de D. Jerónimo de Barrionuevo
(1654-1658) 4 vols . (Madird, 1892-4 ) i , 278 ; neithe r merchan t i s included amon g th e Sevill e corre -
spondents o f Amsterda m Jew s i n th e list s o f 165 5 (see appendi x i) , unless th e latte r i s the sam e a s
Manuel Gomez de Acosta .
171
O f the three, which are doubtless al l aliases, only the second i s given in the lists of 1655 , being the alias
of Abraham Franc o Méndez .
172
AG S Estad o 2669 , Jacom e va n d e Hove , Dutch consul a t Cádiz , t o Philip , 1 4 Sep. 1648 ; ibi d 2670,
consulta 3 1 Jan. 1650 ; Aitzema, Va n Staet en Oorlogh, vii, 165.
173
Mocatt a LW Neths vi, V. Richard t o Baron de Batteville, The Hague , 21 Aug. 1658.
the Amsterdamparnassim, in June 1657, to present a petition to the States-General.174 The
States' response t o the petitio n of the Jewis h elders was the famou s resolution of 1 7 July
1657 which becam e th e classi c formulatio n in th e collectiv e memory of Dutch Sephard i
Jewry, though, as has been seen , there had been earlier similar declarations that "those of
the Jewish natio n wh o live in thes e provinces ar e tru e subjects an d inhabitant s o f these
privinces an d tha t they must enjoy th e conditions , rights and privilege s stipulated i n th e
treaties of peace and commerce (wit h Spain)".175 This was followed by several subsequent
and increasingl y threatenin g statement s t o th e Spanis h ambassado r tha t th e Unite d
Provinces was determined t o uphold this principle.176 Commenting on the strength of the
Dutch reactio n t o th e Pearl affair an d th e unequivoca l resolutio n which th e Jew s ha d
obtained fro m th e States-General , th e secretar y o f the Spanis h embass y a t The Hague ,
Vincent Richard, wrote to the council o f state that the Dutch "will not suffe r i n any case
that the Jews, born i n these provinces and inhabitin g them, should be worse treated tha n
their othe r subjects , sinc e i t i s a fac t tha t thi s natio n ha s ver y grea t powe r wit h th e
magistrates of the city councils, and especiall y tha t of Amsterdam, since they are the ones
who, withou t doubt , hav e th e greates t commerc e an d consequentl y brin g th e greates t
advantage".177
The principal stress between th e Spanish crown and Dutch Jewry in the 1650 s however,
derived fro m th e clas h o f interests involved i n Spanis h determinatio n t o preserve some-
thing o f the syste m of tight commercial control tha t ha d prevaile d i n th e Spanis h port s
from 162 1 unti l 1646 , when th e embargoes against th e Dutc h bega n t o be lifted , an d i n
particular th e mean s t o preven t illega l expor t o f America n silve r fro m Spai n an d t o
174
Mocatt a LW Neths vi, J. Richard t o Gamarra, Amst. 26 Jun. 1657 ; he says that he undertsood from a
"Jew wh o i s a n enem y o f hi s nation " tha t th e Parnassi m wer e als o proposin g t o se e th e Spanis h
ambassador i n Th e Hagu e an d tha t thei r leade r wa s Abraha m Perrha n (sic), presumabl y Pereyra,
Though he was not a parnas in that year.
175
AG S Haya xl, fo. 186 , Gamarra to Philip, 30 Jul. 1657 ; Mocatta LW Neths vi, "Extrait du registr e des
resolutions des Hauls et Puissant s seigneurs les Etats Generaux" undated enclose d wit h Gamarr a t o
Philip, 31 Oct. 1658 which quotes the resolution of 1 7 July 1657; David Franco Mendes in his Memories
do Estabelecimento e Progresso dos Judeos Portuguezes e Espanhoes nestafamosa citade de Amsterdam
(5529-1772), published in Studio Rosenlh. ix, no. ii, p. 63 states that "N o A (nno) 5417 (3 July 1657)
resolverao o s Esta d (o) s d e Holand a e o rateficara o o s Estad(o) s gerai s e m 1 7 d(it)o qu e seria o
reputad(o)s os Judeos dahi em diante por verdadeiros subditos da Republica e que como tais gozeriao
de todos os privilegios".
176
AG S Haya xli, fo. 45, Gamarra to Philip, 4 May 1658; Mocatta LW Neths vi, V. Richard to Don Lui s de
Haro, The Hague , 26 Jul. 165 8 in which he state s tha t th e Jews wer e pressin g the States-Genera l t o
retaliate against Spanish shipping, on account o f the Pearl and a number of other Dutch ships taken by
Biscayan privateers , an d tha t Cromwell' s residen t i n Hollan d wa s supportin g them i n thi s wit h the
intention of creating friction betwee n Spain an d th e United Provinces.
177
AG S Estado 2091, Vincent Richard t o Philip, The Hague, 3 Sep. 165 8 (duplicate in AGS Haya xli, fo.
66); "qu e n o sufrira n po r ningun caso qu e lo s hebreos naturale s destas privncias y moradores della s
scan peo r tratados que los demas vasallos suyos siendo cierto que tiene esta nacio n grandisimo poder
con los magistrados de las villas y especialmente con el de Amsterdam por ser los que tienen sin disputa
el mayor comerzio y por consiguiente que les causan el mayor provecho y assi sera muy del servicio de
Vra. Magd . qu e s e les administre n o sol o recta justicia per o qu e s e les haga l a mayor graci a qu e s e
pudiera".
Spain an d the Dutch Sephardim ->9 3
exclude the merchandise o f enemies of Spain, tha t is of France, Portugal and, after 1655 ,
of England. The Dutch Sephardim wer e distinguished, in the economic sphere, especiall y
by thei r remarkabl e framewor k of contacts linking Amsterdam wit h Rouen , Bordeaux ,
Bayonne, London, Lisbon and the Spanish ports and had a natural desire to exploit it. The
difficulty o f Spanish minister s in this regard was that whatever their distaste for the Dutch
Jews, which remained intense , they could no t afford t o antagonize the Dutch authoritie s
who were all but bound , sinc e it was greatly in the Dutch interest, to support the Jews in
disputes wit h Spain . Muc h o f the activit y of the Dutc h Jew s in Spai n wa s undoubtedl y
illegal under Spanis h laws , but then it is not to be expected tha t Dutch Jewry, confronted
by a persecutin g crown whos e so-calle d Hol y Offic e wa s imprisonin g Spanis h crypto -
Jews, ofte n relative s o f th e Dutc h Sephardim , b y th e doze n an d appropriatin g thei r
belongings, shoul d no t hav e fel t justified no t onl y i n disregardin g th e plan s o f Spanis h
ministers t o damag e th e commerc e o f thei r enemie s bu t i n actuall y retaliatin g against
Spain using thei r commercial powe r an d a n influence with the Dutch authoritie s which
Spanish official s were inclined to regard as rather formidable.
This tension showe d itself less in any specific incidents that occurred than in the general
approach and attitud e o f Spanish official s to the problems of Spanish-Dutch commerce .
Vincent Richard' s assertion that the Sephardi m playe d th e leading role in Dutch com -
merce of the 1650 s is perhaps a rather extreme example of the emphasis placed by Spanis h
officials o n the importance o f the Jews, but i t is typical. The Dutch Sephardi m ha d com e
to represent an extremely imposing reality in the world of Spanish trad e and certainly not
only i n th e mind s o f Spanis h diplomats . I n Octobe r 1654 , th e counci l o f state , havin g
received a flood of reports in recent years from Seville , Cadiz , Malaga , Alicante an d th e
north coast ports instancing examples of violation of regulations and fraud, 178 debated the
highly unsatisfactor y stat e o f affair s tha t ha d arise n i n th e Spanis h ports , followin g
Munster, and especiall y since the concession179 made t o the Dutch in the Spanish-Dutc h
commercial treat y of August 1650 , whereby Dutch vessels in Spanish port s were no longer
subject t o boarding an d inspection , as all foreign ships in Spanish an d sout h Italian port s
had been since the early 1620s , but, instead, to avoid fraud, were merely required t o bring
certificates signed b y officials o f the Dutch admiralty colleges testifying that their cargoes
were not of French o r Portuguese origin. I t was maintained that it was especially th e Jews
178
AG S Estado 2083, consulta 27 Oct. 1654; some of the most worrying reports related to illegal export of
silver fro m Cadi z to Amsterdam; one was received by Penaranda, from Lop o Ramirez, in November
1649 tha t fou r ship s had entere d Amsterdam from Cadi z carrying 3 million ducats of unregistered
silver, AGS 207 0 consulta 26 Dec. 1649 ; see also ibid, consulta 5 Feb. 1650.
179
I n rendering the terms of the agreement, Aitzema records that the Dutch "alleenlijk sulle n gehouden
sijn over te leveren ende te thoonen aen de Officiers van de Havenen van Spaegnien, ofte ander e staten
van de n mee r hooghs t gemelte n Heer e Koningh va n wae r s y sullen vertrecken, hare Passepoorten,
inhoudende d e specificati e va n d e Lading e hare r schepen , geattesteer t end e gemerc t me t he t
Ordinaris-zegel ende Hantteecken, ende erkent van de Officiers va n de Admiraliteyt, in de Quartieren
van dae r s y het gemun t hebben, all e t e same n i n ee n ordinaris e end e gewoonelijck e forme: Nae r
welcker vertooning e hare r Passepoorte n i n d e gemelt e forme , end e sulle n s y i n har e Reys e niet
ghemolesteert nocht e ondersocht, opgehouden , ofte verachte t mogen werden onder wat decksel het
soude mogen wesen," Van Staet en Oorlogh, vii, 181.
who were exploiting the obvious weaknesses of this provision an d the fact that in practic e
the certificates were signed not by Dutch admiralt y officials, who gave out that they knew
no Spanish, but by ordinary notaries. In his various letters touching on the subject of fraud
in Spanish-Dutch commerce, Gamarr a repeatedl y urged Madrid that the only remedy for
the insufferabl e exten t o f Dutc h subersio n o f Spanis h trad e control s wa s t o pre s th e
States-General t o accep t th e nee d fo r certificate s t o be checke d an d signed , a s an assu -
rance o f thei r authenticity , by th e Spanis h consu l i n Amsterda m an d anothe r Spanis h
consul whic h i t was hoped t o establish a t Rotterdam. "Fo r no-on e wil l oppose this", he
confidently thoug h wrongl y claimed, 180 "except th e Jew s an d a few (other) Amsterda m
merchants lest their villanies should be discovered". Like Gamarra, Jacques Richard, th e
consul a t Amsterdam , repeatedl y asserte d tha t i t wa s th e Jew s i n particula r wh o wer e
breaking the Spanish regulations and defrauding the crown.181
These claims were supported with some specific examples. Gamarra, for instance, sen t
to Madrid a copy o f a false certificate, obtained b y Richard i n Amsterdam, made ou t by
the notar y Benedic t Baddel , fo r a shipmen t t o Málaga , bein g sen t b y a non-existan t
merchant name d Franci s Hendriksen , an d witnesse d b y non-existan t witnesses , Hen -
driksen having been found to be the alias of the Dutch Jewish merchant Simon Rodrigue z
Nunez.182 Richar d als o sen t Gamarr a a certificate , agai n mad e ou t b y Baddel , fo r a
shipment o f 10,0001 b of Portuguese Brazilia n tobacc o bein g despatched b y Jacob Ferr o
López183 t o Betanzos , i n Galicia , fo r hi s relativ e Manue l Ferro ; Portugues e Brazilia n
tobacco bein g contraband i n Spain, the consignment wa s falsely declare d to have proce-
eded fro m th e sal e o f a Portuguese prize capture d b y a Zeeland privateer . Ferr o Lópe z
appeared i n the document under the alias Bernard Jan Armer while Baddel styled himself
N. van den Berg. Richard als o uncovere d a master forge r among the Jews at Amsterda m
whom h e refer s to as "Judas Maccabeo" and who , h e says, during th e second Spanish -
Dutch war , had mad e a speciality o f forging documents fo r Dutch merchant s seekin g to
evade th e Spanish embargoe s and who was still busily manufacturing sets of false paper s
for th e Spanish territorie s at fifty guilders a time. This ma y well be the same person wh o
180
AG S Estado 2089. Gamarra t o Philip, 31 Aug. 1656 : "pues no hay quien se oponga a ello sino los judíos
y algunos mercaderes de Amsterdam, para que no se descubren sus villanías"; in fact, there was heavy
opposition fro m al l sides and th e scheme had t o be droppedsee also ibid, consulta 1 6 May 1656 , which
refers to Gamarra's view that the scheme was workable "y dice que lo que mas lo repugnaban eran los
judíos por introducir sus mercancías con testimonios (que suelen ser fatsos)".
181
AG S Estad o 2092 , consult a 2 2 Mar . 1657 , again claim s o n th e basi s of th e advi c of Lamarr a an d
Richard that the scheme would not be opposed "except o algunosjudio s qu eran Is que e orinari hazian
os mayores fraudes".
18
AG S Estado 2089, consulta 16 Nov 1656.
183
Jaco b Ferro López may be the same as, or a relative of, Jacob Semah Ferro who was uparnas in the year
5416 (1656) and presumabl y a relativ e of th e famou s Cortizo s famil y o f Madrid; hi s Spanish corre -
spondent, Manue l Ferro, ma y indeed have been th e nephew of Manuel Cortizos wh o had thi s name,
see Mocatta, L W Neths, vi J. Richar d t o Gamarra, 1 3 Jan. 1656 ; J. Meijer . Encyclopaedia Sephardica
Neerlandica (Amst . 1949 ) bijlage ii ; an d C . Rubens , "Joseph Cortisso s an d th e Wa r o f th e Spanis h
Succession", Transactions of th e Jewish Historical Society of England (TJHSE) xxiv (1975) p. 132.
was referred t o in the Spanish counci l o f state in February 166 1 as the Jew of Amsterdam
who was forging numbers of permits fo r trade in the Spanish Indies. 184
The fac t tha t Dutc h Jew s tradin g wit h Spain regularl y employed aliase s t o veil them -
selves an d thei r factor s fro m th e Spanis h authoritie s in general, and th e Inquisitio n i n
particular, an d t o furthe r their avoidanc e o f Spanis h regulations , led Jacque s Richard ,
who heartil y deteste d th e Jews , t o tr y to penetrat e thei r we b o f aliases an d lear n mor e
about their activities. His major coup was to gain the assistance of the chief clerk of one of
the Amsterdam notarie s wh o had mos t to do with the Jews, an Antwerp Catholic named
Emmanuel Lavill e who was of partly Portuguese converso origin.185 This person , at some
risk t o himself , provide d th e Spanis h consu l wit h th e tw o highl y importan t list s o f
thirty-three Dutch-Jewis h firm s tradin g wit h Spai n se t out i n th e appendi x belo w an d
various othe r piece s of valuable informatio n probabl y includin g the discovery , in 1655 ,
that one of the leaders of the Amsterdam community , wh o styled himself "Cortez", was in
fact named Cortizos. 186
The fac t that th e Dutch Sephardi m wer e clearly much more extensively involved, both
in commerce with Andalusia and with the Spanish north coast, in the period 1646-60 , than
had bee n th e cas e durin g th e Twelve Year s Truce (1609-21) , should caus e th e historia n
little surprise despit e the clear evidence fo r the economic decline o f the Dutch Sephardi m
during the decades 1621-4 1 and the extreme difficulty o f maintaining relations with Spain
until at least 1646. The three major Spanish exports during the 1650s , as during the Twelve
Years Truce, were silver, wool and colonial dyestuffs, but while the Dutch i n general still
had the same advantages, wit h their lower freight rates and better Baltic connections, over
non-Dutch merchant s a s previously, th e Dutch Jew s now had certai n particular advan -
tages ove r othe r Dutc h trader s tha t the y ha d no t possesse d before . I n th e woo l trade ,
whereas h i th e year s 1609-21 , th e Portugues e conversos migrating t o Spai n wer e onl y
beginning t o penetrat e th e aren a an d handle d onl y a smal l part o f th e trade, 187 by th e
1640s and 1650s , after two decades of domination of the financial structure o f the country ,
most o f the major wool dealers, includin g Sebastian Cortizos, Fernando Montezino s and
184
Mocatt a LW Neths, vi, J. Richard t o Gamarra, 20 Dec. 1656 ; AGS Estad o 2198 consulta, 1 Feb. 1661,
refers t o letter s o f Gamarr a i n whic h "d a quent a d e i r creciend o cad a di a ma s e l comerci o qu e
introduzen lo s subditos d e aquella s provincias e n la s Indias . .. valiéndos e de pasaporte s falso s po r
haver allí un judio qu e lo s contrahaze". The ma n referre d to as Judas Maccabeo b y Richard is clearly
the sam e personage a s the highl y skilled calligraphier o f Amsterdam, lehudah Machabeu , wh o prin -
cipally rendere d Jewis h text s into a very fin e Spanis h script ; se e L. Fuks an d R . G. Fuks-Mansfeld ,
Hebrew and Judaic Manuscripts in Amsterdam Public Collections, i (Leiden, 1975) pp. 47,93-4; Chimen
Abramsky give s the name , fro m a differen t manuscript, as lehudah Machaben'lo , se e his catalogu e
"Thirty-eight Highl y Important Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts from th e Collection formed by the
late David Solomo n Sassoon" for the auction arranged b y Sotheby in Zurich, in November 1975 , p. 99.
185
Laville' s fathe r wa s Italia n whil e hi s mothe r wa s a siste r o f Gaspa r Fernánde z d e Leó n o f Paris ,
Moccata L W Neths , xi, J. Richar d t o Gamarra, 1 2 Sep, 3 Oct, 3 1 Oct. 1655 ; V. Brants, "Une pag e d e
sémitisme diplomatique et commercial" Academie Royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres,
Brussels 1905 , no. vu, p. 587.
188
Mocatt a LW Neths , xi, Richard t o Gamarra, 1 6 Dec. 1655.
187
Th e author hopes to publish a separate study on the Spanish wool trade of the early seventeenth century
shortly.
his sons, Manue l and Bartolomé , an d Francisc o Duart e Méndez , were conversos19* an d
conversos i n whos e familie s crypto-Judaism wa s evidentl y deeply ingrained , and sinc e
these men combined thei r wool business with a variety of financial operations which they
generally wished to conceal from Spanis h officialdom and th e Inquisition, they preferred
to deal with the Amsterdam Jews among whom they had an increasing number of relatives
and who could provid e the connections an d secrec y which they needed. Th e importanc e
of the traffic i n tol and of the contraband route , through Úit puertos secos between Castil e
and Navarre , t o Bayonne, a speciality o f the Dutc h ews since 1621 , and on e extensively
used for illicit export o f wool, is shown by the strikingly large proportion o f Jewish firm s
trading wit h Spai n fro m Hollan d whic h ha d mor e tha n on e corresponden t i n th e Sa n
Sebastián, Bilba o and Santander area. One Bayonne Jew who was particularly active as an
intermediary between the Madrid conversos and Amsterdam Jewry was Diego Rodrigue z
Cardoso wh o specialized i n sending North Europea n cloth from Bayonn e to Madrid an d
remitting Castilian wool from south-western France to Amsterdam, notably to such recen t
immigrants fro m Spai n a s Simo n Francisc o Berna i and Manue l Núñe z Méndez. 189 As
regards dealin g i n silver, Mexican cochineal an d Guatemala n indigo, a similar argumen t
applies a s with wool. The major entrepôt in Europe for American products were the west
Andalusian ports, Cádiz, Sanlúcar and Seville especially. At the end of the Twelve Year s
Truce, the Portuguese conversos in Andalusia who , like those i n Madrid, had onl y begu n
to enter i n significan t number s during th e reig n o f Philip H I (1598-1621) , ha d scarcel y
even begu n t o penetrat e th e framewor k of American trade . B y the 1640 s however, th e
position wa s very different wit h a considerable concentration o f Portuguese conversos at
Seville an d Cádi z whic h included numerou s leadin g Indie s merchant s suc h a s Captain
Esteban Lui s Diamante an d his brothers-in-law, Gaspar an d Alfonso Rodriguez Pasarino
who had thei r own network of factors in Mexico and Per u and a t Cartagena an d Bueno s
Aires. Thu s th e transformatio n in Spanish-Dutc h relation s in th e crucial year s 1646-50 ,
culminating in a commercial treaty which was decidedly favourable to the Dutch, not only
made inevitable a return to the position o f Dutch dominance in Spanish commerce, suc h
as existed before 1621 , but produce d a Dutch dominance with a much more pronounce d
Jewish rôle than formerly.
The sudden rapid advance of the Dutch Sephardim i n the decade 1646-55 , within th e
framework o f changing Spanish-Dutc h relations , wa s not howeve r only a matte r o f a n
exceptionally favourable trading opportunity, owing to the superiority of Dutch shippin g
and the collapse of Spanish controls over commercial procedures, in conjunction with the
new prominence of the conversos in Spanish finance, wool and colonial trade. There is still
more to th e impact o f Spain o n th e economic an d cultura l life o f the Dutch Sephardi m
188
I n October 1658 , the crown ordered a sudden embargo general on wool due for export in order to force
the asentistas int o compliance ove r matter s concerning the remittin g of cash t o Flanders ; th e larges t
consignments were those of Sebastián Cortizos and Manue l and Bartolom é Montezinos who had woo l
held u p a t Málaga , Seville , Alicant e an d Bilbao , se e AG S Estad o 4165 , Phili p t o corregidor o f
Guipúzcoa, 9 Nov. 165 8 and followin g documents.
189
Juli o Caro Baroja. Los Judíos en la España moderna y contemporánea 3 vols. (Madrid, II961) ii, 132-46;
see also, for Núñez Méndez and Bernai , appendix I below, nos. 21 and 22.
during thes e years even tha n al l this, considerable thoug h thes e factors were. For beside s
the burgeonin g o f trade , th e decad e 1646-5 5 was als o precisel y tha t i n whic h a majo r
migration o f converso financiers and tax-farmer s from th e Spanis h territorie s t o Hollan d
took place bringing a n accumulation of capital which, in its splendour, ha d n o preceden t
in th e relativel y modes t resource s o f th e pre-164 6 period . I t is , arguably , exactl y th e
combination o f the opening u p o f impressive new trading opportunitie s with the sudde n
injection o f massive resource s a t Amsterda m whic h governed an d determined , possibl y
more tha n an y othe r cause, th e extraordinar y exten t an d spee d o f th e progres s o f th e
Dutch Sephardim durin g th e middle year s of the seventeenth century .
Historians hav e remarked tha t a number of financiers involved with the Spanish crow n
departed fro m Antwerp and settle d i n Holland an d othe r centres o f the North Europea n
Sephardi diaspor a durin g thes e years . Bes t know n i s th e cas e o f th e thre e prominen t
Antwerp banker s Dieg o Teixeira d e Sampay o (Abraha m Senior) , Gi l Lope s (Abraha m
de) Pint o an d hi s brother Rodrig o Alvare s (David de ) Pinto , who fled Antwerp almos t
together i n Jul y 1646 , th e first becoming a t onc e th e leadin g Jew at Hambur g whil e th e
brothers Pint o establishe d themselve s a t Rotterda m a s head s o f wha t wa s a t onc e th e
richest Jewish famil y in th e Unite d Provinces. 190 Joâo d a Roch a Pinto 191 (Zacharias a
Cohen), anothe r Antwer p financier , also , a t abou t thi s time, joined th e communit y a t
Hamburg whilst Joâo Ribeir o (Jaco b Guedalla), 192 uncl e o f Gi l Ribeir o d e Olivares , a
leading Antwerp banker, an d a close relative of the Pintos preceded the m to Rotterdam.
Antonio (Isaac) Lope s Suasso, 193 whose massive fortune later rivalle d tha t of the Pinto s
left th e Spanish Netherlands for Rotterdam a t the end of 1652 . Somewhat less well-known
is th e cas e o f anothe r Antwer p financier , Ada m Dia z Soils , a clos e associat e o f bot h
Teixeira and th e Pintos t o whom th e latter transferred thei r remaining Antwerp business
when they left, who was arrested by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands , in 1647 , on
suspicion o f complicity in th e Portugues e secession bu t who , at some poin t befor e 1655,
190 -«-j-fj g D e pj nto M anuscr¡pt'. A 17t h century Marrano famil y history" , éd . H . P . Salomon , Stadia
Rosenth. ix , i (Jan . 1975 ) pp. 7 , 30-1 ; J . Denucé , "let s ove r Spaansch-Portugeesch e geslachte n in
Nederland", Antwerpsch Archievenblad 192 7 pp. 37-52 ; Moze s Heima n Gans , Memorboek (Baarn ,
1971) p. 110,227 .
191 "Th e D e Pint o Ms" , p . 1 In; Roch a Pint o is listed a s a leadin g Antwerp pagador in 1633 , J. Denucé,
"Thomas de Sampay o en he t Spaansch Legerarchief' , Antwerpsch Archievenblad 1926, p. 312.
192
ibid , p. 318n; "The D e Pinto Ms", p. 26; Gil Ribeiro de Olivares was the son and Antwer p factor of the
Madrid asentista, Duarte Díaz de Olivares whose wife, Isabel, was an aunt of Abraham de Pinto, being
a daughter of Branca (Sarah) Ribeira the elder, sister of de Pinto's grandmother.
193 "T ne rj e pint o Ms"., 42-4; Lopes Suasso became the second husband of Abraham de Pinto's daughter
Violante (Rachel) who became known as Rachel Suasso de Pinto, combining the two wealthiest Jewish
names i n Holland ; i n th e 167 5 ta x assessmen t a t Amsterdam , though Lope s Suasso , assesse d a t
ƒ 231,000 which in any case was certainly a drastic underestimate, had th e largest single fortune o f any
Dutch Jew , the combine d totals o f Abraha m de Pinto' s son, Isaac , an d hi s immediat e relative s was
much higher , see A. M. Vaz Dias, "Over de n vermogenstoestan d de r Amsterdamsche Joden in de 17 e
en d e 18 e eeuw". Tijd. voor Geschied, l i (1963) p. 170.
194
settled as a Jew at Amsterdam. These various movements from Antwerp, however, have
not bee n considered , a s they might, a s part o f a larger migratio n involvin g the flight of
several Madri d asentistas, an d partner s o f asentistas, o f who m th e Antwer p financier s
were both factors, and , in several cases, relatives. In 1646 , a key figure, Thomas Rodriguez
(Abraham) Pereyra fled with his immediate family from Madri d to Amsterdam, where his
brother Isaac had proceded him by several years, bringing a sizeable treasure that could be
compared with that of the Pintos with whom indeed the Pereyras soon becam e intimately
connected.195 I n 1647 , a leadin g Madri d asentista, Salvado r Vae z Martinez , knigh t of
Alcántara, an d apparentl y anothe r brothe r o f Abraham Pereyra, fle d t o Roue n owing ,
according t o Spanis h reports , abou t 70,00 0 ducat s t o th e crown. 196 In th e same year, or
shortly after , Manue l d e Pinto , secon d cousi n o f Abraham d e Pinto, son of the Madri d
asentista Manuel Alvarez Pinto and nephew of the great Madrid financier, Manuel de Paz,
fled wit h hi s famil y fro m Madri d t o Holland. 197 Meanwhile , certai n member s o f th e
immensely wealth y and ennoble d Cortizo s famil y wer e leaving Madri d fo r Amsterdam,
notably Isaa c Semah Cortizos (alias Cortez) who became parnas in 1649 and Jacob Semah
Ferro, while Manuel Cortizo s himself , forme r farmer of the Spanis h woo l revenues and
one of the greates t financier s i n Europe , wa s reported t o have remitted par t o f his huge
fortune, som e 600,000 ducats (about ƒ 1,800,000 ) to held fo r his family i n Amsterdam by
David Osorio , wh o ha d previousl y held a vast sum fo r the Pinto s before their departure
from Antwerp , Abraham del Pardo an d Juan de Paz.198 At the same time, relatives of yet
other Madri d financiers , suc h a s Diego Ménde z d e Brito , were appearing amon g Dutc h
Jewry. Yet more Madrid financiers fled during th e early an d middl e 1650s , notabl y th e
salt arrendadores, Gaspar and Balthasa r Rodriguez Cardoso, and , after hi s appearance in
194
Dia z Sous was the Antwerp facto r o f his father Francisc o Fernánde z Sous , a Sevillian asentista who ,
during the 1640s , was a one of the converso syndicate farming the almojarifazgo d e Indicts de Sevilla, th e
most important customs duty in Spain an d indee d i n Europe; eigh t years after his arrest in Antwerp, he
is mentioned b y Jacques Richard as a "rich Jew of Amsterdam", Mocatta LW Neths xi , J. Richard to
Gamarra, Amst , 2 1 Oct . 1655 ; Memorial Histórico Español. Colección d e documentos, opúsculos y
antigüedades qu e publica l a Real Academia d e l a Historia 4 7 vols . (Madrid , 1851-1915 ) xix , p . 19 5
mentions Adam's arres t and describes Francisc o a s "tesorero del almojarifazgo d e Sevilla".
195
AG S Estad o 2070. Bru n to Gerónimo d e l a Torre, Cambrai , 27 Aug. 1649 ; Cecil Roth is thus shown t o
have bee n correc t i n hi s suggestion tha t Abraham' s brother , Isaa c Pereyra , who se t up , i n 1644 , th e
yeshiva to which Abraham subsequently also handsomely contributed , Preceded hi m to Amsterdam by
at least two years, Cecil Roth. A Life o/Menasseh be n Israel. Rabbi, Printer and Diplomat (Philadelphia,
1934) pp. 62-3, 102 , 317; see also, Silva Rosa , Geschiedenis, 31, 67-8 .
196
Mocatt a L W Neths vi, Gamarra t o Luis de Haro, I I May 1655 ; Caro Baroja, Los Judíos, ii, 140; in 1644 ,
Váez Martine z held th e secon d larges t asiento i n Madrid , o f an y Portuguese , afte r Jorg e d e Pa z d e
Silveira, AGS Estado 2062, "Relación de la provission . . . para Flandes y Alemania est e año de 1644";
his son , Antoni o Martinez , wa s late r seize d b y th e Inquisitio n i n Seville . However , a n undate d
memorandum draw n u p b y one of the King' s secretaries, i n about 1650 , mentions that it had com e t o
Brun's attention that Salvador Váez Martine z was then i n Holland, see AGR, Bruss. , SEG. 675 , Brun
Papers, "Sobre lo de Tomas Pereyra" .
197
"Th e D e Pinto Ms.", p. 18.
198
Car o Baroja, Los Judíos, ii , 112 .
the auto defe a t Cuenca i n January 1656 , Fernando d e Montezinos, a principal merchan t
and asentista whose wif e was a cousin of the Cortizos. 199
This remarkable transfer o f a whole grou p of Europe's leading financiers an d banker s
from Madri d an d Antwer p to Hamburg, Rouen, Rotterdam an d Amsterda m within th e
space of a few years is perhaps best attributed t o two specific pressures o n the conversos in
Spain arising from the crisis of the later 1640s and earl y 1650s . If the flight of Teixeira an d
the Pintos is treated, as it has been,200 in isolation, then it might be convincing to explain i t
in terms o f their fears that the city would fall t o the Dutch army under Frederik Handri k
which was then operating in its vicinity. This was the explanation given i n contemporar y
reports fro m Brussel s to Madrid 201 and clearl y derive d fro m th e pretex t offere d b y th e
families themselves , i n accounting for their preparations, which wer e too considerable to
pass unnoticed . But if it was their pretext, it may no t have been thei r motive and i t must
surely be admitted tha t fears for the fate of Antwerp are a most implausible reason for the
passing of these bankers over to open Judaism. It is decidedly odd that financiers who had
resided in Antwerp sinc e before the start of the second Spanish-Dutch wa r in 162 1 should
flee, afte r a quarter of a century of conflict and severa l Dutch advance s to the vicinity of
Antwerp, durin g th e very last campaign, whe n th e break-through to peace in the talks at
Munster, a s the y mus t hav e known , ha d bee n made. 202 Besides , i f apprehensio n fo r
Antwerp wa s their motive, unles s the y wishe d fo r some othe r reaso n t o break wit h th e
Spanish crown , movin g t o Brussels, Liege o r Cologn e woul d have bee n fa r more logica l
and reputable than fligh t to Rotterdam an d i t is significant that Abraha m d e Pinto's son
later recalled , i n his family history , that, just before their departure, his father and uncl e
had intimate d t o Brussel s tha t the y wer e preparin g t o mov e temporaril y t o th e ver y
Catholic city of Cologne.203 But in any case, th e flight of Teixeira an d th e Pinto s should
not and ca n no t be dealt with separatel y from tha t o f their Antwerp colleagues , such a s
Lopes Suass o an d Diaz Solis , who departed shortl y after th e en d o f the war or from th e
various departure s fro m Madrid . Abraha m Pereyr a an d hi s son , Isaac , who had bee n
engaged in forwarding cash, in connection with the royal asientos to Antwerp, left Madri d
at almost th e same tim e tha t th e Pinto s an d Teixeir a left Antwer p an d their subsequen t
remarkable intimac y with th e Pint o famil y suggests a t leas t th e possibilit y of previou s
collusion. Váe z Martínez , before fleeing Spain , ha d bee n th e Madri d corresponden t o f
199
Car o Baroja, Los Judíos, ii, 78, 80, 113.
200
Th e edito r of the "De Pint o Ms.", H. P. Salomon, maintains, 1 believe wrongly, that the Pinto s fled t o
Rotterdam chiefl y out of fear that Antwerp would fal l to the Dutch an d without an y specific commit-
ment to Judaism. I n m y view, only a strong leaning toward Judaism could have swayed them to adopt
so drastic and otherwis e improbable a course as flight t o Holland, the De Pinto ms., p. 7 et seq.
201
AC S Estad o 2066 , consulta , Zaragoza , 2 7 Sep . 164 6 quote s Castel-Rodrig o tha t "lo s hombre s d e
negocios d e mas caudal d e aquella vill a (Antwerp) y que ma s havian ganado co n los asientos de Vra.
Mgd. se havian retirad o temeroso s del enemigo" ; se e also Mocatt a L W Neths. x, Castel-Rodrigo t o
Philip, 1 9 Jul. and 4 Aug. 1646.
202
AG S Estado 2065. Junta de estado, 3 Jun. 164 6 records th e break-through o f several months befor e in
the peace talks with the Dutch.
203
"Th e De Pinto Ms", p. 30.
DiegoTeixeira, while Manue l de Pinto , as has been seen, was a relative of the Pintos of
Antwerp.
After th e fall o f the conde-duque de Olivares i n Spain, in 1643 , the conversos remained
for a time a s prominent i n Spanish fiannc e an d commerce as they had bee n throug h th e
period since 1627 , the year of Philip TV' s first suspension of asientos and th e partial break
with the clique of Genoese financiers which had previously handled cash transactions for
the crown. After 1627 , the conversos, or th e "Portuguese " as they wer e know n i n officia l
parlance i n Spain , surpasse d th e Genoes e i n importance , i n mos t sector s o f Spanis h
finance, including the remitting o f cash from Madri d t o Antwerp t o finance th e extremel y
costly Spanis h army o f Flanders. The figure s for remittances to Antwerp i n 1646 , the las t
full year before Phili p IV's second suspension of asientos and th e year of the flight of the
Pintos, Pereyra s and o f Teixeira, serves t o illustrate thi s continuin g preponderanc e an d
also the formal link s between the Madrid asentistas an d their Antwerp factors. Th e crown
experienced exceptional difficulty in meeting it s commitments t o its bankers in 164 6 an d
thus the amounts actually paid t o the army paymasters in Antwerp lagged badly behind
the agreed schedule.
Table 13: The Flanders asientos for 1646 2M
Asentistas Antwer p Schedule d Actua l
in Madrid. Correspondents . Payments . Payment s
I. Th e Genoese (A. Piquenoti, J. E. Spinola, J. P. In Castilian

duals, paid in
A. Palavesin, L. Imbrea, Dorchi, etc . twelve monthly
N. Buenaventura, etc.) installments.)
total: 1,139,062 770,123
2 Others: Benjamin
Ruit (Wright?) and others
neither Genoese o r Portuguese 335,179 325,853
3 The Portuguese:
il. Salvado r Váez Martinez, Diego Teixeira and 189,300 104,650
knight of Alcántara. Adam Dia z Solis.
ii. Duart e Díaz de Olivares Gil Ribeiro de Olivares 151,909 85,832
iii Duart e Brando n Suárez Manuel Suárez Ribeiro 121,125 54,166
iv. Jua n Silv a de Lisbo a Doña Isabe l Franco an d
Antonio Rodriguez Franco 137,168 78,307.
v. Felip e Deni s Pacheco Gil López and
y Medina. 205 Rodrigo Alvarez Pinto 121,125 53,610.
vi Baro n Jorge de Paz
de Silveyra, knight Simon Díaz Váez. 300,000 160,656.
of Santiago.
Baron Jorge de Paz Francisco Lópe z Franco y Feo . 50,000 50,000
Baron Jorge de Paz Francisco Lópe z Franc o y Feo . 300,000 183,000.
vu. Duart e Fernández Lic. Garci a d e Yllan 159,271 98,857
Duarte Fernánde z Lie. Garcia de Yllan 24,379 24,379.
Duarte Fernández Francisco Sánchez de Sousa 165,000 84,500
204
AG S Contaduría Mayo r de Cuentas, leg. 937. Thomas Lópe z de Ulloa, "Letras d e España, 1646-8" .
205
Felip e Denis was a nephew of Manuel de Paz of whom the Pintos had for many years been the Antwer p
correspondents; afte r Paz' s death, Denis continued his business.
viii. Francisc o Fernande z

Solis (at Seville). Adam Dia z Solis 100.000 100,000.
ix Enriqu e Ménde z Quiro s Simon Diaz Váez 49,992 19,317.
totals for the Portuguese : 1,869,26 9 1,097,320 .
grand total s
The yea r 164 6 wa s th e las t i n whic h th e financia l circui t create d b y Olivare s an d

dominated b y conversos continued t o function. Undoubtedly variou s signs of the pending
crash of October 1647 were already visible for it was perfectly clear that the crown, with its
revenues exhausted , wa s unabl e t o fin d th e mone y t o pa y it s bankers . I t neede d n o
particular acume n t o discer n tha t th e leve l o f roya l expenditur e o n th e thre e majo r
military front s o f th e 1640s , Flanders , Cataloni a an d Portugal , wa s muc h to o hig h i n
relation t o available income an d especiall y as the general trad e depressio n i n Spain an d
the declin e i n Spanish-America n commerc e wa s becomin g increasingl y sever e durin g
these years. From 1647 , the situation deteriorate d sharply. A run of bad harvests , cause d
by severa l year s o f exceptionall y ba d weather , sprea d famin e an d furthere d th e mos t
terrible outbreak o f plague in seventeenth-century Spain. 206 This in turn, besides the great
suffering an d miser y tha t it caused, involved a sharp setbac k to royal income, for the sales
and consumption taxe s which provided th e bulk of the crown's revenues were severely hit
as a result of the paralysis of Castilian agriculture an d economic activity generally. I f the
years 1647-5 3 were years of "general crisis " throughout Europe, then nowhere was it more
pronounced tha n in Castile. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the deepening gloom of these years
was accompanied b y a marked resurgenc e o f antisemitism whic h mus t b e seen as being
partly a reaction t o years of crushingly heavy taxation, initiated by the crown perhaps, but
handled an d operated mainl y by Portuguese conversos. The notion thet the conversos were
partly responsibl e fo r th e rui n an d misfortune s of th e countr y an d shoul d b e harshl y
stamped upo n wa s very much in the air.207 Turning upon the "Portuguese" was , perhaps,
Philip IV's only remainin g financia l expedient .
In Octobe r 1647 , the crow n suspende d th e asientos, cancelling existin g arrangement s
with it s bankers , i n suc h a wa y a s t o damag e th e conversos especially. Som e Genoes e
suffered also , but it was the "Portuguese" who took th e brunt o f the losses. "The kin g of
206
J . Lynch . Spain under the Habsburgs 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965-9) , ii, 127-8 ; Antoni o Dominque z Ortiz.
Alteraciones Andaluzas (Madrid, 1973) pp. 48, 54,64-5, 161.
207
Car o Baroja , Lo s Judíos, ii , 40-8 ; severa l reference s o f Matía s d e Novo a revea l hi s feeling s o n th e
subject includin g his likening of the crown's suspension of the asientos in 164 7 to the Cid Campeador's
deceiving of the Jews assertin g "Y n o e s mal consejo engaña r a quien engaña"; th e Aragonese , José
Pellicer d e Ossau , i n hi s anonymousl y publishe d Comercio Impedido (1640 ) represent s a strikin g
instance o f specifically economic antisemitis m asserting, for instance, that "el asentist a de Españ a es
compañero de l Bibentebre de Amsterdam, y unos y otros caminan a nuestra ruyna sin diferenciarse el
vezino de Sevilla del de Amsterdam, ni el de Amsterdam del de Sevilla." op. cit., f5v.
Spain", wrote Matías de Novoa, "shook of f the Portuguese, took their assets and lef t them
with debts which were said to be substantial, indeed very large and some of a million. Th e
groans and laments were great, they talked of their utter and total ruin in wealth, trade an d
government (finance)". 208 The collapse oí asentistas in turn affected man y others who had
invested wit h the m an d badl y disrupte d th e busines s o f their Antwerp correspondents .
Antwerp indeed no w ceased t o provide th e major opportunities for conversos that it ha d
formerly.209 The year 1647 marked the beginning of the decline of Antwerp as a key centre
of converso activity . I n Spain , th e specificall y punitiv e aspec t o f th e suspensio n wit h
respect t o the "Portuguese" , is illustrated by Philip IV's orders to the council o f state, of
October 1647 , i n whic h minister s wer e instructe d t o pas s ove r th e conversos a s fa r a s
possible in th e awardin g of arrendamientos in the future , eve n t o the exten t of acceptin g
less advantageous term s than might have otherwis e been obtained. 210 After the crash, the
crown turne d agai n t o th e Genoese and arrange d a new set of asientos from whic h th e
"Portuguese" were largely excluded.211 In later years, some converso firms returned t o the
scene o f governmen t finance , notabl y thos e o f Cortizos , Montezino s an d Simo n d e
Fonseca Pina , bu t the y neve r regaine d quit e th e sam e prominenc e tha t the y ha d ha d
during the years 1627-47.
The fligh t o f Teixeira, the Pinto s and th e Pereyras , then, immediately preceded , an d
that of Váez Martinez, Manuel de Pinto and other s followed, what, for the conversos, was
an economi c catastrophe . Bu t besides th e financia l crisis , ther e wa s yet anothe r poten t
factor effective at least as early as 1646 , the intensification of Inquisition activity in Spain
during th e 1640 s and 1650s . The downfal l of Olivares , wh o ha d sough t t o mak e Spai n
more secure for the conversos, was soon followed b y the appointment of a more rigorous
Inquisitor-General, Do n Dieg o d e Arc e Reynoso , tha n ha d bee n activ e sinc e th e mas s
immigration of "Portuguese" into Spain had begun at the turn of the century.212 Whereas
in the 1620 s there were eighteen autos de fe i n Spain, and in the 1630 s only ten, in the 1640s
there were nineteen an d i n th e 1650s , a peak o f Inquisition persecution i n Spain , no less
than forty-three . Admittedly , i t may be that the very sharp increas e i n the actual number
of Inquisition arrest s of conversos in Spain, during the 1650s , may no t ye t have begun in
the late r 1640s. 213 However , althoug h a t leas t thre e majo r asentistas ha d bee n seize d
208
Matía s de Novoa . Historia de Felipe IV, Re y d e España iii . Colección de documentos inéditos para l a
Historia de Espña 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842-95) Ixxxvi, 365; see also Antonio Domínguez Ortiz. Política y
Hacienda de Felipe /KfMadrid, 1960 ) pp. 66, 69, 108 .
209 "Th e [) e Pint o Ms.", pp. 21 , 49; Isaa c de Pinto , in referrin g t o the brillianc e of Antwerp in th e earl y
seventeenth century, mentions the subsequent decline of the "Portuguese" there: "sendo entâo Anueres
praça d e muito negosio qu e florecía naquelle temp o altamente, com o muitas cazas rica s d a nacào que
despois se forâo estenguindo".
210
Archiv o Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Estado leg. 727. Philip to consejo, 31 Oct. 1647 .
211
AG S Estado 2068, "Relación de las letras de las mesadas de Febrero y Marzo" (1648) .
212
Antoni o Domíngue z Ortiz; "Lo s converso s d e orige n judi o despué s d e l a expulsión" , Estudios d e
Historia Social de España iii, ed. C. Viñas y Mey (Madrid, 1955) p. 343; see also Adler, op. cit., p. 165.
213
Th e lis t of judaizers taken by the Toledo tribuna l of the Holy Office, largel y in Madrid , suggests that
there were in fact less arrests in the 1640 s than in the 1630 s with a sudden very sharp increase from 1650 ,
see Archivo Histórico Nacional. Catálogo de las causas contra la fe seguidas ante el Tribuna! del Santo
Oficio de la Inquisición de Toledo (Madrid , 1903).
214
during th e Olivare s years, i t does see m tha t leading conversos did becom e decidedl y
more vulnerable during the later 1640s. In July 1646, three important conversos were taken
in Madrid including the cashier of a leading asentista.™ Also in 1646 , the elderly financier
Manuel Enrique wa s seized whil e the asset s o f Captain Esteva n Luis Diamante , a prin-
cipal Sevillian financier, were sequestrated. 216In th e early summer of 1646 , the asentista
Alfonso Rodrigue z Pasarino , who was Diamante's brother-in-la w and als o from Seville ,
was taken, just as he was establishing himself at Madrid, an d his brother Gaspar moving
to Antwerp, to service a newly arranged royal asiento whereby, using the Diamante assets,
the brothers undertook to forward 400,000 ducats (ƒ 1,200,000 ) t o Flanders in 1647. 217 The
arrest of Pasarino i s particularly significant, fo r it demonstrates ver y clearly that by 1646 ,
no financier, however important he might be to the crown, had any measure of immunity
from the Inquisition. Yet another asentista, it is not clear which, was arrested in June 1647.
Following th e deat h o f Manuel Cortizos, soo n afte r hi s having transferred much of th e
family's wealth to Holland, the Inquisition increased it s investigations with respect to his
family an d seize d hi s widow endangering many others o f his relatives. 218 Fernand o d e
Montezinos was taken by the Inquisition in 1654 , while Gaspar and Balthasa r Rodriguez
Cardoso, wh o fle d i n 1655 , were evidentl y fleeing from th e Inquisitio n which had bee n
collecting evidence agains t them since 1650 .
The endin g of th e secon d Spanish-Dutc h wa r an d th e resumptio n o f Spanish-Dutc h
trade, therefore , co-incide d wit h a resurgenc e o f Inquisitio n activit y i n Spai n an d a
financial cras h whic h adversel y affecte d th e conversos in bot h Spai n an d th e Spanis h
Netherlands. Together , arguably , thes e circumstance s constitute d th e crucia l elemen t
which serve d t o transfor m th e economi c positio n o f th e Dutc h Sephardi m s o quickly.
Amsterdam and Rotterdam , fro m bein g far inferior to Madrid and Antwerp as centres of
Jewish and New Christian capital accumulation, suddenly, in the later 1640s , outstripped
them makin g Holland , fo r th e firs t time , th e economi c centr e o f th e converso an d
European Sephard i world. The transference of great financiers and merchants with their
funds, fro m th e Spanish territories , did not of course go unnoticed by Spanish official s i n
the Low Countries wh o showed at least a measure of concern. They were to some extent
interested i n checkin g the proces s o f migratio n an d als o i n possibilitie s fo r recovering
certain sum s of money which in the official Spanis h vie w had simpl y been stolen . "I a m
advised", reporte d Bru n to Madrid in August 1649,
"that a personage named Thomas Pereyra left Madri d thre e years ago and came to
Amsterdam, having banktupted there and take n from Hi s Majesty a large sum that
had been entrusted to him for remitting to Flanders and that this man, who is a Jew
214
Thes e were Juan Nunez Saravia, Manuel Fernández Pinto and Antonio Diego Méndez Ximénez who,
interestingly, was listed in 163 5 as Madrid correspondent of the Pintos in Antwerp, Mocatta LW Neths
x, Pierre Roose to Philip, 6 Feb. 1635.
215
Memorial Histórico Español xviii, 360.
216
Henr y Kamen. The Spanish Inquisition (London, 1965) p. 221.
217
ibid ; AGS Haciend a consulta 10 May 1646 ; AGS Estad o 2066, consulta, Zaragoza, 27 Sep. 1646.
218
Car o Baroja, Los Judíos, II , 107-12 .
and live s no w i n Rotterda m an d i s very rich , i f I ha d th e necessar y paper s an d
especially thos e o f the obligation s that he undertook, I could pursu e him throug h
legal process here and recover, if not all, at least part of what he has stolen and owes
to His Majesty; also I am assured that there are others that fled (from Spain ) as well,
and came to the United Provinces, concerning whom, if I had enough information, I
would d o m y dut y not t o let the m enjoy with impunity the roya l revenue s of His
Majesty".219
The counci l o f stat e considere d this , bu t nothin g wa s done , perhap s becaus e i n th e
aftermath o f the 164 7 suspension, it would have been difficul t t o justify th e crown's own
financial conduct i n any foreign court. The fac t tha t the case was just dropped ma y also
indicate that Pereyra's misconduc t was rather less cut and drie d tha n Bru n too k it to be.
There are a number of other references by Spanish officials t o real or alleged stealing from
the crow n b y fleeing crypto-Jews . These however were eithe r very general i n character ,
though this may not mean that they were unfounded, or referred specifically to Abraham
and Isaac Pereyra and their relative, Váez Martinez. No accusations were made, evidently,
against the Pintos, Teixeiras, Lope s Suasso and others. In October 1655 , Jacques Richard,
having only recently learnt about the Pereyras, fro m a certain Simon de Suasso, suggested
to Gamarra tha t the king, so as to retrieve what was owing to him, should seiz e the good s
of Pereyra's Spanis h correspondent s whos e identitie s Richard's diligence ha d latel y un-
covered.220 but again no action was taken.
Slightly more energy was shown by the crown in the cases of Fernando Montezinos and
the brothers Rodriguez Cardoso. When Montezinos was seized by the Inquisition, in 1654,
he held the farm for the salt duties of Galicia and Asturias and an asiento for supplying the
garrison of the Spanish plaza fuerte o f Ceuta in North Africa . His immediate assets, worth
474,096 ducat s were confiscated bu t i t wa s foun d tha t thi s wa s no t enoug h t o pa y hi s
creditors, as his debts, including 400,000 ducats owing for grain purchases for Ceuta mad e
in 1653 , amounted t o a n eve n large r sum. 221 It wa s noted tha t Montezino s had furthe r
assets, worth over 100,000 ducats in the Low Countries, mainly at Amsterdam, and it was
to obtain thes e that the crown, at the prompting of the Inquisition, instructed the admin-
istration in Brussels and its ambassador a t The Hague to seek to have a court order placed
219
AG S Estad o 2070 , Bru n t o Gerónim o d e l a Torre , Cambrai , 2 7 Aug . 1649 : "teng o avis o qu e u n
particular llamad o Thoma s Pereyr a sali ó tre s año s h a d e Madri d y vin o a Amsterdam , haviendo
quebrado alli , y quitado a su Magd. gran suma de dinero que se avia encargado remitir en Flandes, Y
como este hombre, qu e e s un judio, vive agora e n Roterdam mu y rico , si yo tuviera los documentos y
particularmente la s obligaciones qu e hizo , yo podría apretarl e por via de justicia, y cobrar sino todo,
por lo menos parte de lo que ha hurtado y deve a su Magd., me asseguran que otros ay que se huyeron
también, y se retiraron e n la s Provincias Unidas, de qu e teniend o bastantes informaciones haria m i
dever para no dejarles gozar con impunidad la rl. hazienda de su Magd".
220
Mocatt a LW Neths. xi, Richard to Gamarra, Amst . 31 Oct. 1655 ; see also vol. vi, Richard to Gamarra ,
14Jul. 1657 .
221
Kamen , op. cit., pp. 222-3.
on hi s possessions wit h the clai m tha t the money was owed t o his creditors in Spain. 222
Information wa s sent from th e Inquisition suprema, in Madrid, via the council of state, to
the Spanish embass y at The Hague, that Montezinos had recently despatched 1,74 5 sacks
of Castilian wool , through Thoma s d e Sant a Coloma i n Bilbao and Francisc o Lópe z de
Fonseca at Cádiz, to the brothers "Gerardo and Carlos van Narden,223 Dutchmen", an d
Melchor Ménde z and Gerónim o Rodrigue z Pérez,224 all of Amsterdam, and 50 0 pipes of
olive oil, despatche d fro m Sanlúca r b y his son Manuel Montezinos t o the van Nardens .
Richard succeede d i n tracin g the bulk of Montezinos' Dutc h asset s to the warehouses of
"Francisco and Antonio d e Agurre", that is of Abraham and Isaac Pereyra, and had the m
placed unde r distraint in September 1654. 225 The Pereyras challenged the order, but th e
Amsterdam cit y authoritie s uphel d i t unti l i t wa s removed , i n Ma y 1655 , in favou r of
Montezinos' son s in Andalusia, following orders fro m Madrid , resultin g from step s taken
by Manuel and Bartolom é Montezinos to satisfy th e crown.
Gaspar an d Balthasa r Rodrigue z Cardoso , thoug h reporte d b y Barrionuevo t o have
fled t o Amsterdam , i n Jun e 1655 , takin g 200,00 0 ducat s wort h o f woo l an d 250,00 0
(ƒ 750,000) in cash,226 are more likely in fact to have fled to Bayonne. Subsequent Spanis h
references to the brothers, at any rate, do not make it clear whether they themselves were
in Holland, while it is clear that they had close connections with Bayonne. However, they
certainly did transfer some assets to Amsterdam. In August 1655, Gamafra was informed
from Madri d tha t th e brother s owe d 30,00 0 ducat s t o th e roya l treasur y i n unpai d
installments arisin g fro m thei r farmin g of the salt dutie s o f Atienza and Espartina s an d
that the y ha d recentl y shippe d tw o cargoe s o f woo l t o Amsterda m t o correspondent s
named a s "Francisco an d Antoni o d e Agurre " an d remitte d 4,00 0 escudos by lette r of
exchange, issued by Simon Méndez Soto,227 in Madrid, payable by "Jacob Bademburgh",
in Amsterdam, an d anothe r 1,00 0 escudos by Doña Isabe l d e Miranda again payabl e by
"Bademburgh". The woo l i n th e hand s o f th e Pereyra s was dul y brought unde r cour t
order, by Richard, while Gamarra requeste d Madri d to provide the necessary documents
so that he could press the case against the Cardosos at Amsterdam. This however proved
222
AG S Estad o 2083 , consult a o f Inquisitio n suprema, 9 Ma y 1654 ; ibid, 2185, Archduke Leopold t o
Philip, Brass. , 1 2 Sep. 1654 : "en entramba s partes (Norther n an d Souther n Netherlands) se están
haziendo diligencias secretas con los motivos que da la rl. carta de vra. Mgd. pero como este genero de
gente viv e d e u n trat o ta n poc o llan o y s e entiend e mudarse lo s nombre s siempr e que trata n d e
haziendas en encomienda es dificultoso topar con ella".
223
Thi s being the alternative alias of the Pereyras, see appendix I.
224
Tha t is, Enrique Mendes da Silva, see appendix i.
225
Curiously , the notary who acted for Richard in the matter of the distraint and subsequent release of the
Montezinos assets in the Pereyras' warehouses, was none other than Benedict Baddel, see AGS Estado
2085, "Desembargo qu e s e ha hecho en Amsterdam", 5 May 1655.
226
Barrionuevo , A visos, i, 332; however, see also ibid, p. 325 where he says the Cardosos "se han pasado a
Francia"; i n 1646 , Gaspar ha d compete d unsuccessfull y agains t Montezinos for the Ceut a asiento, at
the time he was residing in Osuna, Andalusia, serving as "administrador de las rentas y estado" of the
duke of Osuna, AG S Hacienda 894, consulta 29 Oct. 1646.
227
Ménde z Sot o wa s th e Madri d corresponden t of Jaco b de l Monte , alias Jaco b Bademburgh , and
connected also with Diego Rodriguez Cardoso of Bayonne nephew of Gaspar Rodriguez Cardoso; see
appendix i and Car o Baroj a Lo s Indios, ii , 139.
slow work . I n Marc h 1656 , th e secretar y o f th e counci l o f stat e i n Madri d informe d
Gamarra that although h e had repeatedly pressed th e consejo d e hacienda for the Cardos o
accounts, the y had stil l no t bee n produce d thoug h h e did no t thin k that the y could b e
much longe r delayed. 228 In th e end, however, it would see m tha t no account s were ever
sent.
Spanish official s i n Hollan d ha d littl e reason t o show restrain t in th e term s that the y
used i n describin g th e conduc t o f th e Sephard i immigrant s whos e activitie s wer e s o
sharply a t odds with their own and on e may take it that Richard's assertion, i n a letter to
Gamarra o f July 1656, 229 that all conversos who fle d fro m Spai n t o Holland ha d stole n
from th e crown was considerably exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is doubtless true that some
funds wer e removed fro m Spai n i n questionable circumstances, notably by the Pereyra s
and Cardosos, and it is perhaps pertinent to ask whether this wealth which in any case was
a substantial part of that sudden infusion which was, in the decade 1646-55 , transforming
Dutch Jewis h life , was regarded i n any special ligh t by the Dutch Sephardim . Probably ,
there wa s n o seriou s mora l proble m here . I n Jewis h eyes , th e Spanis h crown , whic h
sanctioned th e seizure , tortur e an d despoliatio n o f hundred s o f converso relative s o f
Sephardi familie s scattere d fro m Italy , to England, and further , was the most oppressiv e
and criminall y pervers e i n Europe an d eve n th e sternes t rabbi s were , perhaps, likely to
regard pilferin g from suc h a government as a rather specia l misdemenou r borderin g o n
being allowable, especially when funds thus resulting were then employed for Jewish uses.
There wa s certainl y muc h ne w spendin g on Jewis h religious , scholarl y an d socia l in -
stitutions in Holland durin g these years, spending in which the Pereyras played a notable
part, and althoug h thi s would doubtles s t o a great extent have occurred anyway , it may
just be that some of this expenditure was expected by the community from certain persons
as a sor t o f conscience money . Manasse h be n Israe l wh o wa s in suc h financia l strait s
previous t o the coming of the Pereyras, tha t h e was contemplating emigratio n t o Dutc h
Brazil, and wa s named hea d o f the new yeshiva that Isaac Pereyra se t up a t Amsterda m
almost at once after hi s arrival, referred perhaps, i n 1647 , when thanking the borthers in
print, rather pointedly to the great wealth that they had brought with them from Spain. 230
In 1656 , the "debotissimo y bienaventurado Abraham Pereyra" , as Levi de Barrios later
called him , established, togethe r with Ephraim Bueno , the Amsterdam yeshiva known as
Tora Hora and, most remarkable of all, endowed in 165 9 the yeshiva known as Hesed-le-
228
AG S Haya xxxix, fo. 87, Ger. de la Torre to Gamarra, 22 Mar. 1656.
229
Mocatt a L W Neths vi, J. Richard to Gamarra, Amst. , 1 4 Jul. 1656 ; he add s however , "a s Abraham
Pereyra did particularly".
230
Meye r Kayserling. Menasse ben Israel. Sein Leben Und Wirken Berlin, (1861) p. 46; "Vierao Vs. Ms.de
Espanha, e avend o tirad o hö a ta o considerave l riqueza , Ihe s pareceo, qu e est a seri a tant o mai s
acreditada e nobre, quanto mais empregada em bons vsos. Intituem Vs. Ms. logo hüa ilustr e iessiva, e
com muytos salarios a enriquecen! de Baale Tora", Menasseh ben Israel, Thesovro dos Dinim que opovo
de Israel, h e abrigado saber e observar (Amsterdam, 5403-5) dedication to the final section.
A vraham a t Hebron , i n th e Hol y Land. 231 In thi s way, funds orginally intended fo r th e
maintaining o f Spanis h infantry , instead sustaine d Jewis h scholars . Th e Pint o famil y
similarly distinguishe d itsel f in th e spher e o f scholarly endowments , foundin g the cele -
brated Jesiva de los Pintos at Rotterdam, in 1650 , later referred t o by the Italian Sephard i
writer Isaa c Cardoso in dedicating his Excelencias de los Hebreos to Jacob d e Pinto , as a
"gloriosa academia". 2^
Spanish concern at the process of migration fro m the Spanish territories to Holland, in
the period 1646-60 , also related to some extent to the flight of conversos as such. With the
great boom in Dutc h carryin g t o Spain after 1646 , the conversos had a n unprecedente d
opportunity no t only to tighten their links with Dutch Jewry, but to flee themselves to the
United Province s in greater numbers. B y 1650, every Spanish port from San Sebastián t o
Barcelona, then still in rebellion, was filled with Dutch shipping almost to the exclusion of
any other, much o f it being chartered, an d i n some case s owned , b y Dutch Jews . This in
combination wit h the new pressures on the conversos in Spain confronted Spanish official s
with a new situation. I n July 1650 , Brun reported to Madrid tha t he had received extensiv e
information o n families that were planning to flee th e Spanish territorie s for Holland "i n
order t o hav e libert y t o profes s Judaism openly" . He name d a whole grou p wh o were
planning t o migrate from Seville : Francisco Hurtado , Francisco Méndez , Jacob Correa ,
Manuel Antonio, Simo n Gómez , Do n Luis de Cuña an d Antonio de Belmente. Of those
intending t o fle e Madrid , h e name d Sebastia n Méndez , Doñ a Isabe l d e Belmente ,
Jerónima Suárez , Juana Ribera , Do n Fernand o Corre a an d hi s brother-in-law Antonio
Méndez, Jerónim o Henrique z an d Jerónim o Hurtado . I n th e Indies , h e advise d tha t
Francisco d e Olivera in Mexico and Manue l de Olivera and Antonio Ménde z Indiano, at
Quito, were likewise planning t o flee to Amsterdam. I n Madrid, this list was seen b y the
council of state an d copie s wer e sent to th e Inquisitio n suprema and, i n cas e an y o f the
personages name d wa s involved i n any asiento or arrendamiento, to the presiden t o f the
consejo de hacienda. 233
Another remarkable , i f slightl y absurd , instanc e o f Spanis h concer n a t converso
migration to Holland i n the 1650s , was the instruction of 1656 from Madrid to the Spanish
ambassador a t The Hague t o lodge a formal protest wit h the States-General concernin g
two "Portuguese " merchant s of Málag a allege d t o hav e bee n illegall y take n aboar d a
Dutch vessel with their families and possessions an d brought, to the loss of their creditors ,
to Holland. Gamarra answere d the council of state that he could not possibly protest to the
States-General unles s h e wer e given th e name s o f th e merchant s an d o f th e shi p an d
231
Silv a Rosa , Geschiedenis, 39 ; W . C . Pieterse . Daniel Levi d e Barrios al s geschiedschrijver va n d e
Portugees-Israelietische Gemeente te Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1968) p. 110 ; "hizo benigna sombra", as
Levi de Barrio s put it , "aun a la distante yesiba que mantuv o de la Tierra Sancta", Lev i d e Barrios.
Triumpho de l Govierno Popular y d e la Antigüedad Holandesa (Amsterdam, 5443), "Epístol a a l mu y
Ilustre Señor Jacob Pereira".
232
Lev i d e Barrios , Triumpho, "Yesib a de lo s Pintos" ; Isaa c Cardoso . Las Excelencias d e lo s Hebreos
(Amsterdam, 5438) dedication to Jacob de Pinto.
233
AG S Estado 2072, consulta 6 Sep. 1650.
skipper concerne d and complained of the negligence of the authorities at Málaga.234 The
king thereupo n requeste d th e corregidor of Málaga , Don Dieg o Fernández d e Córdoba
Ponce d e León, t o be more specific. He reported tha t two conversos, Juan Enrique z and
Simon Nunez, had bankrupted i n January 1656 and been taken in a Hamburg ship not to
Amsterdam but Livorno. 235
"The cit y of Hamburg", h e wrote, " i s one of the Germa n Hanseati c ports which
have th e same privilege s as the Dutch enjo y unde r the peace treaty 236 and order s
respecting contraband , an d bot h thes e an d thos e o f that natio n ar e th e ones , it is
known, wh o tak e th e "Portuguese " who leav e thes e realm s both t o Livorn o an d
Amsterdam; and the y achieve this very easily considering tha t the exemption an d
freedom conceded t o these nations is such that their ships enter and leave these ports
in whatever manner they like without being accountable".
To emphasize the seriousness of the situation at Málaga, he added that , in May 1654, Luis
de Acosta, Manuel de Olivera and hi s wife Doñ a Just a Correa and "man y othe r Portu -
guese" had bee n take n aboar d a Dutc h shi p name d Th e White Horse tha t ha d arrive d
from Amsterda m freighte d b y Mathe o Butela r (Mathe w Butler?) and brough t t o a n
unknown destination while, in February 1655 , an Italian vessel, Nuestra Señora de Mon-
tenegro, skipper Julian Regulino of Livorno , had attempte d t o tak e several familie s o f
"Portuguese" and muc h merchandise from Málaga t o Livorno but tha t he had manage d
to intercept two families and hand them over to the Inquisition.237 The ship had however
taken some Portuguese and picked up others, he believed, at Cádiz.
A particularly emotional incident relating to converso migration from Spai n to Holland
in the 1650s , one that greatly aroused Gamarr a an d Richard , involve d a girl brought to
Amsterdam fro m Sevill e b y a "Jewess " name d Leonard a Nunes . Accordin g t o th e
Spaniards, this girl was taken among the Jews against her will and that of her mother who
subsequently requeste d a n Antwer p merchant , name d Maldonado , t o tr y t o retriev e
her.238 The parnassim, t o protect he r from th e danger of abduction, use d thei r influence
with th e cit y authoritie s t o hav e tw o Spanis h merchant s briefl y imprisoned t o which
Gamarra proteste d i n th e stronges t term s assertin g tha t i t wa s insufferabl e tha t Jews
234
AG S Estado 2089 consulta 1 8 Jul 1656 and 2673 consulta 6 Mar. 1656; Gamarra considered the laxness
at Málaga a serious matter "pues los que desto s reynos pasaban a Holanda era para profesa r publi-
camente la religion que tienen en el corazón".
235
AG S Estado 2673, corregidor of Málaga to Philip 29 Aug. 1656.
236
Afte r the Spanish-Dutch commercial treaty of 1650 , the same concessions were subsequently extended
to the Hanseatic towns.
237
One grou p of conversos, includin g Domingo and Jorg e Rodrigue z Francia , win e merchants , fled
Málaga in 165 5 and saile d directly to London, see Haim Beinart, "The Jew s in the Canary Islands: a
re-evaluation" TJHSE, xxv, p. 65.
238
AG S Haya 295, Gamarra t o city council of Amsterdam, 12 Jul. 1656: "A mon retour en cette ville (The
Hague) d'un petit voyage, que j'ay fai t auprè s de son Alteze sme. j'ay appris l'accident survenu a deux
marchands espagnols nommes Antonio de Beynefar et Jacome Otarise qui ont estes fort mal trailles par
les juifs dans la vostre, et ce dernier de plus mis a leur instance dans une estroitte prison sous une fausse
impression que les dits juifs vous ont donne que ces deux marchands seraient familiers de l'Inquisition
et auraient voulu retirer en telle qualité une fille de Seville qui y a este emmenée contre le gré de la mère
should thu s "seduce" a Christian gir l and tha t the like would b e tolerated nowhere in the
world. The Amsterdam city council retorted in a cold and unco-operative manner , thoug h
one of its members intimate d unofficially to Richard tha t shoul d a letter be shown fro m
the mother demonstratin g that she was sincerely Catholic and wished her daughter to be
returned to Seville this would be arranged, bu t otherwise not,239 Richard in fact attempte d
to obtain suc h a letter from Seville, but i t would seem tha t the affai r wen t no further .
The obviou s influenc e o f th e Sephardi m wit h th e Amsterda m vroedschap, o r cit y
council, during th e 1650s , and through i t on the States of Holland an d th e States-Genera l
itself, a n influenc e which was frequently exasperating t o Gamarra an d Richard , was , as
has been seen , a constant them e of their reports to Madrid. They were in no doubt that it
was the political offshoot of the Jews' growing and excessive rdle in Spanish-Dutch trade .
The Dutc h Sephardi m wer e thu s no t simpl y an . annoyance t o Spanis h officials , but a
serious matter of state for Spain at a time of difficult transitio n i n relations with the United
Provinces. It is of course true that the relations of the Spanish ambassado r and consul with
the Dutch Jews were not only characterized by friction, that they had contact with several
Jews, suc h a s Samue l Pint o an d Isaa c Mocatta , i n respec t o f variou s economi c an d
financial transactions , tha t ther e wa s th e preceden t o f th e understandin g wit h Lop o
Ramirez, and tha t after 166 0 suc h contact s develope d int o the permanent arrangements
with Andre s an d Manue l d e Belmonte . But suc h connection s wer e o f relativel y mino r
importance befor e 1660, and insofar as they developed into the link with the Belmontes do
in fact for m materia l for a separate study.
To conclud e thi s study, it may be said tha t th e Spanis h documentatio n relatin g to the
Dutch Sephardi m o f the mid seventeenth century does requir e the historian t o adjust his
view o f th e rol e o f th e latte r i n certain respects . Th e thesi s once pu t forward , by suc h
historians a s Graetz, Sombar t an d Dubnow , tha t th e Jew s were a crucia l facto r i n th e
initial stages of seventeenth-century Dutch commercial dominance i n both European an d
colonial naviagation , and criticized , in particula r b y van Dillen , a s having been largel y
misplaced, i s confirme d a s bein g wid e o f th e mark. 240 Th e Sephardi m incontestabl y
played a modest, i f not meagre , rol e i n th e ris e of both th e Dutc h north-sout h carryin g
trade, in Euope, and that of the East and West India Companies. Yet, despite this, in a way
Graetz, Sombar t and Dubno w are vindicated in thei r claim that the Jews were crucially
important to Dutch prosperity in the seventeenth century and van Dillen is shown to have
been i n error in attributing a largely peripheral par t t o the Jews throughout the period o f
par un e juifve nomine e Leonarda Nunes et y vendue de la mesme religion. 11 me conste Messieurs que
cette accusatio n est une pur e inventio n e t imposture des juifs, ayan t este informs pa r u n marchan d
d'Anvers nomme Maldonado, que c'estoit luy qui les avoit requis a la priere de la mere de tasche r de
retirer cett e fill e d e cett e abominabl e sect e et d e lu y delivre r un e lettr e d e s a part , qu e l e mesm e
Maldonado leu r envoya , de quoy s'il est besoing, il es t prest a donner tesmoignage juridique, et qu i
meritera plu s d e fo y qu e le s faussete s d e cett e meschant e race; cett e un e chos e intolerabl e qu'ils
seduisent ainsi impunement une fille Chrestienne et qui ne se souffre e n aucun lieu du monde".
239
Mocatt a LW Neths, vi, Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 1 5 Jul. 1656.
240
Va n Dillen, loc. cit., pp. 10-11 ; Weme r Sombart. DieJuden unddas Wirschaftsleben (Leipzig , 1911 ) p.
18; Simon Dubnow. Die Geschichte desjiidischen Volkes in der Neuzeit 1 0 vols. (Berlin, 1925-9) vol. VI,
pp. 430-1.
the Dutch commercial ascendancy . Ther e is a mounting body of evidence, including such
statistical indice s a s the varying tempo o f increase in the total number of depositors wit h
the Wisselbank, 241 tha t th e Dutc h worl d trad e supremac y ha d i n fac t tw o formative,
dynamic phases, bot h of which were short but crucial, separated by a quarter of a century
of relative stagnation (1621-45 ) caused, arguably , chiefl y b y Spanish policie s an d meas -
ures. If the years 1590-162 0 were those of the making of Dutch commercial greatness and
in which th e Jew s too k rathe r littl e part, the year s 1645-6 0 were vital to the prolonging ,
through new trade patterns and a resumption of growth, of the Dutch preponderance into
the secon d hal f o f th e seventeent h century . Moreover , th e fac t i s that th e Dutc h trad e
boom o f 1645-6 0 too k plac e i n wha t wa s i n severa l respect s a highl y unlikel y an d
unconducive context: th e Baltic grain trade, for so long the mainstay of Dutch Europea n
navigation, thoug h stil l important , wa s on th e decline ; th e Nort h Se a fishing industry
which was so vital in the early seventeenth century was waning year by year; Dutch Brazil,
the mos t valuabl e o f th e Dutc h colonies , was collapsing wit h its trade destroyed , whil e
English rivalr y an d pressure , i n bot h Europea n an d colonia l commerce , wa s provin g
increasingly formidabl e an d costl y t o th e Dutch . Ho w the n ca n ther e possibl y hav e
occurred durin g thes e year s a considerabl e expansio n i n Dutc h trad e an d a rapi d
acceleration i n the accumulation of wealth at Amsterdam? The answer surely must be that
during th e 1640s , a revive d an d immensel y profitabl e carryin g trad e t o th e Iberia n
peninsula, an d afte r 164 6 especially t o Spain, reversed the traditional emphasis i n Dutch
trading pattern s from nort h to south, becoming Úieprimum mobile, the driving force of the
Dutch mercantil e economy . An d i n Iberia n trade , th e Dutc h Sephardi m wer e chiefl y
active and owing to the clear dominance of the conversos in many areas of Spanish finance
and commodity dealing , played what was at any rate a major, and i n the view of Spanish
officials, th e leading role. Thus, it may be held , the historian ha s now to attribute to th e
Dutch Sephardim of the 1640 s and 1650 s an extremely important function i n the forming
of what may be termed phas e B of the golden age of the early modern Dutch economy.
APPENDIX I
The two lists of Dutch-Jewish firms trading with Spain, complete with aliases and Spanis h
correspondents, th e first containing eighteen firms, and the second fifteen, procure d fro m
Emmanuel Lavill e i n Amsterdam b y Jacques Richard , sen t by Richar d t o th e Spanis h
embassy a t The Hague , and enclose d by Gamarr a wit h his despatches t o Madri d o f 16
October an d 1 6 November 1655, 242 have a rather curious history of their own. They have,
it would seem, never been published in a full and correct version, though the first only was
given, from what was presumably a very poor copy , with major errors and wit h seven of
the seventeen names missing, by E. N. Adler and subsequently reproduced wit h the same
241
Va n Dillen, loc. cit, p. 14; between 162 0 and 1641 , the total number of Wisselbank depositors gre w from
1202 to 150 8 and betwee n 164 1 and 1661 , from 150 8 to 2102, almost exactly twice as fast .
242
AG S Hay a xxxviii , fos. 143 , 150.
Spain and the Dutch Sephardim 411
errors by H. I. Bloom.243 A full and corrected renderin g of the lists is given below. Finding
references t o thes e list s i n th e consejo d e estado records a t Simanca s is , a s fo r instanc e
Alvaro Castillo found,244 somewhat frustrating, for apparently n o copies of the actual lists
were kept b y the council. Instead , the council advised th e king to send th e first list to the
Inquisition suprema, whenc e i t wa s sen t enclose d wit h a lette r o f Phili p I V t o th e In -
quisitor-General date d 3 0 Decembe r 1655. 245 Th e othe r list , see n b y th e consejo i n
January 1656 , was sen t i n th e firs t instanc e no t t o th e Inquisitio n bu t t o th e consejo d e
hacienda.™ I t ma y b e tha t n o cop y o f th e secon d lis t cam e int o th e hand s o f th e
Inquisition, a t an y rat e a t tha t stage , despite th e keen satisfactio n that th e suprema ha d
expressed o n receivin g th e first . I f so , this would explai n ho w i t wa s that Adler , whos e
version o f the firs t lis t derive d fro m Inquisitio n sources , cam e to reproduc e th e first list
without th e second. Th e present versio n is taken fro m th e records o f the forme r Spanis h
embassy a t The Hague , formerl y deposited wit h th e Archives Générale s at Brussels, bu t
now transferre d t o Simancas. 247 Lucie n Wol f receive d a transcript o f the lists , fro m th e
embassy record s whils t the y wer e a t Brussels , which i s now i n th e Mocatt a Librar y a t
University Colleg e London.248 The Mocatta version is largely correct but also has one or
two small errors which are pointed ou t below.
"Los Nombre s de los principales judios de aquella ciudad qu e contratan e n los reynos de vra. Mgd . en
España y de sus correspondientes. "
Jewish merchants of Aliases Correspondents
Amsterdam trading
with Spai n
1. David Osorio 249 Bento Osorio in Santander,
Fernando Antonio Herrera Calderó n
in Bilbao,
Matheo y Agustín de Montiano 250
San Sebastian,
Francisco de Verois 251 y Pagóla
243
E . N. Adler , "Th e Jew s of Amsterda m in 1655" , TJHS E i v (1899-1901) pp. 224-9 ; H . I . Bloom. The
Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam, pp. 92-3.
244
Alvar o Castillo, "Dan s la Monarchie Espagnol e du XVII e siècle: les banquiers portugais e t le circuit
d'Amsterdam", Annales xix (1964) pp. 311-16 .
245
AG S Estado 208 5 consulta, 26 Dec. 1655 ; Adler, loc. cit.
246
AG S Estad o 2089, consulta 1 8 Jan. 1656.
247
AG S Hay a xxxviii, fos. 145-6v , 152-3.
248
Mocatt a L W Neths. xi, Gamarra to Philip, The Hague, 1 6 Oct and 1 6 Nov. 1655; I am indebted t o Mr.
Edgar Samuel for drawing m y attention to this copy as well as for the general benefit of exchanging
ideas with him on the subject of the trade of the Dutch Sephardi m durin g this period.
249
Wherea s Bent o Osorio th e elder had , i t would seem, no significant dealings in Spain, his son David ,
after th e Spanish-Dutch Peace , clearly became involved in trading in Castilian wool .
250
Adle r and Bloom giv e Montiago; th e Mocatta copy confirms that it is Montiano.
251
Th e Simancas list s give both Vernis and Verois , the Mocatt a copy gives Verois, Adler and Bloo m give
Beron.
Amsterdam Aliases Correspondents

2. Jaco b del Monte Jacobus Vandenberg the same factors as above and ,
Madrid,
Simon Méndez Soto
Luis Flores de Valdes
3. Abraha m Isaa c Perera 252 Francisco y Antonio da Madrid,
(sic) Gurre alias Gerardo Fernando Montezino s and
Carlos va n Narden253 Balthasar Rodriguez Cardos o
Seville,
Manuel and B . Montezinos
and Bartolomé Lópe z Tellez254
Santander,
Herrera Calderó n
4. Josepp e de los Ríos255 Michiel van der Rivieren Bilbao, — the Montiano s
San Sebastián — Verois y Pagóla
Madrid — Flores de Valde s
5. Antoni o Lopes Suazo256 Willem del Monte San Sebastián — Verois y Pagóla
Bilbao,
Juan Baptista de la Rossiunda
Madrid - Flore s de Valdes
Cádiz
Antonio Perera Torre s
6. Abraha m Franc o Ménde z Melchor Ménde z Franc o Seville and Cádiz,
Juan del Soto Martíne z
7. Andre a Christoval Nunes Henrique and Rober t Santander, — Herrera Calderó n
Moyenberg.257 Cáceres,
Laurenzo Pan y Agua258
Bilbao, — the Montiano s
San Sebastián — Verois y Fágala
Seville,
Manuel Gómez d e Acosta and
Fernando Nunes
252
Thi s shoul d presumably read Abraham y Isaac Perera .
253
Adle r and Bloo m give van Narden as Bangardel.
254
Adle r and Bloo m give this as Tello; López Tellez would be a relative of Montezinos.
255
Thi s merchan t i s missing from th e Adler-Bloom list , while his San Sebastián an d Madri d factor s ar e
wrongly given as additional correspondents o f the Pereyras; "II y a un riche Juif qui a présent se trouve
à Anvers" , Richar d informe d Gamarra i n Octobe r 1655 , "c'est un nomm é Migue l de lo s RÍOS , alia s
Miguel van der Rivieren. . .il va y épouser un e demoiselle d e Tovarre, fille d'un Portugai s défun t qu i
demeurait à Anvers. C e Miguel a environ 3 0 ans, i l est né et a été baptisé à Rouen paroisse de Saint
Denis. I l a été circoncise à Amsterdam, il y a 1 4 ou 1 5 ans. Son père s'appelle Marti n Rodrigue z (alias
Joseph de los Ríos) dont l a fortune est estimée à trois ou quatre tonne s d'or", Mocatta L W Neths xi,
Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 20 Oct. 1655 ; Joseph was a parnas at Amsterdam in 1654 .
256
Thi s i s the celebrated merchan t and financie r Lope s Suasso ; th e Adler-Bloom list gives him a s Lope s
Majo.
257 Give n ¡n Adler-Bloom a s Modemberg .
258
Th e perso n wit h this unlikel y nam e is mentioned a s an asentista of a mino r sor t i n 1646 , Domínguez
Ortiz, Política y Hacienda, 149.

8. Th e wido w of Diego Santander — Herrera Calderó n
Netto de Paiva259 San Sebastián — Verois y Pagóla
Seville — Gomez de Acosta and Nunes .
Cáceres — Pan y Agua
9. Duart(e ) and Manue l Faro260 Bilbao — the Mentíano s
Madrid,
Manuel Serrano Monter o and
Pedro del Prado
10. Fernand o Alvare z an d Hendrik an d Rober t Bilbao — the Móndanos .
Antonio Corre a d e van der Sterre.261 San Sebastián — Verois y Fagol a
Mesquita Madrid — Montero
Alicante — Gaspar and Francisc o
de Moxica. 262
11. Baltasa r de Acuña263 Bilbao — the Montiano s
San Sebastián — Verois y Fagol a
Madrid — Montero
12. Manue l Toralta264 Albert Dirksen den Bilbao — the Montiano s
Ouden San Sebastián — Verois
Madrid — Montero and Do n
Antonio d e Anaya265
Seville — Bernardo Estendorp e
259 Gi ven as Netto de Faina in the Mocatta transcript .

aso Give n a s one name , Duarte s Manue l Far o in Adler-Bloom an d a s Duar t an d Manue l Fac o i n th e
Mocatta transcript .
261
Adler-Bloo m give s "Bandersterre"; i n or just before 1650 , "Enrique Robert o Bendeestar " o f Amster-
dam was stated by Diego Rodriguez Idaña , a prisoner of the Inquisition a t Cuenca, to have receive d
from hi m 13 2 sacks of wool of Ciudad Real and t o have paid him by letters of exchange of Simon Diaz
Váez of Antwerp on Felipe de Nis in Madrid, Caro Baroja , Los Judíos, ii , 148.
262
Adler-Bloo m give s "Morica".
263
Balthasa r de Acuña (d a Cunha), who imported woo l from Santander , employed th e alias "Albert va n
de Bergh", see Gemeentearchief Amsterdam. Not. Arch. 1537 , ff. 118 , 130 .
264
Th e Mocatta transcrip t gives Emmanuel Foralta; Toralta an d the rest of the first list are omitted fro m
Adler-Bloom; bu t se e Bloom, op. cit. p. 90, where he gives nine names of Dutch merchant s and thei r
aliases taken fro m references i n Samuel Oppenheim's study of the Jews in Western Guiana in the years
1658-66, aliases employed in trading with the Spaniards mainl y in the Caribbean, th e names are Dieg o
Mendes d e Brit o (Jacque s Albert) , Antoni o Henrique s d e Granad a (Carlo s Guemp) , Samue l Dia s
(Michel Smit) , Antoni o d'Elgad o (Antoni o va n Duren) , Manue l Toralt o (Alber t Dirksen) , Josep h
Penha (Carlo s de Water), Abraham Antunes (Dirck Janssen) , Isaa c Aboab (Denni s Jennis ) and Isaa c
Henriques Mara o (Spycker Veth).
265
Anay a i s mentione d a s a Madri d corresponden t o f Dieg o Rodrigue z Cardos o o f Bayonn e i n Car o
Baroja, Los Judíos, ii , 139.

13. Sebastia n Coutinh o Andres Martensen alias Bilbao — the Montiano s
Julian Galle s San Sebastián — Veroisy Fagola
Madrid — Montero an d Anay a
14. Gerónim o Nune s d'Acosta286 Guigli o San Sebastián — Verois y Fagola
Bentivoglio Alicante — the Moxica s
15. Dieg o Enrique z and Hendri k an d Bilbao — the Montiano s
Juan de Castro Ja n va n Leeuw San Sebastián - Veroi s y Fagola
Madrid — Montero and Anay a
Seville — Bernard Hustendorp e
16. Manue l Coutinho San Sebastián — Verois y Fagol a
Madrid — Montero
17. Isa c del Prad o Jacques de l Prado Cadiz and Seville,
Vicente Zegers an d Comp .
18. Baltasa r Alvare z Noguer a Albert Dirksen Bilbao — the Montiano s
den Jonghe n San Sebastián — Verois y Fagol a
Madrid — Monter o
end o f the first list
Second Lis t
19. Jua n Gonzale s Albert Wighma n alias Málaga, Rodrig o an d Bernard o

Jacobus and Abraha m Elers.
van Gruenenda l Cádiz — Perera Torre s
20. Benjami n de Chaves Gaspar de Chavarria Madrid,
Alvaro de Mora
21. Simo n Francisc o Berna i Simon Fran s San Sebastián
Santiago de Tilleria
Seville,
Pedro Fernande z de Tobar
22. Manue l Nunes Méndez Hector Henrique z de Leon Bilbao — the Montiano s
San Sebastián — Verois y Fagola
A licante — Enrique de Figuered o
23. Manue l Méndez de Crasto Manue l Henriquez Bilbao — the Montiano s
de Aguilar San Sebastián — Verois y Fagola
24. Dieg o Ménde z de Brito 287 Jaco b Alberts Bilbao
Baptista de la Rosiunda
San Sebastián — Verois y Fagol a
266
Thi s was the celebrated agen t o f the Portugues e kin g at Amsterdam; th e fact tha t h e used a n Italian
alias and ha d factor s at Alicante might suggest tha t h e was involved in the carrying o f wool and othe r
products fro m Alicant e t o Italy , possibly Livorn o o r Venice , or both ; however , th e sam e alia s wa s
undoubtedly use d by Antonio López Suasso in several of his freight contract s fo r the carrying of wool
from Santande r to Amsterdam in 1654, so the attribution might also be a mistake, see Gemeentearchief
Amsterdam, Not. Arch., 1537 , ff. 118 , 124.
267
Presumabl y a relative of the crypto-Jewish Madrid asentista, Francisco Diaz Ménde z d e Brito, who in
turn was close to Antonio Núñez Gramajo, arrendador of the Spanish wool taxes in the years 165 1 -1657.
25. Manue l Méndez Enriquez Fernand o de Baeca 268 Bilbao — the Mentíano s
Santander — Herrera Calderó n
Madrid — Anaya
26. Jua n d e Paz and Santander — Herrera Calderó n
Andres de Acevedo. Madrid — Fernando Montezinos
Seville = Lope z Telle z an d
Manuel and Bartolom é Montezino s
27. Henriqu e Méndez d e Silv a Gerónimo Rodriguez Perez Madrid — Fernando Montezinos
Seville — Lopez Tellez an d
Manuel and Bartolom é Montezino s
28. Francisc o de Medina 269 Frederick Wolf Tenerife - Do n Diego Perera
29 Francisc o Ménde z Chilon 270 Málaga — Antonio d e Silv a
30 Christova l Méndez Manuel Franco Ménde z Sa n Sebastián — Verois y Pagóla
Seville — Agustín Garcia
31 Antonio Lui s Bilbao - th e Montianos
32 Josepp e Méndez d'Acosta Bilbao — the Montiano s
33 Isaa c Serran o San Sebastián — Veroís y Pagóla
268 T^J ^ was probably som e confusio n her e on the par t of Laville, for Fernando d e Baeca appears in the
Amsterdam notaria l record s as a real merchant wh o used th e alias "Joris van Krempen" in importin g
wool from Santande r to Holland, se e Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Not . Arch . 1535 , ff . 19 , 20, 60.
268
Thi s i s th e fathe r o f Si r Solomo n d e Medina , th e firs t practisin g Je w t o b e knighte d i n England ;
Francisco lef t Bordeau x for Amsterdam in or around 1649 ; according t o the testimon y of his brother -
in-law, Gaspar de Perera, before th e Canariote Inquisition, in 1662,he subsequently resided and traded
in Middelburg and had also strong connections i n Antwerp; his wife, Caspar's sister, was named Gracia
Perera; accordin g to Lucien Wolf , the Canariote Inquisitio n was probably alerte d t o the judaizing of
the members of the Perera family , in the Canaries, by this present list which he refers to under it s former
Brussels catalogue numbe r (Reg . 2305) , thoug h th e documen t i s dated t o 166 5 in what is probably a
misprint, and tha t as a result Diego Perera, an important merchant and arrendador of Canaries custom s
duties, wa s force d t o flee ; th e Canarie s bein g on e o f th e principa l loophole s i n th e structur e o f th e
official Spanis h Atlanti c trade, it is highly probable tha t Perera an d Medin a were extensively involved
in shipping unregistere d American silver to Holland, see Beinart, op. cit., 61n; Lucien Wolf, Jews in the
Canary Islands (London, 1926 ) pxxxiii; O. K. Rabinowicz. Sir Solomon d e Medina (London , 1974 ) pp.
1,82.
270
A n Antonio Ménde z Chilon, residing at Veracruz, in Mexico, received a naturaleza, naturalization as a
Castilian, a s one o f th e terms o f a royal asiento, in 1643 , with the great Sevillia n "Portuguese " Indies
merchants, th e brother s Rodrigue z Pasarino , Antoni o Domíngue z Ortiz , "Lo s extranjero s en l a vida
española durante el siglo XVII", Estudios de Historia Social de España IV, no. 2 . ed. Carmelo Viña s y
Mey (Madrid, 1960 ) p. 408.
15
THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF DUTC H SEPHARDI

SEPHARDI JEWRY TO HOLLAND'S GOLDEN AGE, 1595-171 3
'This nation' , declare d th e Spanis h ambassador' s secretary, a t Th e Hague , i n a

report sent t o Madrid in 1658 , 'has very considerable powe r wit h the magistrates of
the city councils, and especially that of Amsterdam, for without doubt it is they who
have the greatest commerce an d who, consequently, yield the greatest advantage'. 1
He was referring to the 3,000 or so Sephardi (Iberian) Jews then living at Amsterdam
and the few hundred or so more resident at Rotterdam, Middelburg, and two or three
small inland towns. His assertion i s an obvious exaggeration. Holland wa s then not
just Europe' s bu t al l th e world' s entrepo t an d man y distinc t group s an d factor s
contributed t o it s commercia l ascendancy . Eve n so , contemporaries , Dutc h an d
foreign alike, make enough sweeping claims about the Sephardi Jewish role in golden
age Hollan d t o persuad e u s o f th e wholl y unparalleled positio n o f thi s particular
Jewish community in the wider context o f seventeenth-century Europe. Th e wide -
ranging economic activit y of thi s group was s o manifestl y exceptional , s o distinct
from th e usual pattern o f things , that it invariably made a vivid impressio n o n th e
contemporary mind , compelling some departur e fro m th e habitua l notio n o f th e
lowly Jew . And , indeed , i t i s arguable tha t n o othe r Jewis h communit y has eve r
exerted s o appreciabl e a n economi c influence , over severa l continents , a s Dutc h
Sephardi Jewr y in th e seventeent h century . It wa s one manifestatio n of thi s alto -
gether exceptional economi c rol e tha t during the seventeent h an d eighteent h cen -
turies, Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y was th e onl y Europea n Jewis h community, a t leas t
outside Ottoman territory , which exerted political influence of the sort take n notice
of b y diplomats .
Of course, the special importance of Dutch Sephardi Jewry in the economic sphere
was lon g ag o take n not e o f b y historians . No t infrequently , a t leas t unti l th e
publications of J. G. van Dillen, their contribution was also exaggerated.2 There were
* A short version of this article was read at the 2nd International Conference on the History of Dutch Jewr y
held a t Te l Avi v and Jerusale m i n Decembe r 1982 .
1
Archiv o General de Simancas (ACS) , Estado inv. nr. 2091, Vincent Richard to Philip IV, The Hague, 3
Sept. 1658; in the early seventeenth century, the Ibero-Jewish community i n the Dutch Republic was known
officially as the 'Portuguese nation' but later, from around 1640 , as the 'Portuguese Jewish nation'. The term
'Sephardi', nowadays use d increasingly i n English a s well as Dutch, derives from the Hebrew for 'Spanish'
or 'Iberian' .
2
Werne r Sombart took the lead in publicizing exaggerate d ideas of the historical significance of Dutch
Jewry i n his Die J uden and das Wirtschaftsleben (Leipzi g 1911) , but se e also M. Wolff, 'De eerst e vestigin g
der Joden i n Amsterdam , hu n politiek e e n economische toestand', Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschie-
denisen Oudheidkunde 9 (\9\Q) 365-400, 10(1912 ) 134-182,354-369,11 (1913) 88-101,350-376 . Van Dillen
set out to correct earlier assumption s in two essays: J. G. van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam i n de
eerste helft der zeventiend e eeuw 1 . De Portugeesch e Joden', Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis (TvG) 5 0 (1935)
4-35; J. G. van Dillen. 'De economisch e positie en betekenis der Joden in de Republiek en in de Neder -
landsche kolonial e wereld ' in : H . Brugman s an d A . Fran k éd. , Geschiedenis de r Joden i n Nederland
(Amsterdam 1940) .
those who imagined that the y were a major factor in the rise of the Dutch colonia l
companies o r tha t i t was they who first generate d Dutc h trade with Italy and th e
Levant. But, oddly enough, once the more fanciful notion s were disposed of, by Van
Dillen, very little furthe r discussio n o r researc h ensued . Unti l recently i t was no t
noticed tha t Va n Dille n in tur n ha d distorte d th e picture , albei t i n th e opposit e
direction fro m Sombart , almost to the point of missing the essential significance of
the Dutc h Sephard i rol e altogether. 3 Wha t fo r man y year s wa s the onl y detaile d
survey o f th e subject , tha t b y H . I . Bloom , supplie d som e usefu l ne w dat a but ,
unfortunately, introduced stil l more distortions.4 Eager to show that in a liberal and
tolerant atmosphere Jews readily adapted t o virtually any kind of economic activity,
Bloom was chiefly concerned to catalogue as many different sort s of enterprise as he
could document. He gave little thought to order of importance. Th e result has been
that up to the present no serviceable account o f the Dutch Sephard i economic rol e
was to be found anywhere in the literature on Holland's golden age and even the best
general surve y of modern Jewis h history, th e work of Salo Baron, i s entirely unsa -
tisfactory o n thi s particular topic. 5
Far fro m dispersin g their efforts fa r an d wide , the trade, industry and financia l
activity in which Dutc h Sephardi Jews engaged wa s confined t o only a few routes,
products an d form s of investment. Indeed, the commercial bas e of th e community
was extremely narrow in th e early stage s an d onl y somewhat broade r i n th e later
seventeenth century. Furthermore, the manufacturing and retailin g activities open
to thi s grou p wer e alway s very fe w an d invariabl y closely tie d t o th e restricte d
commercial base. I n effect, th e Portuguese-speaking Jews of Holland an d Zeeland 6
constituted an exceptionally tightly-knit economic groupin g as wholly distinctive in
trade an d industr y as i n religio n an d life-style .
It i s a grea t mistak e to thin k i n term s of long-ter m structures. 7 There wer e tw o
main stages in the evolution of Dutch Sephardi economi c activit y down to 1713 - the
period from 1595 , when the first Portugues e crypto-Jew s (as they then were) settled
at Amsterdam , unti l th e en d o f th e Thirt y Year s War , a perio d i n whic h th e
community was of some, but by no means fundamental, importance in the workings
of the Dutch economy, and, secondly, the phase from 164 8 onwards when , as I shall
argue, the y functione d a s on e o f th e vita l components i n th e imposin g edific e of
Holland's globa l commerce . However , both thes e main stage s subdivid e into four
lesser phases , constitutin g a sequenc e o f eigh t i n all . The generall y abrup t shift s
which characterise this series are mainly, though by no means entirely, attributable
3
D . M . Swetschinski , 'Kinshi p an d Commerce : th e Foundation s of Portuguese Jewish Lif e in seven-
teenth-century Holland' , Studio Rosenthaliana (SR) 1 5 (1981) 55-57 .
4
H . 1. Bloom, The Economic Activities of the Jews o f Amsterdam in the seventeenth an d eighteenth centuries
(2nd edn . 1969 ) (1s t edn. ; Williamspor t 1937) .
5
S . W. Baron , A Social an d Religious History o f th e Jews X V (New Yor k 1973 ) 41-45.
6
O n the small Sephard i community of Middelburg, see J. H . van 't Hoff , 'D e vroeger e Portugeesch -
Joodsche gemeente en de kerkeraad der hervormd e gemeente te Middelburg', Archief uitgegeven door het
Zeeuwsch Genootschap de r Wetenschappen 1922 , 14-28 .
7
l mean this specifically a s a criticism of the Braudelian longue durée, adopted by A. M. van der Woude
in hi s general introductio n t o th e Ne w Algemene Geschiedenis de r Nederlanden vols . 5 to 9 a s th e bes t
available contemporary approach to Dutch social and economic history of the early modem era; i n my own
view, thi s approach i s in fact neithe r convincing nor helpfu l i n the context of seventeenth-century Dutc h
economic history .
The Economic Contribution o f the Dutch Sephardi Jewry 41 9
to the impact of international politica l pressures and events. Any serious attempt t o
elucidate th e rol e o f Sephard i Jewr y t o th e Dutc h econom y must , i n m y view ,
carefully investigat e these phase s eac h o f whic h in tur n significantl y altere d th e
structure and characte r o f Sephardi activity .
Thanks to the fairly abundant evidence which has survived in the notarial archive s
of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp, it is possible to reconstruct the patterns of
Dutch Sephard i enterprise i n some detail. Among other batches of evidence, over
three hundred survivin g freight-contracts coverin g th e years 1595-161 9 signed by
Amsterdam Sephardi merchants have been published in extract and many hundreds
more have been preserved for the post-1619 period, including a compact block of 661
contracts signed by Jewish merchants in the period 1638-7 6 taken by the notary J. V.
OH.8 During the first main period i n the evolution of Dutch Sephardi activity, down
to 1648 , this evidence proves beyond question that the community's overseas trade
was based essentially on dealings with Portugal and its colonies, or rather, the indirect
traffic i n Brazi l suga r an d othe r Portugues e colonial ware s vi a Lisbon , Oporto ,
Madeira and th e Azores. Initially , in the tw o opening phases , fro m 1595 9 to 1608 ,
and 160 8 to 1621 , thi s trade with Portuga l was indeed overwhelmingly preponder -
ant. Subsequently, during the next two phases, from 162 1 to 164 1 and 164 1 to 1648,
the ascendancy of the Portugal trade gradually waned as two other trades expanded.
In th e long run, these other tw o routes, t o Morocco and Spain, wer e so basic a s to
justify ou r categorisin g the m along wit h th e Portuga l trade as moedernegoties, o r
mothertrades, of Dutch Sephardi Jewry. In th e period t o 1648 , virtually all Dutch
Sephardi foreig n trad e involved the route s t o Portugal , Morocc o an d Spai n an d
everything else of any significance - carryin g to and from Livorno and Venice being
the chief additiona l item - wa s essentially an offshoot o f one or more of these, and
especially of th e Portugal trade. It is thus evident that the question whether or no t
Dutch Jewry contributed significantly to the rise of the Dutch East India Company,
over which much ink was spilled in the 1930s , is almost completely irrelevan t to the
real concern s of th e Dutc h Sephardi m of th e earl y seventeent h century.1" Where
Dutch Sephardi Jewry played a notable part in Amsterdam's trade with the Far East,
in th e earl y period , wa s i n importing , vi a Lisbon , commoditie s suc h a s India n
diamonds, Ceylo n cinnamo n and, fo r a time , India n cotto n cloth , fro m region s
which a s ye t wer e beyond th e reac h of th e Eas t Indi a Company.
The initial phase in the growth of Dutch Sephardi commerce, that of 1595-1608,
the year s i n whic h th e Jewis h communitie s o f Amsterda m an d Rotterda m wer e
established, largely co-incided with the first round of economic warfare between th e
8
Th e published extract s appear in th e journal Studia Rosenthaliana vols. 1-16 ; th e Oli contracts are
located i n Gemeentearchief (GA ) Amsterdam , Notaria l Archiv e (NÁ) inv. nrs. 1525-1546 ; hundreds mor e
such contract s and other relevant notarial deeds are t o be found i n th e books of notaries B . Baddel, P.
Padthuysen, D . va n der Groe, A. Loc k an d others .
9
Th e yea r 159 5 is th e firs t fo r whic h ther e i s notaria l evidenc e o f Portugues e marrano s residin g i n
Amsterdam. I t is also noteworthy tha t there is a reference in the Amsterdam Sephardi synagogu e minute s
for 168 5 whic h state s that Jews had the n practise d thei r religio n in Amsterdam fo r ninet y years , se e GA
Amsterdam, Archieve n der Portugees-Israelietisch e Gemeent e (APIG ) inv . nr. 20, f.92v.
10
se e H. Wâtjen , DasJudentum und die Anftinge de r modernen ¡Colonisation (Stuttgart 1914) ; A . M. Vaz
Dias, 'De deelname der marranen in het oprichtingskapitaal de r Oost-Indische Compagnie' , Jaarboek van
hel Genootschap Amstelodamum 3 3 (1936) 43-58.
Spanish crow n an d th e Dutch . Fo r mos t o f th e period fro m 159 8 t o 1608 , Dutc h
shipping an d cargoe s wer e officiall y exclude d fro m Spai n an d it s dependencie s
which the n include d Portugal. 11 I t ma y see m surprisin g tha t a Jewish communit y
principally involved in commerce wit h Portugal should hav e formed precisel y whe n
contact betwee n Hollan d an d Portuga l wa s disrupte d b y actio n o f th e Spanis h
crown, but actuall y thi s remarkabl e fac t is highly revealing about Dutch Sephardi
Jewry i n it s infancy . Until 159 5 almost th e whol e distribution of Portugues e Eas t
India spice s and Brazi l sugar to norther n Europ e was handled b y the Portuguese
New Christians (that is descendants o f Portuguese Jewry forcibly baptised e n masse,
in 1497 , many of whom were crypto-Jews) residing in Antwerp.12 Despite the turmoil
in Flanders and Brabant during the 1570s and 1580s , it is evident that for a time these
Antwerp Portuguese were able to persist i n their former role, distributin g to Ham -
burg, Amsterdam, Londo n an d Rouen . Thus the rise of Dutch Sephard i Jewr y did
not originate in the mass migration from Antwerp, Ghent an d other Sout h Nether -
lands town s to Hollan d and Zeelan d whic h began i n th e 1580s . B y and large , th e
infant Amsterda m community around 160 0 did no t consis t o f migrants from Ant -
werp - thoug h ther e wer e some , bu t o f fres h immigrant s fro m Portugal . Wha t
changed in 159 5 was that whereas previously only Antwerp's bulk trades had bee n
hindered, b y the Dutch closure of the Scheldt, now Antwerp's traffic i n high-valu e
merchandise through Dunkirk and other Flemish sea-ports was cut off as a result of
the genera l maritim e blockad e o f 'the Sout h Netherland s impose d b y th e State s
General, for the first time , in that year. 13 It was this extended blockade, preventing
Dutch and neutra l ships from enterin g th e Flemish sea-ports, not th e events o f the
1580s, whic h wa s th e politica l and economi c midwif e o f Dutc h Sephard i Jewry .
Indeed, the founding of the Amsterdam community was virtually simultaneous with
that of other ne w Sephardi communities at Hamburg , Emden an d Rotterdam , an d
new New Christian groups at Rouen and als o at Nantes, 14 all of which sprang from
the same cause: th e 1595 Dutch ban on maritime trade to Flanders whic h compelle d
the Lisbo n dealer s t o sen d thei r own agent s t o th e mai n distribution points.
The first Portugues e Jewis h merchant s o f Amsterdam an d Rotterda m were thu s
primarily acting for exporters of colonial wares from Portugal , in much the same way
that th e Antwerp Portugues e had been doing for decades, except tha t peppe r and
other East India Spices, which played a key role until 1605 , subsequently faded fro m
the picture following the Dutch Eas t Indi a Company's rapid gain s in Indonesia and
11
J . H. Kernkzmp, D e handel o p den vijand, 1572-1609(2vo\s.; Utrech t 1931-34 ) 11,227-228,234,252 ,
260; F . Pollentier , De Admiraliteit e n de oorlog ter zee onder d e Aartshertogen (1596-1609) (Brussel s 1972 )
127-134.
12
Thi s communit y numbere d aroun d 40 0 in 157 1 declinin g t o aroun d 25 0 by 1591 , see E . Schmidt,
L'histoire des Juifs à Anvers (2n d edn. ; Antwer p 1969 ) (1st edn . 1963) ; I . S. Revah. ' Pou r l'histoir e de s
marranes à Anvers: recensements de la'Nation Portugaise'de 1571 a 1666', Revue des Etudes Juives (REJ)
122 (1963) 123-147 ; H . Pohl , Die Portugiesen i n Antwerpen (1567-1648), Zur Geschichte einer Minderheit
(Wiesbaden 1977 ) 153-162 .
13
Kernkamp , Handel o p den vijand II , 153-156 , 212 .
14
H . Kellenbenz, Sephardim a n der unieren Elbe. Ihre wirtschaftliche undpolitische Bedeuting vom Ende
des 16. bis zum Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden 1958 ) 26-3 1 ; I. S. Revah, 'Le premier établissement
des marranes portugais à Rouen (1603-1609)', Mélanges Isidore Levy. Annuaire de l'Institut d e Philologie e t
d'histoire orientale et slaves XII I (1953) 539-52; Léon Brunschvigg , Les Juifs d e Nantes et du Pays Nantais
(Nantes 1980 ) 13-14 .
The Economic Contribution of th e Dutch Sephardi Jewry 42 1
the Moluccas . Bu t during the year s 1599-160 8 onl y a smal l part o f thei r business
consisted i n importing Portuguese colonial merchandis e direct from eithe r Portugal
or Antwerp. The Spanish embargoe s agains t the Dutch , and the reciprocal ban of
river traffi c betwee n th e Nort h an d Sout h Netherlands i n forc e durin g the sam e
years, were substantia l obstacles . Whereas ther e are twenty-tw o survivin g freight -
contracts drawn up by Amsterdam Sephardi Jews for the years 1595-8 , all but one of
which concern voyages t o and from Portugal , ther e are only twenty such contracts
for th e seven year s 1599-160 5 and wher e previously all the ship s wer e Dutch an d
most were chartered to sail t o Lisbon or Oporto, from 159 9 several wer e Hanseatic
and th e majorit y wer e chartered t o sai l t o smalle r ports suc h a s Portimâo , Faro ,
Buarcos and Aveiro where prospects for evading Philip Ill's embargo wer e better.15
But in these years most of the sugar and other Portuguese colonial products shippe d
to Amsterda m arrive d o n Hanseati c o r Frenc h vessel s via Hamburg, Roue n an d
especially Emden. 16 Also several Portugues e ship s crossed straigh t from Brazi l t o
Holland o n instructions from Lisbo n merchants , carrying fals e paper s designatin g
Portugal as their destination.17 Both the risks and valu e of this traffic were high. In
May 1603 , six Amsterdam Jewish merchants, headed b y Duarte Fernandes (Joshua
Habilho), authorised tw o Londo n merchant s t o reclai m fro m th e Englis h crown
sugar, pepper, cinnamon, Brazil-wood, pearls and diamonds, which had been loaded
onto a flee t o f si x Emde n vessel s e n route from Lisbo n t o Nort h German y bu t
intercepted b y an Englis h squadron i n th e Channel. 18 Londo n admiralt y official s
valued th e cargo at ove r £ 28,000.
The embargoes were lifted i n the summer of 160 8 and fro m the n until the expiry of
the Twelve Years Truce, in April 1621 , there were no political hindrances t o a rapid
growth in Dutch trade with the Iberian Peninsula . There wa s also some recovery at
Antwerp where the Portugues e Ne w Christians fo r a tim e worked i n parallel with
their Jewis h counter-part s i n Holland , despit e th e Dutc h restriction s whic h
remained in force at the mouth of the Scheldt. The Twelve Years Truce, indeed, was
the phas e o f mos t vigorou s an d dramati c growt h o f th e entir e golde n ag e fo r
Amsterdam in general and on e of the most vigorous for its Sephardi community. 19
As ca n b e see n fro m Tabl e 14, the numbe r o f Sephard i Jewis h accounts wit h th e
Amsterdam Exchange Bank rose from 24 , in 1609 , to no less than 11 4 or 9,5% of the
total b y 1620 , a most remarkabl e phenomenon .
15
E . M. Koen, 'Notarial Records in Amsterdam relatin g to the Portuguese Jews in that town up to 1639',
SR 1(1967 ) 110-12 2 and 2 (1968) 111-115 .
16
Koen , 'Notaria l Deeds 1, S R 2 (1968 ) 116-126 , 257-27 2 an d S R 3 (1969 ) 113-125 , 234-254 ; H .
Kellenbenz, As relacôes económicas entre o Brasil e a Alemanha na época colonial (Recife 1961 ) 18-19 .
17
Koen , 'Notaria l Deeds' , SR 3 (1969) 114 , 118 , 235 , 241 .
18
E . R. Samuel, 'Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London', Transactions of th e Jewish Historical Society of
England (77 HSE) 1 8 (1958) appendix. 2.
19
J . I. Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660', S R12 ( 1978) 5-6,15-18; J. I. Israel, The Dutch
Republic an d the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford 1982 ) 46-47 . Se e above, 359-60, 369-72.
Table 14 : Numbers of Dutch Jewish Depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank,
1609-167420
Jews Total Jews Total

1609 24 1641 89 1508
1615 57 850 1646 126 1579
1620 114(106) 1202 1651 197 1875
1625 76 1301 1661 243 2102
1631 89 1348 1674 265 2031
At Venice , th e Portugese Jewis h communit y wa s able to expan d it s rol e a t this

time, thoug h les s dramatically , largel y owin g to the stead y withdrawa l of old -
established Christia n merchant s fro m commerce. 21 Venetia n Jewr y began t o gai n
ground around 1600 , having been unable to do so before, only because a vacuum had
appeared. Bu t at Amsterdam the position was just th e opposite. The Sephardi Jews
greatly advanced their position during this dynamic second stage just when the city's
mercantile bod y a s a whol e enjoye d it s mos t sustaine d boo m o f th e seventeent h
century. Th e explanatio n fo r thi s strikin g contras t lie s i n th e fac t tha t whil e
Amsterdam ha d for centuries traded wit h Portugal, exchangin g Baltic products fo r
Setúbal salt, the trade in Portuguese colonial wares, recently diverted from Antwerp,
was something quite new so that there was little resistance t o Jewish penetration o f
this sector. There was no entrenched grou p barring th e way to Sephardi ascendanc y
over Amsterdam's sugar trade, rather appreciation o f this fresh asset on th e part of
the city fathers. The rise in sugar imports, th e driving force of Dutch Sephardi trad e
during the Twelve Years Truce, was such that over twenty new sugar refineries were
established i n Amsterdam i n th e spac e of te n o r twelv e years.22
During th e Truc e period , a s before , th e vas t majorit y o f th e freight-contract s
signed b y Dutc h Sephard i Jew s wer e for voyage s to an d fro m Portugal. 23 Severa l
Amsterdam Jewish merchants also acquired share s in ships employed o n the Lisbo n
route. Nevertheless, a significant number of voyages were, arranged t o Morocco and
Spain while Manoel Carvalho, apparently th e most active in Italian trade , chartere d
at least eleven ships to sail to and from Livorno and Venice.24 Moreover, ther e can be
little doubt that freight-contracts on their own, without other notarial evidence, yield
an exaggerated notion of the preponderance o f the Portugal trade. I n reality, Dutch
Sephardi dealing s with Italy were more substantial tha n seem s t o be the case fro m
the freight-contracts, being essentially an extension o f the Portuguese an d Spanis h
trades. Amsterdam Sephardi merchant s shipped suga r and other Portuguese colon-
20
Va n Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 14 ; Van Dillen slighty underestimated the number of Sephardi depo-
sitors in 162 0 and probably also other years, E. M. Koen, 'The earliest sources relating to the Portuguese
Jews in the Municipa l Archives of Amsterdam u p t o 1620' , SR 4 (1970) 27.
21
22
B . Pulían, Rich and Poor i n Renaissance Venice (Oxfor d 1971 ) 570-575.
Algemee n Rijksarchief (ARA) , Archive of the States of Holland, inv. nr. 1358 , 'Deductie' of January
1622, f.6v .
« Koen , 'Notarial Records', SR 5 ( 1971 ) 206-241,6 ( 1972) 107-117,229-233 7 ( 1973) 118-122,266-279 8
(1974) 140-143 , 302-307 el passim.
24
S . Hart, 'Die Amsterdamer Italienfahrt, 1590-1620' , Wirtschaftskrafte und Wirtschaftswege. Festschrift
fur Hermann Kellenbenz ( 4 vols.; Nurember g 1978 ) II, 163 .
ial wares from Lisbon to Livorno and Venice - an d Italian silks, Venetian glass and
rice, an d Mediterranean re d coral back to Lisbon - using Genoese and other vessel s
signed on in Italy or Lisbon and which consequently do not figure in the Amsterdam
freight-contracts.25 To cite a key example, Lopo Ramire s (David Curiel), a leading
Dutch Sephardi merchant of the first half o f the century, regularly remitted sugar ,
diamonds, dye-woods an d spices from Portugal t o his brother wh o lived during th e
Truce years at Florence an d who shipped Italia n silks and red coral to Lisbon.26 The
red coral was for re-export on the Portuguese East India galleons to Goa where it was
exchanged fo r diamonds, both Lopo and his brother being major diamond dealers as
well a s general merchants . A t leas t eigh t o r te n Dutc h Sephard i merchant s were
active durin g th e Truc e i n dispatchin g merchandise , ofte n o f Italia n origin , vi a
Lisbon, t o Goa, Cochi n an d Ceylon , tha t i s to area s o f the East Indie s wher e th e
Dutch as yet had no sway, importing a wide variety of Indian products both on their
own account and that of their Lisbon correspondents. Beside s spices and diamonds,
Lopo Ramire s als o importe d India n musk and othe r essence s fo r perfumes.
Structurally, Dutc h Sephard i trad e wit h Portugal durin g thi s secon d phas e dif-
fered from that of the pre-1608 period in that there was now no obstacle to using the
direct sea-lan e t o Lisbon , o r exploitin g the abundanc e an d cheapnes s o f Dutc h
shipping. This encouraged a measure of encroachment int o th e traditiona l Dutc h
bulk trades with Portugal, dispatching grai n and timber and importing salt, fruit and
olive oil as well as colonial wares . Even so, Dutch Jews never attained the prepon -
derance in this sector that they did in the field of sugar, cinnamon (before the 1630s )
and diamonds. The outstanding Dutch Jew in the salt trade at this time was Bento
Osorio, a ma n ver y activ e i n synagogu e affair s who , o n th e evidenc e o f hi s ta x
assessments, wa s in fac t th e riches t Hebrew in Hollan d befor e 1640 . I n th e thre e
years 1615-18 , Osorio chartered over 200 vessels on behalf of his Lisbon correspon-
dent, Andrea Lope s Pinto, to ship Setúbal sal t not just t o Holland an d Zeeland bu t
also Flanders , Norwa y and th e Baltic. 27 A dozen o r s o other Sephard i merchants
imported Portugues e salt int o Holland on a lesser scale .
Before 1621, Dutch Jewish trade with Spain was altogether less important than the
trade wit h Portuga l an d wa s of relativel y slight significanc e i n relatio n t o Dutc h
commerce wit h Spai n overall. 28 Nevertheless , ther e wa s a noticeabl e upsurg e in
transactions with Spain a t th e end of the Truce period , i n the years 1616-21 , which
laid something o f a basis for later Dutch Jewis h penetration o f Spanish trade . The
chief components of this early Spanish activity were grain shipments to Galicia29 the
importing o f wine , syru p and raisin s from Málag a wit h whic h por t fou r o r fiv e
Amsterdam Sephardi merchant s had a regular trade by 1620 30 and the shipments of
Castilian wool eastwards from Sa n Lúcar de Barrameda, Alicant e and Cartagena t o
25
I n 1614 , for instance, Gabriel Lopes of Amsterdam authorised a correspondent in Florence to collect
payment for several sugar consignments which he had shipped to Livorno on vessels chartered i n Lisbon,
Koen, 'Notarial Records', SR l (1973 ) 122.
u Se e above, 333-53. (
27
28
Koen , 'Notarial Records' , SR 5 (1971) 219n .
Se e above, 359-^0 .
29
Koen , 'Notarial Records', SR 1 6 (1982) 72, 202, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210 and S R 1 7 (1983) 76.
30
Koen , 'Notarial Records' SR 1 6 (1982) 62,69,70,74,78,209,213,215 and SR 17(1983)68,72,78,79 ;
Israel, 'Spain and th e Dutch Sephardim' , 10 , 19; see above, 364, 373 .
Livorno (for Florence) an d Venice. 31 The thriving Portuguese Jewish communities of
Livorno and Venice were already collaborating wit h Amsterdam Jewr y in importing
Portuguese colonial merchandise fro m Lisbon , whethe r in Portuguese, Genoese , or
Dutch ships , an d i t wa s a natura l extension o f th e same syste m t o ente r int o th e
transportation of Spanish wool s eastwards t o supply the fine quality woollen clot h
industries of Florence and Venice. On the outward voyages to Spain, besides grai n to
Galicia, cargoes consiste d mainl y of timber, textiles and spices . Severa l o f the ship s
owned at this time by Dutch Jews were employed in the carrying of Castilian wool to
Italy, one such, the St Jan belonging t o Luis Dias Silva of Amsterdam, being lost in
1619, runnin g aground of f Cartagena . A s yet, Dutch Jew s had n o ver y significant
role in th e officia l Spanis h Indie s trade vi a Seville, Sa n Lúcar , an d Cadiz , thoug h
they arrange d a fe w voyages t o thos e port s toward s th e end o f th e Truce period ,
bringing bac k oliv e oil, wine and silver .
Likewise rathe r tentativ e and sporadi c durin g th e Truc e perio d wer e Dutc h
Sephardi dealing s wit h Morocco . I t i s tru e tha t a s earl y a s 1609 , on e Christia n
merchant who exported textile s to Barbar y complained t o the States General ove r
the impact of recent ne w Dutch Jewish competition o n hi s business. 32 But we may
take it that it was of the newly arrived Moroccan Jewis h merchant, Samuel Pallache,
sent by Sultan Moulay Sidan to act as his envoy at The Hague, tha t he complained.
Bento Osorio and on e o r tw o other Portugues e Jew s di d remi t cargoes , mostl y of
wheat an d timber , to Tangiers , Tetua n an d Mazaga n befor e 1621 , bu t Dutc h
Sephardi involvemen t in th e Morocc o trad e the n had nothin g like the significance
which i t acquire d a s fro m 1621 .
Much mor e considerabl e durin g the Truce period , a s th e notarial evidence makes
clear, was the Dutch Sephardi role in the burgeoning Dutch traffi c t o Guinea. I t is
estimated tha t th e tota l volum e of Dutc h trad e wit h equatorial Wes t Afric a gre w
from abou t twent y to fort y ship s annually during the Truce.33 Of these, the freight -
contracts sho w tha t a t leas t tw o or thre e sailed eac h yea r on accoun t o f Sephard i
merchants who , evidently , also sen t good s t o Guine a vi a Lisbon , o n Portugues e
vessels.34 The Guinea trade involve d gold, ivory , Sao Thome sugar , civet-cats , and
slaves. Severa l vessel s chartere d b y Amsterda m Jews t o fetc h slave s fro m Wes t
Africa are known to have sailed directly on to deliver their cargoes i n Brazil and th e
Spanish Caribbean. In 1611 , one of these Dutch Sephardi Jews, Diogo Dias Querido,
or Davi d Querido as he was known i n the synagogue, a native of Oporto wh o had
lived for some years in Brazil, was named in the Council of State, in Madrid, as one of
the chief Dutc h interlopers in the Guinea trade. 35 He was said to keep black servants
in his Amsterdam house to whom he taught Dutch and Portuguese so that they could
31
32
Koe n 'Notaria l Records' , SR 1 6 (1982 ) 68, 84 , 207 and S R 1 7 (1983) 66, 67 .
ARA , Archive of the States General (SG) inv. nr. 4918 i, petition of B. Jacapse, The Hague, 23 Apr.
1609.
33
J . K. de Jonge, Oorsprong van Nederlands beziningen op de kust van Guinea (The Hague 1871 )l O-17; F.
Binder, 'Die Goldeinfuhr vo n der Goldküste in die Vereinigten Provinzen, 1655-1675', Precious Metals in
the Age of Expansion. Papers o f th e XlVth International Congress of the Historical Sciences. H . Kellenben z
ed. (Stuttgar t 1981 ) 131-132.
M Koen,'NotarialRecords',S/?5(1971 ) 110-111,Sfl6(1972) 107,109,5*7(1973) 119,266,SR8(1974)
140, 143.
35 A . Wiznitzer.Jwi in Colonial Brazil (New York 1960)46-7 ; i n 1604 , Querido had f l 1,90 0 invested in
the Dutc h Eas t Indi a Company.
serve as interpreters on his African ventures. From notarial evidence it is known that
this same Querido imported Sâ o Thome a s well as Brazil sugar and tha t he shipped
sugar from both Guine a an d Lisbo n t o Livorn o and Venice , as well as to Amster-
dam.36
By 1620 , Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y numbered approximatel y 1,20 0 souls , a t leas t
1,000 of whom dwelt in Amsterdam.37 But, as we have seen, this sizeable community
as yet dominated only the trade in sugar, Brazil-wood, cinnamon and diamonds an d
had a large share only in trade with Portugal an d perhaps Guinea. In the traditional
Dutch traffi c t o the Baltic, Scandinavia, Britai n and France, ther e was no room for
newcomers an d Dutc h Jewr y playe d littl e o r n o part. Their rol e i n Spanis h an d
Italian trade was still marginal. Bu t the principal obstacl e to the growth o f a larg e
Jewish population i n Holland, a s in al l western and central Europe , wa s exclusion
from th e retai l trade s an d crafts . Where Jew s wer e tolerated , i n norther n Italy ,
Bohemia and the German lands , they were permitted to reside only in small groups
and to enter a very limited number of occupations. Virtuall y nowhere, and certainly
not i n Holland , did th e righ t to settl e include permission eithe r t o becom e shop -
keepers o r practic e mos t traditiona l crafts. The Amsterda m grocers shu t the Jew s
right out o f the retailing of spices an d sugar . On variou s occasions exclusio n fro m
individual guild s wa s uphel d b y th e burgomaster s and , i n Marc h 1632 , th e cit y
council confirmed th e general debarrment of Jews from the Amsterdam guilds.38 Of
many dozens of guilds onl y tw o or thre e di d admi t Jew s notably th e physicians ,
apothecaries an d book-sellers .
The evolution of Amsterdam Jewry, Sephardi an d Ashkenazi, 39 into what, by the
later seventeenth century, was certainly the largest Jewish community in Christen -
dom, possibly exceeding the 10,00 0 mark , representing si x or seven per cent o f the
city's population, was possible only because entirely new industries arose during the
seventeenth century which were based on the recently arisen colonial trades and for
which ther e existe d no previousl y established guil d structure . Thus precisel y th e
same connection s wit h th e Portugues e oversea s empir e whic h enable d Dutc h
Sephardi Jewr y t o becom e a forc e i n Holland' s commerc e als o gav e ris e t o a
phenomenon otherwise unknown in western Europe since the expulsion of the Jews
from Spain , in 1492 , namely a relatively numerous Jewish artisanale. In this respect,
the larg e number s of generall y impoverished Ashkenaz i Jew s wh o migrate d t o
Holland, fro m German y an d Poland , fro m aroun d 162 0 onwards , gaine d fro m
Sephardi Jewish overseas enterprise as much as did poor Sephardi Jews. For this new
Jewish artisanale which was now evolving in Amsterdam was essentially a mixture of
Sephardi and Ashkenazi workmen often working side by side in the same workshops.
Indeed, probably, befor e th e middle of the century, th e Yiddish-speaking elemen t
36
Koen , 'Notarial Records' , SR 5 (1971) 236.
37
Va n Dillen seriously underestimated the size of Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry in 1620 , following Cecil
Roth in supposing a total of only 500; in fact, there were at least 300 grown men alone in the Amsterdam
community b y tha t date, see Koen, 'Earliest Sources', 39-41 .
3
« Va n Dillen , 'Vreemdelingen' , 13-14 ; Va n Dillen , 'Economische positie' , 571-572 ; Koen, 'Earlies t
Sources', 28-9.
39
Dutc h Ashkenazi Jewry consisted of Yiddish-speaking Jews from Germany , Bohemia and Polan d of
which there were some 5,000 in Amsterdam, by 1674, and an equal number, possibly more, in the rest of the
country. Bloom, Economic Activities, 31.
became predominant. Thi s undoubtedly wa s a major facet of the Sephardi contri -
bution t o th e evolution o f Amsterdam .
With the exception of sugar-refining, the Jews brought fe w craft skills with them
to Holland. Most of the manual skills which later became typical of Dutch Jewish lif e
were acquired o n the spot, from Christians, once the opportunity t o enter these new
crafts arose. This process is first discernible during the expansion o f the Truce years.
There exists, for example, a series of notarial deed s of that period which record the
apprenticing o f Sephardi Jewis h youth s to Christia n maste r diamon d cutter s an d
polishers most of whom were themselves immigrants from the South Netherlands. 40
Thus, processing of diamonds and pearls was something new not only to Amsterdam
but also to the Jewish community. In Antwerp, the Portuguese New Christians of the
sixteenth century do not appear to have been much involved in the jewellery crafts as
such.41 But the fact that virtually all rough diamonds entering Europe in the first half
of th e seventeenth century came from India, via Goa an d Lisbon , no t only assure d
Dutch Jewry control over Amsterdam's diamond trad e but an early predominance i n
the diamond crafts.
Tobacco-spinning was the other major Dutch Jewish craft though it would seem to
have attained rea l importanc e onl y i n th e 1630 s an d 1640s . Ye t though , from th e
first, Sephardi and later also Ashkenazi Jews controlled muc h of the wholesale trad e
and th e manufacture of tobacco, under the ruling of 1632 , they were debarred fro m
retailing the product, a restriction which proved impossible to enforce in the long run
and whic h wa s remove d i n 1668. 42 Silk-weavin g was apparentl y introduce d t o
Amsterdam in the first decad e o f the seventeenth centur y by Sephardi immigrant s
from norther n Portuga l wher e th e ol d medieva l Castilia n Jewish traditio n o f sil k
manufacture survived among the refugees who moved from Spain, in 1492, and were
subsequently forcibly baptised. Th e Amsterdam cit y fathers were keen enoug h t o
encourage Sephardi enterprise in this field initially, but in the 1650s a silk-producer s
guild was formed, largely in order t o exclude Jews from th e business, and Sephard i
silk-weaving i n Amsterda m ceased. 43 Fo r a fe w years , however , som e Jew s di d
continue to practice the industry at Maarssen, a village near Utrech t where several
rich Amsterdam Sephardi merchants had summer houses and where a small organ-
ised Jewis h communit y was forme d a t tha t time . Thi s Maarsse n Jewis h silk-mill
apparently employe d twenty-fiv e workmen, a t leas t som e o f who m were Jews .
Sugar-refining, one of Amsterdam's most important industrie s during the golden
age, was originally listed among the poortersneringen or 'citizen's trades ' fro m which
Jews were debarred despit e the fact that this was a new industry recently transferred
from Antwerp. 44 Onl y i n 165 5 did on e o f th e the n wealthies t Jew s i n Holland ,
«o Koen,'Notaria l Records',SR5( 1971)228,SR6(1972) 108,5*7(1973)269; L.C. Fabiao,'Subsidios

para a historia dos chamados 'judeus portugueses' na industria dos diamantes em Amsterdâo nos séculos
XVII e XVIII' , Revista da Facultade d e Letras da Universidade d e Lisboa ser. II I no . 1 5 (1975) 475-480.
41
42
Pohl , Portugiesen in Antwerpen, 122-126 .
Bloom , Economic Activities, 31 ; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven e n het gildewezen van
Amsterdam ( 3 vols.; The Hague , 1929-74 ) J. G. va n Dille n ed. II, 690-691 .
43
J . Zwarts, 'Portugeesche Joden t e Maarsse n en Maarssevee n i n d e 17d e eeuw' Jaarboekje va n hei
Oudheidkundig Genootschap 'Niftarlake', (1922 ) 61-62.
44
J . J. Reesse , D e suikerhandel va n Amsterdam van het begin der 17de eeuw tot 1813 (Haarlem 1908 )
127.
Abraham Pereira, secure permission, o n his own and the community's behalf, to own
and operate sugar-refineries. But while very little is known about the score or so early
refineries tha t mushroomed durin g the Twelve Years Truce, i t is clear tha t quit e a
number of Dutch Sephard i Jews of that period, including severa l immigrant s fro m
Brazil, wer e exper t i n sugar-refinin g and i t seem s mor e tha n probabl e tha t the y
played some substantial part in the industry. I n 1611 , three Amsterdam Portuguese
Jews were invited by the magistracy of Stade, in the Bishopric of Bremen, to set up a
sugar-refinery in the town, the Jews being entrusted with supplying th e supervisor s
and trained workmen. 45 Similarly, in the years around 1620 , several Amsterdam an d
Hamburg Sephardi Jews established sugar-refinerie s at Glückstadt o n the Elbe, the
new-town founded in Holstein, i n 1616 , by Christian IV of Denmark a s an intended
rival t o Hamburg. 46
Another industrial novelt y base d on Dutch colonial trade was the extraction o f
civet fro m th e ana l gland s o f civet-cats, a precious substanc e muc h esteemed a s a
base by the par fumiers of Paris, Venice and Spain. The essence sold at Amsterdam a t
eighteen o r twent y guilders pe r ounce an d sometimes , fo r th e bes t quality , much
more. The cats were imported in large numbers from India, Java and especially fro m
Guinea. B y the 1620s , severa l Sephardi firm s suc h as Michae l an d Lop o d a Lun a
Montalto, i n Amsterdam , an d Francisc o Fernande s d e Pas , a t Alkmaar , wer e
importing an d keepin g thes e cat s by the thousand. 47 A number of poor Jew s were
employed scourin g the environs o f Amsterdam fo r cheap mea t with which to fee d
them an d i n extractin g an d processin g th e civet . Evidently , ther e wa s a certai n
amount of friction between Christian and Jewis h civet dealers a t least in the 1650 s
and 1660s , particularl y over export s o f civet t o Spai n which , apparently, wa s th e
most valuabl e market . Chocolate-making , whic h wa s t o becom e anothe r typica l
Amsterdam Jewish industry, began on a significant scale, as we shall see, only after
the rise of th e Curaçao trad e i n the 1650s' . Printin g shops owne d an d operate d b y
Jews, as distinct from productio n o f Jewish books b y Christians, began at Amster-
dam in 1627 when Menasseh ben Israel set up his press but acquired real significanc e
only toward s th e middl e o f th e century. From th e 1640s , Hebrew text s and othe r
Jewish books, in Spanish, Portuguese, and Yiddish were produced in large quantities
and sol d al l ove r Europ e an d th e Nea r East. 48 Amsterda m indeed soo n usurpe d
Venice's forme r rol e a s th e chie f centr e o f Jewis h boo k production . Once again ,
Sephardi an d Ashkenaz i workme n worke d sid e b y side , togethe r wit h Christia n
employees, an d i n thi s case som e o f th e presse s wer e in fac t owne d b y Ashkenazi
businessmen, thoug h before 170 0 the leading firms were Sephardi. The most eminent
Dutch Jewis h publisher , Josep h Athia s (d . 1700) , produced , i n additio n t o hi s
famous Hebrew Bible, rabbinic and Talmudic works, very appreciable quantitie s of
English Bibles. Indeed, he surpassed any other Dutch publisher in this field and once
boasted tha t he had sold over one million bibles in England and Scotland. For some
45
Koen , 'Notarial Records', SR 6 (1972) 116-117 .
46
Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 62 ; Kellenbenz , Relacöes económicas, 22.
47
I . Prins, 'Gegevens betreffende d e 'oprechte Hollandsche civet ', Economisch-Hisiorisch Jaarboek 2 0
(1936) 1-329 ; Koen, 'Notarial Records', SR 1 5 (1981) 16 , 2)0, 248, 252; in October 1619 , Elias Pereira
bought thre e civet-cats from a cobbler called Gerrit Henricks for th e sum of 307 guilders.
48
Bloom , Economic Activities, 46-53.
years, in the 1670s , he held an official monopoly, conferred by the States General, of
the productio n o f Englis h Bible s i n th e Unite d Provinces. 4^
The thir d phas e in th e evolution o f Dutc h Sephard i commerce began i n Apri l
1621, with the expiry of the Twelve Years Truce, and ended i n December 164 0 with
the secession o f Portugal fro m Spain . Fo r tw o decades Dutch shipping an d cargoes
were again officially excluded from Spain, Portugal, the Flemish ports and southern
Italy by decree o f the Spanis h monarch . Phili p IV' s embargoes certainl y caused a
general recessio n i n Holland , fo r th e severin g o f Dutc h Iberia n trad e als o ha d
adverse effects o n Holland' s commerce with th e Baltic. 50 But whil e muc h o f th e
economy suffered , th e Sephardi Jews of Amsterdam and Rotterda m wer e undoubt-
edly the hardest hit, for they specialized above all in trade with Portugal. As is shown
in Table 14 the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Exchang e Bank fell
back sharply , from 114 , in 1620 , to only 76, or 5.9% of the tota l by 1625 . A sizeabl e
part o f th e Dutc h Sephard i communit y no w migrated , mostl y t o Hambur g an d
Gluckstadt.51 Som e thre e t o fiv e hundre d people , o r ove r a quarte r o f th e total ,
emigrated.
The severity of the slump generated heavy pressure o n th e remaining community
to diversif y it s activities . Bu t Dutch Sephard i Jewry's economic base was still s o
narrow that this proved extremely difficult. I n most of the European carryin g trad e
there were simply no openings. Despit e th e existence of Portugues e crypto-Jewish
communities a t Rouen , Nantes , Bordeaux an d Bayonne , Dutc h Jewis h trad e wit h
France, for example, remained negligible except for the contraband transi t trade, via
Bayonne, wit h norther n Spain . Dutc h Sephard i trad e wit h Ital y a t leas t partl y
collapsed becaus e Amsterda m Sephard i merchant s coul d n o longe r participat e
effectively i n th e route between Lisbo n an d Livorno . Only th e Dutc h Jewis h Mo-
rocco trad e expanded i n the 1620 s and thi s in itself could no t revers e the process of
contraction. Unemploymen t an d distres s withi n th e Dutc h Sephard i communit y
mounted. I n 1622 , the governing boards o f th e the n thre e Sephard i synagogue s i n
Amsterdam jointly erected a co-ordinating council t o fin d way s of coping with th e
sudden massiv e expenditure o n community poor relief and , despit e the heavy emi -
gration that had already taken place, t o encourage further emigratio n o f poor Jew s
abroad.52
Lack of alternatives ensure d that th e Portugal trad e remained th e hub of Dutc h
Sephardi activity despite th e formidable obstacles involve d in continuing business
with Portugal . To a n eve n greater exten t than in the year s 1599-160 7 the commu-
nity's merchant s no w switched t o using Hanseatic, French an d English , instea d of
Dutch ships, to sail to Portugal, via Hamburg, or some other neutral port where the
skippers collecte d certificate s purporting t o sho w tha t thei r cargoe s containe d
nothing of Dutch origin and had not been loade d on Dutch soil. However, this time
«> Ibidem , 48-50.

50
A . T. va n Deursen , Het kopergeld va n de Gouden Eeuw (3 vols.; Assen 1979 ) III, 84-6; Israel, Dutch
Republic, 134-154 .
51
Israel , 'Spai n and the Dutc h Sephardim', 370-3'; Sephard i depositor s wit h th e Hambur g Ban k
increased fro m 2 8 tot 4 3 i n th e years 1619-23 , see Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 254-258 .
52
G A Amsterdam, APIGinv.nr. 13 'Librados termos da ymposta da nacao'; D. M. Swetschinski, 'Th e
Portuguese Jewish Merchants of seventeenth-century Amsterdam: a Social Profile' (unpublished Brandeis
University Ph . D . thesis ; 2 vols. 1979 ) I, 357-367.
The Economic Contribution of the Dutch Sephardi Jewry 42 9
53
Emden was discarded a s its ships were now included in the Spanish embargo. The
Hamburg Senate and othe r loca l authoritie s co-operated i n supplying false papers ,
but th e notaria l evidenc e show s tha t th e whol e process wa s time-consumin g an d
expensive as well as risky. Lopo Ramires, for instance, chartere d severa l Hanseati c
vessels t o fetch Setúbal sal t for the Dutch marke t in 1622-3 , paying freight charge s
more tha n twic e a s hig h as thos e tha t ha d prevaile d unti l 1621. 54 Inevitably , the
community's leadin g merchant s suffere d som e spectacula r losses . I n 1626 , fo r
instance, three Hamburg ships loaded wit h Dutch and English textile s by Francisco
Lopes d'Azeved o an d othe r Amsterdam Sephard i Jew s wer e seized i n Lisbo n an d
confiscated b y the Almirantazgo high-cour t in Madrid. 55 Throughout thi s turbulent
period, India n rough diamonds were shipped t o Amsterdam from Lisbo n via Ham-
burg an d i n Hanseati c ships. 56
Yet, paradoxically, th e harsh pressures of the 1621-4 0 period tende d to reinforce
Jewish predominance in the Dutch Portuga l trade and evidently enhanced thei r role
in Spanis h trade . Relyin g on loca l Portugues e New Christian factor s who, indeed ,
were often relatives , rather tha n on expatriat e Netherlanders, thei r traffi c wa s less
exposed tha n othe r Dutc h trad e t o Spanis h scrutiny , harder fo r the Almirantazgo,
Spain's newly introduced 'inquisitio n of commerce' to eradicate. Indeed, in view of
the modest role played by Dutch Sephardim in Castilian commerce befor e 1621, it is
arguable tha t i t was precisel y Phili p IV's embargoe s whic h rendere d th e Spanis h
trade one o f th e mother-trade s of Dutch Sephard i Jewr y much as it was th e 1599 -
1608 Spanis h embargoe s whic h occassione d Jewis h penetratio n o f Dutch-Portu -
guese trade. Since Dutc h ships could no longer enter the Spanish north coast ports ,
exports o f Castilia n woo l fro m Bilbao , Sa n Sebastia n an d Santande r wer e no w
carried exclusively in neutral ships and (except in the years 1625-30 ) handled chiefl y
by English merchants. 57 But, from 1621 , there also arose a thriving contraband trad e
between Amsterdam and Madrid , chiefly textiles in exchange for silver and wool, via
Bayonne, th e Pyrenea n passe s an d Navarre . Ther e ar e variou s extan t Spanis h
reports abou t thi s overlan d transi t busines s i n th e 1620 s an d 1630 s an d the y
invariably stres s tha t th e traffi c wa s essentially the wor k of Amsterdam Jew s col -
laborating wit h Portuguese Ne w Christians i n Bayonne , th e Frenc h inlan d town s
close to the Pyrennean frontier (particularly Peyrehorade and Labastide-Clairance )
and Madrid. 58
Amsterdam Sephard i merchant s als o chartere d som e neutra l vessel s furnished
with false papers t o sail to Andalusian ports, particularly Málaga.59 But this was very
risky and there was relatively little contact with Seville or its outports, Cadiz and San
Lúcar. The chief means by which Dutch Jewry won its place at this time in the highly
53
AC S Estad o inv.nr. 2645, Consulta, Madrid , 27 Nov. 1621 .
54
G A Amsterdam, box-inde x 'Portugees-Israëlietische gemeente', 'Soutvaart'.
55
Va n Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 32.
56
O A Amsterda m N A inv.nr . 257 , f. 703v-704v.
57
A point muc h emphasised i n A Brief Narration of th e Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade (n p an d nd )
(London? 1650?) .
58
AG S Estado inv.nr. 2139, Consulta 23 July 162 1 ; AGS Hacienda inv. nr. 592, Consulta, 31 Oct. 1622;
ACS Hacienda inv.nr. 664, Consulta, 1 5 Sept. 1630; on the sizeable Portuguese New Christian colonies then
existing at Bayonne , Peyrehorade and Labastide , see British Library, London, Egerton MSS inv. nr. 343,
f. 259.
59
Variou s Scots and German ships were employed by Amsterdam Sephardim in the Málaga contraband
trade durin g th e 1620s , especiall y b y th e fir m o f Duart e an d Jerónim o Rodrigue s Mendes , se e G A
competitive trad e i n Spanis h America n products , includin g silver , wa s throug h
Morocco. In the 1620s, though Morocc o was by no means the only Islami c country
with whic h Dutc h Jewry traded, thei r business with Morocco so far overshadowe d
the res t as t o b e in a class of its own. Of course, Morocc o was the on e part o f th e
Islamic world with which European Sephard i Jews could not more conveniently deal
from Livorn o o r Venice . Bu t i t seem s fairl y clea r fro m th e Amsterda m notaria l
evidence that Dutch Jewish trade wit h Morocc o came t o eclipse th e rest of Dutch
trade wit h tha t country specificall y in th e 1620s . I t i s als o noticeabl e tha t Dutc h
Sephardi merchant s conducting busines s i n Morocc o mostly dealt throug h Euro -
pean Sephard i agents , usually Dutch relative s sent ou t t o Salen , rathe r tha n loca l
Jews.60 I t i s well-known tha t Dutc h Jew s becam e th e chie f arm s supplier s t o th e
corsair bas e at Saleh and generally provided a large part of the munitions and naval
stores consumed i n Morocco. 61 What has not bee n note d i s that during the Thirty
Years War, whilst Dutc h shipping was excluded fro m Spain , Dutch Jews regularly
used Sale h an d Tetua n a s depots for Spanish American product s and particularl y
silver.62
This merchandise would seem to have perculated from the Andalusian ports on local
vessels to the Iberian enclaves in North Africa - Ceuta , Tangiers, Melilla, Oran and
Larache - an d fro m ther e to neighbouring Moroccan ports. 63 Mos t o f the Dutch
ships chartered by Amsterdam Jews to collect silver at Saleh and Tetuan durin g the
1630s and 1640 s then sailed on to Livorno and Venic e where, presumably, the price
of silve r wa s highe r than i n Holland .
The ol d clas h of interest s as betwee n th e Dutc h colonia l companie s an d Dutc h
Sephardi Jewry continued down t o the 1630s . The Eas t Indi a Company's intermit-
tent blockades of Goa an d Malacc a severel y squeezed th e traffi c betwee n Portugal
and th e Fa r East. 64 I n the lat e 1630s , th e Eas t Indi a Company conquered part s of
Ceylon and took control of the cinnamon trade which was hitherto routed via Lisbon
and i n whic h Dutc h Jewr y ha d earlie r bee n active. 65 Meanwhil e leader s o f th e
Amsterdam Sephardi community failed i n their bid to secure official immunit y from
confiscation b y th e Wes t Indi a Compan y o f suga r transporte d fro m Brazi l t o
Portugal i n Portugues e vessel s o n behal f o f Dutc h Jews. 66 Bu t th e pictur e wa s
Amsterdam NÁ 628, fos. 497-498, 503-505,510-152, 513-517. N A 632, pp. 184-186 ; NÁ 1526 , p. 142 , NÁ
1527, p. 288; AGS, Archive of the Consejo de Guerra, inv. nr. 894, Pedro de Arze to Conde-Duque de
Olivares, Málaga, 2 Nov. 1623.
60
61
Bloom , Economic Activities, 76-78.
Ibidem ; Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel, 1590-166 0 II K . Heeringa ed. (The
Hague
62
1910 ) 1109 .
Fo r example s from th e years 1638-42, see GA Amsterda m NÁ 1525 , 31, 99, 104, 108, 149. 184, NÁ
1526, 35 , 223, 227, NÁ 1527 , 39, 125 , 128, 229, 237.
63
I t i s significant perhap s that th e former Spanis h Jews permitted by th e Spanish crown t o reside at
Tangiers, Ceuta and Oran possessed licenses to trade (without personally setting foot on Spanish soil) with
Cadiz, San Lúcar, Málaga, Cartagena and Alicante , se e J. I . Israel, 'The Jew s of Spanish North Africa ,
1600-1669',
64
TJHSE26 (1979 ) 77.
A . R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire. Portuguese Trade in southwest India in the early seventeenth
century
65
(Harvar d 1978 ) 51, 162.
ÍC . W . Goonewardena , Th e Foundation o f Dutch Power i n Ceylon (1638-1658) (Djambata n an d
Amsterdam 1958 ) 9, 11-20 , 28 , 37 .
66
AR A Verzamelin g Bisdom inv. nr. 4 9 i, fos. 8-9, 113v- l 14; Resolutie'n van de Staten van Holland e n
West Vriesland(211 vols , np.nd. ) 1621, p . 106 , 1622, pp. 6 , 12 , 16 , 56 , 90.
The Economic Contribution of the Dutch Sephardi Jewry 43 1
transformed i n the 1630 s b y the West Indi a Company's subjugation o f north-east
Brazil. Th e suga r plantation s o f th e Pernambuc o regio n were devastate d i n th e
fighting, bu t productio n bega n t o recover i n th e late 1630 s and , wit h this, aros e a
thriving, if temporary, direct traffic between Brazil and Holland, handled by private
merchants paying fees an d toll s to th e Company .
From th e outset , Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y wa s pre-eminent i n th e carrying trad e
between Hollan d and th e Dutch zone of Brazil. 67 Thus they continued t o distribute
sugar, tobacc o and Brazil-woo d fro m Amsterdam just as they ha d formerl y don e
except now under the aegis of the Company. Their ascendancy i n this business was
natural given thei r long experience of the Brazil trade, their fluency i n both Dutch
and Portuguese , and th e fact tha t they evinced greater capacity to colonize in Brazil
than di d th e res t o f th e Dutc h population . Indeed , th e Company' s conquest s i n
Brazil reversed the trend of Sephardi emigration fro m Holland t o Germany. Lik e the
later Sephardi colonies in Curaçao an d Surinam, the Jews of Pernambuco, while the
region was under Dutch rule , in the years 1630-54 , were always closely tie d t o th e
mother community in Amsterdam, acknowledging the latter's pre-eminence in reli-
gion, politics and trade. The rise of Netherlands Brazil thus ended the contraction of
Dutch Sephard i Jewry, facilitating the absorption of hundreds o f poor immigrant s
from th e Sephardi diaspora in Europe. By 1644, the professed Jews of Dutch Brazil,
most of whom were emigrants from Holland , thoug h some were former local Ne w
Christians, totalled 1,450 or roughly one third of all the white civilians in the territory
including th e Portugues e Catholic planters. 68
But whil e th e Company' s gain s i n Brazi l undoubtedl y strengthene d Dutc h
Sephardi Jewry and, for the first time , made it into a truly trans-Atlantic network of
a kind which it was to remain for the rest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ,
the change did no t significantl y alte r or enlarge the community's traditional com-
mercial base . Nor , a s th e figure s i n Tabl e 14 indicate , wa s ther e an y significan t
improvement in the number of Sephardi deposits with the Exchange Bank. On th e
contrary, b y 164 1 when Dutc h Brazi l wa s thriving , th e proportio n o f deposit s
belonging t o Dutc h Sephard i merchant s ha d falle n t o a low-poin t o f 5.9% ,
reflecting the decline in their importance since 1621. But there was a rapid increase in
the consumption of tobacco in the Netherlands during the Thirty Years War period ,
not least because Amsterdam was supplying the armies marauding in Germany with
this product, as well as the troops entrenched in the Low Countries. Whether or not
the ne w Brazil trade was a factor encouraging increased us e of the plant, ther e was
undeniably a massive growth in domestic tobacco production, the home-grown leaf
usually being processed in Amsterdam and frequently mixed, with the better quality
tobaccos importe d fro m Brazi l an d Virginia. 69 This large-scal e domestic tobacc o
production, an d expandin g tobacco industr y centre d i n Amsterdam , perceptibly
67
Wiznitzer.Jei w in Colonial Brazil, 120-138; 1. S. Emmanuel, 'Seventeenth-Century Brazilian Jewry: A
Critical Review' , American Jewish Archives 1 4 (1962) 32-68; see also C. R . Boxer , Th e Dutch i n Brazil,
1624-54
68
(2nd edn.; Hamden , Conn. 1973 ) (1st edn. 1957 ) 133-134.
Ibidem.
69
H . K. Roessingh, 'Tobacco Growin g in Holland in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Case
Study i n th e Innovativ e Spirit o f Dutc h Peasants' , Th e Lo w Countries History Yearbook (1979 ) 25-27,
43.
stimulated the growth of the Jewish artisan class. It also gave Dutch Sephardi Jewry
for th e first tim e something of a role in the inland provinces o f the country. Jewish
tobacco buyer s becam e a regula r feature of lif e in and aroun d Amersfoor t and
Nijkerk, two of the main centres of domestic tobacco culture, and in some cases, they
invested heavil y in th e conversio n o f suitabl e lan d fro m othe r use s t o tobacc o
culture.70
During th e brie f fourt h phas e i n th e evolutio n o f Dutc h Sephard i Jewry' s eco -
nomic activity, that of 1641-8, the direct trad e with Pernambuco continued, thoug h
it dwindle d rapidly following th e revolt o f the Portugues e planter s in Netherland s
Brazil, i n 1645. 71 A t th e sam e time , unhindered contac t wit h Portuga l itsel f wa s
resumed, mor e or les s on th e pre-1621 basis , durin g 1641 . The re-openin g o f Por -
tuguese ports t o Dutch ships meant that Dutch Sephard i Jewr y could revert to the
bulk trade s wit h Portuga l an d onc e agai n bega n exportin g grai n an d timbe r i n
quantity and importing salt and fruit. As before, the salt was procured mainl y from
Setúbal and th e figs, oliv e oil and almond s from th e Algarve, usually Vila Nova or
Faro. There was some change though in the pattern o f the indirect traffi c i n Brazil
products via Portugal to Holland as compared wit h that of the pre-1621 period. I t is
striking that fro m 164 1 few of the vessels chartered by Dutc h Sephard i merchant s
sailed to the ports of northern Portugal - Oporto , Vian a and Aveiro - whic h in the
earlier period had been the pivot of this trade. Now Lisbon was the main depot, th e
principal alternatives being Madeira and especially the Azores which had developed
into a flourishin g contraban d centr e durin g th e 162 0 and 1630 s a s a resul t of th e
imposition o f th e Spanis h embargoe s o n Portugal. 72 A s fro m 1645 , thi s indirec t
commerce vi a Lisbo n an d th e Azore s largel y replace d th e direc t traffi c betwee n
Pernambuco and th e Netherlands.
Since th e 1620 s Sephardi Jew s had bee n activ e in th e arm s trade , shippin g al l
manner of munitions and nava l stores t o Morocco. Durin g the 1641- 8 period the y
broadened th e scop e o f thei r arm s dealing s respondin g t o th e ne w Portugues e
monarch's urgent need for weapons and supplies with which to fight Spain . Neither
England nor France , both of which were buyers rather than sellers of most kinds of
munitions at thi s time, could provide what Joâo I V needed. I n effect, Hollan d an d
Hamburg wer e the onl y availabl e source s o f wa r supplies . Larg e arm s purchase s
were placed a t Amsterda m with both Jewish and non-Jewis h dealer s an d Joâo IV
also relie d o n severa l Dutc h an d Hambur g Sephard i Jew s t o hel p financ e these
purchases. In thi s way certain of th e leaders o f the Jewish communities derived an
enhanced politica l status an d became involve d i n th e working s o f international
mercantile politics. What was probably th e largest of Joâo IV' s arm s buyin g con-
tracts, for 100,00 0 cruzados worth of gunpowder, muskets, rigging and sieg e equip-
ment, wa s signe d i n Amsterda m in Jul y 164 1 with Lop o Ramires. 73 Ramire s als o
acted in the 1640 s as the chief nort h European correspondent of the Lisbon bankers
'O J . J . Herks , D e Geschiedenis van de Amersfoortse tabak (Th e Hagu e 1967 ) 70, 84 , 90-93, 96-98 ; C .
Reijnders, Va n 'Joodsche Natiën' to t Joodse Nederlanders (2nd edn. ; Amsterda m 1970 ) 138-139 .
71
F . Mauro , L e Portugal et l'Atlantique a u XVlle siècle, 1570-1670 (Paris 1960 ) 140-141 .
?
2 G A Amsterdam N Á 1527 , pp. 85, 118, 153,234 ; NÁ 1528 , pp. 27-28 , 274; NÁ 1530 , pp. 137,259 ;
NÁ 1531 , pp. 83 , 109 .
73
G A Amsterdam N A 1555B , pp. 1103-1104 , 1563 ; Virgini a Rau, 'A embaixad a d e Tristâo de Men-
donça Furtado e os arquivos notariails holandeses', Anais daAcademia Portuguesa de Historia 2nd ser. VIII
(1953)115-116.
and, amon g other things , was therefore entrusted wit h forwarding cash for mos t of
the Portugues e diplomati c service. 74 In 1645 , Lopo' s nephew, Jerónimo Nune s da
Costa (Moses Curiel), who, like his uncle and father, was knighted by the Portuguese
king (his father had been condemned to be burned in effigy by the Lisbon Inquisitio n
only a few years before his ennoblement) became officia l 'Agen t o f the Portuguese
Crown in the United Provinces' and fro m then until the end of his long life, in 1697 ,
handled th e bulk of the purchases made in Holland of gunpowder, arm s and naval
stores for the Portuguese army and navy and the Brazil fleets sailing from Lisbon. 75
Jerónimo also received commercial privilege s which for several decades assured hi s
primacy a s th e leading Dutc h merchan t tradin g with Portugal .
The second mai n stage in the economic evolutio n of golden ag e Dutch Sephard i
Jewry, fro m 164 8 to 1713 , is characterised abov e al l by th e gradua l eclips e o f th e
Portugal trade and the emergence of Spain and the Caribbean as the principal zone s
of activity . The firs t phas e o f th e new stage, from 164 8 to 1657 , was one o f funda -
mental shifts an d restructuring. On the one hand ther e was the collapse o f Nether -
lands Brazil in the years 1648-54 , a disaster for Dutch Jewry which caused th e total
dispersal o f the Sephardi communit y which had briefl y flourishe d at Pernambuco .
But thi s setbac k wa s more tha n compensate d for by the sudden break-through i n
Spanish trad e whic h occurred a t thi s time . Th e transformatio n o f Dutch-Spanis h
political and economic relation s following the treaty of Munster, in 1648, heralded a
new era i n Dutc h histor y generall y an d nowher e more s o than i n Dutch Sephard i
history. Severa l differen t factor s contribute d t o th e sudde n massiv e boos t t o th e
community's status , resource s an d prospects . It wa s not simpl y the re-opening of
Spanish port s t o Dutc h shippin g an d Phili p IV's somewhat reluctan t bu t explici t
agreement t o permit Jewish subject s of th e Unite d Province s t o trad e with Spain,
through either Catholic or Protestant correspondents, whic h produced thi s dramatic
effect.76 I t i s rather th e fac t tha t thes e importan t change s coincide d wit h certain
shifts withi n Spai n itsel f an d th e Spanis h Netherland s whic h prove d decisive ,
namely th e resurgenc e o f vehemen t Inquisitio n pressur e o n th e Portugues e New
Christians in Castile, following Olivares' downfall, and the Spanish state bankruptcy
of 164 7 which was deliberately aimed b y Spanis h ministers against th e Portuguese
New Christian financiers of Madrid and Antwerp. 77 The result was an appreciabl e
exodus of leading merchants and bankers, and thei r relatives and capital, a s well as
poorer New Christians from both Castile and the Spanish Netherlands. This exodus
began in or around 1645 , though it took a little longe r fo r its effects to be felt, and
continued int o the 1660s .
74
Francisc o d e Sousa Coutinho, Correspondencia diplomática d e Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a
sua embaixada e m Holanda ( 3 vols.; Coimbr a 1920-55 ) I, 12 , 17 , 46, 195 .
75
Publi c Record Office , London , Stale Papers 89/6 f . 200; ARA SG inv. nr. 7015, ü, Jerónimo Nunes da
Costa t o States General, The Hague, 20 Aug. 1689 and 28 Aug. 1691; see also J. I. Israel, 'The Diplomati c
career o f Jerónim o Nune s d a Costa : a n Episod e i n Dutch-Portugues e Relation s o f th e Seventeent h
Century', Bijdragen e n Mededelingen betreffende d e Geschiedenis de r Nederlanden 9 8 (1983), 167-190 .
76
AG S Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 32, Philip IV of Spain to Antoine Brun, Madrid, 9 July 1650 ; L. van
Aitzema, Historie ofverhael va n saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent d e Vereenigde Nederlanden (1 4
vols.; The Hague 1667-71) VII, 178; J. S. da Silva Rosa, Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden le Amsterdam,
1593-1925 (Amsterda m 1925) 84-85.
77
Antoni o Domínguez Ortiz, Política y hacienda d e Felipe ¡ V (Madri d 1960 ) 66, 69, 108 ; Julio Caro
Barqja, Los Judíos e n la España moderna y contemporánea (3 vols.; Madrid 1978) (1st. edn. 1962 ) II, 49-58,
66-68, 81-90; Israel, 'Spain an d the Dutc h Sephardim'/401-2.
A glance at),Tabl e 14 shows tha t th e secon d majo r jump i n the numbers o f Dutc h
Sephardi depositors with the Amsterdam Exchang e Bank in the seventeenth century
occurred i n the extremely brief spa n fro m 164 6 to 1651 . The numbers soare d fro m
126 t o 197 . Bu t th e figure s reveal onl y par t o f th e picture . Th e increas e i n tota l
resources was certainly muc h mor e dramatic. Almos t al l of the ver y ric h familie s
which were to dominate Dutc h Sephardi communit y life and politics for th e rest of
the seventeent h an d muc h o f th e eighteent h centur y arrive d a t thi s tim e bringin g
prestige, quasi-aristocrati c life-styl e and internationa l connection s suc h a s Dutc h
Jewry ha d neve r previously known. Of th e leadin g Dutch Sephard i familie s of th e
later seventeent h centur y - th e De Pinto, Pereira, Lope s Suasso , Nune s d a Cost a
(Curiel), Teixeira, Nune s Henriques and Buen o de Mezquita- most o f which wer e
ennobled a t one time or another by foreign monarchs, the Nunes da Costa wer e the
only on e which were present o r mad e any mar k on Dutch Jewish lif e befor e 1645 .
The res t arrive d fro m Spai n o r Antwer p i n th e 1645-5 4 perio d o r else , lik e th e
Teixeira, i n 1646 , move d fro m Antwer p t o Hamburg , migratin g t o Hollan d lat -
er.™
In additio n there is evidence that several of the principal Portugues e New Chris -
tian bankin g house s tha t remaine d i n Madrid remitte d a portion of thei r relative s
and capita l t o Hollan d durin g the 1640 s an d 1650s , as a kind of insurance , whils t
continuing to participate in the Spanish roya l asientos. This is evident, for instance ,
in th e cas e o f tw o o f th e best-know n Portugues e mercantil e families in Spain , th e
Cortizos and Montezinos. 79 I t is also known, from a detailed record lef t by a member
of the family, that the De Pintos, the wealthiest of all the Dutch Jewish families of the
later seventeent h century, transferred ver y larg e sum s t o Hollan d a t leas t severa l
years befor e it s dramati c mov e fro m Antwer p t o Rotterdam , an d fro m feigne d
Catholicism to open Judaism, in 1646. 80Thus, it emerges that Menassehben Israel' s
statement i n his famous Address t o Olive r Cromwel l tha t th e
'lewish Nation dwelling in Holland and Italy traff icqs with their own stock but also with the
riches of man y other s of thei r ow n Nation , friends , kinds-me n and acquaintanc e whic h
notwithstanding live in Spaine, and send unto them thei r money s and goods , which the y
hold in their hands .. .'81
was entirely true at least as regards Holland i n the 1640 s and 1650s . In effect, muc h
of th e wealt h accumulate d i n Spai n an d Spanis h Americ a b y Portugues e Ne w
Christians unde r Olivares ' protection , i n th e 1620 s an d 1630s , wa s subsequentl y
7
8 O n Pereira's migration see GA Amsterdam NA 1557A , pp. 221-222; on the De Pinto, Lopes Suass o
and Teixeira , see J. Denucé , 'let s ove r Spaansch-Portugeesch e geslachte n i n Nederland' , Antwerpsch
Archieven blad (1927) 35-52; H . P. Salomon, 'The De Pint o Manuscript. A 17t h Century Marrano Family
History', SR 9 (1975) 7-10, 30-31.
79
AG S Estad o inv.nr. 2083, Consulta of the Inquisition Suprema, Madrid, 9 May 1654 ; Caro Baroja ,
Judíos II , 123-4 ; Juli o Car o Baroja , L a sociedad criplojudia e n l a corte d e Felipe IV (Madri d 1970 )
passim.
80
sl
Salomon , 'De Pint o Manuscript', 6-18.
Menasseh ben Israel, To His Highnesse Th e Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland
and Ireland (Amsterdam 1655 ) p. A2; contrary to the view expressed b y Alvaro Castillo, at no stage did the
Portuguese New Christian bankers in Madrid ever draw Dutch Jewish funds int o Spain, for this mistaken
notion, see Alvaro Castillo, 'Dans l a monarchie espagnole du XVII e siècle: les banquiers portugais et le
circuit d'Amsterdam', Annales E.S.C. (1964) 311-316.
transferred, afte r hi s downfall , to Spain' s traditiona l enemy . Non e o f thi s wa s
foreshadowed before Olivares' downfall. The flight of capital from Spain to Amster-
dam, Rotterdam and Hamburg was due purely and simply to the undermining o f the
Portuguese New Christians' positio n i n Castil e and th e fierc e upsurg e of popula r
antipathy agains t the m co-incidin g wit h the restoratio n o f tradin g link s between
Spain an d Holland .
Some of the more opulen t newcomers were content to withdraw from trad e and
live chiefly off accumulated investments, initiating a trend towards a leisured, rentier
existence whic h became mor e pronounced as the century wor e on. The De Pintos,
previously immensely active businessmen, first in Lisbon and later in Antwerp, took
over th e leadershi p o f th e Rotterda m Sephard i community , established a smal l
Jewish religious college and continued t o sustain a luxurious life-style, but made no
real contribution to Dutch trade other than investing heavily in state funds and in the
East and West India Companies. Antonio Lopes (Isaac Israel ) Suasso who arrived
from Antwer p in 165 2 and who amassed numerou s investments includin g what , in
1674, was the largest single Jewish stake in the West India Company, amountin g to
107,000 guilders, did engage in the jewel trade but was otherwise remote from active
commerce, particularly after being made a baron by Charles II of Spain for financial
services on behalf of the Spanish army in the Low Countries during the war against
France i n th e 1670s . However , th e mai n grou p o f newcomer s no t onl y brough t
capital but active commercial connection s with Spain which rapidly transformed th e
whole character o f Dutc h Sephardi economi c activity .
This new Spanish trade which blossomed in the 1650 s consisted essentially of four
strands - Santander , Cadiz , Málaga and the Canaries - only two of which, the routes
to Santander and Málaga, involved bulky goods. For this reason, the great majority
of freight-contract s signe d by Dutc h Jews for voyages to Spai n concern thes e tw o
particular destinations , exep t durin g th e 1648-5 2 perio d whe n larg e quantities of
grain were shipped by Amsterdam Jews to Cadiz and neighbouring ports.82 The total
volume of Dutc h trade with Spai n i n th e 1650 s was extremely large, fa r larger than
that o f Englan d o r an y othe r Europea n countr y an d th e Jew s certainl y di d no t
dominate it in the way that they did th e Morocc o o r aspects of the Portuga l trade.
Indeed, some of the most important non-Jewish Amsterdam firms, such as those of
Coymans, Domme r an d Va n Collen, wer e heavily involved in this traffic. Even so,
the Sephardi Jewish share in what was fast becoming one of the most vital sectors of
Dutch trade was, as numerous Amsterdam notarial deeds attest, substantial, in the
region accordin g t o one moder n estimat e o f 20%. 83
The temporary English dominance over wool exports from northern Spain during
the Thirty Years War ended almost as soon as the Dutch re-entered the field, in 1648.
From the n unti l 1702 , roughl y two-third s o f al l woo l exporte d fro m Spai n wa s
conveyed to the Low Countries in Dutch shipping.84 In the 1650s , a dozen or fiftee n
Amsterdam Sephard i Jews regularly imported woo l fro m norther n Spain , usually
82
G A Amsterdam NÁ 1531 , pp. 222, 230; NÁ 1532 , pp. 35 , 98; J. 1. Israel, 'Some Further Data on the
Amsterdam Sephardi m and thei r trade with Spain during th e 1650s' , SR 1 4 (1980) 7-19.
83
D . M. Swetschinski, 'The Spanish Consul and th e Jews of Amsterdam', Texts and Responses. Studies
presented to Nahum N . Olatzer (Leiden 1975 ) 165-166.
84
H . C. Diferee , D e geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen handel tot den val der Republiek (Amsterdam
1908) 206-207; H . Kamen , Spain i n the later Seventeenth Century, 1665-I700 (London 1980 ) 71.
Santander, and then sold their supplies in Leiden or on the Amsterdam exchang e t o
dealers from Flanders, Liège , Julien and neighbourin g part s of Westphalia. A t that
time, the leadin g Dutc h Jewis h importers o f Spanis h woo l were Abraha m Pereir a
who had arrive d i n Hollan d wit h a large fortun e from Madrid , i n 1645 , an d wh o
maintained a Jewish religious college a t Hebron , i n the The Holy Land , Jaco b del
Monte, Baltasa r da Cunha, Isaa c de Prado, Fernand o Alvares , Fernando de Baeza
and Andre a Cristoba l Nunes. 85 Wha t is especially significant i s that virtually al l of
these wer e 'Spaniards ' wh o ha d onl y recentl y migrate d t o th e Jewis h quarte r o f
Amsterdam bu t wh o were nevertheles s all of the m among th e dozen o r s o richest
Jews i n Holland. 86
While th e Spanis h trad e throve , th e olde r link s of Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y with
Portugal and Brazi l began t o weaken. On the one hand, the collapse of Netherland s
Brazil liquidated the former direct trad e betwee n Brazi l and Hollan d while , on th e
other, th e gradual deterioration i n Dutch-Portuguese relation s which characterise s
the 1650 s began t o hav e an advers e effec t o n trade. 87 But most significan t of all in
reducing th e importanc e of Dutc h Jewis h dealing s wit h Portugal wa s th e sudde n
vigorous upsurge of sugar imports into Europe from various parts of the Caribbean ,
notably Cuba , Martiniqu e and especiall y Barbados , a process which began i n th e
late 1640s , was the direct outcome o f the devastation of the plantations of Nether-
lands Brazil by the Portuguese insurgent s in that territory, an d which, from the first,
was intimatel y linke d with th e activitie s of th e Sephard i Jew s of Amsterda m an d
Hamburg.88 Th e flo w o f ne w Caribbea n suga r combine d wit h th e recover y i n
shipments from Brazil in the 1650 s soon led, however, to a flooding of the European
market. Th e inevitabl e resul t wa s a collaps e i n suga r price s o n th e Amsterda m
Exchange.89 Thi s drasti c fal l i n suga r price s too k plac e i n th e year s 1655- 7 an d
proved a decisive turning-point in the history of Europe's commerc e wit h the New
World: prices never again approached thei r former levels; the sugars of Brazil and
Sao Thome neve r recovered thei r former ascendancy o n th e Dutc h market . Nev-
ertheless, Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y continued t o play a prominent par t i n Holland' s
somewhat dwindlin g trade wit h Portugal . Fo r mos t o f th e 1650s , followin g th e
withdrawal of the Portuguese embassy from th e United Provinces, Jerónimo Nunes
da Cost a wa s simultaneously Portuguese chargé d'affaires i n The Hague , Agen t of
the Portuguese Crow n i n Amsterda m an d th e Amsterda m representativ e o f th e
newly founde d Portuguese Brazi l Company.90 H e handle d th e bul k of th e Brazil-
8
5 G A Amsterda m 1532 , pp. 13 , 15-16, 89, 92, 114 ; Israel , 'Som e Further Data' , 16-18 .
86
Bloom , Economic Activities, 175-176 ; it i s also noteworth y that almos t al l came from Madrid , se e
Swetschinski, 'Portuguese Jewis h Merchants', II , 101 .
87
Thus , man y o f th e ship s an d supplie s fo r th e Portugues e Brazi l Compan y se t u p i n 1648 , wer e
purchased through Jerónimo Nunes da Costa's father, Duarte, Portuguese, 'Agent' in Hamburg, rather than
in Holland, see J. Lucio d'Azevedo Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira (3 vols.; Coimbra 1925-28)1,161-2,168 ,
183; Kellenbenz , Sephardim, 151 .
88
Ibidem , 94, 162 ; Modesto Ulloa , 'Th e Suga r Industr y in the Havan a Distric t (Cuba) , 1641-1667' ,
Wirtschaftskrafte und Wirtschaftswege IV , 75-91 ; on Hambur g Sephardi trad e with Barbados see Hamburg
Staatsarchiv, Archiv e o f th e Admiralitàtskollegium F4/1 5 f . 9 4 et passim.
89
N.W . Posthumus, Inquiry into the History o f Prices in Holland (2 vols.; Leiden 1946-64)1,119,139 and
II, 277-279 , 724.
90
D . M. Swetschinski, 'An Amsterda m Merchant-Diplomat: Jerónim o Nune s da Costa alia s Mose h
Curiel (1620-1697), Agent of the Kin g of Portugal' , in L. Dasberg and J. N. Cohe n eds . Neveh Ya'akov.
Jubilee Volume presented to Dr . Jaap Meijer o n th e Occasion of hi s Seventieth Birthday (Asse n 1982 )
15-20.
The Economie Contribution o f the Dutch Sephardi Jewrry 437
wood entering Hollan d a s well as large quantifies of Brazil sugar and tobáceo , an d
Portuguese sai t an d figs . Amon g th e othe r leadin g Dutc h Sephard i merchant s
trading wit h Portuga l durin g thi s fift h phas e wer e Francisc o Lope s d'Azevedo ,
Simon an d Lui s Rodrigue s d a Sousa , Antoni o Lope s Gomes , Manoe l Gome s d a
Silva an d Joâ o Rodrigue s Muñes. 91 I t i s worthy of not e tha t o f th e doze n larges t
accounts of Dutch Sephardi Jews with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, in 1661 , the
only deposit whic h belonged t o a merchant whose links were mainly with Portugal
was tha t o f Jerónimo Nunes da Costa. 92
A distinctiv e feature o f th e fift h phas e i n th e economi e évolutio n o f Dutc h
Sephardi Jewry is that th e dispersa i o f som e 1,50 0 Jews f rom forme r Netherlands
Brazil in the years 1648-54 greatly enhanced the manpower an d colonizing capacit y
of Dutc h Jewry at a momen t whe n it s resource s dramaticall y increase d an d ne w
opportunities aróse in the Caribbean. There are various reasons why Sephardi Jews
were able to play a fundamental role in the early development o f the non-Spanisc h
Caribbean, but none was more significant than the sheer availability for Caribbea n
colonization, a t a crucia l time , of a substantia l bod y o f merchants , planter s an d
artisans exper t i n sugar , tobáceo , dye-wood s an d th e othe r producí s o f tropica l
South America . I t i s tru e that th e bul k o f th e refugee s were shipped bac k fro m
Pernambuco to Holland but a portion migrate d directly to the Guyanas, Barbado s
(which was the mai n centre before th e rise of Curaçao), Martinique, Jamaica an d
New Amsterda m (later New York) while man y of those wh o returned t o Hollan d
afterwards crosse d bac k t o the Caribbean alon g with other Dutch Jews. 93 There is
not the slightest doubt that the Jewish colony which flourished on Barbados during
the second hal f of the seventeenth century was established an d sustained mainly by
the Jews of Amsterdam and not by the f ledgling community of London.94 It was also
during the 1650 s that Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry established th e Jewish colony on
Curaçao whic h was shortly t o becom e th e mos t importan t of al l th e Jewish com -
munities i n th e New World. 9'
The sixt h phase, tha t of 1657-72 , was one o f further fundamenta l restructuring.
This period, which opens with the Dutch-Portuguese war of 1657-6 1 and the rise, in
the lat e 1650s , o f a regula r Dutc h transi t trad e t o th e Spanis h Indie s vi a th e
Caribbean, th e old Portuga l trade recede d furthe r int o the backgroun d whil e th e
Caribbean traffi c emerge d a s th e secon d mai n pilla r o f Dutc h Sephard i Jewis h
economie activity alongside Spanish commerce. Assuredly, the effects of the 1657-6 1
war should not be exaggerated. There was little fighting excep t in the East where the
Dutch complete d thei r conques t o f Ceylo n an d too k ove r th e Cochi n distric t of
South India. But the States General did forbid its subjects to trade with Portugal for
9
' G A Amsterdam NA 1532 , pp. 32,45,107,137,178,274; NA 1540, pp. 3,51,55,62,99, 176-177,183,
268.
92
Bloom , Economie Activities, 176 .
93
Boxer , Dutch in Brazil, 243; A. Catien, 'Les juifs de la Martinique au XVIIe siècle', REJII (1881 ) 93-7;
Egon an d Fried a Wolff, A Odisseia dosjudeus d e Recife (Sa o Paulo, Brazil, 1979 ) 214 , 242, 248, 251 ,
254-256, 259.
94
AG S Libro s d e L a Hay a inv . nr. 40 , f . 186 ; Wolff, A . Odisseia, 213-214 , 216-217 , 226 , 230, 232,
237.
95
I . S. and S . A. Emmanuel, A History o f the Jews of th e Netherlands Antilles (2 vols.; Cincinatti 1970) I
40-41, 46-47.
the duration and , despite extensive evasion, the struggle undoubtedl y accelerated
English pénétration of the Portugal trade, furthe r reducin g the share of the Dutch.
Af ter the 166 1 Dutch-Portuguese peace treaty, Dutch Jews imported only a fraction
of th e Brazilia n producís fro m Lisbo n tha t the y ha d previousl y whil e Dutc h
Sephardi dealings with northern Portugal declined almost to insignifiance.96 How -
ever, a fe w of the m di d continu e importing sait fro m Setúba l an d fig s fro m th e
Algarve and sustaine d a livel y business with Madeira an d th e Azores, exchanging
cloth and barrel slaves (for the famous Madeira wine) chiefly for contraband Brazil
sugar and tobáceo .
Earlier, during the fifth phase , ihe rise of a network of Jewish colonies on islands
English, Frenen and Dutch but all closely tied socially, culturally an d economically
lo Amsterdam Jewry had crealed Ih e condilions in which Dutch Sephardi merchants
might, or could, assume a leading part in Caribbean commerce . What was lacking
was Iha l a s ye t iher e wa s no regula r iraffi c belwee n Ih e Dutc h island s an d th e
Spanish Indies . As late as 1660 , the Amsterdam notarial deed s show thaï Ihe main
allernative to the Cádiz rout e was the trade to Ihe Canaries.97 Curaçao, the islan d
which was soon to develop inlo the principal depol for Ihe Caribbean transit trade to
the Spanish American colonies had been occupied by the Dutch as f ar back as 1634.
Yet fo r decades Curaça o yielded virtuall y no profi t whatever. 98 I n th e 1640s , Ih e
West India Company aclually considered abandoning what subsequenlly became its
most valuabl e possession, because it Ihe n had n o trade. Even afther 1648 , Dutch
ships venturing to the coast of the Spanish American mainland with slaves, cloth and
spices, th e three ilems mosl in demand wil h the Spanish colonists, al firsl enjoyed
only a very sporadic success in evading Ihe obslacles se t up by Spanish bureaucracy
and garrisons. 99 Regula r contac t betwee n Curaça o an d th e neighbourin g Sout h
American mainland began only in or around 1657 , setting in motion the shift which
was soon t o transform Curaçao into the Amsterdam of the Caribbean. What began
as a trickl e soon gathere d greall y increased momenlu m a s a resull o f Phili p IV' s
signing of the famous 1662 slaving asiento wilh a consortium of Genoese business-
men, stipulalin g Ihal Ih e slave s l o b e shippe d t o Ih e Spanis h Indie s unde r th e
contract were not to be obtained fro m Ih e Portuguese with whom Spain was still al
war.100 T o mee t thi s commilmenl , Ih e Genoes e asentistas, Grill o an d Lomelín ,
turned lo th e Dulch West India Company which in a series of contracis signe d in
Amsterdam agreed to act as an agency licensing individual Dutch merchants lo send
ships to Wesl África fo r slaves and iransport them to Curaçao where they were to be
received an d sol d off t o loca l Spanish buyer s by factors of Ih e Genoese. 10' Fro m
96
O n Dutch Jewish trade with Portugal , Madeira and the Azores in 1661-4 , see GA Amsterdam NA
1541, pp. 28-29,71-72,97-98,102,103,111,126,156, 160,215-216,223,296; NA 1542, pp. 9,32,70,72-73,
93, 97 , 100-102 , 105, 110, 133 , 136 , 146-148 , 158, 198-199, 209, 227, 260.
97
G A Amsterdam NA 1540 , pp. 147,210 ; NA 1541, pp. 39-40; ARA SG inv.nr. 7044, Antoine Brun to
States General, The Hague, ! Feb. 1652 ; Israël, 'Som e Further Data', 14-16 .
98
S . va n Brakel , 'Bescheide n ove r de n slavenhande l der West-Indisch e Compagnie', Economisch-
Historisch Jaarboek I V (1918) 49.
99
Archiv o General de Indias, Seville, Papers of the Audiencia de Santé Fe, legajo nr. 215, Consulta of the
Junta d e Indias, Madrid , 3 1 Jan. 1654 ; W. R . Menkman , De Nederlanders i n het Carai'bische zeegebied
(Amsterdam 1942 ) 44-45,67; W. S. Unger, 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis va n de Nederlandse slavenhan-
del', Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek XXV I (1956) 143, 148, 150.
K» George s Scelle , L a Traite négrière aux Indes d e Castille (2 vols.; Pari s 1906 ) I, 484-485, 501, 527.
'01 Va n Brakel , 'Bescheiden', 61-66.
The Economie Contribution of th e Dutch Sephardi Jewrry 439
1662, for th e rest of th e century, the great majorit y o f slaves entering th e Spanis h
Indies were shipped by the Dutch via Curaçao. 102
From the moment that Spanish colonial officialdom concede d thi s 'legal' flow of
traffic between Curaçao and the mainland, supposedly to obtain slaves, there existed
a viabl e cove r fo r a regular , flourishin g contraban d trad e i n ever y other sor t of
merchandise in demand among the Spanish colonists. Th e main trade was with the
nearby commercial centres of Coro, Cartagena , Maracaibo and Caracas bu t in the
1660s there also aróse a brisk commerce between Curaçao and the relatively distant
Spanish islands of Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico.103 Spanish diplomáis and
agents in Hollan d wer e not slo w t o se e the significanc e o f thi s new development.
Even bef ore th e signing of the asiento, in Marc h 1661 , the Spanish ambassado r i n
The Hagu e warned Phili p I V about th e
'trade which is now being introduced by way of Curaçao... as I understand tha t they have
now established large stores with every kind of merchandise there which they deliver during
the nigh t usin g lon g boats , takin g bac k silve r bar s an d othe r producí s o f thos e
parts.. .''w
In Ihi s way, ihe Dulch effectively caplure d th e Caribbean Iransit trad e with the
Spanish Indie s and continue d t o enjo y th e lion' s shar e wel l int o ih e eighleenl h
cenlury. Fro m th e outset , Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y playe d a centra l rôl e i n thi s
lucrative traffic an d ihoug h iheir share can never be quanlified exaclly, w e can be
f airly sure lhal il amounied to considerably more ihan Iheir 20% or so share in Dulch
irade wilh Spain. Subsianlial numbers of Sephardi Jews setlled on Curaçao from ihe
laie 1650 s an d ihe y dominate d dealing s wit h th e Spanis h America n mainlan d
through thei r contacts wit h the local Portugues e Ne w Chrislian communities . By
1702, th e Dutc h Sephard i communil y on Curaça o numbere d aroun d 60 0 an d
accounled fo r 34.5% of the taxable wealth on Ihe island.105 Bul they themselves had
relalively lillle weallh. Few had much capilal of Iheir own, or owned many slaves or
much property; some were poor. Most were agents, factors and brokers earning Iheir
livelihood by providing the link-up between the Sephardi Jewish merchant body of
Amsterdam with the markets for slaves, cloth and spices in Ihe Spanish Caribbean.
Curaçao als o serve d a s Ih e molher-communit y for th e neighbourin g Sephardi
colonies which aróse even on some of the lesser islands such as Grenada, Nevis and
102
Thi s is assumed b y Scelle, Van Brakel and Menkma n an d i s confirmed b y the statistics of Franz
Binder whos e monumenta l stud y o f th e Dutc h Atlanti c slav e trad e durin g th e thir d quarte r o f th e
se ven teen th centur y will shortly b e published.
103
'Proposicione s del marque s d e Variña s sobr e los abusos d e Yndias' i n Colección d e documentos
inéditos relativos ai descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y
Oceania (25 vols.; Madri d 1885-1932 ) XIX, 243-244, 245-247.
104
AG S Libros de La Haya in v.nr. 43, f. 94, Don Esteban de Gamarra to Philip IV of Spain, The Hague,
8 March 1661; see also AGS Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 47, f. 109 and nr. 50, f. 115, in the latter report the
new Curaça o traffi c i s describe d a s th e 'destrucció n del comerci o d e la s India s y d e lo s tesoro s de
ellas'.
'05 Emmanuel , Jews ofthe Netherlands Antilles II, 763-768; Barbados Sephardi Jewry numbered around
300 in 168 0 and wá s assuredl y th é secon d i n ran k o f th e Caribbea n Sephard i colonie s until Surina m
surpassée ¡t around 1690, see W. S. Samuel, 'Review of the Jewish Colonists in Barbados in the Year 1680',
TJHSE 1 3 (1936) 17 , 21 .
106
Tobago. From thé outset, many and perhaps most of the leading Sephardi Jewish
merchants of Holland involved themselves in thé Curaçao trade and there were soon
at least twenty of thirty Jewish f irms regularly engaged in the traf f ie. Some of the best
known ñames were deeply engaged i n the slaving business, including , in thé 1670s ,
Baron Manuel de Belmonte, Agent of Spain in Amsterdam.107 There is no proof tha t
he wás also a contrabandist bu t thi s seems likely despite hi s officia i function s o n
behalf of thé Spanish crown. More ironie still is the f act that one of those most active
in initiating this traf fie in thé early 1660s , when Spain was still intent on excludin g
slaves procured from Portugues e sources, wá s Jerónimo Muñe s da Costa, Agen t of
thé Portuguese Crown i n thé United Provinces : Jerónim o issue d passe s fo r at leas t
several Dutc h vessel s t o collec t slave s destined fo r th é Spanis h Indie s fro m th é
Portuguese colony of Angola and, fo r good measure , remitted thousand s o f pesos
worth of Ceylon cinnamon, purchased from thé East India Company in Amsterdam ,
to Curaça o t o be smuggled into Maracaib o an d Cartagena. 108
The rise of thé Curaçao trade tended to reinforce thé characteristic concentratio n
of th e Dutch Jewish 'commo n man' , whethe r Sephardi c or Ashkenazic, int o jewel
and tobáce o préparation . Amon g th e mos t typica l tobáceo s processe d b y Jewis h
manufacturer i n Hollan d i n th e late seventeenth century were Puert o Rica n an d
'Bariñas' tobáceo s fro m Venezuela . A s wit h th é Brazil , Virgini a an d Martiniqu e
tobáceos thes e wer e ofte n o r usuall y mixed wit h th é home-grow n lea f an d th é
increase in th é quantity and variet y of American tobáceos handled b y Dutch Jew s
want hand-in-han d wit h continue d Jewis h investmen t in tobáce o cultur e aroun d
Amersfoort an d Nijkerk. 109 Pearl s which were second onl y to diamonds in impor-
tance in thé European jewellery trade of the later seventeenth century came in part
form thé East Indies but significan t quantities were imported also form th é Spanis h
Caribbean vi a Curaçao. 110 Th e ne w transi t traffi c t o th é Spanis h Indie s vi a th é
Caribbean als o adde d anothe r manufactur e — the makin g of chocolat é - t o th é
Amsterdam community's growing industrial repertoire. A very high proportion of
the returns from Curaça o t o Amsterdam consisted of so-called 'Caracas' cacao and
in th e late seventeenth century no commodity figured mor e frequently than this in
Jewish dealings on th é Amsterdam exchange. 111 Indeed , Amsterdam's hold o n th é
international caca o trad e became so total tha t ther e are eve n cases of Venezuelan
cacao being shipped from Hollan d to Cádiz!112 It is amusing to note that Gamarra ,
thé Spanish ambassador i n The Hague during thé 1660s , and an incorrigibl e gour-
'0* G A Amsterdam NÁ 2901 unpag. deedof 3 Jan. 1670(notary P. Padthuysen); G. Merrill, 'The roleo f
Sephardi Jews in thé British Caribbean Área during thé Seventeenth Century1, Caribbean Studies IV (1964)
33.
107
Emmanuel , Jews o f th e Netherlands Antilles I, 75-76.
108
AG S Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 47, f. 196 v and nr . 53, f. 268; see also D. M. Swetschinski, 'Conflict
and Opportunity in "Europe's other Sea" : the Adventure of Caribbean Jewish Seulement', American Jewish
Hisiory 7 2 (l982) 236.
'O» G A Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 633; NA 2901, deed of 3 Feb. 1670 ; NA 3589, f. 343; NA 359 2 dee d 1 1
April 1673.
"O G A Amsterda m N A 4084 , deed 6 April 1677.
111
se e th e register s of cargoe s consigne d to Amsterda m Jew s on ship s returnin g from Curaça o t o
Holland i n AR A Archiv e of th e Wes t Indi a Company inv.nrs. 567, 568, 56 9 and 570 .
112
J . Everaert , De internationale en koloniale handel de r Vlaamse firma's t e Cádiz, ¡670-1700 (Bruges
1973) 420.
The Economie Contribution of th e Dutch Sephardi Jewry 44 1
met, wa s assured b y hi s own official s tha t th e bes t chocolatiers, includin g a ma n
named Pacheco who flavoured hi s chocolate wit h vanilla, were the Jews of Amster-
dam.
The seventh phase, that of 1672-1702, corresponds t o the period when the United
Provinces were embroiled i n open conflict with France but in alliance wit h Spain. It
is a perio d i n whic h los s o f momentu m i n th e Dutc h econom y a s a whol e wa s
unmistakeable. Not withou t reason hav e historians traditionally dated th e waning of
Dutch economi e powe r f rom th e shoc k o f Loui s XIV' s invasio n i n 1672. 113 Th e
dwindling of the old bulk trades - grain, timber and sait - which characterises Dutc h
commerce overal l in the 1672-170 2 period certainl y applies also to Dutch Sephardi
commerce. Bu t Jewish involvement in bulk carrying had been confined largely to the
Portugal trad e and withdrawa l from shippin g grain an d timbe r to , and sai t from ,
Portugal, whic h seems t o have occurred i n the 1670 s and 1680 s only confirmed th e
eclipse of Portuga l i n th e overal l pattern o f Dutch Sephard i activit y and th e con -
solidation o f the Spanish and Caribbean trade s a s the twin pillars o f their busines s
and prosperity. Eve n the leading Amsterdam Portuga l merchant, Jerónimo Nune s
da Costa, largel y ceased dealin g in grain and sait , concentrating increasingl y i n his
later year s o n importin g Brazi l sugar , tobáce o an d dye-wood s fro m th e Azores ,
Lisbon an d Sa o Thomé." 4
But wha t chiefly deserves to be noticed abou t th e Sephardi contributio n t o th e
Dutch economy durin g the las t thir d of th e seventeenth centur y is that il s impor -
tance relative to the rest continued to grow. Indeed, ther e can be no question that the
greatest Sephard i contributio n t o Dutc h économi e influenc e overseas , an d well -
being at home, came precisely in thé period o f Holland's décline not during ils rise.
As can be seen fro m Table 14ithe number of Jewish depositors with thé Amsterdam
Exchange Ban k continue d t o increas e afte r th é figur e fo r th é tota l numbe r o f
accounts had begun to fall so that as a proportion of thé whole thé number of Jewish
depositors rosé to no less than 13 % by 1674. This wás part of a more basic shift in the
1672-1702 period. The reasons why Jewish activit y became mor e fundamenta l to
Dutch well-bein g a t thi s tim e than previousl y ar e much th é sam e a s those which
explain th é relative increase, afte r 1672 , of Amsterdam's weight withi n the Dutc h
economy overall . Fo r a centra l featur e o f Dutc h économi e déclin e i n th e lat e
seventeenth an d eighteent h centurie s is that Amsterda m los t groun d mor e slowly
than the rest. What apparently was happening was that while the fisheries and Baltic
trade, in which many towns participated, suffere d severely, thé Spanish and colonial
trades hel d u p muc h better and , i n som e sectors, continued t o grow . Thu s whil e
Amsterdam accounted fo r som e 50% of thé value of Dutch trade , i n 1650 , by 170 0
this figur e há d rise n t o 64%." 5
The continue d vitalit y o f it s Spanis h an d Caribbea n trad e wer e o f suc h vita l
importance to thé Republic that it amounted almost to dependence. Fo r it wás thèse,
113
see , for instance, Jan de Vries, The Dutch Rural Economy in thé Golden Age, 1500-1700 (New Haven ,
Conn. 1974 ) 95 , 242 .
1
''* J . I. Israël, 'An Amsterda m Merchan t of thé Golden Age: Jerónim o Nunes da Costa, Agent of the
Portuguese Crown in thé United Provinces' , SR (forthcoming) .
115
J . d e Vries , D e economische achteruitgang der Republiek i n de achttiende eeuw (Amsterdam 1959 )
40-41.
together with thé East India commerce, whic h chiefly explain Amsterdam's contin -
ued prépondérance a s thé world's leading commercial an d financia! centre for sixty
or eighty years af ter the rest of the country had begun to lapse into provincial torpor .
The Englis h diplomat Onslow Burrish, writing of the Dutch econom y i n the 1720 s
considered tha t
'without th e bullion which Holland receives annually from Spain , it would b e impossible
for th e Dutch to carry on their commerce with other nations where the ballance of trade is
against them, as in the case of Muscovy, Norway, England, France and the Levant. I do not
think mysel f guilt y of exaggeration therefore when I say that a Révolutio n in this single
branch of commerce would probably draw on the ruin of the Republic, and consequently
the State s General would hazar d a war rather than submit t o it.' 116
As to Amsterdam's ascendancy over the supply of Spanish silver there is little room
for doubt. 117 In some years it rivalled or even exceeded the two-thirds control tha t the
Dutch enjoyed over Spanish wool experts. In this respect, the Dutch would seem to
have profite d fro m Loui s XIV' s agressio n agains t themselve s an d Spain , fo r th e
French shar e whic h wa s substantia l betwee n 165 9 an d 167 2 seems t o hav e bee n
considerably reduce d thereafter. 118 I n 1685 , o f th e fou r millio n pesos shippe d
directly to northern Europe on the return of the New World fleet, three-quarters was
consigned t o Hollan d and muc h o f the silver remitted t o Italy went to Livorn o on
account of Dutch firms trading with the Levant; of the bullion brought back on th e
1698 Indies fleet, four millio n pesos was consigned to Holland, less than half o f this
to France and only 600.000 pesos to England which, bef ore 1713, never succeeded in
rivalling Franc e o r th e Unite d Provinces in thi s key traffic .
During the 1672-170 2 period, Dutc h Jewry continued a regular trad e with most
parts of Spain, including Málaga, Alicante and th e Canaries a s well as the Basqu e
ports and Cádiz. A t the same time, they continued to use the old contraband rout e
from Madri d bringin g silver an d woo l periodically , durin g bout s o f peac e wit h
France, via Pamplona and Bayonne." 9 The main items shipped t o Cádiz for reship-
ment t o th e Indies , w e learn fro m th e notaria l document s signe d b y Amsterdam
Jews, were linens Silesian, Flemish , Dutch an d French , Leide n woollens and Eas t
India pepper an d cinnamon. 120 On the Cádiz eorwoys escorted home by the Dutc h
navy, Dutch Sephardi Jews imported silver, tobáceo, dye-stuffs , vanilla and jewels.
Clearly thi s traffi c wa s engage d i n b y a relativel y larg e numbe r o f merchants ,
1 6
' O . Burrish, Batavia ¡Ilústrala: or a view of the Policy an d Commerce of th e United Provinces (2 vols.;
London 1728 ) I, 503; a Dutch observer remarke d in the 1690 s that the 'commerce d'Espagne est le plus
considerable que nous ayons après ceux de la Mer Baltique, des Indes et des pèches', but whereas the Baltic
trade an d fisherie s wer e in décline , th é Spanis h trad e wá s o f relativel y increasing importance , se e th é
'Mémoire touchant le négoce e t l a navigatio n des Hollandoi s (1699)' éd. P . J. Blok , Bijdragen e n Mede-
delingen va n het Historisch Genootschap 2 4 (1903) 267, 268 .
1 7
' Henr y Kamen's views as to the prédominance o f France in the Spanish trade of the later seventeenth
century are entirely incorrect, see H. Kamen, Spain i n the Later Seventeenth Ceniury, ¡665-1700 (London
1980) 118-121 ; and the exchange between Kamen and myself in 'Debate. The Decline of Spain: A Historical
Myth?', Past and Present 91 (1981) 170-185 .
118
A . Girard, Le commerce f roncáis à Seville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourg (Paris and Bordeaux 1932)
447-450,451-452.
'I' G A Amsterdam NÁ 2901 , p. 693; N Á 6677A, p, 237.
!2
° G A Amsterdam NÁ 2898, pp. 139,205; NÁ 2901 unpaginated, deeds 26 Jan. 1670, 6 Feb. 1670 ; NÁ
6677A, p. 237; N A 6677B, pp. 415, 419, 429 .
The Economie Contribution of the Dutch Sephardi Jewry 44 3
including the Pereira dynasty, the De Los Rios family, Abraham and Isaa c Henri -
ques Faro (alias Antonio and Jacques Boeckelaar), Henríque Mendes da Silva, Isaac
de Prado, Fransisco Nune s da Costa (Aaron Curie!), 'Carolus and Jacobus Schoo-
nenburg' and man y othe r ñames. Little research ha s yet been conducted int o the
activities of the wealthy ship-owning De La Penha family which headed the Sephardi
community of Rotterdam i n the late seventeenth century, but they were of Spanish
rather than Portuguesa background an d it seems likely that they too engaged in this
commerce.121 I t i s remarkable that i n Spain eve n Portuguese New Christia n mer-
chants residin g i n suc h inlan d provincia l centre s a s Valladoli d an d Antequer a
corresponded directl y with Amsterdam Jews.122
Apart from Spai n and, to a dwindling extent Portugal, most of the rest of Dutch
activity in the Oíd World was confined, as bef ore, to Morocco and Livorno. The only
new item was the increasing tendency, af ter 1670 , to import roug h diamonds from
India via London.123 With regard to the Morocco trade, it is noticeable that whereas
Saleh and Tetuan were the chief ports of cali used by Dutch Jewish merchants during
the Thirty Years War, by the 1670s Saleh and especially Agadir were the main foei of
the trafftc . I n the 1670s , the leading Dutch Jewish Morocco merchants were Jacob
Bueno de Mezquita, Abraham Telles, Francisc o Pereira de Castro, Aaron Mende s
and Davi d Ferreira. 124 Regardin g Livorno , numerou s Dutc h Sephard i Jew s hád
close business as well as family lies with the city in the late seventeenth century for by
then this Tuscan port had usurped most of Venice's former functions as an entrepôt
for thé Levant trade. Apart from sugar, Amsterdam Jewry's exports to Livorno were
very simila r to th e good s shippe d t o Spain , consistin g chiefl y of linens , Leide n
woollens, pepper and cinnamon. Most of this merchandise wás clearly intended for
reshipment t o th é Levant, Tunisia and Algeria. 125
Dutch Sephardi Jewry's Caribbean trade continued t o flourish durin g the 1672-
1702 phase despite the persistent efforts o f thé English and French to penétrate the
transit business with thé Spanish colonies and to drive thé Dutch out of the traffic t o
Barbados and Martinique . Despite the Navigation Acts, and Colbert , it is obvious
that much of the commerce of both islands was still handled by Amsterdam Jews in
the 167ÖS. 12*. However , the effort s o f th e Englis h and Frenc h crowns , including
Louis XIV's expulsion of the Jews from th e French Caribbean colonies in 1683 , did
eventually have the intended effect. This pressure in turn caused a major shift in the
pattern of Dutch Sephardi activity in the Caribbean toward s concentrating o n the
'21 D . Hausdorf , Jizkor. Platenatlas van drie en een halve eeuw geschiedenis va n de joodse gemeente in
Rotterdam va n 1610 tot I960 (Baam 1978 ) 17-20.
!22 G A Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 999; NA 2901, deed 26 June 1670; on the correspondence between the
Alicante New Christia n merchant , Felip e d e Moscoso, and variou s Amsterdam Jew s i n th e 1670s , see
Kamen, Spain i n the Later Seventeenth Century, 143-144 .
123
G . Yogev, Diamonds and Coral. Angb-Dtttch Jews and Eighteenth-Ceniuty Trade (Leicester 1978)
84-102.
124
G A Amsterdam N A 1544, p. 260; NA 1545 , pp. 48-49, 50, 200-201, 274.
'25 G A Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 769; NA 2901, pp. 884, 1009 and deeds 28 Jan. 1670,6 Feb. 1670; NA
7350, p . 1034 ; and G A Amsterda m API G ¡nv.nr . 334 , lists o f goods remitted b y Amsterdam Jew s t o
Livorno.
!
2* G A Amsterdam NA 2898, pp. 57-59, 185 , 197; NA 2901, deeds 3 Jan. and 1 1 Mardi 1670 ; I. S.
Emmanuel, 'Les juifs de la Martinique et leurs coreligionnaires d'Amsterdam au XVIIe siècle', REJ 12 3
(1964)511-516.
resources of the Dutch colonies themselves. Though there were instances of Amster-
dam Jew s investing heavily in sugar plantations and mili s in Surinam, even befor e
the Dutch captured the colony f rom the English, in 1667, it was whilst the Republi c
was at war with both France and England, in the years 1672-5 , that Jewish involve-
ment in Surinam assumed appréciable proportions. 127 By 1694, the Surinam Dutch
Sephardi community was the second largest in the Caribbean af ter that of Curaçao,
numbering around 500 , ownin g forty suga r plantation s an d som e 9.00 0 slaves. 128
Thus b y th e en d o f th e century , Amsterdam Sephard i Jewr y ha d becom e th e
European corner of a trans-Atlantic triangle linked to the Dutch Jewish colonies on
Curaçao and in Surinam. By 1730,115 of the 400 plantations in Surinam belonged t o
Sephardi Jews , th e áre a alon g th e muc h extolle d Surina m river being virtuall y a
Jewish autonomous région, the religieus and communa l nerve-centre of which was
the synagogu e a t Jode n Savanneh , thre e o r fou r hour s b y boa t u p rive r fro m
Paramaribo.
But while, at the end of the century, the Jews of Amsterdam were, as the English
consul, William Carr, expressed it 'verie considérable in the trade of this citie',129 and
relatively more so than previously, a smaller and smaller proportion o f the Sephardi
community were actively engaged i n overseas trade. Though stil l well ahead of th e
Germán Jews in sophistication and wealth, the Sephardi community already showed
a marke d loss of momentum and initiativ e compared with the now more dynamic
Ashkenazi merchant class who were visibly narrowing the gap between themselves
and th e Sephardim, entering increasingly into sectors of foreign an d colonia l com -
merce i n whic h the y ha d previousl y playe d littl e o r n o part . B y an d large , th e
Sephardi elite was content to stick to the now easy routine of Caribbean and Spanish
trade, fadin g mor e and mor e from th e traffi c wit h Portugal which had onc e been
their mainstay . In th e upper echelon s o f th e community, many or mos t Sephard i
patricians joined the ranks of the Dutch rentier class along with a good many former
Protestant an d Catholi c merchants , livin g off investments , adopting a strikingly
luxurious life-style and spendin g much time engaged in community and synagogue
affairs, th e Jewish equivalent to the participation of the Dutch régents in municipal
government.
That th e accumulate d financia l powe r o f Dutc h Sephard i Jewr y wa s no w of
considérable importanc e t o th e functionin g of th e Republi c an d il s institutions
generally, as well as to the East and West India Companies, ca n be seen o n several
levéis but perhaps most obviously in the field of army contracting. Well before 1672,
Moroccan émirs and (afte r 1640 ) thé Portuguese crown employed Dutch Sephardi
Jews to help finance their purchases of arms, ships and munitions. But is was during
thé 1672- 8 Franco-Dutch war that a consortium of leading Dutc h Sephardi patri -
cians, headed by Baron Lopes Suasso, Jacob Pereira and Antonio Machado entered
the field o f army contracting proper. Most of this group together with their respec -
tive entourage s move d a t thi s tim e fro m Amsterda m t o Th e Hagu e wher e the y
127
G A Amsterdam NÁ 2898, p. 442; F. O. Dentz, De kolonisatie van de Portugeesch-Joodsche natie in
Suriname (Amsterdam 1927 ) 13-16.
128
Ibidem , 53-5; R. A. J. van Lier, 'The Jewish Community in Surinam: A Historical Survey' in : R .
Cohen éd. Th e Jewish Nation i n Surinam (Amsterdam 1982 ) 19-23.
129
Willia m Carr, The Travellours Guide and Historian'* Faithful Companion (Londo n 1691) 23.
The Economie Contribution o f the Dutch Sephardijewryy445 445
formed the nucleus of a small but soo n flourishing satellite Sephardi community. 130
William II I employe d th e fir m o f Machad o an d Pereir a a s th e mai n supplier s of
grain, horse s an d munition s to hi s armie s fighting th e Frenc h an d retaine d thei r
services as his principal provisioners down to his death in 1702. 131 In collaboratio n
with Baro n Belmente , the Sephardi 'Agent ' o f Spain a t Amsterdam , this firm an d
others also assisted with provisioning the Spanish army of Flanders in years when it
combined with the Dutch against th e French. Machado an d Pereira were also made
responsible, afte r William III became king of England, in 1688 , for provisioning the
English armies in Ireland and Flanders. 132 One of Pereira's agents, Sir Solomon de
Medina, the first professing Jew to be knighted in England but who was Dutch rather
than English, continued to supply Marlborough's armies in Flanders an d Germany
until hè went bankrupt, in 1712. 133 At least fou r o r five Dutc h Sephardi Jew s were
named 'Agents' on behalf of Germán princes and collaborated i n financing various
Germán armie s which entere d int o William III's coalitions agains t Loui s XIV. 134
Jerónimo Nunes da Costa was one of those who participated in this Dutch financing
of Germán courts. In 1688 , for instance he handled th e pay and transi t costs of the
contingent contributed by the Duke of Württemberg to the army William gathered
for hi s invasion o f England .
In th e middl e rank s o f th e Sephard i community , a tren d awa y fro m direc t
involvement in trade to related commercial services, noticeable since the middle of
the century, became more pronounced from the 1670s onwards. Indeed, nothing was
more typical and distinctive of Dutch Sephardi economie life in the late seventeenth
century than the large numbers of brokers. These Jewish brokers feil into four or five
catégories includin g specialists in commodities, handlers of money bilis and bili s of
exchange, stock-brokers, and shipping and insurance agents. It is noticeable that in
the fiel d o f commoditie s Sephard i broker s concentrate d o n suc h merchandis e a s
Sephardi merchants tended to import, especially sugar, chocolate, Spanish wool and
raisins.135 The shipping agents scoured th e city seeking to match merchants looking
for carg o space wit h partially filled ship s preparing t o sail to spécifie destinations.
But it was the Sephardi stock-brokers who most caught the eye of foreign visitors and
who were most prépondérant in their field. One English observer alleged in 1701 that
Jews handle d seventee n ou t o f ever y twent y East Indi a Compan y share s which
changed hand s i n Amsterdam. 136 Th e pre-eminenc e o f Sephard i broker s i n th e
exchange of stocks and share s continued over many decades and i t was one of their
130
M . Henrique z Pimentel , Geschiedkundige aanteekeningen betreffende d e Portugeesche Israëlieten i n
Den Haag (Th e Hague 1876 ) 9, 15 , 22.
131
A . M. Vaz Dias, 'Losse bijdragen to t de geschiedenis der Joden in Amsterdam III: Het approvian-
deeren de r leger s va n de n Stadhouder , Prin s Wille m III' , D e Vrijdagavond (Amsterdam) VI I (1931-2 )
413-415.
132
Swetschinski , 'Portuguese Jewish Merchants' 1,260-266,280-284; O. K. Rabinowicz, Sir Solomon de
Medina (Londo n 1974 ) 14-16, 61-62.
133
Ibidem , 61-70.
134
Thes e included Davi d Buen o de Mezquita, Agent of the Duk e of Brunswick, and Samue l Gomes
Coutinho (alias 'Pieter l a Court') 'Resident' of the Duk e of Mecklenburg .
135
Swetschinski , 'Portuguese Jewish Merchants ' I, 311-316 .
136
V . Barbour, Capitalism i n Amsterdam i n the 17th Century (An n Arbour 1976 ) (Ist edn, Baltimore
1950) 78 .
number, Joseph Pens ó de la Vega, who composée! the first ever detailed accoun t of
the working s of a stock exchange. 137
As active involvemen t i n foreig n trad e waned , bouts o f feveris h spéculatio n i n
stocks, shares, bonds and foreig n funds became an ever more characteristic feature
of Dutc h Sephardi economi e life. The perio d o f the War o f the Spanish Succession
(1702-13) marked a new phase in that for the first time since 1648 , Spain was ranged
on the side of France against the Dutch. All Dutch traf fic to and f rom Spain was thus
heavily disrupte d an d ther e wa s som e squeezin g also o f th e transi t trad e t o th e
Spanish Indie s via Curaçao. While the West India Company's Curaçao registers for
these years show that some thirt y or forty Dutch Sephardi merchant s continued t o
import Spanis h America n cacao, dye-woods, tobáce o an d silver , via Curaçao, reg -
ularly, throughou t th e 1702-1 2 conflict,138 i t does seem likel y that ther e wa s som e
réduction i n th e level of activity. Indeed, th e serious obstacles an d obstruction s of
the 1702-1 3 phase probabl y mar k a furthe r ste p i n th e gradua l withdrawa l f rom
active trade int o finance and financia ! services .
The Treaty of Utrecht, of 1713, which restored peace to western Europe, signaüe d
the resumption of normal links between the Dutch Republic and Spanish lands . We
know that Holland' s trad e with both Spain an d th e Caribbean recovere d t o some-
thing like their former levéis and wer e undoubtedly fundamental to Amsterdam' s
continued rol e as a world entrepô t i n th e mid-eighteent h century. But, as yet, no t
enough is known about Sephardi activity af ter 171 3 for us to be able to say how f ar
Dutch Sephardi merchants retained a significant share in the traffic. The évidence of
the West India Company's Curaçao books suggests that Sephardim did continue to
domínate a larg e part o f Dutc h commerce wit h th e West Indies. 139 Moreover, it is
clear that the Surinam Sephardi colon y continued t o flourish dow n to the 1770 s or
thereabouts, while a third thrivin g Dutc h Sephard i colon y aróse in the post-1713
period on St Eustatius, numbering around 400 soûls in 1780. 140 But it does seem that
by the mid eighteenth century Caribbean trad e was the only significant element in
Dutch Sephardi oversea s commerce. Thus what had onc e bee n a tradin g network
based overwhelmingl y o n Lisbo n an d Oport o finall y ende d up , afte r a serie s of
dramatic oscillation s an d upheavals , a s a syste m base d essentiall y o n Curaçao ,
Surinam an d S t Eustatius.
Of course, numerous gaps remain t o be filled b y furthe r research . Bu t enough is
now clea r fo r u s t o b e abl e t o asser t wit h som e assuranc e tha t th e widesprea d
conviction, derivin g from Va n Dillen , tha t th e Dutc h Sephard i contributio n t o
Holland's commercial greatnes s wa s margina l is incorrect. A wid e variety of évi-
dence would seem rather to indícate that this group, of some significanc e fro m th e
beginning of the seventeenth century, were of central importance in the prolonging
137
Josep h Pens ó de I a Vega , Confusion d e confusiones (Amsterda m 1688 ) and M . F . J . Smit h éd .
Confusion de confusiones van Josseph de la Vega. Herdruk van den spaanschen tekst met nederíandsche
vertaling
138
(The Hague 1939) .
AR A Archive of the WIC inv.nrs. 567, 568, 569, lists of cargoes shipped from Curaçao to Sephardi
merchants of Amsterdam .
139
se e for instanc e ARA Archiv e o f th e WIC, Curaçao books relating t o thé 1740s .
1*> Emmanuel , History I , 522-527 ; J . Hartog , Th e Jews an d S t Eustatius (St . Maarten ? 1976 ) 2, 4 ,
11.
The Economie Contribution o f the Dutch Sephardi Jewrry 447
of Holland's commercial ascendancy in Europe and the Indies af ter 1648 . Moreover,
the rapid séquence of phases, th e constant restructuring of Dutch Sephardi activity
during Holland's golde n age, may well point to additional lessons for the economie
historian. Th e fashio n nowaday s i s fo r th e Braudelia n longue durée, basi c shift s
which are suppose d t o tak e plac e without référenc e t o political events ove r long
spans o f time . Wha t w e lear n fro m th e évolutio n o f Dutc h Sephard i activity ,
however, i s the almos t tota l inapplicabilit y of suc h concept s t o th e earl y moder n
period. Patterns of trade in the seventeenth century, the age of mercantilism, were so
profoundly influence d b y th e fact s o f politica l an d militar y power , b y treaties ,
truces, embargoe s an d blockades , tha t an y attemp t t o trac é economi e évolutio n
without heavy emphasis on such events, however much in vogue, is apt, perhaps even
bound t o b e shallo w an d unhelpful .
INDEX
Acapulco 274-5 , 279, 291, 293- 4 383-5, 410, 421-2, 428, 431, 434, 441
admiralty collèges, Dutc h 105 , 108-10 , —, guild restrictions a t 42 5
113-14,119,128,370,393,123 —, Mediterranean trade of 134-6 , 142 , 153 ,
Aerschot, Philippe-Charles , dukeo f 175 , 156, 158, 208- 9
179-80 —, Portugal trade of 20-1 , 27 , 138, 371 ,
Aerssen, Françoi s van, heer van Sommelsdij k 419-23, 4
(1572-1641) 83 , 86, 90-1, 96- 7 —, priées at 27 , 29, 199
Aitzema, Foppius van, Dutch resident at —, Sephard i Jewish population o f 359 , 417 ,
Hamburg 23 1 425
Aitzema, Lieuw e van (1600-69), Dutch —, silk industry a t 142 , 153 , 42 6
chronicler and political commentator 49n , —, sugar-refining at 426- 7
60-4, 82, 87, 88n, 130 , 174 , 381« —, tobáceo industry at 426 , 431- 2
Albert, Archdukeof Austria (1559-1621), —, as world trade entrepot 66-70 , 75, 101 ,
nominal ruler of the South Netherlands 199-200, 133-9, 194 , 363, 376-7 , 441
(1598-1621) 2 , 103-4, 164-8 , 195-6 , 215, Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-4; 1665-7; 1672-4 )
367-8 151, 158- 9
alcabala, in Spanish America 269-70 , 289 Angola 322-3 , 325, 329 , 440
Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, José Antwerp, citadel of 16 4
(historian) 2-3 , 15 , 190-1, 207, 235, 240 —, fallof(1585) 102,193,42 0
Aleppo (Syria ) 140-2 , 145-7 , 150-1, 202 —, Portuguese New Christians at 185-6,188 ,
Alicante 19 , 21, 137 , 143 , 149 , 423 249, 254, 359 , 367-8 , 378, 397-8, 402, 420
Alkmaar, cit y council of 46 , 49-50, 53, 59, —, Sephardi Jews at 367-8 , 388-9
62-3,71,80 —, silk industry at 142 , 153 , 15 6
Almirantazgo (o( 1624 ) 17-20 , 25-6, 204-7, —, as strategie strong-point 59 , 125-6, 183
210-11, 214, 217 , 219-27, 232-6, 240-3, 257, —, as world trade centre 4 , 7, 23-4, 104 ,
273-4, 373-5, 429 . 113-15, 124, 222, 255, 377, 419-2 1
—, in the Basque provinces 205 , 220« , 391 Aragón, and the Spanish embargoes against
—, in Portugal 205 , 376 the Dutch 19-20 , 144, 149 , 197, 204-5, 37 5
—, Tribunal Mayor de l (at Madrid) 18 , 205, armada, Austro-Spanish, in the Baltic
222, 239, 374- 5 (1627-32) 25 , 206, 224-32
—, in Valencia 19,20 5 armada of Barlovento (Spanish Caribbean
Alvares Machado, Antonio , Amsterda m armada post-1635) 269 , 281, 293-4 , 315
Sephardi army contractor 444- 5 armada of Flanders (1621-46) 11-15 , 36-7,
Amersfoort 10 , 32, 45, 125 , 432, 44 0 168-9, 186- 7
Amsterdam, admiralt y college of 123 , 128- 9 armada o f 1639, t o the English Channe l 3 8
—, Caribbean trade of, see Caribbean, Dutc h Arminians, see Remonstrants
—, Catholic population of 3 2 army, Dutch, se e United Provinces
—, chocolate industr y at 427 , 449-1, 445 army of Flanders l , 9 , 59, 78, 103-5, 125-7,
—, city council (vroedschap) o f 40 , 43, 46, 164-7, 171-2,174, 176, 182 , 341-2, 358, 400
49-50, 53-4, 58, 60, 64-8, 70, 76-7, 80, 90, Arnhem 8 , 102 , 110 , 114 , 11 6
94, 96, 98-9, 114 , 116-17, 121 , 124-8, 131 , Artois, province o f 54 , 180, 18 4
361, 379, 388 , 392 , 409 asentistas, bankers of the crown a t Madrid
—, Counter-rernonstrantism at 64 , 82 395-403, 433
—, Exchange and stock market 29 , 154, 445 Athias, Joseph, Amsterdam Sephardi
—, Exchange Bank (Wisselbank) 27 , 378-9, pubiisher 337 , 427
audiencia oí Mexico 273,305,31 9 Brun, Antoine, first Spanish ambassador to
Aveiro 21 , 197, 360, 376 , 43 2 thé United Provinces (1649-53) 40 , 385-9,
Aytona, Francisco de Moneada, 3r d marquis 403
of (1586-1635) 126 , 176-9, 181, 20 3 Brussels, Spanish régime at 3 , 5, 24-5, 29 , 60,
Azores 432,438,441 , 17 87, 103 , 167-8 , 170, 369
Buenos Aires 267-8 , 271, 274-7, 317, 334 ,
Baltic Sea 3-4 , 14 , 25, 198-201 , 206, 209 , 377, 396
224-32, 385, 44 1 butter, see dairy produce, Dutch
—, naval stores from 4 , 16, 25, 385, 43 3
Barbados 391 , 436-7 Cadereita, marqui s of, viceroy o f Mexico
—, Sephard i population of 439 n (1635-40) 293 , 295 , 297
Barbançon, Albert d e Ligne, prince de, Cádiz, a s trade centre 11 , 149, 211 , 341, 374 ,
Walloon nobleman 175 , 181 , 186 384«, 393, 3% , 424 , 429, 435, 438,440 , 442
Bayonne, as trade depot on the Franco- —, seizures of Dutch ship s at 17 , 192
Spanish borde r 12 , 335-6, 374, 378 , 393 , Calais 102-3 , 108-9, 112, 114 , 116 , 118-21 ,
396, 405 , 429, 442 124, 130 , 256-7 , 26 1
Beaurnont, Simón van (1574-1654), Canary Islands 17 , 210, 329, 380« , 435 , 438 ,
pensionary o f Middelburg 84-5 , 92- 5 442
Belmonte, Baro n Manuel de (Isaac Núñez) Capellen, Alexande r van der, Gelderland
(d. 1705), 'agent-général'o f Spain at nobleman 46 , 88
Amsterdam (1667-1705) 98 , 245, 409, 440 Caribbean, Dutch 38 , 41, 61, 383, 437-40 ,
Bergen-op-Zoom 9 , 11, 108-9, 114-15, 128 , 443-4
131, 170 , 358 —, English 391 , 436 , 439-40
Bergh, Count Hendri k van den, commande r —, French 437 , 443
of the army of Flanders (1628-30) 170-1 , —, Spanish 5 , 41, 189, 199-201 , 211, 267 ,
176, 178 , 180- 1 276, 280-2, 287, 292, 330, 373 , 438-4 0
Bicker, Andries, Amsterdam burgomaster Cartagena de Indias (New Granada ) 276 ,
66,80 278-9, 311, 313 , 329 , 396 , 439-4 0
Borah, Woodrow (historian) 288-9, 313-16 Catholics and Catholicism, in thé United
Bordeaux, a s European trade entrepot 12 , 26, Provinces 2,6-7,31-2,41,56,168 , 357,361
327, 39 3 Cats, Jacob, pensionar y of Holland (1636-51 )
Boulogne 102-3 , 108, 120-1 , 124 , 130 50, 52, 60, 90, 93, 97- 8
Bournonviüe, Alexandre, comte de Henin, caviare 139 , 157
duc d e 177 , 181 Cellorigo, Martin Gonzale z de, Spanish
Brabant, province of 102-3 , 106, 110-11 , économie writer 358 , 36 0
114-15, 118, 124 , 126 , 175-6 , 183, 221 , 389 Central America 268-9 , 276, 291, 327 , 330
Braudel, Fernand (Historian) 134-6 , 138-9, Cerralvo, marqui s of, viceroy of Mexico
144, 149 , 190-1 , 196-7, 200, 211-12, 235 , (1624-35) 16 , 269, 272 , 293 , 29 5
240, 418« , 447 Charnacé, Hercule de, French diplomat 94-6 ,
Brazil 5 , 33, 35-6, 38-9, 59 , 61-2, 65 , 94-5, 98
148, 184, 189 , 249, 274-5, 277, 282, 303 , Chaunu, Pierre (historian) 287-9 0
306, 347 , 384 , 43 8 Chile 38-9 , 26 8
—, Netherlands Brazi l (1630-54) 33 , 38, 382 , Christian IV, king of Denmark, see Denmark
384, 389 , 406 , 410, 431, 4 3 Christina, Queen of Sweden 243 , 345, 349-50
—, Portuguese New Christians in 328-9,334 , Cleves 6 , 36, 108 , 116 , 126 , 129 , 181- 5
364 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, ministe r of Louis
—, sécession o f (Portuguese) Brazil from XIV 152n , 159
Spain (1641) 38 , 297, 31 3 Cologne 6 , 23, 111-12, 123, 214-16
—, trade from, with Potosí 274-5 , 334 Consejo d e Esado (Counci l of State), at Madrid
Brazil Company, Th e (of 1648) 347-8 , 350-1, 1, 4-5, 7-8, 10 , 35, 197 , 229-30, 237, 239 ,
385, 433 , 43 6 243-4, 258, 357 , 387 , 393 , 40 7
Breda 10 , 34, 36-7, 44, 59, 78, 106 , 111-14 , Consejo d e Guerra (Counci l of War), a t Madrid
131, 170 , 183-4,258 20-1, 204, 374, 376
Bredimus, Agustín , Hanseati c 'agent' at Consejo de Hacienda (Counci l of Finance), at
Madrid 218 , 234, 239-40 , 247 Madrid 248,41 1
Bremen, as trade centre 103 , 110 , 115 , 120 , Consejo d e Indias (Counci l of the Indies) , at
124-5, 128 , 131,238,42 7 Madrid 5 , 7, 216, 268-9, 271, 295
Brouckhoven, Jacob van, Leiden burgomaste r Consejo d e Portugal, at Madrid, se e Portugal
85-6, 9 8 Conseil d'Etat, a t Brussels 5 , 167 , 178
Bruges (Brugge) 23 , 103 , 105 , 183 , 22 2 Constantinople 140 , 145 , 148« , 151 , 333
Index 451
convoys, Dutc h to thé Méditerranéen 15 , 222, 256-7, 342 , 420

145, 155 , 157 , 160 Duyck, Antonis, Pensionary of Holland
—, from Hambur g to thé Iberian Península (1619-29) 83-4 , 88-90
26, 192 , 209, 235-6, 341, 372
—, Spanish, to thé New Worl d 11 , 255, East Friesland 122-3,127- 8
287-91, 442 East India trade, Dutch 7 , 65, 156 , 199 ;
—, —, to Flanders 186 , 204 see also United East India Company
copper coinage , counterfeit , smuggled int o —, Portuguese 7 , 218, 258, 336-7, 341 ,
Spain from Hollan d 4 , 357, 363- 5 419-20, 423
Corbie, Spanis h advance to (1636) 37-8 , 18 4 —, see also 'spice trade'
corregidores, in Mexico 299-30 5 Egmont, Louis, Count o f 181 , 363
—, in Spain 1 6 Egypt 141-2 , 145 , 148, 202
Cortizos d e Villasante, Manuel, Portuguese Eindhoven 36 , 174 , 184-5
New Christian financie r 398 , 402- 3 Elliott, J.H. (historian ) l , 164 , 205n, 247,
cotton 142-3 , 149, 161 265-6
Counter-Remonstrants (Gomarists) , Dutc h embargoes of shipping and trade, as
religious and political faction 32-3 , 39-40 , instrument of mercantilist warfare ,
48-9, 51 , 54, 56, 64-7, 74-83, 90-2, 9 8 —, Spanish against the Dutch (l 585-90) 191- 3
crypto-Judaism in Portugal, Spai n and —, Spanish against the English (1585-1604)
Spanish America 311 , 314-15, 320, 334- 6 191-3
Curaçao 269 , 274, 431, 437-40, 444, 446 —, Spanish against the Dutch (1598-1608)
—, Sephardi population o f 43 9 137-9, 141,194-201, 279, 370, 420, 421, 429
currants 143-4 , 157 —, Spanish against the Dutch (1621-47 ) 8-9 ,
Cueva, Cardinal Alons o d e la, marquis of 15-18, 66 , 144-8, 176 , 190-1 , 202-10 , 280 ,
Bedrnar 29 , 32-3, 174, 176 339-40, 371-3, 428-9, 432
Cyprus 141-2 , 145, 148, 202 —, Spanish against the French (1635-59),
209-11
dairy produce, Dutch 23 , 105-6, 110-11, —, Spanish against Portugal (1641-61) 24 3
113-15 —, in recent historiography 15 , 20, 23, 138 ,
Danzig (Gdansk) 26 , 225, 260, 372, 376 189-91, 196-9, 205-6, 240
Delft 46-7 , 49-50, 62-3, 67, 80-1, 90, 96, 102, Emden, as trade centre 6,26,103 , 120,123-4,
118,365 131, 195-6 , 198-9 , 372, 420-1, 429
Denis, Alvar o (Albertus) (d. c. 1645), Ernmerich 107 , 113 , 12 6
Sephardi court 'agent' of Christian I V at Ems (Eems), river 23 , 102-4, 110-13 , 117 ,
Gluckstadt 237- 9 121-2, 126-8 , 377
Denmark 11 , 25-6, 110,119,192,198, 206-7, England, imports of Levant goods fro m
224, 228 , 237, 286, 340 , 342 Holland into 149 , 153
—, trade of, with Spain 198 , 201-3, 208, 222, —, peace treaties of, wit h Spain (1604 and
238-41 1630) 92 , 196 , 207
—, treaties with Spain, of 1630 238-4 1 —, trade with Spain 28 , 193-4, 207-10, 257,
—, —, ofl641 207 , 237-9 , 241-4 262
Deventer, 103, 110 , 115 —, as trade rival of the Dutch 15 , 22 , 129-31,
'deputies in the field ' (gedeputeerden te r velde), 133, 140-1 , 145, 150-6 , 158 , 201-2, 209-10,
84-5, 92, 108 429, 435 , 438 , 442
diamond trade 336-8 , 341, 419, 421, 423, 440, —, readmission of Jews to 38 9
443 Enkhuizen 13 , 31, 47, 50, 53-4, 57, 62-3, 81 ,
Dillen, J.G, va n (historian) 133-4 , 409-10, 86, 115 , 121-2 , 13 6
417-18, 446 Escalona, Diego Lópe z de Pacheco y
Directorate of the Levant Trade, at Bobadilla, marquis of Villena, duke of,
Amsterdam (1625) 146 , 154 , 156 , 16 1 (16th vicero y of Mexico, 1640-2 ) 278 ,
Dom Duarte of Braganza, younger brother of 295-7, 304, 312-14, 317, 330
John IV of Portugal 343-5 , 349-50 Española (Hispaniola) 200 , 439
Dordrecht, i n Dutch politics 46 , 49-50, 59, Esteves da Pina, Duarte, Hamburg Sephard i
62-3, 66-7 , 90, 96, 98, 102-3, 107 , 115-17 , merchant 17 , 371-2
123, 127 , 131
—, as river port 102-3 , 110 , 128 Faro (Algarve) 21, 204, 376, 432
—, Syno d of (1618-19) 76,7 9 Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor 48 , 55,
Dover, a s international entrepot 118 , 127 , 206, 223-5
129-31,342 Ferdinand III, Holy Roman Emperor 245 ,
Dunkirk 11-15 , 59, 66, 103, 129-31,145 , 169 , 343-4
Ferdinand, Cardinal-Infante , governor o f the 243, 340 , 342 , 371-2, 427
Spanish Netherlands (1635-41) 35-7 , 98, Goa, a s Asían trade emporium 337 , 423 , 426 ,
126, 181-6 , 243-4, 341- 2 430
Fernandas, Duarte (Joshua Habilho), Gomes Solis, Duarte, Portugues e Ne w
Amsterdam Sephardi marchant and Christian économie write r 218 , 247-8 , 356
diplomatie intermediary 359 , 361-2,366-8, Gouda 48 , 53, 59-60, 62, 67, 80, 86, 96, 99,
371, 421 118
Finch, Si r John, English diplomat in Italy grain exports, Dutch , t o Italy 135 , 137- 9
139«, 152« , 15 5 Grave 37,103,114,127,184-5
Flanders, province of 102-3 , 105 , 110-11 , Grobbendonck, Anthonie , baron van 170 ,
114, 118 , 124 , 126 , 129 , 174,180-1 , 183 , 175
221 Grol (Groenlo) 86-7 , 104 , 109
—, Dutch maritim e blockade of (1621-47) Groningen, provinc e of (Stad en Lande) 32« ,
103, 105 , 129-31 , 256, 420 58-9, 61 , 86, 89, 97, 111 , 117 , 123 , 38 0
—, textile industry of 67-8 , 70, 223, 261- 3 Guadalajara (Ne w Galicia ) 318 , 320
—, see also armada o f Flanders, Bruges , Guinea trade 189,199-200 , 351,384,424, 438
Dunkirk, Ghent and Ostend
Flushing (Vlissingen) 89 , 93, 104 , 121 , 129 Haarlem 31 , 47-8, 51 , 53-6, 59, 62-4, 67-8 ,
France, diversion o f Dutch trad e with Spain 70-1, 80, 86 , 94, 96 , 99, 118 , 122 , 150
through (1621-35 ) 26-7 , 66 —, and th e straatvaart 142 , 161
—, fine cloth industry 159 , 161 Haersolte tôt Swaluenborch, Sweder van
—, Portuguese New Christians in 327 , 335-6, (1582-1643), leade r of the Overijsse l
339, 375n , 420, 428-9 ridderschap (nobility ) 3-4 , 89 , 92-3, 96- 7
—, rôle of in Dutch domestic politic s 38 , 48, Hainault, province of 54 , 175, 184
54, 76, 92, 94-5, 97- 9 Hamburg, Bank of 37 1
—, trade agreement with Spain (Oct. 1604 ) —, maritim e convoys to thé Iberian Península
196 frorn, se e convoys
—, as trade rival of the Dutch 141-2 , 152 , —, Jews of, seeJews
158-62 —, Senateof 17 , 226-7, 232-4, 237
—, war of with Spain (1635-59) 35-6 , 182- 8 —, as world entrepôt 26 , 105 , 123 , 129 ,
—, see also Bayonne; Bordeaux; Marseîlle s 192-4,206, 232-4, 238 , 245,260,345-7, 357,
Frederick Henry (Frederik Hendrik), Prince of 371, 408 , 420 , 429, 436«
Orange, Dutc h Stadholde r (1625-47) 31 , —, see also Hanseatic towns
34, 38, 40, 44-5, 49-50, 52-5, 57 , 62, 73-9, Hanseatic Towns, shipping of 4 , 15 , 21,
104, 113 , 121 , 123, 125-8 , 178-9 , 380 134-8, 144 , 191-32 , 197-9 , 203, 208 , 235-7 ,
Frederick III, of Holstein-Gottorp 229 , 239 376, 421, 428
freight rates, maritime, Dutch 12 , 25, 145, —, negotiations of with Spain 196 , 222-7 ,
148, 202 , 208, 210 , 378 232-4, 237
Friedrichstadt (Holstein-Gottorp) 229 , 372 Havana 280 , 329 , 436« , 439
Friesland, States of 32n , 40, 58-61, 86, 89, 93, Helmond 36 , 174, 184- 5
111, 117,38 0 herring, Dutc h exports of 101 , 106 , 110-11,
113, 115 , 11 8
Galicia 16 , 204, 362-3, 373, 404 , 423- 4 —, fisher y 12-14 , 24 , 194 , 441
Gamarra y Contreras, Don Esteban de, 2nd Heyn, Piet , Dutc h admirai 174 , 291
Spanish ambassador to thé United Holland, provinc e of 8 , 43, 76, 117 , 120-1,
Provinces 406-9 , 439-4 1 127, 129-3 1
Geertruidenberg 108 , 114 , 127 —, Gecommitteerde raden (standing committee
Gelderland, province of 36 , 46, 58, 86, 95, 97, of the States ) 46 , 58
109-13, 116-17 , 119-20 , 126 —, ridderschap (nobility ) of 50 , 53, 59, 63-4,
Geldern 105 , 109 , 166 , 185 90,95
Gelves, Do n Dieg o Carrill o Mendoza y —, States of 46 , 52-5, 60 , 62-4, 76 , 91, 97-9 ,
Pimentel, marqui s of (13th viceroy of 116, 120-1 , 123 , 127-3 1
Mexico) 267 , 270-2, 276, 287 , 293, 295-6 , Holy Land, The 141 , 334, 407 , 436
303-4, 308, 321-3 , 377 Hoorn 48 , 50, 52-3, 59 , 62-3, 67 , 91, 115,
Gennep 36 , 40, 183- 5 121-2, 136 , 15 6
Genoa, as trade entrepôt 22 , 136-8, 144 , 149 , Hulst 40 , 105 , 131
160, 162 , 206
Ghent 105 , 119 , 124 , 164, 175 , 183 , 42 0 Ibiza 19,138 , 189,20 2
Gibraltar 11 , 136 , 145 , 368, 39 0 Ijssel, rive r 102-3 , 110-12 , 124- 5
Glückstadt (Elbe estuary) 26 , 206-7, 239-41, indigo, fro m Centra l America 28-9,189 , 209,
Index 453
3% Lisbon, as trade entrepôt 11 , 17, 20, 35, 197,
Infantado, Juan Hurtado d e Mendoza de la 204, 219, 336-7, 341, 372, 376, 384, 419-21 ,
Vega y Luna, 6th duke of 15 , 168,203, 216, 323, 429 , 432, 438, 441 , 446
359, 37 3 Livorno (Leghorn), as trade entrepôt 22 ,
Inquisition, Mexican 278-9 , 318, 320 , 323-4, 137-8, 141, 144 , 149 , 154-5 , 158-60, 162 ,
328-9 202, 208, 325 , 327 , 337-8, 408, 419 ,
—, Peruvian 277-9 , 334 424-5, 430, 442- 3
—, Portuguese 334-5 , 347, 367 , 369 , 385 Louis XIII, of France 54-5 , 57, 96, 121
—, Spanish 205 , 247 , 281, 390-1, 402-5, 407, Louis XIV, of France 245 , 441-3, 445
411 Lopes Homem, Manuel, Portuguese Ne w
Isabella, Infant a (Archduches s Isabel Clara Christian merchant 251- 2
Eugenia), regen t o f the Spanish Lópes Pereira, Antoni o (Joseph Israël
Netherlands (1621-33 ) 10 , 23, 30, 34, 43-5 , Pereira) 24 9
52-3, 57 , 59-60, 114, 167-71, 224-5, 381- 2 —, Manuel, Portuguese New Christian
économie writer an d officiai 218-19 ,
Jews, Sephardic, at Amsterdam 4 , 6, 34-5, 61 , 247-64
195, 249 , 327, 338-40 , 355-415, 417-4 7 Lopes Suasso, Baron Antonio (Isaac),
—, in France 327, 335-6, 339, 375 n Sephardi financier at The Hagu e 397 , 399 ,
—, at Glückstadt 238-40 , 340, 371 , 427-8 404, 412, 414M , 434-5
—, at Hamburg 17 , 249, 340-1, 349-53, López d'Azevedo, Francisco , Amsterdam
370-3, 427-8, 432, 435 Sephardi merchant 429 , 437
—, in Italy 327-8 , 335, 43 4 Liibeck 26 , 192, 206, 224-6, 233-4, 260,
—, i n the Levan t 155 , 251, 334 347, 372
—, in Netherlands Brazil 384- 6 Luis, Alvaro and Jacome, Portuguese Ne w
—, in North África 6 , 327 Christian marchant s at Bayonne 374- 5
—, see also crypto-Judaism
John IV, king of Portugal (1640-56 ) (formerl y Maastricht 34-6 , 57, 93, 105 , 107 , 125-6, 128 ,
dukeof Braganza) 314 , 333 , 335-41 , 343 , 176, 178 , 183 , 18 5
347-50, 384-5, 432-3 Madeira 17 , 313, 341 , 363 , 370 , 376 , 380 ,
Jülich 6,9,107,169,172,21 5 391, 419, 432
junta de comercio, at Madrid (1623) 17 , 29, 217, Malaga, as trade centre 18 , 136-7, 149 , 240,
255-8 360, 363-4 , 372-4, 407-8 , 423, 429,435, 442
Mallorca, viceroyalty of 19 , 138, 144 , 173,
Kamen, Henry (historian ) 190-1 , 196 , 200, 197
207,211-12, 235,240 Manso y Zúñiga, Francisco de, Archbishop
of Mexico (1628-35) 272 , 295, 300- 1
La Court, Pieter de, Ducch économie writer Mantuan Succession, war of the (1628-31 )
70, 15 5 30,34,43,92, 174,29 2
La Mata, sait-pans in thé viceroyalty of Marseilles 145 , 147, 159-6 2
Valencia 9 , 21, 144 Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, Dutc h
lastgeld 154 , 16 0 Stadholder (1585-1625) 2 , 7, 76-7, 83 , 92,
Leganés, Dieg o Mexia, Is t marquis of 172-3 , 103, 107 , 10 9
237, 381 » Menasseh ben Israel, Amsterdam Sephardi
Leiden, city council of 47-50 , 53-5, 59-60 , rabbi (1604-57) 406,427,43 4
62-4, 67, 80, 86-7, 91 , 93-4, 96, 99, 11 8 Meierij of's-Hertogenbosch, distric t of
—, and th e straatvaart 142 , 149-50, 153 , 161 north Brabant 61-2 , 71 , 174, 185
—, textile industry at 28 , 67-9, 150-1 , 159 , Mendes Cardoso, Manoel , Portuguese New
209, 261- 3 Christian merchant 362 , 366-7, 370
Lerma, Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, Mendoza, Do n Francisco de, Admirai of
Ist duke of 163 , 165-7 , 201 , 215-16, 368 Aragon 215-1 6
Levant Company, Th e (English ) 134 , 146 , Meuse (Maas) river 23 , 34-5, 57, 102-7,
148, 154 , 158- 9 109-10, 112-3 , 118 , 122 , 125-8 , 18 3
Liège 102 , 104-7 , 116 , 118-19, 122 , 178 , 436 Mexico (Ne w Spain) , viceroyalty of 5 ,
Lima 270 , 278-80 , 33 4 267-70, 275-8, 280-3, 286-309, 342
Lingen, countyof 52 , 59, 86, 91, 104, 109 , —, économie dépressio n in (post-1621) 270 ,
113, 17 2 287-92
Levi de Barrios, Danie l (Migue l de) —, Indian population of 289-90 , 296
(1635-1701), Amsterda m Sephardi —, Jesuits in 302 , 305
historian and poet 249-50 , 339-40 , 406-7 —, Portuguese New Christian s in 276-8 ,
420 311-31
—, rescntment against Spaniards among New Granada (modem Colombia-Panama )
Mexican-born whites (Créoles) 296-7 , 200-1, 267-8, 270
300-2, 308, 326 New Spain , see Mexico
—, seaborne trade of with Peru 274-5 , 294 Nieuwpoort (Flanders) 10 5
—, taxation in 267-70 , 292-4, 30 7 —, battleof(1600) 17 5
—, exploitation of Indian labour by Spaniards Nijmegen 81,102,114,11 6
296-300 Nine Years' War (1688-97) 158 , 160 , 211
Mexico City 270 , 276 , 278 , 291 , 298, 305 , Niza, count of Vidigueira, marquis of ,
317-18 Portuguese diplomat 344 , 348-9
—, Portuguese population of in 1641 31 7 Noordwijk, Nicolaa s van den Bouckhorst,
—, riot s o f ISJanuary 1624 at 272 , 287, 295 , heer van 83-4 , 90 , 93, 96-8
307, 32 2 Nordlingen, battleof (1634) 35,29 2
Middelburg, admiralty collège 108 , 111 , 127, North África, Spanis h enclaves in 6,366 , 368 ,
129 378, 40 4
—, cit y council (vroedschap) 89 , 124-5 , 12 9 Norway 11-12 , 66, 189, 198 , 222, 242, 423,
—, Sephardijewsat 417-1 8 442
—, as trade centre 33 , 108-9, 118-19, 136 —, trade of with Spain 198 , 201, 203, 208 , 241
mohair yarn, Turkish 142 , 150, 153-4, 161 Nunes da Costa, Duart e 0aco b Curiel),
Moluccas (Spice Islands) 141,42 1 'Agent' of thé Portuguese crown at
Moneada, Sanch o de, Spanish économie —, Hambur g (1641-64) 333-53 , 436«
writer 5 , 254-5 Nunes da Costa, Jerónimo (Moseh Curiel),
Montalto, Eliahu (Felipe Rodrigues), 'Agent' of thé Portugués crow n
Sephardi physician and religieus writer 33 5 —, at Amsterdam (1645-97) 337 , 340 , 350 ,
Monte, Jacob del, Amsterdam Sephardi 385, 414 , 433, 436-7, 440-1, 445
merchant 405 , 412 , 436 Nunes da Costa, Manoe l (Selomoh Curiel )
Monte, Silvi o del (Selomoh Cohen), 339-40, 345, 348, 350
Hamburg Sephardi merchant 34 2
Montesclaros, Juan Manuel de Mendoza y Oldenbarnevelt, Johan va n (1547-1619) ,
Manrique, 3rd marquis of 29 , 32, 227, Advocate of Holland 64 , 85, 92
255, 257-8, 288, 302 —, overthrow of (1618) 5 , 32, 68
Montezinos, Fernando, Portuguese Ne w Olivares, Gaspa r de Guzmán, Count-Duke o f
Christian asentista at Madrid 379 , 395-6, (1587-1645)
399, 402 , 405 —, and thé armyof Flanders 173-4 , 177, 182
Morocco, Dutch and Dutch Sephardi dealings 10
with 6 , 338, 340 , 368, 419 , 424 , 430, 432 , —, and Brazil 33-4 , 38, 180, 282, 38 2
435, 443 —, Caribbean polic y of 279-83 , 293-4
Moscow, as trade entrepôt 146 , 139 , 153 , —, and Denmark 237-4 2
156, 158 , 442 —, and thé Dutch 10 , 29-30, 34-8, 58, 87, 95,
Motterie, Claude d e Lannoy, comte de la, 169, 176 , 179 , 182-8 , 203-4
Walloon military commander 176-7 , 181 —, Germán policy of 25 , 34-6, 184-5 , 223-8,
Munster, bishopric of 120 , 123 , 125 257
—, Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations at —, and Spain's embargoes against thé Dutch
(1643-8) 39 , 63, 97 16-24, 203-4, 223
-, effect s of the treaty (1648) of 40-1, 148-9, —, and Juan de Palafox 271-2 , 303
210-11,381-3,387-9,433 —, and Portugal 20-1 , 38 , 180, 186-7 , 205,
Vlusch, Cornelis , secretar y of the States 277-8
General 97- 8 —, and thé Portuguese New Christians
185-6, 277-9, 315 , 327 , 361, 377 , 400-3,
tapies, viceroyalty of 21-2 , 35, 139, 143-4 , 433-5
149,157-8, 202, 211,267, 306, 369,379, 388 —, and Spanish America 265-83 , 292-3,
Massau, Jan van , Catholic general in Spanish 308-9
service 171 , 177, 181- 2 —, mercantilist policies of 16-20 , 213-45,
Slavarre, viceroyalt y of 20 , 204, 374-5, 396 , 248, 256-7, 273-5
429, 44 2 —, and thé Spanish Netherlands 24 , 34,
Mavigation Act (1651), in England 149 , 210 163-88
Mew Biscay (Nueva Vizcaya), the north- Oporto 17 , 21, 204, 367, 369-70, 376, 380« ,
western région of Mexico 290-1 , 319-2 0 381, 419 , 432
Mew Christians, see Portugal, NewChristians Osorio, Bento (Baruch), Amsterdam
îew Galicia (western région o f Mexico) 290 , Sephardi merchant 347 , 359 , 411 , 423
316, 318-19 Ottoman Empire , and thé western trading
Index 455
powers 134,141-2 , 145, 149-52 , 159 , —, truce with the United province s (1641)
208-9, 286, 417 , 442-3 329, 342-3
Overijssel, provinc e of 46 , 52, 58, 89, 92, —, sécession of from Spai n (1640) 27 , 33, 38,
95-6, 109-12, 117 , 12 0 186-7,199ti, 207, 210 , 235 , 237 , 297 , 311 ,
335-41, 384
Pachuca (Mexico) 315-16 , 318, 32 0 Potosí, viceroyalt y of Peru 274- 6
Palafox, Don Juan de, visitador-general of New Puebla de los Angeles (Mexico) 269-70 , 276 ,
Spain (1640-9) 271-2 , 297, 300-5, 308 , 288, 291 , 298, 305 , 32 0
312-14, 317, 321, 325 Puerto Ric o 253,280,43 9
Pamplona 20 , 374-5, 429 Punta de Araya (Venezuela) 27, 65, 199-201,
Papenmutz (Pfaffenmütze o r Mondorf) 6 , 280, 377
217 Purmerend 51 , 59, 63
Papacy, the, anti-Jewish policy of 388- 9 Pyrénées, Peac e of (1659) 163 , 18 7
Pauw, Adriaen (1585-1653), pensionary of
Holland 62-3 , 94 , 98 quicksilver (mercury), Idrian 15 7
Peckius, Petras, Chancellorof Brabant 2 , 8n, —, Peruvian 254- 5
169 —, Spanis h 29 4
Peñaranda, Don Gaspa r de Bracamente y
Guzmán, conde de, Spanish plenipotentiary Raad van State (Dutch council of state) 110 ,
at the Munster peace congress 39-40 , 384, 115-17, 119-20, 123 , 126 , 128- 9
390 Ramires, Lopo (David Curiel), Amsterda m
Pensó de la Vega, Joseph, Amsterda m Sephardi merchant 335-6 , 338, 346 , 384 ,
Sephardi writer 44 6 423, 429, 432
pepper 14 , 152, 157, 189 , 200-1, 347-8, 442, Randwijk, Arnold van, Gelderlan d
see aíso spice s politician 83-5 , 9 8
Pereira, Abraham (Thomas Rodríguez), Realejo (Nicaragua ) 276 , 291
Amsterdam Sephardi merchant and writer Recife (Pernambuco) 33 , 38, 59, 61, 380 ,
398-9, 402-7, 412 , 427 431-2
Pérez de la Serna, Juan, archbishop of Mexico Remonstrants (Arminians), Dutch religiou s
(1613-24) 272 , 302 and political faction 32 , 48-9, 51 , 56, 65-7 ,
Peru, viceroyalty of 5 , 267, 270,275-6,287-8, 70-1, 74-83 , 90-2, 23 8
291, 377 , 396 Rétama, Francisco, économie write r living in
—, Portuguese New Christians in 277-9,313 , Spain 15 , 218, 247 , 357, 359 , 361
327 Rheinberg 35-6 , 59 , 105, 112,172,183-5 , 377
—, taxation in 267-70 , 292-3 , 37 7 Rhine, thé, rive r trade on 23 , 102-3, 106-7,
Philip II, king of Spain (1556-98) 102 , 137 , 110-13, 118 , 123-8 , 377
164, 167 , 191-4, 214-5, 287, 295, 306 —, stratégie crossing points on 6 , 25, 34-5 ,
Philip III, king of Spain (1598-1621) 9 , 167, 183-5, 292
194, 216 , 270, 327, 367-8, 396 —, wine traffic 105- 7
Philip IV, king of Spain (1621-65) 4,9 , 29-30, Richard,Jacques, Spanish consulat
34, 44.5, 58, 60, 87, 95, 123, 167 , 204-5 , Amsterdam in 1650s 394-5 , 404, 408, 41 0
213, 225,241,270,381,382-3,387-9,400-2, Richard, Vincent, secretar y of the Spanis h
433, 43 8 embassyat The Hague in thé 1650s 393- 3
Pinto, Abraha m de (Gil Lopes) 397 , 399-400, Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Cardina l de
402, 404, 407, 434- 5 1585-1642) 54,97,18 1
Philippines 274 , 288, 291 , 293, 325 , 327-8 river blockades, Spanish of the Dutch
Ploos, Adriaen, Dutch politician 84 , 89, 95- 8 (1625-9) 3 , 22-5, 66-7, 148 , 21 3
Poelhekke, J.J. (historian ) 73 , 83, 88 —, Dutch of the Spanish Netherlands 101-3 1
Poland 224-32 , 286, 359 , 425 River Plate (Rió de la Plata) 274-5 , 311, 318 ,
Pontevedra 360 , 364 334, 377
Portugal, Almirantazgo introduced into Rodríguez Méndez, Jerónimo an d Duarte,
(1628), see Almirantazgo Amsterdam Sephardi merchants trading
—, Council of (Consejo de Portugal), in with Malaga in thé 1620s 360 , 364 , 373 ,
Madrid 3 , 7, 20 429«
—, impact of Spanish embargoes on 17,20-1 , Roermond 128 , 170 , 178 , 184- 5
197, 199 , 202-3, 204-5, 208 Roose, Pierre (Petrus) (1586-1673), Olivares'
—, New Christian s of 247-8 , 250-1, 274, right-hand ma n a t Brussels 169 , 178-81 ,
312-21, 326-7, 329-31, 333-7, 342, 385 184-6, 222
—, overseas trade of 4 , 17 , 20-1, 138, 144 , Roosendaal, Dutch-Spanish truc e talks at
189, 197 , 202-4, 286 , 359-60, 372, 375-7 (1629-30) 30 , 35, 43-4
Rotterdam, admiralt y collège 108 , 112 , 114 , 157, 160 n
126n Sound, th é (Danish) 192 , 198 , 203 , 22 5
—, in Dutch politics 46 , 49, 51, 59-60, 70, 90, Sousa Coutinho, Francisc o de, Portuguese
94,96, 105 , 117 , 125 , 129 , 131 ambassador at The Hague in the 1640 s
—, as trade entrepôt 13 , 108 , 115 , 130 , 136 , 343-5, 384n
156, 371, 386 , 388 , 417 , 420, 435 sovereignty over the northern Netherlands ,
Roy, Gabrie l de (c. 1570-1646) seigneur de as an issue in Dutch-Spanish relation s 2 , 7,
Chanteraise, Spanish 'Agent' in northern 53
Germany (1627-45) 206 , 213-45 , 347,257«, Spain, Dutch trad e with 4-5 , 40, 60, 137-9,
368, 37 2 383-4, 386, 393-7 , 401, 409 , 419 , 441- 2
—, cash rernittances from, t o thé Spanish
Salvatierra, Don Garci a Sarmiento d e Netherlands 167 , 186-7 , 400-1
Sotomayor, coun t of, 18t h viceroy o f —, impérial concerns of 1 , 6-7, 35-8 , 189-90 ,
Mexico (1642-8 ) 303-4 , 323 306-7
Saint Jean d e Luz, see Bayonne —, Portuguese Ne w Christian s in 395-6 ,
Saint Lawrence , Phili p II's obsession with 434-5
214-15 —, question of thé admission of Dutch Jews to
Saint Martin (Sint Maarten; Sa n Martín) (1649-51) 381-2 , 386-8
(Virgin Islands ) 280- 1 —, an d Sephardi diaspora 356-41 5
sait and thé sait trade 16 , 19, 27, 65, 101, —, trans-Atlantic trade of 5 , 211, 220 ,
106-8, 110 , 113 , 119 , 128 , 194 , 199-202 , 274-5, 287-91, 442, 204
208, 237, 423, 432 Spanish Netherlands 101-31 , 149-50 , 163-88,
San Lúcar de Barrameda 17-18 , 149 , 364, 372 , 172, 183 , 267, 286
384«, 396, 423 , 42 9 —, nobility of 165 , 169-72 , 174-6 , 180- 2
San Luis Potosí (Mexico) 276 , 288 , 290-1 , —, stratégi e significance for Spanish empir e
320-2 36-7, 163-7 , 186- 7
San Sébastian 9 , 19 , 370-1, 429 —, taxatio n in 166 , 173- 4
Sâo Thomé (West África) 189 , 424-5, 436 , spice trade 5 , 128 , 139-41 , 152 , 157 , 189 ,
441 193-4, 199-201 , 419 , 423 , 425 , 44 2
Schaffer, Goosen , Groningen politicia n 84-5 , Spilbergen, Joris van , Dutc h admira i 5 , 216
89, 95, 97- 8 Spinola, Ambrogio , marqui s de los Balbase s
Scheldt (Schelde) estuary 2 , 7, 23, 30, 34, 59, (1569-1630) 9-10 , 30 , 103 , 107-8 , 112 , 130 ,
103-6,108,112-3,115,126-9,168,193, 357, 168-70, 174 , 216, 229 , 366-8
377, 42 0 straatvaart (Dutch Mediterranean trade) 11 ,
Schenkenschans (Rhin e fortress) 36-7 , 126 , 133-62, 201-2, 205-6, 209, 211 , 430
129, 183- 4 States General (Dutch) 7 , 13, 16, 44-5, 57 , 61,
Schoonhoven 47 , 49, 51, 62-3, 86 , 122 86, 93-4, 98, 103 , 105-8 , 114 , 122-3, 126-8 ,
Seine estuary 102-3 , 109 379-80, 386-8, 391, 407 , 428
Setúbal 20-1 , 197 , 202-4 , 208 , 258 , 338 , 359 , States General (of the South Netherlands), at
373, 376 , 423 , 432 Brussels 34 , 57, 60, 91, 95, 102 , 179- 8
Seville, consulado 29 4 Stradling, R.A. (historian) 163n , 190 , 207
—, Casa de Contratación 220 , 274-5 , 29 4 sugar trade 5 , 24, 35, 113 , 128 , 139 , 148 , 189 ,
—, Flemish merchant colony o f 218-1 9 193-4, 199-200 , 341, 436 , 422-5
—, Portugucs c New Christian s in 252-3 , Surinam 431,437,444,44 6
277-8, 321, 391 , 396 , 40 7 —, Sephard i population o f 44 4
—, a s trade entrepôt 16 , 17-18, 217 , 219 , Swart, K.W . (historian ) 1 , 43n, 101
274-5, 374, 393 , 424 , 429 Sweden, relations of, wit h Portugal 343-6 ,
's-Hertogenbosch (Den Bosch; Belduque; 347-9, 351
Bois-le-Duc) 10 , 30-1, 34 , 44-5, 105 , 113 , —, with Spain 25 , 224, 226-7, 231-2,239, 292
123-5, 127 , 170, 174- 5 Sylt 23 0
Sicily, viceroyaltyof 21,143-4,149,158 , 211,
306,369,371, 388 tariffs, Dutc h (convoyen e n licenten) 68-9 , 104 ,
silk trade 142 , 146-8 , 152-6 , 161 106-20
silver, exports of from Spanis h America to thé tax-farming, se e asentistas
Philippines 274 , 294 Teixeira de Sampayo, Diogo (Abraham
—, illégal exports of, fro m Spai n 4 , 242, 442 Senior), Hambur g Sephard i financie r 397 ,
—, rol e of in Mediterranean trad e 135 , 141 , 399-400, 402, 404 , 434
149-50, 152 Teixeira, Pedro , Portugues e traveller 140,14 7
slave trade 322-3 , 424, 438-40 Tilly.JohanTserclaes, Count 109 , 111 , 122- 3
Smyrna, as trade depot 145 , 147, 149-52, 154 , Tlaxcala (Mexico ) 288 , 291 , 305, 32 0
Index 457
Tobago 282 , 44 0 424-5, 443

Tromp, Maarten, Dutch admirai 38 , 341 Venlo 34-6 , 57, 102 , 104-5 , 112 , 128 , 170 ,
Tserclaes, Madame , intermediary in Dutch- 178, 184- 5
Spanish secret talks 8 7 Veracruz (Mexico) 276-7 , 279, 318, 320, 32 5
Tulancingo (Mexico) 315-1 6 Viana 21 , 197, 432
Twelve Years' Truce (1609-21), between Vitoria, Francisc o de, bishop of Tucumán
Spain and thé United Province s 1 , 3-4, 7, (1577-92) 334,33 6
15,43,56,64,103-4,137,141-6,149,201-2,
213, 279, 355, 383 , 395 , 420-1 , 42 8 Waal (river) 103 , 105-6, 112 , 128
Wallenstein, Albrecht von, Count
Union ofArms Project 171-4,26 8 (1583-1634) 225 , 228-31
—, in Spanish America 266 , 268, 281 , 293-4 Walloon soldiery, of thé army of Flanders
—, in thé Spanish Netherlands 171- 4 165, 172 , 182 , 186- 8
United East India Company (VOC ) 5 , 33, War o f the Spanish Succession (1702-13 ) 158 ,
142-3, 145-7 , 153, 200 , 258, 419-21 , 430 446
United Provinces, arrny of 33 , 79, 99, 104 Wesel 25 , 78, 104 , 111-13, 124 , 172, 185, 37 7
—, diplomacy of 5-6 , 60, 141-2, 146, 226 Weser (river) 110 , 115 , 117 , 120-1, 124-6,
—, stratégi e régulation of river trafïic in thé 128, 238
Low Countries 101-3 1 West India Company (WIC ) 5,16 , 33,35,38,
—, see also States General, Raad van State 46-7, 49-51, 55, 61-2, 65 , 71, 145 , 274-5,
Urizar, Urtuñ o de, Spanish Basque officiai 8 , 279, 377 , 430-1, 435
176, 219, 358 —, Sephardi investment in 33 8
Usselinx, Willem (1567-1647), Dutch —, Spanish attempts to disband 5 , 7, 35,
économie write r 32« , 231 357-8
Utrecht, provinc e of 40 , 46, 58, 61, 77, 81, Westphalia 101 , 105 , 112-13 , 118
86,95, 102 , 117 Wismar 25 , 226, 228-32 , 244
—, city of 61 , 64, 70, 77, 80-1, 95, 102 wool exports, fro m Spai n 40 , 139 , 143,145 ,
150, 189 , 209-10, 395-6, 423-4, 429, 435-6
Váez de Acevedo, Sebastian, Portuguese New
Christian merchant in thé New Worl d 278 , Yllan, Do n Garci a de, Antwerp financier
315, 324-5 , 327 85-6, 341 , 400
Váez Sevilla, Simon, Portuguese Ne w
Christian merchan t in thé New Worl d Zacatecas 268 , 276 , 288-91, 298, 316-17 , 320
277-8, 322 , 325-7 Zante 141 , 143-4 , 15 7
Vane, Si r Henry, Englis h diplomat 82u , 91- 2 Zeeland, provinc e and States of 7n , 8, 32-3,
Vaz Pimentel, Luis , Portuguese Ne w 40, 56 , 58, 60-1, 86 , 89, 93, 95 , 102 , 105 ,
Christian informer 362- 5 108-9, 112 , 114-15, 117-22 , 124-5 , 127 ,
Venezuela (captaincy-general of Caracas) 129-31, 380
200-1, 268, 280 , 282, 327, 329, 377, 439-40 —, transit trade of, with Spanis h
Venice 6 , 22, 54, 87, 13 3 Netherlands 23 , 32-3, 108-3 1
—, and the Cretan War (1645-69) 133-4 , 148 Zierikzee 13 , 108 , 124 , 128
—, fine cloth industry of 147 , 150 Zúñiga, Balthasa r de (1561-1622) 4 , 164 ,
—,Jewsof 148,422-3,42 7 166-8, 187 , 195 , 202-3, 27 0
—, as trade entrepôt 139-43 , 147-9 , 208, 419 , Zutphen 103 , 110 , 113-1 4

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EMPIRES AN D ENTREPOT S

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THE HAMBLEDO N PRES S

102 Gloucester Avenue, London NW1 8HX (U.K.)

ISBN 1 85285 022 1

©Jonathan!. Israel 1990

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Israel, Jonathan I . (Jonathan Irvine )

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Israel, Jonathan Irvine.

Printed and bound in Bristol and Maesteg by WBC Ltd.

The articles reprinte d her e first appeared in the following places

1 Past and Present, 76 (1977), pp. 34-74. Worl d Copyright:

The article s an d essay s collecte d i n thi s volum e focu s o n th e conflic t

entrepots were largely if not exclusively based on the traffic in high-value

stretches o f the New Worl d an d the Philippines an d her European and

character, a n absolutenes s an d intensit y suc h a s no othe r Europea n o r

London, 2 September 198 9

"SINCE THE Y DERIV E AL L THEI R GAIN S FRO M TRAD E WIT H SPAI N AN D

THE HOLLAN D TOWN S AN D

we ca n se e n o wa y o f savin g it, fo r w e have n o mone y wit h which t o brin g ou t a field

Isabella communicate d Phili p IV' s readines s t o sig n a lon g truce , withou t an y

1. Algemee n Rijksarchie f Brussel s (hereafte r AR A Brussels ) SE O 200 , fo . 62, Philip IV to Isabella ,

13. Gedenkschriften va n jonkheer Alexander va n de r Capellen, 1621-1632 (2 vo!s. ; Utrecht , 1777 ) I ,

Only tw o Hollan d town s were resolved fro m th e firs t t o rejec t th e Spanis h ap -

For severa l years , especiall y sinc e th e victor y o f th e libera l opponent s o f th e

In Rotterdam itself , the Counter-Remonstrant predikanten received a stern warn-

35. Se e th e Consideratien ende redenen de r E. Heeren Bewind-hebbers vande Geoctrojeerde West-Indi-

47. ¡bidem, fos . 174-v .

52. Streekarchie f Krimpenerwaard , Schoonhoven , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 6 Dec. 1629 .

In addition, in a reference t o general economic considerations, which was rare in

58. Se e th e Resolutie B y d e Heeren Raeden ende Vroetschappen de r Stadt Haerlem, Ghenomen o p

62. AWG , Enkhuizen , Vroedschap s Resolutie , 1 7 Sept. an d 2 Dec . 1630 .

were mor e moderat e [tha n Zeeland , Frieslan d an d Groningen] , considerin g tha t i f

In orde r t o present a unite d front t o the delegate s o f the Southern Netherlands ,

79. G A Leiden , Secretari e Archie f 449 , fos . 4v-8 .

97. G A Rotterdam , Vroedschap s Resoluties , 1 0 Aug. 1633 .

101. Ja n de n Tex, Oldenbarnevelt ( 5 vols. ; Haarlem-Groningen , 1960-1972 ) II , 575 .

121. idem, 'De industriëel e concurrentie tussche n Noord - e n Zuid-Nederlandsche nijverheidscentr a

FREDERICK HENRY AND THE

FREDERICK HENR Y figure s indisputabl y a s a majo r Europea n

1. Poelhekke , op. cit. pp. 180 — i, 212—13 .

1. Joha n E . Elias , D e Vroedschap va n Amsterdam, ijjS—iyy; ( 2 vols . Haarlem ,

i. Carleto n to Conway, 8/1 8 Jan. 1626 , PRO SP 84/131, fo. f.

The campaig n vigorousl y pursue d b y Noordwijc k and Cat s t o

1. Quark s t o Dorchester, 5/1 5 Nov . 1629 , PRO S P 84/140, fb. i z i .

1. Res . Holl. 7, 13 , ii Dec . 1634 ; 1 4 Feb., 2 ; Apr . 1635 .

THE STATES GENERAL AND THE STRATEGIC REGULATION

7. Se e P. Voeten , 'Antwerps e hande l ove r Duinkerke n tijden s he t twaalfjari g bestand' , Bijdragen

From Neutral Lands From Enemy Lands

b) Imports: From Enemy Territory From Neutral Territory

This heft y ris e i n convo y an d licenc e charge s initiall y sprea d consternatio n

20. Va n Houile , 'L e tonlie u d e Lith' , 304 .

46. Ibidem, S G 3183 , fo . 390 , Res . 2 5 July 1624 .

53. Algemee n Rijksarchie f (ARA ) Brussels , SE G 193 , fö . 23 , Isabell a t o Philip , Brussels , l Ma y

69. Ibidem, fo . 64 , Res . 2 1 February 1626 .

serieuselick helpe n arbeyde n da t d e licente n o p d e neutrale lande n geslote n blyve n end e

Middelburg, whic h consistently strov e throug h 162 7 t o stiffe n th e resistanc e i n

zullen devoi r doe n da t dés e opening e va n licente n o p Neutrale n gee n voortgang h e n

84. Ibidem, Res . 2 4 Novembe r 1626 .

87. Notulen Zeeland, 1627 , 122 .

sonder da t di e va n Amsterda m t e bewege n waren tot he t sluyte n va n d e Havene n van

Nevertheless, on 26 March, Holland consente d i n the States General to deliberate